From 48b026d3d02486bd85dd20ae679b70b6c7fda637 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: lcerrato
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 13:12:36 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] (new_submissions) revisions to tlg0544.tlg001.1st1K-eng1.xml
file #2791
---
.../tlg001/tlg0544.tlg001.1st1K-eng1.xml | 3440 ++++++++---------
1 file changed, 1692 insertions(+), 1748 deletions(-)
diff --git a/data/tlg0544/tlg001/tlg0544.tlg001.1st1K-eng1.xml b/data/tlg0544/tlg001/tlg0544.tlg001.1st1K-eng1.xml
index 82e265102..33e7e2a26 100644
--- a/data/tlg0544/tlg001/tlg0544.tlg001.1st1K-eng1.xml
+++ b/data/tlg0544/tlg001/tlg0544.tlg001.1st1K-eng1.xml
@@ -8,15 +8,20 @@
Outlines of Pyrrhonism
Sextus Empiricus
Robert Gregg Bury
- Tisch Library
+ Tisch Library, Tufts University
- Published original versions of the electronic texts
- Open Greek and Latin
- Gregory Crane
- Leonard Muellner
- Bruce Robertson
+ Tisch Library, Tufts University
+ Tufts University
+ William Roush
+ Gregory Crane
+ Micah Saxton
+ Allison Babeu
+ Lisa Cerrato
-
+
+
+
+
@@ -25,27 +30,27 @@
The natural result of any investigation is that the
investigators either discover the object of search or
deny that it is discoverable and confess it to be
-inapprehensible or persist in their search.
-
+inapprehensible or persist in their search.
+
So, too, with regard to the objects investigated by
philosophy, this is probably why some have claimed to
have discovered the truth, others have asserted that it
cannot be apprehended, while others again go on inquiring.
-
+
Those who believe they have discovered it are the
‟Dogmatists,” specially so called—Aristotle, for
example, and Epicurus and the Stoics and certain
others; Cleitomachus and Carneades and other
-Academics treat it as inapprehensible: the Sceptics
-keep on searching.
-
+AcademicsSee Introd. pp. xxxii ff.
+treat it as inapprehensible: the Sceptics keep on searching.
+
Hence it seems reasonable to hold that the main types of
philosophy are three—the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptic.
Of the other systems it will best become others to speak: our
task at present is to describe in outline the Sceptic doctrine,
-‟Doctrine.” ‟School,” ‟system” or ‟way” are other
-possible renderings of ἀγωγή. ‟Procedure,” ‟way of
-thought,” ‟trend,” or ‟line of argument,” ‟leading” (ἄγων)
+‟Doctrine.” ‟School,” ‟system” or ‟way” are other
+possible renderings of ἀγωγή. ‟Procedure,” ‟way of
+thought,” ‟trend,” or ‟line of argument,” ‟leading” (ἄγων)
up to a definite goal, is rather what it connotes.
first premising that of none of our future statements do we
positively affirm that the fact is exactly as we state it,
@@ -61,14 +66,14 @@ of exposition) is called ‟general,” the other ‟special.”
In the general argument we set forth the distinctive
features of Scepticism, stating its purport and
principles, its logical methods, criterion, and end or aim;
-the ‟Tropes,” also, or ‟Modes,” which lead to suspension
+the ‟Tropes,” also, or ‟Modes,”Cf. Introd. p. xxxvii; §§ 36 f. infra. which lead to suspension
of judgement, and in what sense we adopt the Sceptic
formulae, and the distinction between Scepticism
-and the philosophies which stand next to it.
-
+and the philosophies which stand next to it.
+
In the special argument we state our objections
regarding the several divisions of so-called philosophy.
-Bks. II and III belong to the ‟special”
+Bks. II and III belong to the ‟special”
part of the exposition.
Let us, then, deal first with the general
argument, beginning our description with the names
@@ -85,7 +90,7 @@ produced in the inquirer after his search, and
‟Aporetic” or Dubitative either from its habit of
doubting and seeking, as some say, or from its
indecision as regards assent and denial, and ‟Pyrrhonian”
-from the fact that Pyrrho appears to us to
+from the fact that PyrrhoSee Introd. pp. xxx f. appears to us to
have applied himself to Scepticism more thoroughly
and more conspicuously than his predecessors.
@@ -98,8 +103,8 @@ opposes appearances to judgements in any way
whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the
equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we
are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and
-next to a state of ‟unperturbedness” or quietude.
-
+next to a state of ‟unperturbedness” or quietude.
+
Now we call it an ‟ability” not in any subtle sense,
but simply in respect of its ‟being able.” By
‟appearances” we now mean the objects of sense-
@@ -118,12 +123,12 @@ Or, again, we join ‟in any way whatsoever” to
‟appearances and judgements” in order that we may
not have to inquire how the appearances appear or
how the thought-objects are judged, but may take
-these terms in the simple sense.
-
+these terms in the simple sense.
+
The phrase ‟opposed judgements” we do not employ
in the sense of negations and affirmations only but
simply as equivalent to ‟conflicting judgements.”
-i.e. ‟opposites” includes, for the Sceptics,
+i.e. ‟opposites” includes, for the Sceptics,
‟contraries” (e.g. ‟All are wise”)(‟None are wise”), as well
as ‟contradictories” (e.g. ‟Some are wise”)(‟None are wise”),
whereas the Stoics used it of the latter only.
@@ -175,11 +180,11 @@ say that ‟he does not dogmatize” using ‟dogma”
in the sense, which some give it, of ‟assent to one
of the non-evident objects of scientific inquiry;”
for the Pyrrhonean philosopher assents to nothing
-that is non-evident.
-
+
Moreover, even in the act of enunciating the Sceptic
-formulaeCf. §§187 ff. As there explained, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον
-is eliptical for οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε.concerning things
+formulaeCf. §§187 ff. As there explained, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον
+is eliptical for οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε.concerning things
non-evident—such as the formula ‟No more (one thing than another),”
or the formula ‟I determine nothing,” or any of the others which we shall
presently mention,—he does not dogmatize. For whereas the
@@ -192,8 +197,8 @@ else, as does the formula ‟Nothing is true,”
so also the formula ‟No more” asserts that itself,
like all the rest, is ‟No more (this than that),”
and thus cancels itself along with the rest. And
-of the other formulae we say the same.
-
+of the other formulae we say the same.
+
If then, while the dogmatizer posits the matter of his
dogma as substantial truth, the Sceptic enunciates
his formulae so that they are virtually cancelled by
@@ -202,7 +207,7 @@ enunciation of them. And, most important of all, in
his enunciation of these formulae he states what
appears to himself and announces his own impression
in an undogmatic way, without making any positive
-assertion regarding the external realities.
+assertion regarding the external realities.
Lit. ‟underlying things.” i.e. the essences or reals which
lie behind, and give rise to, sensations or ‟appearances;”
Cf. note in §§48.
@@ -217,14 +222,14 @@ defines a ‟doctrinal rule” as ‟adherence to a number
of dogmas which are dependent both on one another
and on appearances,” and defines ‟dogma” as
‟assent to a non-evident proposition,” then we shall
-say that he has not a doctrinal rule.
-
+say that he has not a doctrinal rule.
+
But if one defines ‟doctrinal rule” as ‟procedure which,
in accordance with appearance, follows a certain line of
reasoning, that reasoning indicating how it is possible
to seem to live rightly (the word ‘rightly’ being
taken, not as referring to virtue only, but in a wider
-senseLit. ‟more smoothly” or ‟simply;” hence ‟in a less
+senseLit. ‟more smoothly” or ‟simply;” hence ‟in a less
restricted, more extensive, way.”) and tending to enable
one to suspend judgement,” then we say that he has a doctrinal rule.
For we follow a line of reasoning which, in accordance
@@ -255,8 +260,8 @@ Those who say that ‟the Sceptics abolish appearances,”
or phenomena, seem to me to be unacquainted
with the statements of our School. For, as we said
above, we do not overthrow the affective sense-
-impressionsi.e. ‟impressions” or ‟presentations”
-which cause ‟affections” or ‟feelings” (πάθη), as described
+impressionsi.e. ‟impressions” or ‟presentations”
+which cause ‟affections” or ‟feelings” (πάθη), as described
in §13 supra. which induce our assent involuntarily;
and these impressions are ‟the appearances.” And
when we question whether the underlying object is
@@ -264,9 +269,9 @@ such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears,
and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself
but the account given of that appearance,—and that
is a different thing from questioning the appearance
-itself.
-
-For example, honeyCf. §213. appears to us to be
+itself.
+
+For example, honeyCf. §213. appears to us to be
sweet (and this we grant, for we perceive sweetness
through the senses), but whether it is also sweet in
its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is
@@ -279,7 +284,7 @@ Dogmatists; for if reason is such a trickster as to all
but snatch away the appearances from under our very
eyes, surely we should view it with suspicion in the
case of things non-evident so as not to display rashness
-by following it.i.e. the ‟reason,” or logic, which serves to discredit
+by following it.i.e. the ‟reason,” or logic, which serves to discredit
phenomena may be used a fortiori to discredit ultra-sensible
objects. Instead of ‟abolishing appearances” it really (as
the Sceptics contend) abolishes itself.
@@ -293,12 +298,12 @@ we say about the Criterion of the Sceptic School.
The word ‟Criterion” is used in two senses: in the
one it means ‟the standard regulating belief in
reality or unreality,” (and this we shall discuss in
-our refutationCf. ii. 14 ff.);
+our refutationCf. ii. 14 ff.);
in the other it denotes the standard
of action by conforming to which in the conduct of
life we perform some actions and abstain from others;
-and it is of the latter that we are now speaking.
-
+and it is of the latter that we are now speaking.
+
The criterion, then, of the Sceptic School is, we say,
the appearance, giving this name to what is virtually the
sense-presentation. For since this lies in feeling and
@@ -310,13 +315,13 @@ such as it appears to be.
Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance
with the normal rules of life, undogmatically,
-seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive.Cf. §§226, 237-238.
+seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive.Cf. §§226, 237-238.
And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold,
and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature,
another in the constraint of the passions, another in
the tradition of laws and customs, another in the
-instruction of the arts.
-
+instruction of the arts.
+
Nature’s guidance is that by which we are naturally capable
of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that
whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition
@@ -333,16 +338,16 @@ Our next subject will be the End of the Sceptic
system. Now an ‟End” is ‟that for which all
actions or reasonings are undertaken, while it exists
for the sake of none;” or, otherwise, ‟the ultimate
-object of appetency.”Cf. De fin. i. 12. 42 ‟vel
-summum bonum vel ultimum vel extremum, quod Graeci
-τέλος nominant, quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem,
-ad id autem res referuntur omnes.” Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 1. 1.
-καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ᾽ἐφείται; ibid. 5 τέλος
-ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δἰ αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο.
+object of appetency.”Cf. De fin. i. 12. 42 ‟vel
+summum bonum vel ultimum vel extremum, quod Graeci
+τέλος nominant, quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem,
+ad id autem res referuntur omnes.” Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 1. 1.
+καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ᾽ἐφείται; ibid. 5 τέλος
+ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δἰ αὑτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο.
We assert still that the Sceptic’s End is quietude in respect of matters of
opinion and moderate feeling in respect of things
-unavoidable.
-
+
For the Sceptic, having set out to
philosophize with the object of passing judgement
on the sense-impressions and ascertaining which of
@@ -351,8 +356,8 @@ thereby, found himself involved in contradictions of
equal weight, and being unable to decide between
them suspended judgement; and as he was thus in
suspense there followed, as it happened, the state
-of quietude in respect of matters of opinion.
-
+of quietude in respect of matters of opinion.
+
For the man who opines that anything is by nature good
or bad is for ever being disquieted: when he is
without the things which he deems good he believes
@@ -362,22 +367,22 @@ good; which when he has obtained he keeps falling
into still more perturbations because of his irrational
and immoderate elation, and in his dread of a change
of fortune he uses every endeavour to avoid losing
-the things which he deems good.
-
+the things which he deems good.
+
On the other hand, the man who determines
nothing as to what is naturally
good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything
eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed.
The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which
-is said to have befallen the painter Apelles.Court painter
+is said to have befallen the painter Apelles.Court painter
to Alexander the Great (circa 350-300 B.C.) Once,
they say, when he was painting a horse and wished
to represent in the painting the horse’s foam, he was
so unsuccessful that he gave up the attempt and flung
at the picture the sponge on which he used to wipe
the paints off his brush, and the mark of the sponge
-produced the effect of a horse’s foam.
-
+produced the effect of a horse’s foam.
+
So, too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude
by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the
objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect
@@ -387,8 +392,8 @@ even as a shadow follows its substance. We do
not, however, suppose that the Sceptic is wholly
untroubled; but we say that he is troubled by things
unavoidable; for we grant that he is cold at times
-and thirsty, and suffers various affections of that kind.
-
+and thirsty, and suffers various affections of that kind.
+
But even in these cases, whereas ordinary people are
afflicted by two circumstances,—namely, by the affections
themselves and, in no less a degree, by the belief that
@@ -398,7 +403,7 @@ all these conditions, escapes here too with less discomfort.
Hence we say that, while in regard to matters of opinion
the Sceptic’s End is quietude, in regard to things
unavoidable it is ‟moderate affection.” But some notable
-ScepticsViz. Timon and Aenesidemus; cf. Diog. Laert. ix 107.
+ScepticsViz. Timon and Aenesidemus; cf. Diog. Laert. ix 107.
have added the further definition ‟suspension
of judgement in investigations.”
@@ -412,18 +417,18 @@ next task to explain how we arrive at this suspension.
Speaking generally, one may say that it is the result
of setting things in opposition. We oppose either
appearances to appearances or objects of thought to
-objects of thought or alternando.
-
+objects of thought or alternando.
+
For instance, we oppose appearances to appearances
-when we say ‟The same tower appears round from a distance,
+when we say ‟The same towerCf. § 118 appears round from a distance,
but square from close at hand;” and thoughts to
thoughts, when in answer to him who argues the
existence of Providence from the order of the heavenly
bodies we oppose the fact that often the good fare
ill and the bad fare well, and draw from this the
-inference that Providence does not exist.
-
-And thoughts we oppose to appearances, as when Anaxagoras
+inference that Providence does not exist.
+
+And thoughts we oppose to appearances, as when AnaxagorasSee Introd. p. xi; cf. ii. 244.
countered the notion that snow is white with the
argument, ‟Snow is frozen water, and water is
black; therefore snow also is black.” With a
@@ -431,8 +436,8 @@ different idea we oppose things present sometimes
to things present, as in the foregoing examples, and
sometimes to things past or future, as, for instance,
when someone propounds to us a theory which we
-are unable to refute, we say to him in reply,
-
+are unable to refute, we say to him in reply,
+
‟Just as, before the birth of the founder of the School
to which you belong, the theory it holds was not as yet
apparent as a sound theory, although it was really
@@ -463,15 +468,14 @@ the variety in animals; the second, on the differences
in human beings; the third, on the different structures
of the organs of sense; the fourth, on the
circumstantial conditions; the fifth, on positions and
-intervals and locations; the sixth, on intermixtures;
-
+intervals and locations; the sixth, on intermixtures;
+
the seventh, on the quantities and formations of the
underlying objects; the eighth, on the fact of relativity;
the ninth, on the frequency or rarity of
occurrence; the tenth, on the disciplines and customs
-and laws, the legendary beliefs and the dogmatic
-convictions.
-
+and laws, the legendary beliefs and the dogmatic convictions.
+
This order, however, we adopt without prejudice.
As superordinate to these there stand three Modes
—that based on the subject who judges, that on the
@@ -482,8 +486,8 @@ either an animal or a man or a sense, and existent in
some condition): the seventh and tenth Modes are
referred to that based on the object judged: the
fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth are referred to the Mode
-based on both subject and object.
-
+based on both subject and object.
+
Furthermore, these three Modes are also referred to that
of relation, so that the Mode of relation stands as the
highest genus, and the three as species, and the ten as
@@ -496,8 +500,8 @@ which shows that the same impressions are not produced
by the same objects owing to the differences
in animals. This we infer both from the differences
in their origins and from the variety of their bodily
-structures.
-
+
Thus, as to origin, some animals are produced
without sexual union, others by coition. And
of those produced without coition, some come from
@@ -509,15 +513,15 @@ others from mud, like worms; others from asses, like
beetles; others from greens, like caterpillars; others
from fruits, like the gall-insects in wild figs; others
from rotting animals, as bees from bulls and wasps
-from horses.
-
+
Of the animals generated by coition,
some—in fact the majority—come from homogeneous
parents, others from heterogeneous parents, as do
mules. Again, of animals in general, some are born
alive, like men ; others are born as eggs, like birds;
-and yet others as lumps of flesh, like bears.
-
+and yet others as lumps of flesh, like bears.
+
It is natural, then, that these dissimilar and variant
modes of birth should produce much contrariety
of sense-affection, and that this is a source of its
@@ -534,17 +538,17 @@ whose eyes are bloodshot call them blood-red. Since,
then, some animals also have eyes which are yellow,
others bloodshot, others albino, others of other
colours, they probably, I suppose, have different
-perceptions of colour.
-
+
Moreover, if we bend down over a book after having gazed
long and fixedly at the sun, the letters seem to us to be
golden in colour and circling round. Since, then, some animals
possess also a natural brilliance in their eyes, and emit
from them a fine and mobile stream of light, so that they
-can even see by night,Cf. §84. we seem bound to suppose
+can even see by night,Cf. §84. we seem bound to suppose
that they are differently affected from us by external
-objects.
-
+
Jugglers, too, by means of smearing lamp-wicks
with the rust of copper or with the juice of the
cuttle-fish make the bystanders appear now copper-
@@ -552,8 +556,8 @@ coloured and now black—and that by just a small
sprinkling of extra matter. Surely, then, we have
much more reason to suppose that when different
juices are intermingled in the vision of animals their
-impressions of the objects will become different.
-
+impressions of the objects will become different.
+
Again, when we press the eyeball at one side the
forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong
and narrow. So it is probable that all animals which
@@ -561,22 +565,22 @@ have the pupil of the eye slanting and elongated—
such as goats, cats, and similar animals—have impressions
of the objects which are different and unlike the notions
formed of them by the animals which have
-round pupils.
-
+
Mirrors, too, owing to differences in
-their construction, represent the external objectsτὰ ὑποκείμενα
+their construction, represent the external objectsτὰ ὑποκείμενα
(Lat. sub-stantia) is a favorite term with Sextus for the objective realities which
‟underlie,” or lie behind, the subjective impressions of sense (phenomena):
-they are called ἐκτός as ‟outside” of and not dependent on the percipient.
+they are called ἐκτός as ‟outside” of and not dependent on the percipient.
I render the term indifferently by ‟objects,” ‟real objects” or
‟realities,” and ‟underlying objects.” at
one time as very small—as when the mirror is concave,
—at another time as elongated and narrow—as when
the mirror is convex. Some mirrors, too, show the
head of the figure reflected at the bottom and the
-feet at the top.
+feet at the top.
-
+
Since, then, some organs of sight
actually protrude beyond the face owing to their
convexity, while others are quite concave, and others
@@ -599,8 +603,8 @@ those with a very wide one, or in animals with hairy
ears and those with smooth ears? For, as regards this
sense, even we ourselves find our hearing affected in
one way when we have our ears plugged and in
-another way when we use them just as they are.
-
+another way when we use them just as they are.
+
Smell also will differ because of the variety in animals.
For if we ourselves are affected in one way when we
have a cold and our internal phlegm is excessive, and
@@ -612,8 +616,8 @@ animals too—since some are flaccid by nature and
rich in phlegm, others rich in blood, others marked
by a predominant excess of yellow or of black gall—
are in each case impressed in different ways by the
-objects of smell.
-
+
So too with the objects of taste;
for some animals have rough and dry tongues, others
extremely moist tongues. We ourselves, too, when
@@ -624,8 +628,8 @@ predominating juices which we are said to contain.
Since, then, animals also have organs of taste which
differ and which have different juices in excess,
in respect of taste also they will receive different
-impressions of the real objects.
-
+impressions of the real objects.
+
For just as the same food when digested becomes in one
place a vein, in another an artery, in another a bone,
in another a sinew, or some other piece of the body,
@@ -633,8 +637,8 @@ displaying a different potency according to the difference
in the parts which receive it;—and just as the same unblended
water, when it is absorbed by trees, becomes in one place bark,
in another branch, in another blossom, and so finally fig and
-quince and each of the other fruits;
-
+quince and each of the other fruits;
+
—and just as the single identical breath of a musician
breathed into a flute becomes here a shrill note and there
a deep note, and the same pressure of his hand on the
@@ -649,9 +653,9 @@ oil seems very agreeable to men, but intolerable to
beetles and bees; and olive oil is beneficial to men,
but when poured on wasps and bees it destroys them;
and sea-water is a disagreeable and poisonous potion
-for men, but fish drink and enjoy it.
+for men, but fish drink and enjoy it.
-
+
Pigs, too, enjoy wallowing in the most stinking mire
rather than in clear and clean water. And whereas
some animals eat grass, others eat shrubs, others
@@ -659,18 +663,18 @@ feed in woods, others live on seeds or flesh or milk;
some of them, too, prefer their food high, others like
it fresh, and while some prefer it raw, others like it
cooked. And so generally, the things which are agreeable
-to some are to others disagreeable, distasteful and deadly.
+to some are to others disagreeable, distasteful and deadly.
-
+
Thus, quails are fattened by hemlock, and pigs by
henbane; and pigs also enjoy eating salamanders,
just as deer enjoy poisonous creatures, and swallows
gnats. So ants and wood-lice, when swallowed by
men, cause distress and gripings, whereas the bear,
whenever she falls sick, cures herself by licking them
-up.
+up.
-
+
The mere touch of an oak-twig paralyses the
viper, and that of a plane-leaf the bat. The elephant
flees from the ram, the lion from the cock, sea-
@@ -691,13 +695,13 @@ For we cannot ourselves judge between our own
impressions and those of the other animals, since we
ourselves are involved in the dispute and are, therefore,
rather in need of a judge than competent to
-pass judgement ourselves.
+pass judgement ourselves.
-
+
Besides, we are unable, either with or without proof,
to prefer our own impressions to those of the irrational
animals. For in addition to the probability that proof is,
-as we shall show,See ii. 134 ff. where it is argued that
+as we shall show,See ii. 134 ff. where it is argued that
logical demonstration or ‟proof” is ‟non-existent.” The argument here is
that, even if we grant the existence of ‟proof” in the abstract we cannot prove
anything in the particular case before us—the question as to the superiority
@@ -711,11 +715,10 @@ it is non-apparent, we shall not accept it with confidence;
while if it is apparent to us, inasmuch as what is apparent
to animals is the point in question and the proof is apparent
to us who are animals, it follows that we shall have to question
-the proof itself as to whether it is as true as it is apparent.
-
-
+the proof itself as to whether it is as true as it is apparent.
+
It is, indeed, absurd to attempt to establish the matter
-in question by means of the matter in question,This would
+in question by means of the matter in question,This would
be the fallacy of petitio principii, or ‟arguing in a circle;”
cf. §§ 117, 164. since in that case the same thing will be at once believed and
disbelieved,—believed in so far as it purports to prove,
@@ -728,18 +731,16 @@ animals their sense-impressions differ, and it is impossible
to judge between them, we must necessarily
suspend judgement regarding the external underlying
objects.
-
-By way of super-addition,i.e. as a further, superfluous or jocular,
+By way of super-addition,i.e. as a further, superfluous or jocular,
kind of argument, which serves to ‟cap” the serious treatment of questions: cf. §§ 63, 78.
too, we draw comparisons between mankind and the so-called irrational animals
in respect of their sense-impressions. For, after our
solid arguments, we deem it quite proper to poke fun
-at those conceited braggarts, the Dogmatists.Esp. the Stoics. As
+at those conceited braggarts, the Dogmatists.Esp. the Stoics. As
a rule, our School compare the irrational animals in
-the mass with mankind;
-
-
+
but since the Dogmatists captiously assert that the comparison
is unequal, we—super-adding yet more—will carry our ridicule
further and base our argument on one animal only, the dog for
@@ -754,12 +755,12 @@ animal, the dog, excels us in point of sensation: as
to smell it is more sensitive than we are, since by
this sense it tracks beasts that it cannot see; and
with its eyes it sees them more quickly than we do;
-and with its ears it is keen of perception.
+and with its ears it is keen of perception.
-
+
Next let us proceed to the reasoning faculty. Of
reason one kind is internal, implanted in the soul, the other
-externally expressed.The Stoic theory of logos thus distinguished between its two senses—
+externally expressed.The Stoic theory of logos thus distinguished between its two senses—
internal reason, or conception, and the enunciation of thought in the uttered word.
Let us consider first the internal reason. Now according to those Dogmatists
who are, at present, our chief opponents—I mean the
@@ -768,68 +769,68 @@ with the following matters: the choice of things congenial
and the avoidance of things alien; the knowledge of the
arts contributing thereto; the apprehension
of the virtues pertaining to one’s proper
-nature and of those relating to the passions.
+nature and of those relating to the passions.
-
+
Now the dog—the animal upon which, by way of example,
we have decided to base our argument—exercises
choice of the congenial and avoidance of the harmful,
in that it hunts after food and slinks away from a
raised whip. Moreover, it possesses an art which
-supplies what is congenial, namely hunting.
+supplies what is congenial, namely hunting.
-
+
Nor is it devoid even of virtue; for certainly if justice
-consists in rendering to each his due,Cf. [Plato], Deff. 411e.
+consists in rendering to each his due,Cf. [Plato], Deff. 411e.
the dog, that welcomes and guards its friends and benefactors but
drives off strangers and evil-doers, cannot be lacking
-injustice.
+injustice.
-
+
But if he possesses this virtue, then, since
the virtues are interdependent, he possesses also all
-the other virtues; and these, say the philosophers,i.e. the Stoics.
+the other virtues; and these, say the philosophers,i.e. the Stoics.
the majority of men do not possess. That the dog is
also valiant we see by the way he repels attacks, and
-intelligent as well, as Homer too testifiedSee Odyss. xvii. 300. when he
+intelligent as well, as Homer too testifiedSee Odyss. xvii. 300. when he
sang how Odysseus went unrecognized by all the
people of his own household and was recognized only
by the dog Argus, who neither was deceived by the
bodily alterations of the hero nor had lost his original
apprehensive impression, which indeed he evidently
-retained better than the men.
+retained better than the men.
-
+
And according to Chrysippus, who shows special interest
in irrational animals, the dog even shares in the far-famed
-‟Dialectic.”i.e. the Stoic logic, cf. ii. 94. This person, at any rate, declares that the dog
-makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogismThe Stoics had five syllogisms which they termed anapodeictic, or ‟indemonstrable,” since they required no proof themselves but served to prove others. The ‟complex” syllogism was of the forms: ‟Either A or B or C exists; but neither A nor B exists; therefore C exists.”
+‟Dialectic.”i.e. the Stoic logic, cf. ii. 94. This person, at any rate, declares that the dog
+makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogismThe Stoics had five syllogisms which they termed anapodeictic, or ‟indemonstrable,” since they required no proof themselves but served to prove others. The ‟complex” syllogism was of the forms: ‟Either A or B or C exists; but neither A nor B exists; therefore C exists.”
when, on arriving at a spot where three ways meet, after smelling
at the two roads by which the quarry did not pass, he rushes
off at once by the third without stopping to smell. For, says the old
writer, the dog implicitly reasons thus: ‟The creature
went either by this road, or by that, or by the other:
but it did not go by this road or by that: therefore it
-went by the other.”
+went by the other.”
-
+
Moreover, the dog is capable of comprehending and
assuaging his own sufferings; for when a thorn has
got stuck in his foot he hastens to remove it by
rubbing his foot on the ground and by using his teeth.
And if he has a wound anywhere, because dirty wounds
are hard to cure whereas clean ones heal easily, the
-dog gently licks off the pus that has gathered.
+dog gently licks off the pus that has gathered.
-
+
Nay more, the dog admirably observes the prescription
-of Hippocrates:The famous physician, of Cos (circa 460-400 B.C.). rest being what cures the foot, whenever
+of Hippocrates:The famous physician, of Cos (circa 460-400 B.C.). rest being what cures the foot, whenever
he gets his foot hurt he lifts it up and keeps it as far
as possible free from pressure. And when distressed by
unwholesome humours he eats grass, by the help of
-which he vomits what is unwholesome and gets well again.
+which he vomits what is unwholesome and gets well again.
-
+
If, then, it has been shown that the animal upon which,
as an example, we have based our argument not only chooses
the wholesome and avoids the noxious, but also possesses
@@ -840,29 +841,29 @@ being the things in which the perfection of internal
reason consists—the dog will be thus far perfect.
And that, I suppose, is why certain of the professors
of philosophy have adorned themselves with the title
-of this animal.A sarcastic allusion to the Cynics; cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 13, Introd. p. xvi.
+of this animal.
A sarcastic allusion to the Cynics; cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 13, Introd. p. xvi.
Concerning external reason, or speech, it is unnecessary
for the present to inquire; for it has been
rejected even by some of the Dogmatists as being
a hindrance to the acquisition of virtue, for which
-reason they used to practise silenceFor the Pythagorean rule of silence (ἐχεμυθία) cf. Diog. Laert. viii. 10. during the period
+reason they used to practise silenceFor the Pythagorean rule of silence (ἐχεμυθία) cf. Diog. Laert. viii. 10. during the period
of instruction; and besides, supposing that a man is
dumb, no one will therefore call him irrational. But
to pass over these cases, we certainly see animals—
the subject of our argument—uttering quite human
-cries,—jays, for instance, and others.
+cries,—jays, for instance, and others.
-
+
And, leaving this point also aside, even if we do not
understand the utterances of the so-called irrational
animals, still it is not improbable that they converse
although we fail to understand them; for in fact when we
listen to the talk of barbarians we do not understand it,
-and it seems to us a kind of uniform chatter.
+and it seems to us a kind of uniform chatter.
-
+
Moreover, we hear dogs uttering one sound when they are
driving people off, another when they are howling,
and one sound when beaten, and a quite different
@@ -872,16 +873,16 @@ examines the matter carefully will find a great variety
of utterance according to the different circumstances,
so that, in consequence, the so-called irrational
animals may justly be said to participate in external
-reason.
+reason.
-
+
But if they neither fall short of mankind in
the accuracy of their perceptions, nor in internal
reason, nor yet (to go still further) in external reason,
or speech, then they will deserve no less credence
-than ourselves in respect of their sense-impressions.
+than ourselves in respect of their sense-impressions.
-
+
Probably, too, we may reach this conclusion by basing
our argument on each single class of irrational animals.
Thus, for example, who would deny that birds excel
@@ -915,48 +916,46 @@ even our own differences of themselves lead to suspense.
For man, you know, is said to be compounded
of two things, soul and body, and in both these we
differ one from another.
-
Thus, as regards the body, we differ in our figures
-and ‟idiosyncrasies,” or constitutional peculiarities.Our word ‟idiosyncrasy” comes from ἰδιοσυγκρασία, a later form of ἰδιοσυγκρισία. σύγκρισις (or σύμμιξις) is Anaxagoras's term for the process of ‟composition” by which the world comes into being; cf. Intro. p. xi.
+and ‟idiosyncrasies,” or constitutional peculiarities.
Our word ‟idiosyncrasy” comes from ἰδιοσυγκρασία, a later form of ἰδιοσυγκρισία. σύγκρισις (or σύμμιξις) is Anaxagoras's term for the process of ‟composition” by which the world comes into being; cf. Intro. p. xi.
-
+
The body of an Indian differs in shape from that of
a Scythian; and it is said that what causes the variation
is a difference in the predominant humours,
Owing to this difference in the predominant humours
the sense-impressions also come to differ, as we
-indicated in our First Argument.See § 52. So too in respect of
+indicated in our First Argument.See § 52. So too in respect of
choice and avoidance of external objects men exhibit
great differences: thus Indians enjoy some things,
our people other things, and the enjoyment of different
things is an indication that we receive varying
-impressions from the underlying objects.
+impressions from the underlying objects.
-
+
In respect of our ‟idiosyncrasies,” our differences are
such that some of us digest the flesh of oxen more
easily than rock-fish, or get diarrhoea from the weak wine of
Lesbos. An old wife of Attica, they say, swallowed
with impunity thirty drams of hemlock, and Lysis
-took four drams of poppy-juice without hurt.
+took four drams of poppy-juice without hurt.
-
+
Demophon, Alexander’s butler, used to shiver when he was
in the sun or in a hot bath, but felt warm in the shade:
Athenagoras the Argive took no hurt from the stings
-of scorpions and poisonous spiders; and the Psyllaeans,A tribe of N. Africa, cf. Hdt. iv. 173.
+of scorpions and poisonous spiders; and the Psyllaeans,A tribe of N. Africa, cf. Hdt. iv. 173.
as they are called, are not harmed by bites
-from snakes and asps,
-
-
-nor are the TentyritaeTentrya was a town in Upper Egypt; cf. Juvenal xv. of Egypt harmed by the crocodile.
-Further, those Ethiopians who live beyond Lake MeroëIn S. Egypt. The ‟Astapous” is the Blue Nile. on
+from snakes and asps,
+
+nor are the TentyritaeTentrya was a town in Upper Egypt; cf. Juvenal xv. of Egypt harmed by the crocodile.
+Further, those Ethiopians who live beyond Lake MeroëIn S. Egypt. The ‟Astapous” is the Blue Nile. on
the banks of the river Astapous eat with impunity scorpions,
snakes, and the like. Rufinus of Chalcis when he drank hellebore
neither vomited nor suffered at all from purging, but swallowed
-and digested it just like any ordinary drink.
+and digested it just like any ordinary drink.
-
+
Chrysermus the Herophilean doctor was liable to
get a heart attack if ever he took pepper;
and Soterichus the surgeon was seized with diarrhoea
@@ -964,7 +963,7 @@ whenever he smelled fried sprats. Andron the Argive
was so immune from thirst that he actually traversed
the waterless country of Libya without needing a
drink. Tiberius Caesar could see in the dark; and
-AristotleSee Aristot. Meterol. iii. 4. tells of a Thasian who fancied that the
+AristotleSee Aristot. Meterol. iii. 4. tells of a Thasian who fancied that the
image of a man was continually going in front of him.
@@ -978,31 +977,30 @@ But the greatest proof of the vast and endless differences
in men’s intelligence is the discrepancy in the
statements of the Dogmatists concerning the right
objects of choice and avoidance, as well as other
-things.
-
-
+
Regarding this the poets, too, have expressed
-themselves fittingly. Thus Pindar says:
Fragm. 242 (Boeckh), Sandys' Pindar, in Loeb Library, p.610, copied by Horace, Odes, i. 1. 3 ff.
-
-
The crowns and trophies of his storm-foot steeds
-Give joy to one ; yet others find it joy
-To dwell in gorgeous chambers gold-bedeckt;
-Some even take delight in voyaging
-O’er ocean’s billows in a speeding barque.
-
-
And the poetSee Homer, Odyss, xiv. 228. Cf. Virgil, Ecl. ii. 65 ‟tahit sua quemque voluntas;” and ‟quot homines, tot sententiae.” says: ‟One thing is pleasing to one
+themselves fittingly. Thus Pindar says:Fragm. 242 (Boeckh), Sandys' Pindar, in Loeb Library, p.610, copied by Horace, Odes, i. 1. 3 ff.
+
+The crowns and trophies of his storm-foot steeds
+Give joy to one ; yet others find it joy
+To dwell in gorgeous chambers gold-bedeckt;
+Some even take delight in voyaging
+O’er ocean’s billows in a speeding barque.
+
+And the poetSee Homer, Odyss, xiv. 228. Cf. Virgil, Ecl. ii. 65 ‟tahit sua quemque voluntas;” and ‟quot homines, tot sententiae.” says: ‟One thing is pleasing to one
man, another thing to another.” Tragedy, too, is
-full of such sayings; for example:
-
-
Were fair and wise the same thing unto all,
-There had been no contentious quarrelling.From Eurip. Phoen. 499 ff.
-
-
And again:
+full of such sayings; for example:
+
+Were fair and wise the same thing unto all,
+There had been no contentious quarrelling.From Eurip. Phoen. 499 ff.
-
'Tis strange that the same thing abhorr’d by some
-Should give delight to others.See Fragm. Trag. adesp. 462 (Nauck): perhaps from Eurip.
+And again:
+
+'Tis strange that the same thing abhorr’d by some
+Should give delight to others.See Fragm. Trag. adesp. 462 (Nauck): perhaps from Eurip.
-
+
Seeing, then, that choice and avoidance depend on
pleasure and displeasure, while pleasure and displeasure
depend on sensation and sense-impression,
@@ -1017,9 +1015,9 @@ reasonably be led to suspension of judgement. For while
we are, no doubt, able to state what each of the
underlying objects appears to be, relatively to each
difference, we are incapable of explaining what it is
-in reality.
+in reality.
-
+
For we shall have to believe either all
men or some. But if we believe all, we shall be
attempting the impossible and accepting contradictories;
@@ -1027,9 +1025,9 @@ and if some, let us be told whose opinions we
are to endorse. For the Platonist will say ‟Plato’s;”
the Epicurean, ‟Epicurus’s;” and so on with the
rest; and thus by their unsettled disputations they
-will bring us round again to a state of suspense.
+will bring us round again to a state of suspense.
-
+
Moreover, he who maintains that we ought to assent
to the majority is making a childish proposal, since
no one is able to visit the whole of mankind and
@@ -1053,29 +1051,28 @@ controversy; and if, when judging appearances, they
have already given the preference to themselves, then,
by thus entrusting themselves with the judgement,
they are begging the question before the judgement
-is begun.
+is begun.
-
+
Nevertheless, in order that we may arrive
at suspension of judgement by basing our argument
on one person—such as, for example, their visionary
-‟Sage”
For exceptions see § 101.—we adopt the Mode which comes Third
+‟Sage”
The ideal ‟Wise Man” of the Stoics; See Introd. p. xxviii.—we adopt the Mode which comes Third
in order.
-
This Third Mode is, we say, based on differences
in the senses. That the senses differ from one
-another is obvious.
+another is obvious.
-
+
Thus, to the eye paintings seem to have recesses and
projections, but not so to the touch. Honey, too, seems
-to some pleasant to the tongue but unpleasant to the eyes;
+to someFor exceptions see § 101. pleasant to the tongue but unpleasant to the eyes;
so that it is impossible to say whether it is absolutely
pleasant or unpleasant. The same is true of sweet oil, for
-it pleases the sense of smell but displeases the taste.
+it pleases the sense of smell but displeases the taste.
-
-So too with spurge:A species of plants with acrid, milky juice. since it pains the eyes but
+
+So too with spurge:A species of plants with acrid, milky juice. since it pains the eyes but
causes no pain to any other part of the body, we cannot
say whether, in its real nature, it is absolutely painful
or painless to bodies. Rain-water, too, is beneficial
@@ -1098,26 +1095,26 @@ possesses these qualities only; or whether it has but
one quality but appears varied owing to the varying
structure of the sense-organs; or whether, again, it
has more qualities than are apparent, some of which
-elude our perception.
+elude our perception.
-
+
That the apple has but one quality might be argued from what
-we said aboveSee § 53 regarding the food absorbed by bodies, and the water
+we said aboveSee § 53 regarding the food absorbed by bodies, and the water
sucked up by trees, and the breath in flutes and pipes and similar
instruments; for the apple likewise may be all of one sort but appear
different owing to differences in the sense-organs in which perception
-takes place.
+takes place.
-
+
And that the apple may possibly possess more qualities
than those apparent to us we argue in this way. Let us
imagine a man who possesses from birth the senses of touch,
taste and smell, but can neither hear nor see. This man, then,
will assume that nothing visible or audible has any existence,
but only those three kinds of qualities which he is able to
-apprehend.
+apprehend.
-
+
Possibly, then, we also, having only
our five senses, perceive only such of the apple's
qualities as we are capable of apprehending; and
@@ -1136,9 +1133,9 @@ Nature. For he who decides the question as to the
existence of Nature will be discredited by them if
he is an ordinary person, while if he is a philosopher
he will be a party to the controversy and therefore
-himself subject to judgement and not a judge.
+himself subject to judgement and not a judge.
-
+
If, however, it is possible that only those qualities
which we seem to perceive subsist in the apple, or that a
greater number subsist, or, again, that not even the
@@ -1157,14 +1154,14 @@ our argument on each sense singly, or even
by disregarding the senses, we further adopt the
Fourth Mode of suspension. This is the Mode based,
as we say, on the ‟circumstances,” meaning by
-‟circumstances” conditions or dispositions.i.e. the mental or physical state of the subject at the moment of perception. And this
+‟circumstances” conditions or dispositions.i.e. the mental or physical state of the subject at the moment of perception. And this
Mode, we say, deals with states that are natural or
unnatural, with waking or sleeping, with conditions
due to age, motion or rest, hatred or love, emptiness
or fulness, drunkenness or soberness, predispositions,
-confidence or fear, grief or joy.
+confidence or fear, grief or joy.
-
+
Thus, according as the mental state is natural or unnatural,
objects produce dissimilar impressions, as when men in a frenzy
or in a state of ecstasy believe they hear daemons’ voices, while
@@ -1174,9 +1171,9 @@ though we fail to perceive them. Also, the same water which feels
very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us.And the
same coat which seems of a bright yellow colour to men with blood-shot
eyes does not appear so to me. And the same honey seems to
-me sweet, but bitter to men with jaundice.
+me sweet, but bitter to men with jaundice.
-
+
Now should anyone say that it is an intermixture of
certain humours which produces in those who are in an
unnatural state improper impressions from the under-
@@ -1185,16 +1182,16 @@ persons also have mixed humours, these humours too
are capable of causing the external objects—which
really are such as they appear to those who are said
to be in an unnatural state—to appear other than they
-are to healthy persons.
+are to healthy persons.
-
+
For to ascribe the power of altering the underlying objects
to those humours, and not to these, is purely fanciful; since
just as healthy men are in a state that is natural for the healthy
but unnatural for the sick, so also sick men are in a state that is
unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so that to these
last also we must give credence as being, relatively speaking, in a
-natural state.This is aimed against the Stoic view that only the healthy, or normal, is ‟natural.”
+natural state.
This is aimed against the Stoic view that only the healthy, or normal, is ‟natural.”
Sleeping and waking, too, give rise to different
@@ -1204,19 +1201,19 @@ imagine when awake; so that the existence or non-
existence of our impressions is not absolute but
relative, being in relation to our sleeping or waking
condition. Probably, then, in dreams we see things
-which to our waking state are unreal,ἀνύπαρκτα (from ὑπάρχω, ‟subsist”) is an Epicurean term for ‟non-existent.” although not
+which to our waking state are unreal,ἀνύπαρκτα (from ὑπάρχω, ‟subsist”) is an Epicurean term for ‟non-existent.” although not
wholly unreal; for they exist in our dreams, just as
waking realities exist although non-existent in dreams.
-Age is another cause of difference.For age as affecting character cf. Aristot. Rhet. ii. 12 ff. For the same
+Age is another cause of difference.For age as affecting character cf. Aristot. Rhet. ii. 12 ff. For the same
air seems chilly to the old but mild to those in their
prime; and the same colour appears faint to older
men but vivid to those in their prime; and similarly
the same sound seems to the former faint, but to the
-latter clearly audible.
+latter clearly audible.
-
+
Moreover, those who differ in age are differently moved
in respect of choice and avoidance. For whereas children—to
take a case—are all eagerness for balls and hoops, men in
@@ -1230,25 +1227,23 @@ Another cause why the real objects appear different
lies in motion and rest. For those objects which,
when we are standing still, we see to be motionless,
we imagine to be in motion when we are sailing
-past them.Cf. Lucret. iv. 388.
+past them.
Cf. Lucret. iv. 388.
Love and hatred are a cause, as when some have
an extreme aversion to pork while others greatly
-enjoy eating it. Hence, too, Menander said:Fragm. 518 (Kock). It is supposed that these lines were spoken by a maiden of her lover who had fallen into evil ways.
-
-
Mark now his visage, what a change is there
-Since he has come to this! How bestial!
-'Tis actions fair that make the fairest face.
-
-
Many lovers, too, who have ugly mistresses think
-them most beautiful.Cf. Horace, Sat. i. 3. 38.
+enjoy eating it. Hence, too, Menander said:Fragm. 518 (Kock). It is supposed that these lines were spoken by a maiden of her lover who had fallen into evil ways.
+
+Mark now his visage, what a change is there
+Since he has come to this! How bestial!
+'Tis actions fair that make the fairest face.
+Many lovers, too, who have ugly mistresses think
+them most beautiful.Cf. Horace, Sat. i. 3. 38.
Hunger and satiety are a cause; for the same food
seems agreeable to the hungry but disagreeable to
the sated.
-
Drunkenness and soberness are a cause; since
actions which we think shameful when sober do not
seem shameful to us when drunk.
@@ -1257,7 +1252,7 @@ seem shameful to us when drunk.
Predispositions are a cause; for the same wine
which seems sour to those who have previously eaten
dates or figs, seems sweet to those who have just
-consumed nuts or chick-peas; and the vestibulei.e. the tepidarium, of moderate temperature. of
+consumed nuts or chick-peas; and the vestibulei.e. the tepidarium, of moderate temperature. of
the bath-house, which warms those entering from
outside, chills those coming out of the bath-room if
they stop long in it.
@@ -1266,7 +1261,6 @@ they stop long in it.
Fear and boldness are a cause; as what seems to
the coward fearful and formidable does not seem so
in the least to the bold man.
-
Grief and joy are a cause; since the same affairs
are burdensome to those in grief but delightful to
those who rejoice.
@@ -1287,9 +1281,9 @@ motion nor at rest, of no definite age, and devoid of
all the other dispositions as well—is the height of
absurdity. And if he is to judge the sense-impressions
while he is in some one disposition, he will be a
-party to the disagreement,Cf. § 90.
+party to the disagreement,Cf. § 90.
-
+
and, moreover, he will not be an impartial judge of the
external underlying objects owing to his being confused
by the dispositions in which he is placed. The waking person,
@@ -1307,9 +1301,9 @@ without proof or critically and with proof; but he
can do this neither without these means (for then he
would be discredited) nor with them. For if he is to
pass judgement on the impressions he must certainly
-judge them by a criterion;
+judge them by a criterion;
-
+
this criterion, then, he will declare to be true, or else false.
But if false, he will be discredited; whereas, if he shall declare
it to be true, he will be stating that the criterion is true either
@@ -1317,9 +1311,9 @@ without proof or with proof. But if without proof, he will be discredited;
and if with proof, it will certainly be necessary for the proof also
to be true, to avoid being discredited. Shall he, then, affirm the
truth of the proof adopted to establish the criterion after having
-judged it or without judging it?
+judged it or without judging it?
-
+
If without judging, he will be discredited; but if after
Judging, plainly he will say that he has judged it by
a criterion; and of that criterion we shall ask for a
@@ -1328,11 +1322,11 @@ proof always requires a criterion to confirm it, and
the criterion also a proof to demonstrate its truth;
and neither can a proof be sound without the previous
existence of a true criterion nor can the criterion be
-true without the previous confirmation of the proof.
+true without the previous confirmation of the proof.
-
+
So in this way both the criterion and the proof are
-involved in the circular process of reasoning,Cf. §§ 60, 122; ii. 34, 121, etc. and
+involved in the circular process of reasoning,Cf. §§ 60, 122; ii. 34, 121, etc. and
thereby both are found to be untrustworthy; for
since each of them is dependent on the credibility of
the other, the one is lacking in credibility just as much
@@ -1348,7 +1342,7 @@ of external realities.
The Fifth Argument (or Trope) is that based on
positions, distances, and locations; for owing to each
of these the same objects appear different; for
-example, the same porch
Cf. Lucret. iv. 428 ff. when viewed from one of
+example, the same porch
Cf. Lucret. iv. 428 ff. when viewed from one of
its corners appears curtailed, but viewed from the
middle symmetrical on all sides; and the same ship
seems at a distance to be small and stationary, but
@@ -1362,7 +1356,7 @@ due to locations are the following: the light of a lamp
appears dim in the sun but bright in the dark; and
the same oar bent when in the water but straight
when out of the water; and the egg soft when inside
-the fowl but hard when in the air; and the jacinth
‟Lyngurion,” so called from the belief that the stone was made of the urine of the lynx frozen or crystallized.
+the fowl but hard when in the air; and the jacinth
‟Lyngurion,” so called from the belief that the stone was made of the urine of the lynx frozen or crystallized.
fluid when in the lynx but hard when in the air;
and the coral soft when in the sea but hard when in
the air’; and sound seems to differ in quality according
@@ -1386,19 +1380,19 @@ mentioned above, we shall be compelled by this Mode
also to end up in suspension of judgement. For in
fact anyone who purposes to give the preference to
any of these impressions will be attempting the
-impossible.
+impossible.
-
+
For if he shall deliver his judgement simply and without
proof, he will be discredited; and should he, on the other
hand, desire to adduce proof, he will confute himself if
he says that the proof is false, while if he asserts that
the proof is true he will be asked for a proof of its truth,
and again for a proof of this latter proof, since it also must
-be true, and so on ad infinitum.Cf. ii. 128. But to produce proofs to infinity is
-impossible;
+be true, and so on ad infinitum.
Cf. ii. 128. But to produce proofs to infinity is
+impossible;
-
+
so that neither by the use of proofs will
he be able to prefer one sense-impression to another.
If, then, one cannot hope to pass judgement on the
@@ -1416,16 +1410,16 @@ which we conclude that, because none of the real
objects affects our senses by itself but always in
conjunction with something else, though we may
possibly be able to state the nature of the resultant
-mixturei.e. the real (‟external”) object of perception (cf. p. 30 note a) plus the physical conditions which accompany the act of perception; these latter may be either external (e.g. atmospheric) or internal (e.g. peculiarities in the sense-organs of the percipient). formed by the external object and that
+mixturei.e. the real (‟external”) object of perception (cf. p. 30 note a) plus the physical conditions which accompany the act of perception; these latter may be either external (e.g. atmospheric) or internal (e.g. peculiarities in the sense-organs of the percipient). formed by the external object and that
along with which it is perceived, we shall not be able
to say what is the exact nature of the external
reality in itself. That none of the external objects
affects our senses by itself but always in conjunction
with something else, and that, in consequence, it
assumes a different appearance, is, I imagine, quite
-obvious.
+obvious.
-
+
Thus, our own complexion is of one hue in warm air,
of another in cold, and we should not be able to say
what our complexion really is, but only what it looks
@@ -1444,7 +1438,7 @@ vision are not perceived apart from these, they will
not be apprehended with exactness; for what we perceive
is the resultant mixture, and because of this the
sufferers from jaundice see everything yellow, and
-those with blood-shot eyes reddish like blood.Cf. §§ 44, 101 supra. And
+those with blood-shot eyes reddish like blood.Cf. §§ 44, 101 supra. And
since the same sound seems of one quality in open
places, of another in narrow and winding places, and
different in clear air and in murky air, it is probable
@@ -1452,9 +1446,9 @@ that we do not apprehend the sound in its real
purity; for the ears have crooked and narrow passages,
which are also befogged by vaporous effluvia
which are said to be emitted by the regions of the
-head.
+head.
