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QUESTION IX
Nullum enim singulare definitur, ut patet per philosophum. Sed persona significat singulare in genere substantiae, ut dictum est. Ergo non potest definiri. 1. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii) no singular thing can be defined. Now a person is an individual in the genus of substance as already stated. Therefore it cannot be defined. - Sed dicendum, quod licet id quod est persona sit quoddam singulare, tamen ratio personae communis est, et pro tanto persona in communi definiri potest. &8212;Sed contra, id quod est commune omnibus substantiis individuis rationalis naturae, est intentio singularitatis, quae quidem non est in genere substantiae. Ergo non debet in definitione personae poni substantia quasi genus. - 2. To this it will be replied that although that which is a person is singular, the idea of a person is something common, and this suffices to make it possible to define it. &8212;On the contrary, that which is common to all individual substances of rational nature, is the ‘intention’ of singularity, which is not in the genus of substance. Therefore in the definition of person we should not give substance the place of the genus. + Sed dicendum, quod licet id quod est persona sit quoddam singulare, tamen ratio personae communis est, et pro tanto persona in communi definiri potest. —Sed contra, id quod est commune omnibus substantiis individuis rationalis naturae, est intentio singularitatis, quae quidem non est in genere substantiae. Ergo non debet in definitione personae poni substantia quasi genus. + 2. To this it will be replied that although that which is a person is singular, the idea of a person is something common, and this suffices to make it possible to define it. —On the contrary, that which is common to all individual substances of rational nature, is the ‘intention’ of singularity, which is not in the genus of substance. Therefore in the definition of person we should not give substance the place of the genus. - Sed dicendum, quod hoc nomen persona non significat tantum intentionem, sed intentionem simul cum subiecto intentionis. &8212;Sed contra est quod philosophus probat, quod compositum ex subiecto et ex accidente, non potest definiri, &8212;sequeretur enim nugatio in definitione&8212; cum enim in definitione accidentis ponatur subiectum, sicut nasus in definitione simi, oportebit quod in definitione compositi ex subiecto et accidente, ponatur bis subiectum: semel pro se, et semel pro accidente. Si ergo persona significat intentionem et subiectum, inconveniens est quod definiatur. - 3. But it will be replied that this word person does not denote a mere intention, but an intention together with its subject. &8212;On the contrary, the Philosopher (Metaph. vii) proves that a compound of subject and accident cannot be defined: because such a definition would be nugatory. For seeing that the definition of an accident includes the subject, e.g. nose in the definition of simous, it will be necessary in defining a compound of subject and accident to express the subject twice; once for itself and once for the accident. If, then, person signifies the intention together with the subject it will be futile to define it. + Sed dicendum, quod hoc nomen persona non significat tantum intentionem, sed intentionem simul cum subiecto intentionis. —Sed contra est quod philosophus probat, quod compositum ex subiecto et ex accidente, non potest definiri, —sequeretur enim nugatio in definitione— cum enim in definitione accidentis ponatur subiectum, sicut nasus in definitione simi, oportebit quod in definitione compositi ex subiecto et accidente, ponatur bis subiectum: semel pro se, et semel pro accidente. Si ergo persona significat intentionem et subiectum, inconveniens est quod definiatur. + 3. But it will be replied that this word person does not denote a mere intention, but an intention together with its subject. —On the contrary, the Philosopher (Metaph. vii) proves that a compound of subject and accident cannot be defined: because such a definition would be nugatory. For seeing that the definition of an accident includes the subject, e.g. nose in the definition of simous, it will be necessary in defining a compound of subject and accident to express the subject twice; once for itself and once for the accident. If, then, person signifies the intention together with the subject it will be futile to define it. Praeterea, subiectum huius intentionis communis est aliquod singulare. Si ergo persona significat simul intentionem et subiectum intentionis, adhuc sequeretur quod, definita persona, definiatur singulare; quod est inconveniens. 4. The subject of this common intention is an individual. If then person denotes the intention together with its subject, it will still follow that in defining person the individual will be defined, which cannot be done. @@ -204,10 +204,10 @@

QUESTION IX
Ad undecimum dicendum quod natura in definitione personae non accipitur prout est principium motus, sicut definitur a philosopho, sed sicut definitur a Boetio: quod natura est unumquodque informans specifica differentia. Et quia differentia complet definitionem et determinat definitum ad speciem, ideo nomen naturae magis competit in definitione personae —quae specialiter in quibusdam substantiis invenitur— quam nomen essentiae, quod est communissimum. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In the definition of person nature is not to be taken according as it is the principle of movement, in which sense it is defined by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, i) but as defined by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) according as it is the specific difference giving each thing its form. And since the difference completes the definition and confines the thing defined to its species, it follows that the term nature is more suitable in the definition of person which is special to certain substances, than the term essence which is most common. - Ad duodecimum dicendum quod individuum, in definitione personae, sumitur pro eo quod non praedicatur de pluribus; et secundum hoc essentia divina non est individua substantia secundum praedicationem &8212;cum praedicetur de pluribus personis&8212; licet sit individua secundum rem. Richardus tamen de sancto Victore, corrigens definitionem Boetii, secundum quod persona in divinis accipitur, dixit: quod persona est divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia, ut per hoc quod dicitur incommunicabilis, essentia divina, persona non esse, ostenderetur. + Ad duodecimum dicendum quod individuum, in definitione personae, sumitur pro eo quod non praedicatur de pluribus; et secundum hoc essentia divina non est individua substantia secundum praedicationem —cum praedicetur de pluribus personis— licet sit individua secundum rem. Richardus tamen de sancto Victore, corrigens definitionem Boetii, secundum quod persona in divinis accipitur, dixit: quod persona est divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia, ut per hoc quod dicitur incommunicabilis, essentia divina, persona non esse, ostenderetur. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In the definition of person individual signifies that which is not predicated of several; and in this sense the divine essence is not an individual substance by predication, inasmuch as it is predicated of several persons, although it is individual in itself. However, Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. iv, 18, 23) amends the definition of Boethius as applied to the divine Persons; and says that a person is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature, so as to indicate by the term incommunicable that the divine essence is not a Person. - Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod cum substantia individua sit quoddam completum per se existens, humana natura in Christo, cum sit assumpta in personam divinam, non potest dici substantia individua &8212;quae est hypostasis&8212; sicut nec manus nec pes nec aliquid eorum quae non subsistunt per se ab aliis separata; et propter hoc non sequitur quod sit persona. + Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod cum substantia individua sit quoddam completum per se existens, humana natura in Christo, cum sit assumpta in personam divinam, non potest dici substantia individua —quae est hypostasis— sicut nec manus nec pes nec aliquid eorum quae non subsistunt per se ab aliis separata; et propter hoc non sequitur quod sit persona. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Seeing that an individual substance is something complete existing by itself, human nature in Christ, inasmuch as it was assumed into the divine Person, cannot be called an individual substance such as is a hypostasis, any more than a hand, a foot or anything that does not subsist by itself apart from anything else: and for this reason it does not follow that it is a person. Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod anima separata est pars rationalis naturae, scilicet humanae, et non tota natura rationalis humana, et ideo non est persona. @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@

QUESTION IX
