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+The natural result of any investigation is that the +investigators either discover the object of search or +deny that it is discoverable and confess it to be +inapprehensible or persist in their search.
+So, too, with regard to the objects investigated by +philosophy, this is probably why some have claimed to +have discovered the truth, others have asserted that it +cannot be apprehended, while others again go on inquiring.
+Those who believe they have discovered it are the
+‟Dogmatists,” specially so called—Aristotle, for
+example, and Epicurus and the Stoics and certain
+others; Cleitomachus and Carneades and other
+Academics
+Hence it seems reasonable to hold that the main types of
+philosophy are three—the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptic.
+Of the other systems it will best become others to speak: our
+task at present is to describe in outline the Sceptic doctrine,
+
+Of the Sceptic philosophy one argument (or branch
+of exposition) is called ‟general,” the other ‟special.”
+In the general argument we set forth the distinctive
+features of Scepticism, stating its purport and
+principles, its logical methods, criterion, and end or aim;
+the ‟Tropes,” also, or ‟Modes,”
+In the special argument we state our objections
+regarding the several divisions of so-called philosophy.
+
+The Sceptic School, then, is also called ‟Zetetic”
+from its activity in investigation and inquiry, and
+‟Ephectic” or Suspensive from the state of mind
+produced in the inquirer after his search, and
+‟Aporetic” or Dubitative either from its habit of
+doubting and seeking, as some say, or from its
+indecision as regards assent and denial, and ‟Pyrrhonian”
+from the fact that Pyrrho
+Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which +opposes appearances to judgements in any way +whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the +equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we +are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and +next to a state of ‟unperturbedness” or quietude.
+Now we call it an ‟ability” not in any subtle sense, +but simply in respect of its ‟being able.” By +‟appearances” we now mean the objects of sense- +perception, whence we contrast them with the objects +of thought or ‟judgements.” The phrase ‟in any +way whatsoever” can be connected either with the +word ‟ability,” to make us take the word ‟ability,” +as we said, in its simple sense, or with the phrase +‟opposing appearances to judgements;” for inasmuch +as we oppose these in a variety of ways—appearances +to appearances, or judgements to judgements, or +/alternando/ appearances to judgements,—in order to +ensure the inclusion of all these antitheses +we employ the phrase ‟in any way whatsoever.” +Or, again, we join ‟in any way whatsoever” to +‟appearances and judgements” in order that we may +not have to inquire how the appearances appear or +how the thought-objects are judged, but may take +these terms in the simple sense.
+The phrase ‟opposed judgements” we do not employ
+in the sense of negations and affirmations only but
+simply as equivalent to ‟conflicting judgements.”
+
+In the definition of the Sceptic system there is also +implicitly included that of the Pyrrhonean philosopher: +he is the man who participates in this ‟ability.”
+The originating cause of Scepticism is, we say, the +hope of attaining quietude. Men of talent, who were +perturbed by the contradictions in things and in +doubt as to which of the alternatives they ought to +accept, were led on to inquire what is true in things +and what false, hoping by the settlement of this +question to attain quietude. The main basic principle +of the Sceptic system is that of opposing to every +proposition an equal proposition; for we believe that +as a consequence of this we end by ceasing to dogmatize.
+When we say that the Sceptic refrains from dogmatizing +we do not use the term ‟dogma,” as some +do, in the broader sense of ‟approval of a thing” +(for the Sceptic gives assent to the feelings which +are the necessary results of sense-impressions, and +he would not, for example, say when feeling hot or +cold ‟I believe that I am not hot or cold”); but we +say that ‟he does not dogmatize” using ‟dogma” +in the sense, which some give it, of ‟assent to one +of the non-evident objects of scientific inquiry;” +for the Pyrrhonean philosopher assents to nothing +that is non-evident.
+Moreover, even in the act of enunciating the Sceptic
+formulae
+If then, while the dogmatizer posits the matter of his
+dogma as substantial truth, the Sceptic enunciates
+his formulae so that they are virtually cancelled by
+themselves, he should not be said to dogmatize in his
+enunciation of them. And, most important of all, in
+his enunciation of these formulae he states what
+appears to himself and announces his own impression
+in an undogmatic way, without making any positive
+assertion regarding the external realities.
+We follow the same lines in replying to the question +‟Has the Sceptic a doctrinal rule?” For if one +defines a ‟doctrinal rule” as ‟adherence to a number +of dogmas which are dependent both on one another +and on appearances,” and defines ‟dogma” as +‟assent to a non-evident proposition,” then we shall +say that he has not a doctrinal rule.
+But if one defines ‟doctrinal rule” as ‟procedure which,
+in accordance with appearance, follows a certain line of
+reasoning, that reasoning indicating how it is possible
+to seem to live rightly (the word ‘rightly’ being
+taken, not as referring to virtue only, but in a wider
+sense
+We make a similar reply also to the question +‟Should the Sceptic deal with physical problems?” +For while, on the one hand, so far as regards making +firm and positive assertions about any of the matters +dogmatically treated in physical theory, we do not +deal with physics; yet, on the other hand, in respect +of our mode of opposing to every proposition an equal +proposition and of our theory of quietude we do treat +of physics. This, too, is the way in which we approach +the logical and ethical branches of so-called ‟philosophy.”
+Those who say that ‟the Sceptics abolish appearances,”
+or phenomena, seem to me to be unacquainted
+with the statements of our School. For, as we said
+above, we do not overthrow the affective sense-
+impressions
+For example, honey
+That we adhere to appearances is plain from what
+we say about the Criterion of the Sceptic School.
+The word ‟Criterion” is used in two senses: in the
+one it means ‟the standard regulating belief in
+reality or unreality,” (and this we shall discuss in
+our refutation
+The criterion, then, of the Sceptic School is, we say, +the appearance, giving this name to what is virtually the +sense-presentation. For since this lies in feeling and +involuntary affection, it is not open to question. +Consequently, no one, I suppose, disputes that the +underlying object has this or that appearance; the +point in dispute is whether the object is in reality +such as it appears to be.
+Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance
+with the normal rules of life, undogmatically,
+seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive.
+Nature’s guidance is that by which we are naturally capable +of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that +whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition +of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct +of life as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, +that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. +But we make all these statements undogmatically.
+Our next subject will be the End of the Sceptic
+system. Now an ‟End” is ‟that for which all
+actions or reasonings are undertaken, while it exists
+for the sake of none;” or, otherwise, ‟the ultimate
+object of appetency.”
+For the Sceptic, having set out to +philosophize with the object of passing judgement +on the sense-impressions and ascertaining which of +them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude +thereby, found himself involved in contradictions of +equal weight, and being unable to decide between +them suspended judgement; and as he was thus in +suspense there followed, as it happened, the state +of quietude in respect of matters of opinion.
+For the man who opines that anything is by nature good +or bad is for ever being disquieted: when he is +without the things which he deems good he believes +himself to be tormented by things naturally bad and +he pursues after the things which are, as he thinks, +good; which when he has obtained he keeps falling +into still more perturbations because of his irrational +and immoderate elation, and in his dread of a change +of fortune he uses every endeavour to avoid losing +the things which he deems good.
+On the other hand, the man who determines +nothing as to what is naturally +good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything +eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed.
+The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which
+is said to have befallen the painter Apelles.
+So, too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude +by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the +objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect +this they suspended judgement; and they found that +quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspense, +even as a shadow follows its substance. We do +not, however, suppose that the Sceptic is wholly +untroubled; but we say that he is troubled by things +unavoidable; for we grant that he is cold at times +and thirsty, and suffers various affections of that kind.
+But even in these cases, whereas ordinary people are
+afflicted by two circumstances,—namely, by the affections
+themselves and, in no less a degree, by the belief that
+these conditions are evil by nature,—the Sceptic, by his
+rejection of the added belief in the natural badness of
+all these conditions, escapes here too with less discomfort.
+Hence we say that, while in regard to matters of opinion
+the Sceptic’s End is quietude, in regard to things
+unavoidable it is ‟moderate affection.” But some notable
+Sceptics
+Now that we have been saying that tranquillity +follows on suspension of judgement, it will be our +next task to explain how we arrive at this suspension. +Speaking generally, one may say that it is the result +of setting things in opposition. We oppose either +appearances to appearances or objects of thought to +objects of thought or alternando.
+For instance, we oppose appearances to appearances
+when we say ‟The same tower
+And thoughts we oppose to appearances, as when Anaxagoras
+‟Just as, before the birth of the founder of the School +to which you belong, the theory it holds was not as yet +apparent as a sound theory, although it was really +in existence, so likewise it is possible that the +opposite theory to that which you now propound is +already really existent, though not yet apparent to +us, so that we ought not as yet to yield assent to this +theory which at the moment seems to be valid.”
+But in order that we may have a more exact understanding +of these antitheses I will describe the Modes +by which suspension of judgement is brought about, +but without making any positive assertion regarding +either their number or their validity; for it is possible +that they may be unsound or there may be more of +them than I shall enumerate.
+The usual tradition amongst the older Sceptics is +that the ‟modes” by which ‟suspension” is supposed +to be brought about are ten in number; and they also +give them the synonymous names of ‟arguments” +and ‟positions.” They are these: the first, based on +the variety in animals; the second, on the differences +in human beings; the third, on the different structures +of the organs of sense; the fourth, on the +circumstantial conditions; the fifth, on positions and +intervals and locations; the sixth, on intermixtures;
+the seventh, on the quantities and formations of the +underlying objects; the eighth, on the fact of relativity; +the ninth, on the frequency or rarity of +occurrence; the tenth, on the disciplines and customs +and laws, the legendary beliefs and the dogmatic convictions.
+This order, however, we adopt without prejudice.
+As superordinate to these there stand three Modes +—that based on the subject who judges, that on the +object judged, and that based on both. The first four +of the ten Modes are subordinate to the Mode based +on the subject (for the subject which judges is +either an animal or a man or a sense, and existent in +some condition): the seventh and tenth Modes are +referred to that based on the object judged: the +fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth are referred to the Mode +based on both subject and object.
+Furthermore, these three Modes are also referred to that +of relation, so that the Mode of relation stands as the +highest genus, and the three as species, and the ten as +subordinate sub-species. We give this as the probable account +of their numbers; and as to their argumentative +force what we say is this:
+The First argument (or Trope), as we said, is that +which shows that the same impressions are not produced +by the same objects owing to the differences +in animals. This we infer both from the differences +in their origins and from the variety of their bodily +structures.
+Thus, as to origin, some animals are produced +without sexual union, others by coition. And +of those produced without coition, some come from +fire, like the animalcules which appear in furnaces, +others from putrid water, like gnats; others from +wine when it turns sour, like ants; others from earth, +like grasshoppers; others from marsh, like frogs; +others from mud, like worms; others from asses, like +beetles; others from greens, like caterpillars; others +from fruits, like the gall-insects in wild figs; others +from rotting animals, as bees from bulls and wasps +from horses.
+Of the animals generated by coition, +some—in fact the majority—come from homogeneous +parents, others from heterogeneous parents, as do +mules. Again, of animals in general, some are born +alive, like men ; others are born as eggs, like birds; +and yet others as lumps of flesh, like bears.
+It is natural, then, that these dissimilar and variant +modes of birth should produce much contrariety +of sense-affection, and that this is a source of its +divergent, discordant and conflicting character.
+Moreover, the differences found in the most important
+parts of the body, and especially in those of
+which the natural function is judging and perceiving,
+are capable of producing a vast deal of divergence
+in the sense-impressions owing to the variety in the
+animals. Thus, sufferers from jaundice declare that
+objects which seem to us white are yellow, while those
+whose eyes are bloodshot call them blood-red. Since,
+then, some animals also have eyes which are yellow,
+others bloodshot, others albino, others of other
+colours, they probably, I suppose, have different
+perceptions of colour.
+Moreover, if we bend down over a book after having gazed
+long and fixedly at the sun, the letters seem to us to be
+golden in colour and circling round. Since, then, some animals
+possess also a natural brilliance in their eyes, and emit
+from them a fine and mobile stream of light, so that they
+can even see by night,
+Jugglers, too, by means of smearing lamp-wicks +with the rust of copper or with the juice of the +cuttle-fish make the bystanders appear now copper- +coloured and now black—and that by just a small +sprinkling of extra matter. Surely, then, we have +much more reason to suppose that when different +juices are intermingled in the vision of animals their +impressions of the objects will become different.
+Again, when we press the eyeball at one side the +forms, figures and sizes of the objects appear oblong +and narrow. So it is probable that all animals which +have the pupil of the eye slanting and elongated— +such as goats, cats, and similar animals—have impressions +of the objects which are different and unlike the notions +formed of them by the animals which have +round pupils.
+Mirrors, too, owing to differences in
+their construction, represent the external objects
+Since, then, some organs of sight +actually protrude beyond the face owing to their +convexity, while others are quite concave, and others +again lie in a level plane, on this account also it is +probable that their impressions differ, and that the +same objects, as seen by dogs, fishes, lions, men +and locusts, are neither equal in size nor similar in +shape, but vary according to the image of each object +created by the particular sight that receives the +impression.
+Of the other sense-organs also the same account +holds good. Thus, in respect of touch, how could +one maintain that creatures covered with shells, with +flesh, with prickles, with feathers, with scales, are all +similarly affected? And as for the sense of hearing, +how could we say that its perceptions are alike in +animals with a very narrow auditory passage and +those with a very wide one, or in animals with hairy +ears and those with smooth ears? For, as regards this +sense, even we ourselves find our hearing affected in +one way when we have our ears plugged and in +another way when we use them just as they are.
+Smell also will differ because of the variety in animals. +For if we ourselves are affected in one way when we +have a cold and our internal phlegm is excessive, and +in another way when the parts about our head are +filled with an excess of blood, feeling an aversion to +smells which seem sweet to everyone else and regarding +them as noxious, it is reasonable to suppose that +animals too—since some are flaccid by nature and +rich in phlegm, others rich in blood, others marked +by a predominant excess of yellow or of black gall— +are in each case impressed in different ways by the +objects of smell.
+So too with the objects of taste; +for some animals have rough and dry tongues, others +extremely moist tongues. We ourselves, too, when +our tongues are very dry, in cases of fever, think the +food proffered us to be earthy and ill-flavoured or +bitter—an affection due to the variation in the +predominating juices which we are said to contain. +Since, then, animals also have organs of taste which +differ and which have different juices in excess, +in respect of taste also they will receive different +impressions of the real objects.
+For just as the same food when digested becomes in one +place a vein, in another an artery, in another a bone, +in another a sinew, or some other piece of the body, +displaying a different potency according to the difference +in the parts which receive it;—and just as the same unblended +water, when it is absorbed by trees, becomes in one place bark, +in another branch, in another blossom, and so finally fig and +quince and each of the other fruits;
+—and just as the single identical breath of a musician +breathed into a flute becomes here a shrill note and there +a deep note, and the same pressure of his hand on the +lyre produces here a deep note and there a shrill note;—so +likewise it is probable that the external objects appear +different owing to differences in the structure of +the animals which experience the sense-impressions.
+But one may learn this more clearly from the +preferences and aversions of animals. Thus, sweet +oil seems very agreeable to men, but intolerable to +beetles and bees; and olive oil is beneficial to men, +but when poured on wasps and bees it destroys them; +and sea-water is a disagreeable and poisonous potion +for men, but fish drink and enjoy it.
+Pigs, too, enjoy wallowing in the most stinking mire +rather than in clear and clean water. And whereas +some animals eat grass, others eat shrubs, others +feed in woods, others live on seeds or flesh or milk; +some of them, too, prefer their food high, others like +it fresh, and while some prefer it raw, others like it +cooked. And so generally, the things which are agreeable +to some are to others disagreeable, distasteful and deadly.
+Thus, quails are fattened by hemlock, and pigs by +henbane; and pigs also enjoy eating salamanders, +just as deer enjoy poisonous creatures, and swallows +gnats. So ants and wood-lice, when swallowed by +men, cause distress and gripings, whereas the bear, +whenever she falls sick, cures herself by licking them +up.
+The mere touch of an oak-twig paralyses the +viper, and that of a plane-leaf the bat. The elephant +flees from the ram, the lion from the cock, sea- +monsters from the crackle of bursting beans, and the +tiger from the sound of a drum. One might, indeed, +cite many more examples, but—not to seem unduly +prolix—if the same things are displeasing to some +but pleasing to others, and pleasure and displeasure +depend upon sense-impression, then animals receive +different impressions from the underlying objects.
+But if the same things appear different owing to +the variety in animals, we shall, indeed, be able to +state our own impressions of the real object, but as +to its essential nature we shall suspend judgement. +For we cannot ourselves judge between our own +impressions and those of the other animals, since we +ourselves are involved in the dispute and are, therefore, +rather in need of a judge than competent to +pass judgement ourselves.
+Besides, we are unable, either with or without proof,
+to prefer our own impressions to those of the irrational
+animals. For in addition to the probability that proof is,
+as we shall show,
+It is, indeed, absurd to attempt to establish the matter
+in question by means of the matter in question,
+By way of super-addition,
+but since the Dogmatists captiously assert that the comparison +is unequal, we—super-adding yet more—will carry our ridicule +further and base our argument on one animal only, the dog for +instance if you like, which is held to be the most worthless +of animals. For even in this case we shall find that the animals +we are discussing are no wise inferior to ourselves in respect +of the credibility of their impressions.
+Now it is allowed by the Dogmatists that this +animal, the dog, excels us in point of sensation: as +to smell it is more sensitive than we are, since by +this sense it tracks beasts that it cannot see; and +with its eyes it sees them more quickly than we do; +and with its ears it is keen of perception.
+Next let us proceed to the reasoning faculty. Of
+reason one kind is internal, implanted in the soul, the other
+externally expressed.
+Now the dog—the animal upon which, by way of example, +we have decided to base our argument—exercises +choice of the congenial and avoidance of the harmful, +in that it hunts after food and slinks away from a +raised whip. Moreover, it possesses an art which +supplies what is congenial, namely hunting.
+Nor is it devoid even of virtue; for certainly if justice
+consists in rendering to each his due,
+But if he possesses this virtue, then, since
+the virtues are interdependent, he possesses also all
+the other virtues; and these, say the philosophers,
+And according to Chrysippus, who shows special interest
+in irrational animals, the dog even shares in the far-famed
+‟Dialectic.”
+Moreover, the dog is capable of comprehending and +assuaging his own sufferings; for when a thorn has +got stuck in his foot he hastens to remove it by +rubbing his foot on the ground and by using his teeth. +And if he has a wound anywhere, because dirty wounds +are hard to cure whereas clean ones heal easily, the +dog gently licks off the pus that has gathered.
+Nay more, the dog admirably observes the prescription
+of Hippocrates:
+If, then, it has been shown that the animal upon which,
+as an example, we have based our argument not only chooses
+the wholesome and avoids the noxious, but also possesses
+an art capable of supplying what is wholesome, and
+is capable of comprehending and assuaging its own
+sufferings, and is not devoid of virtue, then—these
+being the things in which the perfection of internal
+reason consists—the dog will be thus far perfect.
+And that, I suppose, is why certain of the professors
+of philosophy have adorned themselves with the title
+of this animal.
+Concerning external reason, or speech, it is unnecessary
+for the present to inquire; for it has been
+rejected even by some of the Dogmatists as being
+a hindrance to the acquisition of virtue, for which
+reason they used to practise silence
+And, leaving this point also aside, even if we do not +understand the utterances of the so-called irrational +animals, still it is not improbable that they converse +although we fail to understand them; for in fact when we +listen to the talk of barbarians we do not understand it, +and it seems to us a kind of uniform chatter.
+Moreover, we hear dogs uttering one sound when they are +driving people off, another when they are howling, +and one sound when beaten, and a quite different +sound when fawning. And so in general, in the case +of all other animals as well as the dog, whoever +examines the matter carefully will find a great variety +of utterance according to the different circumstances, +so that, in consequence, the so-called irrational +animals may justly be said to participate in external +reason.
+But if they neither fall short of mankind in +the accuracy of their perceptions, nor in internal +reason, nor yet (to go still further) in external reason, +or speech, then they will deserve no less credence +than ourselves in respect of their sense-impressions.
+Probably, too, we may reach this conclusion by basing +our argument on each single class of irrational animals. +Thus, for example, who would deny that birds excel +in quickness of wit or that they employ external +reason? For they understand not only present +events but future events as well, and these they foreshow +to such as are able to comprehend them by +means of prophetic cries as well as by other signs.
+I have drawn this comparison (as I previously +indicated) by way of super-addition, having already +sufficiently proved, as I think, that we cannot prefer +our own sense-impressions to those of the irrational +animals. If, however, the irrational animals are not +less worthy of credence than we in regard to the +value of sense-impressions, and their impressions vary +according to the variety of animal,—then, although +I shall be able to say what the nature of each of the +underlying objects appears to me to be, I shall be +compelled, for the reasons stated above, to suspend +judgement as to its real nature.
+Such, then, is the First of the Modes which induce +suspense. The Second Mode is, as we said, that based +on the differences in men; for even if we grant for +the sake of argument that men are more worthy of +credence than irrational animals, we shall find that +even our own differences of themselves lead to suspense. +For man, you know, is said to be compounded +of two things, soul and body, and in both these we +differ one from another.
+Thus, as regards the body, we differ in our figures
+and ‟idiosyncrasies,” or constitutional peculiarities.
+The body of an Indian differs in shape from that of
+a Scythian; and it is said that what causes the variation
+is a difference in the predominant humours,
+Owing to this difference in the predominant humours
+the sense-impressions also come to differ, as we
+indicated in our First Argument.
+In respect of our ‟idiosyncrasies,” our differences are +such that some of us digest the flesh of oxen more +easily than rock-fish, or get diarrhoea from the weak wine of +Lesbos. An old wife of Attica, they say, swallowed +with impunity thirty drams of hemlock, and Lysis +took four drams of poppy-juice without hurt.
+Demophon, Alexander’s butler, used to shiver when he was
+in the sun or in a hot bath, but felt warm in the shade:
+Athenagoras the Argive took no hurt from the stings
+of scorpions and poisonous spiders; and the Psyllaeans,
+nor are the Tentyritae
+Chrysermus the Herophilean doctor was liable to
+get a heart attack if ever he took pepper;
+and Soterichus the surgeon was seized with diarrhoea
+whenever he smelled fried sprats. Andron the Argive
+was so immune from thirst that he actually traversed
+the waterless country of Libya without needing a
+drink. Tiberius Caesar could see in the dark; and
+Aristotle
+Seeing, then, that men vary so much in body—to +content ourselves with but a few instances of the +many collected by the Dogmatists,—men probably +also differ from one another in respect of the soul +itself; for the body is a kind of expression of the soul, +as in fact is proved by the science of Physiognomy. +But the greatest proof of the vast and endless differences +in men’s intelligence is the discrepancy in the +statements of the Dogmatists concerning the right +objects of choice and avoidance, as well as other +things.
+Regarding this the poets, too, have expressed
+themselves fittingly. Thus Pindar says:
+
+
+And the poet
+
+
+And again:
+
+
+Seeing, then, that choice and avoidance depend on +pleasure and displeasure, while pleasure and displeasure +depend on sensation and sense-impression, +whenever some men choose the very things which +are avoided by others, it is logical for us to conclude +that they are also differently affected by the same +things, since otherwise they would all alike have +chosen or avoided the same things. But if the same +objects affect men differently owing to the differences +in the men, then, on this ground also, we shall +reasonably be led to suspension of judgement. For while +we are, no doubt, able to state what each of the +underlying objects appears to be, relatively to each +difference, we are incapable of explaining what it is +in reality.
+For we shall have to believe either all +men or some. But if we believe all, we shall be +attempting the impossible and accepting contradictories; +and if some, let us be told whose opinions we +are to endorse. For the Platonist will say ‟Plato’s;” +the Epicurean, ‟Epicurus’s;” and so on with the +rest; and thus by their unsettled disputations they +will bring us round again to a state of suspense.
+Moreover, he who maintains that we ought to assent +to the majority is making a childish proposal, since +no one is able to visit the whole of mankind and +determine what pleases the majority of them; for +there may possibly be races of whom we know nothing +amongst whom conditions rare with us are common, +and conditions common with us rare,—possibly, for +instance, most of them feel no pain from the bites +of spiders, though a few on rare occasions feel such +pain; and so likewise with the rest of the ‟idiosyncrasies” +mentioned above. Necessarily, therefore, the +differences in men afford a further reason for bringing +in suspension of judgement.
+When the Dogmatists—a self-loving class of men— +assert that in judging things they ought to prefer +themselves to other people, we know that their claim +is absurd; for they themselves are a party to the +controversy; and if, when judging appearances, they +have already given the preference to themselves, then, +by thus entrusting themselves with the judgement, +they are begging the question before the judgement +is begun.
+Nevertheless, in order that we may arrive
+at suspension of judgement by basing our argument
+on one person—such as, for example, their visionary
+‟Sage”
This Third Mode is, we say, based on differences +in the senses. That the senses differ from one +another is obvious.
+Thus, to the eye paintings seem to have recesses and
+projections, but not so to the touch. Honey, too, seems
+to some
+So too with spurge:
+A longer list of examples might be given, but to +avoid prolixity, in view of the plan of our treatise, +we will say just this. Each of the phenomena +perceived by the senses seems to be a complex: the +apple, for example, seems smooth, odorous, sweet and +yellow. But it is non-evident whether it really +possesses these qualities only; or whether it has but +one quality but appears varied owing to the varying +structure of the sense-organs; or whether, again, it +has more qualities than are apparent, some of which +elude our perception.