-
+
Moreover, since there reside substances in the
nostrils and in the organs of taste, we apprehend the
objects of taste and of smell in conjunction with
@@ -1469,7 +1463,7 @@ and probably, too, the mind itself adds a certain
admixture of its own to the messages conveyed by the
senses; for we observe that there are certain humours
present in each of the regions which the Dogmatists
-regard as the seat of the ‟Ruling Principle”For the Stoic ἡγεμονικόν see Introd. p. xxv; for the dispute as to its location cf. Adv. Log. i. 313.—
+regard as the seat of the ‟Ruling Principle”For the Stoic ἡγεμονικόν see Introd. p. xxv; for the dispute as to its location cf. Adv. Log. i. 313.—
whether it be the brain or the heart, or in whatever
part of the creature one chooses to locate it. Thus,
according to this Mode also we see that, owing to
@@ -1489,25 +1483,25 @@ simply by themselves and without combination, but
when combined in the substance of the horn they
look black. And silver filings appear black when they
are by themselves, but when united to the whole
-mass they are sensed as white.
+mass they are sensed as white.
-
-And chips of the marble of TaenarumTaenarum was the most southerly promontory of Laconia; its marble was yellowish green in colour (like serpentine). seem white when planed,
+
+And chips of the marble of TaenarumTaenarum was the most southerly promontory of Laconia; its marble was yellowish green in colour (like serpentine). seem white when planed,
but in combination with the whole block they appear yellow.
And pebbles when scattered apart appear rough, but when
combined in a heap they produce the sensation of softness.
And hellebore if applied in a fine and powdery state produces
-suffocation, but not so when it is coarse.
+suffocation, but not so when it is coarse.
-
+
And wine strengthens us when drunk in moderate quantity,
but when too much is taken it paralyses the body. So
likewise food exhibits different effects according to the
quantity consumed; for instance, it frequently upsets the
body with indigestion and attacks of purging because
-of the large quantity taken.
+of the large quantity taken.
-
+
Therefore in these cases, too, we shall be able to
describe the quality of the shaving of the horn and
of the compound made up of many shavings, and that
@@ -1531,9 +1525,9 @@ the exact blending of the simple drugs makes the
compound wholesome, but when the slightest oversight
is made in the measuring, as sometimes happens,
the compound is not only unwholesome but frequently
-even most harmful and deleterious.
+even most harmful and deleterious.
-
+
Thus the argument from quantities and compositions
causes confusion as to the real nature of the external
substances. Probably, therefore, this Mode also will
@@ -1548,15 +1542,15 @@ we shall suspend judgement as to what things are
absolutely and really existent. But this point we
must notice—that here as elsewhere we use the term
‟are” for the term ‟appear,” and what we virtually
-mean is ‟all things appear relative.”The main point urged here is that no object can be apprehended in its purity. As perceived it is always conditioned by (1) the physcial or mental state of the percipient (‟the thing which judges”), and (2) by the ‟concomitant percepts” which accompany its emergence into the world of space and time. As thus conditioned, the object is no longer ‟absolute” but ‟relative.” And this statement
+mean is ‟all things appear relative.”The main point urged here is that no object can be apprehended in its purity. As perceived it is always conditioned by (1) the physcial or mental state of the percipient (‟the thing which judges”), and (2) by the ‟concomitant percepts” which accompany its emergence into the world of space and time. As thus conditioned, the object is no longer ‟absolute” but ‟relative.” And this statement
is twofold, implying, firstly, relation to the
thing which judges (for the external object which is
judged appears in relation to that thing), and, in a
second sense, relation to the accompanying percepts,
-for instance the right side in relation to the left.
+for instance the right side in relation to the left.
-
-Indeed, we have already arguedCf. § 39 supra. that all things are
+
+Indeed, we have already arguedCf. § 39 supra. that all things are
relative—for example, with respect to the thing which
judges, it is in relation to some one particular animal
or man or sense that each object appears, and in
@@ -1568,25 +1562,25 @@ or mode or combination or quantity or position.
There are also special arguments to prove the
relativity of all things, in this way: Do things which
-exist ‟differentially”Or ‟have a distinct existence of their own,” as opposed to a merely relative existence. This is a technical term for the class of objects which are ‟self-existent,” ‟absolute,” or ‟independent.” differ from relative things or
+exist ‟differentially”Or ‟have a distinct existence of their own,” as opposed to a merely relative existence. This is a technical term for the class of objects which are ‟self-existent,” ‟absolute,” or ‟independent.” differ from relative things or
not? If they do not differ, then they too are relative;
but if they differ, then, since everything which differs
is relative to something (for it has its name from its
relation to that from which it differs), things which
-exist differentially are relative.
+exist differentially are relative.
-
-Again,—of existing things some, according to the Dogmatists,Including the Peripatetics, as well as the Stoics. A summum genus (e.g. ‟Being”) may be divided into genera (e.g. ‟Animals” ‟Minerals”), and these sub-divided into species (e.g. ‟Men,” ‟Dogs,” etc.), down to the infimae species (e.g. ‟Golden Retriever”) which cannot be further subdivided. The intermediate species (e.g. ‟Men”) are both genera (in relation to their sub-species) and species (in relation to higher genera).
+
+Again,—of existing things some, according to the Dogmatists,Including the Peripatetics, as well as the Stoics. A summum genus (e.g. ‟Being”) may be divided into genera (e.g. ‟Animals” ‟Minerals”), and these sub-divided into species (e.g. ‟Men,” ‟Dogs,” etc.), down to the infimae species (e.g. ‟Golden Retriever”) which cannot be further subdivided. The intermediate species (e.g. ‟Men”) are both genera (in relation to their sub-species) and species (in relation to higher genera).
are summa genera, others infimae species, others both genera
and species; and all these are relative; therefore all things
-are relative. Further, some existing things are ‟pre-evident,”i.e. superlatively, or wholly, manifest. Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 141.
+are relative. Further, some existing things are ‟pre-evident,”i.e. superlatively, or wholly, manifest. Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 141.
as they say, others non-evident; and the apparent things are
significant, but the non-evident signified by the apparent;
for according to them ‟the things apparent are the vision of
the non-evident.” But the significant and the signified are
-relative; therefore all things are relative.
+relative; therefore all things are relative.
-
+
Moreover, some existent things are similar,
others dissimilar, and some equal, others unequal;
and these are relative; therefore all things are relative.
@@ -1618,9 +1612,9 @@ no amazement at all. If, however, we were to conceive
of the sun as appearing but rarely and setting
rarely, and illuminating everything all at once and
throwing everything into shadow suddenly, then we
-should experience much amazement at the sight.
+should experience much amazement at the sight.
-
+
An earthquake also does not cause the same alarm
in those who experience it for the first time and those
who have grown accustomed to such things. How
@@ -1629,12 +1623,12 @@ man who sees it for the first time! And indeed the
beauty of a human body thrills us more at the first
sudden view than when it becomes a customary
spectacle. Rare things too we count as precious,
-but not what is familiar to us and easily got.
+but not what is familiar to us and easily got.
-
+
Thus,if we should suppose water to be rare, how much more
precious it would appear to us than all the things
-which are accounted precious!Cf. Plato, Euthyd. 304b. Or if we should
+which are accounted precious!Cf. Plato, Euthyd. 304b. Or if we should
imagine gold to be simply scattered in quantities
over the earth like stones, to whom do we suppose
it would then be precious and worth hoarding?
@@ -1657,19 +1651,19 @@ with Ethics, being based on rules of conduct, habits,
laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic conceptions.
A rule of conduct is a choice of a way of life,
or of a particular action, adopted by one person
-or many—by Diogenes,
The Cynic philosopher. for instance, or the
-Laconians.
+or many—by Diogenes,The Cynic philosopher. for instance, or the
+Laconians.
-
+
A law is a written contract amongst the members of a
State, the transgressor of which is punished. A habit or
custom (the terms are equivalent) is the joint adoption
of a certain kind of action by a number of men, the transgressor
of which is not actually punished; for example, the law
proscribes adultery, and custom with us forbids intercourse
-with a woman in public.
+with a woman in public.
-
+
Legendary belief is the acceptance of unhistorical and
fictitious events, such as, amongst others, the legends
about Cronos; for these stories win credence with many.
@@ -1677,7 +1671,7 @@ Dogmatic conception is the acceptance of a fact which
seems to be established by analogy or some form of
demonstration, as, for example, that atoms are the
elements of existing things, or homoeomeries, or
-minima,Democritus and Epicurus took the first view, Anaxagoras the second, Diodorus Cornos the third; cf. iii. 32. or something else.
+minima,
Democritus and Epicurus took the first view, Anaxagoras the second, Diodorus Cornos the third; cf. iii. 32. or something else.
And each of these we oppose now to itself, and now
@@ -1687,18 +1681,18 @@ their children, but we do not; and while the Persians
think it seemly to wear a brightly dyed dress reaching
to the feet, we think it unseemly; and whereas
the Indians have intercourse with their women in
-public, most other races regard this as shameful.
+public, most other races regard this as shameful.
-
+
And law we oppose to law in this way: among the Romans
the man who renounces his father’s property does
not pay his father’s debts, but among the Rhodians
he always pays them; and among the Scythian
-Taurii.e. inhabitants of the Crimea; cf. Hdt. iv. 103, and Eurip. Iphigenia in Tauris. it was a law that strangers should be sacrificed
+Taurii.e. inhabitants of the Crimea; cf. Hdt. iv. 103, and Eurip. Iphigenia in Tauris. it was a law that strangers should be sacrificed
to Artemis, but with us it is forbidden to slay a
-human being at the altar.
+human being at the altar.
-
+
And we oppose rule of conduct to rule of conduct, as
when we oppose the rule of Diogenes to that of Aristippus
or that of the Laconians to that of the Italians. And we
@@ -1706,9 +1700,9 @@ oppose legendary belief to legendary belief when we say
that whereas in one story the father of men and gods
is alleged to be Zeus, in another he is Oceanos—
‟Ocean sire of the gods, and Tethys the mother
-that bare them.”Homer, Il. xiv. 201.
+that bare them.”
Homer, Il. xiv. 201.
-
+
And we oppose dogmatic conceptions to one another
when we say that some declare that there is one
element only, others an infinite number; some that
@@ -1724,35 +1718,35 @@ males, but amongst the Romans it is forbidden by
law to do so; and that, whereas with us adultery is
forbidden, amongst the Massagetae it is traditionally
regarded as an indifferent custom, as Eudoxus of
-CnidosFlourished about 360 B.C., famed as astronomer, geometer, legislator and physician. relates in the first book of his Travels; and
+CnidosFlourished about 360 B.C., famed as astronomer, geometer, legislator and physician. relates in the first book of his Travels; and
that, whereas intercourse with a mother is forbidden
in our country, in Persia it is the general custom to
form such marriages; and also among the Egyptians
men marry their sisters, a thing forbidden by law
-amongst us.
+amongst us.
-
+
And habit is opposed to rule of conduct
when, whereas most men have intercourse with their
-own wives in retirement, CratesA Cynic philosopher, circa 320 B.C.; cf. iii. 24. did it in public
+own wives in retirement, CratesA Cynic philosopher, circa 320 B.C.; cf. iii. 24. did it in public
with Hipparchia; and Diogenes went about with one
shoulder bare, whereas we dress in the customary
-manner.
+manner.
-
+
It is opposed also to legendary belief, as
when the legends say that Cronos devoured his own
children, though it is our habit to protect our children;
and whereas it is customary with us to revere the
gods as being good and immune from evil, they are
presented by the poets as suffering wounds and
-envying one another.
+envying one another.
-
+
And habit is opposed to dogmatic conception when, whereas it
-is our habit to pray to the gods for good things, EpicurusCf. iii. 219.
+is our habit to pray to the gods for good things, EpicurusCf. iii. 219.
declares that the Divinity pays no heed to us; and when
-AristippusCf. iii. 204. considers the wearing of feminine
+AristippusCf. iii. 204. considers the wearing of feminine
attire a matter of indifference, though we consider
it a disgraceful thing.
@@ -1762,47 +1756,47 @@ though there is a law which forbids the striking of
a free or well-born man, the pancratiasts strike one
another because of the rule of life they follow; and
when, though homicide is forbidden, gladiators destroy
-one another for the same reason.
+one another for the same reason.
-
+
And we oppose legendary belief to rule of conduct when we
say that the legends relate that Heracles in the house
of Omphale ‟toiled at the spinning of wool, enduring
-slavery's burden,”Homer, Odyss. X. 423. and did things which no one would have
+slavery's burden,”Homer, Odyss. X. 423. and did things which no one would have
chosen to do even in a moderate degree, whereas the rule
-of life of Heracles was a noble one.
+of life of Heracles was a noble one.
-
+
And we oppose rule of conduct to dogmatic conception
when, whereas athletes covet glory as something good
and for its sake undertake a toilsome rule of life,
many of the philosophers dogmatically assert that
-glory is a worthless thing.
+glory is a worthless thing.
-
+
And we oppose law to legendary belief when the poets
represent the gods as commiting adultery and practising
intercourse with males, whereas the law with us forbids
-such actions;
+such actions;
-
-and we oppose it to dogmatic conception when ChrysippusSee Introd. pp. xxvii-xxviii; cf. iii. 205.
+
+and we oppose it to dogmatic conception when ChrysippusSee Introd. pp. xxvii-xxviii; cf. iii. 205.
says that intercourse with mothers or sisters is a thing
-indifferent, whereas the law forbids such things.
+indifferent, whereas the law forbids such things.
-
+
And we oppose legendary belief to dogmatic conception
when the poets say that Zeus came down and had intercourse
with mortal women, but amongst the Dogmatists it is
-held that such a thing is impossible;
+held that such a thing is impossible;
-
-and again, when the poet relatesHomer, Il. xvi. 459. that because of his
+
+and again, when the poet relatesHomer, Il. xvi. 459. that because of his
grief for Sarpedon Zeus ‟let fall upon the earth great
gouts of blood,” whereas it is a dogma of the philosophers
that the Deity is impassive; and when these same philosophers
demolish the legend of the hippocentaurs, and offer us the
-hippocentaur as a type of unreality.Cf. our use of ‟chimera” (Lion+goat+dragon) for what is fantatic.
+hippocentaur as a type of unreality.
Cf. our use of ‟chimera” (Lion+goat+dragon) for what is fantatic.
We might indeed have taken many other examples
@@ -1823,68 +1817,67 @@ Modes we are finally led to suspension of judgement.
Chapter XV.—Of The Five Modes
-The later Scepticsi.e. those posterior to Aenesidemus; but the reference here is specially to Agrippa (See Introd. p. xl); cf. Diog. Laert. ix. 88. hand down Five Modes leading
+The later Scepticsi.e. those posterior to Aenesidemus; but the reference here is specially to Agrippa (See Introd. p. xl); cf. Diog. Laert. ix. 88. hand down Five Modes leading
to suspension, namely these: the first based on
discrepancy, the second on regress ad infinitum,
the third on relativity, the fourth on hypothesis,
-the fifth on circular reasoning.
+the fifth on circular reasoning.
-
+
That based on discrepancy leads us to find that
with regard to the object presented there has
arisen both amongst ordinary people and amongst
the philosophers an interminable conflict because
of which we are unable either to choose a thing or
-reject it, and so fall back on suspension.
+reject it, and so fall back on suspension.
-
+
The Mode based upon regress ad infinitum is that
whereby we assert that the thing adduced as a
proof of the matter proposed needs a further
proof, and this again another, and so on ad
infinitum, so that the consequence is suspension,
-as we possess no starting-point for our argument.
+as we possess no starting-point for our argument.
-
+
The Mode based upon relativity, as we have already
-said,See §§ 135 ff. is that whereby the object has such or such
+said,See §§ 135 ff. is that whereby the object has such or such
an appearance in relation to the subject judging
and to the concomitant percepts, but as to its
-real nature we suspend judgement.
+real nature we suspend judgement.
-
+
We have the Mode based on hypothesis when the
Dogmatists, being forced to recede ad infinitum,
take as their starting-point something which they
do not establish by argument but claim to assume
-as granted simply and without demonstration.
+as granted simply and without demonstration.
-
+
The Mode of circular reasoning is the form used
when the proof itself which ought to establish the
matter of inquiry requires confirmation derived
from that matter; in this case, being unable to
assume either in order to establish the other, we
suspend judgement about both.
-
That every matter of inquiry admits of being
brought under these Modes we shall show briefly in
-this way.
+this way.
-
+
The matter proposed is either a sense-object or a
thought-object, but whichever it is, it is an object
of controversy; for some say that only sensibles are
true, others only intelligibles, others that some
-sensible and some intelligible objects are true.Of these views the first was maintained, e.g. by Protagoras and Epicurus, the second by Plato and Democritus, the third by the Peripatetics and Stoics.
+sensible and some intelligible objects are true.Of these views the first was maintained, e.g. by Protagoras and Epicurus, the second by Plato and Democritus, the third by the Peripatetics and Stoics.
Will they then assert that the controversy can or
cannot be decided? If they say it cannot, we have
it granted that we must suspend judgement; for concerning
matters of dispute which admit of no decision it is
impossible to make an assertion. But if they say that
-it can be decided, we ask by what is it to be decided.
+it can be decided, we ask by what is it to be decided.
-
+
For example, in the case of the sense- object
(for we shall base our argument on it first),
is it to be decided by a sense-object or a thought-object?
@@ -1892,9 +1885,9 @@ For if they say by a sense-object, since we are inquiring
about sensibles that object itself also will require
another to confirm it; and if that too is to be a sense-object,
it likewise will require another for its confirmation, and
-so on ad infinitum.
+so on ad infinitum.
-
+
And if the sense-object shall have to be decided by a
thought-object, then, since thought-objects also are
controverted, this being an object of thought will
@@ -1904,7 +1897,7 @@ object, it will suffer a similar regress ad infinitum;
and if from a sensible object, since an intelligible
was adduced to establish the sensible and a sensible
to establish the intelligible, the Mode of circular
-reasoningLit. ‟the through-one-another mode” (of reasoning). This is the fallacy known as circulus in probando, by which each of two propositions is used in turn to prove the truth of the other. is brought in.
+reasoning
Lit. ‟the through-one-another mode” (of reasoning). This is the fallacy known as circulus in probando, by which each of two propositions is used in turn to prove the truth of the other. is brought in.
If, however, our disputant, by way of escape from
@@ -1912,22 +1905,22 @@ this conclusion, should claim to assume as granted
and without demonstration some postulate for the
demonstration of the next steps of his argument,
then the Mode of hypothesis will be brought in,
-which allows no escape.Lit. ‟without exit (or way of escape);” i.e. it hopelessly entangles the opponent. For if the author of the
+which allows no escape.Lit. ‟without exit (or way of escape);” i.e. it hopelessly entangles the opponent. For if the author of the
hypothesis is worthy of credence, we shall be no
less worthy of credence every time that we make
the opposite hypothesis. Moreover, if the author
of the hypothesis assumes what is true he causes
it to be suspected by assuming it by hypothesis
rather than after proof; while if it is false, the
-foundation of his argument will be rotten.
+foundation of his argument will be rotten.
-
+
Further, if hypothesis conduces at all to proof, let the
subject of inquiry itself be assumed and not some other
thing which is merely a means to establish the actual
subject of the argument ; but if it is absurd to assume
the subject of inquiry, it will also be absurd to assume
-that upon which it depends.i.e. the super-ordinate, or more universal, proposition.
+that upon which it depends.
i.e. the super-ordinate, or more universal, proposition.
It is also plain that all sensibles are relative; for
@@ -1937,9 +1930,9 @@ is presented can easily be referred to one of the Five
Modes. And concerning the intelligible object we
argue similarly. For if it should be said that it is a
matter of unsettled controversy, the necessity of our
-suspending judgement will be granted.
+suspending judgement will be granted.
-
+
And if, on the other hand, the controversy admits of decision,
then if the decision rests on an intelligible object we shall
be driven to the regress ad infinitum, and to circular reasoning
@@ -1947,9 +1940,9 @@ if it rests on a sensible; for since the sensible again is
controverted and cannot be decided by means of itself
because of the regress ad infinitum, it will require the
intelligible object, just as also the intelligible will
-require the sensible.
+require the sensible.
-
+
For these reasons, again, he who assumes anything by
hypothesis will be acting illogically. Moreover,
objects of thought, or intelligibles, are relative; for
@@ -1960,7 +1953,6 @@ have been no controversy about them. Thus the
intelligible also is referred to the Five Modes, so
that in all cases we are compelled to suspend judgement
concerning the object presented.
-
Such then are the Five Modes handed down amongst
the later Sceptics; but they propound these not by
way of superseding the Ten Modes but in order to
@@ -1974,20 +1966,20 @@ conjunction with the Ten.
Chapter XVI.—Of The Two Modes
They hand down also Two other Modes leading
-to suspension of judgement.For this final reduction of the ‟Tropes” to two—arguing against the possibility of either (1) immediate or (2) mediate certitude—see Introd. p. xli. Since every object of
+to suspension of judgement.For this final reduction of the ‟Tropes” to two—arguing against the possibility of either (1) immediate or (2) mediate certitude—see Introd. p. xli. Since every object of
apprehension seems to be apprehended either through
itself or through another object, by showing that
nothing is apprehended either through itself or
through another thing, they introduce doubt, as they
suppose, about everything. That nothing is apprehended
through itself is plain, they say, from the
-controversy which exists amongst the physicists‟Physics,” as a branch of philosophy, was treated of by all the Schools alluded to in § 170 supra, which are specifically here in mind.
+controversy which exists amongst the physicists‟Physics,” as a branch of philosophy, was treated of by all the Schools alluded to in § 170 supra, which are specifically here in mind.
regarding, I imagine, all things, both sensibles and
intelligibles; which controversy admits of no settlement
because we can neither employ a sensible
nor an intelligible criterion, since every criterion
-we may adopt is controverted and therefore discredited.
-
+we may adopt is controverted and therefore discredited.
+
And the reason why they do not allow that
anything is apprehended through something
else is this: If that through which an object is
@@ -2004,7 +1996,7 @@ apprehended either through itself or through some
other thing we remain in doubt, so long as the criterion
of truth or of apprehension is not apparent, and signs,
even apart from demonstration, are rejected, as we
-shall discover in our next Book.
See ii. 96 ff.
+shall discover in our next Book.
See ii. 96 ff.
For the present, however, it will suffice to have said
thus much concerning the Modes leading to suspension
of judgement.
@@ -2021,16 +2013,16 @@ and thus pull up the Dogmatists because of the special
pride they take in these theories. Thus Aenesidemus
furnishes us with Eight Modes by which, as he thinks,
he tests and exposes the unsoundness of every dogmatic
-theory of causation.
-
+
Of these the First, he says, is that which shows that,
since aetiology as a whole deals with the non-apparent,
it is unconfirmed by any agreed evidence derived from
appearances. The Second Mode shows how often, when there
is ample scope for ascribing the object of investigation
to a variety of causes, some of them account for it
-in one way only.
-
+
The Third shows how to orderly events they assign
causes which exhibit no order. The Fourth shows how,
when they have grasped the way in which appearances
@@ -2039,8 +2031,8 @@ how non-apparent things occur, whereas, though
the non-apparent may possibly be realized in a
similar way to the appearances, possibly they
may not be realized in a similar way but
-in a peculiar way of their own.
-
+in a peculiar way of their own.
+
In the Fifth Mode it is shown how practically all
these theorists assign causes according to their
own particular hypotheses about the elements, and
@@ -2048,28 +2040,28 @@ not according to any commonly agreed methods. In
the Sixth it is shown how they frequently admit
only such facts as can be explained by their own
theories, and dismiss facts which conflict therewith
-though possessing equal probability.
-
+though possessing equal probability.
+
The Seventh shows how they often assign causes which
conflict not only with appearances but also with their
own hypotheses. The Eighth shows that often, when there
is equal doubt about things seemingly apparent and things
under investigation, they base their doctrine about
-things equally doubtful upon things equally doubtful.
-
+things equally doubtful upon things equally doubtful.
+
Nor is it impossible, he adds, that the overthrow of
some of their theories of causation should be referred
to certain mixed Modes which are dependent on the
foregoing.
-
Possibly, too, the Five Modes of suspensionSee §§ 164 ff. supra. may
+
Possibly, too, the Five Modes of suspensionSee §§ 164 ff. supra. may
suffice as against the aetiologies. For if a person
propounds a cause, it will either be or not be in accord
with all the philosophical systems and with Scepticism
and with appearances. Probably, however, it is
impracticable to propound a cause in accord with all
these, since all things, whether apparent or non-
-evident, are matters of controversy.
-
+evident, are matters of controversy.
+
But if, on the other hand, the cause propounded be not
in accord therewith, the theorist will be asked in turn
for the cause of this cause, and if he assumes an apparent
@@ -2092,7 +2084,7 @@ aetiologies.
And because when we make use of these Modes
and those which lead to suspension of judgement we
-give utterance to certain expressionsCf. §§ 14, 15 supra. indicative of
+give utterance to certain expressionsCf. §§ 14, 15 supra. indicative of
our sceptical attitude and tone of mind—such as
‟Not more,” ‟Nothing must be determined,” and
others of the kind—it will be our next task to discuss
@@ -2112,33 +2104,33 @@ enunciate both ‟Not more” and ‟Nowise more”
indifferently, and we shall discuss them now as identical
expressions. This expression, then, is elliptical. For
just as when we say ‟a double” we are implicitly
-saying ‟a double hearth,”i.e. (perhaps) a two-storied house (taking ἐστία as meaning οἰκία). Fabric, proposed ἐσθής, διπλῆ then being=διπλοΐς,‟a double cloak.” πλατεῖα, ‟square.” lit. ‟broad, open, place.” and when we say ‟a
+saying ‟a double hearth,”i.e. (perhaps) a two-storied house (taking ἐστία as meaning οἰκία). Fabric, proposed ἐσθής, διπλῆ then being=διπλοΐς,‟a double cloak.” πλατεῖα, ‟square.” lit. ‟broad, open, place.” and when we say ‟a
square” we are implicitly saying ‟a square road-
way,” so when we say ‟Not more” we are implicitly
-saying ‟Not this more than that, up than down.”
+saying ‟Not this more than that, up than down.”
-
+
Some of the Sceptics, however, in place of the ‟Not”
adopt the form ”(For) what this more than that,”
taking the ‟what” to denote, in this case, cause,
so that the meaning is ‟For what reason this more
-than that?”The τί, here substituted for οὐ, is capable of meaning either ‟what” (or ‟in what respect”) or ‟why,” ‟for what cause or reason” (=διὰ τί). Thus τί gives an interrogative form (πύσμα) to the formula, as distinct from the affirmative form (ἀξίωμα) with οὐ. And it is a common practice to use
+than that?”The τί, here substituted for οὐ, is capable of meaning either ‟what” (or ‟in what respect”) or ‟why,” ‟for what cause or reason” (=διὰ τί). Thus τί gives an interrogative form (πύσμα) to the formula, as distinct from the affirmative form (ἀξίωμα) with οὐ. And it is a common practice to use
questions instead of assertions, as for example—‟The
-bride of Zeus, what mortal knows her not?”Eurip. Herc. Fur. 1. And
+bride of Zeus, what mortal knows her not?”Eurip. Herc. Fur. 1. And
also assertions in the place of questions; for instance
—‟I am inquiring where Dion lives,” and ‟I ask
you what reason there is for showing surprise at a
poet.” And further, the use of ‟What” instead of
-‟For what reason” is found in Menander,Fragm. 900 (Kock). ”(For)
-what was I left behind?”
+‟For what reason” is found in Menander,
Fragm. 900 (Kock). ‟(For)
+what was I left behind?”
-
+
And the expression ‟Not more this than that” indicates
also our feeling, whereby we come to end in equipoise
because of the equipollence of the opposed objects;
and by ‟equipollence” we mean equality in respect of
what seems probable to us, and by ‟opposed” we mean in
-general conflicting, and by ‟equipoise”This is the typical Sceptic's attitude of complete mental neutrality, or ‟state of even balance” (ἀρρεψία, Diog. Laert. ix. 74). refusal of
+general conflicting, and by ‟equipoise”This is the typical Sceptic's attitude of complete mental neutrality, or ‟state of even balance” (ἀρρεψία, Diog. Laert. ix. 74). refusal of
assent to either alternative.
@@ -2171,8 +2163,8 @@ assertion in the general sense in which it is
said to include both affirmation and negation,
so that non-assertion is a mental condition of ours
because of which we refuse either to affirm or to
-deny anything.
-
+
Hence it is plain that we adopt non-assertion also not as
though things are in reality of such a kind as wholly
to induce non-assertion, but as indicating that we
@@ -2197,11 +2189,11 @@ it is not,” so that for the sake of conciseness
we adopt the phrase ‟possibly not” instead of
‟possibly it is not,” and ‟maybe not” instead of
‟maybe it is not,” and ‟perhaps not” instead of
-‟perhaps it is not.”
-
+
But here again we do not fight about phrases nor do we
inquire whether the phrases indicate realities, but we
-adopt them, as I said,Cf. §§ 13, 191 supra. in a loose sense. Still it is evident,
+adopt them, as I said,Cf. §§ 13, 191 supra. in a loose sense. Still it is evident,
as I think, that these expressions are indicative of
non-assertion. Certainly the person who says ‟perhaps
it is” is implicitly affirming also the seemingly contradictory
@@ -2213,7 +2205,7 @@ other cases.
Chapter XXII.—Of The Expression ‟I Suspend Judgement”
-The phrase ‟I suspend judgement”Cf. §§ 7, 10 supra. we adopt in
+The phrase ‟I suspend judgement”Cf. §§ 7, 10 supra. we adopt in
place of ‟I am unable to say which of the objects
presented I ought to believe and which I ought to
disbelieve,” indicating that the objects appear to us
@@ -2262,9 +2254,9 @@ means not existing things but such of the non-evident
matters investigated by the Dogmatists as he has
examined, and by ‟undetermined” he means not
superior in point of credibility or incredibility to
-things opposed, or in any way conflicting.For ‟opposed” ‟conflicting” see § 10 above.
-
-And just as the man who says ”(I) walk about”i.e. the personal pronoun ‟I” is potentially, or implicitly, expressed in the ending of the Greek verb (first person singular). is
+things opposed, or in any way conflicting.For ‟opposed” ‟conflicting” see § 10 above.
+
+And just as the man who says ”(I) walk about”i.e. the personal pronoun ‟I” is potentially, or implicitly, expressed in the ending of the Greek verb (first person singular). is
potentially saying ‟I walk about,” so he who says
‟All are undetermined” conveys also, as we hold, the meaning
‟so far as relates to me,” or ‟as appears to me,”
@@ -2279,7 +2271,7 @@ of credibility or incredibility.”
Chapter XXV.—Of The Expression ‟All Things Are Non—Apprehensible”
We adopt a similar attitude when we say ‟All
-things are non-apprehensible.”Cf. § 1. For we give a
+things are non-apprehensible.”Cf. § 1. For we give a
similar explanation of the word ‟all,” and we
similarly supply the words ‟to me,” so that the
meaning conveyed is this—‟All the non-apparent
@@ -2318,38 +2310,38 @@ that has been investigated by us, and the word
that which establishes a point dogmatically (that is to
say with reference to what is non-evident) and
establishes it by any method, and not necessarily by means
-of premisses and a conclusion.i.e. by the use of syllogisms. We say ‟equal”
+of premisses and a conclusion.i.e. by the use of syllogisms. We say ‟equal”
with reference to credibility or incredibility, and we
employ the word ‟opposed” in the general sense of
‟conflicting;” and we supply therewith in thought
-the phrase ‟as appears to me.”
-
+the phrase ‟as appears to me.”
+
So whenever I say ‟To every argument an equal argument is
opposed,” what I am virtually saying is ‟To every argument
investigated by me which establishes a point dogmatically,
it seems to me there is opposed another argument, establishing
a point dogmatically, which is equal to the first in respect
of credibility and incredibility;” so that the utterance of
-the phrase is not a piece of dogmatism,As with Protagoras, who seems to have originated it. but the announcement of
+the phrase is not a piece of dogmatism,As with Protagoras, who seems to have originated it. but the announcement of
a human state of mind which is apparent to the person
experiencing it.
But some also utter the expression in the form
‟To every argument an equal argument is to be
-opposed,”The infinite is here used in a jussive sense. intending to give the injunction ‟To
+opposed,”The infinite is here used in a jussive sense. intending to give the injunction ‟To
every argument which establishes a point dogmatically
let us oppose an argument which investigates dogmatically,
equal to the former in respect of credibility and incredibility,
and conflicting therewith;” for they mean their words
to be addressed to the Sceptic, although they use the
infinitive form ‟to be opposed” instead of the imperative
-‟let us oppose.”
-
+
And they address this injunction to the Sceptic lest
haply, through being misled by the Dogmatist, he may give
up the Sceptic search, and through precipitancy
-miss the ‟quietude”Cf. §§ 10, 25 ff. approved by the Sceptics,
-which they—as we said aboveCf.§ 29.—believe to be dependent
+miss the ‟quietude”Cf. §§ 10, 25 ff. approved by the Sceptics,
+which they—as we said aboveCf.§ 29.—believe to be dependent
on universal suspension of judgement.
@@ -2367,24 +2359,24 @@ themselves, seeing that they themselves are included
in the things to which their doubt applies, just as
aperient drugs do not merely eliminate the humours
from the body, but also expel themselves along with
-the humours.
-
+
And we also say that we employ them not by way of
authoritatively explaining the things with reference
to which we adopt them, but without precision and, if
you like, loosely; for it does not become the Sceptic
-to wrangle over expressions,Cf. § 195 supra. and besides it is to our
+to wrangle over expressions,Cf. § 195 supra. and besides it is to our
advantage that even to these expressions no absolute
significance should be ascribed, but one that is relative
-and relative to the Sceptics.
-
+and relative to the Sceptics.
+
Besides this we must also remember that we do not employ
them universally about all things, but about those which
are non-evident and are objects of dogmatic inquiry; and
that we state what appears to us and do not make any
positive declarations as to the real nature of external
objects; for I think that, as a result of this, every
-sophismSuggesting that such attacks must involve the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi. directed against a Sceptic expression can be
+sophismSuggesting that such attacks must involve the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi. directed against a Sceptic expression can be
refuted.
And now that we have reviewed the idea or purpose
@@ -2403,7 +2395,7 @@ us begin with the Heracleitean philosophy.
Chapter XXIX.—That The Sceptic Way Of Thought Differs From The Heracleitean Philosophy
Now that this latter differs from our Way of thought
-is plain at once; for HeracleitusFor Heracleitus see Introd. p. viii; cf. ii. 59, 63. For Aenesidemus see Introd. pp. xxxvii ff. makes dogmatic
+is plain at once; for HeracleitusFor Heracleitus see Introd. p. viii; cf. ii. 59, 63. For Aenesidemus see Introd. pp. xxxvii ff. makes dogmatic
statements about many non-evident things, whereas
we, as has been said, do not. It is true that Aenesidemus
and his followers used to say that the Sceptic
@@ -2413,14 +2405,14 @@ of opposite appearances is a preliminary to holding
that it is the subject of opposite realities, and while
the Sceptics say that the same thing is the subject
of opposite appearances, the Heracleiteans go on from
-this to assert their reality.The Sceptic view that the same thing apparently possesses opposite attributes or qualities is regarded as a step on the road to the Hercleitean view that it really possesses such qualities. But as Sextus proceeds to argue, the ascription of apparently contradictory attributes to a thing is not peculiar to the Sceptics but common to all men, so that all other might equally well be regarded as Heracleiteans in the making. For the opposition of ‟appearances” cf. §§ 32, 91 ff., 101 ff. But in reply to them we
+this to assert their reality.The Sceptic view that the same thing apparently possesses opposite attributes or qualities is regarded as a step on the road to the Hercleitean view that it really possesses such qualities. But as Sextus proceeds to argue, the ascription of apparently contradictory attributes to a thing is not peculiar to the Sceptics but common to all men, so that all other might equally well be regarded as Heracleiteans in the making. For the opposition of ‟appearances” cf. §§ 32, 91 ff., 101 ff. But in reply to them we
declare that the view about the same thing having
opposite appearances is not a dogma of the Sceptics
but a fact which is experienced not by the Sceptics
alone but also by the rest of philosophers and by
-all mankind;
-
-for certainly no one would venture to say that honeyCf. § 101 supra. does
+all mankind;
+
+for certainly no one would venture to say that honeyCf. § 101 supra. does
not taste sweet to people in sound health or that it does
not taste bitter to those suffering from jaundice; so that
the Heracleiteans start from the general preconception of
@@ -2437,14 +2429,14 @@ ordinary people, why should anyone declare that our
Way of thought is a road to the Heracleitean philosophy
any more than any of the other philosophies or even
than the ordinary view, since we all make use of the
-same common material?i.e. general human experience and observation, dervied from sense-impressions.
+same common material?i.e. general human experience and observation, dervied from sense-impressions.
Rather it is the case that the Sceptic Way so far
from being an aid to the knowledge of the Heracleitean
philosophy is actually an obstacle thereto, seeing that
the Sceptic decries all the dogmatic statements of
Heracleitus as rash utterances, contradicting his
-‟Ecpyrosis,”i.e. ‟world-conflagration,” by which all things are resolved into the Primal Fire. and contradicting his view that the
+‟Ecpyrosis,”i.e. ‟world-conflagration,” by which all things are resolved into the Primal Fire. and contradicting his view that the
same thing is the subject of opposite realities, and in
respect of every dogma of Heracleitus scoffing at his
dogmatic precipitancy, and constantly repeating, as
@@ -2460,7 +2452,7 @@ philosophy.
Chapter XXX.—Wherein The Sceptic Way Differs From The Democritean Philosophy
-But it is also said that the DemocriteanSee Introd. pp. xi ff. philosophy
+But it is also said that the DemocriteanSee Introd. pp. xi ff. philosophy
has something in common with Scepticism,
since it seems to use the same material as we; for
from the fact that honey appears sweet to some and
@@ -2472,8 +2464,8 @@ School of Democritus employ the expression ‟Not
more” in different ways; for while they use it to
express the unreality of either alternative, we express
by it our ignorance as to whether both or neither of
-the appearances is real.
-
+the appearances is real.
+
So that in this respect also we differ, and our difference
becomes specially evident when Democritus says ‟But in
verity atoms and void” (for he says ‟In verity” in place
@@ -2486,7 +2478,7 @@ it is superfluous, I think, to state.
Chapter XXXI.—Wherein Scepticism Differs From Cyrenaicism
-Some assert that the CyrenaicSee Introd. p. xvii; cf. Adv. Log. i. 191 ff. doctrine is identical
+Some assert that the CyrenaicSee Introd. p. xvii; cf. Adv. Log. i. 191 ff. doctrine is identical
with Scepticism since it too affirms that only mental
states are apprehended. But it differs from Scepticism
inasmuch as it says that the End is pleasure and the
@@ -2495,7 +2487,7 @@ smooth motion of the flesh, whereas we say it is
whether pleasure be present or not present the man
who positively affirms pleasure to be the End undergoes
perturbations, as I have argued in my chapter
-‟Of the End.”§§ 25 ff. supra. Further, whereas we suspend
+‟Of the End.”§§ 25 ff. supra. Further, whereas we suspend
judgement, so far as regards the essence of external
objects, the Cyrenaics declare that those objects
possess a real nature which is inapprehensible.
@@ -2504,7 +2496,7 @@ possess a real nature which is inapprehensible.
Chapter XXXII.—Wherein Scepticism Differs From The Protagorean Doctrine
-ProtagorasSee Introd. p. xiv. In his physical theory Protagoras follows Heracleitus. also holds that ‟Man is the measure of all
+ProtagorasSee Introd. p. xiv. In his physical theory Protagoras follows Heracleitus. also holds that ‟Man is the measure of all
things, of existing things that they exist, and of
non-existing things that they exist not;” and by
‟measure” he means the criterion, and by ‟things”
@@ -2513,8 +2505,8 @@ the objects, so that he is virtually asserting that
exist that they exist, and of those which exist not
that they exist not.” And consequently he posits only
what appears to each individual, and thus he introduces
-relativity.
-
+
And for this reason he seems also to have something in
common with the Pyrrhoneans. Yet he differs from them,
and we shall perceive the difference when we have
@@ -2523,19 +2515,19 @@ adequately explained the views of Protagoras.
and as it flows additions are made continuously in the
place of the effluxions, and the senses are transformed
and altered according to the times of life and to all
-the other conditions of the bodies.
-
+the other conditions of the bodies.
+
He says also that the ‟reasons” of all the appearances
subsist in matter, so that matter, so far as depends
on itself, is capable of being all those things which
-appear to all.i.e. in brief, all ‟appearances” (sensations, opinions, etc.) are due to inter-action between the matter of the percipient subject and the matter of the objective world, both of which are in constant flux. Thus ‟matter” is potentially the ‟phenomenon.” And men, he says, apprehend different
+appear to all.i.e. in brief, all ‟appearances” (sensations, opinions, etc.) are due to inter-action between the matter of the percipient subject and the matter of the objective world, both of which are in constant flux. Thus ‟matter” is potentially the ‟phenomenon.” And men, he says, apprehend different
things at different times owing to their differing
dispositions; for he who is in a natural state apprehends
those things subsisting in matter which are able to appear
to those in a natural state, and those who are in a non-
natural state the things which can appear to those in
-a non-natural state.
-
+
Moreover, precisely the same account applies to the
variations due to age, and to the sleeping or waking
state, and to each several kind of condition. Thus,
@@ -2551,7 +2543,7 @@ evident matters about which we suspend judgement.
Chapter XXXIII.—Wherein Scepticism Differs From The Academic Philosophy
-Some indeed say that the Academic philosophySee Introd. pp. xxxii f. is
+Some indeed say that the Academic philosophySee Introd. pp. xxxii f. is
identical with Scepticism; consequently it shall be
our next task to discuss this statement.
According to most people there have been three
@@ -2561,27 +2553,27 @@ of Arcesilaus, the pupil of Polemo, and his School, the
third or New Academy that of the School of Carneades
and Cleitomachus. Some, however, add as a fourth
that of the School of Philo and Charmidas; and some
-even count the School of Antiochus as a fifth.
-
+even count the School of Antiochus as a fifth.
+
Beginning, then, with the Old Academy let us consider
-how the philosophies mentioned differ.
+how the philosophies mentioned differ
.
Plato has been described by some as ‟dogmatic,” by
others as ‟dubitative,” and by others again as partly
dogmatic and partly dubitative. For in his exercitatory
-discourses,i.e. those which aim at training the mind—subdivided (in Diog. Laert. iii. 49 ff.) into ‟maeeutic” (‟akin to the midwife's art” or ‟mental obstetrics”) and ‟peirastic” (or ‟tentative,” e.g. Lysis, Laches, Euthyphro, Meno). where Socrates is introduced either
+discourses,i.e. those which aim at training the mind—subdivided (in Diog. Laert. iii. 49 ff.) into ‟maeeutic” (‟akin to the midwife's art” or ‟mental obstetrics”) and ‟peirastic” (or ‟tentative,” e.g. Lysis, Laches, Euthyphro, Meno). where Socrates is introduced either
as talking playfully with his auditors or as arguing
against sophists, he shows, they say, an exercitatory
and dubitative character; but a dogmatic character
when he is speaking seriously by the mouth either
-of Socrates or of Timaeus or of some similar personage.
-
+of Socrates or of Timaeus or of some similar personage.
+
Now as regards those who describe him as a dogmatist,
or as partly dogmatic and partly dubitative, it would
be superfluous to say anything now; for they themselves
acknowledge his difference from us. But the
question whether Plato is a genuine Sceptic is one
-which we discuss more fully in our ‟Commentaries;”i.e. the five books Against the Dogmatists; see Introd. p. xli.
-but now, in opposition to MenodotusSee Intro. p. xl. and Aenesidemus
+which we discuss more fully in our ‟Commentaries;”i.e. the five books Against the Dogmatists; see Introd. p. xli.
+but now, in opposition to MenodotusSee Introd. p. xl. and Aenesidemus
(these being the chief champions of this view),
we declare in brief that when Plato makes statements
about Ideas or about the reality of Providence or
@@ -2601,30 +2593,32 @@ dogmatizes about a single thing, or ever prefers one
impression to another in point of credibility or
incredibility, or makes any assertion about any
non-evident object, assumes the dogmatic character,
-as TimonSee Introd. p. xxxi; and for Xenophanes, ibid. p. viii. also shows by his remarks about Xenophanes.
-
+as TimonSee Introd. p. xxxi; and for Xenophanes, ibid. p. viii. also shows by his remarks about Xenophanes.
+
For after praising him repeatedly, so that he even
dedicated to him his Satires, he represented him as
-uttering this lamentation—
-
Would that I too had attained a mind compacted of wisdom,
-Both ways casting my eyes; but the treacherous pathway
-deceived me,
-
Old that I was, and as yet unversed in the doubts of the
-Sceptic.
-For in whatever direction I turned my mind in its questing
-All was resolved into One and the Same; All ever-existing
-Into one self-same nature returning shaped itself all ways.
-
So on this account he also calls him ‟semi-vain,” and
-not perfectly free from vanity, where he says—
-
Xenophanes semi-vain, derider of Homer’s deceptions,
-Framed him a God far other than Man, self-equal in all ways,
-Safe from shaking or scathe, surpassing thought in his
-thinking.
-
He called him ‟semi-vain” as being in some degree
+uttering this lamentation—
+
+Would that I too had attained a mind compacted of wisdom,
+Both ways casting my eyes; but the treacherous pathway
+deceived me,
+Old that I was, and as yet unversed in the doubts of the
+Sceptic.
+For in whatever direction I turned my mind in its questing
+All was resolved into One and the Same; All ever-existing
+Into one self-same nature returning shaped itself all ways.
+So on this account he also calls him ‟semi-vain,” and
+not perfectly free from vanity, where he says—
+
+Xenophanes semi-vain, derider of Homer’s deceptions,
+Framed him a God far other than Man, self-equal in all ways,
+Safe from shaking or scathe, surpassing thought in his
+thinking.
+He called him ‟semi-vain” as being in some degree
free from vanity, and ‟derider of Homer’s deceptions”
because he censured the deceit mentioned in
-Homer.e.g. Homer, Il. ii. 114 where Agamemnon says of Zeus νῦν δὲ κακὴν ἀπάτην βουλεύσατ᾽. Cf. Plato, Rep. 380d ff.
-
+Homer.e.g. Homer, Il. ii. 114 where Agamemnon says of Zeus νῦν δὲ κακὴν ἀπάτην βουλεύσατ᾽. Cf. Plato, Rep. 380d ff.
+
Xenophanes, contrary to the preconceptions
of all other men, asserted dogmatically that the All
is one, and that God is consubstantial with all things,
@@ -2648,26 +2642,26 @@ things may be apprehended); but they differ from
us quite plainly in their judgement of things good
and evil. For the Academicians do not describe a
thing as good or evil in the way we do; for they do
-so with the conviction that it is more probableCarneades was the chief exponent of this ‟probabilism;” see Introd. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv. that
+so with the conviction that it is more probableCarneades was the chief exponent of this ‟probabilism;” see Introd. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv. that
what they call good is really good rather than the
opposite, and so too in the case of evil, whereas
when we describe a thing as good or evil we do not
add it as our opinion that what we assert is probable,
but simply conform to life undogmatically that we
-may not be precluded from activity.Cf. §§ 15, 23f.; ii. 13.
-
-And as regards sense-impressions, we sayCf. § 117. that they are
+may not be precluded from activity.Cf. §§ 15, 23f.; ii. 13.
+
+And as regards sense-impressions, we say
Cf. § 117. that they are
equal in respect of probability and improbability, so
far as their essence is concerned, whereas they assert
that some impressions are probable, others improbable.
And respecting the probable impressions they
make distinctions: some they regard as just simply
probable, others as probable and tested, others as
-probable, tested, and ‟irreversible.”διεξωδευμένας and περιωδευμένας mean literally ‟gone all through” (or ‟all over”), hence ‟thoroughly inspected,” ‟scrutinized:” ἀπερισπάστους, ‟not able to be drawn round” (or ‟stripped off”), hence ‟indubitable.” For example,
+probable, tested, and ‟irreversible.”διεξωδευμένας and περιωδευμένας mean literally ‟gone all through” (or ‟all over”), hence ‟thoroughly inspected,” ‟scrutinized:” ἀπερισπάστους, ‟not able to be drawn round” (or ‟stripped off”), hence ‟indubitable.” For example,
when a rope is lying coiled up in a dark room, to one
who enters hurriedly it presents the simply ‟probable”
-appearance of being a serpent;
-
+appearance of being a serpent;
+
but to the man who has looked carefully round and
has investigated the conditions—such as its immobility
and its colour, and each of its other peculiarities—it
@@ -2679,8 +2673,8 @@ brought her up again from Hades and showed her to
Admetus, who received an impression of Alcestis that
was probable and tested; since, however, he knew
that she was dead his mind recoiled from its assent
-and reverted to unbelief.This is a curious example of an ‟irreversible” impression. If the text is right, it looks as if Sextus was nodding.
-
+and reverted to unbelief.This is a curious example of an ‟irreversible” impression. If the text is right, it looks as if Sextus was nodding.
+
So then the philosophers of the New Academy prefer
the probable and tested impression to the simply
probable, and to both of these the impression that
@@ -2688,8 +2682,8 @@ is probable and tested and irreversible.
And although both the Academics and the Sceptics
say that they believe some things, yet here too the
difference between the two philosophies is quite plain.
-For the word ‟believe” has different meanings:
-
+For the word ‟believe” has different meanings:
+
it means not to resist but simply to follow without
any strong impulse or inclination, as the boy is said
to believe his tutor; but sometimes it means to
@@ -2699,20 +2693,20 @@ the incontinent man believes him who approves of
an extravagant mode of life. Since, therefore,
Carneades and Cleitomachus declare that a strong
inclination accompanies their credence and the
-credibility of the object, while weCf. §§ 22, 27 ff. supra. say that our
+credibility of the object, while weCf. §§ 22, 27 ff. supra. say that our
belief is a matter of simple yielding without any
consent, here too there must be a difference between
us and them.
-Furthermore, as regards the End (or aim of life)See §§ 25 supra.
+Furthermore, as regards the End (or aim of life)See §§ 25 supra.
we differ from the New Academy; for whereas the
-men who profess to conform to its doctrineCf. § 226. use
-probability as the guide of life, weCf. §§ 23, 24. live in an undogmatic
+men who profess to conform to its doctrineCf. § 226. use
+probability as the guide of life, weCf. §§ 23, 24. live in an undogmatic
way by following the laws, customs, and natural affections.
And we might say still more about this distinction
had it not been that we are aiming at conciseness.
-Arcesilaus, however, who was, as we said,Cf. § 220 supra. the
+Arcesilaus, however, who was, as we said,Cf. § 220 supra. the
president and founder of the Middle Academy,
certainly seems to me to have shared the doctrines of
Pyrrho, so that his Way of thought is almost identical
@@ -2721,16 +2715,16 @@ about the reality or unreality of anything, nor
does he prefer any one thing to another in point of
probability or improbability, but suspends judgement
about all. He also says that the End is suspension—
-which is accompanied, as we have said, by ‟quietude.”
-
+which is accompanied, as we have said, by ‟quietude.”
+
He declares, too, that suspension regarding particular
objects is good, but assent regarding particulars bad.
Only one might say that whereas we make these
statements not positively but in accordance with what
appears to us, he makes them as statements of real
facts, so that he asserts that suspension in itself
-really is good and assent bad.
-
+really is good and assent bad.