Respondeo. Dicendum quod persona, sicut dictum est, significat quamdam naturam cum quodam modo existendi. Natura autem, quam persona in sua significatione includit, est omnium naturarum dignissima, scilicet natura intellectualis secundum genus suum. Similiter etiam modus existendi quem importat persona est dignissimus, ut scilicet aliquid sit per se existens. Cum ergo omne quod est dignissimum in creaturis, Deo sit attribuendum, convenienter nomen personae Deo attribui potest, sicut et alia nomina quae proprie dicuntur de Deo. I answer that, as stated above, person denotes a certain nature with a certain mode of existence. Now the nature which person includes in its definition is of all natures the most exalted, to wit that nature which is intellectual in regard to its genus. Likewise the mode of existence signified by the word person is most exalted, namely that a thing exists by itself. Since then whatsoever is most excellent in creatures should be attributed to God, it is becoming that the word person should be attributed to God, even as other terms which are said of God properly. - Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nomine aliquo est duo considerare: scilicet, illud ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, et illud a quo imponitur ad significandum. Frequenter enim imponitur nomen aliquod ad significandum rem aliquam, ab aliquo accidente aut actu aut effectu illius rei; quae tamen non sunt principaliter significata per illud nomen, sed potius ipsa rei substantia, vel natura sicut hoc nomen lapis sumitur a laesione pedis, quam tamen non significat, sed potius corpus quoddam in quo tale accidens frequenter invenitur. Unde laesio pedis magis pertinet ad etymologiam huius nominis lapis, quam ad eius significationem. Quando ergo illud ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, Deo non competit &8212;sed aliqua proprietas eius secundum similitudinem quamdam&8212; tunc illud nomen de Deo metaphorice dicitur: sicut Deus nominatur leo, non quia natura illius animalis Deo conveniat, sed propter fortitudinem quae in leone invenitur. Quando vero res significata per nomen Deo convenit, tunc illud nomen proprie de Deo dicitur, sicut bonum, sapiens et huiusmodi; licet etiam quandoque illud a quo tale nomen imponitur, non conveniat Deo. Sic ergo licet personare ad modum larvati hominis a quo impositum fuit nomen personae, Deo non conveniat, tamen illud quod significatur per nomen, scilicet subsistens in natura intellectuali, competit Deo; et propter hoc nomen personae proprie sumitur in divinis. + Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nomine aliquo est duo considerare: scilicet, illud ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, et illud a quo imponitur ad significandum. Frequenter enim imponitur nomen aliquod ad significandum rem aliquam, ab aliquo accidente aut actu aut effectu illius rei; quae tamen non sunt principaliter significata per illud nomen, sed potius ipsa rei substantia, vel natura sicut hoc nomen lapis sumitur a laesione pedis, quam tamen non significat, sed potius corpus quoddam in quo tale accidens frequenter invenitur. Unde laesio pedis magis pertinet ad etymologiam huius nominis lapis, quam ad eius significationem. Quando ergo illud ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, Deo non competit —sed aliqua proprietas eius secundum similitudinem quamdam— tunc illud nomen de Deo metaphorice dicitur: sicut Deus nominatur leo, non quia natura illius animalis Deo conveniat, sed propter fortitudinem quae in leone invenitur. Quando vero res significata per nomen Deo convenit, tunc illud nomen proprie de Deo dicitur, sicut bonum, sapiens et huiusmodi; licet etiam quandoque illud a quo tale nomen imponitur, non conveniat Deo. Sic ergo licet personare ad modum larvati hominis a quo impositum fuit nomen personae, Deo non conveniat, tamen illud quod significatur per nomen, scilicet subsistens in natura intellectuali, competit Deo; et propter hoc nomen personae proprie sumitur in divinis. Reply to the First Objection. Two things must be considered in a name: that which it is intended to signify, and that from which it is taken for the purpose of signification. For a name is often given to signify a certain thing, but is taken from an accident or an action or an effect of that thing, and yet these are not the chief signification of the name which denotes rather the very substance or nature of the thing. Thus the word lapis (stone) is taken from laesio pedis (hurting the foot), yet it does not signify this, but rather a body wherein such an accident is frequently found: so that laesio pedis belongs to the etymology of the word lapis rather than to its meaning. Accordingly when it is not the intended signification of a term that is appropriate to God, but some property by way of likeness, then such a term is applied to God metaphorically. Thus God is called a lion, not that the lion’s nature is to be attributed to God, but on account of the lion’s strength. When, however, that which the term signifies is appropriate to God, it is applied to God in its proper sense, for instance, good, wise and the like, although sometimes the source from which such terms are taken is not applicable to God. Thus although to personate as a masked man, whence comes the term person, is not to be attributed to God, yet that which the word signifies, namely that which subsists in an intellectual nature is appropriate to God: and for this reason the term person is ascribed to God in its proper sense. Ad secundum dicendum quod tam nomen personae quam definitio de persona data, si recte intelligatur, convenit Deo: non tamen ita quod sit definitio eius, quia plus est in Deo quam significetur per nomen. Unde id quod Dei est, per rationem nominis non definitur. @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@

QUESTION IX
Ad quintum dicendum quod rebus materialibus, in quibus formae non sunt per se subsistentes, sed materiae inhaerentes, oportet quod principium individuationis sit ex materia: formae vero immateriales, cum sint per se subsistentes, ex seipsis individuantur; ex hoc enim quod aliquid est subsistens, habet quod de pluribus praedicari non potest: et ideo nihil prohibet in rebus immaterialibus substantiam individuam et personam inveniri. Reply to the Fifth Objection. In material things whose forms are not self-subsistent but adherent to matter the principle of individuation must needs come from matter: whereas immaterial forms, being self-subsistent, are individualized by themselves, because from the very fact that a thing is self-subsistent, it cannot be predicated of several. Consequently there is no reason why there should not be an individual substance and a person in immaterial things. - Ad sextum dicendum quod, licet in Deo non sit compositio, ut in eo aliquid sub alio intelligi possit, tamen secundum intellectum nostrum, seorsum accipimus esse eius et substantiam ipsius sub esse eius existentem, ut huic subsistens dicatur. Vel dicendum, quod licet subesse &8212;a quo imponitur vocabulum subsistendi&8212; Deo non conveniat, tamen per se esse &8212;ad quod significandum imponitur&8212; competit ei. + Ad sextum dicendum quod, licet in Deo non sit compositio, ut in eo aliquid sub alio intelligi possit, tamen secundum intellectum nostrum, seorsum accipimus esse eius et substantiam ipsius sub esse eius existentem, ut huic subsistens dicatur. Vel dicendum, quod licet subesse —a quo imponitur vocabulum subsistendi— Deo non conveniat, tamen per se esse —ad quod significandum imponitur— competit ei. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Although there is no composition in God by reason whereof we might be able to understand subjection of one thing to another in him, nevertheless by an act of the mind we consider his being apart from his substance as subject to his being, and from this point of view call it subsistence. Ad septimum dicendum quod, licet in Deo non sint accidentia, sunt tamen in eo proprietates personales, quibus hypostases substant. @@ -367,7 +367,7 @@

QUESTION IX
Et ideo ad evidentiam huius quaestionis sciendum, quod propria ratio nominis est quam significat nomen, secundum philosophum. Id autem cui attribuitur nomen, si sit recte sumptum sub re significata per nomen, sicut determinatum sub indeterminato, dicitur supponi per nomen; si autem non sit recte sumptum sub re nominis, dicitur copulari per nomen; sicut hoc nomen animal significat substantiam animatam sensibilem, et album significat colorem disgregativum visus: homo vero recte sumitur sub ratione animalis, sicut determinatum sub indeterminato. Est enim homo substantia animata sensibilis tali anima, scilicet rationali; sub albo vero, quod est extra essentiam eius, non directe sumitur. Unde homo supponitur nomine animalis, copulatur vero nomine albi. Et quia inferius quod supponitur per nomen commune, se habet ad commune sicut determinatum ad indeterminatum: id quod erat suppositum, fit significatum, determinatione apposita ad commune: animal enim rationale significat hominem. Sed sciendum, quod aliquid significat dupliciter: uno modo formaliter, et alio modo materialiter. Formaliter quidem significatur per nomen ad id quod significandum nomen est principaliter impositum, quod est ratio nominis; sicut hoc nomen homo significat aliquid compositum ex corpore et anima rationali. Materialiter vero significatur per nomen, illud in quo talis ratio salvatur; sicut hoc nomen homo significat aliquid habens cor et cerebrum et huiusmodi partes, sine quibus non potest esse corpus animatum anima rationali. Accordingly to elucidate the matter it must be noted that, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the proper definition of a term is its signification. Now when a term is predicated of a thing which is directly included in the signification of that