sentence_pairs.tsv

source_sentence	target_sentence	annotation
In the 35 years he has spent in this country, he has never returned to South Korea, nor has he become a U. S. citizen, living instead as a lawful permanent resident.	Petitioner Jae Lee moved to the United States from South Korea with his parents when he was 13.	Elaboration
During the plea process, Lee repeatedly asked his attorney whether he would face deportation; his attorney assured him that he would not be deported as a result of pleading guilty.	Lee retained counsel and entered into plea discussions with the Government.	Elaboration
When a defendant claims that his counsel's deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."	Lee has demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsel's erroneous advice.	Elaboration
Lee contends that he can make this showing because he never would have accepted a guilty plea had he known the result would be deportation.	When a defendant claims that his counsel's deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."	Elaboration
First, it forgets that categorical rules are ill suited to an inquiry that demands a "case-by-case examination" of the "totality of the evidence."	The Government makes two errors in urging the adoption of a per se rule that a defendant with no viable defense cannot show prejudice from the denial of his right to trial.	Elaboration
More fundamentally, it overlooks that the Hill v. Lockhart inquiry focuses on a defendant's decisionmaking, which may not turn solely on the likelihood of conviction after trial.	First, it forgets that categorical rules are ill suited to an inquiry that demands a "case-by-case examination" of the "totality of the evidence."	Elaboration
His attorney assured him there was nothing to worry about--the Government would not deport him if he pleaded guilty.	Although he has lived in this country for most of his life, Lee is not a United States citizen, and he feared that a criminal conviction might affect his status as a lawful permanent resident.	Shift-in-View
His parents settled the family in New York City, where they opened a small coffee shop.	Jae Lee moved to the United States from South Korea in 1982.	Elaboration
With some assistance from his family, Lee opened the Mandarin Palace Chinese Restaurant in a Memphis suburb.	After three years, Lee decided to try his hand at running a business.	Elaboration
The Mandarin was a success, and Lee eventually opened a second restaurant nearby.	With some assistance from his family, Lee opened the Mandarin Palace Chinese Restaurant in a Memphis suburb.	Elaboration
The attorney advised Lee that going to trial was "very risky" and that, if he pleaded guilty, he would receive a lighter sentence than he would if convicted at trial.	Lee retained an attorney and entered into plea discussions with the Government.	Elaboration
Based on that assurance, Lee accepted the plea and the District Court sentenced him to a year and a day in prison, though it deferred commencement of Lee's sentence for two months so that Lee could manage his restaurants over the holiday season.	The attorney told Lee that he would not be deported as a result of pleading guilty.	Elaboration
Upon learning that he would be deported after serving his sentence, Lee filed a motion under 28 U. S. C. §2255 to vacate his conviction and sentence, arguing that his attorney had provided constitutionally ineffective assistance.	Lee had pleaded guilty to what qualifies as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and a noncitizen convicted of such an offense is subject to mandatory deportation.	Elaboration
To establish that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance, the court explained, Lee was required to show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."	On appeal, the Government conceded that the performance of Lee's attorney had been deficient.	Elaboration
Lee had "no bona fide defense, not even a weak one," so he "stood to gain nothing from going to trial but more prison time."	To establish that he was prejudiced by that deficient performance, the court explained, Lee was required to show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."	Elaboration
We instead consider whether the defendant was prejudiced by the "denial of the entire judicial proceeding . . . to which he had a right."	That is because, while we ordinarily "apply a strong presumption of reliability to judicial proceedings," "we cannot accord" any such presumption "to judicial proceedings that never took place."	Elaboration
As we held in Hill v. Lockhart, when a defendant claims that his counsel's deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."	We instead consider whether the defendant was prejudiced by the "denial of the entire judicial proceeding . . . to which he had a right."	Elaboration
The dissent contends that a defendant must also show that he would have been better off going to trial.	As we held in Hill v. Lockhart, when a defendant claims that his counsel's deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."	Elaboration
The Court rejected the defendant's claim because he had "alleged no special circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed particular emphasis on his parole eligibility in deciding whether or not to plead guilty."	Rather than asking how a hypothetical trial would have played out absent the error, the Court considered whether there was an adequate showing that the defendant, properly advised, would have opted to go to trial.	Elaboration
Where a defendant has no plausible chance of an acquittal at trial, it is highly likely that he will accept a plea if the Government offers one.	It is instead because defendants obviously weigh their prospects at trial in deciding whether to accept a plea.	Elaboration
Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies.	"Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task," Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356, 371 (2010), and the strong societal interest in finality has "special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas."	Elaboration
Judges should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences.	Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies.	Elaboration