+
And if one ought to credit also what is said about him,
he appeared at the first glance, they say, to be a
'Pyrrhonean, but in reality he was a dogmatist; and
@@ -2739,13 +2733,13 @@ dubitation to see if they were fitted by nature for
the reception of the Platonic dogmas, he was thought
to be a dubitative philosopher, but he actually passed
on to such of his companions as were naturally gifted
-the dogmas of Plato. And this was why AristonAriston of Chios, a pupil of Zeno the Stoic. described
+the dogmas of Plato. And this was why AristonAriston of Chios, a pupil of Zeno the Stoic. described
him as ‟Plato the head of him, Pyrrho the tail, in
-the midst Diodorus;”The verse is a parody of Homer, Il. vi. 181 (cf. Hesiod, Theog. 323), who thus described the Chimaera: πρόσθε λέων, ὄπιθεν δὲ δράκων, μέσση δὲ χίμαιρα (‟Lion the head of her, Dragon the taol of her, trunk of a She-goat”). Diodorus Cronos was a Megaric philosopher (circa 300 B.C.). because he employed the
+the midst Diodorus;”The verse is a parody of Homer, Il. vi. 181 (cf. Hesiod, Theog. 323), who thus described the Chimaera: πρόσθε λέων, ὄπιθεν δὲ δράκων, μέσση δὲ χίμαιρα (‟Lion the head of her, Dragon the taol of her, trunk of a She-goat”). Diodorus Cronos was a Megaric philosopher (circa 300 B.C.). because he employed the
dialectic of Diodorus, although he was actually a
Platonist.
-PhiloSee Introd. pp. xxxvi f. asserts that objects are inapprehensible
+PhiloSee Introd. pp. xxxvi f. asserts that objects are inapprehensible
so far as concerns the Stoic criterion, that is to say
‟apprehensive impression,” but are apprehensible so
far as concerns the real nature of the objects themselves.
@@ -2763,24 +2757,24 @@ what is called the Fourth Academy and the Fifth.
Since some allege that the Sceptic philosophy
is identical with the Empiricism of the Medical
-sect,The later schools of medicine were three: (1) the Dogmatic or Logical, which theorized about the ‟non-evident” causes of health and disease; (2) the Empiric, which regarded such causes as indiscoverable and confined itself to observation of evident facts; (3) the Methodic, which adopted an intermediate position, refusing either to affirm or deny ‟non-evident” causes; cf. Introd. p. xl. it must be recognized that inasmuch as that
+sect,The later schools of medicine were three: (1) the Dogmatic or Logical, which theorized about the ‟non-evident” causes of health and disease; (2) the Empiric, which regarded such causes as indiscoverable and confined itself to observation of evident facts; (3) the Methodic, which adopted an intermediate position, refusing either to affirm or deny ‟non-evident” causes; cf. Introd. p. xl. it must be recognized that inasmuch as that
Empiricism positively affirms the inapprehensibility of
what is non-evident it is not identical with Scepticism
nor would it be consistent in a Sceptic to embrace that
doctrine. He could more easily, in my opinion, adopt
-the so-called ‟Method;”
-
+
for it alone of the Medical systems appears to avoid rash
treatment of things non-evident by arbitrary assertions as
to their apprehensibility or non-apprehensibility, and
following appearances derives from them what seems beneficial,
in accordance with the practice of the Sceptics. For we stated
-above§23. that the common life, in which the Sceptic also shares,
+above§23. that the common life, in which the Sceptic also shares,
is four-fold, one part depending on the directing force of Nature,
another on the compulsion of the affections, another on the
tradition of laws and customs, and another on the training
-of the arts.
-
+
So then, just as the Sceptic, in virtue of the compulsion
of the affections, is guided by thirst to drink and by hunger
to food, and in like manner to other such objects, in the
@@ -2793,35 +2787,33 @@ and in a relaxed condition, seek to put a stop to it and for this
reason rush off into the cool air. It is plain, too, that
conditions which are naturally alien compel us to take measures
for their removal, seeing that even the dog when it is pricked
-by a thorn proceeds to remove it.
-
+by a thorn proceeds to remove it.
+
And in short—to avoid exceeding the limits proper to an
outline of this kind by a detailed enumeration—I suppose
that all the facts described by the Methodic School can be
classed as instances of the compulsion of the affections,
whether natural or against nature.
-
Besides, the use of terms in an undogmatic and
-indeterminate sense is common to both systems.
-
+indeterminate sense is common to both systems.
+
For just as the Sceptic uses the expressions ‟I determine
nothing” and ‟I apprehend nothing,” as we have
said, in an undogmatic sense, even so the Methodic
-speaks of ‟generality”Or ‟generic character.” All diseases being referred to one or other of the two ‟general” morbid states, over-contraction or over-dilation of the pores or passages of the body, each of these ‟general” states was said to ‟pervade” all the cases which exhibited the symptoms of that state. The ‟genus” ‟pervades” (its characteristics run through) its ‟species” and ‟particulars.” and ‟pervade” and the like
+speaks of ‟generality”Or ‟generic character.” All diseases being referred to one or other of the two ‟general” morbid states, over-contraction or over-dilation of the pores or passages of the body, each of these ‟general” states was said to ‟pervade” all the cases which exhibited the symptoms of that state. The ‟genus” ‟pervades” (its characteristics run through) its ‟species” and ‟particulars.” and ‟pervade” and the like
in a non-committal way. So also he employs the
term ‟indication” in an undogmatic sense to denote
the guidance derived from the apparent affections, or
symptoms, both natural and contra-natural, for the
discovery of the seemingly appropriate remedies—
as, in fact, I mentioned in regard to hunger and thirst
-and the other affections.
-
+and the other affections.
+
Consequently, judging from these and similar indications,
we should say that the Methodic School of Medicine has
some affinity with Scepticism; and, when viewed not
simply by itself, but in comparison with the other
-Medical Schools, it has more affinity than they.
-
+Medical Schools, it has more affinity than they.
And now that we have said thus much concerning
the Schools which seem to stand nearest to that of
the Sceptics, we here bring to a conclusion both our
@@ -2836,23 +2828,23 @@ our ‟Outlines.”
Chapter I.—Can The Sceptic Investigate The Statements Of The Dogmatists?
Since we have undertaken this inquiry in criticism
-of the Dogmatists,i.e. the ‟special” section of this Sceptical treatise, as distinguished from the ‟general” exposition contained in Bk. I.; cf. i. 5, 6, 21. let us review briefly and in outline
+of the Dogmatists,i.e. the ‟special” section of this Sceptical treatise, as distinguished from the ‟general” exposition contained in Bk. I.; cf. i. 5, 6, 21. let us review briefly and in outline
the several divisions of so-called philosophy, when we
have first made reply to those who keep constantly
repeating that the Sceptic is incapable of either
investigating or in any way cognizing the objects
-about which they dogmatize.
-
-For theyi.e. Stoics and Epicureans. maintain that the Sceptic either apprehends or does not
+about which they dogmatize.
+
+For theyi.e. Stoics and Epicureans. maintain that the Sceptic either apprehends or does not
apprehend the statements made by the Dogmatists;
if, then, he apprehends, how can he be perplexed
about things which he has, as he says, apprehended?
Whereas if he apprehends not, then neither does he
-know how to discuss matters which he has not apprehended.
-
+know how to discuss matters which he has not apprehended.
+
For just as he who is ignorant, for instance,
-of the arguments known as ‟How far reduced”This argument is not elsewhere mentioned; possibly it refers to some form of the ‟Sorites”; cf. § 253. But T has ‟qui non novit . . . quid est omnis triangulus habet tres angulos equales duobus rectis.” or
-‟By two hypotheses,”The hypothetical syllogism ‟by two hypotheses” has its major premiss in double form; e.g. ‟If A is, B is, and if A is not, B is; but A either is or is not; therefore B is.” Cf. §§ 131, 186 infra. is unable also to say anything
+of the arguments known as ‟How far reduced”This argument is not elsewhere mentioned; possibly it refers to some form of the ‟Sorites”; cf. § 253. But T has ‟qui non novit . . . quid est omnis triangulus habet tres angulos equales duobus rectis.” or
+‟By two hypotheses,”The hypothetical syllogism ‟by two hypotheses” has its major premiss in double form; e.g. ‟If A is, B is, and if A is not, B is; but A either is or is not; therefore B is.” Cf. §§ 131, 186 infra. is unable also to say anything
about them, so the man who does not know each of
the statements made by the Dogmatists is unable to
criticize them concerning matters of which he has no
@@ -2866,18 +2858,18 @@ without the further affirmation of the reality of the
objects under discussion, or with the further assumption
of the reality of the objects discussed. For
if they say that ‟to apprehend” means, in their
-argument, to assent to an ‟apprehensive impression,”For this term in the Stoic epistemology see Introd. p. xxv. The argument is, in brief, that the Stoic cannot consistently criticize the Epicurean unless he allows that his ‟apprehensive impression” of their dogmas is an impression of things which have no basis in reality, and this contradicts the Stoic definition of ‟apprehensive impression.”
+argument, to assent to an ‟apprehensive impression,”For this term in the Stoic epistemology see Introd. p. xxv. The argument is, in brief, that the Stoic cannot consistently criticize the Epicurean unless he allows that his ‟apprehensive impression” of their dogmas is an impression of things which have no basis in reality, and this contradicts the Stoic definition of ‟apprehensive impression.”
the apprehensive impression being derived
from a real object and being an imprint or stamp upon
the mind corresponding to the actual object, such as
would not result from what is unreal, then probably
not even they themselves will wish to allow their
inability to investigate things which, in this sense, they
-have not apprehended.
-
+
Thus, for example, when the
Stoic criticizes the statement of the Epicurean that
-‟Being is divided,”It is uncertain to what ‟division” this refers—whether that of God from the world (Fabricius), of Body from Void (Zimmermann), of the ‟numberless worlds” from one another (Pappenheim), or (as seems simplest) of Body into numberless atomic fractions. For the dicta about ‟God” and ‟Pleasure” cf. iii. 219. or that ‟God does not foreknow
+‟Being is divided,”It is uncertain to what ‟division” this refers—whether that of God from the world (Fabricius), of Body from Void (Zimmermann), of the ‟numberless worlds” from one another (Pappenheim), or (as seems simplest) of Body into numberless atomic fractions. For the dicta about ‟God” and ‟Pleasure” cf. iii. 219. or that ‟God does not foreknow
events in the Universe,” or that ‟Pleasure is the
Good,” has he apprehended or has he not apprehended?
If he has apprehended these dogmas, by
@@ -2895,8 +2887,8 @@ nonsense—practically the whole of Dogmatism will
be confounded and the Sceptic philosophy will be
firmly established once it is granted that it is
impossible to inquire regarding an object which is not,
-in this sense, apprehended.
-
+in this sense, apprehended.
+
For he who makes a
dogmatic statement about a non-evident object will
declare that he is making it either after having
@@ -2906,8 +2898,8 @@ credence; while if he has apprehended it, he will
say that he has apprehended the object directly and
through itself and owing to the clear impression it
has made on him, or else by means of some kind of
-search and inquiry.For this distinction cf. i. 178 ff.
-
+search and inquiry.For this distinction cf. i. 178 ff.
+
But if he shall say that the
non-evident object has impressed him and has been
apprehended through itself, immediately and clearly,
@@ -2918,8 +2910,8 @@ that is non-evident there exists amongst them
endless controversy; so that the Dogmatist who makes
positive assertions about the reality of a non-evident
object cannot have apprehended it because of its
-having made on him a direct and clear impression.
-
+having made on him a direct and clear impression.
+
If, on the other hand, his apprehension is a result of
search, how was he in a position to make inquiry
before he had accurately apprehended the object,
@@ -2929,7 +2921,7 @@ of an accurate apprehension of that which is to be
the subject of inquiry, while the apprehension of the
subject of inquiry demands, in its turn, the previous
existence of a complete inquiry into that subject,
-owing to this circular process of reasoningCf. i. 61. it
+owing to this circular process of reasoningCf. i. 61. it
becomes impossible for them either to inquire concerning
things non-evident or to dogmatize; for if some
of them wish to make apprehension their starting-
@@ -2941,7 +2933,7 @@ the inquiry, so that for these reasons they can neither
apprehend any non-evident object nor make positive
statements about them. From this there will follow
automatically, as I think, the demolition of the
-Dogmatic sophistryCf. i. 63, ii. 84. and the establishment of the
+Dogmatic sophistryCf. i. 63, ii. 84. and the establishment of the
Suspensive philosophy.
If, however, they say that it is not this kind of
@@ -2960,8 +2952,8 @@ the Suspensive person continues in the Sceptical
state of mind. For, as has been shown, he assents
to what he experiences by way of subjective
impression, according as that impression appears to
-him.
-
+
But consider whether, even in this case, the
Dogmatists are not precluded from inquiry. For
to continue the investigation of problems is not
@@ -2977,7 +2969,7 @@ Thus we have to inquire briefly, on the present
occasion, concerning each several division of philosophy
so called. And since there exists much dispute
amongst the Dogmatists regarding the divisions of
-philosophyCf. Adv. Log. i. ad init.—some saying there is one division, some
+philosophyCf. Adv. Log. i. ad init.—some saying there is one division, some
two, some three—and it would not now be
convenient to discuss the question at length, we will
explain fairly and impartially the view of those who
@@ -2985,13 +2977,13 @@ seem to have treated it most fully, and take their
view as the subject of our discourse.
-
+
Chapter II.—The Starting-Point For Criticism Of The Dogmatists
-The Stoics, then, and several others,The others mentioned in Adv. Log. i. 16 are Plato, Xenocrates, and the Peripatetics; so too the Epicureans. say that there
+The Stoics, then, and several others,The others mentioned in Adv. Log. i. 16 are Plato, Xenocrates, and the Peripatetics; so too the Epicureans. say that there
are three divisions of philosophy, namely, Logic,
Physics, and Ethics; and they begin their teaching
-with Logic,So Chrysippus. Sextus treats of Logic in this Bk. ii., Physics in iii. 1-167, Ethics in iii. 167-278. although the question of the right
+with Logic,So Chrysippus. Sextus treats of Logic in this Bk. ii., Physics in iii. 1-167, Ethics in iii. 167-278. although the question of the right
starting-point is also a matter of much controversy. So
we shall follow them in an undogmatic way; and
since the subject matter of all three divisions requires
@@ -3001,7 +2993,7 @@ Logic, we shall begin with the doctrine of the criterion
and the division of Logic.
-
+
Chapter III.—Of The Criterion
But first we must notice that the word ‟criterion”
@@ -3010,7 +3002,7 @@ of reality and non-reality, and of that which we use
as the guide of life; and our present task is to discuss
the so-called criterion of truth, since we have already
dealt with the criterion in its other sense in our
-discourse ‟On Scepticism.”See i. chap. xi.
+discourse ‟On Scepticism.”
See i. chap. xi.
The criterion, then, with which our argument is
concerned, has three several meanings—the general,
@@ -3022,20 +3014,19 @@ it includes every technical standard of apprehension,
such as the rule and compass. In the ‟most
special” sense it includes every technical standard
of apprehension of a non-evident object; but in this
-application ordinary standardsi.e. standards of weight and measure (e. g. pound, pint, yard). are not regarded as
+application ordinary standardsi.e. standards of weight and measure (e. g. pound, pint, yard). are not regarded as
criteria but only logical standards and those which
-the Dogmatists employ for the judging of truth.
-
-We
-propose, therefore, in the first place to discuss the
+the Dogmatists employ for the judging of truth.
+
+We propose, therefore, in the first place to discuss the
logical criterion. But the logical criterion also may
-be used in three sensesCf. Adv. Log. i. 261.—of the agent, or the
+be used in three sensesCf. Adv. Log. i. 261.—of the agent, or the
instrument, or the ‟according to what;” the agent,
for instance, may be a man, the instrument either
sense-perception or intelligence, and the ‟according
to what” the application of the impression ‟according
to” which the man proceeds to judge by means
-of one of the aforesaid instruments.Examples of these three criteria are—the carpenter, his rule, the ‟applying” of his rule; cf. Adv. Log. i. 35 f.
+of one of the aforesaid instruments.
Examples of these three criteria are—the carpenter, his rule, the ‟applying” of his rule; cf. Adv. Log. i. 35 f.
It was appropriate, I consider, to make these
prefatory observations so that we may realize what is
@@ -3046,19 +3037,19 @@ the criterion of truth, and we will begin with
the dispute which exists about this question.
-
+
Chapter IV.—Does A Criterion Of Truth Really Exist?
Of those, then, who have treated of the criterion
some have declared that a criterion exists—the Stoics,
for example, and certain others—while by some its
-existence is denied, as by the Corinthian Xeniades,Earlier than Democritus: cf. Adv. Log. i. 53, 388.
-amongst others, and by XenophanesCf. i. 224; Adv. Log. i. 48, 110. of Colophon,
+existence is denied, as by the Corinthian Xeniades,Earlier than Democritus: cf. Adv. Log. i. 53, 388.
+amongst others, and by XenophanesCf. i. 224; Adv. Log. i. 48, 110. of Colophon,
who says—‟Over all things opinion bears sway;”
while we have adopted suspension of judgement as
-to whether it does or does not exist.
-
-This dispute,Cf. i. 164 ff., 115 ff.
+to whether it does or does not exist.
+
+This dispute,Cf. i. 164 ff., 115 ff.
then, they will declare to be either capable or
incapable of decision; and if they shall say it is
incapable of decision they will be granting on the spot
@@ -3066,8 +3057,8 @@ the propriety of suspension of judgement, while if
they say it admits of decision, let them tell us whereby
it is to be decided, since we have no accepted criterion,
and do not even know, but are still inquiring, whether
-any criterion exists.
-
+
Besides, in order to decide the
dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must
possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be
@@ -3103,20 +3094,20 @@ which attaches to this seems somehow to involve the
rest as well.
-
+
Chapter V.—Of The Criterion ‟By Whom,” Or Agent
Now ‟Man” (if he is ‟the agent”) seems to me,
so far as regards the statements made by the
Dogmatists, to be not only non-apprehensible but also
-inconceivable. At least we hear the Platonic SocratesCf. Plato, Phaedr. 229e f., Theaet. 174b.
+inconceivable. At least we hear the Platonic SocratesCf. Plato, Phaedr. 229e f., Theaet. 174b.
expressly confessing that he does not know whether
he is a man or something else. And when they wish
to establish the concept of ‟Man” they disagree in
the first place, and in the second place they speak
unintelligibly.
-Thus DemocritusCf. i. 213 ff.; Adv. Log. i. 265. declares that ‟Man is that
+Thus DemocritusCf. i. 213 ff.; Adv. Log. i. 265. declares that ‟Man is that
which we all know.” Then, so far as his opinion goes,
we shall not know Man, since we also know a dog, and
consequently Dog too will be Man. And some men
@@ -3124,10 +3115,9 @@ we do not know, therefore they will not be men. Or
rather, if we are to judge by this concept, no one will
be a man; for since Democritus says that Man must
be known by all, and all men know no one man,
-no one, according to him, will be a man.
-
-And it is
-evident from the relevance of this criticism that we
+no one, according to him, will be a man.
+
+And it is evident from the relevance of this criticism that we
are not now arguing sophistically. For this thinker
proceeds to say that ‟Only the atoms and the void
truly exist,” and these he says ‟form the substrate
@@ -3141,26 +3131,25 @@ distinguish Man from the other animals and form a
precise conception of him.
Again, Epicurus says that Man is ‟This sort
-of a shape combined with vitality.”Cf. Adv. Log. i. 267. Epicurus taught that truth is given by sense-perception: the percept is the real ‟thing in itself”; hence we have no general concepts which can be logically ‟denned” but only particular phenomena which are ‟indicated” or pointed out as ‟such and such, look you” (τοιουτοί) cf. Introd. p. xxiii. According
+of a shape combined with vitality.”Cf. Adv. Log. i. 267. Epicurus taught that truth is given by sense-perception: the percept is the real ‟thing in itself”; hence we have no general concepts which can be logically ‟denned” but only particular phenomena which are ‟indicated” or pointed out as ‟such and such, look you” (τοιουτοί) cf. Introd. p. xxiii. According
to him, then, since Man is shown by pointing out,
he that is not pointed out is not a man, and if anyone
points out a female, the male will not be Man, while
if he points out a male the female will not be Man.
And we shall also draw the same inferences from the
difference in the circumstances which we learn from
-the Fourth Mode of Suspension.Cf. i. 100.
+the Fourth Mode of Suspension.
Cf. i. 100.
-OthersStoics and Peripatetics, cf. § 211 infra. used to assert that ‟Man is a rational
+OthersStoics and Peripatetics, cf. § 211 infra. used to assert that ‟Man is a rational
mortal animal, receptive of intelligence and science.”
Now since it is shown by the First Mode of
-SuspensionSee i. 40 ff. that no animal is irrational but all
+SuspensionSee i. 40 ff. that no animal is irrational but all
are receptive of intelligence and science, so far
as their statements go, we shall be unable to
-perceive what they mean.
-
-And the attributes contained
-in this definition are used either in an ‟actual,” or
-full, or in a potential sense;The familiar Aristotelian distinction between ‟actuality” and ‟potentiality” is here used by Sextus to confute the Peripatetics, cf. Introd. p. xx. if in a full sense,
+perceive what they mean.
+
+And the attributes contained in this definition are used either in an ‟actual,” or
+full, or in a potential sense;
The familiar Aristotelian distinction between ‟actuality” and ‟potentiality” is here used by Sextus to confute the Peripatetics, cf. Introd. p. xx. if in a full sense,
he that has not already acquired complete science
and is not rationally perfect and in the very act of
dying—for this is to be mortal in the full sense of
@@ -3171,13 +3160,13 @@ and science; but this conclusion is even more absurd
than the former.
In this way, then, the concept of Man is shown to be
one which it is impossible to frame.
-
-For when PlatoCf. Adv. Log. i. 281; Diog. Laert. vi. 40; [Plato], Deff. 415 a.
+
+For when PlatoCf. Adv. Log. i. 281; Diog. Laert. vi. 40; [Plato], Deff. 415 a.
declares that ‟Man is a featherless two-footed animal
with broad nails, receptive of political science,” not
even he himself claims to affirm this positively; for
if Man is one of the class of things which, as he puts
-it,Cf. Theaet. 152 d, Tim. 27 d. come into being but never possess absolute
+it,Cf. Theaet. 152 d, Tim. 27 d. come into being but never possess absolute
being, and if it is impossible, in his view, to make a
positive declaration about things which never really
exist, then even Plato will not claim to be taken as
@@ -3187,18 +3176,18 @@ as making, in his usual way, a probable statement.
But even if we should grant, by way of concession,
that Man can be conceived, yet he will be found
to be non-apprehensible. For he is compounded of
-soul and body, and neither body nor soul perchance
‟Perchance,” one of the Sceptic formulae, cf. i. 194.
-is apprehended; so that Man is not apprehended.
-
+soul and body, and neither body nor soul perchance‟Perchance,” one of the Sceptic formulae, cf. i. 194.
+is apprehended; so that Man is not apprehended.
+
Now that body is not apprehended is easily shown
-thus: the attributes of an objecti.e. a ‟substance” in the Aristotelian sense, as distinguished from its ‟attributes,” ‟properties,” or ‟accidents;” cf. Adv. Log. i. 283 ff. are different from
+thus: the attributes of an objecti.e. a ‟substance” in the Aristotelian sense, as distinguished from its ‟attributes,” ‟properties,” or ‟accidents;” cf. Adv. Log. i. 283 ff. are different from
the object whereof they are attributes. So when
colour or any similar quality is perceived by us, what
we perceive is probably the attributes of the body
but not the body itself. Certainly the body, they say,
exists in three dimensions; we ought therefore to
apprehend its length and breadth and depth in order
-to apprehend the body. For if we perceived depthLit. ‟this” (τοῦτο: Mutsch. suggests ταῦτα). The argument would be clearer if we inserted the words ‟But we do not apprehend depth” after ‟body”; the text as it stands is too obscure to be sound.
+to apprehend the body. For if we perceived depthLit. ‟this” (τοῦτο: Mutsch. suggests ταῦτα). The argument would be clearer if we inserted the words ‟But we do not apprehend depth” after ‟body”; the text as it stands is too obscure to be sound.
we should also discern silver pieces under their
coating of gold. Therefore we do not apprehend
the body either.
@@ -3209,11 +3198,11 @@ owing to the fact that his soul is non-apprehensible.
That it is non-apprehensible is plain from this: of
those who have treated of the soul—so that we may
avoid dwelling on the long and endless controversy
-—some have asserted, as did Dicaearchus
A pupil of Aristotle, cf. Adv. Log. i. 349; Cicero, Tusc. i. 10. 22. the
+—some have asserted, as did Dicaearchus
A pupil of Aristotle, cf. Adv. Log. i. 349; Cicero, Tusc. i. 10. 22. the
Messenian, that the soul has no existence, others
that it has existence, and others have suspended
-judgement.
-
+
If, then, the Dogmatists shall maintain
that this dispute is incapable of decision, they will
be admitting thereby the non-apprehensibility of the
@@ -3225,8 +3214,8 @@ and if they shall say ‟by the intellect,” we will say
that inasmuch as the intellect is the least evident part
of the soul—as is shown by those who agree about the
real existence of the soul, though differing about the
-intellect,
-
+
—if they propose to apprehend the soul and
to decide the dispute about it by means of the
intellect, they will be proposing to decide and establish
@@ -3241,7 +3230,7 @@ But even supposing we grant that Man is
apprehended, it would not, probably, be possible to show
that objects ought to be judged by him. For he who
asserts that objects ought to be judged by Man will
-be asserting this either without proof or with proof.Cf. i. 115, 164 ff. Note that, in the context, the words ‟test,” ‟judge,” ‟decide,” are various renderings of κρίνω (whence κριτήριον).
+be asserting this either without proof or with proof.Cf. i. 115, 164 ff. Note that, in the context, the words ‟test,” ‟judge,” ‟decide,” are various renderings of κρίνω (whence κριτήριον).
Not with proof; for the proof must be true and
tested, and therefore tested by some standard.
Since, then, we are unable to make an agreed statement
@@ -3249,8 +3238,8 @@ as to the standard by which the proof itself can
be tested (for we are still inquiring about the criterion
‟By whom”), we shall be unable to pronounce judgement
on the proof, and therefore also to prove the
-criterion, which is the subject of discussion.
-
+criterion, which is the subject of discussion.
+
And if it shall be asserted without proof that objects
ought to be judged by Man, the assertion will be
disbelieved, so that we shall be unable to affirm
@@ -3258,10 +3247,10 @@ positively that the criterion ‟By whom” (or Agent)
is Man. Moreover, who is to be the judge that the
criterion of the Agent is Man? For if they assert this
without a judgement (or criterion) they will surely not
-be believed.
-
+
Yet if they say that a man is to be the
-judge, that will be assuming the point at issue;The fallacy of petitio principii, cf. §§ 57, 60, 67 infra.
+judge, that will be assuming the point at issue;The fallacy of petitio principii, cf. §§ 57, 60, 67 infra.
while if they make another animal the judge, in what
way do they come to adopt that animal for the
purpose of judging whether Man is the criterion? If
@@ -3284,9 +3273,9 @@ whom we must attend, and then, and only then, let
them bid us also to yield him our assent. But if they
are going to dispute about this ‟long as the waters
flow on and the tall trees cease not to burgeon” (to
-quote the familiar saying),From the inscription on the tomb of Midas quoted in Plato, Phaedr. 264 d; cf. Tibullus i. 4. 60. how can they urge us to
-assent rashly to anyone?
-
+quote the familiar saying),From the inscription on the tomb of Midas quoted in Plato, Phaedr. 264 d; cf. Tibullus i. 4. 60. how can they urge us to
+assent rashly to anyone?
+
For if they declare that
we must believe the Sage, we shall ask them ‟What
Sage?” Is it the Sage of Epicurus or of the Stoics,
@@ -3301,8 +3290,8 @@ sagacious than the rest, and in the next place, even
if it be granted that it can be unanimously agreed
who the man is who is more sagacious than those of
the present and the past, even so this man will not
-deserve credence.
-
+
For inasmuch as sagacity is liable
to a great, indeed almost incalculable, advance or
decline in intensity, we assert that it is possible for
@@ -3315,10 +3304,9 @@ sagacity, so it is still more proper to believe his
successor in the future who will be more sagacious
than he. And when that successor has arisen, then
it is right to expect that yet another will arise more
-sagacious than he, and so on ad infinitum.
-
-Nor is it
-evident whether all these men will agree with one
+sagacious than he, and so on ad infinitum.
+
+Nor is it evident whether all these men will agree with one
another or contradict one another. And consequently,
even when one of them is acknowledged to be more
sagacious than those of the past and present, seeing
@@ -3352,7 +3340,7 @@ be the most clever of all.
And if anyone shall say that we ought to attend to
the consensus of the majority, we shall reply that this
-is idle.Cf. Adv. Log. i. 327 ff. For, in the first place, truth is a rare thing,
+is idle.Cf. Adv. Log. i. 327 ff. For, in the first place, truth is a rare thing,
and on this account it is possible for one man to be
wiser than the majority. And, next, the opponents
of any criterion are more numerous than those who
@@ -3360,10 +3348,10 @@ agree about it; for those who admit any kind of
criterion different from that which seems to some to
be generally agreed upon oppose this latter, and they
are much more numerous than those who agree about
-it.
-
+
And besides all this, those who agree are either
-in diverse dispositionsCf. i. 100; Adv. Log. i. 333. or in one and the same. Now
+in diverse dispositionsCf. i. 100; Adv. Log. i. 333. or in one and the same. Now
they certainly are not in diverse dispositions so far as
regards the matter under discussion; else how could
they have made identical statements about it? And
@@ -3373,11 +3361,10 @@ disposition and all these who agree together are also in
one, so far as regards the dispositions in which we find
ourselves, no difference is found even on the ground of
numbers. Consequently we ought not to pay heed
-to the many more than to the one;
-
-besides the
-further fact that—as we pointed out in ‟The Fourth
-Mode of Scepticism”Cf. i. 100 ff. for the fourth trope; but the reference ought rather to be to the second, in i. 89.—the difference in judgements
+to the many more than to the one;
+
+besides the further fact that—as we pointed out in ‟The Fourth
+Mode of Scepticism”Cf. i. 100 ff. for the fourth trope; but the reference ought rather to be to the second, in i. 89.—the difference in judgements
that is based on numbers is non-apprehensible,
since individual men are innumerable and we are
incapable of investigating and expounding the
@@ -3403,15 +3390,15 @@ that those criteria also have been sufficiently dealt
with in what we have now said; yet in order that we
may not seem to be shirking the specific counter-
statement proper to each case, we will exceed our
-briefἐξ ἐπιμέτρου, lit. ‟as extra-measure” or ‟overplus”; ‟into the bargain.” and deal with them also shortly. And we shall
+briefἐξ ἐπιμέτρου, lit. ‟as extra-measure” or ‟overplus”; ‟into the bargain.” and deal with them also shortly. And we shall
discuss first the criterion ‟By means of which” (or
Instrument) as it is called.
-
+
Chapter VI.—Of The Criterion ‟By Means Of Which” (or INSTRUMENT)
-Concerning this criterionCf. Adv. Log. i. 343. the controversy which
+Concerning this criterionCf. Adv. Log. i. 343. the controversy which
exists amongst the Dogmatists is fierce and, one may
say, unending. We, however,—with a view here also
to a systematic treatment,—maintain that inasmuch
@@ -3424,13 +3411,14 @@ unable to judge by means of either sense alone or
intellect alone or both conjoined, we shall have given
a concise answer to all the individual opinions; for
they can all, as it seems, be referred to these three
-rival theories. Let us begin with the senses.
-
-Since, then, somee.g. Heracleitus, Parmenides, Democritus; cf. Adv. Log. i. 126 ff. assert that the senses have
+rival theories.
+
Let us begin with the senses.
+
+Since, then, somee.g. Heracleitus, Parmenides, Democritus; cf. Adv. Log. i. 126 ff. assert that the senses have
‟empty” impressions (none of the objects they seem
-to apprehend having any real existence), and othersEpicurus and Protagoras; cf. Adv. Log. i. 204, 369.
+to apprehend having any real existence), and othersEpicurus and Protagoras; cf. Adv. Log. i. 204, 369.
say that all the objects by which they suppose them
-to be moved are really existent, and others againPeripatetics, Stoics, and Academics; cf. Adv. Log. i. 369, 388.
+to be moved are really existent, and others againPeripatetics, Stoics, and Academics; cf. Adv. Log. i. 369, 388.
say that some of the objects are real, some unreal,
we shall not know whom we should assent to. For
we shall not decide the controversy by sense-perception,
@@ -3439,8 +3427,8 @@ our inquiry whether it is illusory or apprehends truly,
nor yet by anything else, seeing that there does not
even exist any other criterion ‟by means of which”
one ought to judge, according to the present
-hypothesis.
-
+
So then the question whether the senses have
illusory affections or apprehend some real object will
be incapable of either decision or apprehension; and
@@ -3456,18 +3444,17 @@ external real objects. For certainly the senses are
affected in diverse ways by external objects—taste,
for instance, perceives the same honey now as bitter
and now as sweet; and vision pronounces the same
-colour now blood-red and now white.Cf. i. 100 ff.
-
-Nay, even
-smell is not consistent with itself; for certainly the
+colour now blood-red and now white.Cf. i. 100 ff.
+
+Nay, even smell is not consistent with itself; for certainly the
sufferer from headache declares myrrh to be unpleasant,
while one who does not so suffer calls it
pleasant. And those who are possessed or in a frenzy
fancy they hear persons conversing with them whom we
do not hear. And the same water seems to those in a
fever to be unpleasant because of its excessive heat,
-but to all others tepid.
-
+but to all others tepid.
+
Whether, then, one is to call
all the appearances true, or some true and some false,
or all false, it is impossible to say since we possess
@@ -3476,8 +3463,8 @@ we are proposing to decide, nor are we even
provided with a proof that is true and approved,
because we are still in search of the criterion of truth
‟By means of which” the true proof itself ought to
-be tested.
-
+
For these reasons he also who asks us to
believe those who are in a natural state, but not
those whose disposition is non-natural, will be acting
@@ -3492,17 +3479,17 @@ even so the judgement of external real objects
by means of the senses alone will be found to be
impossible. For certainly the sense of sight, even
when it is in a natural state, pronounces the same
-towerCf. i. 118. to be at one time round, at another square;
+towerCf. i. 118. to be at one time round, at another square;
and the sense of taste declares the same food to be
unpleasant in the case of those full-fed, but pleasant
-in the case of those who are hungry;
-
+in the case of those who are hungry;
+
and the sense of hearing likewise perceives the same sound as loud
by night but as faint by day; and the sense of smell
regards the same objects as malodorous in the case
of most people, but not so in the case of tanners;
and the same sense of touch feels warmth in the outer
-hall,Cf. i. 110. when we enter the bath-rooms, but cold when we
+hall,Cf. i. 110. when we enter the bath-rooms, but cold when we
leave them. Therefore, since even when in a natural
state the senses contradict themselves, and their dispute
is incapable of decision, seeing that we possess
@@ -3510,15 +3497,15 @@ no accepted criterion by means of which it can be
judged, the same perplexities must necessarily follow.
Moreover, for the establishment of this conclusion we
may derive still further arguments from our previous
-discussion of the Modes of Suspension.See i. 36 ff. Hence it
+discussion of the Modes of Suspension.See i. 36 ff. Hence it
would probably be untrue to say that sense-perception
alone is able to judge real external objects.
Let us, then, proceed in our exposition to the
-intellect. Now those who claimCf. Adv. Log. i. 89 ff. that we should attend
+intellect. Now those who claimCf. Adv. Log. i. 89 ff. that we should attend
to the intellect only in our judgement of things will,
in the first place, be unable to show that the existence
-of intellect is apprehensible. For when Gorgias,See Introd. p. xv; cf. Adv. Log. i. 65. in
+of intellect is apprehensible. For when Gorgias,See Introd. p. xv; cf. Adv. Log. i. 65. in
denying that anything exists, denies also the existence
of intellect, while some declare that it has real
existence, how will they decide this contradiction?
@@ -3539,9 +3526,9 @@ that it really exists; I still affirm that it cannot judge
objects. For if it does not even discern itself accurately
but contradicts itself about its own existence
and the mode of its origin and the position in which
-it is placed,i.e. whether in the head or breast or elsewhere; cf. Adv. Log. i. 313, 348. how can it be able to apprehend
-anything else accurately?
-
+it is placed,i.e. whether in the head or breast or elsewhere; cf. Adv. Log. i. 313, 348. how can it be able to apprehend
+anything else accurately?
+
And even if it be granted
that the intellect is capable of judging objects, we
shall not discover how to judge according to it. For
@@ -3554,8 +3541,8 @@ those who say that some things do and others do not
exist—we shall have no means of deciding between
these divergent intellects, nor shall we be able to
assert that it is right to take this man’s intellect as
-our guide but not that man’s.
-
+our guide but not that man’s.
+
For if we venture
to judge by any one intellect, by thus agreeing to
assent to one side in the dispute we shall be assuming
@@ -3568,10 +3555,9 @@ made concerning the criterion ‟By whom”
(as it is called), that we are unable to discover the
intellect that is cleverer than all others; and also
that if we should discover the intellect that is cleverer
-than past and present intellects
-
-we ought not to
-attend to it, since it is not evident whether yet
+than past and present intellects
+
+we ought not to attend to it, since it is not evident whether yet
another intellect may not arise which is cleverer than
it; and further, that even if we assume an intellect
which none could possibly surpass, we shall not
@@ -3582,7 +3568,7 @@ he possesses the keenest intellect. Neither, then, by
the intellect alone ought we to judge objects.
The only remaining alternative is judgement by
-means of both senses and intellect.Cf. Adv. Log. i. 354 ff. But this again is
+means of both senses and intellect.Cf. Adv. Log. i. 354 ff. But this again is
impossible; for not only do the senses not guide the
intellect to apprehension, but they even oppose it. For
it is certain, at any rate, that from the fact that honey
@@ -3608,8 +3594,8 @@ shall say ‟by some,” how will they decide that we
ought to give heed to these senses and this intellect
and not to those, seeing that they possess no accepted
criterion by which to judge the differing senses and
-intellects?
-
+
And if they shall say that we will judge
the senses and the intellects by the intellect and the
senses, they are assuming the matter in question;
@@ -3626,10 +3612,9 @@ to judge both objects by the senses or by the intellect,
they will no longer be judging by sense and intellect
but by one of these two, whichever one they may
choose, and thus they will be entangled in the
-perplexities previously mentioned.
-
-And if they shall
-judge the senses by the senses and the intellects by
+perplexities previously mentioned.
+
+And if they shall judge the senses by the senses and the intellects by
the intellect, then, since both senses conflict with
senses and intellects with intellects, whichever of the
conflicting senses they shall adopt for judging the
@@ -3637,16 +3622,16 @@ rest of the senses, they will be assuming the matter
in question; for they will be adopting one section of
the series in dispute, as being already reliable, to
decide about the others which, equally with it, are in
-question.
-
+
And the same argument applies to the
intellects. And if they shall judge the intellects
by the senses, and the senses by the intellect, this
involves circular reasoning inasmuch as it is required
that the intellects should be judged first in order that
the senses may be judged, and the senses be first
-scrutinized in order that the intellects may be tested.
-
+scrutinized in order that the intellects may be tested.
+
Since, therefore, criteria of the one species cannot be
judged by those of a like species, nor those of both
the species by those of one species, nor conversely
@@ -3660,32 +3645,31 @@ to judge, then we shall possess no means by which to
judge objects.
Consequently, for these reasons also the criterion
-‟By means of which” will have no real existence.
+‟By means of which” will have no real existence.
-
+
Chapter VII.—Of The Criterion ‟According To Which”
Let us consider next the Criterion ‟According to
-which,” as theyi.e. the Stoics, cf. § 16; Adv. Log. i. 35, 370. For the Stoic doctrine of ‟presentation” and the ‟Criterion” see Introd. p. xxv. say, objects are judged. In the first
+which,” as theyi.e. the Stoics, cf. § 16; Adv. Log. i. 35, 370. For the Stoic doctrine of ‟presentation” and the ‟Criterion” see Introd. p. xxv. say, objects are judged. In the first
place, then, we may say this of it, that ‟presentation”
is inconceivable. They declare that ‟presentation”
-is an impression on ‟the regent part.”Or ‟ruling principle,” cf. i. 128, Adv. Log. i. 380; Introd. p. xxv. Since, then,
+is an impression on ‟the regent part.”Or ‟ruling principle,” cf. i. 128, Adv. Log. i. 380; Introd. p. xxv. Since, then,
the soul, and the regent part, is breath or something
-more subtile than breath,Cf. § 81 infra, iii. 188: Introd. p. xxv. as they affirm, no one will
+more subtile than breath,Cf. § 81 infra, iii. 188: Introd. p. xxv. as they affirm, no one will
be able to conceive of an impression upon it either
by way of depression and eminence, as we see in
the case of seals, or by way of the magical ‟alteration”
-they talk about;The first of these views is ascribed to Cleanthes, the second to Chrysippus, cf. Adv. Log. i. 228, 372: Introd. p. xxv. for the soul will not be able
+they talk about;The first of these views is ascribed to Cleanthes, the second to Chrysippus, cf. Adv. Log. i. 228, 372: Introd. p. xxv. for the soul will not be able
to conserve the remembrance of all the concepts
that compose an art, since the pre-existing concepts
-are obliterated by the subsequent ‟alterations.”
-
-Yet
-even if ‟presentation” could be conceived, it would
+are obliterated by the subsequent ‟alterations.”
+
+Yet even if ‟presentation” could be conceived, it would
still be non-apprehensible; for since it is an affection
of the regent part, and the regent part, as we have
-shown,See §§ 57 ff. supra. is not apprehended, neither shall we
+shown,See §§ 57 ff. supra. is not apprehended, neither shall we
apprehend its affection.
Further, even were we to grant that the ‟presentation”
@@ -3694,13 +3678,13 @@ according to it; for the intellect, as they assert, does
not make contact with external objects and receive
presentations by means of itself but by means of
the senses, and the senses do not apprehend external
-real objects but only, if at all, their own affections.i.e. sensations or feelings.
+real objects but only, if at all, their own affections.i.e. sensations or feelings.
So then the presentation will be that of the affection
of the sense, which is different from the external
reality; for honey is not the same as my feeling of
sweetness nor gall the same as my feeling of bitterness,
-but a different thing.
-
+
And if this affection differs
from the external real object, the presentation will
not be that of the external reality but of something
@@ -3719,10 +3703,9 @@ senses are similar to the objects of sense when it has
not itself encountered the external objects, and the
senses do not inform it about their real nature but
only about their own affections, as I have argued
-from the Modes of Suspension?See i. 100 ff.
-
-For just as the man
-who does not know Socrates but has seen a picture of
+from the Modes of Suspension?See i. 100 ff.
+
+For just as the man who does not know Socrates but has seen a picture of
him does not know whether the picture is like Socrates,
so also the intellect when it gazes on the affections of
the senses but does not behold the external objects
@@ -3740,12 +3723,12 @@ points to an entirely opposite conclusion. In this
case we shall either believe every presentation, or
impression, and judge according thereto, or some one
impression. But if we are to believe every impression,
-clearly we shall believe also that of XeniadesCf. § 18 supra. according
+clearly we shall believe also that of XeniadesCf. § 18 supra. according
to which he asserted that all impressions are un
untrustworthy, and our statement will be reversed and
made to say that all impressions are not of such a sort
-that objects can be judged according to them.
-
+that objects can be judged according to them.
+
And if we are to believe some, how shall we decide that
it is proper to believe these and disbelieve those?
For if they say we are to do so without presentation,
@@ -3754,8 +3737,8 @@ for judging, inasmuch as they will be stating that
objects can be judged without it; while if they say
‟by the aid of presentation,” how will they select
the presentation which they are adopting for the
-purpose of judging all the other presentations?
-
+purpose of judging all the other presentations?
+
Once again they will need a second presentation to judge
the first, and a third to judge the second, and so on
ad infinitum. But it is impossible to judge an infinite
@@ -3774,7 +3757,7 @@ This is enough to say now, in our outline sketch,
with reference to the criterion ‟According to which,”
as it was said, objects are judged. But one should
notice that we do not propose to assert that the
-criterion of truth is unrealCf. § 103 infra, Adv. Log. i. 443. (for that would be dogmatism);
+criterion of truth is unrealCf. § 103 infra, Adv. Log. i. 443. (for that would be dogmatism);
but since the Dogmatists appear to have
established plausibly that there really is a criterion of
truth, we have set up counter-arguments which appear
@@ -3786,36 +3769,36 @@ of those propounded by the Dogmatists we deduce
suspension of judgement.
-
+
Chapter VIII.—Of The True And Truth
Even were we to grant, by way of hypothesis, that
a criterion of truth exists, it is found to be useless and
vain if we recall that, so far as the statements of the
Dogmatists go, truth is unreal and the true non-
-substantial.Cf. Adv. Log. i. 38 ff. S. argues that, to go by the Stoics’ own statement, neither ‟truth” (which is ‟corporeal”) nor ‟the true” (particular ‟judgement,” which is ‟incorporeal”) has any real existence: he terms the former ‟unreal,” or ‟non-existent” (ἀνύπαρκτος), the latter ‟non-substantial” (ἀνυπόστατον).
-
+substantial.Cf. Adv. Log. i. 38 ff. S. argues that, to go by the Stoics’ own statement, neither ‟truth” (which is ‟corporeal”) nor ‟the true” (particular ‟judgement,” which is ‟incorporeal”) has any real existence: he terms the former ‟unreal,” or ‟non-existent” (ἀνύπαρκτος), the latter ‟non-substantial” (ἀνυπόστατον).
+
The passage we recall is this: ‟The
true is said to differ from truth in three ways—in
essence, composition, potency. In essence, since the
-true is incorporeal (for it is judgement and ‟expression”Literally ‟the utterable” (lekton), or thought in its relation to speech; i.e. the meaning or significance of a word or name (the idea or mental picture evoked by it) as distinguished from (1) the name itself, as uttered (φωνή), and (2) the real object, existing outside the mind (ἐκτός), denoted by the name: these two last were said (by the Stoics) to be ‟corporeal.”),
+true is incorporeal (for it is judgement and ‟expression”Literally ‟the utterable” (lekton), or thought in its relation to speech; i.e. the meaning or significance of a word or name (the idea or mental picture evoked by it) as distinguished from (1) the name itself, as uttered (φωνή), and (2) the real object, existing outside the mind (ἐκτός) denoted by the name: these two last were said (by the Stoics) to be ‟corporeal.”),
while truth is a body (for it is knowledge
declaratory of all true things, and knowledge is a
particular state of the regent part, just as the fist is a
particular state of the hand, and the regent part is a
-body; for according to them it is breath).
-
+body; for according to them it is breath).
+
In composition, because the true is a simple thing, as for
example ‘I converse,’ whereas truth is a compound
-of many true cognitions.Cf. Adv. Log. i. 41 ff.
-
+of many true cognitions.Cf. Adv. Log. i. 41 ff.
+
In potency, since truth depends on knowledge but the
true does not altogether so depend. Consequently,
as they say, truth exists only in the good man, but
the true in the bad man as well; for it is possible
for the bad man to utter something true.”
-
Such are the statements of the Dogmatists.
-
+
Such are the statements of the Dogmatists.
+
But awe,—having regard here again to the plan of our
treatise,—shall confine our present discussion to the
true, since its refutation entails that of truth as well,
@@ -3834,7 +3817,7 @@ particular inventions of the logic of the Dogmatists
are included in the refutation.
-
+
Chapter IX.—Does Anything True Really Exist?
Seeing, then, that there is a controversy amongst
@@ -3854,7 +3837,7 @@ it is impossible also to get to know that something
true exists.
Moreover, the ‟something,” which is, they declare,
-the highest genus of all,Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 32 ff.; Introd. p. xxvi. is either true or false
+the highest genus of all,Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 32 ff.; Introd. p. xxvi. is either true or false
or neither false nor true or both false and true.
If, then, they shall assert that it is false they will
be confessing that all things are false. For just as it
@@ -3865,8 +3848,8 @@ also will be false and nothing true. And this involves
also the conclusion that nothing is false; for the very
statements ‟all things are false,” and ‟something
false exists,” being themselves included in the ‟all,”
-will be false.
-
+
And if the ‟something” is true, all
things will be true; and from this again it follows
that nothing is true, since this statement itself (I
@@ -3883,7 +3866,7 @@ it will be non-evident to us whether the true exists.
Furthermore, the true things are either apparent
only, or non-evident only, or in part non-evident and
-in part apparent;Cf, Adv. Log. ii. 17 ff. By ‟true things” are meant judgements or propositions which conform to fact. but none of these alternatives is
+in part apparent;Cf, Adv. Log. ii. 17 ff. By ‟true things” are meant judgements or propositions which conform to fact. but none of these alternatives is
true, as we shall show; therefore nothing is true. If,
however, the true things are apparent only, they will
assert either that all or that some of the apparent are
@@ -3894,9 +3877,9 @@ without testing that these phenomena are true, those
false, while if he employs a test or criterion he will
say either that this criterion is apparent or that it is
non-evident. But it is certainly not non-evident;
-for it is now being assumedThis is incorrect; on the hypothesis, non-evidents may also be true. that the apparent objects
-only are true.
-
+for it is now being assumedThis is incorrect; on the hypothesis, non-evidents may also be true. that the apparent objects
+only are true.
+
And if it is apparent, since the matter
in question is what apparent things are true and what
false, that apparent thing which is adopted for the
@@ -3909,7 +3892,7 @@ only.
Similarly also he who declares that the non-evident
only are true will not imply that they are all true (for
-he will not say that it is true that the starsA favourite example of the ‟non-evident,” cf. § 97 infra, Adv. Log. ii. 147, etc. are even
+he will not say that it is true that the starsA favourite example of the ‟non-evident,” cf. § 97 infra, Adv. Log. ii. 147, etc. are even
in number and that they are also odd); while if
some are true, whereby shall we decide that these
non-evident things are true and those false? Certainly
@@ -3928,8 +3911,8 @@ some of the non-evident. If, then, we say ‟all,” the
argument will again be overthrown, since the truth is
granted of the statement ‟nothing is true,” and the
truth will be asserted of both the statements ‟the
-stars are even in number” and ‟they are odd.”
-
+stars are even in number” and ‟they are odd.”
+
But if some of the apparent are true and some of the
non-evident, how shall we judge that of the apparent
these are true but those false? For if we do so
@@ -3939,10 +3922,9 @@ non-evident, then, since the non-evidents also require
to be judged, by what means is this non-evident thing
to be judged? If by an apparent thing, we fall into
circular reasoning; and if by a thing non-evident,
-into the regress ad infinitum.
-
-And about the non-
-evident we must make a similar statement; for he
+into the regress ad infinitum.
+
+And about the non-evident we must make a similar statement; for he
who attempts to judge them by something non-
evident is thrown back ad infinitum, while he who
judges by a thing apparent or with the constant
@@ -3960,7 +3942,7 @@ vain, even if we grant, by way of concession, that it
possesses some substantial reality. And if we have
to suspend judgement as to whether anything true
exists, it follows that those who declare that ‟dialectic
-is the science of things true and false and neither”For this Stoic definition cf. §§ 229, 247; Adv. Eth. 187; it is ascribed to Poseidonius by Diog. Laert. vii. 62.
+is the science of things true and false and neither”For this Stoic definition cf. §§ 229, 247; Adv. Eth. 187; it is ascribed to Poseidonius by Diog. Laert. vii. 62.
speak rashly.
And since the criterion of truth has appeared to be
@@ -3972,9 +3954,9 @@ for since the Dogmatists suppose they apprehend
the latter from the things evident, if we are forced
to suspend judgement about the evident, how shall
we dare to make pronouncements about the non-
-evident?