+That the apple has but one quality might be argued from what
+we said above
+And that the apple may possibly possess more qualities +than those apparent to us we argue in this way. Let us +imagine a man who possesses from birth the senses of touch, +taste and smell, but can neither hear nor see. This man, then, +will assume that nothing visible or audible has any existence, +but only those three kinds of qualities which he is able to +apprehend.
+Possibly, then, we also, having only +our five senses, perceive only such of the apple's +qualities as we are capable of apprehending; and +possibly it may possess other underlying qualities +which affect other sense-organs, though we, not being +endowed with those organs, fail to apprehend the +sense-objects which come through them.
+‟But,” it may be objected, ‟Nature made the +senses commensurate with the objects of sense.” +What kind of ‟Nature?” we ask, seeing that there +exists so much unresolved controversy amongst the +Dogmatists concerning the reality which belongs to +Nature. For he who decides the question as to the +existence of Nature will be discredited by them if +he is an ordinary person, while if he is a philosopher +he will be a party to the controversy and therefore +himself subject to judgement and not a judge.
+If, however, it is possible that only those qualities +which we seem to perceive subsist in the apple, or that a +greater number subsist, or, again, that not even the +qualities which affect us subsist, then it will be non- +evident to us what the nature of the apple really is. +And the same argument applies to all the other +objects of sense. But if the senses do not apprehend +external objects, neither can the mind apprehend +them; hence, because of this argument also, we shall +be driven, it seems, to suspend judgement regarding +the external underlying objects.
+In order that we may finally reach suspension by
+our argument on each sense singly, or even
+by disregarding the senses, we further adopt the
+Fourth Mode of suspension. This is the Mode based,
+as we say, on the ‟circumstances,” meaning by
+‟circumstances” conditions or dispositions.
+Thus, according as the mental state is natural or unnatural, +objects produce dissimilar impressions, as when men in a frenzy +or in a state of ecstasy believe they hear daemons’ voices, while +we do not. Similarly they often say that they perceive an odour of +storax or frankincense, or some such scent, and many other things, +though we fail to perceive them. Also, the same water which feels +very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us.And the +same coat which seems of a bright yellow colour to men with blood-shot +eyes does not appear so to me. And the same honey seems to +me sweet, but bitter to men with jaundice.
+Now should anyone say that it is an intermixture of +certain humours which produces in those who are in an +unnatural state improper impressions from the under- +lying objects, we have to reply that, since healthy +persons also have mixed humours, these humours too +are capable of causing the external objects—which +really are such as they appear to those who are said +to be in an unnatural state—to appear other than they +are to healthy persons.
+For to ascribe the power of altering the underlying objects
+to those humours, and not to these, is purely fanciful; since
+just as healthy men are in a state that is natural for the healthy
+but unnatural for the sick, so also sick men are in a state that is
+unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so that to these
+last also we must give credence as being, relatively speaking, in a
+natural state.
+Sleeping and waking, too, give rise to different
+impressions, since we do not imagine when awake
+what we imagine in sleep, nor when asleep what we
+imagine when awake; so that the existence or non-
+existence of our impressions is not absolute but
+relative, being in relation to our sleeping or waking
+condition. Probably, then, in dreams we see things
+which to our waking state are unreal,
+Age is another cause of difference.
+Moreover, those who differ in age are differently moved +in respect of choice and avoidance. For whereas children—to +take a case—are all eagerness for balls and hoops, men in +their prime choose other things, and old men yet others. +And from this we conclude that differences in age +also cause different impressions to be produced by +the same underlying objects.
+Another cause why the real objects appear different
+lies in motion and rest. For those objects which,
+when we are standing still, we see to be motionless,
+we imagine to be in motion when we are sailing
+past them.
+Love and hatred are a cause, as when some have
+an extreme aversion to pork while others greatly
+enjoy eating it. Hence, too, Menander said:
+
+Many lovers, too, who have ugly mistresses think
+them most beautiful.
+Hunger and satiety are a cause; for the same food +seems agreeable to the hungry but disagreeable to +the sated.
+Drunkenness and soberness are a cause; since +actions which we think shameful when sober do not +seem shameful to us when drunk.
+Predispositions are a cause; for the same wine
+which seems sour to those who have previously eaten
+dates or figs, seems sweet to those who have just
+consumed nuts or chick-peas; and the vestibule
+Fear and boldness are a cause; as what seems to +the coward fearful and formidable does not seem so +in the least to the bold man.
+Grief and joy are a cause; since the same affairs +are burdensome to those in grief but delightful to +those who rejoice.
+Seeing then that the dispositions also are the cause
+of so much disagreement, and that men are differently
+disposed at different times, although, no doubt, it is
+easy to say what nature each of the underlying objects
+appears to each man to possess, we cannot go on to
+say what its real nature is, since the disagreement
+admits in itself of no settlement. For the person who
+tries to settle it is either in one of the afore-mentioned
+dispositions or in no disposition whatsoever. But to declare
+that he is in no disposition at all—as, for instance,
+neither in health nor sickness, neither in
+motion nor at rest, of no definite age, and devoid of
+all the other dispositions as well—is the height of
+absurdity. And if he is to judge the sense-impressions
+while he is in some one disposition, he will be a
+party to the disagreement,
+and, moreover, he will not be an impartial judge of the +external underlying objects owing to his being confused +by the dispositions in which he is placed. The waking person, +for instance, cannot compare the impressions of sleepers with +those of men awake, nor the sound person those of the sick with +those of the sound; for we assent more readily to things present, +which affect us in the present, than to things not present.
+In another way, too, the disagreement of such +impressions is incapable of settlement. For he who +prefers one impression to another, or one ‟circumstance” +to another, does so either uncritically and +without proof or critically and with proof; but he +can do this neither without these means (for then he +would be discredited) nor with them. For if he is to +pass judgement on the impressions he must certainly +judge them by a criterion;
+this criterion, then, he will declare to be true, or else false. +But if false, he will be discredited; whereas, if he shall declare +it to be true, he will be stating that the criterion is true either +without proof or with proof. But if without proof, he will be discredited; +and if with proof, it will certainly be necessary for the proof also +to be true, to avoid being discredited. Shall he, then, affirm the +truth of the proof adopted to establish the criterion after having +judged it or without judging it?
+If without judging, he will be discredited; but if after +Judging, plainly he will say that he has judged it by +a criterion; and of that criterion we shall ask for a +proof, and of that proof again a criterion. For the +proof always requires a criterion to confirm it, and +the criterion also a proof to demonstrate its truth; +and neither can a proof be sound without the previous +existence of a true criterion nor can the criterion be +true without the previous confirmation of the proof.
+So in this way both the criterion and the proof are
+involved in the circular process of reasoning,
+The Fifth Argument (or Trope) is that based on
+positions, distances, and locations; for owing to each
+of these the same objects appear different; for
+example, the same porch
+These effects are due to distances; among effects
+due to locations are the following: the light of a lamp
+appears dim in the sun but bright in the dark; and
+the same oar bent when in the water but straight
+when out of the water; and the egg soft when inside
+the fowl but hard when in the air; and the jacinth
+Effects due to positions are such as these: the same +painting when laid flat appears smooth, but when +inclined forward at a certain angle it seems to have +recesses and prominences. The necks of doves, also, +appear different in hue according to the differences in +the angle of inclination.
+Since, then, all apparent objects are viewed in a +certain place, and from a certain distance, or in a +certain position, and each of these conditions produces +a great divergency in the sense-impressions, as we +mentioned above, we shall be compelled by this Mode +also to end up in suspension of judgement. For in +fact anyone who purposes to give the preference to +any of these impressions will be attempting the +impossible.
+For if he shall deliver his judgement simply and without
+proof, he will be discredited; and should he, on the other
+hand, desire to adduce proof, he will confute himself if
+he says that the proof is false, while if he asserts that
+the proof is true he will be asked for a proof of its truth,
+and again for a proof of this latter proof, since it also must
+be true, and so on ad infinitum.
+so that neither by the use of proofs will +he be able to prefer one sense-impression to another. +If, then, one cannot hope to pass judgement on the +afore-mentioned impressions either with or without +proof, the conclusion we are driven to is suspension; +for while we can, no doubt, state the nature which +each object appears to possess as viewed in a certain +position or at a certain distance or in a certain place, +what its real nature is we are, for the foregoing +reasons, unable to declare.
+The Sixth Mode is that based on admixtures, by
+which we conclude that, because none of the real
+objects affects our senses by itself but always in
+conjunction with something else, though we may
+possibly be able to state the nature of the resultant
+mixture
+Thus, our own complexion is of one hue in warm air, +of another in cold, and we should not be able to say +what our complexion really is, but only what it looks +like in conjunction with each of these conditions. And +the same sound appears of one sort in conjunction with +rare air and of another sort with dense air; and odours are +more pungent in a hot bath-room or in the sun than in chilly +air; and a body is light when immersed in water but +heavy when surrounded by air.
+But to pass on from the subject of external
+admixture,—our eyes contain within themselves both
+membranes and liquids. Since, then, the objects of
+vision are not perceived apart from these, they will
+not be apprehended with exactness; for what we perceive
+is the resultant mixture, and because of this the
+sufferers from jaundice see everything yellow, and
+those with blood-shot eyes reddish like blood.
+Moreover, since there reside substances in the +nostrils and in the organs of taste, we apprehend the +objects of taste and of smell in conjunction with +these and not in their real purity. So that, because +of these admixtures, the senses do not apprehend the +exact quality of the external real objects.
+Nor yet does the mind apprehend it, since, in the
+first place, its guides, which are the senses, go wrong;
+and probably, too, the mind itself adds a certain
+admixture of its own to the messages conveyed by the
+senses; for we observe that there are certain humours
+present in each of the regions which the Dogmatists
+regard as the seat of the ‟Ruling Principle”
+The Seventh Mode is that based, as we said, on the +quantity and constitution of the underlying objects, +meaning generally by ‟constitution” the manner of +composition. And it is evident that by this Mode +also we are compelled to suspend judgement concerning +the real nature of the objects. Thus, for example, +the filings of a goat’s horn appear white when viewed +simply by themselves and without combination, but +when combined in the substance of the horn they +look black. And silver filings appear black when they +are by themselves, but when united to the whole +mass they are sensed as white.
+And chips of the marble of Taenarum
+And wine strengthens us when drunk in moderate quantity, +but when too much is taken it paralyses the body. So +likewise food exhibits different effects according to the +quantity consumed; for instance, it frequently upsets the +body with indigestion and attacks of purging because +of the large quantity taken.
+Therefore in these cases, too, we shall be able to +describe the quality of the shaving of the horn and +of the compound made up of many shavings, and that +of the particle of silver and of the compound of many +particles, and that of the sliver of Taenarean marble +and of the compound of many such small pieces, and the +relative qualities of the pebbles, the hellebore, the +wine and the food,—but when it comes to the independent +and real nature of the objects, this we shall be unable +to describe because of the divergency in the sense-impressions +which is due to the combinations.
+As a general rule, it seems that wholesome things +become harmful when used in immoderate quantities, +and things that seem hurtful when taken to excess +cause no harm when in minute quantities. What we +observe in regard to the effects of medicines is the +best evidence in support of our statement; for there +the exact blending of the simple drugs makes the +compound wholesome, but when the slightest oversight +is made in the measuring, as sometimes happens, +the compound is not only unwholesome but frequently +even most harmful and deleterious.
+Thus the argument from quantities and compositions +causes confusion as to the real nature of the external +substances. Probably, therefore, this Mode also will +bring us round to suspension of judgement, as we are +unable to make any absolute statement concerning +the real nature of external objects.
+The Eighth Mode is that based on relativity; and
+by it we conclude that, since all things are relative,
+we shall suspend judgement as to what things are
+absolutely and really existent. But this point we
+must notice—that here as elsewhere we use the term
+‟are” for the term ‟appear,” and what we virtually
+mean is ‟all things appear relative.”
+Indeed, we have already argued
+There are also special arguments to prove the
+relativity of all things, in this way: Do things which
+exist ‟differentially”
+Again,—of existing things some, according to the Dogmatists,
+Moreover, some existent things are similar, +others dissimilar, and some equal, others unequal; +and these are relative; therefore all things are relative. +And even he who asserts that not all things +are relative confirms the relativity of all things, since +by his arguments against us he shows that the very +statement ‟not all things are relative” is relative to +ourselves, and not universal.
+When, however, we have thus established that all +things are relative, we are plainly left with the +conclusion that we shall not be able to state what is the +nature of each of the objects in its own real purity, +but only what nature it appears to possess in its +relative character. Hence it follows that we must +suspend judgement concerning the real nature of the +objects.
+The Mode which, as we said, comes Ninth in order +is based on constancy or rarity of occurrence, +and we shall explain it as follows. The sun is, of +course, much more amazing than a comet; yet +because we see the sun constantly but the comet +rarely we are so amazed by the comet that we even +regard it as a divine portent, while the sun causes +no amazement at all. If, however, we were to conceive +of the sun as appearing but rarely and setting +rarely, and illuminating everything all at once and +throwing everything into shadow suddenly, then we +should experience much amazement at the sight.
+An earthquake also does not cause the same alarm +in those who experience it for the first time and those +who have grown accustomed to such things. How +much amazement, also, does the sea excite in the +man who sees it for the first time! And indeed the +beauty of a human body thrills us more at the first +sudden view than when it becomes a customary +spectacle. Rare things too we count as precious, +but not what is familiar to us and easily got.
+Thus,if we should suppose water to be rare, how much more
+precious it would appear to us than all the things
+which are accounted precious!
+Since then, owing to the frequency or rarity of +their occurrence, the same things seem at one time +to be amazing or precious and at another time nothing +of the sort, we infer that though we shall be able +perhaps to say what nature appears to belong to each +of these things in virtue of its frequent or rare +occurrence, we are not able to state what nature +absolutely belongs to each of the external objects. +So because of this Mode also we suspend judgement +regarding them.
+There is a Tenth Mode, which is mainly concerned
+with Ethics, being based on rules of conduct, habits,
+laws, legendary beliefs, and dogmatic conceptions.
+A rule of conduct is a choice of a way of life,
+or of a particular action, adopted by one person
+or many—by Diogenes,
+A law is a written contract amongst the members of a +State, the transgressor of which is punished. A habit or +custom (the terms are equivalent) is the joint adoption +of a certain kind of action by a number of men, the transgressor +of which is not actually punished; for example, the law +proscribes adultery, and custom with us forbids intercourse +with a woman in public.
+Legendary belief is the acceptance of unhistorical and
+fictitious events, such as, amongst others, the legends
+about Cronos; for these stories win credence with many.
+Dogmatic conception is the acceptance of a fact which
+seems to be established by analogy or some form of
+demonstration, as, for example, that atoms are the
+elements of existing things, or homoeomeries, or
+minima,
+And each of these we oppose now to itself, and now +to each of the others. For example, we oppose habit +to habit in this way: some of the Ethiopians tattoo +their children, but we do not; and while the Persians +think it seemly to wear a brightly dyed dress reaching +to the feet, we think it unseemly; and whereas +the Indians have intercourse with their women in +public, most other races regard this as shameful.
+And law we oppose to law in this way: among the Romans
+the man who renounces his father’s property does
+not pay his father’s debts, but among the Rhodians
+he always pays them; and among the Scythian
+Tauri
+And we oppose rule of conduct to rule of conduct, as
+when we oppose the rule of Diogenes to that of Aristippus
+or that of the Laconians to that of the Italians. And we
+oppose legendary belief to legendary belief when we say
+that whereas in one story the father of men and gods
+is alleged to be Zeus, in another he is Oceanos—
+‟Ocean sire of the gods, and Tethys the mother
+that bare them.”
+And we oppose dogmatic conceptions to one another +when we say that some declare that there is one +element only, others an infinite number; some that +the soul is mortal, others that it is immortal; and +some that human affairs are controlled by divine +Providence, others without Providence.
+And we oppose habit to the other things, as for
+instance to law when we say that amongst the
+Persians it is the habit to indulge in intercourse with
+males, but amongst the Romans it is forbidden by
+law to do so; and that, whereas with us adultery is
+forbidden, amongst the Massagetae it is traditionally
+regarded as an indifferent custom, as Eudoxus of
+Cnidos
+And habit is opposed to rule of conduct
+when, whereas most men have intercourse with their
+own wives in retirement, Crates
+It is opposed also to legendary belief, as +when the legends say that Cronos devoured his own +children, though it is our habit to protect our children; +and whereas it is customary with us to revere the +gods as being good and immune from evil, they are +presented by the poets as suffering wounds and +envying one another.
+And habit is opposed to dogmatic conception when, whereas it
+is our habit to pray to the gods for good things, Epicurus
+And we oppose rule of conduct to law when, +though there is a law which forbids the striking of +a free or well-born man, the pancratiasts strike one +another because of the rule of life they follow; and +when, though homicide is forbidden, gladiators destroy +one another for the same reason.
+And we oppose legendary belief to rule of conduct when we
+say that the legends relate that Heracles in the house
+of Omphale ‟toiled at the spinning of wool, enduring
+slavery's burden,”
+And we oppose rule of conduct to dogmatic conception +when, whereas athletes covet glory as something good +and for its sake undertake a toilsome rule of life, +many of the philosophers dogmatically assert that +glory is a worthless thing.
+And we oppose law to legendary belief when the poets +represent the gods as commiting adultery and practising +intercourse with males, whereas the law with us forbids +such actions;
+and we oppose it to dogmatic conception when Chrysippus
+And we oppose legendary belief to dogmatic conception +when the poets say that Zeus came down and had intercourse +with mortal women, but amongst the Dogmatists it is +held that such a thing is impossible;
+and again, when the poet relates
+We might indeed have taken many other examples +in connexion with each of the antitheses above +mentioned; but in a concise account like ours, these +will be sufficient. Only, since by means of this Mode +also so much divergency is shown to exist in objects, +we shall not be able to state what character belongs +to the object in respect of its real essence, but only +what belongs to it in respect of this particular rule of +conduct, or law, or habit, and so on with each of the +rest. So because of this Mode also we are compelled +to suspend judgement regarding the real nature of +external objects. And thus by means of all the Ten +Modes we are finally led to suspension of judgement.
+The later Sceptics
+That based on discrepancy leads us to find that +with regard to the object presented there has +arisen both amongst ordinary people and amongst +the philosophers an interminable conflict because +of which we are unable either to choose a thing or +reject it, and so fall back on suspension.
+The Mode based upon regress ad infinitum is that +whereby we assert that the thing adduced as a +proof of the matter proposed needs a further +proof, and this again another, and so on ad +infinitum, so that the consequence is suspension, +as we possess no starting-point for our argument.
+The Mode based upon relativity, as we have already
+said,
+We have the Mode based on hypothesis when the +Dogmatists, being forced to recede ad infinitum, +take as their starting-point something which they +do not establish by argument but claim to assume +as granted simply and without demonstration.
+The Mode of circular reasoning is the form used +when the proof itself which ought to establish the +matter of inquiry requires confirmation derived +from that matter; in this case, being unable to +assume either in order to establish the other, we +suspend judgement about both.
+That every matter of inquiry admits of being +brought under these Modes we shall show briefly in +this way.
+The matter proposed is either a sense-object or a
+thought-object, but whichever it is, it is an object
+of controversy; for some say that only sensibles are
+true, others only intelligibles, others that some
+sensible and some intelligible objects are true.
+For example, in the case of the sense- object +(for we shall base our argument on it first), +is it to be decided by a sense-object or a thought-object? +For if they say by a sense-object, since we are inquiring +about sensibles that object itself also will require +another to confirm it; and if that too is to be a sense-object, +it likewise will require another for its confirmation, and +so on ad infinitum.
+And if the sense-object shall have to be decided by a
+thought-object, then, since thought-objects also are
+controverted, this being an object of thought will
+need examination and confirmation. Whence then
+will it gain confirmation? If from an intelligible
+object, it will suffer a similar regress ad infinitum;
+and if from a sensible object, since an intelligible
+was adduced to establish the sensible and a sensible
+to establish the intelligible, the Mode of circular
+reasoning
+If, however, our disputant, by way of escape from
+this conclusion, should claim to assume as granted
+and without demonstration some postulate for the
+demonstration of the next steps of his argument,
+then the Mode of hypothesis will be brought in,
+which allows no escape.
+Further, if hypothesis conduces at all to proof, let the
+subject of inquiry itself be assumed and not some other
+thing which is merely a means to establish the actual
+subject of the argument ; but if it is absurd to assume
+the subject of inquiry, it will also be absurd to assume
+that upon which it depends.
+It is also plain that all sensibles are relative; for +they are relative to those who have the sensations. +Therefore it is apparent that whatever sensible object +is presented can easily be referred to one of the Five +Modes. And concerning the intelligible object we +argue similarly. For if it should be said that it is a +matter of unsettled controversy, the necessity of our +suspending judgement will be granted.
+And if, on the other hand, the controversy admits of decision, +then if the decision rests on an intelligible object we shall +be driven to the regress ad infinitum, and to circular reasoning +if it rests on a sensible; for since the sensible again is +controverted and cannot be decided by means of itself +because of the regress ad infinitum, it will require the +intelligible object, just as also the intelligible will +require the sensible.
+For these reasons, again, he who assumes anything by +hypothesis will be acting illogically. Moreover, +objects of thought, or intelligibles, are relative; for +they are so named on account of their relation to +the person thinking, and if they had really possessed +the nature they are said to possess, there would +have been no controversy about them. Thus the +intelligible also is referred to the Five Modes, so +that in all cases we are compelled to suspend judgement +concerning the object presented.
+Such then are the Five Modes handed down amongst +the later Sceptics; but they propound these not by +way of superseding the Ten Modes but in order to +expose the rashness of the Dogmatists with more +variety and completeness by means of the Five in +conjunction with the Ten.
+They hand down also Two other Modes leading
+to suspension of judgement.
+And the reason why they do not allow that
+anything is apprehended through something
+else is this: If that through which an object is
+apprehended must always itself be apprehended
+through some other thing, one is involved in a process
+of circular reasoning or in regress ad infinitum.
+And if, on the other hand, one should choose to
+assume that the thing through which another object
+is apprehended is itself apprehended through itself,
+this is refuted by the fact that, for the reasons already
+stated, nothing is apprehended through itself. But
+as to how what conflicts with itself can possibly be
+apprehended either through itself or through some
+other thing we remain in doubt, so long as the criterion
+of truth or of apprehension is not apparent, and signs,
+even apart from demonstration, are rejected, as we
+shall discover in our next Book.
For the present, however, it will suffice to have said +thus much concerning the Modes leading to suspension +of judgement.
+Just as we teach the traditional Modes leading to +suspense of judgement, so likewise some Sceptics +propound Modes by which we express doubt about +the particular ‟aetiologies,” or theories of causation, +and thus pull up the Dogmatists because of the special +pride they take in these theories. Thus Aenesidemus +furnishes us with Eight Modes by which, as he thinks, +he tests and exposes the unsoundness of every dogmatic +theory of causation.
+Of these the First, he says, is that which shows that, +since aetiology as a whole deals with the non-apparent, +it is unconfirmed by any agreed evidence derived from +appearances. The Second Mode shows how often, when there +is ample scope for ascribing the object of investigation +to a variety of causes, some of them account for it +in one way only.
+The Third shows how to orderly events they assign +causes which exhibit no order. The Fourth shows how, +when they have grasped the way in which appearances +occur, they assume that they have also apprehended +how non-apparent things occur, whereas, though +the non-apparent may possibly be realized in a +similar way to the appearances, possibly they +may not be realized in a similar way but +in a peculiar way of their own.
+In the Fifth Mode it is shown how practically all +these theorists assign causes according to their +own particular hypotheses about the elements, and +not according to any commonly agreed methods. In +the Sixth it is shown how they frequently admit +only such facts as can be explained by their own +theories, and dismiss facts which conflict therewith +though possessing equal probability.
+The Seventh shows how they often assign causes which +conflict not only with appearances but also with their +own hypotheses. The Eighth shows that often, when there +is equal doubt about things seemingly apparent and things +under investigation, they base their doctrine about +things equally doubtful upon things equally doubtful.
+Nor is it impossible, he adds, that the overthrow of +some of their theories of causation should be referred +to certain mixed Modes which are dependent on the +foregoing.
+Possibly, too, the Five Modes of suspension
+But if, on the other hand, the cause propounded be not +in accord therewith, the theorist will be asked in turn +for the cause of this cause, and if he assumes an apparent +cause for an apparent, or a non-evident for a non- +evident, he will be involved in the regress ad infinitum, +or reduced to arguing in a circle if he grounds each +cause in turn on another. And if at any point he +makes a stand, either he will state that the cause is +well-grounded so far as relates to the previous +admissions, thus introducing relativity and destroying +its claim to absolute reality, or he will make some +assumption ex hypothesi and will be stopped by us. +So by these Modes also it is, no doubt, possible to +expose the rashness of the Dogmatists in their +aetiologies.