term as the determinate in the indeterminate, that thing is said to be classed under that term: but if it is not directly included in the term’s signification it is said to be coupled with it. Thus animal signifies a sensible animate substance, and white signifies a colour that dilates the sight: while man is included directly in the idea of animal as the determinate in the indeterminate; for man is a sensible animate substance, having a rational soul: and is included under white, not directly, however, since white is outside his essence. Hence man is classed under the term animal, but is coupled with the term white. And since that which comes under a common denomination is related to the common name as the determinate to the indeterminate, that which was included becomes the thing signified by the addition of a determining word to the common term: thus a rational animal is a man. But we must observe that a thing is signified in two ways, formally and materially. Formally a term signifies that which it was chiefly intended to signify and this is the definition of the term: thus man signifies something composed of a body and a rational soul. Materially a term signifies that which is requisite for that definition: thus man signifies something that has a heart, brain and such parts as are required in order that the body be animated with a rational soul. - Secundum hoc ergo dicendum est, quod hoc nomen persona communiter sumpta nihil aliud significat quam substantiam individuam rationalis naturae. Et quia sub substantia individua rationalis naturae continetur substantia individua &8212;id est incommunicabilis et ab aliis distincta, tam Dei quam hominis quam etiam Angeli&8212; oportet quod persona divina significet subsistens distinctum in natura divina, sicut persona humana significat subsistens distinctum in natura humana; et haec est formalis significatio tam personae divinae quam personae humanae. Sed quia distinctum subsistens in natura humana non est nisi aliquid per individualem materiam individuatum et ab aliis diversum, ideo oportet quod hoc sit materialiter significatum, cum dicitur persona humana. Distinctum vero incommunicabile in natura divina non potest esse nisi relatio, quia omne absolutum est commune et indistinctum in divinis. Relatio autem in Deo est idem secundum rem quod eius essentia. Et sicut essentia in Deo idem est et habens esse essentiam, ut deitas et Deus: ita idem est relatio et quod per relationem refertur. Unde sequitur quod idem sit relatio et distinctum in natura divina subsistens. Patet ergo quod persona, communiter sumpta, significat substantiam individuam rationalis naturae; persona vero divina, formali significatione, significat distinctum subsistens in natura divina. Et quia hoc non potest esse nisi relatio vel relativum, ideo materiali significatione significat relationem vel relativum. Et propter hoc potest dici, quod significat relationem per modum substantiae, non quae est essentia, sed quae est hypostasis; sicut et relationem significat non ut relationem, sed ut relativum, idest ut significatur hoc nomine pater, non ut significatur hoc nomine paternitas. Sic enim relatio significata includitur oblique in significatione personae divinae, quae nihil aliud est quam distinctum relatione subsistens in essentia divina. + Secundum hoc ergo dicendum est, quod hoc nomen persona communiter sumpta nihil aliud significat quam substantiam individuam rationalis naturae. Et quia sub substantia individua rationalis naturae continetur substantia individua —id est incommunicabilis et ab aliis distincta, tam Dei quam hominis quam etiam Angeli— oportet quod persona divina significet subsistens distinctum in natura divina, sicut persona humana significat subsistens distinctum in natura humana; et haec est formalis significatio tam personae divinae quam personae humanae. Sed quia distinctum subsistens in natura humana non est nisi aliquid per individualem materiam individuatum et ab aliis diversum, ideo oportet quod hoc sit materialiter significatum, cum dicitur persona humana. Distinctum vero incommunicabile in natura divina non potest esse nisi relatio, quia omne absolutum est commune et indistinctum in divinis. Relatio autem in Deo est idem secundum rem quod eius essentia. Et sicut essentia in Deo idem est et habens esse essentiam, ut deitas et Deus: ita idem est relatio et quod per relationem refertur. Unde sequitur quod idem sit relatio et distinctum in natura divina subsistens. Patet ergo quod persona, communiter sumpta, significat substantiam individuam rationalis naturae; persona vero divina, formali significatione, significat distinctum subsistens in natura divina. Et quia hoc non potest esse nisi relatio vel relativum, ideo materiali significatione significat relationem vel relativum. Et propter hoc potest dici, quod significat relationem per modum substantiae, non quae est essentia, sed quae est hypostasis; sicut et relationem significat non ut relationem, sed ut relativum, idest ut significatur hoc nomine pater, non ut significatur hoc nomine paternitas. Sic enim relatio significata includitur oblique in significatione personae divinae, quae nihil aliud est quam distinctum relatione subsistens in essentia divina. Accordingly we reply that the term person signifies nothing else but an individual substance of rational nature. And since under an individual substance of rational nature is contained the substance, individual, i.e. incommunicable and distinct from others, whether of God, of man or of angels, it follows that a divine Person must signify something subsistent and distinct in the divine nature, just as a human person signifies something subsistent and distinct in human nature: and this is the formal signification of a person whether divine or human. Since, however, that which is distinct and subsistent in human ‘nature is nothing else than something individualized and differentiated from others by individual matter, it follows that this is the material signification when we speak of a human person. But the only thing that is distinct and incommunicable in the divine nature is relation, since all that is absolute is common and undivided. Now in God relation is really the same as the essence. And as in God essence is identical with the one who has the essence (e.g. the Godhead is identical with God), so also is relation the same as the one who is related. Consequently relation is the same as that which is distinct and subsists in the divine nature. It is evident then that person commonly speaking signifies an individual substance of rational nature; while a divine person in its formal signification denotes a distinct being subsistent in the divine nature. And seeing that this can be nothing else but a relation or a relative being, it follows that in its material signification it denotes a relation or a relative being. Hence it may be said that it signifies a relation by way of substance not qua essence but qua hypostasis, even as it signifies a relation not qua relation but qua relative: e.g. as signifying Father not as signifying paternity. For in this way the signified relation is included indirectly in the signification of the divine Person, which is nothing but something distinct by a relation and subsistent in the divine essence. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quid non solum quaerit de essentia sed quandoque etiam de supposito, ut: quid natat in mari? Piscis. Et sic, ad quid respondendum est per nomen persona. @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@

QUESTION IX
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod unum in divinis se habet communiter ad essentiam et relationem; dicimus enim quod essentia est una, et quod pater est unus. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. In God one is common to essence and relation: thus we say that the essence is one, and that the Father is one. - Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod forte modus ille processionis diversus &8212;quo dicitur filius procedere per modum intellectus, spiritus sanctus vero per modum voluntatis&8212; non sufficit ad distinguendum personaliter spiritum sanctum a filio, cum voluntas et intellectus non distinguantur personaliter in divinis. Si tamen concedatur quod hoc ad eorum distinctionem sufficiat, manifestum est quod uterque a patre per relationem distinguitur, prout unus eorum procedit a patre ut genitus, alius ut spiratus; et hae relationes constituunt eorum personas. + Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod forte modus ille processionis diversus —quo dicitur filius procedere per modum intellectus, spiritus sanctus vero per modum voluntatis— non sufficit ad distinguendum personaliter spiritum sanctum a filio, cum voluntas et intellectus non distinguantur personaliter in divinis. Si tamen concedatur quod hoc ad eorum distinctionem sufficiat, manifestum est quod uterque a patre per relationem distinguitur, prout unus eorum procedit a patre ut genitus, alius ut spiratus; et hae relationes constituunt eorum personas. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. It may be that this different mode of procession whereby the Son is said to proceed by way of intellect, and the Holy Spirit by way of will, does not suffice for a personal distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son, since in God will and intellect are not really distinct. If, however, it be granted that this suffices to make a distinction between them, it is clear that each is distinct from the Father by a relation, in that one of them proceeds from the Father by generation, the other by spiration, and these relations constitute their Persons. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod sicut relatio significat ut distinguens in divinis, ita relatum significatur ut distinctum. In Deo autem non est aliud relatio et relatum, sicut nec essentia et quod est; et ideo nec distinguens et distinctum in Deo differunt. @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@