-
-Yet, by way of super-addition,Cf. i. 62–63. we shall
+evident?
+
+Yet, by way of super-addition,Cf. i. 62–63. we shall
also raise separate objections against the non-evident
class of objects. And since they seem to be apprehended
and confirmed by means of sign and proof,
@@ -3984,30 +3966,30 @@ begin with sign; for indeed proof seems to be a
kind of sign.
-
+
Chapter X.—Concerning Sign
-Of objects, then, some, according to the Dogmatists,i.e. the Stoics. ‟Pre-evident” = evident of themselves, self-manifesting; cf. i. 138.
+Of objects, then, some, according to the Dogmatists,i.e. the Stoics. ‟Pre-evident” = evident of themselves, self-manifesting; cf. i. 138.
are pre-evident, some non-evident; and of the
non-evident, some are altogether non-evident, some
occasionally non-evident, some naturally non-evident.
Pre-evident are, as they assert, those which come to
-our knowledge of themselves,Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 141, 144, 316. as for example the
+our knowledge of themselves,Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 141, 144, 316. as for example the
fact that it is day-time; altogether non-evident are
those which are not of a nature to fall within our
-apprehension, as that the starsCf. § 90 supra are even in number;
-occasionally non-evident are those which,
-
+apprehension, as that the starsCf. § 90 supra are even in number;
+occasionally non-evident are those which,
+
though patent in their nature, are occasionally rendered non-
-evident to us owing to certain external circumstances,i.e. distance in space. From this we infer that Sextus was not then residing at Athens.
+evident to us owing to certain external circumstances,i.e. distance in space. From this we infer that Sextus was not then residing at Athens.
as the city of Athens is now to me; naturally non-
-evident are those which are not of such a natureCf. §§ 146, 318. For the ‟pores” (or excretory ‟ducts,” or ‟passages”) as ‟intelligible” (νοητοί), or objects of thought as opposed to sense, cf. § 140, Adv. Log. ii. 306. as
+evident are those which are not of such a natureCf. §§ 146, 318. For the ‟pores” (or excretory ‟ducts,” or ‟passages”) as ‟intelligible” (νοητοί), or objects of thought as opposed to sense, cf. § 140, Adv. Log. ii. 306. as
to fall within our clear perception, like the intelligible
pores; for these never appear of themselves but may
be thought to be apprehended, if at all, owing to
other things, such as perspirations or something of
-the sort.
-
+
Now the pre-evident objects, they say, do
not require a sign, for they are apprehended of themselves.
And neither do the altogether non-evident,
@@ -4020,23 +4002,23 @@ and by ‟indicative” signs in the case of the
naturally non-evident.
Of the signs, then, according to them, some are
-suggestive, some indicative.The Stoic doctrine. Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 151 ff., 156. They term a sign
+suggestive, some indicative.The Stoic doctrine. Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 151 ff., 156. They term a sign
‟suggestive” when, being mentally associated with
the thing signified, it by its clearness at the time
of its perception, though the thing signified remains
non-evident, suggests to us the thing associated with
it, which is not clearly perceived at the moment—
-as for instance in the case of smoke and fire.
-
+as for instance in the case of smoke and fire.
+
An ‟indicative” sign, they say, is that which is not
clearly associated with the thing signified, but signifies
that whereof it is a sign by its own particular nature
and constitution, just as, for instance, the bodily
motions are signs of the soul. Hence, too, they define
this sign as follows: ‟An indicative sign is an antecedent
-judgement, in a sound hypothetical syllogism,Cf. § 104 infra. As smoke ‟indicates” fire, so in the hypothetical syllogism—‟If there is smoke, there is fire; but in fact there is smoke; therefore there is fire”—the ‟antecedent” (or ‟if”-clause) ‟reveals” (or is a ‟sign” of) the ‟consequent” judgement ‟there is fire.”
-which serves to reveal the consequent.”
-
+judgement, in a sound hypothetical syllogism,Cf. § 104 infra. As smoke ‟indicates” fire, so in the hypothetical syllogism—‟If there is smoke, there is fire; but in fact there is smoke; therefore there is fire”—the ‟antecedent” (or ‟if”-clause) ‟reveals” (or is a ‟sign” of) the ‟consequent” judgement ‟there is fire.”
+which serves to reveal the consequent.”
+
Seeing, then, that there are, as we have said, two different
kinds of sign, we do not argue against every sign
but only against the indicative kind as it seems to
@@ -4058,7 +4040,7 @@ apparent equivalence of the arguments adduced for
its reality and for its unreality.
-
+
Chapter XI.—Does an Indicative Sign Exist?
Now the sign, judging by the statements of the
@@ -4068,13 +4050,12 @@ exactly, in attempting to establish the conception of
the sign, state that ‟A sign is an antecedent judgement
in a valid hypothetical syllogism, which serves
to reveal the consequent;” and ‟judgement” they
-define as ‟A self-complete expressionAn ‟expression,” lekton (see p. 203 note b), may be either ‟deficient” (e.g. ‟writes”) or ‟complete” (e.g. ‟he writes”); cf. § 81, Adv. Log. ii. 71. which is of
+define as ‟A self-complete expressionAn ‟expression,” lekton (see p. 203 note b), may be either ‟deficient” (e.g. ‟writes”) or ‟complete” (e.g. ‟he writes”); cf. § 81, Adv. Log. ii. 71. which is of
itself declaratory;” and ‟valid hypothetical syllogism”
-as one ‟which does not begin with truthi.e. with a true antecedent, or ‟if” clause. Cf. generally Adv. Log. ii. 112, 245 ff., 449.
-and end with a false consequent.”
-
-For either the
-syllogism begins with the true and ends with the true
+as one ‟which does not begin with truthi.e. with a true antecedent, or ‟if” clause. Cf. generally Adv. Log. ii. 112, 245 ff., 449.
+and end with a false consequent.”
+
+For either the syllogism begins with the true and ends with the true
(e.g. ‟If there is day, there is light”), or it begins with
what is false and ends in falsehood (like ‟If the earth
flies, the earth is winged”), or it begins with truth and
@@ -4083,15 +4064,15 @@ flies”), or it begins with falsehood and ends in truth
(like ‟If the earth flies, the earth exists”). And
they say that of these only that which begins with
truth and ends in falsehood is invalid, and the rest
-valid.
-
+
‟Antecedent,” they say, is ‟the precedent
clause in a hypothetical syllogism which begins in
truth and ends in truth.” And it ‟serves to reveal the
consequent,” since in the syllogism ‟If this woman
has milk, she has conceived,” the clause ‟If this
woman has milk” seems to be evidential of the clause
-‟she has conceived.”For this stock example cf. Aristot. Anal. pr. ii. 27, Rhet. i. 2. 18; Plato, Menex. 237 e.
+‟she has conceived.”
For this stock example cf. Aristot. Anal. pr. ii. 27, Rhet. i. 2. 18; Plato, Menex. 237 e.
Such is the Stoic doctrine. But we assert, firstly,
that it is non-evident whether any ‟expression”
@@ -4108,8 +4089,8 @@ because it is composed of expressions will be unable
to be adduced to confirm the existence of expression
(for how will he who refuses to allow the existence of
expression grant the reality of a system compounded
-of expressions?),
-
+
—it follows that the man who
attempts to establish the existence of expression
from the reality of the system of expressions is proposing
@@ -4119,11 +4100,11 @@ by means of demonstration that any expression exists,
it is non-evident that any expression exists.
So, too, with the question whether judgement
exists; for the judgement is a form of expression.
-
+
And very possibly, even should it be granted by
way of assumption that expression exists, judgement
will be found to be non-existent, it being compounded
-of expressions not mutually co-existent.Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 80 ff. Thus, for
+of expressions not mutually co-existent.Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 80 ff. Thus, for
example, in the case of ‟If day exists, light exists,”
when I say ‟day exists” the clause ‟light exists” is
not yet in existence, and when I say ‟light exists”
@@ -4136,31 +4117,31 @@ then the judgement will have no real existence.
But passing over this objection, it will be found that
the valid hypothetical syllogism is non-apprehensible.
-For PhiloA Megaric philosopher (circa 300 b.c.), not the Academic mentioned in i. 235, and Introd. pp. xxxvi f.; cf. Adv. Log. ii. 113 ff. says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is
+For PhiloA Megaric philosopher (circa 300 b.c.), not the Academic mentioned in i. 235, and Introd. pp. xxxvi f.; cf. Adv. Log. ii. 113 ff. says that a valid hypothetical syllogism is
‟that which does not begin with a truth and end
with a falsehood,” as for instance the syllogism ‟If
it is day, I converse,” when in fact it is day and I am
-conversing; but DiodorusCf. i. 234, Adv. Log. ii. 115. defines it as ‟that which
+conversing; but DiodorusCf. i. 234, Adv. Log. ii. 115. defines it as ‟that which
neither was nor is capable of beginning with a truth
and ending with a falsehood;” so that according to
him the syllogism now mentioned seems to be false,
since if it is in fact day but I have remained silent
it will begin with a truth but end with a falsehood,
-whereas the syllogism
-
+
‟If atomic elements of things
do not exist, atomic elements exist,” seems true,
since it begins with the false clause ‟atomic elements
do not exist” and will end, according to him, with
the true clause ‟atomic elements exist.” And
-those who introduce ‟connexion,” or ‟coherence,”The opposite is ‟diartesis,” incoherence or incompatibility, §§ 146, 152, 238 infra, Adv. Log. ii. 430.
+those who introduce ‟connexion,” or ‟coherence,”The opposite is ‟diartesis,” incoherence or incompatibility, §§ 146, 152, 238 infra, Adv. Log. ii. 430.
assert that it is a valid hypothetical syllogism whenever
the opposite of its consequent contradicts its
antecedent clause; so that, according to them, the
above-mentioned syllogisms are invalid, whereas the
-syllogism ‟If day exists, day exists” is true.
-
-And those who judge by ‟implication”‟Implication” (emphasis) is power of signifying more than is explicitly expressed. An example of this ‟potential inclusion” is ‟If a man exists, a beast exists.” declare
+syllogism ‟If day exists, day exists” is true.
+
+And those who judge by ‟implication”‟Implication” (emphasis) is power of signifying more than is explicitly expressed. An example of this ‟potential inclusion” is ‟If a man exists, a beast exists.” declare
that a hypothetical syllogism is true when its consequent
is potentially included in its antecedent;
and according to them the syllogism ‟If day exists,
@@ -4177,7 +4158,7 @@ its conclusion follows the combination of its
premisses as the consequent follows the antecedent;
thus, for example—‟If it is day it is light; but in
fact it is day; therefore it is light:” [‟If it is day it
-is light,” ‟it is day and also it is light.”]The words bracketed give an unintelligible form of syllogism, and the Greek text is evidently corrupt. Possibly we should read—‟It is day; and if it is day it is light; therefore it is light”—thus merely transposing the premisses of the preceding syllogism (cf. § 137).
+is light,” ‟it is day and also it is light.”]
The words bracketed give an unintelligible form of syllogism, and the Greek text is evidently corrupt. Possibly we should read—‟It is day; and if it is day it is light; therefore it is light”—thus merely transposing the premisses of the preceding syllogism (cf. § 137).
But when we inquire how we are to judge the logical sequence
of the consequent in its relation to the antecedent,
@@ -4187,15 +4168,14 @@ syllogism, the conclusion of the proof must follow
logically from its premisses, as we said above; and,
in turn, in order to establish this, the hypothetical
syllogism and its logical sequence must be tested;
-and this is absurd.
-
-So then the valid hypothetical
-syllogism is non-apprehensible.
+and this is absurd.
+
+So then the valid hypothetical syllogism is non-apprehensible.
But the ‟antecedent” also is unintelligible. For
the antecedent, as they assert, is ‟the leading clause
in a hypothetical syllogism of the kind which begins
-with a truth and ends in a truth.”Cf. §§ 105 f. supra.
-
+with a truth and ends in a truth.”Cf. §§ 105 f. supra.
+
But if the sign serves to reveal the consequent, the consequent is
either pre-evident or non-evident. If, then, it is
pre-evident, it will not so much as need the thing
@@ -4210,8 +4190,8 @@ them is true, it will be non-evident whether the
hypothetical syllogism ends in a true consequent.
And this involves the further fact that it is non-
evident whether the leading clause in the syllogism
-is the logical antecedent.
-
+is the logical antecedent.
+
But to pass over this
objection also, the sign cannot serve to reveal the
consequent, if the thing signified is relative to the
@@ -4221,8 +4201,8 @@ and just as ‟right” cannot be apprehended as ‟right
of left” before ‟left,” nor vice versa—and the same
holds good of all other relative terms,—so neither will
it be possible for the sign, as ‟sign of signified,” to be
-apprehended before the thing signified.Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 163 ff.
-
+apprehended before the thing signified.Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 163 ff.
+
And if the sign is not apprehended before the thing signified,
neither can it really serve to reveal the actual thing
which is apprehended along with itself and not after
@@ -4231,8 +4211,8 @@ itself.
statements of the dissenting philosophers (the
Stoics), the sign is inconceivable. For they assert
that it is both relative and serving to reveal the
-thing signified, in relation to which they say it was.
-
+thing signified, in relation to which they say it was.
+
Accordingly, if it is relative and in relation to the
thing signified it certainly ought to be apprehended
along with the thing signified, as is ‟left” with
@@ -4241,10 +4221,9 @@ relative terms. Whereas, if it serves to reveal the
thing signified, it certainly ought to be apprehended
before it, in order that by being foreknown it may
lead us to a conception of the object which comes to
-be known by means of it.
-
-But it is impossible to form
-a conception of an object which cannot be known
+be known by means of it.
+
+But it is impossible to form a conception of an object which cannot be known
before the thing before which it must necessarily be
apprehended; and so it is impossible to conceive of
an object which is both relative and also really serves
@@ -4256,16 +4235,16 @@ impossible to conceive of the sign.
Furthermore, there is this also to be said. Amongst
our predecessors there existed a controversy, some
declaring that an indicative sign exists, others
-maintaining that no indicative sign exists.
Cf. §§ 99: the ‟others” include some of the Academics and medical Empirics (cf. i. 236). He, then,
+maintaining that no indicative sign exists.
Cf. §§ 99: the ‟others” include some of the Academics and medical Empirics (cf. i. 236). He, then,
who asserts the existence of an indicative sign will
assert it either simply and without proof, making a
bald assertion, or by the aid of proof. But if he shall
employ mere assertion he will not gain credence;
while if he shall propose to prove it he will be assuming
-the matter in question.
-
+
For since proof is stated
-to come under the genus sign,Cf. § 96; Adv. Log. ii. 178 ff. seeing that it is
+to come under the genus sign,Cf. § 96; Adv. Log. ii. 178 ff. seeing that it is
disputed whether or not a sign exists, there will also be a
dispute as to whether proof does or does not at all
exist—just as, when we make, let us suppose, the
@@ -4274,12 +4253,12 @@ inquiry ‟Does animal exist?” we are inquiring also
the matter in question either by means of what is
equally in question or by means of itself. So that
neither will one be able by means of proof to affirm
-positively that sign exists.
-
+positively that sign exists.
+
And if it is not possible
either simply or with the aid of proof to make a
positive declaration about the sign, it is impossible
-to make an apprehensive affirmationA curious expression, only used here by Sextus; it seems to mean ‟an affirmation which treats the thing as though it were apprehended.” concerning it;
+to make an apprehensive affirmationA curious expression, only used here by Sextus; it seems to mean ‟an affirmation which treats the thing as though it were apprehended.” concerning it;
and if the sign is not apprehended with exactness,
neither will it be said to be significant of anything,
inasmuch as there is no agreement even about
@@ -4289,7 +4268,7 @@ sign will be unreal and inconceivable.
But there is this further to be said. Either the signs
are apparent only or non-evident only, or some are
-apparent and some non-evident.Cf. § 88; Adv. Log. ii. 171 ff. But none of these
+apparent and some non-evident.Cf. § 88; Adv. Log. ii. 171 ff. But none of these
alternatives is valid; therefore sign does not exist.
Now that all the signs are not non-evident is shown
by the following argument. The non-evident does
@@ -4308,7 +4287,7 @@ apprehended.
And if all the signs are apparent, then, because
the sign is a relative thing and in relation to the
-thing signified, and relatives are apprehended conjointly,Cf. §§ 119, 169.
+thing signified, and relatives are apprehended conjointly,Cf. §§ 119, 169.
the things said to be signified, being apprehended
along with what is apparent, will be apparent.
For just as when the right and left are perceived
@@ -4316,8 +4295,8 @@ together, the right is not said to appear more than
the left nor the left than the right, so when the sign
and the thing signified are apprehended together the
sign should not be said to appear any more than the
-thing signified.
-
+
And if the thing signified is apparent,
it will not even be signified, as it requires nothing to
signify and reveal it. Hence, just as when ‟right”
@@ -4332,13 +4311,13 @@ difficulties remain. For the things said to be signified
by the apparent signs will, as we said before, be
apparent and require nothing to signify them, and
will not even be things signified at all, so that neither
-will the signs be signs, as not signifying anything.
-
+will the signs be signs, as not signifying anything.
+
And as to the non-evident signs which need things
to reveal them, if we say that they are signified by
things non-evident, the argument will be involved in
a regress ad infinitum, rendering them non-apprehensible
-and therefore unreal, as we said before;Cf. § 124 supra.
+and therefore unreal, as we said before;Cf. § 124 supra.
whereas, if they are to be signified by things apparent,
they will be apparent, because apprehended along
with their apparent signs, and therefore also unreal.
@@ -4346,7 +4325,7 @@ For it is impossible for any object really to exist
which is by nature both non-evident and apparent;
but the signs which we are discussing though assumed
to be non-evident have been found to be apparent
-owing to the reversal of the argument.Cf. §§ 185, 187.
+owing to the reversal of the argument.
Cf. §§ 185, 187.
If, therefore, the signs are neither all apparent nor
all non-evident, nor yet some of the signs apparent
@@ -4360,12 +4339,12 @@ non-existence of an indicative sign. Next, we shall set
forth those which go to suggest the existence of a
sign, in order that we may exhibit the equipollence
of the counter-balancing arguments.
-Either, then, the phrases used in criticism of the
-sign signify something or they signify nothing.
Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 279. The meaning of these sections, 130–133, is briefly this: The Dogmatists argue (§§ 130–131) (1) that the Sceptics’ objections to ‟sign” must signify either something or nothing; if nothing, they have no force against it, while if they signify something they are signs themselves and so prove sign’s existence; (2) the arguments (λόγοι) against ‟sign” prove either something or nothing; if nothing, they fail to prove the non-existence of ‟sign,” while if they prove something, they are ‟proofs,” i.e. a species of ‟sign,” and thus prove sign’s existence. Hence, whichever view we take—the Dogmatists’ that ‟sign exists,” or the Sceptics’ that ‟sign exists not”—we arrive at the same conclusion that ‟sign exists.” In § 132 we have the counter-argument of the Sceptics, ‟reversing” that of the Dogmatists. But
+
Either, then, the phrases used in criticism of the
+sign signify something or they signify nothing.Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 279. The meaning of these sections, 130–133, is briefly this: The Dogmatists argue (§§ 130–131) (1) that the Sceptics’ objections to ‟sign” must signify either something or nothing; if nothing, they have no force against it, while if they signify something they are signs themselves and so prove sign’s existence; (2) the arguments (λόγοι) against ‟sign” prove either something or nothing; if nothing, they fail to prove the non-existence of ‟sign,” while if they prove something, they are ‟proofs,” i.e. a species of ‟sign,” and thus prove sign’s existence. Hence, whichever view we take—the Dogmatists’ that ‟sign exists,” or the Sceptics’ that ‟sign exists not”—we arrive at the same conclusion that ‟sign exists.” In § 132 we have the counter-argument of the Sceptics, ‟reversing” that of the Dogmatists. But
if they are non-significant how could they affect the
reality of the sign? While if they signify something,
-there exists a sign.
-
+
Further, the arguments against
the sign are either probative or non-probative; but
if they are non-probative they do not prove the non-
@@ -4376,8 +4355,8 @@ also is propounded: ‟If sign exists, sign exists;
and if sign exists not, sign exists; for the non-
existence of sign is shown by proof, which is a form
of sign. But sign either exists or exists not;
-therefore sign exists.”
-
+
And this argument is counter-
balanced by the following argument: ‟If any sign
does not exist, sign does not exist; and if sign is
@@ -4385,12 +4364,12 @@ that which the Dogmatists declare sign to be, sign
does not exist (for the sign under discussion, accord-
ing to the conception of it and as stated to be both
relative and serving to reveal the thing signified, is
-found to be unreal, as we have shown).
-
+found to be unreal, as we have shown).
+
But sign either exists or exists not; therefore sign does not
exist.”
Regarding also the phrases used in support of the
-sign,In this § 133 the Sceptics are replying to the first argument of the Dogmatists (in § 130); the conclusion that ‟the existence of sign” proves its ‟non-existence” is based on the arguments in § 132, which ‟reverses” that of the Dogmatists. let the Dogmatists themselves say in reply to our
+sign,In this § 133 the Sceptics are replying to the first argument of the Dogmatists (in § 130); the conclusion that ‟the existence of sign” proves its ‟non-existence” is based on the arguments in § 132, which ‟reverses” that of the Dogmatists. let the Dogmatists themselves say in reply to our
argument whether they signify something or signify
nothing. For if they signify nothing, the existence
of sign is not confirmed; whereas if they signify
@@ -4398,27 +4377,26 @@ something, the thing signified will follow them; and
it was ‟the existence of a sign.” And from this
follows, as we have shown, the non-existence of
sign, because of the reversal of the argument.
-
In short, then, since such plausible arguments are
adduced both for the existence and for the non-
existence of sign, we must declare that sign is ‟no
-more”For this Sceptic formula cf. i. 188. existent than non-existent.
+more”
For this Sceptic formula cf. i. 188. existent than non-existent.
-
+
Chapter XII.—Of Proof
Now it is plain from this that neither is proof a
matter upon which there is agreement; for if we
suspend judgement about the sign, and proof also is
-a sign,Cf. §§ 96, 122, 131 supra; and for the next ten sections cf. Adv. Log. ii. 299 ff. we must necessarily suspend judgement about
+a sign,Cf. §§ 96, 122, 131 supra; and for the next ten sections cf. Adv. Log. ii. 299 ff. we must necessarily suspend judgement about
proof likewise. And in fact we shall find that the
arguments propounded concerning the sign can be
adapted to apply to proof as well, since it seems to
be both relative and serving to reveal the conclusion,
and from these properties followed nearly all the
-results we mentioned in the case of the sign.
-
+results we mentioned in the case of the sign.
+
If,however, one ought to devote a separate discussion
to proof, I shall proceed to treat of it concisely after
endeavouring first to explain shortly the definition
@@ -4428,18 +4406,18 @@ means of agreed premisses, reveals by way of deduction
a non-evident inference.” What their statement
means will be made clearer by what follows. ‟An
argument is a system composed of premisses and an
-inference.
-
+
The premisses of it are (it is said) the
judgements adopted by consent for the establishment
of the inference, and the inference is the judgement
established by the premisses.” For example, in the
argument ‟If it is day, it is light; but it is in truth
day; therefore it is light,” the clause ‟therefore it
-is light” is a conclusion, and the rest are premisses.
-
+is light” is a conclusion, and the rest are premisses.
+
And of arguments some are conclusive, some inconclusive—
-conclusive when the hypothetical syllogismτὸ συνημμένον, lit. ‟the combination”; cf. p. 246 note a.
+conclusive when the hypothetical syllogismτὸ συνημμένον, lit. ‟the combination”; cf. p. 246 note a.
which begins with the combination made by the
premisses of the argument and ends with its
inference is valid; thus, for example, the argument
@@ -4452,14 +4430,14 @@ But arguments that are not like this are inconclusive.
And of the conclusive arguments some are true,
some not true—true when not only the syllogism
formed by the combination of the premisses and the
-inference is valid,
‟Valid” refers only to logical form; ‟true” to content; cf. § 139; Adv. Log. ii. 413. as we said above, but the conclusion
+inference is valid,
‟Valid” refers only to logical form; ‟true” to content; cf. § 139; Adv. Log. ii. 413. as we said above, but the conclusion
also and the combination of the premisses,
which is the antecedent in the syllogism, is really
true. And a combination is true when it has all its
parts true, as in the case of ‟It is day, and if it is
day, it is light;” but those of a different kind are
-not true.
-
+
For an argument such as this—‟If it is
night, it is dark; but in fact it is night; therefore
it is dark”—is indeed conclusive, since the syllogism
@@ -4476,12 +4454,12 @@ Of true arguments, again, some are ‟probative,”
some ‟non-probative;” and the probative are those
which deduce something non-evident by means of
pre-evident premisses, the non-probative those not of
-this sort.For this and the following sections cf. Adv. Log. ii. 305 ff. For example, an argument such as this—
+this sort.For this and the following sections cf. Adv. Log. ii. 305 ff. For example, an argument such as this—
‟If it is day it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore
it is light” is not probative; for its conclusion,
that ‟it is light,” is pre-evident. But an argument
like this—‟If sweat pours through the surface, there
-are insensible pores;Cf. § 98 supra. but in fact sweat does pour
+are insensible pores;Cf. § 98 supra. but in fact sweat does pour
through the surface; therefore there are insensible
pores”—is a probative one, as its conclusion (‟there
are therefore insensible pores”) is non-evident.
@@ -4498,10 +4476,9 @@ god (assume that I point to Zeus) has said to you that
this man will be rich; therefore he will be rich;”
for we assent to the conclusion not so much on account
of the logical force of the premisses as because of our
-belief in the statement of the god.
-
-But some arguments
-conduct us to the conclusion by way of discovery
+belief in the statement of the god.
+
+But some arguments conduct us to the conclusion by way of discovery
as well as of progression, like the following:
‟If sweat pours through the surface, there are
insensible pores; but the first is true, therefore also
@@ -4520,12 +4497,12 @@ inference.” It is in these terms, then, that they are
in the habit of explaining the conception of proof.
-
+
Chapter XIII.—Does Proof Exist?
That proof has no real existence may be inferred
from their own statements, by refuting each of the
-assumptions implied in its conception.See the definition of ‟proof” in §§ 135–136. It is with ‟hypothetical syllogisms” that Sextus is here concerned. The ‟component elements” of the syllogism (or ‟argument”) are the ‟judgements” (or propositions) which go to form its ‟premisses.” Thus, for
+assumptions implied in its conception.See the definition of ‟proof” in §§ 135–136. It is with ‟hypothetical syllogisms” that Sextus is here concerned. The ‟component elements” of the syllogism (or ‟argument”) are the ‟judgements” (or propositions) which go to form its ‟premisses.” Thus, for
instance, the argument is compounded of judgements,
but compound things cannot exist unless its component
elements mutually co-exist, as is pre-evident from
@@ -4546,18 +4523,17 @@ of the hypothetical premiss, and the coherence in
that premiss is a matter of unsettled dispute and is
probably non-apprehensible, as we suggested in our
chapter (xi.) ‟On the Sign,” then the conclusive
-argument also will be non-apprehensible.
-
-Now the
-Dialecticiansi.e. the Stoics, cf. §§ 166, 235. assert that an argument is inconclusive
+argument also will be non-apprehensible.
+
+Now the Dialecticiansi.e. the Stoics, cf. §§ 166, 235. assert that an argument is inconclusive
owing to inconsistency or to deficiency or to its being
propounded in a bad form or to redundancy. An
example of inconsistency is when the premisses are
not logically coherent with each other and with the
inference, as in the argument ‟If it is day, it is light;
but in fact wheat is being sold in the market; therefore
-Dion is walking.”
-
+
And it is a case of redundancy
when we find a premiss that is superfluous for the logic
of the argument, as for instance ‟If it is day, it is
@@ -4570,10 +4546,9 @@ is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it
is light;” and ‟If it is day, it is light; but it is not
light; therefore it is not day,”—the inconclusive
argument runs thus: ‟If it is day, it is light; but
-in fact it is light; therefore it is day.”
-
-For since the
-major premiss announces that if its antecedent exists
+in fact it is light; therefore it is day.”
+
+For since the major premiss announces that if its antecedent exists
its consequent also exists, naturally when the antecedent
is admitted the consequent also is inferred,
and when the consequent is denied the antecedent
@@ -4587,7 +4562,7 @@ antecedent.
Hence, the argument which deduces the consequent
from the major premiss and the antecedent is
-said to be syllogistic,i.e.(in Stoic terminology) definitely valid and conclusive; cf. § 163 infra. Note that the term συνημμένον (‟combination”) mostly means the ‟hypothetical, or major, premiss of a hypothetical syllogism,” but sometimes the whole syllogism. and also that which deduces
+said to be syllogistic,i.e.(in Stoic terminology) definitely valid and conclusive; cf. § 163 infra. Note that the term συνημμένον (‟combination”) mostly means the ‟hypothetical, or major, premiss of a hypothetical syllogism,” but sometimes the whole syllogism. and also that which deduces
the opposite of the antecedent from the major premiss
and the opposite of the consequent; but the argument
which, like that stated above, deduces the antecedent
@@ -4597,36 +4572,35 @@ even though its premisses are true, whenever it is
uttered by lamplight at night. For though the
major premiss ‟If it is day, it is light” is true, and
also the minor premiss, ‟but in fact it is light,” the
-inference ‟therefore it is day” is false.
-
-And the
-argument is faulty by deficiency, when it suffers from
+inference ‟therefore it is day” is false.
+
+And the argument is faulty by deficiency, when it suffers from
the omission of some factor needed for the deducing
of the conclusion: thus, for instance, while we have,
as they think, a valid argument in ‟Wealth is either
good or bad or indifferent; but it is neither bad nor
-indifferent; therefore it is good,”Cf. iii. 177 ff. the following
+indifferent; therefore it is good,”Cf. iii. 177 ff. the following
is faulty by way of deficiency: ‟Wealth is either
-good or bad; but it is not bad; therefore it is good.”
-
+good or bad; but it is not bad; therefore it is good.”
+
If, then, I shall show that, according to them, it is
impossible to distinguish any difference between the
inconclusive and the conclusive arguments, I shall have
shown that the conclusive argument is non-apprehensible,
-so that their endless disquisitions on ‟dialectic”Over 300 volumes, dealing with grammar and logic (‟dialectic”), are ascribed to Chrysippus.
+so that their endless disquisitions on ‟dialectic”Over 300 volumes, dealing with grammar and logic (‟dialectic”), are ascribed to Chrysippus.
are superfluous. And I show it in this wise.
It was said that the argument which is inconclusive
owing to inconsistency is recognized by the want of
coherence which marks its premisses in their relation
-both to each other and to the inference.With §§ 152–156 cf. Adv. Log. ii. 435 ff. Since, then,
+both to each other and to the inference.With §§ 152–156 cf. Adv. Log. ii. 435 ff. Since, then,
the recognition of this coherence ought to be preceded
-by the judgement on the hypothetical syllogism,i.e. the syllogism as a whole, which is a ‟combination” and
+by the judgement on the hypothetical syllogism,i.e. the syllogism as a whole, which is a ‟combination” and
that syllogism, as I have argued, does not admit of
judgement, the argument that is inconclusive through
inconsistency will likewise be incapable of being
-distinguished.
-
+
For he who declares that any particular
argument is inconclusive through inconsistency will,
if he is merely uttering a statement, find himself
@@ -4648,8 +4622,8 @@ says that an argument is unsound owing to its being
propounded in a faulty form; for he who maintains
that a form is unsound will have no argument agreed
to be conclusive whereby he will be able to draw the
-conclusion he states.
-
+
And hereby we have also
potentially refuted those who try to show that there
are arguments which are inconclusive through
@@ -4666,7 +4640,7 @@ that it is deficient.
Moreover, the argument that is said to be faulty
through redundancy is indistinguishable from those
that are probative. For, so far as concerns redundancy,
-even the ‟non-demonstrable” arguments
i.e. those which need no proof as being self-evident; cf. Aristotle’s ‟perfect syllogisms,” and i. 69; Adv. Log. ii. 223 ff. so
+even the ‟non-demonstrable” arguments
i.e. those which need no proof as being self-evident; cf. Aristotle’s ‟perfect syllogisms,” and i. 69; Adv. Log. ii. 223 ff. so
much talked of by the Stoics will be found to be
inconclusive, and if they are demolished the whole of
dialectic is overturned; for they are the arguments
@@ -4681,16 +4655,16 @@ Now there are, in their imaginings, many non-
demonstrable arguments, but the five which they
chiefly propound, and to which all the rest can, it
seems, be referred, are these. The first is that which
-deduces the consequent from the major premiss
Literally, the ‟combination,” which here (as in § 104) means the hypothetical major premiss, of which the ‟if,” clause is the ‟antecedent,” the other clause the ‟consequent.” and
+deduces the consequent from the major premiss
Literally, the ‟combination,” which here (as in § 104) means the hypothetical major premiss, of which the ‟if,” clause is the ‟antecedent,” the other clause the ‟consequent.” and
the antecedent, as for example ‟If it is day, it is
light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light.” The
second is that which deduces the opposite of the
antecedent from the major premiss and the opposite of
the consequent, as for example ‟If it is day, it is
-light; but it is not light; therefore it is not day.”
-
+light; but it is not light; therefore it is not day.”
+
The third deduces from the negation of a coupled
-premissi.e. a premiss consisting of two clauses ‟coupled” by ‟and” (or ‟both . . . and”); a ‟conjunctive” premiss (as opposed to a ‟disjunctive,” coupled by ‟either . . . or”).
+premissi.e. a premiss consisting of two clauses ‟coupled” by ‟and” (or ‟both . . . and”); a ‟conjunctive” premiss (as opposed to a ‟disjunctive,” coupled by ‟either . . . or”).
and one of its clauses the
opposite of the other clause, as for example ‟It is not
both night and day; but it is day; therefore it is
@@ -4698,7 +4672,7 @@ not night.” The fourth deduces from a disjunctive
premiss and one of its alternative clauses the opposite
of the other, as for example ‟Either it is day or it is
night; but it is day; therefore it is not night.” The
-fifthCf. i. 69. deduces from a disjunctive premiss and the
+fifthCf. i. 69. deduces from a disjunctive premiss and the
opposite of one of its clauses the other clause, as for
example ‟Either it is day or it is night; but it is not
night; therefore it is day.”
@@ -4716,7 +4690,7 @@ day” be true, the clause ‟it is light” will necessarily
be true also, then, once we have asserted that ‟it is
day,” the statement ‟it is light” is also inferred, so
that an argument in the form ‟It is day, therefore
-it is light” is sufficient,
An example of the syllogismus decurtatus, which has but one premiss; cf. § 167. and the major premiss ‟If
+it is light” is sufficient,
An example of the syllogismus decurtatus, which has but one premiss; cf. § 167. and the major premiss ‟If
it is day, it is light” is redundant.
And in the case of the second non-demonstrable
@@ -4757,9 +4731,9 @@ is redundant.
One may also make similar observations on the so-
called ‟categorical” syllogisms, which are chiefly
-used by the Peripatetics.Aristotle dealt only with this form of proof; later Peripatetics with the hypothetical and disjunctive forms as well. Thus, for example, in the
+used by the Peripatetics.Aristotle dealt only with this form of proof; later Peripatetics with the hypothetical and disjunctive forms as well. Thus, for example, in the
argument—‟The just is fair, but the fair is good,
-therefore the just is good,”Cf. Plato, Alcib. I. 116. either it is agreed and
+therefore the just is good,”Cf. Plato, Alcib. I. 116. either it is agreed and
pre-evident that ‟the fair is good,” or it is disputed
and is non-evident. But if it is non-evident, it will
not be granted in the process of deduction, and
@@ -4770,16 +4744,15 @@ that this particular thing is fair the fact that it is
good is likewise implied, so that it is enough to put
the argument in the form ‟The just is fair, therefore
the just is good,” and the other premiss, in which it
-was stated that ‟the fair is good,” is redundant.
-
-So
-too in an argument such as this—‟Socrates is a man;
+was stated that ‟the fair is good,” is redundant.
+
+So too in an argument such as this—‟Socrates is a man;
every man is an animal; therefore Socrates is an
animal,”—if it is not at once pre-evident that whatsoever
is man is always also animal, the universal
premiss is not agreed, and neither will we admit it in
-the process of deduction.
-
+the process of deduction.
+
But if the fact that he is a
man is logically followed by the fact that he is also an
animal, and in consequence the premiss ‟Every man
@@ -4788,37 +4761,38 @@ stating that ‟Socrates is a man” we admit therewith
that he is also an animal, so that an argument in the
form ‟Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an
animal” is sufficient, and the premiss ‟Every man is
-an animal” is redundant.
-
+an animal” is redundant.
+
And (not to dwell on the
-matter now) in the case of the other primary
i.e. of the First Figure: the previous examples are cases of Barbara and Darii, so ‟the others” would belong to Celarent and Ferio. But Heintz’s suggestion, τρόπων τῶν (for πρώτων), ‟the other figures,” may well be right. categorical
+matter now) in the case of the other primary
i.e. of the First Figure: the previous examples are cases of Barbara and Darii, so ‟the others” would belong to Celarent and Ferio. But Heintz’s suggestion, τρόπων τῶν (for πρώτων), ‟the other figures,” may well be right. categorical
arguments also it is possible to employ similar
methods of reasoning.
Since, however, these arguments which the
-Dialecticiansi.e. Stoics and Peripatetics, cf. § 146 supra. lay down as the foundations of their
+Dialecticiansi.e. Stoics and Peripatetics, cf. § 146 supra. lay down as the foundations of their
syllogisms are redundant, by reason of this redundancy
the whole of Dialectic is thus far overthrown, seeing
that we cannot distinguish the redundant, and
consequently inconclusive, arguments from what are called
-the conclusive syllogisms.
-
+the conclusive syllogisms.
+
But if some persons disapprove of arguments being of
a ‟one-premiss form,” they deserve no more credence
-than does Antipater
A. of Tarsus was head of the Stoic School circa 150-30 b.c.; cf. Adv. Log. ii. 443 for Chrysippus on the ‟curtailed syllogism.” who does not reject such arguments.
+than does Antipater
A. of Tarsus was head of the Stoic School circa 150-30 b.c.; cf. Adv. Log. ii. 443 for Chrysippus on the ‟curtailed syllogism.”
+who does not reject such arguments.
For these reasons, then, the argument named by
the Dialecticians ‟conclusive” is not judged acceptable.
-But further, the ‟true”Cf. § 143. argument is indiscoverable
-both for the foregoing reasonsSee §§ 85-94 supra, and § 138. and because
+But further, the ‟true”Cf. § 143. argument is indiscoverable
+both for the foregoing reasonsSee §§ 85-94 supra, and § 138. and because
it ought in all cases to end in truth. For the
conlusion which is said to be true is either apparent
-or non-evident.
-
+
And it is certainly not apparent;
for it would not need to be disclosed by means of the
premisses if it were perceptible of itself and no less
apparent than its premisses. But if it is non-evident,
then, since there is an unsettled dispute concerning
-things non-evident, as we mentioned above,Cf. § 116. and they
+things non-evident, as we mentioned above,Cf. § 116. and they
are in consequence non-apprehensible, the conclusion
also of the argument said to be true will be non-
apprehensible. And if this is non-apprehensible,
@@ -4833,18 +4807,18 @@ of pre-evident premisses is indiscoverable. For if the
inference follows from the combination of its premisses,
and what follows and forms the consequent is relative
and relative to the antecedent, and relatives are
-apprehended, as we have shown,Cf. §§ 117 ff., 125. simultaneously,—
+apprehended, as we have shown,Cf. §§ 117 ff., 125. simultaneously,—
then, if the conclusion is non-evident, the premisses
also will be non-evident, while if the premisses are
pre-evident the conclusion also will be pre-evident,
as being apprehended along with the pre-evident
premisses, so that no longer is there a deduction of
-what is non-evident from pre-evident premisses.
-
+what is non-evident from pre-evident premisses.
+
And for these reasons, neither is the inference revealed by
the premisses, as it is either non-evident and not
apprehended, or pre-evident and not in need of
-anything to reveal it. So that if proof is definedCf. §§ 135, 143 ff. as ‟an
+anything to reveal it. So that if proof is definedCf. §§ 135, 143 ff. as ‟an
argument which by deduction, that is conclusively,
reveals a non-evident inference by means of certain
premisses agreed to be true,” while we have shown
@@ -4855,29 +4829,28 @@ conclusion,—then it is apparent that proof is without
real existence.
That proof is unreal, or even inconceivable, we shall
-discover also from the following line of attack.Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 382 ff. He
+discover also from the following line of attack.Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 382 ff. He
who asserts the existence of proof posits either a
general or a particular proof; but, as we shall suggest,
it is not possible to posit either the general or the
particular proof; and besides these no other can be
conceived; no one, therefore, can posit proof as really
-existing.
-
+
Now the general proof is unreal for the
following reasons. It either has or has not certain
premisses and a certain inference. And if it has them
not, it is not even proof; while if it has premisses and
an inference, then, since everything which proves or is
-proved in this way belongs to the class of ‟particulars,”Cf. τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους, § 87 supra; ‟things of a partial character” as opposed to ‟wholes” or genera.
+proved in this way belongs to the class of ‟particulars,”Cf. τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους, § 87 supra; ‟things of a partial character” as opposed to ‟wholes” or genera.
proof will be particular; therefore no general
-proof exists. Nor yet any particular proof.
-
-For they
-will describe as proof either the system made up of
-the premisses and the inferenceCf. § 135 supra. or only the system
+proof exists. Nor yet any particular proof.
+
+For they will describe as proof either the system made up of
+the premisses and the inferenceCf. § 135 supra. or only the system
of the premisses; but neither of these is proof, as I
-shall show; therefore particular proof does not exist.
-
+shall show; therefore particular proof does not exist.
+
Now the system composed of the premisses and the
inference is not proof because, firstly, it contains a
non-evident part—that is to say, the inference—and
@@ -4896,8 +4869,8 @@ to its own proof or does not do so; but if it
contributes, it will serve to reveal itself, while if it
does not contribute but is redundant it will not be
even a part of the proof, since we shall declare the
-proof to be faulty by reason of redundance.
-
+proof to be faulty by reason of redundance.
+
Nor yet will the system composed of the premisses by itself
be proof; for who would maintain that a statement
in the form ‟If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is
@@ -4915,8 +4888,8 @@ either as apparent it serves to reveal what is apparent,
or as non-evident what is non-evident, or as non-
evident what is apparent, or as apparent what is
non-evident; but it cannot be conceived as serving
-to reveal any of these; therefore it is inconceivable.
-
+to reveal any of these; therefore it is inconceivable.
+
For if it as apparent serves to reveal the apparent,
the thing revealed will be at once both apparent and
non-evident—apparent because it was assumed to be
@@ -4925,8 +4898,8 @@ and is not clearly perceived by us of itself. And if
as non-evident it reveals the non-evident, it will itself
need something to reveal it and will not serve to
reveal other things, which is foreign to the conception
-of proof.
-
+
And for these reasons neither can there
be a non-evident proof of the pre-evident; nor yet
a pre-evident proof of the non-evident; for since
@@ -4945,17 +4918,17 @@ must declare that proof is nothing.
Furthermore, there is this also to be said. Proof
is a matter of controversy; for some declare that it
does not even exist, as do those who assert that
-nothing at all exists,
i.e. is real, as opposed to phenomenal; so Xenophanes, Xeniades, Gorgias, cf. § 18. but others, including the
+nothing at all exists,
i.e. is real, as opposed to phenomenal; so Xenophanes, Xeniades, Gorgias, cf. § 18. but others, including the
majority of the Dogmatists, that it does exist; and
-we affirm that it is ‟no more”
For this Sceptic formula cf. i. 188. existent than non-
-existent.
-
+we affirm that it is ‟no more”For this Sceptic formula cf. i. 188. existent than non-
+existent.
+
And besides, proof always contains a
dogma, and they are in dispute about every dogma,
so that there must necessarily be dispute about every
proof. For if (for the sake of argument) when the
proof for the existence of void is accepted the existence
-of void is likewise accepted,The Epicurean proof of Void ran thus: ‟If motion exists, Void exists; but motion does exist; therefore Void exists.” Cf. § 245, Adv. Log. ii. 329 ff. it is plain that
+of void is likewise accepted,The Epicurean proof of Void ran thus: ‟If motion exists, Void exists; but motion does exist; therefore Void exists.” Cf. § 245, Adv. Log. ii. 329 ff. it is plain that
those who dispute the existence of void dispute its
proof also; and the same argument applies to all the
other dogmas with which the proofs are concerned.
@@ -4976,26 +4949,25 @@ show that proof exists.
But neither can it be revealed by means of a sign.
For since it is a matter of inquiry whether sign
-exists,Cf. §§ 104 ff., 121. and since the sign needs proof to ensure its
+exists,Cf. §§ 104 ff., 121. and since the sign needs proof to ensure its
reality, we find ourselves involved in circular reasoning—
the proof requiring a sign, and the sign in turn
a proof; which is absurd. And for these reasons
neither is it possible to decide the controversy
regarding proof, seeing that the decision requires a
criterion, but—because it is a matter of inquiry, as
-we have shown,Cf. §§ 48 ff. supra. whether a criterion exists, and
+we have shown,Cf. §§ 48 ff. supra. whether a criterion exists, and
consequently the criterion needs a proof showing the
existence of a criterion—we are again involved in
-the perplexity of circular reasoning.
-
-If, then, neither
-by proof nor by sign nor by criterion it is possible to
+the perplexity of circular reasoning.
+
+If, then, neither by proof nor by sign nor by criterion it is possible to
show that proof exists, and it is not evident of itself
-either, as we have shown,Cf. §§ 144 supra. then it will be non-apprehensible
+either, as we have shown,Cf. §§ 144 supra. then it will be non-apprehensible
whether proof exists. Consequently, proof
will also be unreal; for it is conceived together with
the act of proving, and were it not apprehended it
-would be unable to prove.i.e. if ‟proof” is non-apprehensible it must also be unreal or non-existent, because non-apprehensible ‟proof” is incapable of ‟proving” anything, and ‟proof” apart from ‟proving” is inconceivable—the ‟conception” of the one necessarily implying the other. Wherefore proof will not
+would be unable to prove.i.e. if ‟proof” is non-apprehensible it must also be unreal or non-existent, because non-apprehensible ‟proof” is incapable of ‟proving” anything, and ‟proof” apart from ‟proving” is inconceivable—the ‟conception” of the one necessarily implying the other. Wherefore proof will not
exist.
Thus much it will be enough to say by way of
@@ -5006,10 +4978,10 @@ probative or not probative; and if they are not
probative, they are incapable of showing that proof
does not exist; while if they are probative, they
themselves involve the reality of proof by self-
-refutation.Lit. ‟reversal” of the argument; cf. § 128, Adv. Log. ii. 463.
-
+refutation.Lit. ‟reversal” of the argument; cf. § 128, Adv. Log. ii. 463.
+
Hence also they propound an argument
-in this form:Cf. § 131 for this hypothetical syllogism with double major premiss. Here, as there, the Dogmatists argue that the Sceptics’ proof that ‟proof exists not” refutes itself, the very proof they employ being itself an ‟existent” proof. ‟If proof exists, proof exists; if
+in this form:Cf. § 131 for this hypothetical syllogism with double major premiss. Here, as there, the Dogmatists argue that the Sceptics’ proof that ‟proof exists not” refutes itself, the very proof they employ being itself an ‟existent” proof. ‟If proof exists, proof exists; if
proof exists not, proof exists; but proof either exists
or exists not; therefore proof exists.” With the
same intention they propound also this argument:
@@ -5030,13 +5002,13 @@ those which deduce what is true by means of true
premisses; wherefore their inference is true. Now
the inference was this—‟therefore proof does not
exist;” therefore the statement ‟proof does not
-exist” is true by reversing the argument.
-
+exist” is true by reversing the argument.
+
And just as purgative medicines expel themselves together
with the substances already present in the body, so
these arguments are capable of cancelling themselves
along with the other arguments which are said to be
-probative.
Cf. i. 206, Adv. Log. ii. 480. Nor is this preposterous, since in fact
+probative.
Cf. i. 206, Adv. Log. ii. 480. Nor is this preposterous, since in fact
the saying ‟nothing is true” not only refutes every
other saying but also nullifies itself as well.
And as regards this argument—‟If proof exists,
@@ -5044,8 +5016,8 @@ proof exists; if proof does not exist, proof exists;
but it either exists or exists not; therefore it exists”
—there are a number of ways by which it can be
shown to be inconclusive, but for the moment the
-following method may suffice.
-
+following method may suffice.
+
If the hypothetical
premiss ‟If proof exists, proof exists” is valid, the
contradictory of its consequent, namely ‟proof does
@@ -5059,8 +5031,8 @@ also true, whereas conflicting clauses contrariwise
promise that if either one of them is true the other
cannot possibly be true. If therefore the premiss
‟If proof exists, proof exists” is valid, the premiss
-‟If proof exists not, proof exists” cannot be valid.
-
+‟If proof exists not, proof exists” cannot be valid.
+
And again. conversely, if we grant by way of
assumption that the premiss ‟If proof exists not,
proof exists” is valid, then the clause ‟If proof
@@ -5070,10 +5042,9 @@ Therefore, in the premiss ‟If proof exists, proof
exists,” the contrary of its consequent is not in
conflict with its antecedent, so that, conversely,
this premiss will not be valid, as the former was
-posited, by agreement, as valid.
-
-And as the clause
-‟proof exists not” is not in conflict with ‟proof
+posited, by agreement, as valid.
+
+And as the clause ‟proof exists not” is not in conflict with ‟proof
exists,” the disjunctive ‟Either proof exists or
proof exists not” will not be valid; for the valid
disjunctive promises that one of its clauses is valid,
@@ -5083,11 +5054,11 @@ premiss ‟If proof exists not, proof exists” is, in
turn, found to be fallacious, as composed of conflicting
clauses. So then the premisses in the foregoing
argument are discordant and mutually destructive;
-wherefore the argument is not valid.
-
+wherefore the argument is not valid.
+
And further, they are unable even to show that anything follows
logically from the contradictories, since, as we have
-argued,
See §§ 145 ff. they possess no criterion of logical
+argued,
See §§ 145 ff. they possess no criterion of logical
consequence or deduction.
But this discussion is, in fact, superfluous. For if,
on the one hand, the arguments in defence of proof
@@ -5098,7 +5069,7 @@ concerning proof also, and declare that proof is
‟no more” existent than non-existent.
-
+
Chapter XIV.—Concerning Syllogisms
So then it is also superfluous, perhaps, to discuss
@@ -5108,18 +5079,18 @@ existence of ‟proof” (for it is plain that if this is
non-existent there is no place either for probative
argument), and for another, we have implicitly
contradicted them in our previous statements, when
-in discussing redundancyCf. §§ 159–162 against the Stoics, and 163–166 against the Peripatetics. we mentioned a certain
+in discussing redundancyCf. §§ 159–162 against the Stoics, and 163–166 against the Peripatetics. we mentioned a certain
method by which it is possible to show that all the
probative arguments of the Stoics and the Peripatetics
-are really inconclusive.
-
+are really inconclusive.
+
Yet perhaps it will not
-be amiss to go furtherFor the phrase ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου, ‟into the bargain,” cf. § 47 supra. and deal with them separately,
+be amiss to go furtherFor the phrase ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου, ‟into the bargain,” cf. § 47 supra. and deal with them separately,
especially since these thinkers pride themselves upon
them. Now there is much that one can say by way
of suggesting their unreality, but in an outline sketch
it is sufficient to treat of them by the method which
-follows. And I will deal at present with the axiomaticOr ‟non-demonstrable,” including here categorical syllogisms as well as those mentioned in § 157 supra.