+And because when we make use of these Modes
+and those which lead to suspension of judgement we
+give utterance to certain expressions
+This expression, then, we sometimes enunciate
+in the form I have stated but sometimes in the form
+‟Nowise more.” For we do not, as some suppose,
+adopt the form ‟Not more” in specific inquiries
+and ‟Nowise more” in generic inquiries, but we
+enunciate both ‟Not more” and ‟Nowise more”
+indifferently, and we shall discuss them now as identical
+expressions. This expression, then, is elliptical. For
+just as when we say ‟a double” we are implicitly
+saying ‟a double hearth,”
+Some of the Sceptics, however, in place of the ‟Not”
+adopt the form ”(For) what this more than that,”
+taking the ‟what” to denote, in this case, cause,
+so that the meaning is ‟For what reason this more
+than that?”
+And the expression ‟Not more this than that” indicates
+also our feeling, whereby we come to end in equipoise
+because of the equipollence of the opposed objects;
+and by ‟equipollence” we mean equality in respect of
+what seems probable to us, and by ‟opposed” we mean in
+general conflicting, and by ‟equipoise”
+Then as to the formula ‟Nowise more,” even +though it exhibits the character of a form of assent +or of denial, we do not employ it in this way, but we +take it in a loose and inexact sense, either in place +of a question or in place of the phrase ‟I know not +to which of these things I ought to assent, and to +which I ought not.” For our aim is to indicate what +appears to us; while as to the expression by which +we indicate this we are indifferent. This point, too, +should be noticed—that we utter the expression +‟Nowise more” not as positively affirming that it +really is true and certain, but as stating in regard to +it also what appears to us.
+Concerning non-assertion what we say is this. The +term ‟assertion” has two senses, general and special; +used in the general sense it indicates affirmation or +negation, as for example ‟It is day,” ‟It is not +day;” in its special sense it indicates affirmation +only, and in this sense negations are not termed +assertions. Non-assertion, then, is avoidance of +assertion in the general sense in which it is +said to include both affirmation and negation, +so that non-assertion is a mental condition of ours +because of which we refuse either to affirm or to +deny anything.
+Hence it is plain that we adopt non-assertion also not as +though things are in reality of such a kind as wholly +to induce non-assertion, but as indicating that we +now, at the time of uttering it, are in this condition +regarding the problems now before us. It must +also be borne in mind that what, as we say, we +neither posit nor deny, is some one of the dogmatic +statements made about what is non-apparent; for +we yield to those things which move us emotionally +and drive us compulsorily to assent.
+The formulae ‟perhaps” and ‟perhaps not,” and +‟possibly” and ‟possibly not,” and ‟maybe” and +‟maybe not,” we adopt in place of ‟perhaps it is +and perhaps it is not,” and ‟possibly it is and +possibly it is not,” and ‟maybe it is and maybe +it is not,” so that for the sake of conciseness +we adopt the phrase ‟possibly not” instead of +‟possibly it is not,” and ‟maybe not” instead of +‟maybe it is not,” and ‟perhaps not” instead of +‟perhaps it is not.”
+But here again we do not fight about phrases nor do we
+inquire whether the phrases indicate realities, but we
+adopt them, as I said,
+The phrase ‟I suspend judgement”
+Regarding the phrase ‟I determine nothing” this +is what we say. We hold that ‟to determine” is +not simply to state a thing but to put forward +something non-evident combined with assent. For +in this sense, no doubt, it will be found that +the Sceptic determines nothing, not even the very +proposition ‟I determine nothing;” for this is not a +dogmatic assumption, that is to say assent to something +non-evident, but an expression indicative of our +own mental condition. So whenever the Sceptic says +‟I determine nothing,” what he means is ‟I am +now in such a state of mind as neither to affirm +dogmatically nor deny any of the matters now in +question.” And this he says simply by way of announcing +undogmatically what appears to himself regarding +the matters presented, not making any confident +declaration, but just explaining his own state of mind.
+Indetermination is a state of mind in which we
+neither deny nor affirm any of the matters which are
+subjects of dogmatic inquiry, that is to say, non-
+evident. So whenever the Sceptic says ‟All things
+are undetermined,” he takes the word ‟are” in the
+sense of ‟appear to him,” and by ‟all things” he
+means not existing things but such of the non-evident
+matters investigated by the Dogmatists as he has
+examined, and by ‟undetermined” he means not
+superior in point of credibility or incredibility to
+things opposed, or in any way conflicting.
+And just as the man who says ”(I) walk about”
+We adopt a similar attitude when we say ‟All
+things are non-apprehensible.”
+Both the expressions ‟I am non-apprehensive” +and ‟I apprehend not” are indicative of a personal +state of mind, in which the Sceptic, for the time being, +avoids affirming or denying any non-evident matter +of inquiry, as is obvious from what we have said above +concerning the other expressions.
+When we say ‟To every argument an equal argument
+is opposed,” we mean ‟to every argument”
+that has been investigated by us, and the word
+‟argument” we use not in its simple sense, but of
+that which establishes a point dogmatically (that is to
+say with reference to what is non-evident) and
+establishes it by any method, and not necessarily by means
+of premisses and a conclusion.
+So whenever I say ‟To every argument an equal argument is
+opposed,” what I am virtually saying is ‟To every argument
+investigated by me which establishes a point dogmatically,
+it seems to me there is opposed another argument, establishing
+a point dogmatically, which is equal to the first in respect
+of credibility and incredibility;” so that the utterance of
+the phrase is not a piece of dogmatism,
+But some also utter the expression in the form
+‟To every argument an equal argument is to be
+opposed,”
+And they address this injunction to the Sceptic lest
+haply, through being misled by the Dogmatist, he may give
+up the Sceptic search, and through precipitancy
+miss the ‟quietude”
+In a preliminary outline it will be sufficient to have +explained the expressions now set forth, especially +since it is possible to explain the rest by deductions +from the foregoing. For, in regard to all the Sceptic +expressions, we must grasp first the fact that we make +no positive assertion respecting their absolute truth, +since we say that they may possibly be confuted by +themselves, seeing that they themselves are included +in the things to which their doubt applies, just as +aperient drugs do not merely eliminate the humours +from the body, but also expel themselves along with +the humours.
+And we also say that we employ them not by way of
+authoritatively explaining the things with reference
+to which we adopt them, but without precision and, if
+you like, loosely; for it does not become the Sceptic
+to wrangle over expressions,
+Besides this we must also remember that we do not employ
+them universally about all things, but about those which
+are non-evident and are objects of dogmatic inquiry; and
+that we state what appears to us and do not make any
+positive declarations as to the real nature of external
+objects; for I think that, as a result of this, every
+sophism
+And now that we have reviewed the idea or purpose +of Scepticism and its divisions, and the criterion and +the end, and the modes, too, of suspension, and have +discussed the Sceptic expressions, and have thus made +clear the character of Scepticism, our next task is, +we suppose, to explain briefly the distinction which +exists between it and the philosophic systems which +lie next to it, in order that we may more clearly +understand the ‟suspensive” Way of thought. Let +us begin with the Heracleitean philosophy.
+Now that this latter differs from our Way of thought
+is plain at once; for Heracleitus
+for certainly no one would venture to say that honey
+Rather it is the case that the Sceptic Way so far
+from being an aid to the knowledge of the Heracleitean
+philosophy is actually an obstacle thereto, seeing that
+the Sceptic decries all the dogmatic statements of
+Heracleitus as rash utterances, contradicting his
+‟Ecpyrosis,”
+But it is also said that the Democritean
+So that in this respect also we differ, and our difference +becomes specially evident when Democritus says ‟But in +verity atoms and void” (for he says ‟In verity” in place +of ‟In truth”); and that he differs from us when he says +that the atoms and the void are in truth subsistent, +although he starts out from the incongruity of appearances, +it is superfluous, I think, to state.
+Some assert that the Cyrenaic
+Protagoras
+And for this reason he seems also to have something in +common with the Pyrrhoneans. Yet he differs from them, +and we shall perceive the difference when we have +adequately explained the views of Protagoras.
+What he states then is this—that matter is in flux, +and as it flows additions are made continuously in the +place of the effluxions, and the senses are transformed +and altered according to the times of life and to all +the other conditions of the bodies.
+He says also that the ‟reasons” of all the appearances
+subsist in matter, so that matter, so far as depends
+on itself, is capable of being all those things which
+appear to all.
+Moreover, precisely the same account applies to the +variations due to age, and to the sleeping or waking +state, and to each several kind of condition. Thus, +according to him, Man becomes the criterion of real +existences; for all things that appear to men also exist, +and things that appear to no man have no existence either.
+We see, then, that he dogmatizes about the fluidity +of matter and also about the subsistence therein of +the ‟reasons” of all appearances, these being non- +evident matters about which we suspend judgement.
+Some indeed say that the Academic philosophy
According to most people there have been three +Academies—the first and most ancient that of Plato +and his School, the second or middle Academy that +of Arcesilaus, the pupil of Polemo, and his School, the +third or New Academy that of the School of Carneades +and Cleitomachus. Some, however, add as a fourth +that of the School of Philo and Charmidas; and some +even count the School of Antiochus as a fifth.
+Beginning, then, with the Old Academy let us consider
+how the philosophies mentioned differ
Plato has been described by some as ‟dogmatic,” by
+others as ‟dubitative,” and by others again as partly
+dogmatic and partly dubitative. For in his exercitatory
+discourses,
+Now as regards those who describe him as a dogmatist,
+or as partly dogmatic and partly dubitative, it would
+be superfluous to say anything now; for they themselves
+acknowledge his difference from us. But the
+question whether Plato is a genuine Sceptic is one
+which we discuss more fully in our ‟Commentaries;”
+And if Plato does really utter some statements in a
+sceptical way when he is, as they say, ‟exercising,”
+that will not make him a Sceptic; for the man that
+dogmatizes about a single thing, or ever prefers one
+impression to another in point of credibility or
+incredibility, or makes any assertion about any
+non-evident object, assumes the dogmatic character,
+as Timon
+For after praising him repeatedly, so that he even
+dedicated to him his Satires, he represented him as
+uttering this lamentation—
+
+
+So on this account he also calls him ‟semi-vain,” and
+not perfectly free from vanity, where he says—
+
+
+He called him ‟semi-vain” as being in some degree
+free from vanity, and ‟derider of Homer’s deceptions”
+because he censured the deceit mentioned in
+Homer.
+Xenophanes, contrary to the preconceptions +of all other men, asserted dogmatically that the All +is one, and that God is consubstantial with all things, +and is of spherical form and passionless and unchangeable +and rational; and from this it is easy to show +how Xenophanes differs from us. However, it is plain +from what has been said that even if Plato evinces +doubt about some matters, yet he cannot be a Sceptic +inasmuch as he shows himself at times either making +assertions about the reality of non-evident objects +or preferring one non-evident thing to another in +point of credibility.
+The adherents of the New Academy, although they
+affirm that all things are non-apprehensible, yet
+differ from the Sceptics even, as seems probable, in
+respect of this very statement that all things are
+non-apprehensible (for they affirm this positively,
+whereas the Sceptic regards it as possible that some
+things may be apprehended); but they differ from
+us quite plainly in their judgement of things good
+and evil. For the Academicians do not describe a
+thing as good or evil in the way we do; for they do
+so with the conviction that it is more probable
+And as regards sense-impressions, we say
And respecting the probable impressions they
+make distinctions: some they regard as just simply
+probable, others as probable and tested, others as
+probable, tested, and ‟irreversible.”
+but to the man who has looked carefully round and
+has investigated the conditions—such as its immobility
+and its colour, and each of its other peculiarities—it
+appears as a rope, in accordance with an impression
+that is probable and tested. And the impression that
+is also ‟irreversible” or incontrovertible is of this
+kind. When Alcestis had died, Heracles, it is said,
+brought her up again from Hades and showed her to
+Admetus, who received an impression of Alcestis that
+was probable and tested; since, however, he knew
+that she was dead his mind recoiled from its assent
+and reverted to unbelief.
+So then the philosophers of the New Academy prefer +the probable and tested impression to the simply +probable, and to both of these the impression that +is probable and tested and irreversible.
+And although both the Academics and the Sceptics +say that they believe some things, yet here too the +difference between the two philosophies is quite plain. +For the word ‟believe” has different meanings:
+it means not to resist but simply to follow without
+any strong impulse or inclination, as the boy is said
+to believe his tutor; but sometimes it means to
+assent to a thing of deliberate choice and with a
+kind of sympathy due to strong desire, as when
+the incontinent man believes him who approves of
+an extravagant mode of life. Since, therefore,
+Carneades and Cleitomachus declare that a strong
+inclination accompanies their credence and the
+credibility of the object, while we
+Furthermore, as regards the End (or aim of life)
+Arcesilaus, however, who was, as we said,
+He declares, too, that suspension regarding particular +objects is good, but assent regarding particulars bad. +Only one might say that whereas we make these +statements not positively but in accordance with what +appears to us, he makes them as statements of real +facts, so that he asserts that suspension in itself +really is good and assent bad.
+And if one ought to credit also what is said about him,
+he appeared at the first glance, they say, to be a
+'Pyrrhonean, but in reality he was a dogmatist; and
+because he used to test his companions by means of
+dubitation to see if they were fitted by nature for
+the reception of the Platonic dogmas, he was thought
+to be a dubitative philosopher, but he actually passed
+on to such of his companions as were naturally gifted
+the dogmas of Plato. And this was why Ariston
+Philo
+Since some allege that the Sceptic philosophy
+is identical with the Empiricism of the Medical
+sect,
+for it alone of the Medical systems appears to avoid rash
+treatment of things non-evident by arbitrary assertions as
+to their apprehensibility or non-apprehensibility, and
+following appearances derives from them what seems beneficial,
+in accordance with the practice of the Sceptics. For we stated
+above
+So then, just as the Sceptic, in virtue of the compulsion +of the affections, is guided by thirst to drink and by hunger +to food, and in like manner to other such objects, in the +same way the Methodical physician is guided by the pathological +affections to the corresponding remedies—by contraction to +dilatation, as when one seeks refuge in heat from the contraction +due to the application of cold, or by fluxion to the stoppage +of it, as when persons in a hot bath, dripping with perspiration +and in a relaxed condition, seek to put a stop to it and for this +reason rush off into the cool air. It is plain, too, that +conditions which are naturally alien compel us to take measures +for their removal, seeing that even the dog when it is pricked +by a thorn proceeds to remove it.
+And in short—to avoid exceeding the limits proper to an +outline of this kind by a detailed enumeration—I suppose +that all the facts described by the Methodic School can be +classed as instances of the compulsion of the affections, +whether natural or against nature.
+Besides, the use of terms in an undogmatic and +indeterminate sense is common to both systems.
+For just as the Sceptic uses the expressions ‟I determine
+nothing” and ‟I apprehend nothing,” as we have
+said, in an undogmatic sense, even so the Methodic
+speaks of ‟generality”
+Consequently, judging from these and similar indications, +we should say that the Methodic School of Medicine has +some affinity with Scepticism; and, when viewed not +simply by itself, but in comparison with the other +Medical Schools, it has more affinity than they.
+And now that we have said thus much concerning +the Schools which seem to stand nearest to that of +the Sceptics, we here bring to a conclusion both our +general account of Scepticism and the First Book of +our ‟Outlines.”
+Since we have undertaken this inquiry in criticism
+of the Dogmatists,
+For they
+For just as he who is ignorant, for instance,
+of the arguments known as ‟How far reduced”
+Now let those who speak thus make answer and
+tell us in what sense they are now using the term
+‟apprehend,” whether simply of mental conception
+without the further affirmation of the reality of the
+objects under discussion, or with the further assumption
+of the reality of the objects discussed. For
+if they say that ‟to apprehend” means, in their
+argument, to assent to an ‟apprehensive impression,”
+Thus, for example, when the
+Stoic criticizes the statement of the Epicurean that
+‟Being is divided,”
+And we must use a like argument against those +who issue from any of the other Sects, whenever they +desire to make any critical investigation of the tenets +of those who differ from them in doctrine. +consequently they are debarred from indulging in any +criticism of one another. Or rather—to avoid talking +nonsense—practically the whole of Dogmatism will +be confounded and the Sceptic philosophy will be +firmly established once it is granted that it is +impossible to inquire regarding an object which is not, +in this sense, apprehended.
+For he who makes a
+dogmatic statement about a non-evident object will
+declare that he is making it either after having
+apprehended or after having not apprehended it.
+But if he has not apprehended it he will not gain
+credence; while if he has apprehended it, he will
+say that he has apprehended the object directly and
+through itself and owing to the clear impression it
+has made on him, or else by means of some kind of
+search and inquiry.
+But if he shall say that the +non-evident object has impressed him and has been +apprehended through itself, immediately and clearly, +in this case the object would not be non-evident but +apparent to all men equally, an acknowledged and +uncontroverted fact. But about every single object +that is non-evident there exists amongst them +endless controversy; so that the Dogmatist who makes +positive assertions about the reality of a non-evident +object cannot have apprehended it because of its +having made on him a direct and clear impression.
+If, on the other hand, his apprehension is a result of
+search, how was he in a position to make inquiry
+before he had accurately apprehended the object,
+without violating our present assumption? For since
+the inquiry necessitates as a preliminary the existence
+of an accurate apprehension of that which is to be
+the subject of inquiry, while the apprehension of the
+subject of inquiry demands, in its turn, the previous
+existence of a complete inquiry into that subject,
+owing to this circular process of reasoning
+If, however, they say that it is not this kind of +apprehension that ought, in their view, to precede +inquiry, but simply mental conception, then it is no +longer impossible for those who suspend judgement +to inquire about the reality of things non-evident. +For the Sceptic is not, I suppose, prohibited from +mental conception which arises through the reason +itself as a result of passive impressions and clear +appearances and does not at all involve the reality +of the objects conceived; for we conceive, as +they say, not only of real things but also of unreal. +Hence both while inquiring and while conceiving +the Suspensive person continues in the Sceptical +state of mind. For, as has been shown, he assents +to what he experiences by way of subjective +impression, according as that impression appears to +him.
+But consider whether, even in this case, the +Dogmatists are not precluded from inquiry. For +to continue the investigation of problems is not +inconsistent in those who confess their ignorance +of their real nature, but only in those who believe +they have an exact knowledge of them; since for +the latter the inquiry has already, as they suppose, +reached its goal, whereas for the former the ground +on which all inquiry is based—namely, the belief +that they have not found the truth—still subsists.
+Thus we have to inquire briefly, on the present
+occasion, concerning each several division of philosophy
+so called. And since there exists much dispute
+amongst the Dogmatists regarding the divisions of
+philosophy
+The Stoics, then, and several others,
+But first we must notice that the word ‟criterion”
+is used both of that by which, as they say, we judge
+of reality and non-reality, and of that which we use
+as the guide of life; and our present task is to discuss
+the so-called criterion of truth, since we have already
+dealt with the criterion in its other sense in our
+discourse ‟On Scepticism.”
+The criterion, then, with which our argument is
+concerned, has three several meanings—the general,
+the special, and the most special. In the ‟general”
+sense it is used of every standard of apprehension,
+and in this sense we speak even of physical organs,
+such as sight, as criteria. In the ‟special” sense
+it includes every technical standard of apprehension,
+such as the rule and compass. In the ‟most
+special” sense it includes every technical standard
+of apprehension of a non-evident object; but in this
+application ordinary standards
+We propose, therefore, in the first place to discuss the
+logical criterion. But the logical criterion also may
+be used in three senses
+It was appropriate, I consider, to make these +prefatory observations so that we may realize what is +the exact subject of our discourse; and it remains +for us to proceed to our counter-statement aimed +against those who rashly assert that they have apprehended +the criterion of truth, and we will begin with +the dispute which exists about this question.
+Of those, then, who have treated of the criterion
+some have declared that a criterion exists—the Stoics,
+for example, and certain others—while by some its
+existence is denied, as by the Corinthian Xeniades,
+This dispute,
+Besides, in order to decide the +dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must +possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be +able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess +an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion +must first be decided. And when the argument thus +reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the +discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since +we do not allow them to adopt a criterion by assumption, +while if they offer to judge the criterion by a +criterion we force them to a regress ad infinitum. +And furthermore, since demonstration requires a +demonstrated criterion, while the criterion requires +an approved demonstration, they are forced into +circular reasoning.
+We suppose, then, that this is sufficient to expose +the rashness of the Dogmatists in respect of their +doctrine of the Criterion; but in order to enable us +to confute them in detail, it will not be out of place +to dwell at length upon this topic. We do not, +however, desire to oppose their opinions about the +criterion severally, one by one—for their controversy +is endless, and to do so would necessarily involve +us as well in a confused discussion,—but inasmuch as +the criterion in question is three-fold (the agent, the +instrument, and the ‟according to what”), we shall +discuss each of these in turn and establish the non- +apprehensibility of each, since in this way our exposition +will be at once both methodical and complete. +Let us begin with the agent; for the perplexity +which attaches to this seems somehow to involve the +rest as well.
+Now ‟Man” (if he is ‟the agent”) seems to me,
+so far as regards the statements made by the
+Dogmatists, to be not only non-apprehensible but also
+inconceivable. At least we hear the Platonic Socrates
+Thus Democritus
+And it is evident from the relevance of this criticism that we +are not now arguing sophistically. For this thinker +proceeds to say that ‟Only the atoms and the void +truly exist,” and these he says ‟form the substrate +not only of animals but of all compound substances,” +so that, so far as depends on these, we shall not form +a concept of the particular essence of ‟Man,” seeing +that they are common to all things. But besides +these there is no existing substrate; so that we shall +possess no means whereby we shall be able to +distinguish Man from the other animals and form a +precise conception of him.
+Again, Epicurus says that Man is ‟This sort
+of a shape combined with vitality.”
+Others
+And the attributes contained in this definition are used either in an ‟actual,” or
+full, or in a potential sense;
In this way, then, the concept of Man is shown to be +one which it is impossible to frame.
+For when Plato
+But even if we should grant, by way of concession,
+that Man can be conceived, yet he will be found
+to be non-apprehensible. For he is compounded of
+soul and body, and neither body nor soul perchance
+Now that body is not apprehended is easily shown
+thus: the attributes of an object
+But, not to dwell on the controversy about the
+body, Man is also found to be non-apprehensible
+owing to the fact that his soul is non-apprehensible.
+That it is non-apprehensible is plain from this: of
+those who have treated of the soul—so that we may
+avoid dwelling on the long and endless controversy
+—some have asserted, as did Dicaearchus
+If, then, the Dogmatists shall maintain +that this dispute is incapable of decision, they will +be admitting thereby the non-apprehensibility of the +soul, while if they say it is capable of decision, let +them tell us by what means they will decide it. For +they cannot say ‟by sense-perception,” since the +soul is said by them to be an object of intelligence; +and if they shall say ‟by the intellect,” we will say +that inasmuch as the intellect is the least evident part +of the soul—as is shown by those who agree about the +real existence of the soul, though differing about the +intellect,
+—if they propose to apprehend the soul and +to decide the dispute about it by means of the +intellect, they will be proposing to decide and establish +the less questionable matter by the more questionable, +which is absurd. Thus, neither by the intellect will +the dispute about the soul be decided; therefore there +is no means to decide it. And this being so, it is +non-apprehensible; and, in consequence, Man too +will not be apprehended.
+But even supposing we grant that Man is
+apprehended, it would not, probably, be possible to show
+that objects ought to be judged by him. For he who
+asserts that objects ought to be judged by Man will
+be asserting this either without proof or with proof.
+And if it shall be asserted without proof that objects +ought to be judged by Man, the assertion will be +disbelieved, so that we shall be unable to affirm +positively that the criterion ‟By whom” (or Agent) +is Man. Moreover, who is to be the judge that the +criterion of the Agent is Man? For if they assert this +without a judgement (or criterion) they will surely not +be believed.
+Yet if they say that a man is to be the
+judge, that will be assuming the point at issue;
+But let it be granted and established that objects
+ought to be judged by Man. Then, since there exists
+great difference amongst men, let the Dogmatists
+first agree together that this is the particular man to
+whom we must attend, and then, and only then, let
+them bid us also to yield him our assent. But if they
+are going to dispute about this ‟long as the waters
+flow on and the tall trees cease not to burgeon” (to
+quote the familiar saying),
+For if they declare that +we must believe the Sage, we shall ask them ‟What +Sage?” Is it the Sage of Epicurus or of the Stoics, +the Cyrenaic Sage or the Cynic? For they will be +unable to return a unanimous answer.
+And if anyone shall demand that we should desist +from our inquiry about the Sage and simply believe +the man who is more sagacious than all others, then, +in the first place, they will dispute as to who is more +sagacious than the rest, and in the next place, even +if it be granted that it can be unanimously agreed +who the man is who is more sagacious than those of +the present and the past, even so this man will not +deserve credence.
+For inasmuch as sagacity is liable +to a great, indeed almost incalculable, advance or +decline in intensity, we assert that it is possible for +another man to arise who is more sagacious than this +man who, we say, is more sagacious than those of the +past and present. So, then, just as we are requested +to believe the man who is now said to be wiser than +those of the present and the past because of his +sagacity, so it is still more proper to believe his +successor in the future who will be more sagacious +than he. And when that successor has arisen, then +it is right to expect that yet another will arise more +sagacious than he, and so on ad infinitum.