QUESTION IX
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum. Deus est mensura non mensurata. Ergo in Deo non est numerus. 12. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) number is multitude measured by unity. But God is a measure, himself unmeasured. Therefore no number is in God. - Praeterea, in omni natura quae non differt a suo supposito, impossibile est multiplicari supposita illius naturae: propter hoc enim possibile est esse plures homines in una natura humana, quia hic homo non est sua humanitas; et ideo multiplicatio individuorum in una natura humana, consequitur diversitatem principiorum individualium, quae non sunt de ratione naturae communis. In substantiis autem immaterialibus in quibus ipsa natura speciei est suppositum subsistens, non est possibile esse plura individua unius speciei. Sed in Deo est idem natura et suppositum, quia ipsum esse divinum &8212;quod est natura divina&8212; est subsistens. Impossibile est ergo quod in natura divina sint plura supposita vel plures personae. + Praeterea, in omni natura quae non differt a suo supposito, impossibile est multiplicari supposita illius naturae: propter hoc enim possibile est esse plures homines in una natura humana, quia hic homo non est sua humanitas; et ideo multiplicatio individuorum in una natura humana, consequitur diversitatem principiorum individualium, quae non sunt de ratione naturae communis. In substantiis autem immaterialibus in quibus ipsa natura speciei est suppositum subsistens, non est possibile esse plura individua unius speciei. Sed in Deo est idem natura et suppositum, quia ipsum esse divinum —quod est natura divina— est subsistens. Impossibile est ergo quod in natura divina sint plura supposita vel plures personae. 13. In a nature that differs not from its supposit, it is impossible to have several supposits of that nature: since for this reason is it possible to have several men in the one human nature, that the individual man is not his own humanity: wherefore the multiplication of individuals in the one human nature is consequent to the diversity of individual principles, which are not part of the common nature. Whereas in immaterial substances wherein the very nature of the species is the subsisting supposit, there cannot be several individuals of one species. Now in God there is the most complete identity of nature and supposit, because the divine being itself which is the divine nature, is subsistent. Therefore there cannot be in God several supposits or persons. Praeterea, persona est nomen rei. Ergo ubi non est numerus rerum, non est numerus personarum. Sed in Deo non est numerus rerum; dicit enim Damascenus, quod in divinis pater et filius et spiritus sanctus re quidem sunt unum, ratione autem et cogitatione differunt. Ergo in Deo non est numerus personarum. @@ -534,7 +534,7 @@

QUESTION IX
Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum pluralitas unitatum ex aliqua distinctione causetur, ubi est distinctio secundum esse, oportet quod unitates secundum esse differant; ubi autem est distinctio secundum relationes, oportet quod unitates ex quibus consistit pluralitas, solum relationibus ab invicem distinguantur. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Since plurality of units is caused by a distinction, if this distinction be one of being the units must differ in being: but where the distinction is one of relation, the units that compose the number must differ only relatively from one another. - Ad quintum dicendum, quod quaelibet distinctio sufficit ad pluralitatem similem constituendam. Unde, sicut in Deo non est divisio secundum absoluta &8212;quae sine compositione esse non potest&8212; sed solum distinctio relationum; ita non est in Deo pluralitas quantum ad absoluta, sed solum quantum ad relationes, ut iam dictum est. + Ad quintum dicendum, quod quaelibet distinctio sufficit ad pluralitatem similem constituendam. Unde, sicut in Deo non est divisio secundum absoluta —quae sine compositione esse non potest— sed solum distinctio relationum; ita non est in Deo pluralitas quantum ad absoluta, sed solum quantum ad relationes, ut iam dictum est. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Any kind of distinction suffices to cause a plurality of like kind. Wherefore as in God there is no distinction in that which is absolute (which distinction is inseparable from composition) but only a distinction of relations, even so in God there is not plurality in respect of what is absolute, but only in respect of relations, as already stated. Ad sextum dicendum, quod unitates semper sunt partes numeri, si loquamur de numero absoluto quo numeramus; si autem loquamur de numero qui est in rebus, tunc non est ratio totius et partis in numero, nisi sicut invenitur totum et pars in rebus numeratis. Diversae autem relationes in divinis non sunt partes, sicut paternitas et filiatio non sunt partes Socratis, quamvis sit pater et filius diversorum. Unde nec unitates relationum comparantur ad numerum relationum ut partes. @@ -543,7 +543,7 @@

QUESTION IX
Ad septimum dicendum, quod creatura differt a Deo in hoc quod producitur in numero essentialium principiorum. Talis autem non est numerus personarum. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The creature differs from God in that it is produced in a number of essential principles. But this kind of number is not that of the persons. - Ad octavum dicendum, quod numerus qui est species quantitatis, causatur ex divisione continui; unde sicut quantitas continua est quid mathematicum &8212;quia est separata a materia sensibili secundum rationem, et non secundum esse&8212; ita et numerus qui est species quantitatis, qui est etiam subiectum arithmeticae, cuius principium est unum quod est prima mensura quantitatis. Unde patet quod hic numerus non potest esse in rebus immaterialibus, sed est in eis multitudo, quae opponitur uni quod convertitur cum ente; quae quidem causatur ex divisione formali, quae est per quasdam formas oppositas, vel absolutas vel relativas. Et talis numerus est in divinis. + Ad octavum dicendum, quod numerus qui est species quantitatis, causatur ex divisione continui; unde sicut quantitas continua est quid mathematicum —quia est separata a materia sensibili secundum rationem, et non secundum esse— ita et numerus qui est species quantitatis, qui est etiam subiectum arithmeticae, cuius principium est unum quod est prima mensura quantitatis. Unde patet quod hic numerus non potest esse in rebus immaterialibus, sed est in eis multitudo, quae opponitur uni quod convertitur cum ente; quae quidem causatur ex divisione formali, quae est per quasdam formas oppositas, vel absolutas vel relativas. Et talis numerus est in divinis. Reply to the Eighth Objection. The number which is a species of quantity is caused by a division of a continuous quantity: wherefore just as continuous quantity relates to mathematics, because it is separated from sensible matter logically and not in reality, so also number which is a species of quantity is the subject-matter of arithmetic the principle whereof is unity that is the first measure of quantity. Hence it is plain that number of this kind cannot be in immaterial things; but in them is multitude that is opposed to the unity that is convertible with being: and this is caused by formal division which is into opposite forms whether absolute or relative: and such is number in God. Ad nonum dicendum, quod illae passiones consequuntur numerum qui est species quantitatis, qui non competit in divinis, ut dictum est. @@ -655,7 +655,7 @@

QUESTION IX
Ad sextum dicendum, quod hoc nomen persona significat subsistentem in natura divina, cum distinctione et incommunicabilitate; hoc autem nomen Deus significat habentem divinam naturam nihil importans de distinctione vel incommunicabilitate; ideo non est simile. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The word person signifies one that subsists in the divine nature distinctly and incommunicably: whereas the word God signifies one who has the divine nature without reference to distinction or incommunicability: hence the comparison fails. - Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet Deus a Deo non differat aliqua differentia divinitatis &8212;quia non est nisi una divinitas numero&8212; persona tamen divina differt a persona divina differentia personalitatis, quia ad personalitatem pertinet in divinis etiam proprietas distinguens personas. + Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet Deus a Deo non differat aliqua differentia divinitatis —quia non est nisi una divinitas numero— persona tamen divina differt a persona divina differentia personalitatis, quia ad personalitatem pertinet in divinis etiam proprietas distinguens personas. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although God differs not from God by a difference in the Godhead, for there is only one Godhead: yet divine person differs from divine person by a difference of personality, since in God personality includes also the property that distinguishes the persons.