Only when Lee's counsel assured him that the judge's statement was a "standard warning" was Lee willing to proceed to plead guilty.	When the judge inquired "[h]ow does it affect your decision," Lee responded "I don't understand," and turned to his attorney for advice.	Elaboration
In contrast to these strong connections to the United States, there is no indication that he had any ties to South Korea; he had never returned there since leaving as a child.	At the time of his plea, Lee had lived in the United States for nearly three decades, had established two businesses in Tennessee, and was the only family member in the United States who could care for his elderly parents--both naturalized American citizens.	Elaboration
The Government argues, however, that under Padilla v. Kentucky, a defendant "must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances."	In contrast to these strong connections to the United States, there is no indication that he had any ties to South Korea; he had never returned there since leaving as a child.	No Relation
But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so.	Not everyone in Lee's position would make the choice to reject the plea.	Elaboration
Lee's claim that he would not have accepted a plea had he known it would lead to deportation is backed by substantial and uncontroverted evidence.	But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so.	No Relation
I would therefore affirm the Court of Appeals on the ground that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the allegedly ineffective assistance in this case.	As an initial matter, I remain of the view that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution does not "requir[e] counsel to provide accurate advice concerning the potential removal consequences of a guilty plea."	Elaboration
The Court in Strickland held that a defendant may establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by showing that his "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and, as relevant here, that the representation prejudiced the defendant by "actually ha[ving] an adverse effect on the defense."	The Court and both of the parties agree that the prejudice inquiry in this context is governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984).	Elaboration
Strickland made clear that the "result of the proceeding" refers to the outcome of the defendant's criminal prosecution as a whole.	To establish prejudice under Strickland, a defendant must show a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."	Elaboration
In analyzing the prejudice issue, the Court did not focus solely on whether the suppression hearing would have turned out differently, or whether the defendant would have chosen to go to trial.	In that case, the defendant argued that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he had failed to seek suppression of his confession before he pleaded no contest.	Elaboration
It focused as well on the weight of the evidence against the defendant and the fact that he likely would not have obtained a more favorable result at trial, regardless of whether he succeeded at the suppression hearing.	In analyzing the prejudice issue, the Court did not focus solely on whether the suppression hearing would have turned out differently, or whether the defendant would have chosen to go to trial.	Elaboration
In those circumstances, the Court has not held that the prejudice inquiry focuses on whether that stage of the proceeding would have ended differently.	Those stages include not only "the entry of a guilty plea," but also "arraignments, postindictment interrogation, [and] postindictment lineups."	Elaboration
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relies almost exclusively on the single line from Hill that "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."	The majority misapplies this Court's precedents when it concludes that a defendant may establish prejudice by showing only that "he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial," without showing that "the result of that trial would have been different than the result of the plea bargain."	Elaboration
For the reasons explained above, that sentence prescribes the threshold showing a defendant must make to establish Strickland prejudice where a defendant has accepted a guilty plea.	In reaching this conclusion, the Court relies almost exclusively on the single line from Hill that "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."	Elaboration
The Court did not, however, further hold that a defendant can establish prejudice by making that showing alone.	In Hill, the Court concluded that the defendant had not made that showing, so it rejected his claim.	Elaboration
The Court observed that the lawyer's failure to file the notice of appeal "arguably led not to a judicial proceeding of disputed reliability," but instead to "the forfeiture of a proceeding itself."	There, the Court considered a defendant's claim that his attorney failed to file a notice of appeal.	Elaboration
And because the presumption of reliability does not apply, we may not depend on Strickland's statement "that '[a] defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker.' "	Because that trial " 'never took place,' " the Court reasons, we cannot " 'apply a strong presumption of reliability' " to it.	Elaboration
The majority's analysis, however, is directly contrary to Hill, which instructed a court undertaking a prejudice analysis to apply a presumption of reliability to the hypothetical trial that would have occurred had the defendant not pleaded guilty.	This point is key to the majority's conclusion that petitioner would have chosen to gamble on a trial even though he had no viable defense.	Elaboration
The majority responds that Hill made statements about presuming a reliable trial only in "discussing how courts should analyze 'predictions of the outcome at a possible trial,' " which "will not always be 'necessary.' "	In other words, Hill instructs that the prejudice inquiry must presume that the foregone trial would have been reliable.	Elaboration
Applying the ordinary Strickland standard in this case, I do not think a defendant in petitioner's circumstances could show a reasonable probability that the result of his criminal proceeding would have been different had he not pleaded guilty.	In my view, we should take the Court's precedents at their word and conclude that "[a]n error by counsel . . . does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment."	Elaboration