+Nor is it evident whether all these men will agree with one +another or contradict one another. And consequently, +even when one of them is acknowledged to be more +sagacious than those of the past and present, seeing +that we are unable to affirm positively that no man +will be more clever than he (this being non-evident), +we shall always have to wait for the judgement of the +more sagacious man of the future, and never give our +assent to this superior person.
+And even should we grant, by way of concession, +that no one either is, was, or will be more sagacious +than our hypothetical Sage, not even so is it proper +to believe him. For since it is the sagacious above +all who, in the construction of their doctrines, love +to champion unsound doctrines and to make them +appear sound and true, whenever this sharp-witted +person makes a statement we shall not know whether +he is stating the matter as it really is, or whether he +is defending as true what is really false and persuading +us to think of it as something true, on the ground that +he is more sagacious than all other men and therefore +incapable of being refuted by us. So not even to +this man will we assent, as one who judges matters +truly, since, though we suppose it possible that he +speaks the truth, we also suppose that owing to his +excessive cleverness he makes his statements with +the object of defending false propositions as true. +Consequently, in the judgement of propositions we +ought not to believe even the man who is thought to +be the most clever of all.
+And if anyone shall say that we ought to attend to
+the consensus of the majority, we shall reply that this
+is idle.
+And besides all this, those who agree are either
+in diverse dispositions
+besides the further fact that—as we pointed out in ‟The Fourth
+Mode of Scepticism”
+But if we are not even to give heed to numbers, +we shall not find anyone by whom objects are to be +judged, in spite of our having granted so much by +way of concession. Therefore, on all these grounds, +the criterion ‟By whom” objects are to be judged +is found to be non-apprehensible.
+And seeing that the other criteria are included in
+this one, since each of them is either a part or an
+affection or an activity of Man, our next task might
+perhaps have been to proceed in our discussion to one
+of the subjects which follows next in order, supposing
+that those criteria also have been sufficiently dealt
+with in what we have now said; yet in order that we
+may not seem to be shirking the specific counter-
+statement proper to each case, we will exceed our
+brief
+Concerning this criterion
Let us begin with the senses.
+Since, then, some
+So then the question whether the senses have +illusory affections or apprehend some real object will +be incapable of either decision or apprehension; and +there follows the corollary, that we must not attend +to sensation alone in our judgement of matters, since +regarding it we cannot so much as affirm that it +apprehends anything at all.
+But let it be granted, by way of concession, that
+the senses are apprehensive; yet, even so they will
+not be found any the less unreliable for judging the
+external real objects. For certainly the senses are
+affected in diverse ways by external objects—taste,
+for instance, perceives the same honey now as bitter
+and now as sweet; and vision pronounces the same
+colour now blood-red and now white.
+Nay, even smell is not consistent with itself; for certainly the +sufferer from headache declares myrrh to be unpleasant, +while one who does not so suffer calls it +pleasant. And those who are possessed or in a frenzy +fancy they hear persons conversing with them whom we +do not hear. And the same water seems to those in a +fever to be unpleasant because of its excessive heat, +but to all others tepid.
+Whether, then, one is to call +all the appearances true, or some true and some false, +or all false, it is impossible to say since we possess +no agreed criterion whereby we shall judge the question +we are proposing to decide, nor are we even +provided with a proof that is true and approved, +because we are still in search of the criterion of truth +‟By means of which” the true proof itself ought to +be tested.
+For these reasons he also who asks us to +believe those who are in a natural state, but not +those whose disposition is non-natural, will be acting +absurdly; for he will not gain credence if he says +this without proof, and, for the reasons given above, +he will not possess a true and approved proof.
+And even were one to concede that the sense-
+impressions of those in a natural state are reliable,
+and those of men in a non-natural condition unreliable,
+even so the judgement of external real objects
+by means of the senses alone will be found to be
+impossible. For certainly the sense of sight, even
+when it is in a natural state, pronounces the same
+tower
+and the sense of hearing likewise perceives the same sound as loud
+by night but as faint by day; and the sense of smell
+regards the same objects as malodorous in the case
+of most people, but not so in the case of tanners;
+and the same sense of touch feels warmth in the outer
+hall,
+Let us, then, proceed in our exposition to the
+intellect. Now those who claim
+But let it be granted that the intellect has been
+apprehended, and let us agree, by way of assumption,
+that it really exists; I still affirm that it cannot judge
+objects. For if it does not even discern itself accurately
+but contradicts itself about its own existence
+and the mode of its origin and the position in which
+it is placed,
+And even if it be granted +that the intellect is capable of judging objects, we +shall not discover how to judge according to it. For +since there exists great divergence in respect of the +intellect—for the intellect of Gorgias, according to +which he states that nothing exists, is one kind, and +another kind is that of Heracleitus, according to which +he declares that all things exist, and another that of +those who say that some things do and others do not +exist—we shall have no means of deciding between +these divergent intellects, nor shall we be able to +assert that it is right to take this man’s intellect as +our guide but not that man’s.
+For if we venture +to judge by any one intellect, by thus agreeing to +assent to one side in the dispute we shall be assuming +the matter in question; while if we judge by anything +else, we shall be falsifying the assertion that +one ought to judge objects by the intellect alone.
+Further, we shall be able to show, from the statements +made concerning the criterion ‟By whom” +(as it is called), that we are unable to discover the +intellect that is cleverer than all others; and also +that if we should discover the intellect that is cleverer +than past and present intellects
+we ought not to attend to it, since it is not evident whether yet +another intellect may not arise which is cleverer than +it; and further, that even if we assume an intellect +which none could possibly surpass, we shall not +assent to the man who judges by means of it, dreading +lest he may put forward some false statement +and succeed in persuading us of its truth because +he possesses the keenest intellect. Neither, then, by +the intellect alone ought we to judge objects.
+The only remaining alternative is judgement by
+means of both senses and intellect.
+Then there is this also to be said: they will judge +objects either by all the senses and by all men’s +intellects or by some. But if a man shall say ‟by all,” +he will be claiming what is impossible in view of the +immense discrepancy which obviously exists amongst +the senses and the intellects; and moreover, by +reason of the assertion of Gorgias’s intellect that ‟we +must not give heed either to sense or to intellect,” +the man’s statement will be demolished. And if they +shall say ‟by some,” how will they decide that we +ought to give heed to these senses and this intellect +and not to those, seeing that they possess no accepted +criterion by which to judge the differing senses and +intellects?
+And if they shall say that we will judge +the senses and the intellects by the intellect and the +senses, they are assuming the matter in question; +for what we are questioning is the possibility of +judging by means of these.
+Another point we must make is this: either one +will judge both the senses and the intellects by the +senses, or both the senses and the intellects by the +intellects, or the senses by the senses and the intellect +by the intellects, or the intellects by the senses and +the senses by the intellect. If then they shall propose +to judge both objects by the senses or by the intellect, +they will no longer be judging by sense and intellect +but by one of these two, whichever one they may +choose, and thus they will be entangled in the +perplexities previously mentioned.
+And if they shall judge the senses by the senses and the intellects by +the intellect, then, since both senses conflict with +senses and intellects with intellects, whichever of the +conflicting senses they shall adopt for judging the +rest of the senses, they will be assuming the matter +in question; for they will be adopting one section of +the series in dispute, as being already reliable, to +decide about the others which, equally with it, are in +question.
+And the same argument applies to the +intellects. And if they shall judge the intellects +by the senses, and the senses by the intellect, this +involves circular reasoning inasmuch as it is required +that the intellects should be judged first in order that +the senses may be judged, and the senses be first +scrutinized in order that the intellects may be tested.
+Since, therefore, criteria of the one species cannot be +judged by those of a like species, nor those of both +the species by those of one species, nor conversely +by those of an unlike species, we shall not be able to +prefer intellect to intellect or sense to sense. And +because of this we shall have nothing by which to +judge; for if we shall be unable to judge by all the +senses and intellects, and shall not know either by +which of them we ought and by which we ought not +to judge, then we shall possess no means by which to +judge objects.
+ +Consequently, for these reasons also the criterion +‟By means of which” will have no real existence.
+Let us consider next the Criterion ‟According to
+which,” as they
+Yet even if ‟presentation” could be conceived, it would
+still be non-apprehensible; for since it is an affection
+of the regent part, and the regent part, as we have
+shown,
+Further, even were we to grant that the ‟presentation”
+is apprehended, objects cannot be judged
+according to it; for the intellect, as they assert, does
+not make contact with external objects and receive
+presentations by means of itself but by means of
+the senses, and the senses do not apprehend external
+real objects but only, if at all, their own affections.
+And if this affection differs +from the external real object, the presentation will +not be that of the external reality but of something +else which is different therefrom. If, therefore, the +intellect judges according to this, it judges badly and +not according to reality. Consequently, it is absurd +to say that external objects are judged according to +the presentation.
+Nor, again, is it possible to assert that the soul
+apprehends external realities by means of the affections
+of sense owing to the similarity of the affections
+of the senses to the external real objects. For how
+is the intellect to know whether the affections of the
+senses are similar to the objects of sense when it has
+not itself encountered the external objects, and the
+senses do not inform it about their real nature but
+only about their own affections, as I have argued
+from the Modes of Suspension?
+For just as the man who does not know Socrates but has seen a picture of +him does not know whether the picture is like Socrates, +so also the intellect when it gazes on the affections of +the senses but does not behold the external objects +will not so much as know whether the affections of +the senses are similar to the external realities. So +that not even on the ground of resemblance will he +be able to judge these objects according to the +presentation.
+But let us grant by way of concession that in
+addition to being conceived and apprehended the
+presentation is also such that it admits of objects
+being judged according to it, although the argument
+points to an entirely opposite conclusion. In this
+case we shall either believe every presentation, or
+impression, and judge according thereto, or some one
+impression. But if we are to believe every impression,
+clearly we shall believe also that of Xeniades
+And if we are to believe some, how shall we decide that +it is proper to believe these and disbelieve those? +For if they say we are to do so without presentation, +they will be granting that presentation is superfluous +for judging, inasmuch as they will be stating that +objects can be judged without it; while if they say +‟by the aid of presentation,” how will they select +the presentation which they are adopting for the +purpose of judging all the other presentations?
+Once again they will need a second presentation to judge +the first, and a third to judge the second, and so on +ad infinitum. But it is impossible to judge an infinite +series; and therefore it is impossible to discover what +sort of presentations we ought to employ as criteria, +and what we ought not. Seeing, then, that, even +should we grant that one ought to judge objects +according to presentations, whether we adopt the +alternative of trusting all as criteria or that of trusting +some and distrusting others, in either case the argument +is overthrown, and we are forced to conclude +that we ought not to adopt presentations as criteria +for the judging of objects.
+This is enough to say now, in our outline sketch,
+with reference to the criterion ‟According to which,”
+as it was said, objects are judged. But one should
+notice that we do not propose to assert that the
+criterion of truth is unreal
+Even were we to grant, by way of hypothesis, that
+a criterion of truth exists, it is found to be useless and
+vain if we recall that, so far as the statements of the
+Dogmatists go, truth is unreal and the true non-
+substantial.
+The passage we recall is this: ‟The
+true is said to differ from truth in three ways—in
+essence, composition, potency. In essence, since the
+true is incorporeal (for it is judgement and ‟expression”
+In composition, because the true is a simple thing, as for
+example ‘I converse,’ whereas truth is a compound
+of many true cognitions.
+In potency, since truth depends on knowledge but the +true does not altogether so depend. Consequently, +as they say, truth exists only in the good man, but +the true in the bad man as well; for it is possible +for the bad man to utter something true.”
+Such are the statements of the Dogmatists.
+But awe,—having regard here again to the plan of our +treatise,—shall confine our present discussion to the +true, since its refutation entails that of truth as well, +it being defined as the ‟system of the knowledge of +things true.” Again, since some of our arguments, +whereby we dispute the very existence of the true, +are more general, others of a specific kind, whereby +we prove that the true does not exist in utterance or +in expression or in the movement of the intellect, we +deem it sufficient for the present to set forth only +those of the more general kind. For just as, when +the foundation of a wall collapses, all the super- +structure collapses along with it, so also, when, the +substantial existence of the true is refuted, all the +particular inventions of the logic of the Dogmatists +are included in the refutation.
+Seeing, then, that there is a controversy amongst +the Dogmatists regarding ‟the true,” since some +assert that something true exists, others that nothing +true exists, it is impossible to decide the controversy, +because the man who says that something true exists +will not be believed without proof, on account of the +controversy; and if he wishes to offer proof, he will +be disbelieved if he acknowledges that his proof is +false, whereas if he declares that his proof is true he +becomes involved in circular reasoning and will be +required to show proof of the real truth of his proof, +and another proof of that proof, and so on ad infinitum. +But it is impossible to prove an infinite series; and so +it is impossible also to get to know that something +true exists.
+Moreover, the ‟something,” which is, they declare,
+the highest genus of all,
+And if the ‟something” is true, all +things will be true; and from this again it follows +that nothing is true, since this statement itself (I +mean that ‟nothing is true”) being ‟something” is +true. And if the ‟something” is both false and +true, each of its particulars will be both false and true. +From which we conclude that nothing is really true; +for that which has its real nature such that it is true +will certainly not be false. And if the ‟something” +is neither false nor true, it is acknowledged that all +the particulars also, being declared to be neither +false nor true, will not be true. So for these reasons +it will be non-evident to us whether the true exists.
+Furthermore, the true things are either apparent
+only, or non-evident only, or in part non-evident and
+in part apparent;
+And if it is apparent, since the matter +in question is what apparent things are true and what +false, that apparent thing which is adopted for the +purpose of judging the apparent objects will itself in +turn require an apparent criterion, and this again +another, and so on ad infinitum. But it is impossible +to judge an infinite series; and hence it is impossible +to apprehend whether the true things are apparent +only.
+Similarly also he who declares that the non-evident
+only are true will not imply that they are all true (for
+he will not say that it is true that the stars
+The remaining alternative is to say that of the true +some are apparent, some non-evident; but this too +is absurd. For either all the apparent and all the +non-evident are true, or some of the apparent and +some of the non-evident. If, then, we say ‟all,” the +argument will again be overthrown, since the truth is +granted of the statement ‟nothing is true,” and the +truth will be asserted of both the statements ‟the +stars are even in number” and ‟they are odd.”
+But if some of the apparent are true and some of the +non-evident, how shall we judge that of the apparent +these are true but those false? For if we do so +by means of an apparent thing, the argument is +thrown back ad infinitum; and if by means of a thing +non-evident, then, since the non-evidents also require +to be judged, by what means is this non-evident thing +to be judged? If by an apparent thing, we fall into +circular reasoning; and if by a thing non-evident, +into the regress ad infinitum.
+And about the non-evident we must make a similar statement; for he +who attempts to judge them by something non- +evident is thrown back ad infinitum, while he who +judges by a thing apparent or with the constant +assistance of a thing apparent falls back ad infinitum, +or, if he passes over to the apparent, is guilty of +circular reasoning. It is false, therefore, to say that +of the true some are apparent, some non-evident.
+If, then, neither the apparent nor the non-evident
+alone are true, nor yet some apparent and some non-
+evident things, nothing is true. But if nothing is
+true, and the criterion seems to require the true for
+the purpose of judging, the criterion is useless and
+vain, even if we grant, by way of concession, that it
+possesses some substantial reality. And if we have
+to suspend judgement as to whether anything true
+exists, it follows that those who declare that ‟dialectic
+is the science of things true and false and neither”
+And since the criterion of truth has appeared to be +unattainable, it is no longer possible to make positive +assertions either about those things which (if we may +depend on the statements of the Dogmatists) seem +to be evident or about those which are non-evident; +for since the Dogmatists suppose they apprehend +the latter from the things evident, if we are forced +to suspend judgement about the evident, how shall +we dare to make pronouncements about the non- +evident?
+Yet, by way of super-addition,
+Of objects, then, some, according to the Dogmatists,
+though patent in their nature, are occasionally rendered non-
+evident to us owing to certain external circumstances,
+Now the pre-evident objects, they say, do +not require a sign, for they are apprehended of themselves. +And neither do the altogether non-evident, +since of course they are not even apprehended at all. +But such objects as are occasionally or naturally +non-evident are apprehended by means of signs— +not of course by the same signs, but by ‟suggestive” +signs in the case of the occasionally non-evident +and by ‟indicative” signs in the case of the +naturally non-evident.
+Of the signs, then, according to them, some are
+suggestive, some indicative.
+An ‟indicative” sign, they say, is that which is not
+clearly associated with the thing signified, but signifies
+that whereof it is a sign by its own particular nature
+and constitution, just as, for instance, the bodily
+motions are signs of the soul. Hence, too, they define
+this sign as follows: ‟An indicative sign is an antecedent
+judgement, in a sound hypothetical syllogism,
+Seeing, then, that there are, as we have said, two different +kinds of sign, we do not argue against every sign +but only against the indicative kind as it seems to +be invented by the Dogmatists. For the suggestive +sign is relied on by living experience, since when a +man sees smoke fire is signified, and when he beholds +a scar he says that there has been a wound. Hence, +not only do we not fight against living experience, +but we even lend it our support by assenting undogmatically +to what it relies on, while opposing the +private inventions of the Dogmatists.
+These prefatory remarks it was, perhaps, fitting to +make for the sake of elucidating the object of our +inquiry. It remains for us to proceed to our refutation, +not in any anxiety to show that the indicative +sign is wholly unreal, but reminding ourselves of the +apparent equivalence of the arguments adduced for +its reality and for its unreality.
+Now the sign, judging by the statements of the
+Dogmatists about it, is inconceivable. Thus, for
+instance, the Stoics, who seem to have defined it
+exactly, in attempting to establish the conception of
+the sign, state that ‟A sign is an antecedent judgement
+in a valid hypothetical syllogism, which serves
+to reveal the consequent;” and ‟judgement” they
+define as ‟A self-complete expression
+For either the syllogism begins with the true and ends with the true +(e.g. ‟If there is day, there is light”), or it begins with +what is false and ends in falsehood (like ‟If the earth +flies, the earth is winged”), or it begins with truth and +ends in falsehood (like ‟If the earth exists, the earth +flies”), or it begins with falsehood and ends in truth +(like ‟If the earth flies, the earth exists”). And +they say that of these only that which begins with +truth and ends in falsehood is invalid, and the rest +valid.
+‟Antecedent,” they say, is ‟the precedent
+clause in a hypothetical syllogism which begins in
+truth and ends in truth.” And it ‟serves to reveal the
+consequent,” since in the syllogism ‟If this woman
+has milk, she has conceived,” the clause ‟If this
+woman has milk” seems to be evidential of the clause
+‟she has conceived.”
+Such is the Stoic doctrine. But we assert, firstly, +that it is non-evident whether any ‟expression” +exists. For since some of the Dogmatists, the +Epicureans, declare that expression does not exist, +others, the Stoics, that it does exist, when the Stoics +assert its existence they are employing either mere +assertion or demonstration as well. If assertion, then +the Epicureans will confute them with the assertion +which states that no expression exists. But if they +shall adduce demonstration, then since demonstration +is composed of expressed judgements, and +because it is composed of expressions will be unable +to be adduced to confirm the existence of expression +(for how will he who refuses to allow the existence of +expression grant the reality of a system compounded +of expressions?),
+—it follows that the man who +attempts to establish the existence of expression +from the reality of the system of expressions is proposing +to confirm the problematic by the problematic. +If, then, it is impossible to establish either simply or +by means of demonstration that any expression exists, +it is non-evident that any expression exists.
+So, too, with the question whether judgement +exists; for the judgement is a form of expression.
+And very possibly, even should it be granted by
+way of assumption that expression exists, judgement
+will be found to be non-existent, it being compounded
+of expressions not mutually co-existent.
+But passing over this objection, it will be found that
+the valid hypothetical syllogism is non-apprehensible.
+For Philo
+‟If atomic elements of things
+do not exist, atomic elements exist,” seems true,
+since it begins with the false clause ‟atomic elements
+do not exist” and will end, according to him, with
+the true clause ‟atomic elements exist.” And
+those who introduce ‟connexion,” or ‟coherence,”
+And those who judge by ‟implication”
+Probably, then, it will not seem feasible to get this
+controversy resolved. For whether we prefer any one
+of the above-mentioned rival views without proof or
+by the aid of proof, in neither case shall we gain
+credence. For proof itself is held to be valid whenever
+its conclusion follows the combination of its
+premisses as the consequent follows the antecedent;
+thus, for example—‟If it is day it is light; but in
+fact it is day; therefore it is light:” ‟If it is day it
+is light,” ‟it is day and also it is light.”
+But when we inquire how we are to judge the logical sequence +of the consequent in its relation to the antecedent, +we are met with the argument in a circle. For in +order to prove the judgement upon the hypothetical +syllogism, the conclusion of the proof must follow +logically from its premisses, as we said above; and, +in turn, in order to establish this, the hypothetical +syllogism and its logical sequence must be tested; +and this is absurd.
+So then the valid hypothetical syllogism is non-apprehensible.
+But the ‟antecedent” also is unintelligible. For
+the antecedent, as they assert, is ‟the leading clause
+in a hypothetical syllogism of the kind which begins
+with a truth and ends in a truth.”
+But if the sign serves to reveal the consequent, the consequent is +either pre-evident or non-evident. If, then, it is +pre-evident, it will not so much as need the thing +which is to reveal it but will be apprehended along +with it and will not be the object signified thereby, +and hence also the thing mentioned will not be a +‟sion” of the object. But if the consequent is non- +evident, seeing that there exists an unsettled controversy +about things non-evident, as to which of them +are true, which false, and in general whether any of +them is true, it will be non-evident whether the +hypothetical syllogism ends in a true consequent. +And this involves the further fact that it is non- +evident whether the leading clause in the syllogism +is the logical antecedent.
+But to pass over this
+objection also, the sign cannot serve to reveal the
+consequent, if the thing signified is relative to the
+sign and is, therefore, apprehended along with it. For
+relatives are apprehended along with each other;
+and just as ‟right” cannot be apprehended as ‟right
+of left” before ‟left,” nor vice versa—and the same
+holds good of all other relative terms,—so neither will
+it be possible for the sign, as ‟sign of signified,” to be
+apprehended before the thing signified.
+And if the sign is not apprehended before the thing signified, +neither can it really serve to reveal the actual thing +which is apprehended along with itself and not after +itself.
+Thus also, so far as we may judge by the usual +statements of the dissenting philosophers (the +Stoics), the sign is inconceivable. For they assert +that it is both relative and serving to reveal the +thing signified, in relation to which they say it was.
+Accordingly, if it is relative and in relation to the +thing signified it certainly ought to be apprehended +along with the thing signified, as is ‟left” with +‟right,” ‟up” with ‟down,” and the rest of the +relative terms. Whereas, if it serves to reveal the +thing signified, it certainly ought to be apprehended +before it, in order that by being foreknown it may +lead us to a conception of the object which comes to +be known by means of it.
+But it is impossible to form a conception of an object which cannot be known +before the thing before which it must necessarily be +apprehended; and so it is impossible to conceive of +an object which is both relative and also really serves +to reveal the thing in relation to which it is thought. +But the sign is, as they affirm, both relative and +serving to reveal the thing signified; wherefore it is +impossible to conceive of the sign.
+Furthermore, there is this also to be said. Amongst
+our predecessors there existed a controversy, some
+declaring that an indicative sign exists, others
+maintaining that no indicative sign exists.
+For since proof is stated
+to come under the genus sign,
+And if it is not possible
+either simply or with the aid of proof to make a
+positive declaration about the sign, it is impossible
+to make an apprehensive affirmation
+But there is this further to be said. Either the signs
+are apparent only or non-evident only, or some are
+apparent and some non-evident.
Now that all the signs are not non-evident is shown +by the following argument. The non-evident does +not become apparent of itself, as the Dogmatists +assert, but is perceived by means of something else. +The sign, therefore, if it were non-evident, would +require another non-evident sign—since, according +to the hypothesis assumed, there is no apparent sign +—and this again a third, and so on ad infinitum. +But it is impossible to grasp an infinite series of +signs; and so it is impossible for the sign to be +apprehended when it is non-evident. And for this +reason it will also be unreal, as it is unable to signify +anything and to be a sign owing to its not being +apprehended.
+And if all the signs are apparent, then, because
+the sign is a relative thing and in relation to the
+thing signified, and relatives are apprehended conjointly,
+And if the thing signified is apparent, +it will not even be signified, as it requires nothing to +signify and reveal it. Hence, just as when ‟right” +is abolished there exists no ‟left,” so when the thing +signified is abolished there can exist no sign, so that +the sign is found to be unreal, if one should declare +that the signs are apparent only.
+It remains to declare that of the signs some are +apparent, others non-evident; but even so the +difficulties remain. For the things said to be signified +by the apparent signs will, as we said before, be +apparent and require nothing to signify them, and +will not even be things signified at all, so that neither +will the signs be signs, as not signifying anything.
+And as to the non-evident signs which need things
+to reveal them, if we say that they are signified by
+things non-evident, the argument will be involved in
+a regress ad infinitum, rendering them non-apprehensible
+and therefore unreal, as we said before;
+If, therefore, the signs are neither all apparent nor +all non-evident, nor yet some of the signs apparent +and some non-evident, and besides these there is no +other alternative, as they themselves affirm, then the +so-called signs will be unreal.
+So then these few arguments out of many will be +enough for the present to suggest to us the +non-existence of an indicative sign. Next, we shall set +forth those which go to suggest the existence of a +sign, in order that we may exhibit the equipollence +of the counter-balancing arguments.
