sentiment_results.tsv

source_sentence	target_sentence	annotation
The Government makes two errors in urging the adoption of a per se rule that a defendant with no viable defense cannot show prejudice from the denial of his right to trial.	The Government contends that Lee cannot show prejudice from accepting a plea where his only hope at trial was that something unexpected and unpredictable might occur that would lead to acquittal.	Shift-in-View
Unlike the Government, this Court cannot say that it would be irrational for someone in Lee's position to risk additional prison time in exchange for holding on to some chance of avoiding deportation.	The Government argues that Lee cannot "convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances," Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356, 372, since deportation would almost certainly result from a trial.	Shift-in-View
His attorney assured him there was nothing to worry about--the Government would not deport him if he pleaded guilty.	Although he has lived in this country for most of his life, Lee is not a United States citizen, and he feared that a criminal conviction might affect his status as a lawful permanent resident.	Shift-in-View
The attorney told Lee that he would not be deported as a result of pleading guilty.	Lee informed his attorney of his noncitizen status and repeatedly asked him whether he would face deportation as a result of the criminal proceedings.	Shift-in-View
As we held in Hill v. Lockhart, when a defendant claims that his counsel's deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."	We instead consider whether the defendant was prejudiced by the "denial of the entire judicial proceeding . . . to which he had a right."	Shift-in-View
He says he accordingly would have rejected any plea leading to deportation--even if it shaved off prison time--in favor of throwing a "Hail Mary" at trial.	Here Lee alleges that avoiding deportation was the determinative factor for him; deportation after some time in prison was not meaningfully different from deportation after somewhat less time.	Shift-in-View
When the judge inquired "[h]ow does it affect your decision," Lee responded "I don't understand," and turned to his attorney for advice.	Lee demonstrated as much at his plea colloquy: When the judge warned him that a conviction "could result in your being deported," and asked "[d]oes that at all affect your decision about whether you want to plead guilty or not," Lee answered "Yes, Your Honor."	Shift-in-View
We cannot agree that it would be irrational for a defendant in Lee's position to reject the plea offer in favor of trial.	The Government contends that Lee cannot make that showing because he was going to be deported either way; going to trial would only result in a longer sentence before that inevitable consequence.	Shift-in-View
As an initial matter, I remain of the view that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution does not "requir[e] counsel to provide accurate advice concerning the potential removal consequences of a guilty plea."	Neither the Sixth Amendment nor this Court's precedents support that conclusion.	Shift-in-View
I would therefore affirm the Court of Appeals on the ground that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the allegedly ineffective assistance in this case.	As an initial matter, I remain of the view that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution does not "requir[e] counsel to provide accurate advice concerning the potential removal consequences of a guilty plea."	Shift-in-View
The Court and both of the parties agree that the prejudice inquiry in this context is governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984).	Because the Court today announces a novel standard for prejudice at the plea stage, I further dissent on the separate ground that its standard does not follow from our precedents.	Shift-in-View
In sum, the proper inquiry requires a defendant to show both that he would have rejected his plea and gone to trial and that he would likely have obtained a more favorable result in the end.	Thus, a defendant cannot show prejudice where it is " 'inconceivable' " not only that he would have gone to trial, but also " 'that if he had done so he either would have been acquitted or, if convicted, would nevertheless have been given a shorter sentence than he actually received.' "	Shift-in-View
It focused as well on the weight of the evidence against the defendant and the fact that he likely would not have obtained a more favorable result at trial, regardless of whether he succeeded at the suppression hearing.	In analyzing the prejudice issue, the Court did not focus solely on whether the suppression hearing would have turned out differently, or whether the defendant would have chosen to go to trial.	Shift-in-View
It instead has made clear that the prejudice inquiry is the same as in Strickland, which requires a defendant to establish that he would have been better off in the end had his counsel not erred.	In those circumstances, the Court has not held that the prejudice inquiry focuses on whether that stage of the proceeding would have ended differently.	Shift-in-View
Guilty pleas "rarely" give rise to the "concern that unfair procedures may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant."	In any event, the Court in Hill recognized that guilty pleas are themselves generally reliable.	Shift-in-View
The Court has warned that "the prospect of collateral challenges" threatens to undermine these important values.	This Court has shown special solicitude for the plea process, which brings "stability" and "certainty" to "the criminal justice system."	Shift-in-View
Dr. John Goff, a psychologist hired by Madison's counsel, reported that Madison's strokes have rendered him unable to remember "numerous events that have occurred over the past thirty years or more."	Asked at the hearing whether Madison understands that Alabama is seeking retribution against him for his criminal act, Dr. Kirkland answered, "Certainly."	Shift-in-View