An Alabama jury found Madison guilty of capital murder.	More than 30 years ago, Vernon Madison crept up behind police officer Julius Schulte and shot him twice in the head at close range.	Elaboration
The court concluded that Madison had failed to make that showing.	It held that, under this Court's decisions in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399 (1986), and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U. S. 930 (2007), Madison was entitled to relief if he could show that he "suffers from a mental illness which deprives [him] of the mental capacity to rationally understand that he is being executed as a punishment for a crime."	Elaboration
In 2017, the 21 individuals who have been executed were on death row on average for more than 19 years.	In 2007, the average delay rose to a little less than 13 years.	Elaboration
Alabama has executed three individuals this year, including Thomas Arthur, who spent 34 years on death row before his execution on May 26, 2017, at the age of 75; Robert Melson, who spent 21 years on death row before his execution on June 8, 2017; and Torrey McNabb, who spent nearly two decades on death row before his execution on October 19, 2017.	In 2017, the 21 individuals who have been executed were on death row on average for more than 19 years.	Elaboration
The court's appointed psychologist, Dr. Karl Kirkland, reported that, although Madison may have "suffered a significant decline post-stroke, . . . [he] understands the exact posture of his case at this point," and appears to have a "rational understanding of . . . the results or effects" of his death sentence.	The court held a hearing to receive testimony from two psychologists who had examined Madison and prepared reports concerning his competence.	Elaboration
We express no view on the merits of the underlying question outside of the AEDPA context.	Under that deferential standard, Madison's claim to federal habeas relief must fail.	No Relation
The issue whether a State may administer the death penalty to a person whose disability leaves him without memory of his commission of a capital offense is a substantial question not yet addressed by the Court.	Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor join, concurring.	No Relation
Alabama has executed three individuals this year, including Thomas Arthur, who spent 34 years on death row before his execution on May 26, 2017, at the age of 75; Robert Melson, who spent 21 years on death row before his execution on June 8, 2017; and Torrey McNabb, who spent nearly two decades on death row before his execution on October 19, 2017.	In 2017, the 21 individuals who have been executed were on death row on average for more than 19 years.	Elaboration
The Eleventh Circuit's decision, as we read it, was based solely on its conclusion, rooted in the state court's factfinding, that Tharpe had failed to show prejudice in connection with his procedurally defaulted claim, i.e., that Tharpe had "failed to demonstrate that Barney Gattie's behavior 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' "	The Eleventh Circuit denied his COA application after deciding that jurists of reason could not dispute that the District Court's procedural ruling was correct.	Elaboration
Our review of the record compels a different conclusion.	The Eleventh Circuit's decision, as we read it, was based solely on its conclusion, rooted in the state court's factfinding, that Tharpe had failed to show prejudice in connection with his procedurally defaulted claim, i.e., that Tharpe had "failed to demonstrate that Barney Gattie's behavior 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' "	Shift-in-View
The question of prejudice--the ground on which the Eleventh Circuit chose to dispose of Tharpe's application--is not the only question relevant to the broader inquiry whether Tharpe should receive a COA.	The Eleventh Circuit erred when it concluded otherwise.	Elaboration
We therefore grant Tharpe's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for further consideration of the question whether Tharpe is entitled to a COA.	But on the unusual facts of this case, the Court of Appeals' review should not have rested on the ground that it was indisputable among reasonable jurists that Gattie's service on the jury did not prejudice Tharpe.	Elaboration
If bad facts make bad law, then "unusual facts" inspire unusual decisions.	Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito and Justice Gorsuch join, dissenting.	No Relation
The only possible explanation is its concern with the "unusual facts" of this case, specifically a juror affidavit that expresses racist opinions about blacks.	One might wonder why the Court engages in this pointless exercise.	No Relation
The opinions in the affidavit are certainly odious.	The only possible explanation is its concern with the "unusual facts" of this case, specifically a juror affidavit that expresses racist opinions about blacks.	Elaboration
But because Freeman and her family were "good black folks," the affidavit continued, Gattie thought Tharpe "should get the electric chair for what he did."	Tharpe "wasn't in the 'good' black folks category," according to the affidavit, and if Freeman had been "the type Tharpe is, then picking between life and death for Tharpe wouldn't have mattered so much."	Elaboration
And Tharpe failed to establish prejudice because the state court credited Gattie's testimony that he had not relied on race when voting to sentence Tharpe.	Tharpe's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel was insufficient to establish cause because he had "failed to establish the requisite deficiency or prejudice."	Elaboration
The Eleventh Circuit denied a COA.	The District Court deferred to that credibility determination, and nothing in Pena-Rodriguez undermined that determination.	No Relation
Courts do not have discretion to overlook such an error, at least where it is called to their attention.	Petitioner in this case did not file a defective notice of appeal from the amended judgment imposing restitution, but rather failed altogether to file a notice of appeal from the amended judgment.	Elaboration