+Either, then, the phrases used in criticism of the
+sign signify something or they signify nothing.
+Further, the arguments against +the sign are either probative or non-probative; but +if they are non-probative they do not prove the non- +existence of a sign; while if they are probative, +since proof, as serving to reveal the conclusion, belongs +to the genus sign, sign will exist. Whence this argument +also is propounded: ‟If sign exists, sign exists; +and if sign exists not, sign exists; for the non- +existence of sign is shown by proof, which is a form +of sign. But sign either exists or exists not; +therefore sign exists.”
+And this argument is counter- +balanced by the following argument: ‟If any sign +does not exist, sign does not exist; and if sign is +that which the Dogmatists declare sign to be, sign +does not exist (for the sign under discussion, accord- +ing to the conception of it and as stated to be both +relative and serving to reveal the thing signified, is +found to be unreal, as we have shown).
+But sign either exists or exists not; therefore sign does not +exist.”
+Regarding also the phrases used in support of the
+sign,
In short, then, since such plausible arguments are
+adduced both for the existence and for the non-
+existence of sign, we must declare that sign is ‟no
+more”
+Now it is plain from this that neither is proof a
+matter upon which there is agreement; for if we
+suspend judgement about the sign, and proof also is
+a sign,
+If,however, one ought to devote a separate discussion +to proof, I shall proceed to treat of it concisely after +endeavouring first to explain shortly the definition +they give of proof.
+Proof is, as they assert, ‟an argument which, by +means of agreed premisses, reveals by way of deduction +a non-evident inference.” What their statement +means will be made clearer by what follows. ‟An +argument is a system composed of premisses and an +inference.
+The premisses of it are (it is said) the +judgements adopted by consent for the establishment +of the inference, and the inference is the judgement +established by the premisses.” For example, in the +argument ‟If it is day, it is light; but it is in truth +day; therefore it is light,” the clause ‟therefore it +is light” is a conclusion, and the rest are premisses.
+And of arguments some are conclusive, some inconclusive—
+conclusive when the hypothetical syllogism
+And of the conclusive arguments some are true,
+some not true—true when not only the syllogism
+formed by the combination of the premisses and the
+inference is valid,
+For an argument such as this—‟If it is +night, it is dark; but in fact it is night; therefore +it is dark”—is indeed conclusive, since the syllogism +‟it is night, and if it is night it is dark, therefore +it is dark” is a valid one, but, when it is day-time, it +is not true. For the antecedent combination—‟it is +night, and if it is night it is dark”—is false since it +contains the falsehood ‟it is night;” for the +combination which contains a falsehood is false. Hence +they also say that a true argument is that which +deduces a true conclusion from true premisses.
+Of true arguments, again, some are ‟probative,”
+some ‟non-probative;” and the probative are those
+which deduce something non-evident by means of
+pre-evident premisses, the non-probative those not of
+this sort.
+And of arguments which deduce something non- +evident, some conduct us through the premisses to +the conclusion by way of progression only, others +both by way of progression and by way of discovery +as well. By progression, for instance, are those +which seem to depend on belief and memory, such +as the argument ‟If a god has said to you that +this man will be rich, this man will be rich; but this +god (assume that I point to Zeus) has said to you that +this man will be rich; therefore he will be rich;” +for we assent to the conclusion not so much on account +of the logical force of the premisses as because of our +belief in the statement of the god.
+But some arguments conduct us to the conclusion by way of discovery +as well as of progression, like the following: +‟If sweat pours through the surface, there are +insensible pores; but the first is true, therefore also +the second;” for the pouring of the sweat makes +discovery of the fact of the existence of pores, +because of the prior assumption that moisture cannot +pass through a solid body.
+So, then, proof ought to be an argument which +is deductive and true and has a non-evident +conclusion which is discovered by the potency of the +premisses; and because of this, proof is defined as +‟an argument which by means of agreed premisses +discovers by way of deduction a non-evident +inference.” It is in these terms, then, that they are +in the habit of explaining the conception of proof.
+That proof has no real existence may be inferred
+from their own statements, by refuting each of the
+assumptions implied in its conception.
+But apart from this, the conclusive argument is +non-apprehensible; for if it is judged by the coherence +of the hypothetical premiss, and the coherence in +that premiss is a matter of unsettled dispute and is +probably non-apprehensible, as we suggested in our +chapter (xi.) ‟On the Sign,” then the conclusive +argument also will be non-apprehensible.
+Now the Dialecticians
+And it is a case of redundancy +when we find a premiss that is superfluous for the logic +of the argument, as for instance ‟If it is day, it is +light; but in fact it is day and Dion also is walking; +therefore it is light.” And it is due to the bad form +in which it is propounded when the form of the argument +is not conclusive; for whereas the really syllogistic +arguments are, they say, such as these: ‟If it +is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it +is light;” and ‟If it is day, it is light; but it is not +light; therefore it is not day,”—the inconclusive +argument runs thus: ‟If it is day, it is light; but +in fact it is light; therefore it is day.”
+For since the major premiss announces that if its antecedent exists +its consequent also exists, naturally when the antecedent +is admitted the consequent also is inferred, +and when the consequent is denied the antecedent +also is denied; for if the antecedent had existed, +the consequent also would have existed. But when +the consequent is admitted, the antecedent is not +necessarily admitted as well; for the major premiss +did not promise that the antecedent should follow +the consequent, but only the consequent the +antecedent.
+Hence, the argument which deduces the consequent
+from the major premiss and the antecedent is
+said to be syllogistic,
+And the argument is faulty by deficiency, when it suffers from
+the omission of some factor needed for the deducing
+of the conclusion: thus, for instance, while we have,
+as they think, a valid argument in ‟Wealth is either
+good or bad or indifferent; but it is neither bad nor
+indifferent; therefore it is good,”
+If, then, I shall show that, according to them, it is
+impossible to distinguish any difference between the
+inconclusive and the conclusive arguments, I shall have
+shown that the conclusive argument is non-apprehensible,
+so that their endless disquisitions on ‟dialectic”
+It was said that the argument which is inconclusive
+owing to inconsistency is recognized by the want of
+coherence which marks its premisses in their relation
+both to each other and to the inference.
+For he who declares that any particular +argument is inconclusive through inconsistency will, +if he is merely uttering a statement, find himself +opposed by a statement which contradicts his own; +while if he tries to prove it by argument, he will be +told that this argument of his must itself be conclusive +before he can prove that the premisses of the argument +said to be inconsistent are devoid of consistency. +But we shall not know whether it is probative, since +we have no agreed test of the syllogism whereby +to judge whether the conclusion follows the logical +connexion formed by the premisses. And thus, also, +we shall be unable to distinguish the argument that +is faulty through inconsistency from those that are +conclusive.
+And we will make the same reply to the man who +says that an argument is unsound owing to its being +propounded in a faulty form; for he who maintains +that a form is unsound will have no argument agreed +to be conclusive whereby he will be able to draw the +conclusion he states.
+And hereby we have also
+potentially refuted those who try to show that there
+are arguments which are inconclusive through
+deficiency. For if the complete and finished argument
+is indistinguishable
+Moreover, the argument that is said to be faulty
+through redundancy is indistinguishable from those
+that are probative. For, so far as concerns redundancy,
+even the ‟non-demonstrable” arguments
+Now there are, in their imaginings, many non-
+demonstrable arguments, but the five which they
+chiefly propound, and to which all the rest can, it
+seems, be referred, are these. The first is that which
+deduces the consequent from the major premiss
+The third deduces from the negation of a coupled
+premiss
+These, then, are the much talked of non-demonstrable
+arguments, but they all seem to me to be
+inconclusive through redundancy. Thus for instance,
+to begin with the first, either it is agreed, or else it
+is non-evident, that in the major premiss ‟If it is
+day, it is light,” the clause ‟it is light” follows from
+its antecedent ‟it is day.” But if this is non-evident,
+we shall not grant the major premiss as agreed;
+if, however, it is pre-evident that if the clause ‟it is
+day” be true, the clause ‟it is light” will necessarily
+be true also, then, once we have asserted that ‟it is
+day,” the statement ‟it is light” is also inferred, so
+that an argument in the form ‟It is day, therefore
+it is light” is sufficient,
+And in the case of the second non-demonstrable +argument we make a similar objection. For it is +either possible or impossible for the antecedent to be +true when the consequent is not true. But if this +is possible, the major premiss will not be valid; +while if it is impossible, at the moment of positing +‟Not the consequent” we posit also ‟Not the +antecedent,” and the major premiss is redundant once +again, the argument propounded being ‟It is not +light, therefore it is not day.”
+The same reasoning applies also to the third non- +demonstrable argument. For either it is pre-evident +that it is impossible for the clauses in the coupled +premiss mutually to co-exist, or else it is non-evident. +And if it is non-evident we shall not grant the negative +of the coupled premiss; but if it is pre-evident, +at the moment of positing the one clause the other +is annulled, and the negative of the coupled premiss +is redundant when we propound the argument in the +form ‟It is day, therefore it is not night.”
+And we deal in like manner with the fourth non- +demonstrable argument and the fifth. For either it is +pre-evident or it is non-evident that in the disjunctive +premiss one clause is true, the other false, in complete +contradiction, as the disjunctive proclaims. And if +this is non-evident, we shall not grant the disjunctive; +but if it is pre-evident, if one of its clauses be affirmed +it is apparent that the other is not true, and if one +is negated it is pre-evident that the other is true, so +that it is sufficient to frame the argument thus—‟It +is day, therefore it is not night,” or ‟It is not day, +therefore it is night;” and the disjunctive premiss +is redundant.
+One may also make similar observations on the so-
+called ‟categorical” syllogisms, which are chiefly
+used by the Peripatetics.
+So too in an argument such as this—‟Socrates is a man; +every man is an animal; therefore Socrates is an +animal,”—if it is not at once pre-evident that whatsoever +is man is always also animal, the universal +premiss is not agreed, and neither will we admit it in +the process of deduction.
+But if the fact that he is a +man is logically followed by the fact that he is also an +animal, and in consequence the premiss ‟Every man +is an animal” is by agreement true, at the moment of +stating that ‟Socrates is a man” we admit therewith +that he is also an animal, so that an argument in the +form ‟Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an +animal” is sufficient, and the premiss ‟Every man is +an animal” is redundant.
+And (not to dwell on the
+matter now) in the case of the other primary
Since, however, these arguments which the
+Dialecticians
+But if some persons disapprove of arguments being of
+a ‟one-premiss form,” they deserve no more credence
+than does Antipater
For these reasons, then, the argument named by
+the Dialecticians ‟conclusive” is not judged acceptable.
+But further, the ‟true”
+And it is certainly not apparent;
+for it would not need to be disclosed by means of the
+premisses if it were perceptible of itself and no less
+apparent than its premisses. But if it is non-evident,
+then, since there is an unsettled dispute concerning
+things non-evident, as we mentioned above,
+But, to pass over these objections also, the
+argument which deduces what is non-evident by means
+of pre-evident premisses is indiscoverable. For if the
+inference follows from the combination of its premisses,
+and what follows and forms the consequent is relative
+and relative to the antecedent, and relatives are
+apprehended, as we have shown,
+And for these reasons, neither is the inference revealed by
+the premisses, as it is either non-evident and not
+apprehended, or pre-evident and not in need of
+anything to reveal it. So that if proof is defined
+That proof is unreal, or even inconceivable, we shall
+discover also from the following line of attack.
+Now the general proof is unreal for the
+following reasons. It either has or has not certain
+premisses and a certain inference. And if it has them
+not, it is not even proof; while if it has premisses and
+an inference, then, since everything which proves or is
+proved in this way belongs to the class of ‟particulars,”
+For they will describe as proof either the system made up of
+the premisses and the inference
+Now the system composed of the premisses and the +inference is not proof because, firstly, it contains a +non-evident part—that is to say, the inference—and +so will be non-evident, which is absurd; for if the +proof is non-evident, instead of serving to prove other +things it will itself be in need of something to prove it.
+Moreover, since they assert that proof is a relative +thing and relative to the inference, and relatives, as +they themselves affirm, are conceived in relation to +other things, the thing proved must be other than +the proof ; if, then, the thing proved is the conclusion, +the proof will not be conceived along with the conclusion. +For the conclusion either contributes something +to its own proof or does not do so; but if it +contributes, it will serve to reveal itself, while if it +does not contribute but is redundant it will not be +even a part of the proof, since we shall declare the +proof to be faulty by reason of redundance.
+Nor yet will the system composed of the premisses by itself +be proof; for who would maintain that a statement +in the form ‟If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is +day,” either is an argument or completely expresses +a piece of reasoning? So then, neither does the +system of the premisses alone constitute proof. Therefore +the particular proof has no real existence either. +But if neither the particular nor the general proof has +real existence, and besides these one can conceive +no other proof, then proof is without real existence.
+And it is possible to show the unreality of proof +from these further considerations. If proof exists, +either as apparent it serves to reveal what is apparent, +or as non-evident what is non-evident, or as non- +evident what is apparent, or as apparent what is +non-evident; but it cannot be conceived as serving +to reveal any of these; therefore it is inconceivable.
+For if it as apparent serves to reveal the apparent, +the thing revealed will be at once both apparent and +non-evident—apparent because it was assumed to be +such, and non-evident because it needs a revealer +and is not clearly perceived by us of itself. And if +as non-evident it reveals the non-evident, it will itself +need something to reveal it and will not serve to +reveal other things, which is foreign to the conception +of proof.
+And for these reasons neither can there +be a non-evident proof of the pre-evident; nor yet +a pre-evident proof of the non-evident; for since +they are relatives, and relatives are apprehended +together, that which is said to be proved, being +apprehended together with its pre-evident proof, will +be pre-evident, so that the argument is reversed and +the proof probative of the non-evident is not found +to be pre-evident. If, therefore, proof is neither +apparent of the apparent, nor non-evident of the +non-evident, nor non-evident of the pre-evident, nor +pre-evident of the non-evident, and besides these, as +they say, there is no other alternative, then we +must declare that proof is nothing.
+Furthermore, there is this also to be said. Proof
+is a matter of controversy; for some declare that it
+does not even exist, as do those who assert that
+nothing at all exists,
+And besides, proof always contains a
+dogma, and they are in dispute about every dogma,
+so that there must necessarily be dispute about every
+proof. For if (for the sake of argument) when the
+proof for the existence of void is accepted the existence
+of void is likewise accepted,
+Since, then, proof is non-evident, owing to the +controversy which exists concerning it (for things +controverted, in so far as controverted, are non- +evident), its existence is not self-evident but needs +to be established for us by proof. The proof, then, +by which proof is established will not be evident and +agreed (for we are now inquiring whether proof in +general exists), and being thus in dispute and non- +evident it will need another proof, and this again a +third, and so on ad infinitum. But it is impossible to +prove an infinite series; therefore it is impossible to +show that proof exists.
+But neither can it be revealed by means of a sign.
+For since it is a matter of inquiry whether sign
+exists,
+If, then, neither by proof nor by sign nor by criterion it is possible to
+show that proof exists, and it is not evident of itself
+either, as we have shown,
+Thus much it will be enough to say by way of
+outline and in criticism of proof. The Dogmatists,
+however, maintaining the opposite view assert that
+the arguments propounded against proof are either
+probative or not probative; and if they are not
+probative, they are incapable of showing that proof
+does not exist; while if they are probative, they
+themselves involve the reality of proof by self-
+refutation.
+Hence also they propound an argument
+in this form:
+Now to this we may reply, for instance, that, because +we do not believe that any argument is probative, +we do not assert either that the arguments against +proof are absolutely probative but that they appear +to us plausible; but those that are plausible are +not necessarily probative. Yet if they actually are +probative (which we do not positively affirm) they +certainly are also true. And true arguments are +those which deduce what is true by means of true +premisses; wherefore their inference is true. Now +the inference was this—‟therefore proof does not +exist;” therefore the statement ‟proof does not +exist” is true by reversing the argument.
+And just as purgative medicines expel themselves together
+with the substances already present in the body, so
+these arguments are capable of cancelling themselves
+along with the other arguments which are said to be
+probative.
And as regards this argument—‟If proof exists, +proof exists; if proof does not exist, proof exists; +but it either exists or exists not; therefore it exists” +—there are a number of ways by which it can be +shown to be inconclusive, but for the moment the +following method may suffice.
+If the hypothetical +premiss ‟If proof exists, proof exists” is valid, the +contradictory of its consequent, namely ‟proof does +not exist,” must conflict with ‟proof exists,” for this +is the antecedent of the hypothetical premiss. But, +according to them, it is impossible for a hypothetical +premiss to be valid when composed of conflicting +clauses. For the hypothetical premiss promises +that when its antecedent is true its consequent is +also true, whereas conflicting clauses contrariwise +promise that if either one of them is true the other +cannot possibly be true. If therefore the premiss +‟If proof exists, proof exists” is valid, the premiss +‟If proof exists not, proof exists” cannot be valid.
+And again. conversely, if we grant by way of +assumption that the premiss ‟If proof exists not, +proof exists” is valid, then the clause ‟If proof +exists” can co-exist with ‟proof exists not.” But if +it can co-exist with it, it is not in conflict with it. +Therefore, in the premiss ‟If proof exists, proof +exists,” the contrary of its consequent is not in +conflict with its antecedent, so that, conversely, +this premiss will not be valid, as the former was +posited, by agreement, as valid.
+And as the clause ‟proof exists not” is not in conflict with ‟proof +exists,” the disjunctive ‟Either proof exists or +proof exists not” will not be valid; for the valid +disjunctive promises that one of its clauses is valid, +but the other or others false and contradictory. +Or else, if the disjunctive be valid, the hypothetical +premiss ‟If proof exists not, proof exists” is, in +turn, found to be fallacious, as composed of conflicting +clauses. So then the premisses in the foregoing +argument are discordant and mutually destructive; +wherefore the argument is not valid.
+And further, they are unable even to show that anything follows
+logically from the contradictories, since, as we have
+argued,
But this discussion is, in fact, superfluous. For if, +on the one hand, the arguments in defence of proof +are (let it be granted) plausible, while, on the other +hand, the criticisms directed against proof are also +plausible, then we must necessarily suspend judgement +concerning proof also, and declare that proof is +‟no more” existent than non-existent.
+So then it is also superfluous, perhaps, to discuss
+in detail the much vaunted ‟syllogisms,” since, for
+one thing, they are included in the refutation of the
+existence of ‟proof” (for it is plain that if this is
+non-existent there is no place either for probative
+argument), and for another, we have implicitly
+contradicted them in our previous statements, when
+in discussing redundancy
+Yet perhaps it will not
+be amiss to go further
+Well then, the premiss ‟Every man is an animal”
+is established by induction from the particular
+instances; for from the fact that Socrates, who is a
+man, is also an animal, and Plato likewise, and Dion
+and each one of the particular instances,
+So whenever they argue ‟Every man is an +animal, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is +an animal,” proposing to deduce from the universal +proposition ‟Every man is an animal” the particular +proposition ‟Socrates therefore is an animal,” which +in fact goes (as we have mentioned) to establish by way +of induction the universal proposition, they fall into the +error of circular reasoning, since they are establishing +the universal proposition inductively by means of each +of the particulars and deducing the particular proposition +from the universal syllogistically.
+So likewise in the case of such an argument as ‟Socrates is a man, but +no man is four-footed, therefore Socrates is not four- +footed,” by proposing to establish the premiss ‟No +man is four-footed” by induction from the particular +instances while wishing to deduce each several particular +from the premiss ‟No man is four-footed,” they +become involved in the perplexity of the circular +fallacy.
+And a similar criticism may be passed upon the +rest of the ‟axiomatic” arguments, as they are +called by the Peripatetics; and also upon arguments +in the form ‟If it is day, it is light.” For the +proposition ‟If it is day, it is light ” is capable, they say, +of proving that ‟it is light,” and the clause ‟it is +light” in conjunction with ‟it is day” serves to +establish the proposition ‟If it is day, it is light.” +For the hypothetical premiss stated above would not +have been considered valid unless the constant co- +existence of ‟it is light” with ‟it is day” had already +been observed.
+If, then, one has to apprehend +beforehand that when there is day there certainly +is light also, in order to construct the hypothetical +premiss ‟If it is day, it is light,” while by means +of this premiss we deduce that when it is day it +is light, the co-existence of the being of day and of +night being proved (so far as depends on the axiomatic +argument before us) by the premiss ‟If it +is day, it is light,” and that premiss in turn being +established by the co-existence of the facts aforesaid, +—in this case also the fallacy of circular reasoning +overthrows the substance of the argument.
+So likewise with an argument in the form ‟If it is +day, it is light; but it is not light; therefore it is not +day.” For from the fact that we do not observe day +without light the hypothetical premiss ‟If it is +day, it is light” might be considered to be valid; +just as if, should day, let us suppose, at some +time appear, without the appearance of light, the +premiss would be said to be false; but, so far as +concerns the axiomatic argument aforesaid, the non- +existence of day when light is non-existent is proved +by the premiss ‟If it is day, it is light,” so that +each of these statements needs for its confirmation +the secure grasp of the other in order thereby to +become credible by means of circular reasoning.
+Moreover, from the fact that some things are
+unable to co-exist—take, for instance, if you like, day
+and night—both the conjunctive
+Whence we argue again +that if for establishing the disjunctive proposition and +the negative of the conjunctive we require to apprehend +beforehand the fact that the judgements they +contain are incapable of co-existence, while they +believe that they are deducing this incapacity for +co-existence by means of both the disjunctive and +the negative conjunctive, we involve ourselves in +circular reasoning, seeing that we are unable either +to give credence to the aforesaid premisses without +having apprehended the incapacity for co-existence +of the judgements they contain, or to affirm +positively that incapacity before concluding the +syllogisms based on these premisses.
+Consequently,as we possess no principle on which to ground belief
+owing to the circular style of the argument, we shall
+declare that, so far as depends on these statements,
+neither the third nor the fourth nor the fifth of the
+‟axiomatic” syllogisms
For the present, then, it will suffice to have said +thus much concerning syllogisms.
+It is also easy, I consider, to set aside the method +of induction. For, when they propose to establish +the universal from the particulars by means of induction, +they will effect this by a review either of all +or of some of the particular instances. But if they +review some, the induction will be insecure, since +some of the particulars omitted in the induction may +contravene the universal; while if they are to review +all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the +particulars are infinite and indefinite. Thus on both +grounds, as I think, the consequence is that induction +is invalidated.
+Further, the Dogmatists take great pride in their +systematic treatment of definitions, which they include +in the logical division of their Philosophical System, +as they call it. So come and let us now make a few +observations on definitions.
+Now while the Dogmatists hold that definitions +have many uses, you will probably find that these fall +under two main heads which, as they say, include all +their necessary uses;
+for, as they explain, definitions
+are necessary in all cases either for apprehension
+So then, without preliminary, if, on the one hand, +the man who knows not the object of definition is +unable to define the object unknown to him, while, +on the other hand, the man who knows and proceeds +to define has not apprehended the object from its +definition but has put together his definition to fit +the object already apprehended, then the definition +is not necessary for the apprehension of objects. And +since, if we propose to define absolutely all things, +we shall define nothing, because of the regress ad +infinitum; while if we allow that some things are +apprehended even without definitions, we are declaring +that definitions are not necessary for apprehension, +seeing that we are able to apprehend all things +apart from definitions in the same way as the undefined +objects were apprehended,
+—then we shall +either define absolutely nothing or we shall declare +that definitions are not necessary.
+And for these reasons they are not necessary for instruction +either, as we shall discover. For just as the man who first perceived +the object perceived it apart from definition, so likewise the man +who receives instruction about it can be instructed without +definition.
+Moreover, they judge the definitions by the objects +defined and declare those definitions to be faulty which include +any attributes not belonging either to all or to some of the objects +defined. Hence, whenever one states that man is ‟a rational +immortal animal” or ‟a rational mortal literary animal,” whereas no +man is immortal, and some are not literary, such a definition they +say is faulty.
+And it may be also that the definitions do not admit of +judgement owing to the infinity of the particulars by which they +ought to be judged; and consequently they will not convey +apprehension and instruction regarding the objects whereby they +are judged, which evidently have been known beforehand, if at all, +and apprehended beforehand.
+And how could it be other than absurd to assert that definitions +are of use for apprehension or instruction or elucidation of any +kind, when they involve us in such a fog of uncertainty?
+Thus, for instance, to take a ridiculous case, suppose that one wished to ask
+someone whether he had met a man riding a horse and leading a
+dog and put the question in this form—‟O rational mortal animal,
+receptive of intelligence and science, have you met with an animal
+capable of laughter, with broad nails and receptive of political
+science,
So then we must declare that, so far as we may +judge by this, the definition is useless,
+whether it be described as ‟a statement which by a brief reminder
+brings us to a conception of the objects which underlie
+the terms,”—as is plain (is it not?) from what we
+have said just a moment ago,—or as ‟a statement
+declaratory of the essence,”
So what I have said about definitions is enough +for the present.