+follows. And I will deal at present with the axiomaticOr ‟non-demonstrable,” including here categorical syllogisms as well as those mentioned in § 157 supra.
arguments; for if these are destroyed all the
rest of the arguments are overthrown as well, since
it is from these that they derive the proof of their
@@ -5129,15 +5100,15 @@ Well then, the premiss ‟Every man is an animal”
is established by induction from the particular
instances; for from the fact that Socrates, who is a
man, is also an animal, and Plato likewise, and Dion
-and each one of the particular instances,Cf. Aristot. Anal. pr. ii. 23 on logical ‟induction.” they think
+and each one of the particular instances,Cf. Aristot. Anal. pr. ii. 23 on logical ‟induction.” they think
it possible to assert that every man is an animal;
so that if even a single one of the particulars should
apparently conflict with the rest the universal premiss
is not valid; thus, for example, when most animals
move the lower jaw, and only the crocodile the upper,
-the premissCf. Hdt. ii. 68; Aristot. Hist. An. iii. 7. ‟Every animal moves the lower jaw” is
-not true.
-
+the premissCf. Hdt. ii. 68; Aristot. Hist. An. iii. 7. ‟Every animal moves the lower jaw” is
+not true.
+
So whenever they argue ‟Every man is an
animal, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is
an animal,” proposing to deduce from the universal
@@ -5148,10 +5119,9 @@ of induction the universal proposition, they fall into the
error of circular reasoning, since they are establishing
the universal proposition inductively by means of each
of the particulars and deducing the particular proposition
-from the universal syllogistically.
-
-So likewise in
-the case of such an argument as ‟Socrates is a man, but
+from the universal syllogistically.
+
+So likewise in the case of such an argument as ‟Socrates is a man, but
no man is four-footed, therefore Socrates is not four-
footed,” by proposing to establish the premiss ‟No
man is four-footed” by induction from the particular
@@ -5171,8 +5141,8 @@ establish the proposition ‟If it is day, it is light.”
For the hypothetical premiss stated above would not
have been considered valid unless the constant co-
existence of ‟it is light” with ‟it is day” had already
-been observed.
-
+
If, then, one has to apprehend
beforehand that when there is day there certainly
is light also, in order to construct the hypothetical
@@ -5199,11 +5169,11 @@ existence of day when light is non-existent is proved
by the premiss ‟If it is day, it is light,” so that
each of these statements needs for its confirmation
the secure grasp of the other in order thereby to
-become credible by means of circular reasoning.
-
+become credible by means of circular reasoning.
+
Moreover, from the fact that some things are
unable to co-exist—take, for instance, if you like, day
-and night—both the conjunctiveFor the ‟conjunctive” or ‟coupled” premiss see § 158, note. negation ‟Not day
+and night—both the conjunctiveFor the ‟conjunctive” or ‟coupled” premiss see § 158, note. negation ‟Not day
exists and night exists” and the disjunctive ‟Either
day exists or night exists” might be considered to be
valid. But they consider that their non-co-existence is
@@ -5212,8 +5182,8 @@ by the disjunctive, arguing ‟Not day exists and night
exists; but in fact night exists; day therefore exists
not;” and ‟Either it is day or it is night; but in
fact it is night; therefore it is not day,” or ‟it is not
-night, therefore it is day.”
-
+night, therefore it is day.”
+
Whence we argue again
that if for establishing the disjunctive proposition and
the negative of the conjunctive we require to apprehend
@@ -5227,18 +5197,18 @@ to give credence to the aforesaid premisses without
having apprehended the incapacity for co-existence
of the judgements they contain, or to affirm
positively that incapacity before concluding the
-syllogisms based on these premisses.
-
+syllogisms based on these premisses.
+
Consequently,as we possess no principle on which to ground belief
owing to the circular style of the argument, we shall
declare that, so far as depends on these statements,
neither the third nor the fourth nor the fifth of the
-‟axiomatic” syllogisms
For the ‟five non-demonstrable (or axiomatic) syllogisms” see §§ 157-158 supra. possesses valid substance.
+‟axiomatic” syllogisms
For the ‟five non-demonstrable (or axiomatic) syllogisms” see §§ 157-158 supra. possesses valid substance.
For the present, then, it will suffice to have said
thus much concerning syllogisms.
-
+
Chapter XV.—Concerning Induction
It is also easy, I consider, to set aside the method
@@ -5255,7 +5225,7 @@ grounds, as I think, the consequence is that induction
is invalidated.
-
+
Chapter XVI.—Concerning Definitions
Further, the Dogmatists take great pride in their
@@ -5266,10 +5236,10 @@ observations on definitions.
Now while the Dogmatists hold that definitions
have many uses, you will probably find that these fall
under two main heads which, as they say, include all
-their necessary uses;
-
+
for, as they explain, definitions
-are necessary in all cases either for apprehensionCf. § 4 supra. or
+are necessary in all cases either for apprehensionCf. § 4 supra. or
for instruction. If, then, we shall show that they are
of use for neither of these purposes, we shall, I think,
bring to naught all the labour so vainly spent on them
@@ -5290,8 +5260,8 @@ apprehended even without definitions, we are declaring
that definitions are not necessary for apprehension,
seeing that we are able to apprehend all things
apart from definitions in the same way as the undefined
-objects were apprehended,
-
+objects were apprehended,
+
—then we shall
either define absolutely nothing or we shall declare
that definitions are not necessary.
@@ -5299,16 +5269,16 @@ that definitions are not necessary.
either, as we shall discover. For just as the man who first perceived
the object perceived it apart from definition, so likewise the man
who receives instruction about it can be instructed without
-definition.
-
+
Moreover, they judge the definitions by the objects
defined and declare those definitions to be faulty which include
any attributes not belonging either to all or to some of the objects
defined. Hence, whenever one states that man is ‟a rational
immortal animal” or ‟a rational mortal literary animal,” whereas no
man is immortal, and some are not literary, such a definition they
-say is faulty.
-
+
And it may be also that the definitions do not admit of
judgement owing to the infinity of the particulars by which they
ought to be judged; and consequently they will not convey
@@ -5317,27 +5287,26 @@ are judged, which evidently have been known beforehand, if at all,
and apprehended beforehand.
And how could it be other than absurd to assert that definitions
are of use for apprehension or instruction or elucidation of any
-kind, when they involve us in such a fog of uncertainty?
-
+kind, when they involve us in such a fog of uncertainty?
+
Thus, for instance, to take a ridiculous case, suppose that one wished to ask
someone whether he had met a man riding a horse and leading a
dog and put the question in this form—‟O rational mortal animal,
receptive of intelligence and science, have you met with an animal
capable of laughter, with broad nails and receptive of political
-science,
Cf. §§ 26, 28 for this definition of Man. a with his (posterior) hemispheres seated on a mortal
+science,
Cf. §§ 26, 28 for this definition of Man. a with his (posterior) hemispheres seated on a mortal
animal capable of neighing, and leading a four-footed animal
capable of barking?”—how would one be otherwise than
ridiculous, in thus reducing the man to speechlessness concerning
so familiar an object because of one’s definitions?
So then we must declare that, so far as we may
-judge by this, the definition is useless,
-
-whether it be
-described as ‟a statement which by a brief reminder
+judge by this, the definition is useless,
+
+whether it be described as ‟a statement which by a brief reminder
brings us to a conception of the objects which underlie
the terms,”—as is plain (is it not?) from what we
have said just a moment ago,—or as ‟a statement
-declaratory of the essence,”The Aristotelian definition of ‟Definition,” the previous definition being probably Stoic. or what you like. For
+declaratory of the essence,”The Aristotelian definition of ‟Definition,” the previous definition being probably Stoic. or what you like. For
in fact, in their desire to propound a definition of the
definition they plunge into an endless controversy
which I now pass over, because of the plan of my
@@ -5347,10 +5316,10 @@ definitions.
for the present.
-
+
Chapter XVII.—Concerning Division
-Inasmuch as some of the DogmatistsThe definition of ‟Dialectic,” and also the four kinds of ‟Division,” here mentioned are given by Alcinous, a second-century (a.d.) Eclectic. As used by Plato and Aristotle, ‟Division” includes only the 3rd and 4th kinds (i.e. ‟logical” as distinguished from grammatical (§ 214) and arithmetical (§§ 215–218) division). Logical ‟division” is the process of defining a class-name by splitting it up into its component parts—the ‟genus” into ‟species,” the ‟species” into particulars. By it we enumerate the classes of objects denoted by the name or term which is ‟divided.” affirm that
+Inasmuch as some of the DogmatistsThe definition of ‟Dialectic,” and also the four kinds of ‟Division,” here mentioned are given by Alcinous, a second-century (a.d.) Eclectic. As used by Plato and Aristotle, ‟Division” includes only the 3rd and 4th kinds (i.e. ‟logical” as distinguished from grammatical (§ 214) and arithmetical (§§ 215–218) division). Logical ‟division” is the process of defining a class-name by splitting it up into its component parts—the ‟genus” into ‟species,” the ‟species” into particulars. By it we enumerate the classes of objects denoted by the name or term which is ‟divided.” affirm that
‟Dialectic” is ‟a science dealing with syllogism,
induction, definition and division,” and, after our
arguments concerning the criterion and the sign and
@@ -5365,7 +5334,7 @@ show that, on the contrary, in respect of none of these
does a divisive science exist.
-
+
Chapter XVIII.—Concerning The Division Of A Name Into Things Signified
Now they at once assert that the sciences of natural
@@ -5376,7 +5345,7 @@ the conventional objects are easily liable to change
and variation, because their character is altered by
the shifting of the conventions which depend upon
ourselves. Since, then, the significance of names is
-based on convention and not on natureThat ‟names” exist ‟by nature” was held by Heracleitus, Cratylus, Stoics and Epicureans; Aristotle and the Sceptics took the other view. θέσει, ‟by convention” (or human ordinance), like the more usual νόμῳ, is opposed to φύσει, ‟by nature,” much as we contrast the ‟artificial” with the ‟natural.” (for otherwise
+based on convention and not on natureThat ‟names” exist ‟by nature” was held by Heracleitus, Cratylus, Stoics and Epicureans; Aristotle and the Sceptics took the other view. θέσει, ‟by convention” (or human ordinance), like the more usual νόμῳ, is opposed to φύσει, ‟by nature,” much as we contrast the ‟artificial” with the ‟natural.” (for otherwise
all men, barbarians as well as Greeks, would understand
all the things signified by the terms, besides
the fact that it is in our power at any time to point
@@ -5388,11 +5357,11 @@ imagine, a ‟science of things which signify and are
signified?”
-
+
Chapter XIX.—Concerning Whole And Part
Whole and part we shall discuss in what we call
-our physical treatise,Cf. iii. 82 ff.; Adv. Phys. i. 297 ff., 330 ff., ii. 304. but at present we have to deal
+our physical treatise,Cf. iii. 82 ff.; Adv. Phys. i. 297 ff., 330 ff., ii. 304. but at present we have to deal
with the so-called division of the whole into its parts.
When a man says that the decad is being divided into
one and two and three and four, the decad is not
@@ -5400,8 +5369,8 @@ being divided into these. For as soon as its first part,
say one, is subtracted—granting for the moment that
this can be done—there no longer subsists the decad
but the number nine, something quite different from
-the decad.
-
+
Hence the division and the subtraction
of the other parts is not made from the decad but
from some other numbers, and these vary with each
@@ -5416,10 +5385,9 @@ decad—they say that nine is certainly a part of the
decad, since it is divided into one plus nine. But so
likewise is the number eight, since it is divided into
eight plus two; and so also are the numbers seven,
-six, five, four, three, two and one.
-
-If then all these
-numbers are included in the decad, and when added
+six, five, four, three, two and one.
+
+If then all these numbers are included in the decad, and when added
together with it make up fifty-five, then fifty-five is
included in the number ten, which is absurd. Therefore
neither are its so-called parts included in the decad
@@ -5427,24 +5395,24 @@ nor can the decad be divided into them, as a whole
into parts, since they are not even seen in it at all.
And the same objections will confront us in the case
-of magnitudesThe subject of geometry, as numbers are of arithmetic. also, supposing one should wish, for
+of magnitudesThe subject of geometry, as numbers are of arithmetic. also, supposing one should wish, for
example, to divide the magnitude of ten cubits.
Probably, then, it is not practicable to divide a whole
into parts.
-
+
Chapter XX.—Of Genera And Species
There still remains, then, the subject of genera and
-species, which we shall discuss more at large elsewhere,No such discussion is to be found in the extant works of Sextus.
+species, which we shall discuss more at large elsewhere,No such discussion is to be found in the extant works of Sextus.
but here we shall deal with them concisely.
-If, on the one hand, theyi.e. the Stoics; cf. §§ 29 ff., 70 ff., Adv. Log. i. 370 ff. for the Sceptic criticisms. assert that genera and
+If, on the one hand, theyi.e. the Stoics; cf. §§ 29 ff., 70 ff., Adv. Log. i. 370 ff. for the Sceptic criticisms. assert that genera and
species are mental concepts, our criticisms of the
‟regent part” and of ‟presentation” refute them;
whereas if they assign to them a substantiality of
-their own, how will they reply to this objection?
-
+their own, how will they reply to this objection?
+
If the genera exist, either they are equal in number to
the species or else there is one genus common to all
the species which are said to belong to it. If, then,
@@ -5452,7 +5420,7 @@ the genera are equal in number to their species, there
will no longer be a common genus to be divided into
the species; while if it shall be said that the genus
exists as one in all its species, then each species partakes
-of either the whole or a part of it.This view is Plato’s, the former Aristotle’s. The following objections are like those brought against the Platonic theory of ‟participation” by Aristotle and in the Parmenides of Plato. But it certainly
+of either the whole or a part of it.This view is Plato’s, the former Aristotle’s. The following objections are like those brought against the Platonic theory of ‟participation” by Aristotle and in the Parmenides of Plato. But it certainly
does not partake of the whole; for it is impossible
that what is one real object should be equally included
in separate things in such a way as to appear as a
@@ -5461,8 +5429,8 @@ exist. And if it partakes of a part, then, in the first
place, all the genus will not, as they suppose, accompany
the species, nor will ‟man” be ‟an animal”
but a part of an animal—he will be substance, for
-example, but neither animate nor sensitive.i.e. a part of the Genus is taken as meaning a part of its definition; cf. § 224 for this definition of the genus ‟animal.”
-
+example, but neither animate nor sensitive.i.e. a part of the Genus is taken as meaning a part of its definition; cf. § 224 for this definition of the genus ‟animal.”
+
Then, in the next place, all the species will be said to partake
either of the same part of their genus or of different
parts; but to partake of the same part is impossible
@@ -5472,7 +5440,7 @@ dissimilar one to another (which they will not admit),
and each genus will be infinite because cut up into
infinite sections (not into the species only but also
into the particulars, since it is actually seen in these
-along with its species; for DionThe stock name for a specimen of ‟Man,” cf. i. 189, and §§ 227 ff. is said to be an
+along with its species; for DionThe stock name for a specimen of ‟Man,” cf. i. 189, and §§ 227 ff. is said to be an
animal as well as a man). But if these consequences
are absurd, then not even by way of parts do the
species partake of their genus, it being a unity.
@@ -5482,11 +5450,11 @@ the whole genus nor of a part of it, how can it be said
that the one genus exists in all its parts so as to be
actually divided into them? No one, probably, could
make such a statement unless by concocting some
-imaginary entities,
e.g. the Platonic Ideas, cf. iii. 189. which will be overturned, as the
+imaginary entities,
e.g. the Platonic Ideas, cf. iii. 189. which will be overturned, as the
attacks of the Sceptics show, by the unsettled disputes
of the Dogmatists themselves.
-Furthermore, there is this to be said.The argument here is that it is impossible to conceive a number of opposite qualities, such as are possessed by the multitude of species and particulars included in the ‟genus,” co-existing in the unity of the genus; while if they do not all co-exist in it, the ‟genus” ceases to be inclusive of all its proper species and particulars; and if it includes none of the opposites, it is wholly unrelated to its particulars, and has no claim to be termed a ‟genus.” The species
+Furthermore, there is this to be said.The argument here is that it is impossible to conceive a number of opposite qualities, such as are possessed by the multitude of species and particulars included in the ‟genus,” co-existing in the unity of the genus; while if they do not all co-exist in it, the ‟genus” ceases to be inclusive of all its proper species and particulars; and if it includes none of the opposites, it is wholly unrelated to its particulars, and has no claim to be termed a ‟genus.” The species
are of this kind or of that kind: the genera of these
species either are of both this kind and that kind, or
of this kind but not of that kind, or neither of this
@@ -5496,9 +5464,9 @@ others incorporeal, and some true others false, and
some (it may be) white others black, and some very
large others very small, and so on with the rest, the
genus ‟something” (to take it for the sake of argument),
-which some regard as the summum genus,The Stoic view, cf. §§ 86 f. supra. will
-either be all these or some of them or none.
-
+which some regard as the summum genus,The Stoic view, cf. §§ 86 f. supra. will
+either be all these or some of them or none.
+
But if the ‟something,” and the genus too, is absolutely
none of them, the inquiry comes to an end. And if
we should say that it is all of them, then, besides the
@@ -5512,8 +5480,8 @@ and incorporeal and false and true and black, it may
be, and white and very small and very large, and all
the rest, each of the species and of the particulars will
be all these—which is contrary to observation. So
-this too is false.
-
+
But if the genus is some of them
only, the genus of these will not be the genus of the
rest; if, for instance, the genus ‟something” is
@@ -5527,14 +5495,14 @@ kind, or of this kind but not of that, or of neither this
kind nor that; and if this be so, neither does the
genus exist at all.
And if one should say that the genus is potentially
-all things,Aristotle regarded the relation of Genus to Species as that of Potentiality to Actuality, i.e. of unrealized possibility to what is real and determinate, or of the germinal to the fully evolved. As the ‟actuality” of the oak is implicit in the ‟potency” of the acorn, so the plurality of ‟actual” particulars are implicit in the ‟potency” of the unitary ‟genus.” we shall reply that what is potentially
+all things,Aristotle regarded the relation of Genus to Species as that of Potentiality to Actuality, i.e. of unrealized possibility to what is real and determinate, or of the germinal to the fully evolved. As the ‟actuality” of the oak is implicit in the ‟potency” of the acorn, so the plurality of ‟actual” particulars are implicit in the ‟potency” of the unitary ‟genus.” we shall reply that what is potentially
something must also be actually something, as, for
instance, no one can be potentially literary without
being so actually. So too, if the genus is potentially
all things, what, we ask them, is it actually? And
thus we find that the same difficulties remain. For
it cannot actually be all the contraries;
-
+
nor yet can it be some of them actually and some only potentially
—corporeal, for instance, actually and incorporeal
potentially. For it is potentially that which it is
@@ -5547,10 +5515,10 @@ therefore, for the genus to be some things actually
and some only potentially. But if it is absolutely
nothing actually, it has no substantial existence.
Hence the genus, which they say they divide into
-the species, is nothing.
+the species, is nothing.
And further, here is another point worthy of notice.
-Just as, because Alexander and ParisTwo names of the son of Priam who carried off Helen to Troy. are identical,
+Just as, because Alexander and ParisTwo names of the son of Priam who carried off Helen to Troy. are identical,
it is impossible that the statement ‟Alexander walks”
should be true when ‟Paris walks” is false, so also if
‟manhood” is identical for both Theon and Dion,
@@ -5559,13 +5527,13 @@ a judgement will cause the judgement to be equally
true or false in the case of both. But this is not what
we find; for when Dion is sitting and Theon walking,
the judgement ‟man walks” is true when used of
-the one, but false of the other. Therefore the term‟Term,” i.e. (in Stoic usage) ‟common noun or appellative” (Diog. Laert. vii. 58).
+the one, but false of the other. Therefore the term‟Term,” i.e. (in Stoic usage) ‟common noun or appellative” (Diog. Laert. vii. 58).
‟man” is not common to them both and the same
for both but, if applicable at all, it is peculiar to one
of the two.
-
+
Chapter XXI.—Concerning Common Properties
Similar arguments apply also to the ‟common
@@ -5587,41 +5555,41 @@ therefore it is not identical.
will be sufficient for the present.
-
+
Chapter XXII.—Concerning Sophisms
It will not, perhaps, be amiss to give our attention
for a moment to the subject of Sophisms, seeing that
-those who glorify DialecticThe Stoics; cf. § 94 supra for the definition of Dialectic. declare that it is
+those who glorify DialecticThe Stoics; cf. § 94 supra for the definition of Dialectic. declare that it is
indispensable for exposing sophisms. For, they say, if
Dialectic is capable of distinguishing true and false
arguments, and sophisms are false arguments, it will
also be capable of discerning these, which distort the
truth by apparent plausibilities. Hence the dialecticians,
-by way of assisting lifei.e. the views and conduct of ordinary people, cf. i. 23, 165. when it totters, strive
+by way of assisting lifei.e. the views and conduct of ordinary people, cf. i. 23, 165. when it totters, strive
earnestly to teach us the conception of sophisms, their
differences and their solutions. They declare that a
sophism is ‟a plausible argument cunningly framed
to induce acceptance of the inference, it being either
false or resembling what is false or non-evident or
-otherwise unacceptable.”
-
+otherwise unacceptable.”
+
It is false, for example,
in the case of the sophism ‟Nobody offers one a
predicate to drink; but ‟to drink absinth” is a
predicate; nobody therefore offers one absinth to
drink.” Or again, it may resemble the false, as in
this case—‟What neither was nor is possible is not
-absurd;Or ‟meaningless.” The Stoics held that every ‟judgement” or ‟proposition” (ἀξίωμα) was significant; so the proposition” this is not possible” is not ἄτοπον, in this sense of the word. but it neither was nor is possible for a doctor,
+absurd;Or ‟meaningless.” The Stoics held that every ‟judgement” or ‟proposition” (ἀξίωμα) was significant; so the proposition” this is not possible” is not ἄτοπον, in this sense of the word. but it neither was nor is possible for a doctor,
qua doctor, to murder; therefore it is not absurd that
-a doctor, qua doctor, should murder.”
-
+a doctor, qua doctor, should murder.”
+
Or again, it may be non-evident, as thus—‟It is not true both
that I have asked you a question first and that the
stars are not even in number; but I have asked you
a question first; therefore the stars are even.” Or
again, it may be otherwise unacceptable, like the
-so-called solecistici.e. ungrammatical, involving the use of an adjective for a noun, the accusative for the nominative case (as here τόπον for τόπος), and the like. Cf. Aristot. Soph. El. cc. 14, 32. arguments, such as—‟That at
+so-called solecistici.e. ungrammatical, involving the use of an adjective for a noun, the accusative for the nominative case (as here τόπον for τόπος), and the like. Cf. Aristot. Soph. El. cc. 14, 32. arguments, such as—‟That at
which you look exists; but you have a frenzied look;
therefore 'frenzied' exists;” or ‟What you gaze at
exists; but you gaze at an inflamed spot; therefore
@@ -5637,18 +5605,18 @@ itself. Hence, whereas one ought to infer ‟Nobody
therefore drinks the ‘to drink absinth,’” which
is true, the inference drawn is ‟Nobody therefore
drinks absinth,” which is false, as not deduced from
-the established premisses.
-
+the established premisses.
+
And as regards the second sophism, they explain that while it seems to
lead in a false direction, so that it makes the inattentive
hesitate in assenting to it, its conclusion is true,
namely ‟It is not therefore absurd that the doctor,
qua doctor, should murder.” For no judgement
-is absurd,i.e. meaningless—a Stoic dictum. and ‟the doctor, qua doctor, murders”
-is a judgement, so that neither is it absurd.
-
-And the method of leading up to the non-evidenti.e. the third Sophism, in § 231. deals,
-they say, with the class of things that are variable.i.e. judgements which change from truth to falsehood; cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 76.
+is absurd,i.e. meaningless—a Stoic dictum. and ‟the doctor, qua doctor, murders”
+is a judgement, so that neither is it absurd.
+
+And the method of leading up to the non-evidenti.e. the third Sophism, in § 231. deals,
+they say, with the class of things that are variable.i.e. judgements which change from truth to falsehood; cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 76.
For when, according to the assumption, no previous
question has been asked, the negation of the
conjunctive premiss is true, the conjunctive or major
@@ -5662,8 +5630,8 @@ the first clause in the negation of the major becomes
false while the false clause in the major has become
true; so that it is never possible for the conclusion
to be deduced if the negation of the major premiss
-does not co-exist with the minor premiss.
-
+does not co-exist with the minor premiss.
+
And as to the last class—the solecistic arguments—some
declare that they are introduced absurdly, contrary to
linguistic usage.
@@ -5673,11 +5641,11 @@ indeed make other statements; and what they say may
be able, perhaps, to tickle the ears of the casual hearer,
superfluous though it is and the result of vain labour
on their part. Probably this can be seen from what we have
-said already;Cf. §§ 80 ff. supra.
+said already;Cf. §§ 80 ff. supra.
for we have shown that truth and falsehood, according to the
Dialecticians, cannot be apprehended, and that by a variety
of arguments as well as by the refutation of their evidences
-for the validity of the syllogism, namely proof and axiomatic arguments.Cf. §§ 144 ff., 156 ff.
+for the validity of the syllogism, namely proof and axiomatic arguments.
Cf. §§ 144 ff., 156 ff.
And there are many other special objections bearing
on the topic before us which we might mention, but now,
@@ -5692,7 +5660,7 @@ Thus, for instance, to mention one or two examples,
if a sophism such as this were propounded—‟In diseases,
at the stages of abatement, a varied diet and wine are
to be approved; but in every type of disease an abatement
-inevitably occurs before the first third day;The ‟Methodic” School of medicine held that the progress of a disease was marked by three-day periods of increasing (up to the crisis) or decreasing severity; for the former they prescribed a light diet. it is necessary,
+inevitably occurs before the first third day;The ‟Methodic” School of medicine held that the progress of a disease was marked by three-day periods of increasing (up to the crisis) or decreasing severity; for the former they prescribed a light diet. it is necessary,
therefore, to take for the most part a varied diet and wine
before the first third day,”—in this case the dialectician
would be unable to assist in exposing the argument, useful though the exposure would be,
@@ -5714,12 +5682,12 @@ local condition—in the second premiss.
Again, in the case of one who suffers from fever
due to aggravated ‟contraction” or obstruction, if
an argument is propounded in the form—‟Opposites
-are cures of opposites;
Cf. Hippocrates, De. flat. 2; for morbid ‟contraction” counteracted by ‟dilatation” or ‟relaxation” cf. i. 238. By ‟corresponding” is meant the appropriate ‟counteracting” remedy. The ‟persistent” or ‟deep-seated” (προσεχῆ) morbid states are distinguished from the superficial ‟symptoms” which the Methodic School disregarded as accidentals. cold is the opposite of the
+are cures of opposites;
Cf. Hippocrates, De. flat. 2; for morbid ‟contraction” counteracted by ‟dilatation” or ‟relaxation” cf. i. 238. By ‟corresponding” is meant the appropriate ‟counteracting” remedy. The ‟persistent” or ‟deep-seated” (προσεχῆ) morbid states are distinguished from the superficial ‟symptoms” which the Methodic School disregarded as accidentals. cold is the opposite of the
present feverish condition; therefore cold is the
treatment which corresponds to the present feverish
condition,”—here again the dialectician will keep
-silence,
-
+
but the doctor, since he knows what morbid
states are fundamentally persistent and what are
symptoms of such states, will declare that the argument
@@ -5730,32 +5698,31 @@ persistent morbid states, and that the constipation is
persistent but requires an expansive method of
treatment rather than contraction, whereas the resultant
symptom of inflammation is not fundamentally persistent,
- nor (consequently) is the state of cold which
+nor (consequently) is the state of cold which
seems to correspond thereto.
Thus, as regards sophisms the exposure of which is useful,
the dialectician will not have a word to say,
-but he will propound for us arguments such as theseThe ceratinē or ‟Horn-fallacy” (invented by the Megarics, cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 111, vi. 39) is generally put in a simpler form—‟If you have not lost anything, you have it; you have not lost horns, therefore you have horns” (a joke aimed at cuckolds, thinks Fabricius). Sextus’s complex syllogism seems much more clumsy (if the text is right).
+but he will propound for us arguments such as theseThe ceratinē or ‟Horn-fallacy” (invented by the Megarics, cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 111, vi. 39) is generally put in a simpler form—‟If you have not lost anything, you have it; you have not lost horns, therefore you have horns” (a joke aimed at cuckolds, thinks Fabricius). Sextus’s complex syllogism seems much more clumsy (if the text is right).
—‟If it is not so that you both have fair horns and
have horns, you have horns; but it is not so that
you have fair horns and have horns; therefore you
-have horns.”
-
+
‟If a thing moves, it moves either in
the spot where it is or where it is not; but it moves
neither in the spot where it is (for it is at rest) nor
in that where it is not (for how could a thing be
active in a spot where it does not so much as exist?);
-therefore nothing moves.”Cf. § 245, iii. 7, and Adv. Gramm. 311, where this argument is ascribed to Diodorus the Megaric.
-
-‟Either the existent
-becomes or the non-existent; now the existent does
-not become (for it exists); nor yet does the non-
-existent (for the becoming is passive but the non-
-existent is not passive); therefore nothing becomes.”In Adv. Log. i. 71 this argument is ascribed to Gorgias.
-
+therefore nothing moves.”Cf. § 245, iii. 7, and Adv. Gramm. 311, where this argument is ascribed to Diodorus the Megaric.
+
+‟Either the existent becomes or the non-existent; now the existent does
+not become (for it exists); nor yet does the non-existent
+(for the becoming is passive but the non-existent is not passive);
+therefore nothing becomes.”In Adv. Log. i. 71 this argument is ascribed to Gorgias.
+
‟Snow is frozen water; but water is black; therefore
-snow is black.”
Anaxagoras held this notion about snow, cf. i. 33.
+snow is black.”
Anaxagoras held this notion about snow, cf. i. 33.
And when he has made a collection of such trash
he draws his eyebrows together, and expounds
Dialectic and endeavours very solemnly to establish
@@ -5765,16 +5732,16 @@ horns, although it is probably sufficient to confront
the trash with the plain fact in order to smash up
their positive affirmation by means of the equipollent
contradictory evidence derived from appearances.
-Thus, in fact, a certain philosopher,Diogenes the Cynic (Diog. Laert. vi. 39); see iii. 66. Cf. Boswell’s story of how Dr. Johnson refuted Berkeley. when the
+Thus, in fact, a certain philosopher,Diogenes the Cynic (Diog. Laert. vi. 39); see iii. 66. Cf. Boswell’s story of how Dr. Johnson refuted Berkeley. when the
argument against motion was put to him, without a word
started to walk about; and people who follow the usual
way of life proceed on journeys by land and sea and
build ships and houses and beget children without paying
any attention to the arguments against motion
-and becoming.
-
+
And we are told of an amusing retort
-made by the physician Herophilus:A famous anatomist of Cos, circa 300 b.c. For Diodorus Cronos cf. i. 234. he was a
+made by the physician Herophilus:A famous anatomist of Cos, circa 300 b.c. For Diodorus Cronos cf. i. 234. he was a
contemporary of Diodorus who, being given to juggling
with dialectic, used to promulgate sophistical
arguments against motion as well as many other things.
@@ -5786,15 +5753,15 @@ not; but it was put out neither where it was nor
where it was not; therefore it has not been put
out;” so that the Sophist begged him to leave such
arguments alone and apply the treatment prescribed
-by medical art as suitable to his case.
-
-ForThis refers back to the end of § 244, § 245 being parenthetic. it is, I
+by medical art as suitable to his case.
+
+ForThis refers back to the end of § 244, § 245 being parenthetic. it is, I
think, sufficient to conduct one’s life empirically and
undogmatically in accordance with the rules and
beliefs that are commonly accepted, suspending judgement
regarding the statements derived from dogmatic
subtlety and furthest removed from the usage of
-life.The traditional Sceptic attitude, cf. i. 15, 23 ff., etc. If, then, dialectic would fail to expose any of
+life.The traditional Sceptic attitude, cf. i. 15, 23 ff., etc. If, then, dialectic would fail to expose any of
the sophisms which might usefully be exposed, while
the exposure of all the sophisms which we might
perhaps grant it capable of exposing is useless,
@@ -5810,16 +5777,16 @@ of ascertaining what is deduced from what but chiefly
for the sake of knowing how to discern the true and
the false by means of probative arguments. Thus
they declare that dialectic is ‟the science of what is
-true and false and neither.”
-
+true and false and neither.”
+
Since, then, they assert
that a true argument is one which draws a true
-conclusion by means of true premisses,Cf. §§ 137 ff. when an
+conclusion by means of true premisses,Cf. §§ 137 ff. when an
argument is propounded which has a false conclusion we
shall at once know that it is false and shall not yield
it assent. For the argument itself must either be
-illogical or contain premisses that are not true.
-
+illogical or contain premisses that are not true.
+
The following considerations show this clearly: The false
conclusion in the argument either follows from the
combination formed by its premisses, or it does not
@@ -5830,9 +5797,9 @@ from the combination formed by its premisses. If,
again, it does so follow, then—according to their own
technical treatises—the combination formed by its
premisses must necessarily be false; for they say that
-the false follows from the false and nohow from the true.Cf. Aristot. Anal. pr. ii. 2; Diog. Laert. vii. 81.
-
-And from what we have already saidCf. § 139. it is plain that
+the false follows from the false and nohow from the true.Cf. Aristot. Anal. pr. ii. 2; Diog. Laert. vii. 81.
+
+And from what we have already said
Cf. § 139. it is plain that
according to them the argument which is not logically
sound or not true is not probative either.
If, then, when an argument is propounded with a
@@ -5858,8 +5825,8 @@ ought to yield hasty assent to the absurdity because
of its plausibility, but it is they that ought to abstain
from the argument which constrains them to assent
to absurdities, if they really choose to seek truth, as
-they profess, rather than drivel like children.
-
+they profess, rather than drivel like children.
+
Thus, suppose there were a road leading up to a chasm, we
do not push ourselves into the chasm just because there
is a road leading to it but we avoid the road because
@@ -5867,23 +5834,22 @@ of the chasm; so, in the same way, if there should be
an argument which leads us to a confessedly absurd
conclusion, we shall not assent to the absurdity just
because of the argument but avoid the argument
-because of the absurdity.
-
-So whenever such an
-argument is propounded to us we shall suspend
+because of the absurdity.
+
+So whenever such an argument is propounded to us we shall suspend
judgement regarding each premiss, and when finally
the whole argument is propounded we shall draw
what conclusions we approve.
And if the Dogmatists of the School of Chrysippus
-declare that when the ‟Sorites”The fallacy of the ‟Heap” (acervalis), so-called because commonly framed thus: ‟This is a heap of grain: take away one grain—two grains—three grains, and so on—is it still a heap?” Or ‟Does one grain make a heap? Or, if not, 2,3, . . . x grains?” The essence of the fallacy is that ‟aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur” (Cicero, Lucull. 16). In modern Logic ‟Sorites” denotes a chain of syllogisms in which all the conclusions save the last are suppressed. is being propounded
+declare that when the ‟Sorites”The fallacy of the ‟Heap” (acervalis), so-called because commonly framed thus: ‟This is a heap of grain: take away one grain—two grains—three grains, and so on—is it still a heap?” Or ‟Does one grain make a heap? Or, if not, 2,3, . . . x grains?” The essence of the fallacy is that ‟aliquid minutatim et gradatim additur aut demitur” (Cicero, Lucull. 16). In modern Logic ‟Sorites” denotes a chain of syllogisms in which all the conclusions save the last are suppressed. is being propounded
they ought to halt while the argument is still proceeding
and suspend judgement, to avoid falling into absurdity,
much more, surely, would it be fitting for us, who are
Sceptics, when we suspect absurdity, to give no hasty
approval of the premisses propounded but rather to
suspend judgement about each until the completion
-of the whole series which forms the argument.
-
+of the whole series which forms the argument.
+
And whereas we, by starting undogmatically from the
observation of practical life, thus avoid these fallacious
arguments, the Dogmatists will not be in a position
@@ -5891,10 +5857,9 @@ to distinguish the Sophism from the argument which
seems to be correctly propounded, seeing that they
have to pronounce dogmatically that the form of the
argument is, or is not, logically sound and also that
-the premisses are, or are not, true.
-
-For we have
-shown above that they are neither able to apprehend
+the premisses are, or are not, true.
+
+For we have shown above that they are neither able to apprehend
the logically valid arguments nor yet capable of
deciding that a thing is true, since—as we have shown
from their own statements—they possess neither a
@@ -5906,18 +5871,17 @@ is otiose.
And we say much the same regarding the distinguishing
of ambiguities. For if the Ambiguity is a
word or phrase having two or more meanings, and it
-is by convention
Cf. § 214. that words have meaning, then all
+is by convention
Cf. § 214. that words have meaning, then all
such ambiguities as can be usefully cleared up—such,
that is, as occur in the course of some practical affair—
will be cleared up, not certainly by the dialectician,
but by the craftsmen trained in each several art, as
they have personal experience of the conventional
way adopted by themselves of using the terms to
-denote the objects signified
-
-—as, for example, in the
-case of the ambiguity ‟In periods of abatement one
-should sanction a varied diet and wine.”Cf. § 237. And in
+denote the objects signified
+
+—as, for example, in the case of the ambiguity ‟In periods of abatement one
+should sanction a varied diet and wine.”Cf. § 237. And in
the ordinary affairs of life we see already how people
—ay, and even the slave-boys—distinguish ambiguities
when they think such distinction is of use.
@@ -5927,27 +5891,27 @@ this to be common name for a servant) to be summoned,
the slave-boy will ask ‟Which one?” And
if a man who had several different wines were to
say to his boy ‟Pour me out a draught of wine,”
-then too the boy will ask ‟Which one?”
-
+then too the boy will ask ‟Which one?”
+
Thus it is the experience of what is useful in each affair that
brings about the distinguishing of ambiguities.
All such ambiguities, however, as are not involved
in the practical experiences of life but in dogmatic
opinions, and are no doubt useless for a life void of
dogmatism,—concerning these the Dialectician, in
-his own peculiar position,i.e. his special attitude, as a Dogmatist, towards ambiguities. will be similarly forced,
+his own peculiar position,i.e. his special attitude, as a Dogmatist, towards ambiguities. will be similarly forced,
in view of the Sceptic attacks, to suspend judgement,
in so far as they are probably linked up with
matters that are non-evident and non-apprehensible,
-or even non-substantial.
-
-This subject, however, we
-shall discuss later on;No such discussion is to be found in the extant works of Sextus. and if any Dogmatist should
-attempt to refute any of our statements he will be
-strengthening the Sceptic argument by adding support
-to their suspension of judgement about the matters
-in question as a result of our mutual antagonism and
-interminable dissension.
+or even non-substantial.
+
+This subject, however, we shall discuss later on;
+
No such discussion is to be found in the extant works of Sextus.
+and if any Dogmatist should attempt to refute any of
+our statements he will be strengthening the Sceptic
+argument by adding support to their suspension of
+judgement about the matters in question as a result
+of our mutual antagonism and interminable dissension.
Having said thus much concerning ambiguities we
now conclude therewith our Second Book of Outlines.
@@ -5956,21 +5920,21 @@ now conclude therewith our Second Book of Outlines.
Concerning the logical division of what is called
-‟Philosophy”For the Stoic division of ‟Philosophy” into three parts—logic, physics and ethics—see ii. 13. the foregoing account may suffice by
+‟Philosophy”For the Stoic division of ‟Philosophy” into three parts—logic, physics and ethics—see ii. 13. the foregoing account may suffice by
way of outline.
Chapter I.—Of The Physical Division
-Pursuing the same method of exposition in our
+
Pursuing the same method of exposition in our
investigation of the Physical division of Philosophy,
we shall not refute each of their statements in order,
but we shall endeavour to overthrow those of a more
-general characterCf. ii. 84. wherein the rest also are included.
-
Let us begin with their doctrine of Principles.‟Principles,” or ‟origins” (ἀρχαί) which are assumed to explain existence: fundamental realities: here used practically as a synonym for ‟Causes” (αἴτια).
+general character
Cf. ii. 84. wherein the rest also are included.
+
Let us begin with their doctrine of Principles.‟Principles,” or ‟origins” (ἀρχαί) which are assumed to explain existence: fundamental realities: here used practically as a synonym for ‟Causes” (αἴτια).
Chapter II.—Of Efficient Principles
-Since it is agreed by most that of Principles some
+
Since it is agreed by most that of Principles some
are material and some efficient, we shall make our
argument start with the efficient; for these, as they
assert, are superior to the material.
@@ -5981,24 +5945,24 @@ assert, are superior to the material.
Since, then, the majority have declared that God
is a most efficient Cause, let us begin by inquiring
-about God,Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 13 ff. It is argued here (1) that God is not ‟conceived,” §§ 2–5; nor (2) ‟apprehended,” §§ 6–11. Cf. § 218 infra. first premising that although, following
-the ordinary view,Literally ‟life”; cf. i. 23 f. we affirm undogmatically that
+about God,Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 13 ff. It is argued here (1) that God is not ‟conceived,” §§ 2–5; nor (2) ‟apprehended,” §§ 6–11. Cf. § 218 infra. first premising that although, following
+the ordinary view,Literally ‟life”; cf. i. 23 f. we affirm undogmatically that
Gods exist and reverence Gods and ascribe to them
foreknowledge, yet as against the rashness of the
Dogmatists we argue as follows.
When we conceive objects we ought to form
-conceptions of their substances‟Substances” in the logical sense, as opposed to ‟properties.” as well, as, for instance,
+conceptions of their substances‟Substances” in the logical sense, as opposed to ‟properties.” as well, as, for instance,
whether they are corporeal or incorporeal. And also
of their forms; for no one could conceive ‟Horse”
unless he had first learnt the horse’s form. And
of course the object conceived must be conceived
- somewhere.
-
+
Since, then, some of the Dogmatists assert that God is corporeal, others that
he is incorporeal, and some that he has human form,
others not, and some that he exists in space, others
not; and of those who assert that he is in space some
-put him inside the world, others outside;The Stoics held God to be ‟corporeal,” not ‟of human form,” ‟inside the world”; the Epicureans, ‟corporeal,” ‟of human form,” ‟outside the world”; Aristotle, ‟incorporeal” and ‟not in space.” Cf. § 218 infra. how shall
+put him inside the world, others outside;The Stoics held God to be ‟corporeal,” not ‟of human form,” ‟inside the world”; the Epicureans, ‟corporeal,” ‟of human form,” ‟outside the world”; Aristotle, ‟incorporeal” and ‟not in space.” Cf. § 218 infra. how shall
we be able to reach a conception of God when we have
no agreement about his substance or his form or his
place of abode? Let them first agree and consent
@@ -6009,20 +5973,19 @@ God. But so long as they disagree interminably, we
cannot say what agreed notion we are to derive
from them.
-But, say they,i.e. the Stoics and Epicurus, cf. § 219 infra. when you have conceived of a Being
+But, say they,i.e. the Stoics and Epicurus, cf. § 219 infra. when you have conceived of a Being
imperishable and blessed, regard this as God. But
this is foolish; for just as one who does not know Dion
is unable also to conceive the properties which belong
to him as Dion, so also when we do not know the
substance of God we shall also be unable to learn
-and conceive his properties.
-
-And apart from this, let
-them tell us what a ‟blessed” thing is—whether it is
+and conceive his properties.
+
+And apart from this, let them tell us what a ‟blessed” thing is—whether it is
that which energizes according to virtue and foreknows
what is subject to itself, or that which is void
of energy and neither performs any work itself nor
-provides work for another.The Epicurean Deity as contrasted with the Platonic and Stoic. Cf. Lucretius ii. 646 ff.: omnis enim per se divom natura necessest inmortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe. For indeed about this
+provides work for another.The Epicurean Deity as contrasted with the Platonic and Stoic. Cf. Lucretius ii. 646 ff.: omnis enim per se divom natura necessest inmortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe. For indeed about this
also they disagree interminably and thus render
‟the blessed” something we cannot conceive, and
therefore God also.
@@ -6031,12 +5994,12 @@ Further, in order to form a conception of God one
must necessarily—so far as depends on the Dogmatists
—suspend judgement as to his existence or
non-existence. For the existence of God is not
-pre-evident.
i.e. plainly manifest, self-evident, cf. i. 178. For if God impressed us automatically,
+pre-evident.
i.e. plainly manifest, self-evident, cf. i. 178. For if God impressed us automatically,
the Dogmatists would have agreed together regarding
his essence, his character, and his place; whereas
their interminable disagreement has made him seem
-to us non-evident and needing demonstration.
-
+to us non-evident and needing demonstration.
+
Now he that demonstrates the existence of God does so by
means of what is either pre-evident or non-evident.
Certainly not, then, by means of the pre-evident;
@@ -6044,12 +6007,12 @@ for if what demonstrates God’s existence were pre-evident,
then—since the thing proved is conceived
together with that which proves it, and therefore is
apprehended along with it as well, as we have
-establishedCf. ii. 179, 128.—God’s existence also will be pre-evident, it
+establishedCf. ii. 179, 128.—God’s existence also will be pre-evident, it
being apprehended along with the pre-evident fact
which proves it. But, as we have shown, it is not
pre-evident; therefore it is not proved, either, by a
-pre-evident fact. Nor yet by what is non-evident.
-
+pre-evident fact. Nor yet by what is non-evident.
+
For if the non-evident fact which is capable of proving
God’s existence, needing proof as it does, shall be said
to be proved by means of a pre-evident fact, it will
@@ -6061,8 +6024,8 @@ into circular reasoning when we keep demanding
proof every time for the non-evident fact which he
produces as proof of the one last propounded.
Consequently, the existence of God cannot be proved
-from any other fact.
-
+
But if God’s existence is neither
automatically pre-evident nor proved from another
fact, it will be inapprehensible.
@@ -6074,8 +6037,8 @@ things or for some things. But if he had forethought
for all, there would have been nothing bad and no
badness in the world; yet all things, they say, are full
of badness; hence it shall not be said that God forethinks
-all things.
-
+
If, again, he forethinks some, why
does he forethink these things and not those? For
either he has both the will and the power to forethink
@@ -6087,8 +6050,8 @@ but for the reasons stated above he does not forethink
all; therefore he has not both the will and the power
to forethink all. And if he has the will but not the
power, he is less strong than the cause which renders
-him unable to forethink what he does not forethink:
-
+him unable to forethink what he does not forethink:
+
but it is contrary to our notion of God that he should
be weaker than anything. And if, again, he has the
power but not the will to have forethought for all, he
@@ -6102,8 +6065,8 @@ able to name the source of the apprehension of God’s
existence, inasmuch as he neither appears of himself
nor is apprehended by means of any of his products.
So for these reasons we cannot apprehend whether
-God exists.
-
+
And from this we further conclude that
those who positively affirm God’s existence are probably
compelled to be guilty of impiety; for if they
@@ -6118,7 +6081,7 @@ and obviously this is to use impious language.
Chapter IV.—Concerning Cause
To prevent the Dogmatists attempting also to
-slander us,i.e. by charging us with atheism. because of their inability to refute us
+slander us,i.e. by charging us with atheism. because of their inability to refute us
in a practical way, we shall discuss the question of
the efficient Cause more at large when we have first
tried to give attention to the conception of Cause.
@@ -6127,12 +6090,12 @@ concerned, it would be impossible for anyone even to
conceive Cause, since, in addition to offering
discrepant and contradictory conceptions of Cause, they
have rendered its substance also indiscoverable by
-their disagreement about it.
-
+their disagreement about it.
+
For some affirm Cause
-to be corporeal, others incorporeal.e.g. Plato’s ‟Ideas” and the Pythagorean ‟Numbers”; cf. § 32, Adv. Phys. i. 364. In the broad
+to be corporeal, others incorporeal.e.g. Plato’s ‟Ideas” and the Pythagorean ‟Numbers”; cf. § 32, Adv. Phys. i. 364. In the broad
sense, a Cause would seem to be, according to them,
-‟That by whose energizing the effect comes about;”Cf. Plato, Cratyl. 413 a, Phileb. 26 e; Adv. Phys. i. 228.
+‟That by whose energizing the effect comes about;”Cf. Plato, Cratyl. 413 a, Phileb. 26 e; Adv. Phys. i. 228.
as, for example, the sun or the sun’s heat is the cause
of the wax being melted or of the melting of the
wax. For even on this point they are at variance,
@@ -6143,7 +6106,7 @@ will be ‟that by whose energizing the effect comes
about.”
The majority of them hold that of these Causes
-some are immediate,Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 1, 243. some associate, some co-
+some are immediate,Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 1, 243. some associate, some co-
operant; and that causes are ‟immediate” when
their presence involves the presence, and their
removal the removal, and their decrease the decrease,
@@ -6165,7 +6128,7 @@ things present are causes of things future, being
sun causes fever. But this view is rejected by some,
on the ground that, since the Cause is relative to
something existent and to a real effect, it cannot
-precede it as its cause.Cf. § 25 infra.
+precede it as its cause.
Cf. § 25 infra.
As regards this controversy, our position is as
follows:
@@ -6177,11 +6140,11 @@ That Cause exists is plausible; for how could
there come about increase, decrease, generation,
corruption, motion in general, each of the physical
and mental effects, the ordering of the whole universe,
-and everything else, except by reason of some cause?To mark the distinction between αἴτιον and αἰτία, I render the former by ‟Cause,” the latter by ‟cause.” The latter seems used mostly of the particular instance, the former of the general notion; or (as in §§ 19, 23, 24) the former of the cause of existence, the latter of the cause of cognition.
-For even if none of these things has real existence,Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 201. ‟These things,” being ‟appearances” (or phenomena), may not really exist in the form in which they ‟appear” to us: the ‟real” may differ from the ‟phenomenal,” but even so a ‟Cause” of that difference must be assumed.
+and everything else, except by reason of some cause?To mark the distinction between αἴτιον and αἰτία, I render the former by ‟Cause,” the latter by ‟cause.” The latter seems used mostly of the particular instance, the former of the general notion; or (as in §§ 19, 23, 24) the former of the cause of existence, the latter of the cause of cognition.
+For even if none of these things has real existence,Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 201. ‟These things,” being ‟appearances” (or phenomena), may not really exist in the form in which they ‟appear” to us: the ‟real” may differ from the ‟phenomenal,” but even so a ‟Cause” of that difference must be assumed.
we shall affirm that it is due to some cause that they
-appear to us other than they really are.
-
+appear to us other than they really are.
+
Moreover, if cause were non-existent everything would have been
produced by everything and at random. Horses,
for instance, might be born, perchance, of flies,
@@ -6189,18 +6152,17 @@ and elephants of ants; and there would have been
severe rains and snow in Egyptian Thebes, while the
southern districts would have had no rain, unless
there had been a cause which makes the southern
-parts stormy, the eastern dry.
-
-Also, he who asserts
-that there is no Cause is refuted; for if he says that
+parts stormy, the eastern dry.
+
+Also, he who asserts that there is no Cause is refuted; for if he says that
he makes this assertion absolutely and without any
cause, he will not win credence; but if he says that
he makes it owing to some cause, he is positing
Cause while wishing to abolish it, since he offers us
a cause to prove the non-existence of Cause.
For these reasons, then, the existence of Cause is
-plausible.
-
+
But that it is also plausible to say that
nothing is the Cause of anything will be evident when
we have set forth, to suit the occasion, a few of the
@@ -6208,14 +6170,14 @@ many arguments which go to prove this case. Thus
it is, for example, impossible to conceive the Cause
before apprehending its effect as its effect; for we only
recognize that it is causative of the effect when we
-apprehend the latter as an effect.