There, an evidence technician tested the pills and got the same negative result, but claimed in his report that one of the pills tested "positive for the probable presence of ecstasy."	Still, they arrested Manuel and took him to the police station.	No Relation
An arresting officer also reported that, based on his "training and experience," he "knew the pills to be ecstasy."	There, an evidence technician tested the pills and got the same negative result, but claimed in his report that one of the pills tested "positive for the probable presence of ecstasy."	Elaboration
This conclusion follows from the Court's settled precedent.	Manuel may challenge his pretrial detention on Fourth Amendment grounds.	No Relation
And those constitutional protections apply even after the start of "legal process" in a criminal case--here, that is, after the judge's determination of probable cause.	Our answer follows from settled precedent.	No Relation
Legal process has gone forward, but it has done nothing to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's probable-cause requirement.	Then, too, a person is confined without constitutionally adequate justification.	No Relation
The rest of Manuel's question did indeed express a view as to what would follow from an affirmative answer ("so as to allow a malicious prosecution claim").	That is exactly the issue we have resolved.	No Relation
The Internal Revenue Code provision at issue, §7212(a), has two substantive clauses.	Rather, the clause as a whole refers to specific interference with targeted governmental tax-related proceedings, such as a particular investigation or audit.	No Relation
The first clause, which we shall call the "Officer Clause," forbids	The Internal Revenue Code provision at issue, §7212(a), has two substantive clauses.	Elaboration
The second clause, which we shall call the "Omnibus Clause," forbids	"corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) endeavor[ing] to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under [the Internal Revenue Code]."	No Relation
It held that a defendant need not possess " 'an awareness of a particular [IRS] action or investigation.' "	Brief for Appellant in No. 15-2224, pp. 23-25.	No Relation
But we do not see how.	The Government argues that the need to show the defendant's obstructive conduct was done "corruptly" will cure any overbreadth problem.	Elaboration
The Government asserts that "corruptly" means acting with "the specific intent to obtain an unlawful advantage" for the defendant or another.	But we do not see how.	No Relation
True, the Government used the Omnibus Clause only sparingly during the first few decades after its enactment.	Neither can we rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the statute's scope.	No Relation
That nexus requires a "relationship in time, causation, or logic with the [administrative] proceeding."	We conclude that, to secure a conviction under the Omnibus Clause, the Government must show (among other things) that there is a "nexus" between the defendant's conduct and a particular administrative proceeding, such as an investigation, an audit, or other targeted administrative action.	Elaboration
This Court has repeatedly declined to depart from the plain meaning of the text simply because the same conduct would be criminalized under two or more provisions.	For better or worse, redundancy abounds in both the criminal law and the Tax Code.	No Relation
When defense counsel requested a continuance at the sentencing hearing, he repeatedly told the court that he needed "to have someone else review" the Goff report and medical records.	The record does not support this contention.	No Relation
We need not, and do not, decide, however, whether this particular McWilliams claim is correct.	He points to language in Ake that seems to foresee that consequence.	No Relation
It is not necessary, however, for us to decide whether the Constitution requires States to satisfy Ake's demands in this way.	This appears to be the approach that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have adopted.	Elaboration
Other language in Ake, however, points at least as strongly in the opposite direction.	While it is possible for a neutral expert to provide these services, in our adversary system they are customarily performed by an expert working exclusively for one of the parties.	No Relation
Bobby James Moore fatally shot a store clerk during a botched robbery.	Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.	No Relation
Those strengths, the court reasoned, undercut the significance of Moore's adaptive limitations.	Moore had demonstrated adaptive strengths, the CCA spelled out, by living on the streets, playing pool and mowing lawns for money, committing the crime in a sophisticated way and then fleeing, testifying and representing himself at trial, and developing skills in prison.	Elaboration
But Dr. Kristi Compton, the state expert who had administered that test, explained that it was not an accurate measure of Moore's abilities.	Moore had taken a standardized test of adaptive functioning in which he scored more than two standard deviations below the mean.	Elaboration
For example, the Court faults the CCA for placing too much weight on Moore's adaptive strengths and functioning in prison, implying that this marked a dismissal of clinical standards.	"Disregard" normally means to dismiss as unworthy of attention, and that is plainly not what the CCA did here.	Elaboration
Justice Hood dissented in both cases.	As no other statute addresses refunds, the court concluded that the Exoneration Act is the "exclusive process for exonerated defendants seeking a refund of costs, fees, and restitution."	No Relation
Because neither petitioner has been validly convicted, he explained, each must be presumed innocent.	Justice Hood dissented in both cases.	Elaboration
That scheme, we hold, does not comport with due process.	Under Colorado's legislation, as just recounted, a defendant must prove her innocence by clear and convincing evidence to obtain the refund of costs, fees, and restitution paid pursuant to an invalid conviction.	No Relation
In that event, the defendant pays no costs, fees, or restitution.	Suppose a trial judge grants a motion to set aside a guilty verdict for want of sufficient evidence.	Elaboration