+Inasmuch as some of the Dogmatists
+Now they at once assert that the sciences of natural
+objects exist whereas those of conventional objects
+have no existence, and that with reason. For science
+claims to be a thing that is firm and invariable, but
+the conventional objects are easily liable to change
+and variation, because their character is altered by
+the shifting of the conventions which depend upon
+ourselves. Since, then, the significance of names is
+based on convention and not on nature
+Whole and part we shall discuss in what we call
+our physical treatise,
+Hence the division and the subtraction +of the other parts is not made from the decad but +from some other numbers, and these vary with each +subtraction.
+Probably then it is impracticable to divide the +whole into what are called its parts. For, in fact, if +the whole is divided into parts, the parts ought to be +comprised in the whole before the act of division, +but probably they are not so comprised. Thus for +example—to base our argument once more on the +decad—they say that nine is certainly a part of the +decad, since it is divided into one plus nine. But so +likewise is the number eight, since it is divided into +eight plus two; and so also are the numbers seven, +six, five, four, three, two and one.
+If then all these numbers are included in the decad, and when added +together with it make up fifty-five, then fifty-five is +included in the number ten, which is absurd. Therefore +neither are its so-called parts included in the decad +nor can the decad be divided into them, as a whole +into parts, since they are not even seen in it at all.
+And the same objections will confront us in the case
+of magnitudes
+There still remains, then, the subject of genera and
+species, which we shall discuss more at large elsewhere,
+If the genera exist, either they are equal in number to
+the species or else there is one genus common to all
+the species which are said to belong to it. If, then,
+the genera are equal in number to their species, there
+will no longer be a common genus to be divided into
+the species; while if it shall be said that the genus
+exists as one in all its species, then each species partakes
+of either the whole or a part of it.
+Then, in the next place, all the species will be said to partake
+either of the same part of their genus or of different
+parts; but to partake of the same part is impossible
+for the reasons stated above; while if they partake
+of different parts, the species will be generically
+dissimilar one to another (which they will not admit),
+and each genus will be infinite because cut up into
+infinite sections (not into the species only but also
+into the particulars, since it is actually seen in these
+along with its species; for Dion
+If, then, each several species partakes neither of
+the whole genus nor of a part of it, how can it be said
+that the one genus exists in all its parts so as to be
+actually divided into them? No one, probably, could
+make such a statement unless by concocting some
+imaginary entities,
+Furthermore, there is this to be said.
+But if the ‟something,” and the genus too, is absolutely +none of them, the inquiry comes to an end. And if +we should say that it is all of them, then, besides the +impossibility of such a statement, each of the species +and of the particulars wherein it exists will have to +be all. For just as when the genus ‟animal” is, as +they assert, ‟an animate sensitive substance,” each +of its species is said to be substance and animate and +sensitive, so likewise if the genus is both corporeal +and incorporeal and false and true and black, it may +be, and white and very small and very large, and all +the rest, each of the species and of the particulars will +be all these—which is contrary to observation. So +this too is false.
+But if the genus is some of them +only, the genus of these will not be the genus of the +rest; if, for instance, the genus ‟something” is +corporeal it will not be that of the incorporeal, and if +the genus ‟animal” is rational it will not be that of +the irrational, so that there is neither an incorporeal +‟something” nor an irrational animal, and so likewise +with all other cases; and this is absurd. Therefore +the genus cannot be either of both this and that +kind, or of this kind but not of that, or of neither this +kind nor that; and if this be so, neither does the +genus exist at all.
+And if one should say that the genus is potentially
+all things,
+nor yet can it be some of them actually and some only potentially +—corporeal, for instance, actually and incorporeal +potentially. For it is potentially that which it is +capable of really being actually, but that which is +actually corporeal is incapable of becoming incorporeal +in actuality, so that if, for example, the genus +‟something” is actually corporeal it is not potentially +incorporeal, and vice versa. It is impossible, +therefore, for the genus to be some things actually +and some only potentially. But if it is absolutely +nothing actually, it has no substantial existence. +Hence the genus, which they say they divide into +the species, is nothing.
+And further, here is another point worthy of notice.
+Just as, because Alexander and Paris
+Similar arguments apply also to the ‟common +properties.” For if vision is one and the same +property in Dion and in Theon, then, suppose that +Dion should perish and Theon survive and retain his +sight, either they will assert that the vision of the +perished Dion remains unperished, which is incredible, +or they will declare that the same vision has both +perished and not perished, which is absurd; therefore +the vision of Theon is not identical with Dion’s but, +if anything, the vision of each is peculiar to himself. +And if breathing is an identical property in Dion and +Theon, it is impossible that breathing should exist +in Theon and not exist in Dion; but this is possible +when the one has perished and the other survives; +therefore it is not identical.
+However, as regards this subject, this concise statement +will be sufficient for the present.
+It will not, perhaps, be amiss to give our attention
+for a moment to the subject of Sophisms, seeing that
+those who glorify Dialectic
+It is false, for example,
+in the case of the sophism ‟Nobody offers one a
+predicate to drink; but ‟to drink absinth” is a
+predicate; nobody therefore offers one absinth to
+drink.” Or again, it may resemble the false, as in
+this case—‟What neither was nor is possible is not
+absurd;
+Or again, it may be non-evident, as thus—‟It is not true both
+that I have asked you a question first and that the
+stars are not even in number; but I have asked you
+a question first; therefore the stars are even.” Or
+again, it may be otherwise unacceptable, like the
+so-called solecistic
+Moreover, they attempt also to set forth solutions +of the sophisms, saying in the case of the first sophism +that one thing is established by the premisses and +another inferred in the conclusion. For it is established +that a predicate is not drunk and that ‟to drink +absinth” is a predicate, but not ‟absinth” by +itself. Hence, whereas one ought to infer ‟Nobody +therefore drinks the ‘to drink absinth,’” which +is true, the inference drawn is ‟Nobody therefore +drinks absinth,” which is false, as not deduced from +the established premisses.
+And as regards the second sophism, they explain that while it seems to
+lead in a false direction, so that it makes the inattentive
+hesitate in assenting to it, its conclusion is true,
+namely ‟It is not therefore absurd that the doctor,
+qua doctor, should murder.” For no judgement
+is absurd,
+And the method of leading up to the non-evident
+And as to the last class—the solecistic arguments—some +declare that they are introduced absurdly, contrary to +linguistic usage.
+Such are the statements made by some of the
+Dialecticians concerning sophisms—though others
+indeed make other statements; and what they say may
+be able, perhaps, to tickle the ears of the casual hearer,
+superfluous though it is and the result of vain labour
+on their part. Probably this can be seen from what we have
+said already;
+And there are many other special objections bearing +on the topic before us which we might mention, but now, +for brevity’s sake, we mention only this one.
+As regards all the sophisms which dialectic seems +peculiarly able to expose, their exposure is useless; +whereas in all cases where the exposure is useful, it +is not the dialectician who will expose them but the +experts in each particular art who grasp the connexion of the facts.
+Thus, for instance, to mention one or two examples,
+if a sophism such as this were propounded—‟In diseases,
+at the stages of abatement, a varied diet and wine are
+to be approved; but in every type of disease an abatement
+inevitably occurs before the first third day;
+but the doctor will expose the sophism, since he knows +that the term ‟abatement” is used in two senses, of the +general ‟abatement” in the disease and of the tendency to +betterment after the crisis in +the strained local conditions, and this improvement +in the local strain generally occurs before the first +third day, but it is not for this but for the general +abatement in the disease that we recommend the +varied diet. Consequently he will say that the +premisses are discordant, since one kind of ‟abatement” +is adopted in the first premiss, namely that +of the general condition, and another—that of the +local condition—in the second premiss.
+Again, in the case of one who suffers from fever
+due to aggravated ‟contraction” or obstruction, if
+an argument is propounded in the form—‟Opposites
+are cures of opposites;
+but the doctor, since he knows what morbid +states are fundamentally persistent and what are +symptoms of such states, will declare that the argument +does not apply to the symptoms (not to mention +the fact that the result of the application of cold is +to aggravate the feverish condition) but to the +persistent morbid states, and that the constipation is +persistent but requires an expansive method of +treatment rather than contraction, whereas the resultant +symptom of inflammation is not fundamentally persistent, +nor (consequently) is the state of cold which +seems to correspond thereto.
+Thus, as regards sophisms the exposure of which is useful,
+the dialectician will not have a word to say,
+but he will propound for us arguments such as these
+‟If a thing moves, it moves either in
+the spot where it is or where it is not; but it moves
+neither in the spot where it is (for it is at rest) nor
+in that where it is not (for how could a thing be
+active in a spot where it does not so much as exist?);
+therefore nothing moves.”
+‟Either the existent becomes or the non-existent; now the existent does
+not become (for it exists); nor yet does the non-existent
+(for the becoming is passive but the non-existent is not passive);
+therefore nothing becomes.”
+‟Snow is frozen water; but water is black; therefore
+snow is black.”
And when he has made a collection of such trash
+he draws his eyebrows together, and expounds
+Dialectic and endeavours very solemnly to establish
+for us by syllogistic proofs that a thing becomes, a
+thing moves, snow is white, and we do not have
+horns, although it is probably sufficient to confront
+the trash with the plain fact in order to smash up
+their positive affirmation by means of the equipollent
+contradictory evidence derived from appearances.
+Thus, in fact, a certain philosopher,
+And we are told of an amusing retort
+made by the physician Herophilus:
+For
+Starting even from the actual statements made by +the dialecticians one might show concisely in this wise +that their technical arguments about sophisms are +superfluous. The dialecticians assert that they have +resorted to the art of dialectic not simply for the sake +of ascertaining what is deduced from what but chiefly +for the sake of knowing how to discern the true and +the false by means of probative arguments. Thus +they declare that dialectic is ‟the science of what is +true and false and neither.”
+Since, then, they assert
+that a true argument is one which draws a true
+conclusion by means of true premisses,
+The following considerations show this clearly: The false
+conclusion in the argument either follows from the
+combination formed by its premisses, or it does not
+so follow. But if it does not so follow, neither will
+the argument be logically sound; for an argument,
+they say, is logically sound when its conclusion follows
+from the combination formed by its premisses. If,
+again, it does so follow, then—according to their own
+technical treatises—the combination formed by its
+premisses must necessarily be false; for they say that
+the false follows from the false and nohow from the true.
+And from what we have already said
If, then, when an argument is propounded with a +false conclusion we know at once that the argument +is neither true nor logically sound, because of its false +conclusion, we shall not assent to it, even if we fail +to see wherein the fallacy lies. For just as we refuse +our assent to the truth of the tricks performed by +jugglers and know that they are deluding us, even +if we do not know how they do it, so likewise we +refuse to believe arguments which, though seemingly +plausible, are false, even when we do not know how +they are fallacious.
+Further, since the sophism leads, they say, not only +to falsehood but also to other absurdities, we must +discuss it more at large. The argument propounded +leads us either to an inadmissible conclusion or to one +of such a sort that we must needs admit it. In the +latter case we shall assent to it without absurdity; +but if it leads to what is inadmissible, it is not we that +ought to yield hasty assent to the absurdity because +of its plausibility, but it is they that ought to abstain +from the argument which constrains them to assent +to absurdities, if they really choose to seek truth, as +they profess, rather than drivel like children.
+Thus, suppose there were a road leading up to a chasm, we +do not push ourselves into the chasm just because there +is a road leading to it but we avoid the road because +of the chasm; so, in the same way, if there should be +an argument which leads us to a confessedly absurd +conclusion, we shall not assent to the absurdity just +because of the argument but avoid the argument +because of the absurdity.
+So whenever such an argument is propounded to us we shall suspend +judgement regarding each premiss, and when finally +the whole argument is propounded we shall draw +what conclusions we approve.
+And if the Dogmatists of the School of Chrysippus
+declare that when the ‟Sorites”
+And whereas we, by starting undogmatically from the +observation of practical life, thus avoid these fallacious +arguments, the Dogmatists will not be in a position +to distinguish the Sophism from the argument which +seems to be correctly propounded, seeing that they +have to pronounce dogmatically that the form of the +argument is, or is not, logically sound and also that +the premisses are, or are not, true.
+For we have shown above that they are neither able to apprehend +the logically valid arguments nor yet capable of +deciding that a thing is true, since—as we have shown +from their own statements—they possess neither a +Criterion nor a Demonstration that commands general +agreement. Thus far, then, the technical treatment +of Sophisms so much talked of amongst the Dialecticians +is otiose.
+And we say much the same regarding the distinguishing
+of ambiguities. For if the Ambiguity is a
+word or phrase having two or more meanings, and it
+is by convention
+—as, for example, in the case of the ambiguity ‟In periods of abatement one
+should sanction a varied diet and wine.”
+Thus it is the experience of what is useful in each affair that +brings about the distinguishing of ambiguities.
+All such ambiguities, however, as are not involved
+in the practical experiences of life but in dogmatic
+opinions, and are no doubt useless for a life void of
+dogmatism,—concerning these the Dialectician, in
+his own peculiar position,
+This subject, however, we shall discuss later on;
+
Having said thus much concerning ambiguities we +now conclude therewith our Second Book of Outlines.
Pursuing the same method of exposition in our
+investigation of the Physical division of Philosophy,
+we shall not refute each of their statements in order,
+but we shall endeavour to overthrow those of a more
+general character
Let us begin with their doctrine of Principles.
Since it is agreed by most that of Principles some +are material and some efficient, we shall make our +argument start with the efficient; for these, as they +assert, are superior to the material.
+Since, then, the majority have declared that God
+is a most efficient Cause, let us begin by inquiring
+about God,
When we conceive objects we ought to form
+conceptions of their substances
+Since, then, some of the Dogmatists assert that God is corporeal, others that
+he is incorporeal, and some that he has human form,
+others not, and some that he exists in space, others
+not; and of those who assert that he is in space some
+put him inside the world, others outside;
+But, say they,
+And apart from this, let them tell us what a ‟blessed” thing is—whether it is
+that which energizes according to virtue and foreknows
+what is subject to itself, or that which is void
+of energy and neither performs any work itself nor
+provides work for another.
+Further, in order to form a conception of God one
+must necessarily—so far as depends on the Dogmatists
+—suspend judgement as to his existence or
+non-existence. For the existence of God is not
+pre-evident.
+Now he that demonstrates the existence of God does so by
+means of what is either pre-evident or non-evident.
+Certainly not, then, by means of the pre-evident;
+for if what demonstrates God’s existence were pre-evident,
+then—since the thing proved is conceived
+together with that which proves it, and therefore is
+apprehended along with it as well, as we have
+established
+For if the non-evident fact which is capable of proving +God’s existence, needing proof as it does, shall be said +to be proved by means of a pre-evident fact, it will +no longer be non-evident but pre-evident. Therefore +the non-evident fact which proves his existence is not +proved by what is pre-evident. Nor yet by what is +non-evident; for he who asserts this will be driven +into circular reasoning when we keep demanding +proof every time for the non-evident fact which he +produces as proof of the one last propounded. +Consequently, the existence of God cannot be proved +from any other fact.
+But if God’s existence is neither +automatically pre-evident nor proved from another +fact, it will be inapprehensible.
+There is this also to be said. He who affirms that +God exists either declares that he has, or that he has +not, forethought for the things in the universe, and +in the former case that such forethought is for all +things or for some things. But if he had forethought +for all, there would have been nothing bad and no +badness in the world; yet all things, they say, are full +of badness; hence it shall not be said that God forethinks +all things.
+If, again, he forethinks some, why +does he forethink these things and not those? For +either he has both the will and the power to forethink +all things, or else he has the will but not the power, or +the power but not the will, or neither the will nor the +power. But if he had had both the will and the +power he would have had forethought for all things; +but for the reasons stated above he does not forethink +all; therefore he has not both the will and the power +to forethink all. And if he has the will but not the +power, he is less strong than the cause which renders +him unable to forethink what he does not forethink:
+but it is contrary to our notion of God that he should +be weaker than anything. And if, again, he has the +power but not the will to have forethought for all, he +will be held to be malignant; while if he has neither +the will nor the powers he is both malignant and weak +—an impious thing to say about God. Therefore +God has no forethought for the things in the universe.
+But if he exercises no forethought for anything, and +there exists no work nor product of his, no one will be +able to name the source of the apprehension of God’s +existence, inasmuch as he neither appears of himself +nor is apprehended by means of any of his products. +So for these reasons we cannot apprehend whether +God exists.
+And from this we further conclude that +those who positively affirm God’s existence are probably +compelled to be guilty of impiety; for if they +say that he forethinks all things they will be declaring +that God is the cause of what is evil, while if they say +that he forethinks some things or nothing they will +be forced to say that God is either malignant or weak, +and obviously this is to use impious language.
+To prevent the Dogmatists attempting also to
+slander us,
+For some affirm Cause
+to be corporeal, others incorporeal.
+The majority of them hold that of these Causes
+some are immediate,
+Some of them, however, have asserted further that
+things present are causes of things future, being
+‟antecedents;” as when intense exposure to the
+sun causes fever. But this view is rejected by some,
+on the ground that, since the Cause is relative to
+something existent and to a real effect, it cannot
+precede it as its cause.
As regards this controversy, our position is as +follows:
+That Cause exists is plausible; for how could
+there come about increase, decrease, generation,
+corruption, motion in general, each of the physical
+and mental effects, the ordering of the whole universe,
+and everything else, except by reason of some cause?
+Moreover, if cause were non-existent everything would have been +produced by everything and at random. Horses, +for instance, might be born, perchance, of flies, +and elephants of ants; and there would have been +severe rains and snow in Egyptian Thebes, while the +southern districts would have had no rain, unless +there had been a cause which makes the southern +parts stormy, the eastern dry.
+Also, he who asserts that there is no Cause is refuted; for if he says that +he makes this assertion absolutely and without any +cause, he will not win credence; but if he says that +he makes it owing to some cause, he is positing +Cause while wishing to abolish it, since he offers us +a cause to prove the non-existence of Cause.
+For these reasons, then, the existence of Cause is +plausible.
+But that it is also plausible to say that +nothing is the Cause of anything will be evident when +we have set forth, to suit the occasion, a few of the +many arguments which go to prove this case. Thus +it is, for example, impossible to conceive the Cause +before apprehending its effect as its effect; for we only +recognize that it is causative of the effect when we +apprehend the latter as an effect.
+But we cannot either apprehend the effect of the Cause as its effect +unless we apprehend the Cause of the effect as its +Cause; for we think we know that it is its effect only +when we have apprehended the Cause of it as its +Cause.
+If, then, in order to conceive the Cause, we +must first know the effect, while in order to know +the effect we must, as I said, have previous knowledge +of the Cause, the fallacy of this circular mode of +reasoning proves both to be inconceivable, the Cause +being incapable of being conceived as Cause, and the +effect as effect. For since each of them needs the +evidence of the other, we shall not be able to say +which conception is to have the precedence. Hence +we shall be unable to declare that anything is the +Cause of anything.
+And even were one to grant that Cause can be
+conceived, it might be held to be inapprehensible
+because of the divergency of opinion. For he who
+says that there is some Cause of something either
+asserts that he makes this statement absolutely and
+without basing it on any rational cause, or else he will
+declare that he has arrived at his conviction owing
+to certain causes.
+Besides, since we are inquiring about the +reality of Cause, it will certainly be necessary for him +to produce a cause for the cause of the existence of +Cause, and of that cause yet another, and so on ad +infinitum. But it is impossible to produce causes +infinite in number. It is impossible, therefore, to +affirm positively that anything is Cause of anything.
+Moreover, the Cause, when it produces the effect, +either is and subsists already as causal or is non-causal. +Certainly it is not non-causal; while if it is causal, it +must first have subsisted and become causal, and +thereafter produces the effect which is said to be +brought about by it as already existing Cause. But +since the Cause is relative and relative to the effect, +it is clear that it cannot be prior in existence to the +latter; therefore not even as being causal can the +Cause bring about that whereof it is Cause.
+And if it does not bring about anything either as being or as +not being causal, then it does not bring anything +about; and hence it will not be a Cause; for apart +from its effecting something the Cause cannot be +conceived as Cause.
+Hence some people argue thus: The Cause must +either subsist along with its effect or before it or must +come into being after it. Now to say that the Cause +is brought into existence after the appearance of its +effect would seem ridiculous. But neither can it subsist +before the effect; for it is said to be conceived in relation +thereto, and they affirm that relatives,
+in so far as they are relative, co-exist with each other and are +conceived together. Nor, again, can it subsist along +with its effect; for if it is productive of the effect, +and what comes into existence must so come by the +agency of what exists already, the Cause must have +become causal first, and this done, then produces its +effect. If, then, the Cause neither subsists before its +effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect +precede the Cause, it would seem that it has no +substantial existence at all.
+And it is clear probably that by these arguments the conception of Cause is +overthrown again. For if Cause as a relative notion +cannot be conceived before its effect, and yet, if it is +to be conceived as causative of its effect, it must be +conceived before its effect, while it is impossible for +anything to be conceived before that which the +conception of it cannot precede,—then it is impossible for +the Cause to be conceived.
+From all this we conclude finally that—if the
+arguments by which it was shown
+So far, then, as concerns the efficient Principle this
+account will suffice for the present. But we must also
+give a brief account of what are called the Material
+Principles.
+the School of Empedocles as well as the Stoics, fire, air, water and
+earth—for why should one even mention that
+mysterious ‟indeterminate matter” which some of
+them talk about,
+Democritus and Epicurus, atoms; Anaxagoras of Clazomenae,
+homoeomeries
+Since, then, there exists amongst them as much +divergence as this, and even more, regarding the +Material Principles, we shall give assent either to all +the positions stated, and all others as well, or to some +of them. But to assent to all is not possible; for +we certainly shall not be able to assent both to +Asclepiades, who says that the elements can be +broken up and possess qualities, and to Democritus, +who asserts that they are indivisible and +void of quality, and to Anaxagoras, who leaves +every sensible quality attached to the homoeomeries.
+Yet if we shall prefer any one standpoint, or view,
+to the rest, we shall be preferring it either
+absolutely and without proof or with proof.
+If, then, in order to show the truth of the proof which prefers any +one view, its criterion must be proved, and to prove +the criterion in turn its proof must be pre-established, +the argument is found to be the circular one +which will not allow the reasoning to go forward, +since the proof keeps always requiring a proved +criterion, and the criterion an approved proof.
+And should any one propose to approve the criterion by a +criterion and to prove the proof by a proof, he will +be driven to a regress ad infinitum. Accordingly, if +we are unable to assent either to all the views +held about the elements or to any one of them, it is +proper to suspend judgement about them.
+Now though it is, perhaps, possible to show by
+these arguments alone the inapprehensibility of the
+elements and of the Material Principles, yet in order
+that we may be able to refute the Dogmatists in a
+more comprehensive manner we shall dwell on this
+topic at appropriate length. And since the opinions
+about the elements are, as we have shown, numerous
+and well-nigh infinite, we will excuse ourselves—
+because of the character of our present treatise—
+from discussing each opinion in detail, but will make
+answer to them all implicitly. For since the elements,
+whatever view one takes of them, must be finally
+regarded either as corporeal or incorporeal,
+Some say that Body is that which is capable of
+being active or passive.
+But some define Body as what has three dimensions
+combined with resistance or solidity.
+The answer, however, to these people is simple. For they will +say either that Body is nothing more than these +qualities, or that it is something else than the +combination of the qualities already mentioned. Now +apart from length and breadth and depth and solidity +the Body would be nothing; but if these things are +the Body, anyone who shall prove that they are +unreal will likewise abolish the Body; for wholes are +abolished along with the sum of their parts.
+Now it is possible to disprove these dimensions in a
+variety of ways; but for the present it will be enough
+to say that if the Limits
+If, then, one should affirm the +existence of a surface or a line, then it will be affirmed +that each of the afore-mentioned objects either can +subsist of itself or is cognized solely in connexion +with so-called Bodies. But to imagine either a line +or a surface as existing of itself is doubtless silly. +While if it should be said that each of these objects +is cognized solely in connexion with the Bodies and +has no independent existence, it will thereby be +granted, in the first place, that the Bodies are not +generated from them (for if so, I suppose, these +objects ought to have had independent existence first, +and then have combined to form the Bodies);
+and further, they have no real existence even in the so-called Bodies.
+This can be shown by several arguments, but for
+the present it will suffice to mention the difficulties
+which arise from
+And if the surface touches the surface of the
+juxtaposed Body with some of its parts, and with
+other parts is united with the Body of which it is a
+limit,
So likewise when two surfaces are, let us imagine, +juxtaposed along the limits where they come to an +end, by way of what is called their ‟length,” that is to +say by way of their ‟lines,” then these lines, by means +of which the surfaces are said to touch each other, +will not be unified (else they would be fused together); +yet if each of them touches the line which +lies next to it breadth-wise with some of its parts +and by others is united with the surface of which it +is a limit, it will not be without breadth, and, +consequently, it will not be a line. But if there exists +in Body neither line nor surface, neither length nor +breadth nor depth will exist in Body.
+And should anyone assert that the Limits are +bodies, he can be answered very shortly. For if +length is a body, it must needs be divided into its +three dimensions, and each of these, in turn, being a +body will be divided into three other dimensions, +which will be bodies, and these likewise into others, +and so on ad infinitum, so that the Body comes to be +of infinite size, being divided into an infinity of parts: +this result is absurd, and therefore the dimensions +aforesaid are not bodies. But if they are neither +bodies nor lines nor surfaces, they will be held to have +no existence.