Dr. John Goff, a psychologist hired by Madison's counsel, reported that Madison's strokes have rendered him unable to remember "numerous events that have occurred over the past thirty years or more."	Asked at the hearing whether Madison understands that Alabama is seeking retribution against him for his criminal act, Dr. Kirkland answered, "Certainly."	Shift-in-View
The District Court also noted that Tharpe could not overcome that procedural default because he had failed to produce any clear and convincing evidence contradicting the state court's determination that Gattie's presence on the jury did not prejudice him.	The District Court denied the motion on the ground that, among other things, Tharpe's claim was procedurally defaulted in state court.	Shift-in-View
But because Freeman and her family were "good black folks," the affidavit continued, Gattie thought Tharpe "should get the electric chair for what he did."	Tharpe "wasn't in the 'good' black folks category," according to the affidavit, and if Freeman had been "the type Tharpe is, then picking between life and death for Tharpe wouldn't have mattered so much."	Shift-in-View
The Court is not willing to say that Tharpe can satisfy this standard.	To obtain a COA, Tharpe must show "that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right" and "that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling."	Shift-in-View
It does not read the decision as reaching cause, and it declines to consider that or any other alternative reason to affirm the Eleventh Circuit.	First, it "read[s]" the decision below as resting "solely" on Tharpe's "fail[ure] to show prejudice" to overcome his procedural default.	Shift-in-View
But the Court does not explain why it nonetheless limits itself to the question of prejudice.	The Court acknowledges that our review "is certainly not limited to grounds expressly addressed by the court whose decision is under review."	Shift-in-View
The only cause that Tharpe raised in state court was ineffective assistance of counsel.	Second, no reasonable jurist could argue that Tharpe demonstrated cause for his procedural default.	Shift-in-View
In his reply brief in support of certiorari in this Court, Tharpe argues that he did not have to raise his claim of juror bias on direct appeal.	Nor could a reasonable jurist debate the cause argument that Tharpe raises here.	Shift-in-View
Even if Tharpe could show that Pena-Rodriguez is retroactive under Teague and could overcome his procedural default, no reasonable jurist could argue that he has stated a valid juror-bias claim on the merits.	He has already received the benefit of the rule announced in Pena-Rodriguez.	Shift-in-View
If he fails to do so and the Government objects, he may not challenge the restitution order on appeal.	Held: A defendant wishing to appeal an order imposing restitution in a deferred restitution case must file a notice of appeal from that order.	Shift-in-View
Instead, the Court recognized, "strong arguments" supported the proposition that both the initial judgment and the restitution order were each immediately appealable final judgments.	The Dolan Court did not decide the question presented here, but the Court was not persuaded by the argument that "a sentencing judgment is not 'final' until it contains a definitive determination of the amount of restitution."	Shift-in-View
We hold that it is not, at least where, as here, the Government objects to the defendant's failure to file a notice of appeal following the amended judgment.	We must decide whether a single notice of appeal, filed between the initial judgment and the amended judgment, is sufficient to invoke appellate review of the later-determined restitution amount.	Shift-in-View
Notwithstanding his failure to file a second notice of appeal, petitioner challenged the restitution amount before the Eleventh Circuit, arguing in his brief that the Government had not shown he was the proximate cause of the victim's injuries and that the restitution amount bore no rational relationship to the damages she claimed.	Petitioner did not file a second notice of appeal from the court's order imposing restitution or from the amended judgment.	Shift-in-View
The Government countered that petitioner had forfeited his right to challenge the restitution amount by failing to file a second notice of appeal.	Notwithstanding his failure to file a second notice of appeal, petitioner challenged the restitution amount before the Eleventh Circuit, arguing in his brief that the Government had not shown he was the proximate cause of the victim's injuries and that the restitution amount bore no rational relationship to the damages she claimed.	Shift-in-View
Although we did not decide "whether or when a party can, or must, appeal"--the question presented here--we were not persuaded by the argument that "a sentencing judgment is not 'final' until it contains a definitive determination of the amount of restitution."	The petitioner in that case argued that the amended judgment imposing restitution is the only final, appealable judgment in a deferred restitution case.	Shift-in-View
To the contrary, we recognized "strong arguments" supporting the proposition that both the "initial judgment [that] imposed a sentence of imprisonment and supervised release" and the subsequent " 'sentence that impose[d] an order of restitution' " were each immediately appealable final judgments.	Although we did not decide "whether or when a party can, or must, appeal"--the question presented here--we were not persuaded by the argument that "a sentencing judgment is not 'final' until it contains a definitive determination of the amount of restitution."	Shift-in-View
But the court relied on another basis in rejecting Manuel's challenge to his subsequent detention (which stretched from March 18 to May 5, 2011).	The court first held that the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred Manuel's claim for unlawful arrest, because more than two years had elapsed between the date of his arrest (March 18, 2011) and the filing of his complaint (April 22, 2013).	Shift-in-View