@@ -731,14 +731,14 @@

QUESTION IX
Praeterea, unum et multitudo, sive numerus, sunt in genere quantitatis. In Deo autem non potest esse aliqua quantitas, cum quantitas sit accidens et dispositio materiae. Termini ergo numerales in Deo nihil ponunt. 3. One and many, i.e. number are in the genus of quantity. Now there is no quantity in God, seeing that quantity is an accident and a disposition, of matter. Therefore numeral terms indicate nothing positive in God. - Sed dicendum, quod licet quantitas secundum rationem sui generis, vel secundum rationem accidentis, non possit esse in Deo, tamen secundum rationem speciei aliqua quantitas potest praedicari de Deo, sicut aliqua qualitas, ut scientia vel iustitia. &8212;Sed contra, illae solae species qualitatis in divinam praedicationem assumuntur quae secundum rationem suae speciei nullam imperfectionem important, sicut scientia, iustitia et aequitas; non autem ignorantia nec albedo. Omnis autem quantitas secundum rationem suae speciei imperfectionem importat: cum enim quantum sit quod est indivisibile, species quantitatis distinguuntur secundum diversos modos divisionis; sicut pluralitas est quae divisibilis est in non continua, linea autem quae est divisibilis secundum unam dimensionem, superficies autem secundum duas, corpus vero secundum tres. Divisio autem perfectioni divinae simplicitatis repugnat. Nulla ergo quantitas secundum rationem suae speciei potest praedicari de Deo. - 4. To this it will be replied that although quantity as to its generic nature or considered as an accident cannot be in God, yet in its specific nature a certain kind of quantity may be predicated of God, even as a certain kind of quality such as knowledge or justice. &8212;On the contrary only those species of quality can be predicated of God which in their specific nature contain no imperfection, such as knowledge, justice, equity, but not ignorance or whiteness. But all quantity by its specific nature implies imperfection: because since a thing that has quantity is divisible, the various species of quantity are distinguished according to various kinds of division: thus plurality is quantity divisible into non-continuous parts: a line is quantity divisible as to one dimension: while a surface is divisible as to two, and a body as to three. Now division is incompatible with the perfection of divine simplicity. Therefore no quantity as to its specific nature can be predicated of God. + Sed dicendum, quod licet quantitas secundum rationem sui generis, vel secundum rationem accidentis, non possit esse in Deo, tamen secundum rationem speciei aliqua quantitas potest praedicari de Deo, sicut aliqua qualitas, ut scientia vel iustitia. —Sed contra, illae solae species qualitatis in divinam praedicationem assumuntur quae secundum rationem suae speciei nullam imperfectionem important, sicut scientia, iustitia et aequitas; non autem ignorantia nec albedo. Omnis autem quantitas secundum rationem suae speciei imperfectionem importat: cum enim quantum sit quod est indivisibile, species quantitatis distinguuntur secundum diversos modos divisionis; sicut pluralitas est quae divisibilis est in non continua, linea autem quae est divisibilis secundum unam dimensionem, superficies autem secundum duas, corpus vero secundum tres. Divisio autem perfectioni divinae simplicitatis repugnat. Nulla ergo quantitas secundum rationem suae speciei potest praedicari de Deo. + 4. To this it will be replied that although quantity as to its generic nature or considered as an accident cannot be in God, yet in its specific nature a certain kind of quantity may be predicated of God, even as a certain kind of quality such as knowledge or justice. —On the contrary only those species of quality can be predicated of God which in their specific nature contain no imperfection, such as knowledge, justice, equity, but not ignorance or whiteness. But all quantity by its specific nature implies imperfection: because since a thing that has quantity is divisible, the various species of quantity are distinguished according to various kinds of division: thus plurality is quantity divisible into non-continuous parts: a line is quantity divisible as to one dimension: while a surface is divisible as to two, and a body as to three. Now division is incompatible with the perfection of divine simplicity. Therefore no quantity as to its specific nature can be predicated of God. - Sed dicendum, quod distinctio per relationes quae facit numerum personarum in divinis, non importat imperfectionem in Deo. &8212;Sed contra, omnis divisio vel distinctio aliquam multitudinem causat. Non autem omnis multitudo est numerus qui est species quantitatis: cum multitudo et unum circumeant omnia genera. Non ergo omnis divisio vel distinctio sufficit ad constituendum numerum qui est species quantitatis, sed sola illa divisio quae est secundum quantitatem, qualis non est distinctio relationum. - 5. But it will be argued that distinction according to the relations which causes the number of persons in God, does not imply perfection in him. &8212;On the contrary every division or distinction causes plurality of some kind. Now not every kind of plurality is that number which is a species of quantity, inasmuch as many and one pervade all the genera. Hence not any division or distinction suffices to set up number which is a species of quantity, but only quantitative division, and such is not relative division. + Sed dicendum, quod distinctio per relationes quae facit numerum personarum in divinis, non importat imperfectionem in Deo. —Sed contra, omnis divisio vel distinctio aliquam multitudinem causat. Non autem omnis multitudo est numerus qui est species quantitatis: cum multitudo et unum circumeant omnia genera. Non ergo omnis divisio vel distinctio sufficit ad constituendum numerum qui est species quantitatis, sed sola illa divisio quae est secundum quantitatem, qualis non est distinctio relationum. + 5. But it will be argued that distinction according to the relations which causes the number of persons in God, does not imply perfection in him. —On the contrary every division or distinction causes plurality of some kind. Now not every kind of plurality is that number which is a species of quantity, inasmuch as many and one pervade all the genera. Hence not any division or distinction suffices to set up number which is a species of quantity, but only quantitative division, and such is not relative division. - Sed dicendum, quod omnis multitudo est species quantitatis, et omnis divisio sufficit ad constituendam speciem quantitatis. &8212;Sed contra, ad positionem substantiae non sequitur positio quantitatis, cum substantia possit esse sine accidente. Sed positis solis formis substantialibus, sequitur distinctio in substantiis. Ergo non quaelibet distinctio constituit multitudinem quae est accidens et species quantitatis. - 6. But it will be objected that every plurality is a species of quantity, and every division suffices to cause a species of quantity. &8212;On the contrary given substance, quantity does not necessarily follow, inasmuch as substance can be without accident. Now given substantial forms only, there follows distinction in substances. Therefore not every distinction causes number, which is an accident and a species of quantity. + Sed dicendum, quod omnis multitudo est species quantitatis, et omnis divisio sufficit ad constituendam speciem quantitatis. —Sed contra, ad positionem substantiae non sequitur positio quantitatis, cum substantia possit esse sine accidente. Sed positis solis formis substantialibus, sequitur distinctio in substantiis. Ergo non quaelibet distinctio constituit multitudinem quae est accidens et species quantitatis. + 6. But it will be objected that every plurality is a species of quantity, and every division suffices to cause a species of quantity. —On the contrary given substance, quantity does not necessarily follow, inasmuch as substance can be without accident. Now given substantial forms only, there follows distinction in substances. Therefore not every distinction causes number, which is an accident and a species of quantity. Praeterea, discretio quae constituit numerum, quae est species quantitatis, opponitur continuo. Discretio autem continuo opposita est, quae consistit in divisione continui. Ergo sola divisio continui, quae non competit Deo, causat numerum qui est species quantitatis; et ita non potest praedicari de Deo numerus qui est species quantitatis. 7. Discreteness that causes number which is a species of quantity is opposed to continuity. Now discreteness is opposed to continuity because it consists in division of the continuous. Therefore only division of the continuous, which division is impossible in God, causes number that is a species of quantity: so that such a number cannot be predicated of God. @@ -746,7 +746,7 @@