+Solidity
+So these wholes, which are parts of +other things, will not touch as wholes touching wholes, +for the reasons aforesaid, nor yet through parts +touching parts; for their parts, too, being wholes +relatively to their own parts, will not be in contact +either as wholes with wholes or as parts with parts. +But if we apprehend the occurrence of touch neither +by way of wholeness nor by way of parts, touch will be +inapprehensible. And, consequently, solidity also; +and, therefore, Body; for if this is nothing more than +the three dimensions plus Solidity, and we have +proved that each of these is inapprehensible, Body +also will be inapprehensible.
+Thus, then, if we are to judge by the conception
+and about this problem there is this also to be said.
+Of existing things some, they say, are sensible, others
+intelligible, and the latter are apprehended by the
+reason, the former by the senses, and the senses are
+‟simply-passive,”
+And if Body is said to be intelligible, there must certainly be pre-existent
+in the nature of things some sensible object from
+which to derive the notion of bodies, they being
+intelligible. But nothing exists save Body and the
+Incorporeal, and of these the Incorporeal is essentially
+intelligible,
+Accordingly we, by thus opposing the arguments against Body to +the apparent existence of Body, infer suspension of +judgement concerning Body.
+The inapprehensibility of Body involves also that +of the Incorporeal. For privations are conceived as +privations of states or faculties, as, for example, blindness +of sight, deafness of hearing, and similarly with +the rest. Hence, in order to apprehend a privation, +we must first have apprehended the state of which +the privation is said to be a privation; for if one had +no conception of sight one would not be able to assert +that this man does not possess sight, which is the +meaning of being blind.
+If then Incorporeality is the privation of Body, and when states are not apprehended
+it is impossible for the privations of them to
+be apprehended, and it has been proved that Body
+is inapprehensible, Incorporeality also will be
+inapprehensible. Moreover, it is either sensible or
+intelligible. And if it is sensible, it is inapprehensible
+because of the variance amongst animals and men,
+the senses and the circumstances, and owing to the
+admixtures and all the other things we have previously
+described in our exposition of the Ten Tropes.
+Also, he who asserts that he apprehends the
+Incorporeal will maintain that he apprehends it either
+by sense or by means of reason. Certainly not by
+sense, since it is supposed that the senses perceive
+the sensibles by way of ‟impression” and ‟indentation,”
+—take sight, for instance, whether it occur by
+reason of the tension of a cone, or of the emissions and
+immissions of images, or by effusions of rays or
+colours;
+But incorporeals are incapable of submitting to impression +of this kind, so that they could not be apprehended by sense.
+Nor yet by means of reason. For if the reason
+is ‟verbally expressible”
+How, then, is one to prove that this particular incorporeal (I mean reason) +is previously apprehended? For if it is by means of +another incorporeal, we shall ask for the proof of its +apprehension also, and so on ad infinitum; whereas, if +it is by means of a body, the apprehension of bodies +is also in question; by what means, then, are we +to prove that the body which is assumed in order to +prove the apprehension of the incorporeal reason is +itself apprehended? If by means of a body, we are +plunged into infinite regress; while if we do so by +means of an incorporeal, we are wrecked on circular +reasoning. Reason, then, since it is incorporeal, +remaining thus inapprehensible, no one will be able to +say that by means of it the incorporeal is +apprehended.
+But if reason is a body, inasmuch as about bodies
+also there is much controversy as to whether or not
+they are apprehended, owing to what is called their
+‟continual flux,”
+And if they are neither objects of sense nor apprehended +by means of reason, they will not be apprehended at all.
+If, then, it is impossible to be positive either
+about the existence of Body or about the
+Incorporeals, we must also suspend judgement
+concerning the Elements, and possibly about the things
+which lie behind the Elements
+But, to pass over these problems, how do they
+explain the production of the compounds from the
+primary elements,
+They declare that mixed things are composed of
+substance and qualities. If so, one must declare
+either that their substances are blended
+And if it should be said that the qualities are simply juxtaposed and the +substances blended, even so the statement would be +absurd; for we do not perceive the qualities in the +mixtures as separate objects but as a single sense- +impression produced by the mixed things. And anyone +who should assert that the qualities are blended, +but the substances not, would be asserting the +impossible; for the reality of the qualities resides in +the substances, so that it would be ridiculous to +assert that the qualities by themselves, in separation +from the substances, are somehow blended with one +another, while the substances are left apart void of +quality.
+It only remains to say that both the qualities and
+the substances of the mixed things permeate one
+another
+Yet if the hemlock is blended in with every particle of the water +and is distributed as a whole over the whole volume +of the water and through the mutual interpenetration +of both their substances and their qualities, so that +Mixture may in this way result; and if the things so +distributed over each other in every particle occupy +an equal space, so that they are equal to each other,— +then the cup of hemlock will be equal to the ten cups +of water, so that the blend must consist of twenty +cups or of only two, according to the assumption now +made as to the mode of Mixture. And if, again, a +cup of water were poured into the twenty cups, +then—according to the theory assumed—the quantity +is bound to be forty cups or, again, only two, since it +is admissible to conceive either the one cup as all +the twenty over which it is distributed, or the twenty +cups as the one with which they are equalized.
+And by thus pouring in a cup at a time and pursuing the +same argument it is possible to infer that the twenty +cups seen in the blend must be twenty thousand and +more, according to the theory of Mixture assumed, +and at the same time only two—a conclusion which +reaches the very height of incongruity. Wherefore +this theory of Mixture also is absurd.
+But if Mixture cannot come about by the mutual +blending either of the substances alone or of the +qualities alone or of both or of neither, and it is +impossible to conceive any other ways than these, +then the process of Mixture and of blending in +general is inconceivable. Hence, if the so-called +Elements are unable to form the compounds either +by way of contact through juxtaposition or by +mixture or blending, then, so far as this argument +goes, the physical theory of the Dogmatists is +inconceivable.
+In addition to the foregoing we might have dwelt +on the argument about the kinds of motion, since +this also might be held to render the physical theory +of the Dogmatists impossible. For the formation of +the compounds must certainly be due to some motion +both of the elements and of the efficient Principle. +If, then, we shall show that no one kind of motion is +generally agreed upon, it will be clear that, even if +all the assumptions mentioned above be granted, the +Dogmatists have elaborated their so-called ‟Physical +Doctrine” in vain.
+Now those who are reputed to have given the most
+complete classification of Motion assert that six kinds
+of it exist—local transition, physical change, increase,
+decrease, becoming, perishing.
+The main views held about motion are, I imagine,
+three. It is assumed by ordinary people
+We shall begin with those who affirm its real +existence.
+These base their view mainly on ‟evidence.”
So these men attempt in this way to put to shame +those who hold the contrary opinion;
+but those who deny the existence of motion allege such arguments +as these: If a thing is moved, it is moved either +by itself or by another thing. But if it is moved by +another, it will be moved either causelessly or owing +to some cause. Nothing, they assert, is moved +causelessly; but if it is moved owing to some cause, +the cause owing to which it moves will be what +makes it move, and thus we are involved in an +infinite regress, according to the criticism stated a +little while ago.
+Moreover, if the movent thing +is active, and what is active is moved, that movent +thing will need another movent thing, and the +second a third, and so on ad infinitum, so that the +motion comes to have no beginning; which is absurd. +Therefore the thing that moves is not always moved +by another. Nor yet by itself. Since every movent +causes motion either by pushing forward or by drawing +after or by pushing up or by thrusting down, what +is self-movent must move itself in one of the aforesaid +ways.
+But if it moves itself propulsively, it will be +behind itself; and if by pulling after, it will be in +front of itself; and if by pushing up, it will be below +itself; and if by thrusting down, it will be above +itself. But it is impossible for anything to be above +or before or beneath or behind its own self; therefore +it is impossible for anything to be moved by itself. +But if nothing is moved either by itself or by another, +then nothing is moved at all.
+And if anyone should seek refuge in the notions
+of ‟impulse” and ‟purpose” we must remind him of
+the controversy about ‟what is in our power,”
+Further, there is this also to be said. If a thing
+moves, it moves either in the place where it is or in
+that where it is not. But it does not move in the
+place where it is, for if it is in it, it remains in it;
+nor yet does it move in the place where it is not;
+for where a thing is not, there it can neither effect
+nor suffer anything. Therefore nothing moves. This
+argument is, in fact, that of Diodorus Cronos,
+Some, then, assert that a thing can move in
+the place where it is; at any rate the globes which
+revolve round their axes move while remaining in the
+same place.
+And we shall take the same course +in replying to those who declare that the moving +thing occupies two places, that wherein it is and that +whereto it shifts. For we shall ask them when the +moving object shifts from the place wherein it is to +the other place—whether while it is in the first place +or while it is in the second. But when it is in the first +place it does not pass over into the second, for it is +still in the first; and when it is not in this, it is not +passing from it.
+And besides, the question is being begged; for where it is not, +there it cannot be active.For surely no one will allow that +any object to which he does not grant motion at all can shift to any place.
+Some, however, make this statement: Place is
+used in two senses, the broad sense, as for example
+‟my house,” and the exact sense,
+We should also propound the following argument.
Now that a thing can not move in orderly progression +is plain on the face of it. For if bodies, and also +the places and the times in which the bodies are said +to move, are divided to infinity, motion will not occur, +it being impossible to discover amongst the infinite +any first thing wherefrom the object said to move will +derive its initial movement.
+And if the aforesaid objects are reducible to atomic parts, and each of the
+moving things passes equally in an atomic period of
+time with its own first atom into the first atomic point
+of space, then all moving things are of equal velocity
+—the speediest horse, for instance, and the tortoise;
Nor yet by way of immediate occupation of the divisible interval.
+For if one ought, as they declare, +to take the apparent as evidence for the non-apparent, +since, in order to complete the distance of a stade +a man must first complete the first portion of the +stade, and secondly the second portion, and so on with +the rest, so likewise everything that moves ought to +move by way of orderly progression; for surely if we +should assert that the moving thing passes all at once +through all the portions of the place wherein it is +said to move, it will be in all the portions thereof at +once, and if one portion of the place through which it +has its motion should be cold, another hot, or, mayhap, +one black, another white, so as to be able also to +colour things in contact,—then the moving thing will +be at once hot and cold and black and white, which is +absurd.
+Next let them tell us how much space the
+moving thing passes through all at once. For if they
+shall assert that it is limitless, they will be granting
+that a thing moves through the whole of the earth all
+at once; while if they shirk this conclusion, let them
+define for us the extent of the space. But, on the one
+hand, the attempt to define precisely the space or
+interval beyond which the thing moving all at once
+will be unable to advance so much as a hair’s-breadth
+is probably not merely presumptuous and rash or even
+ridiculous, but plunges us again into the original
+difficulty;
+And if, on the other go hand, they shall assert that the moving thing moves
+all at once through a space that is small but not
+precisely determined, it will be open to us to adopt
+the sorites argument
+But if a thing moves neither thus instantaneously nor by +way of gradual progression, it does not move at all.
+These, and yet more than these, are the arguments +used by those who reject transient motion. But we, +being unable to refute either these arguments or the +apparent facts on which the view of the reality of +motion is based, suspend our judgement—in view +of the contradiction between appearances and +arguments—regarding the question as to the existence +or non-existence of motion.
+Employing the same reasoning we suspend judgement
+also concerning both increase and decrease.
+For the outward evidence
+Just as if, for example, when there is a beam three cubits +long a man should bring another of ten cubits and +declare that the beam of three cubits had increased, he +would be lying because the one is wholly different from +the other; so too in the case of every object which is +said to increase, as the former matter flows away and +fresh matter enters in its place, if what is said to be +added is added, one should not call such a condition +increase but complete alteration.
+The same argument applies also to decrease.
+That subtraction
That subtraction takes place in none of these ways +is plain from what follows: What is subtracted from +anything ought, before its subtraction, to be included +in that from which it is subtracted.
+But the equal is not included in the equal—six, for instance, +in six; for what includes must be greater than what +is included, and that from which the subtraction is +made than what is subtracted, in order that there +may be some remainder after the subtraction; for +it is this which is held to distinguish subtraction +from complete removal. Nor is the greater included +in the less—six, for instance, in five; for that is +irrational.
+And for this reason, neither is the less
+included in the greater. For if five is included in six,
+as less in greater, four will be included in five, three
+in four, two in three, and one in two. Therefore six
+will contain five, four, three, two, and one, which
+when put together form the number fifteen, and
+this we conclude is included in six, if it be granted
+that the less is included in the greater. So likewise
+in the fifteen which is included in the six there is
+included the number thirty-five,
+If, then, what is subtracted from a thing must be +included in that from which it is to be subtracted, +and neither equal is included in equal, nor greater +in less, nor less in greater, then nothing is subtracted +from anything.
+Again, if anything is subtracted from anything, it +is either a whole subtracted from a whole, or a part +from a part, or a whole from a part, or a part from +a whole.
+But to say that a whole is subtracted
+from either a whole or a part is plainly nonsense. It
+remains, then, to say that a part is subtracted either
+from a whole or from a part; which is absurd. Thus
+for example—basing our argument on numbers for
+the sake of clearness—let us take ten and suppose
+that from it one is subtracted. This one, then, cannot
+be subtracted either from the whole ten or from the
+remaining part of the ten, as I shall show; therefore
+it is not subtracted at all.
+For if the one is subtracted from the whole ten, +since the ten is neither something other than the +ten ones nor one of the ones, but the aggregate of +the ones, the one ought to be subtracted from each +of the ones in order to be subtracted from the whole +ten. Now from a one, above all, nothing can be +subtracted; for the ones are indivisible, and on this +account the one will not be subtracted from the ten +in this way.
+And even were we to grant that the
+one is subtracted from each of the ones, the one will
+contain ten parts, and as containing ten parts it will
+beaten. And further, since ten other parts remain,
+after the subtraction of the ten parts of the so-called
+one, the ten will be twenty. But it is absurd to say
+that the one is ten and the ten twenty, and to divide
+what, according to them, is indivisible.
+Neither is the one subtracted from the remaining +nine; for that from which anything is subtracted +does not remain entire, but the nine does remain +entire after the subtraction of that one. Besides, +since the nine is nothing more than the nine ones, if +it should be said that the one is subtracted from the +whole nine, the sum subtracted will be nine, or if +from a part of it, then in case it be eight the same +absurd results will follow, while if the subtraction is +made from the last one, they will be affirming the +divisibility of the one, which is absurd.
+So then, neither from the nine is the one subtracted. But if +it is neither subtracted from the whole ten nor from +a part of it, no part can be subtracted from either a +whole or a part. If, then, nothing is subtracted either +as whole from whole or as part from whole, nor as +whole from part or as part from part, then nothing +is subtracted from anything.
+Moreover, addition is regarded by them
+Neither is it added to the compound +of the four cups and the one cup; for how +could anything be added to what does not yet exist? +Besides, if the added cup is blended with the four +cups and the one cup, six cups will be the measure +resulting from the four cups and the one cup and +the added cup.
+And if the, cup is added to the four +cups alone, since that which is extended over +anything is equal to that over which it extends, the cup +which extends over the measure of four cups will +double the four cups so that the whole measure +becomes eight cups—a result contrary to experience. +If, then, what is said to be added is neither added to +itself nor to what pre-exists nor to the compound of +these, and besides these there are no other +alternatives, then there is no addition of anything to +anything.
+Together with the existence of addition and subtraction
+and local motion transposition also is
+abolished,
+So too with both whole and part.
+Now it is apparent that the whole is nothing other than its parts; for certainly
+when the parts are removed there is nothing left, so
+as to enable us to account the whole as something else
+besides its parts. But if the parts themselves form
+the whole, the whole will be merely a name and an
+empty title,
+Nor yet parts. For if parts exist, either they are
+parts of the whole, or of one another, or each one of
+itself. But they are not parts of the whole, since it
+is nothing else than its parts (and besides, the parts
+will on this assumption be parts of themselves, since
+each of the parts is said to be complementary to the
+whole); nor yet of one another, since the part is said
+to be included
+Neither will each be a part of itself; for,
+because of the inclusion, it will be both greater and
+less than itself. If, then, the so-called parts are parts
+neither of the whole nor of themselves nor of one
+another, they are parts of nothing. But if they are
+parts of nothing, parts have no existence; for co-
+relatives are annulled together.
Let thus much be said, then, of a general character, +by way of digression, seeing that once already we +have dealt with the subject of whole and part.
+Some, too, maintain that what is called ‟physical
+change” is non-real, and the arguments they employ
+are such as these:
+If a thing changes, it changes through certain actions of a Cause
+Therefore nothing changes at all. If a thing changes, either what is
+changes or what is not.
+Now in so far as it is not in being it does not change, for it is not even +existent; while if it changes in so far as it is existent, +it will be other than existent, which means that it +will be non-existent. But it is absurd to say that the +existent becomes non-existent; therefore the existent +does not change either. And if neither the existent +nor the non-existent changes, and besides these there +is nothing else, it only remains to say that nothing +changes.
+Some also argue thus:
+For the present time is probably also unreal,
+Further, if change exists at all
+Both becoming and perishing are included in the +refutation of addition and subtraction and physical +change; for apart from these nothing would become +or perish. Thus, for instance, it is as a result of +the perishing of the ten, as they say, that the nine +becomes by the subtraction of one, and the ten from +the perishing of the nine by the addition of one; +and rust becomes from the perishing of bronze by +means of change. Hence, if the aforesaid motions +are abolished it is likely that becoming and perishing +are also necessarily abolished.
+Yet none the less some argue also as follows:
+And if Socrates died, he died either when he lived or when he died. +Now he did not die when he lived, since he would +have been at once both alive and dead; nor yet +when he died, since he would have been dead twice. +Therefore Socrates did not die. And by applying +this argument in turn to each of the things said to +become or perish it is possible to abolish becoming +and perishing.
+Some also argue thus:
+If, then, neither the non-existent becomes nor the existent, +nothing becomes at all.
+For the same reasons, neither does anything
+perish.
+for since it does not perish in so far as it is non-existent but +in so far as it is existent, it will be other than the +existent and therefore non-existent in so far as it is +said to have perished, whereas in so far as it is said to +perish while continuing in existence it will be existent. +But it is absurd to say that the same thing is both +existent and non-existent; therefore the existent does +not perish while continuing in existence. And if the +existent does not perish while continuing in existence +but passes first into non-existence and then in this +way perishes, it is no longer the existent that perishes +but the non-existent; and this we have shown to be +impossible. If, then, neither the existent perishes nor +the non-existent, and besides these there is nothing +else, nothing perishes at all.
+This account of the motions
+In like manner some have doubted about physical
+rest,
+What is said to be at rest is, in fact, held to be embraced
+by the things which surround it, and what is embraced
+is acted upon; but nothing acted upon exists, since
+no causal activity exists, as we have shown;
Some, too, propound this argument: What is at +rest is acted upon; but what is acted upon is in +motion; therefore what is said to be at rest is in +motion; but if it is in motion, it is not at rest.
+And from this it is evident that neither does the incorporeal +admit of being at rest. For if what is at rest is acted +upon, and being acted upon is a property, if anything, +of bodies and not of incorporeals, no incorporeal +can either be acted upon or be at rest; therefore +nothing is at rest.
+So much for the subject of rest. And since no one +of the things we have mentioned is conceived apart +from space or time, we must pass on to consider these; +for if one should prove these to be unreal, then, +because of them, each of the others also will be +unreal. Let us begin with space.
+Space, or place, then, is used in two senses,
+And of these, those who maintain its existence have recourse to the
+evidence of experience.
+and when, also, he hears the
+ancients declaring that ‟Verily first of all came Chaos
+into existence”
+But those who deny space do not admit the existence
+of the parts of space; for space, they say, is nothing
+else than its parts, and he who tries to deduce the
+existence of space from the assumption that its parts
+exist is seeking to establish the matter in question by
+means of itself. Equally silly is the language of those
+who assert that a thing becomes or has become in
+some place, when space in general is not admitted
+Hesiod, too, is no competent judge of philosophical problems. And while thus +rebutting the arguments that tend to establish the +existence of space, they also demonstrate its unreality +more elaborately by making use of what are held to +be the most weighty views of the Dogmatists about +space, namely those of the Stoics and Peripatetics, in +the following fashion.
+The Stoics declare that Void is that which is capable +of being occupied by an existent but is not so occupied, +or an interval empty of body, or an interval un- +occupied by body; and that Place is an interval +occupied by an existent and equated to that which +occupies it (‟existent” being here the name they +give to ‟body”); and that Room is an interval partly +occupied by body and partly unoccupied—though +some of them say that Room is the Place of the large +body, so that the difference between Place and Room +depends on size.
+Their opponents then argue thus:
+When the Stoics define Place as an ‟interval occupied
+by body,” in what sense do they call it an ‟interval?”
+Do they mean the length of the body or its width or
+its depth only, or all three dimensions? For if they
+mean one dimension, the place is not equated with
+the object of which it is the place, and besides, that
+which includes is part of what is included, which is
+pure nonsense.
+And if by ‟interval” is meant the
+three dimensions, then, since in the so-called place
+there subsists neither a void nor another body which
+has dimensions, but only the body said to exist in
+place, and it is composed of the dimensions (for it is
+length and breadth and depth and solidity,
+Therefore no dimension of a subsisting place exists. +And, consequently, place is nothing.
+This argument also is propounded.
+If they belong to both, then, since the
+Void has no reality apart from the dimensions, if the
+dimensions of the Void subsist in the body and serve
+to compose the body itself, the components of the
+Void will also be components of the body—for about
+the reality of solidity it is impossible to say anything
+positive, as we have shown above.
+Further, it is argued that when the body occupies
+the Void and place comes about, the Void either
+remains or withdraws or perishes. But if it remains,
+the Plenum and the Void will be identical; and if it
+withdraws by a movement of transition, or perishes
+by change, the Void will be a body;
+For these reasons also the Void is found to be unreal,
+since it is impossible for it to be occupied by body and
+to become place; for Void was defined
These arguments, and others besides, are directed +against the views about place held by the Stoics.
+The Peripatetics
+Furthermore, if place is anything, it is either created +or uncreate.Now it is not uncreate; for it is brought +about, they say, by being moulded round the body +within it. Nor yet is it created; for if it is created, +it is either when the body is in place that the place, +in which the body in place is already said to be, +comes into existence, or when the body is not in it.
+But it does not come into existence either when the +body is in it (for the place of the body within it exists +already), or when it is not in it, since, as they assert, +the container is moulded round the contained and in +this way place becomes, and nothing can be moulded +round that which is not within it. But if place does +not become either when the body is in place or when +it is not therein, and no other alternatives are +conceivable, then place is not created at all. And if it +is neither created nor uncreate, it has no existence.
+These objections may also be stated more generally.
+It is possible to adduce many other arguments.
+But in order to avoid prolonging our exposition, we
+may conclude by saying that while the Sceptics are
+put to confusion by the arguments, they are also put
+to shame by the evidence
+Our attitude is the same with respect to the inquiry
+about time. For if we depend on appearances, time
+seems to be something, but if we depend on the
+arguments about it, it appears unreal. Some
+Strato (or, as some say, Aristotle) as ‟the measure of motion and rest;”
+Epicurus (according to Demetrius the Laconian
+And, in point of substance, some have affirmed that it is corporeal
+—for instance, Aenesidemus, arguing that it differs
+in nothing from Being and the prime body,—others,
+And besides, should it
+be granted that the assertion of the corporeality
+of time is false, and that of its incorporeality likewise
+false, then, ipso facto, the unreality of time will
+be granted; for it cannot be anything but one or
+other of these. Nor yet can we apprehend which
+theories are true, which false, owing to the equal
+weight
+Hence for these reasons we shall be unable to affirm anything positively +about time.
+Further, since time does not seem to subsist without +motion or even rest, if motion is abolished, and +likewise rest, time is abolished. None the less the +following objections against time are made by some. +If time exists, it is either limited or unlimited.
+But if it is limited, it began at a certain time and will end
+at a certain time. Consequently, there was once a
+time when time was not (before it began), and there
+will once be a time when time will not be (after it has
+ended); which is absurd.
+But if it is unlimited, since part of it is said to be
+past, part present, and part future, the future and
+past are either existent or non-existent. But if they
+are non-existent, and there remains only the present,
+which is momentary, time will be limited and the
+original difficulties
+Further, if time exists it is either divisible or +indivisible. Now it is not indivisible; for it is divided, +as they themselves declare, into present, past, and +future. Yet it is not divisible either. For each +divisible thing is measured by some part of itself, the +measure coinciding with each part of the measured, +as when we measure a cubit by a finger. But time +cannot be measured by any part of itself. If, for +instance, the present measures the past, it will +coincide with the past and will therefore be past, +and similarly it will be future in the case of the +future. And if the future should measure the rest, +it will be present and past, and so likewise the past +will be future and present; which is nonsense. +Neither, then, is time divisible. But if it is neither +indivisible nor divisible, it does not exist.
+Time, too, is said to be tripartite, partly past, partly
+present, and partly future. Of these the past and
+the future are non-existent; for if past and future
+time exist now, each of them will be present. Neither
+is the present existent; for if present time exists
+it is either indivisible or divisible. Now it is not
+indivisible; for what changes is said to change in
+the present time, but nothing changes in indivisible
+time
+Neither is it divisible; for it could not be divided into a +plurality of presents, since time present is said to +change into time past imperceptibly owing to the +rapid flux of the things in the Universe. Nor yet into +past and future; for so it will be unreal, having one +part of itself no longer existent and the other part +not yet existent.