-
+apprehend the latter as an effect.
+
But we cannot either apprehend the effect of the Cause as its effect
unless we apprehend the Cause of the effect as its
Cause; for we think we know that it is its effect only
when we have apprehended the Cause of it as its
-Cause.
-
+
If, then, in order to conceive the Cause, we
must first know the effect, while in order to know
the effect we must, as I said, have previous knowledge
@@ -6235,7 +6197,7 @@ says that there is some Cause of something either
asserts that he makes this statement absolutely and
without basing it on any rational cause, or else he will
declare that he has arrived at his conviction owing
-to certain causes.Cf., for the following arguments, i. 164. If, then, he says that he states it
+to certain causes.Cf., for the following arguments, i. 164. If, then, he says that he states it
‟absolutely,” he will be no more worthy of credence
than the man who asserts ‟absolutely” that nothing
is a cause of anything; whereas if he shall mention
@@ -6245,8 +6207,8 @@ the matter in question by means of that matter itself;
for when we are examining the question whether
anything is the Cause of anything, he asserts that
Cause exists since there exists a cause for the existence
-of Cause.
-
+
Besides, since we are inquiring about the
reality of Cause, it will certainly be necessary for him
to produce a cause for the cause of the existence of
@@ -6264,8 +6226,8 @@ brought about by it as already existing Cause. But
since the Cause is relative and relative to the effect,
it is clear that it cannot be prior in existence to the
latter; therefore not even as being causal can the
-Cause bring about that whereof it is Cause.
-
+Cause bring about that whereof it is Cause.
+
And if it does not bring about anything either as being or as
not being causal, then it does not bring anything
about; and hence it will not be a Cause; for apart
@@ -6277,8 +6239,8 @@ come into being after it. Now to say that the Cause
is brought into existence after the appearance of its
effect would seem ridiculous. But neither can it subsist
before the effect; for it is said to be conceived in relation
-thereto, and they affirm that relatives,
-
+thereto, and they affirm that relatives,
+
in so far as they are relative, co-exist with each other and are
conceived together. Nor, again, can it subsist along
with its effect; for if it is productive of the effect,
@@ -6288,8 +6250,8 @@ become causal first, and this done, then produces its
effect. If, then, the Cause neither subsists before its
effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect
precede the Cause, it would seem that it has no
-substantial existence at all.
-
+substantial existence at all.
+
And it is clear probably that by these arguments the conception of Cause is
overthrown again. For if Cause as a relative notion
cannot be conceived before its effect, and yet, if it is
@@ -6300,12 +6262,12 @@ conception of it cannot precede,—then it is impossible for
the Cause to be conceived.
From all this we conclude finally that—if the
-arguments by which it was shownCf. §§ 17 ff. that we ought to
+arguments by which it was shownCf. §§ 17 ff. that we ought to
affirm the existence of Cause are plausible, and if the
arguments which go to prove that it is improper to
declare that any Cause exists are likewise plausible,
and if it is inadmissible to prefer any of these arguments
-to the others, since, as we have shown above,Cf. ii. 18, 104, 134 ff.
+to the others, since, as we have shown above,Cf. ii. 18, 104, 134 ff.
we confessedly possess neither sign nor criterion nor
proof,—we are compelled to suspend judgement concerning
the real existence of Cause, declaring that
@@ -6320,30 +6282,30 @@ Dogmatists.
So far, then, as concerns the efficient Principle this
account will suffice for the present. But we must also
give a brief account of what are called the Material
-Principles.With the following sections cf. Adv. Phys. i. 360 ff., ii. 310 ff.; and for the arguments employed, i. 164. Now that these are inapprehensible may
+Principles.With the following sections cf. Adv. Phys. i. 360 ff., ii. 310 ff.; and for the arguments employed, i. 164. Now that these are inapprehensible may
easily be gathered from the disagreement which
exists about them amongst the Dogmatists. For
-Pherecydes of SyrosPherecydes, circa 650 b.c., was a semi-scientific cosmogonist; Oenopides was an astronomer and mathematician of the fifth century b.c.; Onomacritus was an Athenian religious poet, said to be the author of some of the Orphic hymns. For the other names see Introd. declared earth to be the
+Pherecydes of SyrosPherecydes, circa 650 b.c., was a semi-scientific cosmogonist; Oenopides was an astronomer and mathematician of the fifth century b.c.; Onomacritus was an Athenian religious poet, said to be the author of some of the Orphic hymns. For the other names see Introd. declared earth to be the
Principle of all things; Thales of Miletus, water;
Anaximander (his pupil), the Unlimited; Anaximenes
and Diogenes of Apollonia, air; Hippasus of
Metapontum, fire; Xenophanes of Colophon, earth
and water; Oenopides of Chios, fire and air; Hippo
of Rhegium, fire and water; Onomacritus, in his
-Orphica, fire and water and earth;
-
+Orphica, fire and water and earth;
+
the School of Empedocles as well as the Stoics, fire, air, water and
earth—for why should one even mention that
mysterious ‟indeterminate matter” which some of
-them talk about,For this ‟formless” or ‟unqualified” primary matter of the Stoics cf. Adv. Phys. i. 11, ii. 312. when not even they themselves
+them talk about,For this ‟formless” or ‟unqualified” primary matter of the Stoics cf. Adv. Phys. i. 11, ii. 312. when not even they themselves
are positive that they apprehend it? Aristotle
the Peripatetic fire, air,
-water, earth, and the ‟revolving body;”i.e. the quinta essentia, aether (αἰθήρ fr. ἀεὶ θεῖν, ‟ever-speeding,” Plato, Cratyl. 410 b, Aristot. De Caelo i. 3).
-
+water, earth, and the ‟revolving body;”i.e. the quinta essentia, aether (αἰθήρ fr. ἀεὶ θεῖν, ‟ever-speeding,” Plato, Cratyl. 410 b, Aristot. De Caelo i. 3).
+
Democritus and Epicurus, atoms; Anaxagoras of Clazomenae,
-homoeomeriesi.e. ‟things with like parts,” or ‟homogeneous substances,” is Aristotle’s name for Anaxagoras’s ‟seeds of things,” or material ‟elements”; cf. Introd. p. xi.; Diodorus, surnamed Cronos, minimal
+homoeomeriesi.e. ‟things with like parts,” or ‟homogeneous substances,” is Aristotle’s name for Anaxagoras’s ‟seeds of things,” or material ‟elements”; cf. Introd. p. xi.; Diodorus, surnamed Cronos, minimal
and non-composite bodies; Heracleides Ponticus and
-Asclepiades the Bithynian,Asclepiades (first century b.c.), a physician at Rome, held a theory of non-sensible, frangible ‟molecules” (ὄγκοι) of matter always in motion; by collision with one another these ‟molecules” break in pieces, and when re-united become objects of sense. homogeneous masses;
+Asclepiades the Bithynian,Asclepiades (first century b.c.), a physician at Rome, held a theory of non-sensible, frangible ‟molecules” (ὄγκοι) of matter always in motion; by collision with one another these ‟molecules” break in pieces, and when re-united become objects of sense. homogeneous masses;
the School of Pythagoras, the numbers; the Mathematicians,
the limits of bodies; Strato the Physicist,
the qualities.
@@ -6358,25 +6320,25 @@ Asclepiades, who says that the elements can be
broken up and possess qualities, and to Democritus,
who asserts that they are indivisible and
void of quality, and to Anaxagoras, who leaves
-every sensible quality attached to the homoeomeries.
-
+every sensible quality attached to the homoeomeries.
+
Yet if we shall prefer any one standpoint, or view,
to the rest, we shall be preferring it either
-absolutely and without proof or with proof.For this form of argument cf. ii. 183.
+absolutely and without proof or with proof.For this form of argument cf. ii. 183.
Now without proof we shall not yield assent; and if it is to
be with proof, the proof must be true. But a true
proof can only be given when approved by a true
criterion, and a criterion is shown to be true by
-means of an approved proof.
-
+means of an approved proof.
+
If, then, in order to show the truth of the proof which prefers any
one view, its criterion must be proved, and to prove
the criterion in turn its proof must be pre-established,
the argument is found to be the circular one
which will not allow the reasoning to go forward,
since the proof keeps always requiring a proved
-criterion, and the criterion an approved proof.
-
+criterion, and the criterion an approved proof.
+
And should any one propose to approve the criterion by a
criterion and to prove the proof by a proof, he will
be driven to a regress ad infinitum. Accordingly, if
@@ -6396,7 +6358,7 @@ because of the character of our present treatise—
from discussing each opinion in detail, but will make
answer to them all implicitly. For since the elements,
whatever view one takes of them, must be finally
-regarded either as corporeal or incorporeal,A favourite classification of the Stoics, cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 218. we think
+regarded either as corporeal or incorporeal,A favourite classification of the Stoics, cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 218. we think
it enough to show that corporeal things are inapprehensible
and incorporeal things inapprehensible; for
thus it will be clear that the elements also are
@@ -6407,24 +6369,24 @@ inapprehensible.
Chapter VII.—Are Bodies Apprehensible?
Some say that Body is that which is capable of
-being active or passive.This definition is ascribed to Pythagoras in Adv. Phys. i. 366. But so far as this conception
+being active or passive.This definition is ascribed to Pythagoras in Adv. Phys. i. 366. But so far as this conception
goes it is inapprehensible. For, as we have
shown, Cause is inapprehensible; and if we cannot
say whether any Cause exists, neither can we say
whether anything passive exists; for what is passive
is certainly made passive by a Cause. And when both
the Cause and the passive object are inapprehensible,
-the result will be that Body also is inapprehensible.
-
+the result will be that Body also is inapprehensible.
+
But some define Body as what has three dimensions
-combined with resistance or solidity.Cf. ii. 30, Adv. Phys. i. 367, ii. 12. For they
+combined with resistance or solidity.Cf. ii. 30, Adv. Phys. i. 367, ii. 12. For they
describe the point as that which has no parts, the line
as length without breadth, the surface as length with
breadth; and when this takes on both depth and
resistance there is formed Body—the object of our
present discussion—it being composed of length and
-breadth and depth and resistance.
-
+breadth and depth and resistance.
+
The answer, however, to these people is simple. For they will
say either that Body is nothing more than these
qualities, or that it is something else than the
@@ -6436,9 +6398,9 @@ unreal will likewise abolish the Body; for wholes are
abolished along with the sum of their parts.
Now it is possible to disprove these dimensions in a
variety of ways; but for the present it will be enough
-to say that if the LimitsIn geometry ‟Limits” (or ‟boundaries”) was used to denote the lines or surfaces by which any magnitude is ‟bounded.” exist, they are either lines
-or surfaces or bodies.
-
+to say that if the LimitsIn geometry ‟Limits” (or ‟boundaries”) was used to denote the lines or surfaces by which any magnitude is ‟bounded.” exist, they are either lines
+or surfaces or bodies.
+
If, then, one should affirm the
existence of a surface or a line, then it will be affirmed
that each of the afore-mentioned objects either can
@@ -6451,21 +6413,20 @@ has no independent existence, it will thereby be
granted, in the first place, that the Bodies are not
generated from them (for if so, I suppose, these
objects ought to have had independent existence first,
-and then have combined to form the Bodies);
-
-and further, they have no real existence even in the so-
-called Bodies.
+and then have combined to form the Bodies);
+
+and further, they have no real existence even in the so-called Bodies.
This can be shown by several arguments, but for
the present it will suffice to mention the difficulties
-which arise from touch.For arguments based on ‟touch,” or contact, cf. Adv. Phys. i. 258 ff., Adv. Geom. 34 ff. For if juxtaposed
+which arise from touch.For arguments based on ‟touch,” or contact, cf. Adv. Phys. i. 258 ff., Adv. Geom. 34 ff. For if juxtaposed
Bodies touch one another they are in contact
with their Limits—for example, with their surfaces.
The surfaces, then, will not be completely unified one
with another as a result of touching, since otherwise
touch would be fusion and the separation of things
touching a rending apart; and this is not what we
-find.
-
+
And if the surface touches the surface of the
juxtaposed Body with some of its parts, and with
other parts is united with the Body of which it is a
@@ -6503,7 +6464,7 @@ aforesaid are not bodies. But if they are neither
bodies nor lines nor surfaces, they will be held to have
no existence.
-SolidityOr ‟resistance,” § 39; for this quality, as treated by Epicurus, cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 222. also is inapprehensible. For if it is
+SolidityOr ‟resistance,” § 39; for this quality, as treated by Epicurus, cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 222. also is inapprehensible. For if it is
apprehended, it must be apprehended by touch. If,
then, we shall prove that touch is inapprehensible, it
will be clear that it is impossible for solidity to be
@@ -6515,8 +6476,8 @@ for then they will be unified instead of being in
contact with one another. Nor yet through parts
touching parts; for their parts, though in relation to
the wholes they are parts, are wholes in relation
-to their parts.
-
+
So these wholes, which are parts of
other things, will not touch as wholes touching wholes,
for the reasons aforesaid, nor yet through parts
@@ -6530,14 +6491,14 @@ and, therefore, Body; for if this is nothing more than
the three dimensions plus Solidity, and we have
proved that each of these is inapprehensible, Body
also will be inapprehensible.
-
Thus, then, if we are to judge by the conceptionCf.§ 38 of
-Body, it is inapprehensible whether any body exists;
-
+
Thus, then, if we are to judge by the conceptionCf.§ 38 of
+Body, it is inapprehensible whether any body exists;
+
and about this problem there is this also to be said.
Of existing things some, they say, are sensible, others
intelligible, and the latter are apprehended by the
reason, the former by the senses, and the senses are
-‟simply-passive,”This means that each sense is specialized, so that it is capable of receiving only one kind of impression (e.g. the sight is affected by colour, but not by sound or solidity); cf. § 108. while the reason proceeds from
+‟simply-passive,”This means that each sense is specialized, so that it is capable of receiving only one kind of impression (e.g. the sight is affected by colour, but not by sound or solidity); cf. § 108. while the reason proceeds from
the apprehension of sensibles to the apprehension
of intelligibles. If then any body exists, it is either
sensible or intelligible. Now it is not sensible; for it
@@ -6545,22 +6506,21 @@ is supposed to be apprehended as a conglomeration of
length and depth and breadth and solidity and colour
and various other things, along with which it is
experienced; whereas, according to their statements,
-the senses are ‟simply-passive.”
-
-And if Body is said
-to be intelligible, there must certainly be pre-existent
+the senses are ‟simply-passive.”
+
+And if Body is said to be intelligible, there must certainly be pre-existent
in the nature of things some sensible object from
which to derive the notion of bodies, they being
intelligible. But nothing exists save Body and the
Incorporeal, and of these the Incorporeal is essentially
-intelligible,i.e. in the view of the Stoics, but not of the Sceptics, for the inapprehensibility of the ‟Incorporeal” is proved in § 50 ad fin. and Body, as we have shown, is not
+intelligible,i.e. in the view of the Stoics, but not of the Sceptics, for the inapprehensibility of the ‟Incorporeal” is proved in § 50 ad fin. and Body, as we have shown, is not
sensible. Since, then, no sensible object exists in the
nature of things from which we can derive the notion
of Body, Body will not be intelligible either. And if
it is neither sensible nor intelligible, and besides these
nothing else exists, we must declare that, so far as this
-argument goes, Body has no existence.
-
+argument goes, Body has no existence.
+
Accordingly we, by thus opposing the arguments against Body to
the apparent existence of Body, infer suspension of
judgement concerning Body.
@@ -6573,8 +6533,8 @@ we must first have apprehended the state of which
the privation is said to be a privation; for if one had
no conception of sight one would not be able to assert
that this man does not possess sight, which is the
-meaning of being blind.
-
+
If then Incorporeality is the privation of Body, and when states are not apprehended
it is impossible for the privations of them to
be apprehended, and it has been proved that Body
@@ -6584,10 +6544,10 @@ intelligible. And if it is sensible, it is inapprehensible
because of the variance amongst animals and men,
the senses and the circumstances, and owing to the
admixtures and all the other things we have previously
-described in our exposition of the Ten Tropes.Cf. i. 36 ff. If,
+described in our exposition of the Ten Tropes.Cf. i. 36 ff. If,
again, it is intelligible, since the apprehension of
sensibles, which is supposed to form the starting-point
-from which we attain to the intelligibles,Cf. ii. 10. is not
+from which we attain to the intelligibles,Cf. ii. 10. is not
immediately given, neither will the apprehension of
the intelligibles be given immediately, nor,
consequently, that of Incorporeality.
@@ -6600,17 +6560,17 @@ the sensibles by way of ‟impression” and ‟indentation,”
—take sight, for instance, whether it occur by
reason of the tension of a cone, or of the emissions and
immissions of images, or by effusions of rays or
-colours;The first of these theories of vision is that of Chrysippus (a cone of light connecting eye with object), the second that of Democritus and Epicurus, the third that of Empedocles, Pythagoreans, Plato (Tim. 45 b) and Aristotle. and hearing too, whether it be the smitten
-airCf. Plato, Tim. 67 b; Diog. Laert. vii. 158; ‟acoustic breath” is Stoic for the air within the ear. cf. ii. 70. or the parts of the sound that are carried round
+colours;The first of these theories of vision is that of Chrysippus (a cone of light connecting eye with object), the second that of Democritus and Epicurus, the third that of Empedocles, Pythagoreans, Plato (Tim. 45 b) and Aristotle. and hearing too, whether it be the smitten
+airCf. Plato, Tim. 67 b; Diog. Laert. vii. 158; ‟acoustic breath” is Stoic for the air within the ear. cf. ii. 70. or the parts of the sound that are carried round
the ears and smite the acoustic breath so as to effect
the perception of sound. Smells also impinge on the
nose and flavours on the tongue, and likewise objects
-of touch on the sense of touch.
-
+of touch on the sense of touch.
+
But incorporeals are incapable of submitting to impression
of this kind, so that they could not be apprehended by sense.
Nor yet by means of reason. For if the reason
-is ‟verbally expressible”For the Stoic theory of ‟expression” (λεκτόν) cf. ii. 81,104. Logos (‟reason” or ‟word”) is from the same stem as Lekton (‟what can be put into words” or ‟meaning”), which—as contrasted with ‟uttered words”—was termed by the Stoics ‟incorporeal.” and incorporeal, as the
+is ‟verbally expressible”For the Stoic theory of ‟expression” (λεκτόν) cf. ii. 81,104. Logos (‟reason” or ‟word”) is from the same stem as Lekton (‟what can be put into words” or ‟meaning”), which—as contrasted with ‟uttered words”—was termed by the Stoics ‟incorporeal.” and incorporeal, as the
Stoics assert, he who says that incorporeals are
apprehended by means of reason is begging the
question, For when our question is—‟Can an
@@ -6618,10 +6578,9 @@ incorporeal object be apprehended?” he assumes an
incorporeal object and then, by means of it alone,
claims to effect the apprehension of incorporeals. Yet
reason itself, if it is incorporeal, belongs to the class
-of things which are in question.
-
-How, then, is one to
-prove that this particular incorporeal (I mean reason)
+of things which are in question.
+
+How, then, is one to prove that this particular incorporeal (I mean reason)
is previously apprehended? For if it is by means of
another incorporeal, we shall ask for the proof of its
apprehension also, and so on ad infinitum; whereas, if
@@ -6640,23 +6599,23 @@ apprehended.
But if reason is a body, inasmuch as about bodies
also there is much controversy as to whether or not
they are apprehended, owing to what is called their
-‟continual flux,”The Heracleitean doctrine, cf. i. 217 ff.; §§ 82, 115 infra. which gives rise to the view that
+‟continual flux,”The Heracleitean doctrine, cf. i. 217 ff.; §§ 82, 115 infra. which gives rise to the view that
they do not admit of the title ‟this” and are non-
-existent—just as PlatoCf. ii. 28. speaks of bodies as ‟becoming
+existent—just as PlatoCf. ii. 28. speaks of bodies as ‟becoming
but never being,”—I am perplexed as to how
this controversy about Body is to be settled, as I see
that it cannot be settled, because of the difficulties
stated a moment ago, either by a body or by an
incorporeal. Neither, then, is it possible to
-apprehend the incorporeals by reason.
-
+apprehend the incorporeals by reason.
+
And if they are neither objects of sense nor apprehended
by means of reason, they will not be apprehended at all.
If, then, it is impossible to be positive either
about the existence of Body or about the
Incorporeals, we must also suspend judgement
concerning the Elements, and possibly about the things
-which lie behind the ElementsFor the four (or five) ‟elements” cf. §§ 30, 31; for ‟the things behind” them (from the point of view of cognition), i.e. primary bodies or stuff, cf. § 32. as well, seeing that
+which lie behind the ElementsFor the four (or five) ‟elements” cf. §§ 30, 31; for ‟the things behind” them (from the point of view of cognition), i.e. primary bodies or stuff, cf. § 32. as well, seeing that
of these some are bodies, others incorporeals, and
both of these are matters of doubt. In fact, when
both the active and the material Principles, for these
@@ -6669,14 +6628,14 @@ of Principles is open to doubt.
But, to pass over these problems, how do they
explain the production of the compounds from the
-primary elements,i.e. the primary bodies out of which, as ‟elements,” the (four) so-called ‟elements” (earth, air, fire, water) were said by the Stoics to be compounded. when neither contact and touch
-nor mixture or blendingFor ‟touch” cf. i. 50, 96, iii. 45–46. ‟Mixture” (of solids as well as fluids) is a wider term than ‟blending.” has any existence at all?
+primary elements,i.e. the primary bodies out of which, as ‟elements,” the (four) so-called ‟elements” (earth, air, fire, water) were said by the Stoics to be compounded. when neither contact and touch
+nor mixture or blendingFor ‟touch” cf. i. 50, 96, iii. 45–46. ‟Mixture” (of solids as well as fluids) is a wider term than ‟blending.” has any existence at all?
For that touch is nothing I showed a moment ago,
when I was discussing the subsistence of Body; and
that the method of Mixture is equally impossible on
their own showing, I shall briefly demonstrate. For
there is much argument about Mixture, and the rival
-views held by the DogmatistsEspecially Aristotle (De gen. et corr. i. 10) and the Stoics. The following argument is against the latter. As Aristotle says. ‟mixture” effects some change, but not a total change, in the things mixed, which must be such as are capable of mutually affecting one another, and capable also of being easily decomposed into their constituent particles: he defines ‟mixture” as ‟the union of mixables which have undergone alteration.” on the problem propounded
+views held by the DogmatistsEspecially Aristotle (De gen. et corr. i. 10) and the Stoics. The following argument is against the latter. As Aristotle says. ‟mixture” effects some change, but not a total change, in the things mixed, which must be such as are capable of mutually affecting one another, and capable also of being easily decomposed into their constituent particles: he defines ‟mixture” as ‟the union of mixables which have undergone alteration.” on the problem propounded
are well-nigh endless; and hence we might
straightway infer, along with the indeterminable
controversy, the inapprehensibility of the problem. And
@@ -6687,7 +6646,7 @@ will amply suffice for the present.
They declare that mixed things are composed of
substance and qualities. If so, one must declare
-either that their substances are blendedHere ‟blend” is used merely as a synonym for ‟mix.” but not
+either that their substances are blendedHere ‟blend” is used merely as a synonym for ‟mix.” but not
their qualities, or their qualities blended but not their
substances any longer, or neither blended with the
other, or both unified with each other. But if neither
@@ -6695,10 +6654,9 @@ the qualities nor the substances are blended with one
another, Mixture will be inconceivable; for how will
a single sensation result from the things mixed if the
things mixed are blended with one another in none
-of the ways stated above?
-
-And if it should be said
-that the qualities are simply juxtaposed and the
+of the ways stated above?
+
+And if it should be said that the qualities are simply juxtaposed and the
substances blended, even so the statement would be
absurd; for we do not perceive the qualities in the
mixtures as separate objects but as a single sense-
@@ -6714,15 +6672,15 @@ quality.
It only remains to say that both the qualities and
the substances of the mixed things permeate one
-anotherChrysippus held that ‟mixture” is not effected by superficial ‟juxtaposition” but by the mutual ‟permeation” or ‟interpenetration” of the constituents of the mixture: ‟qualities” as well as substances he regarded as corporeal and thus capable of being ‟penetrated.” and by their blending produce Mixture.
+anotherChrysippus held that ‟mixture” is not effected by superficial ‟juxtaposition” but by the mutual ‟permeation” or ‟interpenetration” of the constituents of the mixture: ‟qualities” as well as substances he regarded as corporeal and thus capable of being ‟penetrated.” and by their blending produce Mixture.
But this is a more absurd view than any of the
foregoing; for such a mixture is impossible. Thus, for
example, if a cup of hemlock juice were blended with
ten cups of water, it will be said that the hemlock is
mixed in with all the water; for certainly if one were
to take even the least portion of the mixture he would
-find it full of the potency of the hemlock.
-
+find it full of the potency of the hemlock.
+
Yet if the hemlock is blended in with every particle of the water
and is distributed as a whole over the whole volume
of the water and through the mutual interpenetration
@@ -6739,8 +6697,8 @@ then—according to the theory assumed—the quantity
is bound to be forty cups or, again, only two, since it
is admissible to conceive either the one cup as all
the twenty over which it is distributed, or the twenty
-cups as the one with which they are equalized.
-
+cups as the one with which they are equalized.
+
And by thus pouring in a cup at a time and pursuing the
same argument it is possible to infer that the twenty
cups seen in the blend must be twenty thousand and
@@ -6784,7 +6742,7 @@ Doctrine” in vain.
Now those who are reputed to have given the most
complete classification of Motion assert that six kinds
of it exist—local transition, physical change, increase,
-decrease, becoming, perishing.Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 37 ff.; Aristot. Phys. vii. 2, Categ. 15 a 13; Plato, Laws, x. 894. We, then, shall deal
+decrease, becoming, perishing.Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 37 ff.; Aristot. Phys. vii. 2, Categ. 15 a 13; Plato, Laws, x. 894. We, then, shall deal
with each of the aforesaid kinds of motion separately
beginning with local transition. According, then, to
the Dogmatists, this is the motion by which the moving
@@ -6795,9 +6753,9 @@ axis, for while as a whole it remains in the same place,
its parts change their places.
The main views held about motion are, I imagine,
-three. It is assumed by ordinary peopleLit. ‟by life,” cf. i. 165, ii. 244. and by
+three. It is assumed by ordinary peopleLit. ‟by life,” cf. i. 165, ii. 244. and by
some philosophers that motion exists, but by
-Parmenides, Melissus and certain othersSuch as Zeno and Diodorus Cronos, cf. ii. 242. that it does
+Parmenides, Melissus and certain othersSuch as Zeno and Diodorus Cronos, cf. ii. 242. that it does
not exist; while the Sceptics have declared that it is
‟no more” existent than non-existent; for so far as
the evidence of phenomena goes it seems that motion
@@ -6806,13 +6764,13 @@ it would seem not to exist. So when we have
exposed the contradiction which lies between those
who believe in the existence of motion and those who
maintain that motion is naught, if we shall find the
-counter-arguments of equal weight,Cf. i. 26 for ‟equipollence” as leading to Sceptic ‟suspension.” we shall be
+counter-arguments of equal weight,Cf. i. 26 for ‟equipollence” as leading to Sceptic ‟suspension.” we shall be
compelled to declare that, so far as these arguments
-go, motion is ‟no more” existent than non-existent.
-
+go, motion is ‟no more” existent than non-existent.
+
We shall begin with those who affirm its real
existence.
-
These base their view mainly on ‟evidence.”i.e. what is plainly obvious, cf. § 266. If,
+
These base their view mainly on ‟evidence.”i.e. what is plainly obvious, cf. § 266. If,
say they, motion does not exist, how does the sun
move from east to west, and how does it produce the
seasons of the year, which are brought about by its
@@ -6822,13 +6780,13 @@ in other harbours very far distant from the first?, And
in what fashion does the denier of motion proceed
from his house and return to it again? These facts
are perfectly incontestable. Consequently, when one
-of the CynicsCf. ii. 244. had an argument against motion put
+of the CynicsCf. ii. 244. had an argument against motion put
to him, he made no reply but stood up and began
to walk, thus demonstrating by his action and by
‟evidence” that motion is capable of real existence.
So these men attempt in this way to put to shame
-those who hold the contrary opinion;
-
+those who hold the contrary opinion;
+
but those who deny the existence of motion allege such arguments
as these: If a thing is moved, it is moved either
by itself or by another thing. But if it is moved by
@@ -6838,8 +6796,8 @@ causelessly; but if it is moved owing to some cause,
the cause owing to which it moves will be what
makes it move, and thus we are involved in an
infinite regress, according to the criticism stated a
-little while ago.
-
+
Moreover, if the movent thing
is active, and what is active is moved, that movent
thing will need another movent thing, and the
@@ -6850,8 +6808,8 @@ by another. Nor yet by itself. Since every movent
causes motion either by pushing forward or by drawing
after or by pushing up or by thrusting down, what
is self-movent must move itself in one of the aforesaid
-ways.
-
+
But if it moves itself propulsively, it will be
behind itself; and if by pulling after, it will be in
front of itself; and if by pushing up, it will be below
@@ -6864,9 +6822,9 @@ then nothing is moved at all.
And if anyone should seek refuge in the notions
of ‟impulse” and ‟purpose” we must remind him of
-the controversy about ‟what is in our power,”An Aristotelian phrase: freedom of choice was denied by fatalists, such as Democritus and the Stoics. and
+the controversy about ‟what is in our power,”An Aristotelian phrase: freedom of choice was denied by fatalists, such as Democritus and the Stoics. and
how it is still unsettled, since hitherto we have failed
-to find a criterion of truth.Cf. ii. 18 ff.
+to find a criterion of truth.Cf. ii. 18 ff.
Further, there is this also to be said. If a thing
moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in
@@ -6875,7 +6833,7 @@ place where it is, for if it is in it, it remains in it;
nor yet does it move in the place where it is not;
for where a thing is not, there it can neither effect
nor suffer anything. Therefore nothing moves. This
-argument is, in fact, that of Diodorus Cronos,Cf. ii. 245. but it
+argument is, in fact, that of Diodorus Cronos,Cf. ii. 245. but it
has been the subject of many attacks, of which we
shall describe, owing to the character of our treatise,
only the more formidable, together with a judgement
@@ -6884,13 +6842,13 @@ of their value, as it seems to us.
Some, then, assert that a thing can move in
the place where it is; at any rate the globes which
revolve round their axes move while remaining in the
-same place.Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 93, 103. Against these men we should transfer
+same place.Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 93, 103. Against these men we should transfer
the argument which applies to each of the parts of the
globe, and, reminding them that, to judge by this
argument, it does not move even in respect of its
parts, draw the conclusion that nothing moves in the
-place where it is.
-
+
And we shall take the same course
in replying to those who declare that the moving
thing occupies two places, that wherein it is and that
@@ -6900,16 +6858,15 @@ the other place—whether while it is in the first place
or while it is in the second. But when it is in the first
place it does not pass over into the second, for it is
still in the first; and when it is not in this, it is not
-passing from it.
-
-And besides, the question is being
-begged; for where it is not, there it cannot be active.
-For surely no one will allow that any object to which
-he does not grant motion at all can shift to any place.
+passing from it.
+
+And besides, the question is being begged; for where it is not,
+there it cannot be active.For surely no one will allow that
+any object to which he does not grant motion at all can shift to any place.
Some, however, make this statement: Place is
used in two senses, the broad sense, as for example
-‟my house,” and the exact sense,Cf. §§ 119, 131. ‟Place” in the ‟exact” or narrow sense means the precise portion of space occupied by an object, as distinguished from ‟place” in the ‟broad” or ‟extended” sense in which it includes surrounding portions of space. The latter sense of ‟place” was adopted in order to make ‟motion in place” feasible; but Sextus argues that it fails to do so. as for instance
+‟my house,” and the exact sense,Cf. §§ 119, 131. ‟Place” in the ‟exact” or narrow sense means the precise portion of space occupied by an object, as distinguished from ‟place” in the ‟broad” or ‟extended” sense in which it includes surrounding portions of space. The latter sense of ‟place” was adopted in order to make ‟motion in place” feasible; but Sextus argues that it fails to do so. as for instance
‟the air which enfolds the surface of my body.” So
the moving object is said to move in place, ‟place”
being used not in the exact sense but in the
@@ -6927,7 +6884,7 @@ this is composed of the place wherein it is in the exact
sense and the place wherein it is not, and it has been
proved that a thing cannot move in either of these.
-We should also propound the following argument.The following sections, 76–80, criticize two kinds of motion, (1) successive motion, by which the moving body occupies the first part of the intervening space first with its own first part, next with its second part, and so on till all its parts have passed through all the parts of the ‟interval.” (Here it is assumed that both the moving body and the spatial distance, or ‟interval,” are divisible; but, argues Sextus, whether they are infinitely divisible or divisible only into a limited number of indivisible parts, in either case motion is found to be impossible.) (2) Momentaneous motion (§§ 78–79), by which the moving body passes into the whole of the interval in a single moment of time.
+We should also propound the following argument.The following sections, 76–80, criticize two kinds of motion, (1) successive motion, by which the moving body occupies the first part of the intervening space first with its own first part, next with its second part, and so on till all its parts have passed through all the parts of the ‟interval.” (Here it is assumed that both the moving body and the spatial distance, or ‟interval,” are divisible; but, argues Sextus, whether they are infinitely divisible or divisible only into a limited number of indivisible parts, in either case motion is found to be impossible.) (2) Momentaneous motion (§§ 78–79), by which the moving body passes into the whole of the interval in a single moment of time.
If a thing moves it moves either by way of orderly,
or gradual, progression or by occupying the divisible
interval all at once; but in neither of these ways can
@@ -6939,20 +6896,18 @@ the places and the times in which the bodies are said
to move, are divided to infinity, motion will not occur,
it being impossible to discover amongst the infinite
any first thing wherefrom the object said to move will
-derive its initial movement.
-
-And if the aforesaid
-objects are reducible to atomic parts, and each of the
+derive its initial movement.
+
+And if the aforesaid objects are reducible to atomic parts, and each of the
moving things passes equally in an atomic period of
time with its own first atom into the first atomic point
of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity
-—the speediest horse, for instance, and the tortoise;
Cf, the Eleatic puzzle of ‟Achilles” (and the tortoise); cf. Aristot. Phys. vi. 9.
+—the speediest horse, for instance, and the tortoise;
Cf, the Eleatic puzzle of ‟Achilles” (and the tortoise); cf. Aristot. Phys. vi. 9.
which is a result even more absurd than the former.
Therefore motion does not take place by way of
orderly progression.
-
Nor yet by way of immediate occupation of the
-divisible interval.
-
+
Nor yet by way of immediate occupation of the divisible interval.
+
For if one ought, as they declare,
to take the apparent as evidence for the non-apparent,
since, in order to complete the distance of a stade
@@ -6968,8 +6923,8 @@ has its motion should be cold, another hot, or, mayhap,
one black, another white, so as to be able also to
colour things in contact,—then the moving thing will
be at once hot and cold and black and white, which is
-absurd.
-
+
Next let them tell us how much space the
moving thing passes through all at once. For if they
shall assert that it is limitless, they will be granting
@@ -6981,15 +6936,14 @@ interval beyond which the thing moving all at once
will be unable to advance so much as a hair’s-breadth
is probably not merely presumptuous and rash or even
ridiculous, but plunges us again into the original
-difficulty;Cf. § 77. This is further explained in Adv. Phys. i. 154: ‟If all is indivisible (time, bodies, and space), all moving bodies will be of equal velocity (e.g. the sun and the tortoise), since an indivisible interval is completed by all alike in an indivisible moment of time.” In this § 79 the difficulties as regards the quantity of space passed through by the moving body on the momentaneous theory are exposed: it must be conceived either as (1) unlimited or (2) precisely limited, or (3) small, but not precisely limited; but all these views lead to absurdities. for all things will be of equal velocity,
+difficulty;Cf. § 77. This is further explained in Adv. Phys. i. 154: ‟If all is indivisible (time, bodies, and space), all moving bodies will be of equal velocity (e.g. the sun and the tortoise), since an indivisible interval is completed by all alike in an indivisible moment of time.” In this § 79 the difficulties as regards the quantity of space passed through by the moving body on the momentaneous theory are exposed: it must be conceived either as (1) unlimited or (2) precisely limited, or (3) small, but not precisely limited; but all these views lead to absurdities. for all things will be of equal velocity,
if each of them alike has its transitional movements
-over definite intervals of space.
-
-And if, on the other go
-hand, they shall assert that the moving thing moves
+over definite intervals of space.
+
+And if, on the other go hand, they shall assert that the moving thing moves
all at once through a space that is small but not
precisely determined, it will be open to us to adopt
-the sorites argumentCf. ii. 253. and keep constantly adding a
+the sorites argumentCf. ii. 253. and keep constantly adding a
hair’s-breadth of space to the breadth assumed. And
if, then, they shall make a halt anywhere while we
are pursuing this argument, they will be reverting to
@@ -6998,11 +6952,11 @@ while if they shall assent to the process of addition,
we shall force them to grant that a thing can move
all at once through the whole of the earth.
Consequently, objects said to be in motion do not move
-by occupying a divisible interval all at once.
-
+by occupying a divisible interval all at once.
+
But if a thing moves neither thus instantaneously nor by
-way of gradual progression, it does not move at all.
-These, and yet more than these, are the arguments
+way of gradual progression, it does not move at all.
+
These, and yet more than these, are the arguments
used by those who reject transient motion. But we,
being unable to refute either these arguments or the
apparent facts on which the view of the reality of
@@ -7017,17 +6971,17 @@ or non-existence of motion.
Employing the same reasoning we suspend judgement
also concerning both increase and decrease.
-For the outward evidenceCf. § 66. seems to support their
+For the outward evidenceCf. § 66. seems to support their
reality, which the arguments seem to refute. For
just consider: That which increases must grow in
size as a stable substance, so that it will be false
for anyone to say that one thing increases when an
-addition is made to another. Since then substancei.e. material substance, which Heracleitus and Plato said was ‟in flux,” cf. i. 217 ff., ii. 28. is
+addition is made to another. Since then substancei.e. material substance, which Heracleitus and Plato said was ‟in flux,” cf. i. 217 ff., ii. 28. is
never stable but always in flux, one part supplanting
another, the thing said to have increased does not
retain its former substance together with the added
-substance but has its substance all different.
-
+substance but has its substance all different.
+
Just as if, for example, when there is a beam three cubits
long a man should bring another of ten cubits and
declare that the beam of three cubits had increased, he
@@ -7038,7 +6992,7 @@ fresh matter enters in its place, if what is said to be
added is added, one should not call such a condition
increase but complete alteration.
-The same argument applies also to decrease.Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 277 ff. For
+The same argument applies also to decrease.Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 277 ff. For
how could that which has no stable existence be said
to have decreased? Besides, if decrease takes place
by way of subtraction, and increase by addition, and
@@ -7049,7 +7003,7 @@ neither decrease nor increase is anything.
Chapter XII.—Concerning Subtraction And Addition
-That subtractionCf. Adv. Phys. i. 297 ff. is nothing they argue thus: If
+That subtractionCf. Adv. Phys. i. 297 ff. is nothing they argue thus: If
anything is subtracted from anything, either equal
is subtracted from equal, or greater from less, or
less from greater. But in none of these ways does
@@ -7058,8 +7012,8 @@ subtraction is impossible.
That subtraction takes place in none of these ways
is plain from what follows: What is subtracted from
anything ought, before its subtraction, to be included
-in that from which it is subtracted.
-
+in that from which it is subtracted.
+
But the equal is not included in the equal—six, for instance,
in six; for what includes must be greater than what
is included, and that from which the subtraction is
@@ -7068,8 +7022,8 @@ may be some remainder after the subtraction; for
it is this which is held to distinguish subtraction
from complete removal. Nor is the greater included
in the less—six, for instance, in five; for that is
-irrational.
-
+
And for this reason, neither is the less
included in the greater. For if five is included in six,
as less in greater, four will be included in five, three
@@ -7079,11 +7033,11 @@ when put together form the number fifteen, and
this we conclude is included in six, if it be granted
that the less is included in the greater. So likewise
in the fifteen which is included in the six there is
-included the number thirty-five,The addition of the numbers 1 . . . 5 gives 15; of 1 . . . 4, 10; of 1 . . . 3, 6; of 1 and 2, 3; so we get the total 35 = 15+10+6+3+1; cf. Adu. Phys. i. 304 ff. But perhaps we should read 105 for 35 (ἑκατόν for τριάκοντα), as 1 . . . 14 = 105. and so on, step by
+included the number thirty-five,The addition of the numbers 1 . . . 5 gives 15; of 1 . . . 4, 10; of 1 . . . 3, 6; of 1 and 2, 3; so we get the total 35 = 15+10+6+3+1; cf. Adu. Phys. i. 304 ff. But perhaps we should read 105 for 35 (ἑκατόν for τριάκοντα), as 1 . . . 14 = 105. and so on, step by
step, to infinity. But it is absurd to say that infinite
numbers are included in the number six; and so it is
-also absurd to say that less is included in greater.
-
+also absurd to say that less is included in greater.
+
If, then, what is subtracted from a thing must be
included in that from which it is to be subtracted,
and neither equal is included in equal, nor greater
@@ -7092,8 +7046,8 @@ from anything.
Again, if anything is subtracted from anything, it
is either a whole subtracted from a whole, or a part
from a part, or a whole from a part, or a part from
-a whole.
-
+
But to say that a whole is subtracted
from either a whole or a part is plainly nonsense. It
remains, then, to say that a part is subtracted either
@@ -7103,7 +7057,7 @@ the sake of clearness—let us take ten and suppose
that from it one is subtracted. This one, then, cannot
be subtracted either from the whole ten or from the
remaining part of the ten, as I shall show; therefore
-it is not subtracted at all.In what follows it is argued (§§ 90, 91) that 1 cannot be subtracted from a ‟whole 10,” 10 being ten ones, so that the subtracted 1 must be subtracted from each of those ones, including itself, and thus 10–1 = 0. Further, as the number 1 (the ‟monad”) is indivisible, it does not admit of subtraction: and the 1 to be subtracted must fall into 10 parts, and thus be itself a 10, if it is subtracted 10 separate times from the units of the 10.
+it is not subtracted at all.
In what follows it is argued (§§ 90, 91) that 1 cannot be subtracted from a ‟whole 10,” 10 being ten ones, so that the subtracted 1 must be subtracted from each of those ones, including itself, and thus 10–1 = 0. Further, as the number 1 (the ‟monad”) is indivisible, it does not admit of subtraction: and the 1 to be subtracted must fall into 10 parts, and thus be itself a 10, if it is subtracted 10 separate times from the units of the 10.
For if the one is subtracted from the whole ten,
since the ten is neither something other than the
@@ -7113,8 +7067,8 @@ of the ones in order to be subtracted from the whole
ten. Now from a one, above all, nothing can be
subtracted; for the ones are indivisible, and on this
account the one will not be subtracted from the ten
-in this way.
-
+
And even were we to grant that the
one is subtracted from each of the ones, the one will
contain ten parts, and as containing ten parts it will
@@ -7122,7 +7076,7 @@ beaten. And further, since ten other parts remain,
after the subtraction of the ten parts of the so-called
one, the ten will be twenty. But it is absurd to say
that the one is ten and the ten twenty, and to divide
-what, according to them, is indivisible.i.e. the Dogmatists, who assumed the indivisibility of the ‟one.” In the next sections (92–93) it is shown that ‟a part cannot be subtracted from a part,” i.e., in the case of the ‟Decad,” you cannot subtract 1 from 9: for 10–1 still leaves an ‟entire” 9; and if 9 = 9 x 1, and 1 is subtracted from each of the 9 ones, the subtracted 1 will be 1 x 9; and the same applies to subtraction of 1 from other ‟parts” of the ‟Decad” (8, 7, 6, etc.), of which the last is 1, which, as indivisible, does not admit of subtraction. Wherefore
+what, according to them, is indivisible.i.e. the Dogmatists, who assumed the indivisibility of the ‟one.” In the next sections (92–93) it is shown that ‟a part cannot be subtracted from a part,” i.e., in the case of the ‟Decad,” you cannot subtract 1 from 9: for 10–1 still leaves an ‟entire” 9; and if 9 = 9 x 1, and 1 is subtracted from each of the 9 ones, the subtracted 1 will be 1 x 9; and the same applies to subtraction of 1 from other ‟parts” of the ‟Decad” (8, 7, 6, etc.), of which the last is 1, which, as indivisible, does not admit of subtraction. Wherefore
it is absurd to say that the one is subtracted from the
whole ten.
@@ -7136,8 +7090,8 @@ whole nine, the sum subtracted will be nine, or if
from a part of it, then in case it be eight the same
absurd results will follow, while if the subtraction is
made from the last one, they will be affirming the
-divisibility of the one, which is absurd.
-
+divisibility of the one, which is absurd.
+
So then, neither from the nine is the one subtracted. But if
it is neither subtracted from the whole ten nor from
a part of it, no part can be subtracted from either a
@@ -7146,25 +7100,25 @@ as whole from whole or as part from whole, nor as
whole from part or as part from part, then nothing
is subtracted from anything.
-Moreover, addition is regarded by themi.e. the Sceptics. as one of
+Moreover, addition is regarded by themi.e. the Sceptics. as one of
the impossibles. For, they say, that which is added
is added either to itself or to what pre-exists or to
the compound of both; but none of these alternatives
is sound; therefore nothing is added to anything.
-Suppose, for instance, a measure of four cups,Cf. § 59. and
+Suppose, for instance, a measure of four cups,Cf. § 59. and
add to this a cup. To what, I ask, is it added? for
it cannot be added to itself, since what is added must
be other than that whereto it is added, but nothing
-is other than itself.
-
+
Neither is it added to the compound
of the four cups and the one cup; for how
could anything be added to what does not yet exist?
Besides, if the added cup is blended with the four
cups and the one cup, six cups will be the measure
resulting from the four cups and the one cup and
-the added cup.
-
+
And if the, cup is added to the four
cups alone, since that which is extended over
anything is equal to that over which it extends, the cup
@@ -7183,28 +7137,27 @@ anything.
Together with the existence of addition and subtraction
and local motion transposition also is
-abolished,Lit. ‟is cancelled,” cf. i. 13. for this is subtraction from a thing and
+abolished,Lit. ‟is cancelled,” cf. i. 13. for this is subtraction from a thing and
addition to a thing by way of transition.
Chapter XIV.—Concerning Whole And Part
-So too with both whole and part.Cf. ii. 215 ff., Adv. Phys. i. 330 ff. For the whole
+So too with both whole and part.Cf. ii. 215 ff., Adv. Phys. i. 330 ff. For the whole
is held to come about by the combination and addition
of the parts, and to cease from being a whole by the
subtraction of one or more parts. Besides, if a whole
-exists, it is either other than its partsThe view of Epicurus; the Stoics said that the whole is neither the same as its parts nor different. or its parts
-themselves form the whole.
-
-Now it is apparent that
-the whole is nothing other than its parts; for certainly
+exists, it is either other than its partsThe view of Epicurus; the Stoics said that the whole is neither the same as its parts nor different. or its parts
+themselves form the whole.
+
+Now it is apparent that the whole is nothing other than its parts; for certainly
when the parts are removed there is nothing left, so
as to enable us to account the whole as something else
besides its parts. But if the parts themselves form
the whole, the whole will be merely a name and an
-empty title,Cf. ii. 214, 227. and it will have no individual existence,
-just as separationCf Adv. Phys. i. 344 f., ii. 27. also is nothing apart from the
+empty title,Cf. ii. 214, 227. and it will have no individual existence,
+just as separationCf Adv. Phys. i. 344 f., ii. 27. also is nothing apart from the
things separated, or laying beams apart from the
beams laid. Therefore no whole exists.
@@ -7215,17 +7168,17 @@ is nothing else than its parts (and besides, the parts
will on this assumption be parts of themselves, since
each of the parts is said to be complementary to the
whole); nor yet of one another, since the part is said
-to be includedCf. §§ 86 ff. supra. The notion of ‟part” involves that of a ‟whole” which ‟includes” it, and of which it is ‟part.” in that whereof it is part, and it is
+to be includedCf. §§ 86 ff. supra. The notion of ‟part” involves that of a ‟whole” which ‟includes” it, and of which it is ‟part.” in that whereof it is part, and it is
absurd to assert that, say, the hand is included in
-the foot.
-
+
Neither will each be a part of itself; for,
because of the inclusion, it will be both greater and
less than itself. If, then, the so-called parts are parts
neither of the whole nor of themselves nor of one
another, they are parts of nothing. But if they are
parts of nothing, parts have no existence; for co-
-relatives are annulled together.
‟Part” and ‟whole” are ‟co-relative” notions, each implying the other, and relative things are ‟apprehended together,” the presence, or absence, of the one involving that of the other, cf. ii. 125, 175.
+relatives are annulled together.
‟Part” and ‟whole” are ‟co-relative” notions, each implying the other, and relative things are ‟apprehended together,” the presence, or absence, of the one involving that of the other, cf. ii. 125, 175.
Let thus much be said, then, of a general character,
by way of digression, seeing that once already we
have dealt with the subject of whole and part.
@@ -7236,28 +7189,25 @@ have dealt with the subject of whole and part.
Some, too, maintain that what is called ‟physical
change” is non-real, and the arguments they employ
-are such as these:With this section cf. §§ 38 ff., 49 and 64 where ‟physical change” is distinguished from ‟local transition” and other kinds of ‟motion.” If a thing changes, what changes
+are such as these:With this section cf. §§ 38 ff., 49 and 64 where ‟physical change” is distinguished from ‟local transition” and other kinds of ‟motion.” If a thing changes, what changes
is either corporeal or incorporeal; but each of these
is matter of dispute; therefore the theory of change
-will also be disputable.
-
-If a thing changes, it changes
-through certain actions of a CauseCf. §§ 17 ff. and by being
+will also be disputable.
+
+If a thing changes, it changes through certain actions of a CauseCf. §§ 17 ff. and by being
acted upon. But it does not change by being acted
upon, for the reality of Cause is refuted, and therewith
is refuted also the object which is acted upon, as
-it has no agent to act upon it.
-
-Therefore nothing
-changes at all. If a thing changes, either what is
-changes or what is not.With §§ 104–105 cf. 109 ff. Now what is not is unreal
+it has no agent to act upon it.
+
+Therefore nothing changes at all. If a thing changes, either what is
+changes or what is not.With §§ 104–105 cf. 109 ff. Now what is not is unreal
and can neither act nor be acted upon at all, so that
it does not admit of change either. And if what is
changes, it changes either in so far as it is in being or
-in so far as it is not in being.
-
-Now in so far as it is
-not in being it does not change, for it is not even
+in so far as it is not in being.
+
+Now in so far as it is not in being it does not change, for it is not even
existent; while if it changes in so far as it is existent,
it will be other than existent, which means that it
will be non-existent. But it is absurd to say that the
@@ -7267,17 +7217,16 @@ nor the non-existent changes, and besides these there
is nothing else, it only remains to say that nothing
changes.
-Some also argue thus:Cf. §§ 144 ff.; Aristot. Phys. vi. 6. That which changes must
+Some also argue thus:Cf. §§ 144 ff.; Aristot. Phys. vi. 6. That which changes must
change in a certain time; but nothing changes either
in the past or in the future, nor yet in the present, as
we shall prove; nothing therefore changes. Nothing
changes in the past or in the future, for neither
of these times is present, and it is impossible to do
or suffer anything in time that is not existent and
-present. Nor yet in time present.