QUESTION IX
Praeterea, quaelibet substantia dicitur una. Aut ergo est una per essentiam suam, aut per aliquid aliud. Si per aliquid aliud, cum et illud oporteat esse unum, necesse est quod et illud per se sit unum, vel per aliquid aliud, et illud iterum per aliud. Impossibile est autem quod hoc procedat in infinitum. Ergo statur alicubi. Melius est ergo quod stetur in primo, ut scilicet substantia per seipsam sit una. Non ergo unum est aliquid additum substantiae; et ita non videtur significare aliquid positive. 8. Every substance is one. Either then it is one by its essence, or by something else. If by something else, since this again must be one, it must be one either of itself or by something else, and this again by something else. But this cannot go on indefinitely: and hence we must stop somewhere. And it were better to stop at the beginning, so that substance be one of itself. Therefore unity is not something added to substance: and thus seemingly it does not signify anything positively. - Sed dicendum, quod substantia non est una per seipsam, sed per unitatem ei accidentem; unitas autem est per se una; prima enim denominant seipsa, sicut bonitas est bona, veritas est vera, et similiter unitas est una. &8212;Sed contra, huiusmodi seipsa denominant propter hoc quod sunt primae formae, nam secundae formae non denominant seipsas, sicut albedo non est alba. Quae autem se habent ex additione ad aliud, non sunt prima. Ergo unitas et bonitas non se habent ex additione ad substantiam. + Sed dicendum, quod substantia non est una per seipsam, sed per unitatem ei accidentem; unitas autem est per se una; prima enim denominant seipsa, sicut bonitas est bona, veritas est vera, et similiter unitas est una. —Sed contra, huiusmodi seipsa denominant propter hoc quod sunt primae formae, nam secundae formae non denominant seipsas, sicut albedo non est alba. Quae autem se habent ex additione ad aliud, non sunt prima. Ergo unitas et bonitas non se habent ex additione ad substantiam. 9. But it will be argued that a substance is one not by itself but by accidental unity: and unity is one essentially, since the primary notions are named after themselves: thus goodness is good, truth is true and likewise unity is one. —On the contrary these are named after themselves because they are primary forms; whereas second forms are not named after themselves: thus whiteness is not white. Now things which result from addition to others are not primary. Therefore unity and goodness are not additional to substance. Praeterea, secundum philosophum, omnia dicuntur unum in quantum non dividuntur. Hoc autem quod est non dividi, non ponit aliquid, sed solum removet. Ergo unum non praedicatur positive sed remotive in divinis; et per consequens multitudo, quae constituitur ex unis. @@ -761,13 +761,13 @@

QUESTION IX
Quidam vero non distinguentes inter unum quod convertitur cum ente, et unum quod est principium numeri, crediderunt e contrario, quod utrolibet modo dictum unum, adderet aliquod esse accidentale supra substantiam; et per consequens omnis multitudo oportet quod sit aliquod accidens pertinens ad genus quantitatis. Et haec fuit positio Avicennae, quam quidem videntur secuti fuisse omnes antiqui doctores. Non enim intellexerunt per unum et multa nisi aliquod pertinens ad genus quantitatis discretae. On the other hand others who failed to distinguish between unity that is convertible with being and unity that is the principle of number held the contrary opinion that in any sense unity adds a certain accidental being to substance: and that in consequence all number is an accident pertaining to the genus of quantity. This was the opinion of Avicenna: and apparently all the teachers of old followed him: for they did not understand by one and many anything else but something pertaining to discrete quantity. - Quidam vero fuerunt qui attendentes quod in Deo nulla quantitas esse potest, posuerunt quod termini significantes unum vel multa de Deo non ponunt aliquid, sed removeant tantum. Non enim possunt ponere nisi quod significant, scilicet quantitatem discretam, quae nullo modo potest esse in Deo. Sic ergo secundum eos unum dicitur de Deo ad removendum multitudinem quantitatis discretae; termini vero significantes pluralitatem, dicuntur de Deo ad removendum unitatem, quae est principium quantitatis discretae. Et haec videtur fuisse opinio Magistri, quae ponitur in 24 dist. I sententiarum. Quae quidem, supposita suae opinionis radice, scilicet quod omnis multitudo significaret quantitatem discretam, et omne unum esset eiusdem quantitatis principium, inter omnes rationabilior invenitur. Nam et Dionysius dicit, quod negationes sunt maxime verae in Deo; affirmationes vero sunt incompactae. Non enim scimus de Deo quid est, sed magis quid non est, ut Damascenus dicit. Unde et Rabbi Moyses omnia quae affirmative videntur dici de Deo, dicit magis esse introducta ad removendum quam ad aliquid ponendum. Dicimus enim Deum esse vivum ad removendum ab eo illum modum essendi quem habent res quae apud nos non vivunt, non ad ponendum vitam in ipso, cum vita et omnia huiusmodi nomina sint imposita ad significandum quasdam formas et perfectiones creaturarum quae longe absunt a Deo; quamvis hoc non sit usquequaque verum, nam, sicut dicit Dionysius, sapientia et vita et alia huiusmodi non removentur a Deo quasi ei desint, sed quia excellentius habet ea quam intellectus humanus capere, vel sermo significare possit; et ex illa perfectione divina descendunt perfectiones creatae, secundum quamdam similitudinem imperfectam. Et ideo de Deo, secundum Dionysium, non solum dicitur aliquid per modum negationis et per modum causae, sed etiam per modum eminentiae. Sed quidquid sit de spiritualibus perfectionibus, certum est quod materiales dispositiones removentur omnino a Deo. Unde cum quantitas sit dispositio materiae, si termini numerales non significant nisi quod est in genere quantitatis, necesse est quod de Deo non dicatur nisi ad removendum quae significant, sicut Magister posuit, loc. cit. Nec sequitur ex eius positione circulus &8212;dum unitas removet multitudinem, multitudo unitatem&8212; quia removentur a Deo unitas et multitudo, quae sunt in genere quantitatis, quorum neutrum de Deo dicitur. Et sic unitas dicta de Deo, quae removet multitudinem, non removetur, sed alia unitas, quae de Deo dici non potest. + Quidam vero fuerunt qui attendentes quod in Deo nulla quantitas esse potest, posuerunt quod termini significantes unum vel multa de Deo non ponunt aliquid, sed removeant tantum. Non enim possunt ponere nisi quod significant, scilicet quantitatem discretam, quae nullo modo potest esse in Deo. Sic ergo secundum eos unum dicitur de Deo ad removendum multitudinem quantitatis discretae; termini vero significantes pluralitatem, dicuntur de Deo ad removendum unitatem, quae est principium quantitatis discretae. Et haec videtur fuisse opinio Magistri, quae ponitur in 24 dist. I sententiarum. Quae quidem, supposita suae opinionis radice, scilicet quod omnis multitudo significaret quantitatem discretam, et omne unum esset eiusdem quantitatis principium, inter omnes rationabilior invenitur. Nam et Dionysius dicit, quod negationes sunt maxime verae in Deo; affirmationes vero sunt incompactae. Non enim scimus de Deo quid est, sed magis quid non est, ut Damascenus dicit. Unde et Rabbi Moyses omnia quae affirmative videntur dici de Deo, dicit magis esse introducta ad removendum quam ad aliquid ponendum. Dicimus enim Deum esse vivum ad removendum ab eo illum modum essendi quem habent res quae apud nos non vivunt, non ad ponendum vitam in ipso, cum vita et omnia huiusmodi nomina sint imposita ad significandum quasdam formas et perfectiones creaturarum quae longe absunt a Deo; quamvis hoc non sit usquequaque verum, nam, sicut dicit Dionysius, sapientia et vita et alia huiusmodi non removentur a Deo quasi ei desint, sed quia excellentius habet ea quam intellectus humanus capere, vel sermo significare possit; et ex illa perfectione divina descendunt perfectiones creatae, secundum quamdam similitudinem imperfectam. Et ideo de Deo, secundum Dionysium, non solum dicitur aliquid per modum negationis et per modum causae, sed etiam per modum eminentiae. Sed quidquid sit de spiritualibus perfectionibus, certum est quod materiales dispositiones removentur omnino a Deo. Unde cum quantitas sit dispositio materiae, si termini numerales non significant nisi quod est in genere quantitatis, necesse est quod de Deo non dicatur nisi ad removendum quae significant, sicut Magister posuit, loc. cit. Nec sequitur ex eius positione circulus —dum unitas removet multitudinem, multitudo unitatem— quia removentur a Deo unitas et multitudo, quae sunt in genere quantitatis, quorum neutrum de Deo dicitur. Et sic unitas dicta de Deo, quae removet multitudinem, non removetur, sed alia unitas, quae de Deo dici non potest. There were others who, considering that there cannot be quantity of any kind in God, maintained that words signifying one or many have no positive signification when attributed to God, but only remove something from him. For they cannot ascribe to him save what they signify, to wit discrete quantity, and this can nowise be in God. Hence according to these one is predicated of God in order to remove the. plurality of discrete quantity; and terms signifying plurality are said of God in order to remove that unity which is the principle of discrete quantity. Apparently this was the view of the Master (I., D. xxiv): and granted the principle on which his opinion is based, namely that all multitude signifies discrete quantity, and all unity is the principle of such quantity, this opinion would seem of all the most reasonable. For Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ii) says that we are nearer the truth when we speak of God in the negative, and that all our affirmations about him are figurative. For we know not what God is, but rather what he is not, as Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. i, 4). Hence Rabbi Moses says that whatever we affirm about God is to be taken as removing something from him rather than as placing something in him. Thus we say that God is a living being in order to remove from him that mode of being which inanimate beings have, and not in order to ascribe life to him; since life and all such terms are employed to denote certain forms and perfections of creatures which are far distant from God. And yet this is not altogether true, for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) wisdom and life and the like are not removed from God as though they were not in him; but because he has them in a higher degree than mind can conceive or words express: and from that divine perfection created perfections come down in an imperfect likeness to it. Wherefore things are said of God according to Dionysius (Myst. Theol. i: Coel. Hier. ii: Div. Nom. ii) not only negatively and causally but also eminently. Still whatever the truth may be with regard to spiritual perfections it is certain that material dispositions are altogether to be removed from God. Wherefore since quantity is a disposition of matter, if numeral terms signify nothing outside the genus of quantity it follows that they are not to be said of God except as removing what they signify, according to the Master’s opinion (loc. cit.), and although in his opinion unity removes plurality and plurality unity, this does not involve a vicious circle, because the unity and plurality removed from God are in the genus of quantity, neither of which can be ascribed to God. So that the unity ascribed to God which removes plurality is not removed, but that other unity which cannot be said of God. - Quidam vero, non intelligentes quod nomina affirmativa ad removendum possint in praedicationem divinam induci, nec iterum ponentes unum et multa &8212;nisi quod est in genere quantitatis discretae, quam in Deo ponere non audebant&8212; dixerunt quod termini numerales non praedicantur de Deo quasi dictiones significantes aliquam rem conceptam sed quasi dictiones officiales, exercentes aliquid in divinis, scilicet distinctionem ad modum syncategorematicae distinctionis. Quod quidem fatuum apparet, cum nihil tale ex horum terminorum significatione possit haberi. + Quidam vero, non intelligentes quod nomina affirmativa ad removendum possint in praedicationem divinam induci, nec iterum ponentes unum et multa —nisi quod est in genere quantitatis discretae, quam in Deo ponere non audebant— dixerunt quod termini numerales non praedicantur de Deo quasi dictiones significantes aliquam rem conceptam sed quasi dictiones officiales, exercentes aliquid in divinis, scilicet distinctionem ad modum syncategorematicae distinctionis. Quod quidem fatuum apparet, cum nihil tale ex horum terminorum significatione possit haberi. Some, however, through not understanding how affirmative expressions can be predicated of God for the purpose of negation, and not conceiving unity and plurality except as included in the genus of discrete quantity, which they dared not ascribe to God, said that numeral terms are not predicated of God as though they expressed’ an idea with an objective reality, but as official expressions positing something in God, namely a kind of syncategorematic distinction, all of which is clearly absurd, since nothing of the kind can be had from the meaning of these terms. - Et ideo alii dixerunt, quod praedicti termini aliquid positive ponunt in Deo, licet supponant quod unum et multa sunt solum in genere quantitatis; dicunt enim quod non est inconveniens aliquam speciem quantitatis Deo attribui, licet genus removeatur a Deo; sicut et aliquae species qualitatis, ut sapientia et iustitia, dicuntur de Deo positive, licet in Deo qualitas esse non possit. Sed illud non est simile, ut in obiiciendo est tactum, nam omnes species quantitatis ex ratione suae speciei habent imperfectionem, non autem omnes species qualitatis. Et praeterea quantitas proprie est dispositio materiae; unde omnes species quantitatis sunt mathematica quaedam, quae secundum esse non possunt a materia sensibili separari, nisi tempus et locus quae sunt naturalia, et magis materiae sensibili annexa. Unde patet quod nulla species quantitatis potest in rebus spiritualibus convenire, nisi secundum metaphoram. Qualitas autem sequitur formam, unde quaedam qualitates sunt omnino immateriales, quae attribui possunt rebus spiritualibus. Hae igitur opiniones processerunt, supposito quod idem sit unum quod convertitur cum ente et quod est principium numeri, et quod non sit aliqua multitudo nisi numerus qui est species quantitatis. Quod quidem patet esse falsum: nam cum divisio multitudinem causet, indivisio vero unitatem, oportet secundum rationem divisionis de uno et multo iudicium sumi. Est autem quaedam divisio quae omnino genus quantitatis excedit, quae scilicet est per aliquam oppositionem formalem, quae nullam quantitatem concernit. Unde oportet quod multitudo hanc divisionem consequens, et unum quod hanc divisionem privat, sint maioris communitatis et ambitus quam genus quantitatis. Est autem et alia divisio secundum quantitatem quae genus quantitatis non transcendit. Unde et multitudo consequens hanc divisionem, et unitas eam privans, sunt in genere quantitatis. Quod quidem unum, aliquid accidentale addit supra id de quo dicitur, quod habet rationem mensurae; alias numerus ex unitate constitutus, non esset aliquod accidens, nec alicuius generis species. Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, non addit supra ens nisi negationem divisionis, non quod significet ipsam indivisionem tantum, sed substantiam eius cum ipsa: est enim unum idem quod ens indivisum. Et similiter multitudo correspondens uni nihil addit supra res multas nisi distinctionem, quae in hoc attenditur quod una earum non est alia; quod quidem non habent ex aliquo superaddito, sed ex propriis formis. Patet ergo quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, ponit quidem ipsum ens, sed nihil superaddit nisi negationem divisionis. Multitudo autem ei correspondens addit supra res, quae dicuntur multae, quod unaquaeque earum sit una, et quod una earum non sit altera, in quo consistit ratio distinctionis. Et sic, cum unum addat supra ens unam negationem &8212;secundum quod aliquid est indivisum in se&8212; multitudo addit duas negationes, prout scilicet aliquid est in se indivisum, et prout est ab alio divisum. Quod quidem dividi est unum eorum non esse alterum. + Et ideo alii dixerunt, quod praedicti termini aliquid positive ponunt in Deo, licet supponant quod unum et multa sunt solum in genere quantitatis; dicunt enim quod non est inconveniens aliquam speciem quantitatis Deo attribui, licet genus removeatur a Deo; sicut et aliquae species