-
-For the present
-time is probably also unreal,This is shown later, in §§ 144–145. and—even if we set
+present. Nor yet in time present.
+
+For the present time is probably also unreal,This is shown later, in §§ 144–145. and—even if we set
aside this point—it is indivisible; and it is impossible
to suppose that in an indivisible moment of
time iron, say, changes from hard to soft, or any one
@@ -7288,11 +7237,11 @@ present, we must declare that nothing changes at all.
Further, if change exists at all
-are specialized,Lit. ‟simply passive,” i.e. each sense perceives only one class of objects, cf. § 47 supra. whereas change is thought to possess
-‟concurrent recollection”A peculiar Stoic expression, cf. Adv. Phys. i. 353 ff., ii. 64. both of that from which
+are specialized,Lit. ‟simply passive,” i.e. each sense perceives only one class of objects, cf. § 47 supra. whereas change is thought to possess
+‟concurrent recollection”A peculiar Stoic expression, cf. Adv. Phys. i. 353 ff., ii. 64. both of that from which
it changes and that into which it is said to change.
And if it is intelligible, then, since (as we have
-frequently pointed out alreadyCf. ii. 57 ff., i. 170.) there exists among
+frequently pointed out alreadyCf. ii. 57 ff., i. 170.) there exists among
the ancients an unsettled controversy as to the reality
of intelligibles, we shall also be unable to make any
assertion about the reality of change.
@@ -7313,17 +7262,16 @@ means of change. Hence, if the aforesaid motions
are abolished it is likely that becoming and perishing
are also necessarily abolished.
-Yet none the less some argue also as follows:Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 269, ii. 346 ff.
+Yet none the less some argue also as follows:Cf. Adv. Phys. i. 269, ii. 346 ff.
If Socrates was born, Socrates became either when
Socrates existed not or when Socrates already existed;
but if he shall be said to have become when he already
existed, he will have become twice; and if when he
did not exist, Socrates was both existent and non-
existent at the same time—existent through having
-become, non-existent by hypothesis.
-
-And if Socrates
-died, he died either when he lived or when he died.
+become, non-existent by hypothesis.
+
+And if Socrates died, he died either when he lived or when he died.
Now he did not die when he lived, since he would
have been at once both alive and dead; nor yet
when he died, since he would have been dead twice.
@@ -7332,7 +7280,7 @@ this argument in turn to each of the things said to
become or perish it is possible to abolish becoming
and perishing.
-Some also argue thus:Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 326 ff.; Aristot. Phys. i. 8. If a thing becomes,
+Some also argue thus:Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 326 ff.; Aristot. Phys. i. 8. If a thing becomes,
either the existent becomes or the non-existent.
But the non-existent does not become; for to the
non-existent nothing can occur; neither, therefore,
@@ -7342,22 +7290,22 @@ far as it is existent or in so far as it is non-existent.
Now in so far as it is non-existent it does not become.
But if it becomes in so far as it is existent, then, since
they assert that what becomes becomes other from
-other,i.e. it is (‟other” or) different after it has ‟become” from what it was before it ‟became”: ‟becoming” involves a change of nature or character in the thing which undergoes the process. what becomes will be other than the existent,
+other,i.e. it is (‟other” or) different after it has ‟become” from what it was before it ‟became”: ‟becoming” involves a change of nature or character in the thing which undergoes the process. what becomes will be other than the existent,
and that is non-existent. Therefore what becomes
-will be non-existent, which is nonsense.
-
+will be non-existent, which is nonsense.
+
If, then, neither the non-existent becomes nor the existent,
nothing becomes at all.
For the same reasons, neither does anything
-perish.Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 344 f. For if anything perishes, it is either the
+perish.Cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 344 f. For if anything perishes, it is either the
existent that perishes or the non-existent. Now the
non-existent does not perish, for what perishes must
be a subject of action. Nor yet does the existent
perish. For it must perish either while continuing in
existence or while not so continuing. And if it be
while continuing in existence, it will be at one and the
-same time both existent and non-existent;
-
+same time both existent and non-existent;
+
for since it does not perish in so far as it is non-existent but
in so far as it is existent, it will be other than the
existent and therefore non-existent in so far as it is
@@ -7373,7 +7321,7 @@ but the non-existent; and this we have shown to be
impossible. If, then, neither the existent perishes nor
the non-existent, and besides these there is nothing
else, nothing perishes at all.
-
This account of the motionsCf. § 64. will suffice by way
+
This account of the motionsCf. § 64. will suffice by way
of outline, and therefrom it follows that the Physical
Science of the Dogmatists is unreal and inconceivable.
@@ -7382,25 +7330,25 @@ Science of the Dogmatists is unreal and inconceivable.
Chapter XVII.—Concerning Rest
In like manner some have doubted about physical
-rest,i.e. ‟rest” as the opposite of motion in general, not of locomotion only (as in the Stoic use of the term); cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 245 ff. say ing that what is in motion is not at rest, but
+rest,i.e. ‟rest” as the opposite of motion in general, not of locomotion only (as in the Stoic use of the term); cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 245 ff. say ing that what is in motion is not at rest, but
every body i is constantly in motion according to the
views of the Dogmatists who assert that Being is in
-fluxCf. §§ 51, 54 supra. and always undergoing effluxes and additions—
+fluxCf. §§ 51, 54 supra. and always undergoing effluxes and additions—
just as Plato does not even speak of bodies as ‟being”
but rather calls them ‟becoming,” and Heracleitus
-compares the mobility of our matteri.e. ‟matter” (in the ordinary sense) of ‟our” physical universe, as distinct from any logical or metaphysical use of the term. to the swift
-current of a river. Therefore no body is at rest.
-
+compares the mobility of our matteri.e. ‟matter” (in the ordinary sense) of ‟our” physical universe, as distinct from any logical or metaphysical use of the term. to the swift
+current of a river. Therefore no body is at rest.
+
What is said to be at rest is, in fact, held to be embraced
by the things which surround it, and what is embraced
is acted upon; but nothing acted upon exists, since
-no causal activity exists, as we have shown;
Cf. §§ 13 ff., 103 supra. therefore
+no causal activity exists, as we have shown;
Cf. §§ 13 ff., 103 supra. therefore
nothing is at rest.
Some, too, propound this argument: What is at
rest is acted upon; but what is acted upon is in
motion; therefore what is said to be at rest is in
-motion; but if it is in motion, it is not at rest.
-
+motion; but if it is in motion, it is not at rest.
+
And from this it is evident that neither does the incorporeal
admit of being at rest. For if what is at rest is acted
upon, and being acted upon is a property, if anything,
@@ -7419,33 +7367,33 @@ unreal. Let us begin with space.
Chapter XVIII.—Concerning Space
-Space, or place, then, is used in two senses,Cf. § 75 supra for this distinction between the ‟broad” and narrow or ‟strict” senses of ‟place.” In §§ 121–120 we have the popular arguments for space based on (1) observed facts as to ‟the parts of space,” and the movement of bodies in space; and (2) traditional language, which assumes the existence of space; (3) if body exists, space must also exist. the
+Space, or place, then, is used in two senses,Cf. § 75 supra for this distinction between the ‟broad” and narrow or ‟strict” senses of ‟place.” In §§ 121–120 we have the popular arguments for space based on (1) observed facts as to ‟the parts of space,” and the movement of bodies in space; and (2) traditional language, which assumes the existence of space; (3) if body exists, space must also exist. the
strict and the loose—loosely of place taken broadly
(as ‟my city”), and strictly of exactly containing
place whereby we are exactly enclosed. Our inquiry,
then, is concerned with space of the strict kind. This
-somee.g. the Stoics and Peripatetics, cf. §§ 124, 131. have affirmed, others denied; and others have
-suspended judgement about it.
-
+somee.g. the Stoics and Peripatetics, cf. §§ 124, 131. have affirmed, others denied; and others have
+suspended judgement about it.
+
And of these, those who maintain its existence have recourse to the
-evidence of experience.Cf. Aristot. Phys. iv. 1. Who, they argue, could
+evidence of experience.Cf. Aristot. Phys. iv. 1. Who, they argue, could
assert that space does not exist when he sees the parts
of space, such as right and left, up and down, before
and behind; and when he is now here, now there,
-and sees that where my teacherHerodotus of Tarsus, cf. Introd. pp. xl f. was talking there
+and sees that where my teacherHerodotus of Tarsus, cf. Introd. pp. xl f. was talking there
I am talking now; and when he observes that the
place of things naturally light is different from that of
-things naturally heavy;
-
+
and when, also, he hears the
ancients declaring that ‟Verily first of all came Chaos
-into existence”Hesiod, Theog. 118. For space, they say, is called Chaos
-from its capacity for containing‟Chaos” is here absurdly derived from χώρα, ‟room” (the Stoics connected it with χεῖν, ‟to pour”). It means, in fact, a ‟cavity” or abyss (from χάσκειν, ‟to yawn”). what becomes within
+into existence”Hesiod, Theog. 118. For space, they say, is called Chaos
+from its capacity for containing‟Chaos” is here absurdly derived from χώρα, ‟room” (the Stoics connected it with χεῖν, ‟to pour”). It means, in fact, a ‟cavity” or abyss (from χάσκειν, ‟to yawn”). what becomes within
it. Then, too, if any body exists, space also exists;
for without it body would not exist. And if ‟that-by-
-which” exists, and ‟that-from-which,”‟By which” is the ‟efficient,” ‟from which” the ‟material” cause: the Stoics regarded both these as ‟bodies,” and so involving the existence of space. there exists;
+which” exists, and ‟that-from-which,”‟By which” is the ‟efficient,” ‟from which” the ‟material” cause: the Stoics regarded both these as ‟bodies,” and so involving the existence of space. there exists;
also ‟that-in-which,” and this is space; but the first
-is in each of the two, therefore the second is in both.For the Stoic use of ‟first” and ‟second” in hypothetical syllogisms cf. ii. 104, 142. In the next sections (122–123) the arguments of the previous sections (120–121) are rebutted: (1) the ‟parts of space” are identical with space and in asserting their existence we are merely ‟begging the question”: (2) the reality of ‟body,” or solid matter, as well as of the ‟efficient” and ‟material” causes, is likewise pure assumption. In §§ 124–130 the special views of the Stoics are expounded and refuted; in §§ 13 1ff. those of Aristotle and his School.
+is in each of the two, therefore the second is in both.
For the Stoic use of ‟first” and ‟second” in hypothetical syllogisms cf. ii. 104, 142. In the next sections (122–123) the arguments of the previous sections (120–121) are rebutted: (1) the ‟parts of space” are identical with space and in asserting their existence we are merely ‟begging the question”: (2) the reality of ‟body,” or solid matter, as well as of the ‟efficient” and ‟material” causes, is likewise pure assumption. In §§ 124–130 the special views of the Stoics are expounded and refuted; in §§ 13 1ff. those of Aristotle and his School.
But those who deny space do not admit the existence
of the parts of space; for space, they say, is nothing
@@ -7454,14 +7402,13 @@ existence of space from the assumption that its parts
exist is seeking to establish the matter in question by
means of itself. Equally silly is the language of those
who assert that a thing becomes or has become in
-some place, when space in general is not admittedCf. §§ 38 ff. supra.
+some place, when space in general is not admittedCf. §§ 38 ff. supra.
And they also presume the reality of body, which
is not self-evident; and, in much the same way as
space, both that-from-which and that-by-which are
-proved to be unreal.
-
-Hesiod, too, is no competent
-judge of philosophical problems. And while thus
+proved to be unreal.
+
+Hesiod, too, is no competent judge of philosophical problems. And while thus
rebutting the arguments that tend to establish the
existence of space, they also demonstrate its unreality
more elaborately by making use of what are held to
@@ -7479,8 +7426,8 @@ give to ‟body”); and that Room is an interval partly
occupied by body and partly unoccupied—though
some of them say that Room is the Place of the large
body, so that the difference between Place and Room
-depends on size.
-
+
Their opponents then argue thus:
When the Stoics define Place as an ‟interval occupied
by body,” in what sense do they call it an ‟interval?”
@@ -7489,21 +7436,21 @@ its depth only, or all three dimensions? For if they
mean one dimension, the place is not equated with
the object of which it is the place, and besides, that
which includes is part of what is included, which is
-pure nonsense.The argument is: ‟Interval” cannot mean one ‟dimension” only (such as ‟length”) since (by definition) ‟Place” must be ‟equated” to the ‟body” which is in it and must therefore have all three dimensions; and further, the ‟in- cluding” place of one ‟dimension” would be less than the body of three dimensions which it ‟includes.” Nor can it be all three dimensions, since the body which is ‟in” it is all these three dimensions and therefore identical with its ‟place”—the thing contained with the thing which contains it. Thus ‟interval” and ‟place” are not explicable in terms of ‟dimensions.”
-
+pure nonsense.The argument is: ‟Interval” cannot mean one ‟dimension” only (such as ‟length”) since (by definition) ‟Place” must be ‟equated” to the ‟body” which is in it and must therefore have all three dimensions; and further, the ‟in- cluding” place of one ‟dimension” would be less than the body of three dimensions which it ‟includes.” Nor can it be all three dimensions, since the body which is ‟in” it is all these three dimensions and therefore identical with its ‟place”—the thing contained with the thing which contains it. Thus ‟interval” and ‟place” are not explicable in terms of ‟dimensions.”
+
And if by ‟interval” is meant the
three dimensions, then, since in the so-called place
there subsists neither a void nor another body which
has dimensions, but only the body said to exist in
place, and it is composed of the dimensions (for it is
-length and breadth and depth and solidity,Cf. § 39 supra. this last
+length and breadth and depth and solidity,Cf. § 39 supra. this last
being said to be a property of the foregoing dimensions),
the body itself will be its own place and at
-once both container and contained, which is absurd.
-
+once both container and contained, which is absurd.
+
Therefore no dimension of a subsisting place exists.
And, consequently, place is nothing.
-
This argument also is propounded.This argument raises the question—since ‟body” and ‟place” coincide (spatially), to which of the two do the ‟dimensions” belong, as we cannot assume two sets of dimensions in the same place? To ascribe them to the ‟body” annuls ‟place” and vice versa. Since the
+
This argument also is propounded.This argument raises the question—since ‟body” and ‟place” coincide (spatially), to which of the two do the ‟dimensions” belong, as we cannot assume two sets of dimensions in the same place? To ascribe them to the ‟body” annuls ‟place” and vice versa. Since the
dimensions are not found to be twofold in the case of
each of the objects said to exist in place, but there
is one length, one breadth and one depth, do these
@@ -7511,15 +7458,15 @@ dimensions belong to the body only, or to the place
only, or to both? If they belong only to the place,
the body will have no length or breadth or depth of
its own, so that the body will not even be body, which
-is absurd.
-
+
If they belong to both, then, since the
Void has no reality apart from the dimensions, if the
dimensions of the Void subsist in the body and serve
to compose the body itself, the components of the
Void will also be components of the body—for about
the reality of solidity it is impossible to say anything
-positive, as we have shown above.Cf. §§ 45 f.; the ‟components” of ‟body” are the three ‟dimensions.” And since in
+positive, as we have shown above.Cf. §§ 45 f.; the ‟components” of ‟body” are the three ‟dimensions.” And since in
the case of the so-called body only those dimensions
appear which belong to the Void and are identical
with the Void, the body will be Void, which is absurd.
@@ -7533,15 +7480,15 @@ the Void and place comes about, the Void either
remains or withdraws or perishes. But if it remains,
the Plenum and the Void will be identical; and if it
withdraws by a movement of transition, or perishes
-by change, the Void will be a body;Cf. §§ 49 ff.; and for the ‟affections,” §§ 38, 52, 117. for these
+by change, the Void will be a body;Cf. §§ 49 ff.; and for the ‟affections,” §§ 38, 52, 117. for these
affections are peculiar to body. But it is absurd to say
either that Void and Plenum are identical or that the
Void is body. Therefore it is absurd to say that the
-Void can be occupied by body and become place.
-
+Void can be occupied by body and become place.
+
For these reasons also the Void is found to be unreal,
since it is impossible for it to be occupied by body and
-to become place; for Void was defined
Cf. § 124. as ‟that
+to become place; for Void was defined
Cf. § 124. as ‟that
which is capable of being occupied by body.” And,
in the refutation of these, Room also is involved; for
it is annulled along with place if ‟room is the large
@@ -7549,9 +7496,9 @@ place,” while if it is ‟that which is partly occupied
by body and partly empty extension,” its refutation
is included in that of these two.
These arguments, and others besides, are directed
-against the views about place held by the Stoics.
-
-The PeripateticsCf. Adv. Phys. ii. 30 ff.; Aristot. Phys. iv. 4, De cael. iv. 3. assert that place is ‟the limit of
+against the views about place held by the Stoics.
+
+The PeripateticsCf. Adv. Phys. ii. 30 ff.; Aristot. Phys. iv. 4, De cael. iv. 3. assert that place is ‟the limit of
what encloses in so far as it encloses,” so that my
place is the surface of the air that forms a mould
round my body. But if this is place, the same thing
@@ -7575,8 +7522,8 @@ about, they say, by being moulded round the body
within it. Nor yet is it created; for if it is created,
it is either when the body is in place that the place,
in which the body in place is already said to be,
-comes into existence, or when the body is not in it.
-
+comes into existence, or when the body is not in it.
+
But it does not come into existence either when the
body is in it (for the place of the body within it exists
already), or when it is not in it, since, as they assert,
@@ -7588,7 +7535,7 @@ it is not therein, and no other alternatives are
conceivable, then place is not created at all. And if it
is neither created nor uncreate, it has no existence.
-These objections may also be stated more generally.The first objection is based on §§ 38–56, the second also on §§ 38 ff., the third on §§ 109 ff.
+These objections may also be stated more generally.The first objection is based on §§ 38–56, the second also on §§ 38 ff., the third on §§ 109 ff.
If place is anything, it is either corporeal or incorporeal;
but each of these alternatives is, as we have
shown, disputed; therefore place is in dispute. Place
@@ -7603,7 +7550,7 @@ It is possible to adduce many other arguments.
But in order to avoid prolonging our exposition, we
may conclude by saying that while the Sceptics are
put to confusion by the arguments, they are also put
-to shame by the evidenceCf. §§ 66, 81. The Sceptics are here said to be ‟put to shame,” or ‟confusion” (i.e. caused to hesitate in their judgement as to the nature of space) owing to the ‟equipollence” of the arguments against space and those for it based on the obvious facts of experience. of experience. Consequently
+to shame by the evidenceCf. §§ 66, 81. The Sceptics are here said to be ‟put to shame,” or ‟confusion” (i.e. caused to hesitate in their judgement as to the nature of space) owing to the ‟equipollence” of the arguments against space and those for it based on the obvious facts of experience. of experience. Consequently
we attach ourselves to neither side, so
far as concerns the doctrines of the Dogmatists, but
suspend judgement regarding place.
@@ -7615,29 +7562,27 @@ suspend judgement regarding place.
Our attitude is the same with respect to the inquiry
about time. For if we depend on appearances, time
seems to be something, but if we depend on the
-arguments about it, it appears unreal. SomeThe Stoics, cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 141. This definition is derived from the fact that Time is measured by the motions of the planets and stars which compose the Universe. define
+arguments about it, it appears unreal. SomeThe Stoics, cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 141. This definition is derived from the fact that Time is measured by the motions of the planets and stars which compose the Universe. define
time as ‟the interval of the motion of the Whole”
-(meaning by ‟Whole” the Universe), othersAristot. Phys. iv. 10 mentions this (Platonic) definition, cf. Plato, Tim. 47 d ff. Aristotle says that our notion of time is derived from a sense of difference and of succession in our thoughts and perceptions, which brings with it a distinction between ‟before” and ‟after”—between ‟past,” ‟present,” and ‟future.” Thus ‟time” is a thing ‟numbered” or ‟measured” by the conscious mind, and Aristotle defines it as ‟a numeration of motion in respect of priority and posteriority” (Phys. iv. 11). as
+(meaning by ‟Whole” the Universe), othersAristot. Phys. iv. 10 mentions this (Platonic) definition, cf. Plato, Tim. 47 d ff. Aristotle says that our notion of time is derived from a sense of difference and of succession in our thoughts and perceptions, which brings with it a distinction between ‟before” and ‟after”—between ‟past,” ‟present,” and ‟future.” Thus ‟time” is a thing ‟numbered” or ‟measured” by the conscious mind, and Aristotle defines it as ‟a numeration of motion in respect of priority and posteriority” (Phys. iv. 11). as
‟the actual motion of the Universe;” Aristotle (or,
as some say, Plato) as ‟the number of the prior
-and posterior in motion;”
-
-Strato (or, as some say, Aristotle) as
-‟the measure of motion and rest;”
-Epicurus (according to Demetrius the LaconianAn Epicurean, cf. Adv. Log. ii. 348.) as
+and posterior in motion;”
+
+Strato (or, as some say, Aristotle) as ‟the measure of motion and rest;”
+Epicurus (according to Demetrius the LaconianAn Epicurean, cf. Adv. Log. ii. 348.) as
‟a concurrence of concurrences, concomitant with
-days and nights and seasons and affections and non-
-affections and motions and rests.”
-
+days and nights and seasons and affections and non-affections and motions and rests.”
+
And, in point of substance, some have affirmed that it is corporeal
—for instance, Aenesidemus, arguing that it differs
-in nothing from Being and the prime body,—others,i.e. the Stoics.
+in nothing from Being and the prime body,—others,i.e. the Stoics.
that it is incorporeal. Either, then, all these theories
are true, or all false, or some true and some false;
but they cannot all be true (most of them being
in conflict), nor will it be granted by the Dogmatists
-that all are false.
-
+
And besides, should it
be granted that the assertion of the corporeality
of time is false, and that of its incorporeality likewise
@@ -7645,29 +7590,29 @@ false, then, ipso facto, the unreality of time will
be granted; for it cannot be anything but one or
other of these. Nor yet can we apprehend which
theories are true, which false, owing to the equal
-weightCf. i. 8. of the rival opinions as well as the perplexity
-regarding the criterion and proof.Cf. ii. cc. 3–7, 12, 13.
-
+weightCf. i. 8. of the rival opinions as well as the perplexity
+regarding the criterion and proof.Cf. ii. cc. 3–7, 12, 13.
+
Hence for these reasons we shall be unable to affirm anything positively
about time.
Further, since time does not seem to subsist without
motion or even rest, if motion is abolished, and
likewise rest, time is abolished. None the less the
following objections against time are made by some.
-If time exists, it is either limited or unlimited.
-
+If time exists, it is either limited or unlimited.
+
But if it is limited, it began at a certain time and will end
at a certain time. Consequently, there was once a
time when time was not (before it began), and there
will once be a time when time will not be (after it has
-ended); which is absurd.Cf. Aristot. Met. xii. 6. So then time is not limited.
-
+ended); which is absurd.Cf. Aristot. Met. xii. 6. So then time is not limited.
+
But if it is unlimited, since part of it is said to be
past, part present, and part future, the future and
past are either existent or non-existent. But if they
are non-existent, and there remains only the present,
which is momentary, time will be limited and the
-original difficultiese.g. that there was once a time when no time was. will follow. And if the past
+original difficultiese.g. that there was once a time when no time was. will follow. And if the past
exists and the future exists, each of these will be
present. But it is absurd to call past and future
time present; neither, then, is time unlimited. But
@@ -7699,17 +7644,17 @@ is the present existent; for if present time exists
it is either indivisible or divisible. Now it is not
indivisible; for what changes is said to change in
the present time, but nothing changes in indivisible
-timeCf. Aristot. Phys. vi. 6.—iron, for instance, into softness, and so on.
-Hence present time is not indivisible.
-
+timeCf. Aristot. Phys. vi. 6.—iron, for instance, into softness, and so on.
+Hence present time is not indivisible.
+
Neither is it divisible; for it could not be divided into a
plurality of presents, since time present is said to
change into time past imperceptibly owing to the
rapid flux of the things in the Universe. Nor yet into
past and future; for so it will be unreal, having one
part of itself no longer existent and the other part
-not yet existent.
-
+
Hence, too, the present cannot be
the end of the past and the beginning of the future,
since then it will both be and not be existent; for it
@@ -7723,16 +7668,15 @@ is unreal.
This argument, too, is alleged against time: If
time exists it is either generable and perishable or
-ingenerable and imperishable.Time ‟came into existence” (γέγονεν), said Plato (Tim. 38 b): ‟No,” said Aristotle (Met. xii. 6). In §§ 147–148 I render γενητός (‟capable of coming into existence”) by ‟generable,” and γίνεται by ‟is generated”; but in § 149, and elsewhere, I usually render γίνεται by ‟becomes,” γινόμενα by ‟becoming,” etc. Now it is not
+ingenerable and imperishable.Time ‟came into existence” (γέγονεν), said Plato (Tim. 38 b): ‟No,” said Aristotle (Met. xii. 6). In §§ 147–148 I render γενητός (‟capable of coming into existence”) by ‟generable,” and γίνεται by ‟is generated”; but in § 149, and elsewhere, I usually render γίνεται by ‟becomes,” γινόμενα by ‟becoming,” etc. Now it is not
ingenerable and imperishable, since part of it is said
to be past and no longer in existence, and part to be
future and not yet in existence. Neither is it generable
-and perishable.
-
-For things generated must be
-generated from something existent, and things which
+and perishable.
+
+For things generated must be generated from something existent, and things which
perish must perish into something existent, according
-to the postulates of the Dogmatists themselves.e.g. Aristotle, Epicurus, Poseidonius; cf. Lucr. i. 151. If,
+to the postulates of the Dogmatists themselves.e.g. Aristotle, Epicurus, Poseidonius; cf. Lucr. i. 151. If,
then, time perishes into the past, it perishes into a
non-existent; and if it is generated out of the future,
it is generated out of a non-existent; for neither of
@@ -7751,9 +7695,9 @@ once both existent and non-existent. For since that
within which a thing becomes must exist before the
thing which becomes within it, the time which becomes
in itself does not yet exist in so far as it becomes,
-but does already exist in so far as it becomes in itself.Cf. § 133 supra.
-Consequently it does not become in itself.
-
+but does already exist in so far as it becomes in itself.Cf. § 133 supra.
+Consequently it does not become in itself.
+
Nor yet in another. For if the present becomes in the future,
the present will be future, and if in the past, it will
be past. And the same may be said of all the other
@@ -7771,12 +7715,12 @@ or ingenerable.
Since time, it seems, is not found apart from
number, it will not be out of place to discuss number
-briefly.With this chapter cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 248–309. In §§ 152–156 the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers as the primary constituents, or ‟elements,” of the Universe is expounded; in §§ 156–157 the Pythagorean proof that numbers are distinct from things numbered (‟numerables”) is set forth; in §§ 158 ff. the Sceptical arguments against the Pythagorean doctrine of the real existence of numbers (as distinct from ‟numerables”) are developed. In the customary way we speak undogmaticallyCf. i. 15.
+briefly.With this chapter cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 248–309. In §§ 152–156 the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers as the primary constituents, or ‟elements,” of the Universe is expounded; in §§ 156–157 the Pythagorean proof that numbers are distinct from things numbered (‟numerables”) is set forth; in §§ 158 ff. the Sceptical arguments against the Pythagorean doctrine of the real existence of numbers (as distinct from ‟numerables”) are developed. In the customary way we speak undogmaticallyCf. i. 15.
of numbering a thing and hear number
talked of as something which exists; but the extreme
methods of the Dogmatists have provoked the attack
-upon number also.
-
+
Thus, for example, the School of
Pythagoras declare that numbers are also elements
of the Universe. They assert, in fact, that phenomena
@@ -7784,14 +7728,13 @@ are constructed from something, and that the
elements must be simple; therefore the elements
are non-evident. But of things non-evident, some are
corporeal, like atoms and masses, others incorporeal,
-like figuresi.e. ‟the limits of bodies” of § 32 supra, cf. § 153. and forms and numbers. Of these
+like figuresi.e. ‟the limits of bodies” of § 32 supra, cf. § 153. and forms and numbers. Of these
the corporeal are composite, being constructed from
length and breadth and depth and solidity, or even
weight. The elements, therefore, are not only non-
-evident but also incorporeal.
-
-Moreover, each of the
-incorporeals involves the perception of number, for
+evident but also incorporeal.
+
+Moreover, each of the incorporeals involves the perception of number, for
it is either one or two or more. Thus it is inferred
that the non-evident and incorporeal numbers which
are involved in all perception are the elements of
@@ -7799,24 +7742,24 @@ existing things. Yet not simply ,
but both the Monad also and the Indefinite Dyad
which is generated by the expansion of the Monad,
and by participation in which the particular dyads
-become dyads.The existence of the ‟elemental” numbers is said to be due to ‟participation” in either the principle of ‟Unity” (‟the Monad”) or the principle of Duality (‟the indefinite Dyad”)—odd numbers in the first, even in the second. These principles are the ‟genera” of which odd and even numbers are ‟particulars.”
-
+become dyads.The existence of the ‟elemental” numbers is said to be due to ‟participation” in either the principle of ‟Unity” (‟the Monad”) or the principle of Duality (‟the indefinite Dyad”)—odd numbers in the first, even in the second. These principles are the ‟genera” of which odd and even numbers are ‟particulars.”
+
For they say that it is from these
that the rest of the numbers are generated—those,
that is, which are involved in the perception of
numerables—and the Universe is arranged. For the
point presents the relation, or character, of the
-Monad,i.e. it is an indivisible unit, and begins the line as the One begins the number-series; cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 278. and the line that of the Dyad (it being
+Monad,i.e. it is an indivisible unit, and begins the line as the One begins the number-series; cf. Adv. Phys. ii. 278. and the line that of the Dyad (it being
regarded as lying between two points), and the
surface that of the Triad (for they describe it as a
flowing of the line breadth-wise up to another point
placed transversely), and the body that of the
Tetrad; for Body is formed by an ascension of the
-surface up to a point placed above.
-
+surface up to a point placed above.
+
It is in this way that they image forth both the bodies and the whole
Universe, which also they declare to be arranged
-according to harmonic ratiosThe terms here used are those of the Pythagorean musical (‟octave”) system, and denote the ratios 4: 3, 3:2,2: 1. Cf. Plato, Tim. 36 a; Adv. Arithm. 6–9, Adv. Mus. 46.—namely, that of the
+according to harmonic ratiosThe terms here used are those of the Pythagorean musical (‟octave”) system, and denote the ratios 4: 3, 3:2,2: 1. Cf. Plato, Tim. 36 a; Adv. Arithm. 6–9, Adv. Mus. 46.—namely, that of the
‟By-Fours,” which is ‟epitrite,” as is the ratio of
8 to 6; and that of the “ By-Fives,” which is one
and a half times, as is the ratio of 9 to 6; and that
@@ -7826,7 +7769,7 @@ of the ‟By-Alls,” which is double, as is the ratio of
These are the fictions they imagine; and they
also make out that number is something else apart
from numerables, arguing that if ‟animal” according
-to its proper definitionOr ‟in its own essence,” apart from relation to anything else. is (say) one, the plant, since
+to its proper definitionOr ‟in its own essence,” apart from relation to anything else. is (say) one, the plant, since
it is not an animal, will not be one; but the plant is
one; therefore the animal is not one but
in virtue of some other attribute perceived outside
@@ -7836,8 +7779,8 @@ numerables, since the numerables are men (say) and
oxen and horses, number will be men and oxen and
horses—and number will be white and black and
bearded, if the objects counted should happen to be
-such.
-
+
But these things are absurd; therefore number
is not the numerables, but it has a reality of its own
apart from them whereby it is involved in the perception
@@ -7853,7 +7796,7 @@ as we shall show; number, therefore, is nothing.
That number is nothing apart from the numerables
we shall demonstrate by basing our argument on the
-Monad, for the sake of lucidity of exposition.The argument here is that ‟participation” of things in the Monad involves either (1) the division of the Monad into an infinite number of parts (§§ 158–159), or (2) the multiplication of the Monad into an infinite number of whole Monads (§§ 160–162), both which results violate the conception of the Monad as unique principle of Unity. If the
+Monad, for the sake of lucidity of exposition.The argument here is that ‟participation” of things in the Monad involves either (1) the division of the Monad into an infinite number of parts (§§ 158–159), or (2) the multiplication of the Monad into an infinite number of whole Monads (§§ 160–162), both which results violate the conception of the Monad as unique principle of Unity. If the
Monad, by partaking in which each of its participants
becomes one, is in itself a real object, this Monad
will be either one or as many as are its participants.
@@ -7862,10 +7805,9 @@ thereof partake of all of it or of a part of it? For
if the one man (say) takes all the Monad, there will
no longer exist a monad for the one horse to partake
of, or the one dog or any one of all the other things
-which we declare to be one
-
-—just as, supposing there
-are a number of naked men, who possess only one
+which we declare to be one
+
+—just as, supposing there are a number of naked men, who possess only one
garment amongst them, which one man had put on,
all the rest will remain naked and without a garment.
And if each thing partakes of a part of it, then, in
@@ -7883,10 +7825,10 @@ of the particular objects is called one, are equal
in number to the numerables to which the term
‟one” is applied, the monads partaken of will be
infinite in number. And these either partake of a
-superiori.e. ‟Unity” as a summum genus, cf. i. 38. monad or of monads equal in number to
+superiori.e. ‟Unity” as a summum genus, cf. i. 38. monad or of monads equal in number to
themselves, or else they do not so partake but are
-monads apart from any participation.
-
+monads apart from any participation.
+
Yet if these can be monads without participation, each of the
sensibles also will be able to be one without participation
in a monad, and so at once the monad said to be
@@ -7895,8 +7837,8 @@ those monads are monads by participation, either they
all partake of one monad, or each partakes of a monad
of its own. And if all partake of one, each will be
said to partake either of a part or of the whole, and
-the original difficulties will still remain;
-
+the original difficulties will still remain;
+
but if each partakes of its own monad, we must posit a new
monad for each of those monads, and others again
for the former, and so on ad infinitum. If then, in
@@ -7936,8 +7878,8 @@ did the monads, when existing apart from each other,
contain the Dyad as involved in the perception of
them, according to their own definition, nor has
any addition now been made to them from without,
-just as, by hypothesis, nothing has been subtracted.
-
+just as, by hypothesis, nothing has been subtracted.
+
Hence the combination of the monad with the monad
will not be a dyad, as no addition or subtraction
from without takes place. But if subtraction does
@@ -7948,13 +7890,13 @@ generated from the monads, the things which appear
to be two will be four; for there exists already a
monad and a second monad, and when an outside
dyad is added to these the result will be the number
-four.
-
+
And the same argument applies to all the
other numbers which are said to be formed as a
result of combination.
If, then, the numbers which are said to be compounded
-from the superiorCf. § 160 supra. numbers are formed
+from the superiorCf. § 160 supra. numbers are formed
neither by subtraction nor by addition nor without
subtraction and addition, the formation of the number
which is said to be independent and apart from the
@@ -7963,8 +7905,8 @@ make it clear that the numbers formed by combination
are not ungenerated by asserting that they are
compounded and generated from the superior numbers
—from the monad, for example, and the Indefinite
-Dyad.Cf. § 153 supra.
-
+
So then number does not subsist of itself.
But if number neither is conceived as self-existent,
nor subsists in the numerables, then, to judge from
@@ -7979,7 +7921,7 @@ what is called the Physical section of philosophy.
There remains the Ethical division, which is supposed
to deal with the distinguishing of things
-good,Lit. ‟fair” (honestum): the Stoics used καλόν as a synonym for ἀγαθόν ‟good” (bonum), and in this section the terms are used as synonymous. bad, and indifferent. In order, then, to treat
+good,Lit. ‟fair” (honestum): the Stoics used καλόν as a synonym for ἀγαθόν ‟good” (bonum), and in this section the terms are used as synonymous. bad, and indifferent. In order, then, to treat
of this branch also in a summary way, we shall inquire
into the reality of things good, bad, and indifferent,
explaining first the conception of each.
@@ -7992,11 +7934,11 @@ The Stoics, then, assert that good is ‟utility or not
other than utility,” meaning by ‟utility” virtue and
right action, and by ‟not other than utility” the
good man and the friend. For ‟virtue,” as consisting
-in a certain state of the ruling principle,Or ‟regent part,” i.e. the mind, cf. i. 128, ii. 81; Introd. p. xxv. The doctrine that ‟the good man” is ‟not other” than goodness (virtue or ‟utility”) strikes one as curious. The Stoics, we must remember, regarded attributes or qualities as corporeal and parts of the ‟substance” (οὐσία) to which they belong—here the mind (‟regent part”) of ‟the good man.” For the equation of ‟virtue” (or ‟goodness”) with ‟utility” (or ‟benefit”) as ‟the source (or agency) from which benefit results” see Diog. Laert. vii. 94. For Stoic Ethics cf. Introd. pp. xxvi ff. and
+in a certain state of the ruling principle,Or ‟regent part,” i.e. the mind, cf. i. 128, ii. 81; Introd. p. xxv. The doctrine that ‟the good man” is ‟not other” than goodness (virtue or ‟utility”) strikes one as curious. The Stoics, we must remember, regarded attributes or qualities as corporeal and parts of the ‟substance” (οὐσία) to which they belong—here the mind (‟regent part”) of ‟the good man.” For the equation of ‟virtue” (or ‟goodness”) with ‟utility” (or ‟benefit”) as ‟the source (or agency) from which benefit results” see Diog. Laert. vii. 94. For Stoic Ethics cf. Introd. pp. xxvi ff. and
‟right action,” being an activity in accordance with
virtue, are exactly ‟utility;” while the good man
-and the friend are ‟not other than utility.”
-
+and the friend are ‟not other than utility.”
+
For utility is a part of the good man, being his ruling
principle. But the wholes, they say, are not the
same as the parts (for the man is not a hand), nor are
@@ -8010,23 +7952,23 @@ utility, they declare that he is not other than utility.
Hence also they assert that good has three meanings.
In one of its meanings, good, they say, is that
by which utility may be gained, this being the most
-principal goodi.e. ‟primary, fundamental, good”—the source of other goods. Good in the first sense is the central good, which expands into the second and third senses as into concentric circles—the third including the second, the second the first. and virtue; in another meaning, good
+principal goodi.e. ‟primary, fundamental, good”—the source of other goods. Good in the first sense is the central good, which expands into the second and third senses as into concentric circles—the third including the second, the second the first. and virtue; in another meaning, good
is that of which utility is an accidental result, like
virtue and virtuous actions; and thirdly, it is that
which is capable of being useful; and such is virtue
and virtuous action and the good man and the friend,
and gods and good daemons; so that the second
signification of good is inclusive of the first signification,
-and the third of both the second and the first.
-
+and the third of both the second and the first.
+
But some define good as ‟what is to be chosen for its
-own sake;”
Cf. Aristot. Rhet. i. 6; the other definition is Stoic. and others as ‟that which contributes
+own sake;”
Cf. Aristot. Rhet. i. 6; the other definition is Stoic. and others as ‟that which contributes
to happiness or is supplementary thereto;” and
happiness, as the Stoics declare, is ‟the smooth
current of life.”
These, or such as these, are their statements with
-reference to the notion of the Good.
-
+reference to the notion of the Good.
+
But in describing as good what is useful or what is choiceworthy
for its own sake or what is contributory to happiness,
one is not exhibiting the essence of the good but
@@ -8036,10 +7978,9 @@ only or to other things as well. But if they belong to
other things as well, they are not, when thus extended,
characteristic marks of the good; while if they belong
only to the Good, it is not possible for us to derive
-from them a notion of the good.
-
-For just as the man
-who has no notion of ‟horse” has no knowledge of
+from them a notion of the good.
+
+For just as the man who has no notion of ‟horse” has no knowledge of
what ‟neighing” is and cannot arrive thereby at a
notion of ‟horse,” unless he should first meet with a
neighing horse, so too one who is seeking the essence
@@ -8050,18 +7991,18 @@ to gain a notion of the good itself. For he must first
learn the nature of the good itself, and then pass on
to apprehend that it is useful, and that it is
choiceworthy for its own sake, and that it is productive
-of happiness.
-
+
But that the aforesaid attributes are
not sufficient to indicate the concept and the real
nature of the good is made plain by the practice of
the Dogmatists. All, probably, agree that the good is
useful and that it is choiceworthy (so that the good is
-said to be, as it were, ‟the delightful”Deriving ἀγαθόν from ἀγαστόν, cf. Plato, Cratyl. 412 c, 422 a and § 184 infra.) and that it
+said to be, as it were, ‟the delightful”Deriving ἀγαθόν from ἀγαστόν, cf. Plato, Cratyl. 412 c, 422 a and § 184 infra.) and that it
is productive of happiness; but when asked what the
thing is to which these properties belong, they plunge
into a truceless war, some saying it is virtue, others
-pleasure, others painlessness,The Stoics said ‟virtue,” Cyrenaics and Epicureans ‟pleasure,” some Peripatetics ‟painlessness” (cf. Aristot. Rhet. i. 7). and others something
+pleasure, others painlessness,The Stoics said ‟virtue,” Cyrenaics and Epicureans ‟pleasure,” some Peripatetics ‟painlessness” (cf. Aristot. Rhet. i. 7). and others something
else. And yet, if the essence of the good had
been proved from the foregoing definitions, they
would not have been at feud as though its nature
@@ -8071,7 +8012,7 @@ Such, then, is the discord amongst those who are
reputed the most eminent of the Dogmatists regarding
the notion of the Good; and they have differed likewise
regarding Evil, some defining Evil as ‟damage
-or not other than damage,”‟Damage” or ‟harm” being the opposite of ‟utility” or ‟benefit”—the Stoic definition of ‟good.” others as ‟what is to be
+or not other than damage,”‟Damage” or ‟harm” being the opposite of ‟utility” or ‟benefit”—the Stoic definition of ‟good.” others as ‟what is to be
shunned for its own sake,” others as ‟what is
productive of unhappiness.” But since they express by
these phrases not the essence of evil but some of its
@@ -8093,10 +8034,9 @@ one more than that one; and a third sense of the term
neither to happiness nor to unhappiness,” as health,
or wealth; for what a man may use now well, now
ill, that, they say, is indifferent, and they claim to
-discuss it specially in their Ethics.
-
-But what view we
-ought to take regarding this conception is plain from
+discuss it specially in their Ethics.
+
+But what view we ought to take regarding this conception is plain from
what we have already said about things good and evil.
Thus, then, it is plain that they have not guided
us to a clear conception of the several things above-
@@ -8104,7 +8044,7 @@ mentioned; yet, in thus failing with regard to
matters that, perhaps, have no real existence, their
experience is by no means strange. For there
are some who argue on the following grounds
-that nothing is by natureCf. i. 27. either good or evil or
+that nothing is by natureCf. i. 27. either good or evil or
indifferent.
@@ -8119,21 +8059,21 @@ condition. But none of the so-called ‟goods,” as we
shall show, moves all men as being good; therefore
no natural good exists. And that none of the so-called
goods moves all men alike is, they assert, an evident
-fact.
-
+
For, not to mention ordinary folk—of whom
some regard right bodily condition as good, others
chambering, others gluttony, others drunkenness,
others gambling, others greed, and others still worse
things,—some of the philosophers themselves (such as
the Peripatetics) say that there are three kinds of
-goods;Cf. Plato, Laws iii. 697; Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 8. of these some concern the soul, like the
+goods;Cf. Plato, Laws iii. 697; Aristot. Eth. Nic. i. 8. of these some concern the soul, like the
virtues, others the body, like health and similar
things, while others are external, such as friends,
-wealth and the like.
-
+
The Stoics themselves, too,
-assert that there is a trinityApparently a unique sense of the rare word τριγένεια (from τριγενής, ‟thrice-born”). of goods; of these some
+assert that there is a trinityApparently a unique sense of the rare word τριγένεια (from τριγενής, ‟thrice-born”). of goods; of these some
have to do with the soul, like the virtues, others are
external, like the good man and the friend, while
others are neither of the soul nor external, as for
@@ -8142,7 +8082,7 @@ they deny that the bodily states, which the Peripatetics
declare to be goods, are goods. And some have
accepted pleasure as a good, whereas some affirm
that it is a downright evil, so that one professor of
-philosophyAntisthenes, the Cynic. actually exclaimed, ‟I would sooner be
+philosophyAntisthenes, the Cynic. actually exclaimed, ‟I would sooner be
mad than merry.”
If, then, things which move by nature move all
@@ -8157,13 +8097,13 @@ arguments of those who take the rival view, and
therefore he himself, along with the rest, will need
an adjudicator instead of pronouncing judgement on
others. And as there does not exist any agreed
-criterion or proofCf. ii. 18 ff., 134 ff. owing to the unsettled controversy
+criterion or proofCf. ii. 18 ff., 134 ff. owing to the unsettled controversy
about these matters, he will be reduced to suspending
judgement, and consequently he will be unable to
affirm positively what the good by nature is.
Further, it is asserted by some that Good is either
-the ChoiceLiterally, ‟the (act of) choosing” or ‟trying to get for oneself.” ‟Choice” (as the context shows) involves ‟desire” and the striving for satisfaction. itself or that which we choose. Now Choice
+the ChoiceLiterally, ‟the (act of) choosing” or ‟trying to get for oneself.” ‟Choice” (as the context shows) involves ‟desire” and the striving for satisfaction. itself or that which we choose. Now Choice
is not good according to its proper meaning; else we
would not have been hurrying to obtain that which
we choose, for fear of losing the power of continuing
@@ -8182,16 +8122,15 @@ is either external to us or in connexion with us. But
if it is external to us either it produces in us a soothing
motion and a welcome condition and a delightful
feeling, or it does not affect us at all. And if it is not
-a delight to us it will not be good,For the connexion of ‟good” (ἀγαθόν) with ‟delightful” (ἀγαστόν) cf. § 175. nor will it attract
+a delight to us it will not be good,For the connexion of ‟good” (ἀγαθόν) with ‟delightful” (ἀγαστόν) cf. § 175. nor will it attract
us to the choosing of it, nor will it be choiceworthy
at all. And if there arises within us, from the external
object, a congenial condition and an agreeable feeling,
it is not for its own sake that the external object will
be choiceworthy but for the sake of the internal
-condition which follows upon it;
-
-so that what is choiceworthy
-in itself cannot be external. Nor can it be
+condition which follows upon it;
+
+so that what is choiceworthy in itself cannot be external. Nor can it be
personal to us. For it is said to belong either to the
body alone or to the soul alone or to both. But if it
belongs to the body alone, it will elude our perception;
@@ -8207,12 +8146,12 @@ by the irrational body.
There remains the alternative that the good is in
the soul only. But this, too, is impossible if we go by
the statements of the Dogmatists. For the soul is,
-perhaps, actually non-existent;Cf. ii. 31 ff., which also deals with ‟the Criterion.” and even if it exists,
+perhaps, actually non-existent;Cf. ii. 31 ff., which also deals with ‟the Criterion.” and even if it exists,
judging by what they say it is not apprehended, as
I have argued in my chapter ‟On the Criterion.”
How then could one venture to affirm that something
-takes place in a thing which he does not apprehend?
-
+takes place in a thing which he does not apprehend?
+
But, to pass over these objections, in what manner
does the good, according to them, come about in the
soul? For certainly, if Epicurus makes the End consist
@@ -8224,29 +8163,29 @@ and good, that object to be avoided and evil.
-Chapter XXIV.—What Is The So-Called Art Of Living?
It is a mistake (of the mss.) to make a new chapter here, as §§ 188 ff. carry on the argument of 185 ff. about the connexion of ‟good” with the soul. The ‟Art of Living” is first dealt with in § 239.
+Chapter XXIV.—What Is The So-Called Art Of Living?
It is a mistake (of the mss.) to make a new chapter here, as §§ 188 ff. carry on the argument of 185 ff. about the connexion of ‟good” with the soul. The ‟Art of Living” is first dealt with in § 239.
Again, the Stoics declare that goods of the soul
are certain arts, namely the virtues. And an art,
they say, is ‟a system composed of co-exercised
-apprehensions,”Cf. Cic. Acad. iv. 7. 22 ‟ars . . . ex multis animi perceptionibus constat.” The virtues, said the Stoics, are ‟arts” because they are forms of knowledge and consist in the use or ‟exercise” of a large number of perceptions or ‟apprehensions” related to one another in a systematic way. These ‟apprehensions” are ‟deposited” in the mind which is conceived as an elastic fluid pneuma of which the whole moves when any part of it is moved. Cf. §§ 241, 251 infra. and the perceptions arise in
+apprehensions,”Cf. Cic. Acad. iv. 7. 22 ‟ars . . . ex multis animi perceptionibus constat.” The virtues, said the Stoics, are ‟arts” because they are forms of knowledge and consist in the use or ‟exercise” of a large number of perceptions or ‟apprehensions” related to one another in a systematic way. These ‟apprehensions” are ‟deposited” in the mind which is conceived as an elastic fluid pneuma of which the whole moves when any part of it is moved. Cf. §§ 241, 251 infra. and the perceptions arise in
the ruling principle. But how there takes place
in the ruling principle, which according to them
-is breath,Cf. i. 128, ii. 70. a deposit of perceptions, and such
+is breath,Cf. i. 128, ii. 70. a deposit of perceptions, and such
an aggregation of them as to produce art, it is
impossible to conceive, when each succeeding
impression obliterates the previous one, seeing that
breath is fluid and it is said to move as a whole at
-each impression.
-
+
For it is perfect nonsense to say
that Plato’s imaginary construction of the soul—I
mean the mixture of the indivisible and the divisible
essence and of the nature of the Other and of the
-Same,Cf. Plato, Tim. 35 ff. But ‟the Numbers” may refer to the Pythagorean theory. or the Numbers—is capable of being receptive
+Same,Cf. Plato, Tim. 35 ff. But ‟the Numbers” may refer to the Pythagorean theory. or the Numbers—is capable of being receptive
of the Good. Hence the good cannot belong to the
-soul either.
-
+
But if the good is not choice itself, and
what is choiceworthy in itself neither exists externally
nor belongs to either body or soul—as I have argued,
@@ -8264,23 +8203,22 @@ Similarly there is nothing naturally indifferent,
because of the divergence of opinion about things
indifferent. The Stoics, for example, assert that of
the indifferents some are preferred, some rejected,
-and others neither preferred nor rejected,Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, Cic. De fin. iii. 15 f., iv. 9, 16.—the preferred
+and others neither preferred nor rejected,Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, Cic. De fin. iii. 15 f., iv. 9, 16.—the preferred
being such as have sufficient value, like health
and wealth; the rejected such as have not sufficient
value, like poverty and sickness; while extending
the finger or bending it in are cases of the neither
-preferred nor rejected.
-
-Some, however, maintain
-that none of the indifferents is by nature preferred or
+preferred nor rejected.
+
+Some, however, maintain that none of the indifferents is by nature preferred or
rejected; for, owing to the differences in the circumstances,
each of the indifferents appears at one time
preferred, at another rejected. For certainly, they
argue, if the rich were being threatened with attack
by a tyrant while the poor were being left in peace,
everyone would prefer to be poor rather than rich, so
-that wealth would be a thing rejected.
-
+that wealth would be a thing rejected.
+
Consequently,since of each of the so-called indifferents some say
that it is good, others bad, whereas all alike would
have counted it indifferent had it been naturally
@@ -8295,7 +8233,7 @@ since deer and hares and many other animals
are naturally impelled thereto. The majority of
men, too, show themselves to be cowardly; for it is
rare for a man to give himself up to death for the sake
-of his country,The word bracketed in the Greek text (βλακευσάμενος) means ‟being lazy, or spiritless,” and is obviously out of place here, though it would fit well enough in the next clause (as Apelt suggests). or to seem inspired to do any other
+of his country,The word bracketed in the Greek text (βλακευσάμενος) means ‟being lazy, or spiritless,” and is obviously out of place here, though it would fit well enough in the next clause (as Apelt suggests). or to seem inspired to do any other
daring deed, the great majority of mankind being
averse to all such actions.