qualitatis, ut sapientia et iustitia, dicuntur de Deo positive, licet in Deo qualitas esse non possit. Sed illud non est simile, ut in obiiciendo est tactum, nam omnes species quantitatis ex ratione suae speciei habent imperfectionem, non autem omnes species qualitatis. Et praeterea quantitas proprie est dispositio materiae; unde omnes species quantitatis sunt mathematica quaedam, quae secundum esse non possunt a materia sensibili separari, nisi tempus et locus quae sunt naturalia, et magis materiae sensibili annexa. Unde patet quod nulla species quantitatis potest in rebus spiritualibus convenire, nisi secundum metaphoram. Qualitas autem sequitur formam, unde quaedam qualitates sunt omnino immateriales, quae attribui possunt rebus spiritualibus. Hae igitur opiniones processerunt, supposito quod idem sit unum quod convertitur cum ente et quod est principium numeri, et quod non sit aliqua multitudo nisi numerus qui est species quantitatis. Quod quidem patet esse falsum: nam cum divisio multitudinem causet, indivisio vero unitatem, oportet secundum rationem divisionis de uno et multo iudicium sumi. Est autem quaedam divisio quae omnino genus quantitatis excedit, quae scilicet est per aliquam oppositionem formalem, quae nullam quantitatem concernit. Unde oportet quod multitudo hanc divisionem consequens, et unum quod hanc divisionem privat, sint maioris communitatis et ambitus quam genus quantitatis. Est autem et alia divisio secundum quantitatem quae genus quantitatis non transcendit. Unde et multitudo consequens hanc divisionem, et unitas eam privans, sunt in genere quantitatis. Quod quidem unum, aliquid accidentale addit supra id de quo dicitur, quod habet rationem mensurae; alias numerus ex unitate constitutus, non esset aliquod accidens, nec alicuius generis species. Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, non addit supra ens nisi negationem divisionis, non quod significet ipsam indivisionem tantum, sed substantiam eius cum ipsa: est enim unum idem quod ens indivisum. Et similiter multitudo correspondens uni nihil addit supra res multas nisi distinctionem, quae in hoc attenditur quod una earum non est alia; quod quidem non habent ex aliquo superaddito, sed ex propriis formis. Patet ergo quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, ponit quidem ipsum ens, sed nihil superaddit nisi negationem divisionis. Multitudo autem ei correspondens addit supra res, quae dicuntur multae, quod unaquaeque earum sit una, et quod una earum non sit altera, in quo consistit ratio distinctionis. Et sic, cum unum addat supra ens unam negationem —secundum quod aliquid est indivisum in se— multitudo addit duas negationes, prout scilicet aliquid est in se indivisum, et prout est ab alio divisum. Quod quidem dividi est unum eorum non esse alterum. Wherefore others, though holding that unity and multitude are only in the genus of quantity, said that these terms denote something positive in God. They say in effect that it is not unreasonable to ascribe some kind of quantity to God, although the genus is not to be attributed to him: even as certain species of quality, as wisdom and justice are predicated of God, although there cannot be quality in God. But as indicated in an objection (5) there is no comparison: because all the species of quantity from their specific nature are imperfect, but not all the species of quality. Moreover quantity properly speaking is a disposition of matter: so that all the species of quantity are mathematical entities which cannot exist apart from sensible matter, except time and place which are natural entities and which are better described as adjuncts of sensible matter. It is evident then that no species of quantity can be attributed. to spiritual things otherwise than metaphorically. Whereas quality follows the form, wherefore certain qualities are altogether immaterial and can be ascribed to spiritual things. Accordingly the above opinions were based on the supposition that the one which is convertible with being is the same with that which is the principle of number, and that there is no plurality but number that is a species of quantity. Now this is clearly false. For since division causes plurality and indivision unity, we must judge of one and many according to the various kinds of division. Now there is a kind of division which altogether transcends the genus of quantity, and this is division according to formal opposition which has nothing to do with quantity. Hence the plurality resulting from such a division, and the unity which excludes such a division, must needs be more universal and comprehensive than the genus of quantity. Again there is a division of quantity which does not transcend the genus of quantity. Wherefore the plurality consequent to this division and the unity which excludes it are in the genus of quantity. This latter unity is an accidental addition to the thing of which it is predicated, in that it measures it: otherwise the number arising from this unity would not be an accident nor the species of a genus. Whereas the unity that is convertible with being, adds nothing to being except the negation of division, not that it signifies indivision only, but substance with indivision: for one is the same as individual being. In like manner the plurality that corresponds to this unity adds nothing to the many things except distinction, which consists in each one not being the other: and this they have not from anything added to them but from their proper forms. It is clear then that one which is convertible with being, posits being but adds nothing except the negation of division. And the number corresponding to it adds this to the things described as many, that each of them is one, and that each of them is not the other, wherein is the essence of distinction. Accordingly then, while one adds to being one negation inasmuch as a thing is undivided in itself; plurality adds two negations, inasmuch as a certain thing is undivided in itself, and distinct from another; i.e. one of them is not the other. Dico ergo, quod in divinis non praedicantur unum et multa quae pertinent ad genus quantitatis, sed unum quod convertitur cum ente, et multitudo ei correspondens. Unde unum et multa ponunt quidem in divinis ea de quibus dicuntur; sed non superaddunt nisi distinctionem et indistinctionem, quod est superaddere negationes, ut supra expositum est. Unde concedimus, quod quantum ad id quod superaddunt eis de quibus praedicantur, remotive in Deo accipiuntur; in quantum autem includunt in sua significatione ea de quibus dicuntur, positive accipiuntur. Unde ad utrasque rationes respondendum est. @@ -847,7 +847,7 @@

QUESTION IX
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, diversum dicitur absolute, differens vero relative; unde omne differens est diversum, non autem omne diversum est differens. Sed in divinis conceditur esse differentia; dicit enim Damascenus: differentiam personarum in tribus proprietatibus, id est paternali et filiali et processibili recognoscimus. Ergo in divinis est diversitas. 2. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) diversity is absolute, but difference is relative: wherefore all that differs is diverse, but not everything that is diverse is different. Now it is granted that there is difference in God, since Damascene (De Fid. Orth. iii) says: We acknowledge a difference between the persons arising from the three properties, namely Paternity, filiation and Procession. Therefore there is diversity in God. - Praeterea, differentia accidentalis facit alterum solum; differentia vero substantialis facit aliud, idest diversum. Cum ergo in divinis sit differentia, et non possit ibi esse accidentalis differentia &8212;et per consequens oportet quod sit differentia substantialis&8212; oportet quod sit ibi diversitas. + Praeterea, differentia accidentalis facit alterum solum; differentia vero substantialis facit aliud, idest diversum. Cum ergo in divinis sit differentia, et non possit ibi esse accidentalis differentia —et per consequens oportet quod sit differentia substantialis— oportet quod sit ibi diversitas. 3. Accidental difference only makes a thing other, but substantial difference makes another, i.e. a diverse, thing. Since then in God there is a difference, which must be substantial, seeing that it cannot be accidental, there must be diversity in him. Praeterea, multitudo causatur ex divisione, sicut iam dictum est. Ubi autem est divisio sequitur diversitas. Ergo in divinis cum sit multitudo, erit ibi diversitas.