@@ -8303,8 +8241,8 @@ Hence, also, the Epicureans suppose themselves to
have proved that pleasure is naturally choiceworthy;
for the animals, they say, as soon as they are born,
when still unperverted, seek after pleasure and avoid
-pains.
-
+
But to these we may reply that what is productive
of evil cannot be naturally good; but pleasure
is productive of evils; for to every pleasure there is
@@ -8314,8 +8252,8 @@ when filling himself with wine, and the glutton with
food, and the lecher in immoderate sexual intercourse,
yet these things are productive of both poverty and
sickness, which, as they say, are painful and evil.
-Pleasure, therefore, is not a natural good.
-
+Pleasure, therefore, is not a natural good.
+
Similarly, too, what is productive of good is not naturally evil,
and pains bring about pleasures; it is, in fact, by toil
that we acquire knowledge, and it is thus also that
@@ -8330,7 +8268,7 @@ hardship and despising pleasure.
And so, too, those who assert that the virtuous life
is naturally good might be refuted by the fact that
some of the sages choose the life which includes
-pleasure,
e.g. the Cyrenaics. so that the claim that a thing is by nature
+pleasure,
e.g. the Cyrenaics. so that the claim that a thing is by nature
of this sort or that is contradicted by the divergence of
opinion amongst the Dogmatists themselves.
@@ -8343,29 +8281,29 @@ and the like. For thus we shall discover a great
variety of belief concerning what ought or ought not
to be done.
-For example,Cf. the examples in i. 145 ff. ‟Amongst us” here, and throughout this chapter (as in i. 145 ff.), means ‟amongst the Greeks” and refers in special to the laws or customs of Athens. amongst us sodomy is regarded as
-shameful or rather illegal, but by the Germani,Prob. not ‟Germans,” but a Persian tribe, cf. i. 152. they
+For example,Cf. the examples in i. 145 ff. ‟Amongst us” here, and throughout this chapter (as in i. 145 ff.), means ‟amongst the Greeks” and refers in special to the laws or customs of Athens. amongst us sodomy is regarded as
+shameful or rather illegal, but by the Germani,Prob. not ‟Germans,” but a Persian tribe, cf. i. 152. they
say, it is not looked on as shameful but as a customary
thing. It is said, too, that in Thebes long ago this
practice was not held to be shameful, and they say
that Meriones the Cretan was so called by way of
-indicating the Cretans’ custom,i.e. Μηριόνης is derived from μηρός (‟thigh”); cf. § 245 infra. and some refer to
-this the burning love of Achilles for Patroclus.Cf. Plato, Symp. 180 a.
-
+indicating the Cretans’ custom,i.e. Μηριόνης is derived from μηρός (‟thigh”); cf. § 245 infra. and some refer to
+this the burning love of Achilles for Patroclus.Cf. Plato, Symp. 180 a.
+
And what wonder, when both the adherents of the Cynic
philosophy and the followers of Zeno of Citium,
Cleanthes and Chrysippus, declare that this practice
-is indifferent?Cf. §§ 205, 245; and i. 148, 153, 160 for what follows. The repellent features of Stoic ethical theory mentioned in this chapter are passed over in most expositions of Stoicism, though confirmed by Plutarch (De Stoic. repugn.). We may ascribe them to the ‟Back to Nature” movement, which the early Stoics shared with the Cynics. The dictum ‟Live according to Nature” might be taken to mean ‟Disregard conventional morals,” ‟Cease to repress your natural instincts.” But, as Sextus says in § 249, they did not (like some of the Cynics) carry out in practice these shocking theories. Having intercourse with a woman,
+is indifferent?Cf. §§ 205, 245; and i. 148, 153, 160 for what follows. The repellent features of Stoic ethical theory mentioned in this chapter are passed over in most expositions of Stoicism, though confirmed by Plutarch (De Stoic. repugn.). We may ascribe them to the ‟Back to Nature” movement, which the early Stoics shared with the Cynics. The dictum ‟Live according to Nature” might be taken to mean ‟Disregard conventional morals,” ‟Cease to repress your natural instincts.” But, as Sextus says in § 249, they did not (like some of the Cynics) carry out in practice these shocking theories. Having intercourse with a woman,
too, in public, although deemed by us to be shameful,
is not thought to be shameful by some of the Indians;
at any rate they couple publicly with indifference, like
-the philosopher Crates, as the story goes.
-
+the philosopher Crates, as the story goes.
+
Moreover, prostitution is with us a shameful and disgraceful
thing, but with many of the Egyptians it is highly
esteemed; at least, they say that those women who
have the greatest number of lovers wear an ornamental
-ankle-ring as a token of their proud position.Cf. Hdt. iv. 176.
+ankle-ring as a token of their proud position.Cf. Hdt. iv. 176.
And with some of them the girls marry after
collecting a dowry before marriage by means of
prostitution. We see the Stoics also declaring that
@@ -8374,49 +8312,53 @@ to live on the profits of prostitution.
Moreover, with us tattooing is held to be shameful
and degrading, but many of the Egyptians and
-Sarmatians tattoo their offspring.
-
+Sarmatians tattoo their offspring.
+
Also, it is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but
amongst some of the barbarians, like the Syrians, it is
a token of nobility. And some, by way of marking
their nobility still further, pierce the nostrils also of
their children and suspend from them rings of silver
-or gold—a thing which nobody with us would do,
-
+or gold—a thing which nobody with us would do,
+
just as no man here would dress himself in a flowered
robe reaching to the feet, although this dress, which
with us is thought shameful, is held to be highly
respectable by the Persians. And when, at the Court
of Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily, a dress of this
description was offered to the philosophers Plato and
-Aristippus,
Cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 78, and i. 155 supra. The verses are from Eurip. Bacchae 836 and 317. Plato sent it away with the words—
-
A man am I, and never could I don
-A woman’s garb;
-
but Aristippus accepted it, saying—
-
For e’en midst revel-routs
-She that is chaste will keep her purity.
-
Thus, even in the case of these sages, while the one of
+Aristippus,Cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 78, and i. 155 supra. The verses are from Eurip. Bacchae 836 and 317.
+Plato sent it away with the words—
+
+A man am I, and never could I don
+A woman’s garb;
+but Aristippus accepted it, saying—
+
+For e’en midst revel-routs
+She that is chaste will keep her purity.
+Thus, even in the case of these sages, while the one of
them deemed this practice shameful, the other did
-not.
-
+
And with us it is sinful to marry one’s mother
or one’s own sister ; but the Persians, and especially
those of them who are reputed to practise wisdom—
namely, the Magi,—marry their mothers; and the
-Egyptians
Cf. i. 152. take their sisters in marriage, even as the
-poet says
Homer, Il. xviii. 356.—
-
Thus spake Zeus unto Hera, his wedded wife and his
-sister.
-
Moreover, Zeno of Citium says that it is not amiss for
+EgyptiansCf. i. 152. take their sisters in marriage, even as the
+poet saysHomer, Il. xviii. 356.—
+
+Thus spake Zeus unto Hera, his wedded wife and his
+sister.
+Moreover, Zeno of Citium says that it is not amiss for
a man to rub his mother’s private part with his own
private part, just as no one would say it was bad for
him to rub any other part of her body with his hand.
-Chrysippus,Cf. § 246, i. 160. too, in his book The State approves of a
+Chrysippus,Cf. § 246, i. 160. too, in his book The State approves of a
father getting children by his daughter, a mother by
-her son, and a brother by his sister. And Plato,Cf. Rep. v. 457. in
+her son, and a brother by his sister. And Plato,Cf. Rep. v. 457. in
more general terms, has declared that wives ought
-to be held in common.
-
+
Masturbation, too, which we count loathsome,
is not disapproved by Zeno; and we
are informed that others, too, practise this evil as
@@ -8424,24 +8366,24 @@ though it were a good thing.
Moreover, the eating of human flesh is sinful with
us, but indifferent amongst whole tribes of
-barbarians.Cf. § 225 infra. Yet why should one speak of ‟barbarians”
-when even TydeusTydeus, father of Diomede; his ‟enemy” was Melanippus (Il. xiv. 114 ff.). is said to have devoured the
+barbarians.Cf. § 225 infra. Yet why should one speak of ‟barbarians”
+when even TydeusTydeus, father of Diomede; his ‟enemy” was Melanippus (Il. xiv. 114 ff.). is said to have devoured the
brains of his enemy, and the Stoic School declare
that it is not wrong for a man to eat either other
-men’s flesh or his own?
-
+
And with most of us it is sinful to defile an altar of a god with human blood,
but the Laconians lash themselves fiercely over the
-altar of Artemis OrthosiaBoys were scourged at the altar of Artemis Orthia in Laconia. in order that a great
+altar of Artemis OrthosiaBoys were scourged at the altar of Artemis Orthia in Laconia. in order that a great
stream of blood may flow over the altar of the
goddess. Moreover, some sacrifice a human victim
-to Cronos, just as the ScythiansCf. i. 149. sacrifice strangers
+to Cronos, just as the ScythiansCf. i. 149. sacrifice strangers
to Artemis; whereas we deem that holy places are
-defiled by the slaying of a man.
-
+defiled by the slaying of a man.
+
Adulterers are, of course, punished by law with us, but amongst some
-peoplesCf. Hdt. iv. 180; Aristot. Pol. ii. 3. intercourse with other men’s wives is a thing
-indifferent; and some philosophers,e.g. Diogenes the Cynic, cf. Diog. Laert vi. 72. too, declare that
+peoplesCf. Hdt. iv. 180; Aristot. Pol. ii. 3. intercourse with other men’s wives is a thing
+indifferent; and some philosophers,e.g. Diogenes the Cynic, cf. Diog. Laert vi. 72. too, declare that
intercourse with the wife of another is indifferent.
With us, also, the law enjoins that the fathers
@@ -8451,8 +8393,8 @@ over sixty years old. And what wonder, seeing that
Cronos cut off his father’s genitals with a sickle, and
Zeus plunged Cronos down to Tartarus, and Athena
with the help of Hera and Poseidon attempted to
-bind her father with fetters?Cf. Hom. Il. xiv. 204, i. 399.
-
+bind her father with fetters?Cf. Hom. Il. xiv. 204, i. 399.
+
Moreover, Cronos decided to destroy his own children, and Solon gave
the Athenians the law ‟concerning things immune,”
by which he allowed each man to slay his own child;
@@ -8462,30 +8404,31 @@ are subjects and slaves of their fathers, and that power
over the children’s property belongs to the fathers
and not the children, until the children have obtained
their freedom like bought slaves; but this custom is
-rejected by others as being despotic.
-
+rejected by others as being despotic.
+
It is the law, too, that homicides should be punished; but gladiators
when they kill often receive actual commendation.
Moreover, the laws prevent the striking of free men;
yet when athletes strike free men, and often even
kill them, they are deemed worthy of rewards and
-crowns.
-
+
With us, too, the law bids each man to
have one wife, but amongst the Thracians and
-Gaetulians (a Libyan tribe)Cf. Sallust, Bell. Iug. 21, 82. each man has many
-wives.
-
+Gaetulians (a Libyan tribe)Cf. Sallust, Bell. Iug. 21, 82. each man has many
+wives.
+
Piracy, too, is with us illegal and criminal,
but with many of the barbarians it is not disapproved.
Indeed they say that the Cilicians used to regard it
as a noble pursuit, so that they held those who died
in the course of piracy to be worthy of honour. So
-too Nestor—in the poet’s account
Homer, Od. iii. 73. For early Greek piracy cf. Thucyd. i.5.—after welcoming
-Telemachus and his comrades, addresses them thus—
-
Say, are you roaming
-Aimlessly, like sea-rovers?
-
Yet, if piracy had been an improper thing, he would
+too Nestor—in the poet’s accountHomer, Od. iii. 73. For early Greek piracy cf. Thucyd. i.5.—after welcoming
+Telemachus and his comrades, addresses them thus—
+
+Say, are you roaming
+Aimlessly, like sea-rovers?
+Yet, if piracy had been an improper thing, he would
not have welcomed them in this friendly way, because
of his suspicion that they might be people of that
kind.
@@ -8496,46 +8439,47 @@ god cause this practice to be accounted not criminal—
for how could a god be bad? And some say that the
Laconians also punished those who thieved, not
because they had thieved, but because they had been
-found out.
-
+
Moreover, the coward and the man
who throws away his shield are in many places
punished by law; and this is why the Laconian
mother, when giving a shield to her son as he set
out for the war, said, ‟Either with this, my child, or
-upon it.” Yet Archilochus,
A. of Paros, famous for his iambic poems, circa 680 b.c. Alcaeus, a later poet, also flung away his shield in battle; and Hor. Od. ii. 7 is based on one or other of these incidents. as though vaunting to
+upon it.” Yet Archilochus,
A. of Paros, famous for his iambic poems, circa 680 b.c. Alcaeus, a later poet, also flung away his shield in battle; and Hor. Od. ii. 7 is based on one or other of these incidents. as though vaunting to
us of his flight after flinging away his shield, speaks
-thus of himself in his poems—
-
Over my shield some Saïan warrior gloats,—
-The shield I left, though loth, beside the bush—
-A flawless piece of armour; I myself
-Fled and escaped from death which endeth all.
-
-And the AmazonsCf. Hdt. iv. 114. used to maim the males amongst
+thus of himself in his poems—
+
+Over my shield some Saïan warrior gloats,—
+The shield I left, though loth, beside the bush—
+A flawless piece of armour; I myself
+Fled and escaped from death which endeth all.
+
+And the AmazonsCf. Hdt. iv. 114. used to maim the males amongst
their offspring so as to make them incapable of any
manly action, while they themselves attended to
warfare; though with us the opposite practice is
-regarded as right. The Mother of the gods,Cybele, whose priests were eunuchs, cf. Catullus 63. also,
+regarded as right. The Mother of the gods,Cybele, whose priests were eunuchs, cf. Catullus 63. also,
approves of effeminates, and the goddess would not
have decided thus if unmanliness were naturally a
-bad thing.
-
+
So it is that, in regard to justice and
injustice and the excellence of manliness, there is a
great variety of opinion.
Around all matters of religion and_ theology
-also, there rages violent controversy.Cf. for this subject Adv. Phys. i. 13 ff., 50 ff. For while
+also, there rages violent controversy.Cf. for this subject Adv. Phys. i. 13 ff., 50 ff. For while
the majority declare that gods exist, some deny
their existence, like Diagoras of Melos, and Theodorus,
-and Critias the Athenian.Diagoras, atomist and poet, circa 420 b.c.; Theodorus, a Cyrenaic, circa 310 b.c.; Critias, orator and poet, one of the ‟Thirty Tyrants” (404 b.c.) of Athens. And of those
+and Critias the Athenian.Diagoras, atomist and poet, circa 420 b.c.; Theodorus, a Cyrenaic, circa 310 b.c.; Critias, orator and poet, one of the ‟Thirty Tyrants” (404 b.c.) of Athens. And of those
who maintain the existence of gods, some believe in
the ancestral gods, others in such as are constructed
in the Dogmatic systems—as Aristotle asserted
-that God is incorporeal and ‟the limit of heaven,”This definition of God is not in our Aristotle, but cf. De caelo, i. 9, 278 b 14: ‟We are wont to give the name of ‘Heaven’ especially to the outermost and highest (part of the Universe), in which all the Divinity, we say, is situated.” It is this outermost circumference—the abode of Fire, the finest and most divine of elements—which is here termed ‟the limit” (πέρας).
+that God is incorporeal and ‟the limit of heaven,”This definition of God is not in our Aristotle, but cf. De caelo, i. 9, 278 b 14: ‟We are wont to give the name of ‘Heaven’ especially to the outermost and highest (part of the Universe), in which all the Divinity, we say, is situated.” It is this outermost circumference—the abode of Fire, the finest and most divine of elements—which is here termed ‟the limit” (πέρας).
the Stoics that he is a breath which permeates even
-through things foul, Epicurus that he is anthropomorphic,Cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 138 f. (Stoics), x. 139 (Epicureans). For Xenophanes cf. i. 225.
-Xenophanes that he is an impassive sphere.
-
+through things foul, Epicurus that he is anthropomorphic,Cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 138 f. (Stoics), x. 139 (Epicureans). For Xenophanes cf. i. 225.
+Xenophanes that he is an impassive sphere.
+
Some, too, hold that he cares for human affairs, others
that he does not so care; for Epicurus declares that
‟what is blessed and incorruptible neither feels trouble
@@ -8543,7 +8487,7 @@ itself nor causes it to others.” Hence ordinary people
differ also, some saying that there is one god, others
that there are many gods and of various shapes;
in fact, they even come to share the notions of the
-EgyptiansCf. Hdt. ii. 41, Juvenal xv. 2 ff. who believe in gods that are dog-faced, or
+EgyptiansCf. Hdt. ii. 41, Juvenal xv. 2 ff. who believe in gods that are dog-faced, or
hawk-shaped, or cows or crocodiles or anything else.
Hence, too, sacrificial usages, and the ritual of worship
@@ -8555,25 +8499,25 @@ for example, no one would sacrifice a pig to Sarapis,
but they sacrifice it to Heracles and Asclepius. To
sacrifice a sheep to Isis is forbidden, but it is offered
up in honour of the so-called Mother of the gods
-and of other deities.
-
-To CronosCf. § 208 supra. a human victim is
+and of other deities.
+
+To Cronos
Cf. § 208 supra. a human victim is
sacrificed
, although this is regarded by
most as an impious act. In Alexandria they offer a
cat to Horus and a beetle to Thetis—a thing which
no one here would do. To Poseidon they sacrifice a
-horse; but to Apollo (especially the Didymaeani.e. of Didymus, near Miletus.
+horse; but to Apollo (especially the Didymaeani.e. of Didymus, near Miletus.
Apollo) that animal is an abomination. It is an act
-of piety to offer goats to Artemis, but not to Asclepius.
-
+of piety to offer goats to Artemis, but not to Asclepius.
+
And I might add a host of similar instances, but I
forbear since my aim is to be brief. Yet surely, if a
sacrifice had been holy by nature or unholy, it would
have been deemed so by all men alike.
Examples similar to these may also be found in
-the religious observances with regard to human diet.
-
-For a Jew or an Egyptian priestCf. Hdt. ii. 47. would sooner die
+the religious observances with regard to human diet.
+
+For a Jew or an Egyptian priestCf. Hdt. ii. 47. would sooner die
than eat swine’s flesh; by a Libyan it is regarded as
a most impious thing to taste the meat of a sheep,
by some of the Syrians to eat a dove, and by others
@@ -8581,62 +8525,63 @@ to eat sacrificial victims. And in certain cults it is
lawful, but in others impious, to eat fish. And
amongst the Egyptians some of those who are reputed
to be sages believe it is sinful to eat an animal’s
-head,Cf. Hdt. ii. 39. others the shoulder, others the foot, others
-some other part.
-
-And no one would bring an onionCf. Juv. xv. 9.
-as an offering to Zeus Casius of Pelusium,East of the Nile Delta. just as
+head,Cf. Hdt. ii. 39. others the shoulder, others the foot, others
+some other part.
+
+And no one would bring an onionCf. Juv. xv. 9.
+as an offering to Zeus Casius of Pelusium,East of the Nile Delta. just as
no priest of the Libyan Aphrodite would taste garlic.
And in some cults they abstain from mint, in others
from catmint, in others from parsley. And some
declare that they would sooner eat their fathers’
-heads than beans.Cf. Emped. Frag. 141; probably a Pythagorean (or Orphic) ‟taboo”; cf. Hdt. ii. 37.
-
+heads than beans.Cf. Emped. Frag. 141; probably a Pythagorean (or Orphic) ‟taboo”; cf. Hdt. ii. 37.
+
Yet, amongst others, these things
are indifferent. Eating dog’s flesh, too, is thought
by us to be sinful, but some of the Thracians are
reported to be dog-eaters. Possibly this practice was
customary also amongst the Greeks; and on this
account Diocles, too, starting from the practices of
-the Asclepiadae,The earliest Greek medical guild; Diocles was a famous physician of the fourth century b.c. prescribes that hounds’ flesh should
+the Asclepiadae,The earliest Greek medical guild; Diocles was a famous physician of the fourth century b.c. prescribes that hounds’ flesh should
be given to certain patients. And some, as I have
-said,§ 207 supra. even eat human flesh indifferently, a thing
-which with us is accounted sinful.
-
+said,§ 207 supra. even eat human flesh indifferently, a thing
+which with us is accounted sinful.
+
Yet, if the rules
of ritual and of unlawful foods had existed by nature,
they would have been observed by all men alike.
A similar account may be given of reverence
-towards the departed.For this subject cf. Diog. Laert. ix. 84; Cic. Tusc. i. 45; Sir T. Browne, Hydriotaphia, chap. i. Some wrap the dead up
+towards the departed.For this subject cf. Diog. Laert. ix. 84; Cic. Tusc. i. 45; Sir T. Browne, Hydriotaphia, chap. i. Some wrap the dead up
completely and then cover them with earth, thinking
that it is impious to expose them to the sun; but
the Egyptians take out their entrails and embalm
-them and keep them above ground with themselves.
-
+them and keep them above ground with themselves.
+
The fish-eating tribes of the Ethiopians cast them
into the lakes, there to be devoured by the fish; the
-HyrcaniansSouth of the Caspian Sea. expose them as a prey to dogs, and some
+HyrcaniansSouth of the Caspian Sea. expose them as a prey to dogs, and some
of the Indians to vultures. And they say that some
-of the Troglodytesi.e. ‟cave-dwellers” of west coast of the Red Sea. take the corpse to a hill, and then
+of the Troglodytesi.e. ‟cave-dwellers” of west coast of the Red Sea. take the corpse to a hill, and then
after tying its head to its feet cast stones upon it
amidst laughter, and when they have made a heap
-of stones over it they leave it there.
-
-And some of the barbariansCf. § 210 supra. slay and eat those who are over
+of stones over it they leave it there.
+
+And some of the barbariansCf. § 210 supra. slay and eat those who are over
sixty years old, but bury in the earth those who die
young. Some burn the dead; and of these some
-recover and preserve their bones,Cf. Tibull. iii. 2. 17 for the practice of ossilegium. while others show
+recover and preserve their bones,Cf. Tibull. iii. 2. 17 for the practice of ossilegium. while others show
no care but leave them scattered about. And they
-say that the PersiansCf. Hdt. i. 140. impale their dead and
+say that the PersiansCf. Hdt. i. 140. impale their dead and
embalm them with nitre, after which they wrap
them round in bandages. How much grief others
endure for the dead we see ourselves.
Some, too, believe death itself to be dreadful and
-horrible, others do not. Thus Euripides says:Eurip. Frag. 638 (Nauck).
-
Who knows if life be but the state of death,
-And death be counted life in realms below?
-
And Epicurus declares:Eric. p. 61. 6; 71. 6 (Usener); cf. Lucret. iii. 830. ‟Death is nothing to us;
+horrible, others do not. Thus Euripides says:Eurip. Frag. 638 (Nauck).
+
+Who knows if life be but the state of death,
+And death be counted life in realms below?
+And Epicurus declares:Eric. p. 61. 6; 71. 6 (Usener); cf. Lucret. iii. 830. ‟Death is nothing to us;
for what is dissolved is senseless, and what is senseless
is nothing to us.” They also declare that, inasmuch as
we are compounded of soul and body, and death is a
@@ -8644,32 +8589,34 @@ dissolution of soul and body, when we exist death
does not exist (for we are not being dissolved), and
when death exists we do not exist, for through the
cessation of the compound of soul and body we too
-cease to exist.
-
-And HeracleitusCf. Heracl. Frag. 67, 78 (b 88 Diels). Part of the ‟Upward and Downward Way” of H. (see Introd, p. viii) is the cycle of generation by which every creature is simultaneously both living and dying. The soul, which consists of ‟fire,” is continually passing into the other elements, and the other elements into it. But the second clause (‟for when we live” etc.) looks rather like a contamination of Heracleitus’s doctrine with the σῶμα—σῆμα (‟body a tomb”) theory of Pythagoreanism. states that both life
+cease to exist.
+
+And Heracleitus
Cf. Heracl. Frag. 67, 78 (b 88 Diels). Part of the ‟Upward and Downward Way” of H. (see Introd, p. viii) is the cycle of generation by which every creature is simultaneously both living and dying. The soul, which consists of ‟fire,” is continually passing into the other elements, and the other elements into it. But the second clause (‟for when we live” etc.) looks rather like a contamination of Heracleitus’s doctrine with the σῶμα—σῆμα (‟body a tomb”) theory of Pythagoreanism. states that both life
and death exist both in our state of life and in our
state of death; for when we live our souls are dead
and buried within us, and when we die our souls
revive and live. And some even suppose that dying
-is better for us than living. Thus Euripides says;
Frag. 449; cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 48, Lucr. v. 222 ff.
-
Rather should we assemble to bewail
-The babe new-born, such ills has he to face;
-Whereas the dead, who has surcease from woe,
-With joy and gladness we should bear from home.
-
-These lines, too, spring from the same sentiment:Theognis 425 ff.; cf. Soph. Oed. Col. 1227.
-
Not to have been begotten at all were the best thing for
-mortals,
-Nor to have lookèd upon fiery rays of the sun:
-Or, if begotten, to hasten amain to the portals of Hades,
-And to lie unmoved robèd in masses of earth.
-
We know, too, the facts about Cleobis and Biton
-which HerodotusCf. Hdt. i. 31; Cic. Tusc. i. 47. Their mother Cydippe (the ‟Argive priestess” of Hera) prayed the goddess to grant her sons, C. and B., the best of boons for mortals: the same night both died in their sleep. relates in his story of the Argive
-priestess.
-
+is better for us than living. Thus Euripides says;Frag. 449; cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 48, Lucr. v. 222 ff.
+
+Rather should we assemble to bewail
+The babe new-born, such ills has he to face;
+Whereas the dead, who has surcease from woe,
+With joy and gladness we should bear from home.
+
+These lines, too, spring from the same sentiment:Theognis 425 ff.; cf. Soph. Oed. Col. 1227.
+
+Not to have been begotten at all were the best thing for
+mortals,
+Nor to have lookèd upon fiery rays of the sun:
+Or, if begotten, to hasten amain to the portals of Hades,
+And to lie unmoved robèd in masses of earth.
+We know, too, the facts about Cleobis and Biton
+which HerodotusCf. Hdt. i. 31; Cic. Tusc. i. 47. Their mother Cydippe (the ‟Argive priestess” of Hera) prayed the goddess to grant her sons, C. and B., the best of boons for mortals: the same night both died in their sleep. relates in his story of the Argive
+priestess.
+
It is reported, also, that some of the
Thracians sit round the new-born babe and chant
-dirges.Cf. Hdt. v. 4. So, then, death should not be considered a
+dirges.Cf. Hdt. v. 4. So, then, death should not be considered a
thing naturally dreadful, just as life should not be
considered a thing naturally good. Thus none of the
things mentioned above is naturally of this character
@@ -8683,11 +8630,11 @@ exposition. And even if, in regard to some of them,
we are unable to declare their discrepancy offhand,
we ought to observe that disagreement concerning
them may possibly exist amongst certain nations that
-are unknown to us.Cf. ii. 40.
-
+are unknown to us.Cf. ii. 40.
+
For just as, if we had been
ignorant, say, of the custom amongst the Egyptians
-of marrying sisters,Cf. § 205 supra. we should have asserted wrongly
+of marrying sisters,Cf. § 205 supra. we should have asserted wrongly
that it was universally agreed that men ought not to
marry sisters,—even so, in regard to those practices
wherein we notice no discrepancy, it is not proper for
@@ -8700,12 +8647,12 @@ Accordingly, the Sceptic, seeing so great a diversity
of usages, suspends judgement as to the natural
existence of anything good or bad or (in general) fit
or unfit to be done, therein abstaining from the rashness
-of dogmatism;Cf. i. 13, 25 ff. and he follows undogmatically
+of dogmatism;Cf. i. 13, 25 ff. and he follows undogmatically
the ordinary rules of life, and because of this he
remains impassive in respect of matters of opinion,
while in conditions that are necessitated his emotions
-are moderate;
-
+
for though, as a human being, he
suffers emotion through his senses, yet because he
does not also opine that what he suffers is evil by
@@ -8714,10 +8661,9 @@ added opinion that a thing is of such a kind is worse
than the actual suffering itself, just as sometimes the
patients themselves bear a surgical operation, while
the bystanders swoon away because of their opinion
-that it is a horrible experience.
-
-But, in fact, he who
-assumes that there exists by nature something good
+that it is a horrible experience.
+
+But, in fact, he who assumes that there exists by nature something good
or bad or, generally, fit or unfit to be done, is disquieted
in various ways. For when he experiences
what he regards as natural evils he deems himself to
@@ -8726,10 +8672,10 @@ of what seems to him good things he falls into no
ordinary state of disquiet both through arrogance and
through fear of losing them, and through trying to
guard against finding himself again amongst what he
-regards as natural evils;
-
+regards as natural evils;
+
for those who assert that goods
-are incapable of being lostSo said the Cynics, and some Stoics; other Stoics gave up the doctrine; cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 105, vii. 127. we shall put to silence
+are incapable of being lostSo said the Cynics, and some Stoics; other Stoics gave up the doctrine; cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 105, vii. 127. we shall put to silence
by means of the doubts raised by their dissension.
Hence we conclude that if what is productive of evil
is evil and to be shunned, and the persuasion that
@@ -8745,7 +8691,7 @@ evil, and indifferent is sufficient.
Chapter XXV.—Does There Exist An Art Of Living?
It is plain from what has been said above that there
-can be no art of living.Cf. Adv. Eth. 167 ff.; Cic. De fin. i. 13, v. 6 ff. For if such an art exists, it
+can be no art of living.Cf. Adv. Eth. 167 ff.; Cic. De fin. i. 13, v. 6 ff. For if such an art exists, it
has to do with the consideration of things good, evil,
and indifferent, so that these being non-existent the
art of living also is non-existent. Further, since the
@@ -8753,8 +8699,8 @@ Dogmatists do not all with one accord lay down one
single art of living, but some propound one art, some
another, they are guilty of discrepancy and open to
the argument from discrepancy which I stated in our
-discussion of the Good.Cf. §§ 180, 238 supra.
-
+discussion of the Good.Cf. §§ 180, 238 supra.
+
Yet, even if they were
all to agree in assuming that the art of living is one
—such as, for example, the celebrated ‟prudence”
@@ -8762,15 +8708,15 @@ whereof the Stoics dream, and which seems to be
more convincing than all the rest,—even so equally
absurd results will follow. For since ‟prudence” is a
virtue, and the Sage alone was in possession of virtue,
-the Stoics, not being sages,For the sage as ‟indiscoverable” cf. Adv. Phys. i. 133, Introd. p. xxix. ‟Prudence” (φρόνησις), or ‟practical wisdom, is distinguished from ‟wisdom” (σοφία). Note that in this argument ‟the art of living” is identified with ‟prudence.” will not be in possession
-of the art of living.
-
+the Stoics, not being sages,For the sage as ‟indiscoverable” cf. Adv. Phys. i. 133, Introd. p. xxix. ‟Prudence” (φρόνησις), or ‟practical wisdom, is distinguished from ‟wisdom” (σοφία). Note that in this argument ‟the art of living” is identified with ‟prudence.” will not be in possession
+of the art of living.
+
And in general, since, according
-to them, no art
Cf. §§ 188 ff.; ii. 53 ff. can have real existence, an art of
+to them, no art
Cf. §§ 188 ff.; ii. 53 ff. can have real existence, an art of
living cannot exist, so far as their statements go.
Thus, for example, they declare that art is ‟a
composite of apprehensions,” and apprehension is ‟assent
-to an apprehensive impression.”Cf. ii. 4, 53 ff., Introd. p. xxv. But the apprehensive
+to an apprehensive impression.”Cf. ii. 4, 53 ff., Introd. p. xxv. But the apprehensive
impression is indiscoverable; for every impression
is not apprehensive, nor is it possible to decide which
one of the impressions is the apprehensive impression,
@@ -8780,13 +8726,13 @@ not, while if we require an apprehensive impression in
order to determine which is the apprehensive impression
we are wrecked on the ad infinitum fallacy, since
we are asking for another apprehensive impression so
-as to determine the impression taken to be apprehensive.
-
+as to determine the impression taken to be apprehensive.
+
And herein, too, the procedure of the Stoics,
in presenting the notion of the apprehensive impression,
is logically unsound; for in stating, on the one
hand, that an apprehensive impression is that which
-is derived from a real object,Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 88. and, on the other hand,
+is derived from a real object,Cf. Adv. Log. ii. 88. and, on the other hand,
that a real object is that which is capable of giving
rise to an apprehensive impression, they fall into the
fallacy of circular reasoning. If, then, in order that
@@ -8807,19 +8753,20 @@ as well. Therefore no art of living exists. For we
shall not ascertain (as some assert) from the apparent
derivation of some speech or operation of the prudent
man from a state of prudence that it is a product of
-prudence.
-
+
For the state of prudence itself is inapprehensible,
not being directly apparent either of itself or
from its products, these being common to ordinary folk
as well. And to say that we apprehend the possessor
of the art of living by the unvarying quality of his
-actions
i.e. always consistently good, impeccable. is the assertion of those who over-estimate
+actions
i.e. always consistently good, impeccable. is the assertion of those who over-estimate
human nature and are visionaries rather than truth-
-tellers:
-
As is the day which upon them is brought by the sire
-immortal,
-So are the minds of mortal men.Homer, Od. xviii. 136–137.
+tellers:
+
+As is the day which upon them is brought by the sire
+immortal,
+So are the minds of mortal men.Homer, Od. xviii. 136–137.
There remains the assertion that the art of living
is apprehended by means of those effects which they
@@ -8832,10 +8779,10 @@ regarding the rearing of children, says this:
favourite than of a non-favourite child, nor of a female
than of a male; favourite or non-favourite, males or
females, no different conduct, but the same, befits
-and is befitting to all alike.”
-
+and is befitting to all alike.”
+
And as concerns piety
-towards parents, the same man states,Cf. § 205. in reference
+towards parents, the same man states,Cf. § 205. in reference
to the story of Jocasta and Oedipus, that there was
nothing dreadful in his rubbing his mother: ‟If she
had been ailing in one part of her body and he
@@ -8848,18 +8795,16 @@ agrees. At least he says in his State: ‟I approve
of carrying out those practices—which, quite rightly,
are customary even nowadays amongst many peoples
—according to which a mother has children by her
-son,Cf. § 199. the father by his daughter, the brother by
-his full sister.”
-
-And he proceeds, in the same
-treatises, to introduce amongst us cannibalism,Cf. § 207.
+son,Cf. § 199. the father by his daughter, the brother by
+his full sister.”
+
+And he proceeds, in the same treatises, to introduce amongst us cannibalism,Cf. § 207.
saying: ‟And if from a living body a part be cut
off that is good for food, we should not bury it nor
otherwise get rid of it, but consume it, so that from
-our parts a new part may arise.”
-
-And in his book
-On Duty he says expressly, regarding the burial of
+our parts a new part may arise.”
+
+And in his book On Duty he says expressly, regarding the burial of
parents: ‟When our parents decease we should use
the simplest forms of burial, as though the body—like
the nails or teeth or hair—were nothing to us, and we
@@ -8875,7 +8820,7 @@ and pay no more regard to it than to nails or hair.”
Of such a kind are most of the philosophers’
theories; but they would not dare to put them into
practice unless they lived under the laws of the
-Cyclopes or Laestrygones.For C. and L., as savages of ancient Sicily, cf. Hom. Od. i. 69, x. 81; Thuc. vi. 21. But if they are totally
+Cyclopes or Laestrygones.For C. and L., as savages of ancient Sicily, cf. Hom. Od. i. 69, x. 81; Thuc. vi. 21. But if they are totally
incapable of acting thus, and their actual conduct is
common to ordinary folk as well, there is no action
peculiar to those who are suspected of possessing the
@@ -8897,14 +8842,14 @@ art of living will arise in them either in so far as they
are men, or in so far as they are not men. Certainly
not in so far as they are not men; for it is not a fact
that they are not men. But if it is in so far as they
-are men, then prudenceFor ‟prudence,” or practical ‟wisdom,” cf. § 240. would have belonged to all
+are men, then prudenceFor ‟prudence,” or practical ‟wisdom,” cf. § 240. would have belonged to all
men, so that all would have been prudent and virtuous
-and wise. But they describe most men as bad.
-
+and wise. But they describe most men as bad.
+
Neither, then, in so far as they are men will the art of
living belong to them. Therefore it does not accrue
by nature. And again, since they insist that art is
-‟a system of co-exercised apprehensions,”Cf. §§ 188, 241, 261. they
+‟a system of co-exercised apprehensions,”Cf. §§ 188, 241, 261. they
make it evident that the art under discussion, as well
as all other arts, is acquired rather by some sort of
effort and learning.
@@ -8929,13 +8874,13 @@ either true or false; if false it would not be taught;
for they assert that falsehood is non-existent, and of
non-existents there could be no teaching. Nor yet
if it were said to be true; for we have shown in our
-chapter ‟On the Criterion”Cf. ii. 85 ff. that truth is non-existent.
+chapter ‟On the Criterion”Cf. ii. 85 ff. that truth is non-existent.
If, then, neither the false nor the true
is being taught, and besides these there is nothing
capable of being taught (for no one, to be sure, will
say that, though these are unteachable, he teaches
-only dubious lessons‟Dubious lessons”: if the text is right, we must supply λόγους (sayings, ‟lessons”) with τοὺς ἀπόρους. It was laid down (cf. Adv. Math. i. 29) that ‟the dubious (ἄπορον) cannot be taught”: it is intermediate between truth and falsehood.), then nothing is taught.
-
+only dubious lessons‟Dubious lessons”: if the text is right, we must supply λόγους (sayings, ‟lessons”) with τοὺς ἀπόρους. It was laid down (cf. Adv. Math. i. 29) that ‟the dubious (ἄπορον) cannot be taught”: it is intermediate between truth and falsehood.), then nothing is taught.
+
And the matter taught is either apparent or non-evident.
But if it is apparent, it will not require
teaching; for things apparent appear to all alike.
@@ -8959,10 +8904,10 @@ if the non-existent is taught the non-existent will be
true, since teaching is held to be of things true. And
if it is true, it will also subsist; for they declare that
‟a true thing is what subsists and is opposed to
-something.”For the Stoic doctrine of ‟the true” and ‟truth” cf. ii. 80 ff. What ‟the true” is ‟opposed to” is presumably ‟the false.” ‟But it is absurd to say that the non-
+something.”For the Stoic doctrine of ‟the true” and ‟truth” cf. ii. 80 ff. What ‟the true” is ‟opposed to” is presumably ‟the false.” ‟But it is absurd to say that the non-
existent subsists; therefore the non-existent is not
-taught.
-
+
Yet neither is the existent. For if the
existent is taught, it is taught either in so far as it is
existent or in so far as it is something else. But if it
@@ -8970,9 +8915,9 @@ is to be taught in so far as it is existent, it will be one
of the existing things, and therefore a thing incapable
of being taught; for teaching ought to proceed
from certain acknowledged facts which require no
-teaching.Cf. Aristot. Anal. Post. i. 1. Therefore the existent, in so far as it is
-existent, is not capable of being taught.
-
+teaching.Cf. Aristot. Anal. Post. i. 1. Therefore the existent, in so far as it is
+existent, is not capable of being taught.
+
Nor, in fact, in so far as it is something else. For the existent has
not anything else which is non-existent attached to it,
so that if the existent in so far as it is existent is
@@ -8998,9 +8943,9 @@ expert, or the expert the non-expert. Now the expert
does not teach the expert; for neither of them, qua
expert, needs teaching. Nor does the non-expert
teach the non-expert, any more than the blind can
-lead the blind.For this saying cf. Matt. xv. 14; Hor. Epist. i. 17. Nor the non-expert the expert, for
-it would be ridiculous.
-
+lead the blind.For this saying cf. Matt. xv. 14; Hor. Epist. i. 17. Nor the non-expert the expert, for
+it would be ridiculous.
+
The only thing left is to say
that the expert teaches the non-expert; and this,
too, is a thing impossible. For it is declared to be
@@ -9009,11 +8954,11 @@ since neither do we see anyone existing spontaneously
and from birth as an expert, nor does anyone turn
into an expert from being a non-expert. For either
one lesson and one apprehension can make an expert
-of the non-expert or they cannot do so at all.The argument here is that the non-expert cannot become an expert either (1) by a single lesson, §§ 261–262, or (2) by a course of lessons, which must follow each other singly, § 263. ‟Apprehension” here means the grasp of a truth or principle of the art or craft which is being imparted, the ‟art” itself being defined as a ‟system” of such pieces of knowledge.
-
+of the non-expert or they cannot do so at all.The argument here is that the non-expert cannot become an expert either (1) by a single lesson, §§ 261–262, or (2) by a course of lessons, which must follow each other singly, § 263. ‟Apprehension” here means the grasp of a truth or principle of the art or craft which is being imparted, the ‟art” itself being defined as a ‟system” of such pieces of knowledge.
+
But if one apprehension makes the non-expert an
expert, it will be open to us to declare, firstly, that
-art is not a system of apprehensions;Cf. § 251 supra. for the man
+art is not a system of apprehensions;Cf. § 251 supra. for the man
who knows nothing at all would be termed an expert
if only he were taught a single lesson of art. And,
secondly, should anyone assert that, as soon as a man
@@ -9021,8 +8966,8 @@ who has acquired some principles of art and still
needs one more, and because of this is non-expert,
acquires also that one principle, he at once becomes
an expert instead of a non-expert by means of one
-apprehension, he will be making a random assertion.Cf. § 79 supra.
-
+apprehension, he will be making a random assertion.Cf. § 79 supra.
+
For in the case of individual men we could not point
to one who, being still a non-expert, will become an
expert by acquiring one additional principle; for no
@@ -9031,8 +8976,8 @@ of the principles of each art as to be able to say,
by numbering off the known principles, how many
are still needed to make up the full number of the
principles of the art. So then the learning of one
-principle does not make the non-expert an expert.
-
+principle does not make the non-expert an expert.
+
But if this is true, seeing that no one acquires all the
principles of the arts at once, but each .one singly,
if at all—this point also being granted by way of
@@ -9050,30 +8995,30 @@ expert, learn and apprehend the principles of the art
wherein he is non-expert. For just as the man who
is blind from birth, in so far as he is blind, will not
acquire perception of colours, nor, similarly, he who
-is deaf from birth, of sound,These comparisons are ascribed to Anacharsis, the Scythian sage of Solon’s time (circa 590 b.c.); cf. Adv. Log. i. 55. so too the non-expert
+is deaf from birth, of sound,These comparisons are ascribed to Anacharsis, the Scythian sage of Solon’s time (circa 590 b.c.); cf. Adv. Log. i. 55. so too the non-expert
will not apprehend the principles of the art wherein
he is non-expert. For should he do so the same man
would be both expert and non-expert in the same
things—non-expert since he is such by hypothesis,
and expert since he has apprehension of the principles
of the art. Hence, neither does the expert
-teach the non-expert.
-
-But if neither the expert
-teaches the expert, nor the non-expert the non-
+teach the non-expert.
+
+But if neither the expert teaches the expert, nor the non-expert the non-
expert, nor the non-expert the expert, nor the expert
the non-expert, and these are all the alternatives
possible, then neither the teacher exists nor the
-taught. And if neither the learner nor the teacher exists,
-the method of teaching also is abolished.
+taught.
+And if neither the learner nor the teacher exists,
+the method of teaching also is abolished.
Chapter XXX.—Does There Exist Any Method Of Learning?
-
+
And it is no less disputed on the following grounds. The method
of teaching comes to exist either by ocular evidence
-or by speech;Cf. i. 138, 178. but it does not come to exist either
+or by speech;Cf. i. 138, 178. but it does not come to exist either
by ocular evidence or by speech, as we shall show;
therefore the method of learning also is not easy to
discover.
@@ -9090,11 +9035,11 @@ speech either signifies something or signifies nothing.
But if it signifies nothing, neither will it be capable
of teaching anything. And if it signifies something,
it does so either by nature or by convention.
-But it is not significant by natureCf. ii. 214. because
+But it is not significant by natureCf. ii. 214. because
all men do not understand all when they hear
them, as is the case with Greeks hearing barbarians
-talk or barbarians hearing Greeks.
-
+talk or barbarians hearing Greeks.
+
And if it is significant by convention, evidently those who
have grasped beforehand the objects to which the
several words are assigned will perceive those objects,
@@ -9103,15 +9048,15 @@ which they were ignorant, but by recollecting and
recovering things which they knew; whereas those
who require to learn what they do not know, and
who are ignorant of the objects to which the words
-are assigned, will have no perception of anything.
-
+are assigned, will have no perception of anything.
+
Consequently, the method of learning also will be
incapable of subsisting. For, in fact, the teacher
ought to impart to the learner an apprehension of
the principles of the art he is teaching, so that the
latter by apprehending them as a system may thus
become an expert artist. But, as we have shown
-above,Cf. § 214. apprehension is nothing; therefore also the
+above,Cf. § 214. apprehension is nothing; therefore also the
method of teaching cannot subsist. But if neither
the matter taught exists, nor the teacher and the
learner, nor the method of learning, then neither
@@ -9121,19 +9066,18 @@ Such, then, are the objections put forward regarding
learning and teaching in general. And the same
difficulties may also be alleged in the case of the
so-called art of living. Thus, for instance, we have
-shown aboveCf. §§ 240 ff. that the matter taught, namely prudence,
+shown aboveCf. §§ 240 ff. that the matter taught, namely prudence,
is non-existent; and both the teacher and the
learner are non-existent. For either the prudent
man will teach the prudent the art of living, or the
imprudent the imprudent, or the imprudent the
prudent, or the prudent the imprudent; but none
of these teaches any other; therefore the so-called
-art of living is not taught.
-
-Probably it is superfluous
-even to refer to the other cases; but if the prudent
+art of living is not taught.
+
+Probably it is superfluous even to refer to the other cases; but if the prudent
man teaches prudence to the imprudent, and prudence is
-‟knowledgeCf. § 168. of things good and evil and
+‟knowledgeCf. § 168. of things good and evil and
neither,” the imprudent man, as he does not possess
prudence, possesses ignorance of the things that are
good and evil and neither; and since he possesses
@@ -9143,8 +9087,8 @@ neither, he will merely hear what is said and will not
get to know the things. For if he should grasp them
while in a state of imprudence, then imprudence too
will be capable of perceiving what things are good
-and evil and neither.
-
+
But, according to them, imprudence
is certainly not capable of perceiving these
things, since, if it were, the imprudent man will be
@@ -9162,24 +9106,23 @@ the philosophers, is indiscoverable.
Yet even were one to grant, as an act of bounty,
that this visionary art of living is imparted to someone,
it will show itself to be hurtful to its possessors,
-and a cause of perturbation, rather than beneficial.
-Thus, for instance—to take a few arguments out
+and a cause of perturbation, rather than beneficial.
+
Thus, for instance—to take a few arguments out
of many by way of example—the art of living might
be thought to benefit the wise man by furnishing
-him with temperanceFor the Stoic definition of this virtue cf. Adv. Phys. i. 153. It denotes ‟self-mastery” by which the rational self (or ‟Logos”) overcomes the irrational appetites and passions. in his impulses towards good
-and repulsions from evil.
+him with temperance
For the Stoic definition of this virtue cf. Adv. Phys. i. 153. It denotes ‟self-mastery” by which the rational self (or ‟Logos”) overcomes the irrational appetites and passions. in his impulses towards good
+and repulsions from evil.
Chapter XXXI.—Does The Art Of Living Benefit Its Possessor?
-
-He, then, who is termed by
-them a temperate sage is called temperate either in
+
+He, then, who is termed by them a temperate sage is called temperate either in
virtue of his never feeling the impulse towards good
-or repulsion from evil,Cf. § 177 for the Stoic use of ‟inclination” and ‟aversion” as ethical terms. The Stoic ideal being complete absence of passion and emotion (‟apathy”), the less ‟temperance” a man exercised the better he was. ‟The Sage,” being a purely rational self, needs no ‟self-mastery.” Cf. Introd. p. xxviii. or in virtue of his possessing
+or repulsion from evil,Cf. § 177 for the Stoic use of ‟inclination” and ‟aversion” as ethical terms. The Stoic ideal being complete absence of passion and emotion (‟apathy”), the less ‟temperance” a man exercised the better he was. ‟The Sage,” being a purely rational self, needs no ‟self-mastery.” Cf. Introd. p. xxviii. or in virtue of his possessing
slight impulses in either direction and overcoming
-them by reason.
-
+
But in respect of his freedom from
bad resolutions he will not be self-controlled; for he
will not control what he does not possess. And just
@@ -9190,21 +9133,21 @@ no attraction at all towards such things, so that they
might rise superior to the attraction through temperance),
—in the same way we ought not to term the
sage temperate, because he possesses no natural
-feeling over which he may exercise control.
-
+feeling over which he may exercise control.
+
And if they shall claim that he is temperate in virtue
of his forming bad resolutions but overcoming them
by reason, then, firstly, they will be admitting that
prudence was of no benefit to him just when he was
in a state of perturbation and needed assistance, and,
secondly, he is found to be even more unfortunate
-than those they term bad.The ‟not-wise” of the Stoics, cf. § 251. For if he feels an impulse
+than those they term bad.The ‟not-wise” of the Stoics, cf. § 251. For if he feels an impulse
towards anything, he is certainly perturbed; while
if he overcomes it by reason, he retains the evil,
and because of this he is more perturbed than the
bad man who no longer experiences this feeling;
-for the latter,
-
+
though he is perturbed if he is feeling
an impulse, yet ceases from his perturbation if he
gains his desires.
@@ -9212,12 +9155,12 @@ gains his desires.
virtue of his prudence; or if he does become so, he
is of all men the most miserable, so that the art of
living has brought him no benefit but the uttermost
-perturbation. And we have shown aboveCf. §§ 236 f. supra, i. 27. that the
+perturbation. And we have shown aboveCf. §§ 236 f. supra, i. 27. that the
man who believes that he possesses the art of living,
and that by means of it he discerns what things are
naturally good and what bad, is extremely perturbed
-both when good things are his and when evil things.
-
+both when good things are his and when evil things.
+
We must, then, declare that, if there is no agreement
as to the existence of things good and bad and
indifferent, and the art of living is possibly non-
@@ -9240,15 +9183,14 @@ only this final section:
The Sceptic, being a lover of his kind, desires to
cure by speech, as best he can, the self-conceit
-and rashnessCf. i. 20, 177; ii. 256, 258. of the Dogmatists. So, just as the
+and rashnessCf. i. 20, 177; ii. 256, 258. of the Dogmatists. So, just as the
physicians who cure bodily ailments have remedies
which differ in strength, and apply the severe ones
to those whose ailments are severe and the milder to
those mildly affected,—so too the Sceptic propounds
-arguments which differ in strength,
-
-and employs those
-which are weighty and capable by their stringency of
+arguments which differ in strength,
+
+and employs those which are weighty and capable by their stringency of
disposing of the Dogmatists' ailment, self-conceit, in
cases where the mischief is due to a severe attack of
rashness, while he employs the milder arguments in
@@ -9262,4 +9204,6 @@ such as appear less impressive,—and he does so on
purpose, as the latter are frequently sufficient to
enable him to effect his object.
-
\ No newline at end of file
+
+
+
\ No newline at end of file