+Hence, too, the present cannot be +the end of the past and the beginning of the future, +since then it will both be and not be existent; for it +will exist as present, but will not exist because its +parts are non-existent. Therefore it is not divisible +either. But if the present is neither indivisible nor +divisible, it does not exist. And when neither the +present nor the past nor the future exists, time too is +non-existent; for what is compounded of things unreal +is unreal.
+This argument, too, is alleged against time: If
+time exists it is either generable and perishable or
+ingenerable and imperishable.
+For things generated must be generated from something existent, and things which
+perish must perish into something existent, according
+to the postulates of the Dogmatists themselves.
+Further, since everything which becomes seems to
+become in time, time, if it becomes, becomes in time.
+Either, then, it becomes itself in itself or as one time
+in another. But if it becomes in itself, it will be at
+once both existent and non-existent. For since that
+within which a thing becomes must exist before the
+thing which becomes within it, the time which becomes
+in itself does not yet exist in so far as it becomes,
+but does already exist in so far as it becomes in itself.
+Nor yet in another. For if the present becomes in the future, +the present will be future, and if in the past, it will +be past. And the same may be said of all the other +times; so that one time does not become in another. +But if time neither becomes in itself nor as one time +in another it is not generable. And it has been shown +that it is not ingenerable either. Being, then, neither +generable nor ingenerable, it is wholly non-existent; +for each existing thing is bound to be either generable +or ingenerable.
+Since time, it seems, is not found apart from
+number, it will not be out of place to discuss number
+briefly.
+Thus, for example, the School of
+Pythagoras declare that numbers are also elements
+of the Universe. They assert, in fact, that phenomena
+are constructed from something, and that the
+elements must be simple; therefore the elements
+are non-evident. But of things non-evident, some are
+corporeal, like atoms and masses, others incorporeal,
+like figures
+Moreover, each of the incorporeals involves the perception of number, for
+it is either one or two or more. Thus it is inferred
+that the non-evident and incorporeal numbers which
+are involved in all perception are the elements of
+existing things. Yet not simply
+For they say that it is from these
+that the rest of the numbers are generated—those,
+that is, which are involved in the perception of
+numerables—and the Universe is arranged. For the
+point presents the relation, or character, of the
+Monad,
+It is in this way that they image forth both the bodies and the whole
+Universe, which also they declare to be arranged
+according to harmonic ratios
+These are the fictions they imagine; and they
+also make out that number is something else apart
+from numerables, arguing that if ‟animal” according
+to its proper definition
+But these things are absurd; therefore number +is not the numerables, but it has a reality of its own +apart from them whereby it is involved in the perception +of the numerables and is an element.
+So when they had thus concluded that number is +not the numerables, there arose in consequence the +difficulty about number. For it is argued that if +number exists, number is either the actual numerables +or something else apart from them; but number is +neither the actual numerables, as the Pythagoreans +have proved, nor something else apart from them, +as we shall show; number, therefore, is nothing.
+That number is nothing apart from the numerables
+we shall demonstrate by basing our argument on the
+Monad, for the sake of lucidity of exposition.
+—just as, supposing there are a number of naked men, who possess only one +garment amongst them, which one man had put on, +all the rest will remain naked and without a garment. +And if each thing partakes of a part of it, then, in +the first place, the Monad will have a part. and parts, +too, infinite in number into which it is divided; which +is absurd. And further, just as the part of the Decad, +such as the Dyad, is not a Decad, so neither will the +part of the Monad be a Monad, and for this reason +nothing will partake of the Monad. Hence the Monad +whereof the particular objects are said to partake is +not one.
+But if the monads, by participation in which each
+of the particular objects is called one, are equal
+in number to the numerables to which the term
+‟one” is applied, the monads partaken of will be
+infinite in number. And these either partake of a
+superior
+Yet if these can be monads without participation, each of the +sensibles also will be able to be one without participation +in a monad, and so at once the monad said to be +perceived as real in itself is overthrown. Whereas, if +those monads are monads by participation, either they +all partake of one monad, or each partakes of a monad +of its own. And if all partake of one, each will be +said to partake either of a part or of the whole, and +the original difficulties will still remain;
+but if each partakes of its own monad, we must posit a new +monad for each of those monads, and others again +for the former, and so on ad infinitum. If then, in +order to apprehend that there are certain self-sub-sistent +monads by participation in which each existing +thing is one, it is necessary to apprehend an infinite +infinity of intelligible monads, and to apprehend an +infinite infinity of intelligible monads is a thing +impossible, then it is impossible to show that there are +certain intelligible monads and that each existing +thing is one through becoming one by participation +in its own monad.
+It is absurd, therefore, to say that the monads are +as numerous as the things which partake of them. +But if the so-called self-subsistent monad is neither +one nor as many as its participants, a self-subsistent +monad does not exist at all. So likewise none of the +other numbers will be self-subsistent; for one may +apply to all the numbers the argument which has +now been employed in the typical case of the monad. +But if number is neither self-subsistent, as we have +shown, nor consists in the actual numerables, as the +Pythagoreans have demonstrated, and beyond these +there is no other alternative, then we must declare +that number does not exist.
+In what way, too, is the Dyad said to be generated +from the Monad by those who believe that number +is something else apart from the numerables? For +when we combine a monad with another monad either +something external is added to the monads, or something +is subtracted from them, or nothing is either +added or subtracted. But if nothing is either added +or subtracted, there will not be a Dyad. For neither +did the monads, when existing apart from each other, +contain the Dyad as involved in the perception of +them, according to their own definition, nor has +any addition now been made to them from without, +just as, by hypothesis, nothing has been subtracted.
+Hence the combination of the monad with the monad +will not be a dyad, as no addition or subtraction +from without takes place. But if subtraction does +take place, not only will there not be a dyad but the +monads will even be diminished. And if the dyad is +added to them from without, so that a dyad may be +generated from the monads, the things which appear +to be two will be four; for there exists already a +monad and a second monad, and when an outside +dyad is added to these the result will be the number +four.
+And the same argument applies to all the +other numbers which are said to be formed as a +result of combination.
+If, then, the numbers which are said to be compounded
+from the superior
+So then number does not subsist of itself. +But if number neither is conceived as self-existent, +nor subsists in the numerables, then, to judge from +the subtleties introduced by the Dogmatists, number +is nothing.
+Let this, then, suffice as an account in outline of +what is called the Physical section of philosophy.
+There remains the Ethical division, which is supposed
+to deal with the distinguishing of things
+good,
+The Stoics, then, assert that good is ‟utility or not
+other than utility,” meaning by ‟utility” virtue and
+right action, and by ‟not other than utility” the
+good man and the friend. For ‟virtue,” as consisting
+in a certain state of the ruling principle,
+For utility is a part of the good man, being his ruling +principle. But the wholes, they say, are not the +same as the parts (for the man is not a hand), nor are +they other than the parts (for without the parts they +do not subsist). Wherefore they assert that the +wholes are not other than the parts. Hence, since +the good man stands in the relation of a whole to his +ruling principle, which they have identified with +utility, they declare that he is not other than utility.
+Hence also they assert that good has three meanings.
+In one of its meanings, good, they say, is that
+by which utility may be gained, this being the most
+principal good
+But some define good as ‟what is to be chosen for its
+own sake;”
These, or such as these, are their statements with +reference to the notion of the Good.
+But in describing as good what is useful or what is choiceworthy +for its own sake or what is contributory to happiness, +one is not exhibiting the essence of the good but +stating one of its properties. And this is senseless. +For the properties aforesaid belong either to the good +only or to other things as well. But if they belong to +other things as well, they are not, when thus extended, +characteristic marks of the good; while if they belong +only to the Good, it is not possible for us to derive +from them a notion of the good.
+For just as the man who has no notion of ‟horse” has no knowledge of +what ‟neighing” is and cannot arrive thereby at a +notion of ‟horse,” unless he should first meet with a +neighing horse, so too one who is seeking the essence +of the good, because he has no knowledge of the +good, cannot perceive the attribute which is peculiar +to it alone in order that he may be enabled thereby +to gain a notion of the good itself. For he must first +learn the nature of the good itself, and then pass on +to apprehend that it is useful, and that it is +choiceworthy for its own sake, and that it is productive +of happiness.
+But that the aforesaid attributes are
+not sufficient to indicate the concept and the real
+nature of the good is made plain by the practice of
+the Dogmatists. All, probably, agree that the good is
+useful and that it is choiceworthy (so that the good is
+said to be, as it were, ‟the delightful”
+Such, then, is the discord amongst those who are
+reputed the most eminent of the Dogmatists regarding
+the notion of the Good; and they have differed likewise
+regarding Evil, some defining Evil as ‟damage
+or not other than damage,”
+The term ‟indifferent,” they say, is used in three +senses—in one sense, of that which is an object of +neither inclination nor disinclination, as for instance +the fact that the stars or the hairs of the head are +even in number; in another sense, of that which is an +object of inclination or disinclination, but not towards +this particular object any more than towards that, as +in the case of two indistinguishable tetradrachms, +when one has to choose one of them; for there arises +an inclination to choose one of them, but not this +one more than that one; and a third sense of the term +‟indifferent” is, they say, ‟that which contributes +neither to happiness nor to unhappiness,” as health, +or wealth; for what a man may use now well, now +ill, that, they say, is indifferent, and they claim to +discuss it specially in their Ethics.
+But what view we ought to take regarding this conception is plain from +what we have already said about things good and evil.
+Thus, then, it is plain that they have not guided
+us to a clear conception of the several things above-
+mentioned; yet, in thus failing with regard to
+matters that, perhaps, have no real existence, their
+experience is by no means strange. For there
+are some who argue on the following grounds
+that nothing is by nature
+Fire which heats by nature appears to all as heating, +and snow which chills by nature appears to all as +chilling, and all things which move by nature move +equally all those who are, as they say, in a natural +condition. But none of the so-called ‟goods,” as we +shall show, moves all men as being good; therefore +no natural good exists. And that none of the so-called +goods moves all men alike is, they assert, an evident +fact.
+For, not to mention ordinary folk—of whom
+some regard right bodily condition as good, others
+chambering, others gluttony, others drunkenness,
+others gambling, others greed, and others still worse
+things,—some of the philosophers themselves (such as
+the Peripatetics) say that there are three kinds of
+goods;
+The Stoics themselves, too,
+assert that there is a trinity
+If, then, things which move by nature move all
+men alike, while we are not all moved alike by the
+so-called goods, there is nothing good by nature. In
+fact it is impossible to believe either all the views
+now set forth, because of their conflicting character,
+or any one of them. For he who asserts that one
+must believe this view, but not that, becomes a party
+to the controversy, since he has opposed to him the
+arguments of those who take the rival view, and
+therefore he himself, along with the rest, will need
+an adjudicator instead of pronouncing judgement on
+others. And as there does not exist any agreed
+criterion or proof
+Further, it is asserted by some that Good is either
+the Choice
+But neither is the good the choiceworthy. For this
+is either external to us or in connexion with us. But
+if it is external to us either it produces in us a soothing
+motion and a welcome condition and a delightful
+feeling, or it does not affect us at all. And if it is not
+a delight to us it will not be good,
+so that what is choiceworthy in itself cannot be external. Nor can it be +personal to us. For it is said to belong either to the +body alone or to the soul alone or to both. But if it +belongs to the body alone, it will elude our perception; +for our perceptions are said to be properties of the +soul, and they assert that the body, viewed by itself, +is irrational. And if it should be said to extend to +the soul also, it would seem to be choiceworthy owing +to its affecting the soul and to the agreeable feeling +therein; for, according to them, what is judged to +be choiceworthy is judged by the intellect and not +by the irrational body.
+There remains the alternative that the good is in
+the soul only. But this, too, is impossible if we go by
+the statements of the Dogmatists. For the soul is,
+perhaps, actually non-existent;
+But, to pass over these objections, in what manner +does the good, according to them, come about in the +soul? For certainly, if Epicurus makes the End consist +in pleasure and asserts that the soul, like all else, +is composed of atoms, it is impossible to explain how +in a heap of atoms there can come about pleasure and +assent or judgement that this object is choiceworthy +and good, that object to be avoided and evil.
+Again, the Stoics declare that goods of the soul
+are certain arts, namely the virtues. And an art,
+they say, is ‟a system composed of co-exercised
+apprehensions,”
+For it is perfect nonsense to say
+that Plato’s imaginary construction of the soul—I
+mean the mixture of the indivisible and the divisible
+essence and of the nature of the Other and of the
+Same,
+But if the good is not choice itself, and +what is choiceworthy in itself neither exists externally +nor belongs to either body or soul—as I have argued, +—then there does not exist at all any natural good.
+For the foregoing reasons also there exists no +natural evil. For things which seem to some to be +evil are pursued as goods by others—for instance, +incontinence, injustice, avarice, intemperance, and the +like. Hence, if it is the nature of things naturally +existent to move all men alike, whereas the things +said to be evil do not move all alike, nothing is +naturally evil.
+Similarly there is nothing naturally indifferent,
+because of the divergence of opinion about things
+indifferent. The Stoics, for example, assert that of
+the indifferents some are preferred, some rejected,
+and others neither preferred nor rejected,
+Some, however, maintain that none of the indifferents is by nature preferred or +rejected; for, owing to the differences in the circumstances, +each of the indifferents appears at one time +preferred, at another rejected. For certainly, they +argue, if the rich were being threatened with attack +by a tyrant while the poor were being left in peace, +everyone would prefer to be poor rather than rich, so +that wealth would be a thing rejected.
+Consequently,since of each of the so-called indifferents some say +that it is good, others bad, whereas all alike would +have counted it indifferent had it been naturally +indifferent, there is nothing that is naturally +indifferent.
+So also, should anyone declare that courage is
+naturally choiceworthy because lions seem to be
+naturally bold and courageous, bulls too, it may be,
+and some men and cocks, we reply that, as for that,
+cowardice also is one of the things naturally choiceworthy,
+since deer and hares and many other animals
+are naturally impelled thereto. The majority of
+men, too, show themselves to be cowardly; for it is
+rare for a man to give himself up to death for the sake
+of his country,
+Hence, also, the Epicureans suppose themselves to +have proved that pleasure is naturally choiceworthy; +for the animals, they say, as soon as they are born, +when still unperverted, seek after pleasure and avoid +pains.
+But to these we may reply that what is productive +of evil cannot be naturally good; but pleasure +is productive of evils; for to every pleasure there is +linked a pain, and pain, according to them, is a natural +evil. Thus, for example, the drunkard feels pleasure +when filling himself with wine, and the glutton with +food, and the lecher in immoderate sexual intercourse, +yet these things are productive of both poverty and +sickness, which, as they say, are painful and evil. +Pleasure, therefore, is not a natural good.
+Similarly, too, what is productive of good is not naturally evil, +and pains bring about pleasures; it is, in fact, by toil +that we acquire knowledge, and it is thus also that +a man becomes possessed both of wealth and of his +lady-love, and pains preserve health. Toil, then, is +not naturally evil. Indeed if pleasure were naturally +good, and toil bad, all men, as we said, would have +been similarly disposed towards them, whereas we +see many of the philosophers choosing toil and +hardship and despising pleasure.
+And so, too, those who assert that the virtuous life
+is naturally good might be refuted by the fact that
+some of the sages choose the life which includes
+pleasure,
+And perhaps it may not be amiss, in addition to +what has been said, to dwell more in detail, though +briefly, on the notions concerning things shameful and +not shameful, unholy and not so, laws and customs, +piety towards the gods, reverence for the departed, +and the like. For thus we shall discover a great +variety of belief concerning what ought or ought not +to be done.
+For example,
+And what wonder, when both the adherents of the Cynic
+philosophy and the followers of Zeno of Citium,
+Cleanthes and Chrysippus, declare that this practice
+is indifferent?
+Moreover, prostitution is with us a shameful and disgraceful
+thing, but with many of the Egyptians it is highly
+esteemed; at least, they say that those women who
+have the greatest number of lovers wear an ornamental
+ankle-ring as a token of their proud position.
+Moreover, with us tattooing is held to be shameful +and degrading, but many of the Egyptians and +Sarmatians tattoo their offspring.
+Also, it is a shameful thing with us for men to wear earrings, but +amongst some of the barbarians, like the Syrians, it is +a token of nobility. And some, by way of marking +their nobility still further, pierce the nostrils also of +their children and suspend from them rings of silver +or gold—a thing which nobody with us would do,
+just as no man here would dress himself in a flowered
+robe reaching to the feet, although this dress, which
+with us is thought shameful, is held to be highly
+respectable by the Persians. And when, at the Court
+of Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily, a dress of this
+description was offered to the philosophers Plato and
+Aristippus,
+
+but Aristippus accepted it, saying—
+
+
+Thus, even in the case of these sages, while the one of
+them deemed this practice shameful, the other did
+not.
+And with us it is sinful to marry one’s mother
+or one’s own sister ; but the Persians, and especially
+those of them who are reputed to practise wisdom—
+namely, the Magi,—marry their mothers; and the
+Egyptians
+
+Moreover, Zeno of Citium says that it is not amiss for
+a man to rub his mother’s private part with his own
+private part, just as no one would say it was bad for
+him to rub any other part of her body with his hand.
+Chrysippus,
+Masturbation, too, which we count loathsome, +is not disapproved by Zeno; and we +are informed that others, too, practise this evil as +though it were a good thing.
+Moreover, the eating of human flesh is sinful with
+us, but indifferent amongst whole tribes of
+barbarians.
+And with most of us it is sinful to defile an altar of a god with human blood,
+but the Laconians lash themselves fiercely over the
+altar of Artemis Orthosia
+Adulterers are, of course, punished by law with us, but amongst some
+peoples
+With us, also, the law enjoins that the fathers
+should receive due care from their children; but the
+Scythians cut their throats when they get to be
+over sixty years old. And what wonder, seeing that
+Cronos cut off his father’s genitals with a sickle, and
+Zeus plunged Cronos down to Tartarus, and Athena
+with the help of Hera and Poseidon attempted to
+bind her father with fetters?
+Moreover, Cronos decided to destroy his own children, and Solon gave +the Athenians the law ‟concerning things immune,” +by which he allowed each man to slay his own child; +but with us the laws forbid the slaying of children. +The Roman lawgivers also ordain that the children +are subjects and slaves of their fathers, and that power +over the children’s property belongs to the fathers +and not the children, until the children have obtained +their freedom like bought slaves; but this custom is +rejected by others as being despotic.
+It is the law, too, that homicides should be punished; but gladiators +when they kill often receive actual commendation. +Moreover, the laws prevent the striking of free men; +yet when athletes strike free men, and often even +kill them, they are deemed worthy of rewards and +crowns.
+With us, too, the law bids each man to
+have one wife, but amongst the Thracians and
+Gaetulians (a Libyan tribe)
+Piracy, too, is with us illegal and criminal,
+but with many of the barbarians it is not disapproved.
+Indeed they say that the Cilicians used to regard it
+as a noble pursuit, so that they held those who died
+in the course of piracy to be worthy of honour. So
+too Nestor—in the poet’s account
+
+Yet, if piracy had been an improper thing, he would
+not have welcomed them in this friendly way, because
+of his suspicion that they might be people of that
+kind.
+Moreover, thieving is with us illegal and criminal; +yet those who declare that Hermes is a most thievish +god cause this practice to be accounted not criminal— +for how could a god be bad? And some say that the +Laconians also punished those who thieved, not +because they had thieved, but because they had been +found out.
+Moreover, the coward and the man
+who throws away his shield are in many places
+punished by law; and this is why the Laconian
+mother, when giving a shield to her son as he set
+out for the war, said, ‟Either with this, my child, or
+upon it.” Yet Archilochus,
+
+And the Amazons
+So it is that, in regard to justice and +injustice and the excellence of manliness, there is a +great variety of opinion.
+Around all matters of religion and_ theology
+also, there rages violent controversy.
+Some, too, hold that he cares for human affairs, others
+that he does not so care; for Epicurus declares that
+‟what is blessed and incorruptible neither feels trouble
+itself nor causes it to others.” Hence ordinary people
+differ also, some saying that there is one god, others
+that there are many gods and of various shapes;
+in fact, they even come to share the notions of the
+Egyptians
+Hence, too, sacrificial usages, and the ritual of worship +in general, exhibit great diversity. For things +which are in some cults accounted holy are in others +accounted unholy. But this would not have been so +if the holy and the unholy existed by nature. Thus, +for example, no one would sacrifice a pig to Sarapis, +but they sacrifice it to Heracles and Asclepius. To +sacrifice a sheep to Isis is forbidden, but it is offered +up in honour of the so-called Mother of the gods +and of other deities.
+To Cronos
+And I might add a host of similar instances, but I +forbear since my aim is to be brief. Yet surely, if a +sacrifice had been holy by nature or unholy, it would +have been deemed so by all men alike.
+Examples similar to these may also be found in +the religious observances with regard to human diet.
+For a Jew or an Egyptian priest
+And no one would bring an onion
+Yet, amongst others, these things
+are indifferent. Eating dog’s flesh, too, is thought
+by us to be sinful, but some of the Thracians are
+reported to be dog-eaters. Possibly this practice was
+customary also amongst the Greeks; and on this
+account Diocles, too, starting from the practices of
+the Asclepiadae,
+Yet, if the rules +of ritual and of unlawful foods had existed by nature, +they would have been observed by all men alike.
+A similar account may be given of reverence
+towards the departed.
+The fish-eating tribes of the Ethiopians cast them
+into the lakes, there to be devoured by the fish; the
+Hyrcanians
+And some of the barbarians
+Some, too, believe death itself to be dreadful and
+horrible, others do not. Thus Euripides says:
+
+And Epicurus declares:
+And Heracleitus
+
+These lines, too, spring from the same sentiment:
+
+We know, too, the facts about Cleobis and Biton
+which Herodotus
+It is reported, also, that some of the
+Thracians sit round the new-born babe and chant
+dirges.
+The same method of treatment may be applied also
+to each of the other customs, which we have not now
+described owing to the summary character of our
+exposition. And even if, in regard to some of them,
+we are unable to declare their discrepancy offhand,
+we ought to observe that disagreement concerning
+them may possibly exist amongst certain nations that
+are unknown to us.
+For just as, if we had been
+ignorant, say, of the custom amongst the Egyptians
+of marrying sisters,
+Accordingly, the Sceptic, seeing so great a diversity
+of usages, suspends judgement as to the natural
+existence of anything good or bad or (in general) fit
+or unfit to be done, therein abstaining from the rashness
+of dogmatism;
+for though, as a human being, he +suffers emotion through his senses, yet because he +does not also opine that what he suffers is evil by +nature, the emotion he suffers is moderate. For the +added opinion that a thing is of such a kind is worse +than the actual suffering itself, just as sometimes the +patients themselves bear a surgical operation, while +the bystanders swoon away because of their opinion +that it is a horrible experience.
+But, in fact, he who assumes that there exists by nature something good +or bad or, generally, fit or unfit to be done, is disquieted +in various ways. For when he experiences +what he regards as natural evils he deems himself to +be pursued by Furies, and when he becomes possessed +of what seems to him good things he falls into no +ordinary state of disquiet both through arrogance and +through fear of losing them, and through trying to +guard against finding himself again amongst what he +regards as natural evils;
+for those who assert that goods
+are incapable of being lost
For the present, then, this account of things good, +evil, and indifferent is sufficient.
+It is plain from what has been said above that there
+can be no art of living.
+Yet, even if they were
+all to agree in assuming that the art of living is one
+—such as, for example, the celebrated ‟prudence”
+whereof the Stoics dream, and which seems to be
+more convincing than all the rest,—even so equally
+absurd results will follow. For since ‟prudence” is a
+virtue, and the Sage alone was in possession of virtue,
+the Stoics, not being sages,
+And in general, since, according
+to them, no art
Thus, for example, they declare that art is ‟a
+composite of apprehensions,” and apprehension is ‟assent
+to an apprehensive impression.”
+And herein, too, the procedure of the Stoics,
+in presenting the notion of the apprehensive impression,
+is logically unsound; for in stating, on the one
+hand, that an apprehensive impression is that which
+is derived from a real object,
+Another argument is this. Every art appears to +be apprehended by means of its own special products, +but there is no special product of the art of living; +for anything you might mention as its product—such +as honouring parents, paying back deposits, and all +the rest—is found to be common to ordinary folk +as well. Therefore no art of living exists. For we +shall not ascertain (as some assert) from the apparent +derivation of some speech or operation of the prudent +man from a state of prudence that it is a product of +prudence.
+For the state of prudence itself is inapprehensible,
+not being directly apparent either of itself or
+from its products, these being common to ordinary folk
+as well. And to say that we apprehend the possessor
+of the art of living by the unvarying quality of his
+actions
+
+There remains the assertion that the art of living +is apprehended by means of those effects which they +describe in their books; and these being numerous +and much alike, I will extract a few of them by way +of examples. Thus, for instance, Zeno, the Master of +their sect, in his treatises, amongst many other statements +regarding the rearing of children, says this: +‟Have carnal knowledge no less and no more of a +favourite than of a non-favourite child, nor of a female +than of a male; favourite or non-favourite, males or +females, no different conduct, but the same, befits +and is befitting to all alike.”
+And as concerns piety
+towards parents, the same man states,
+And he proceeds, in the same treatises, to introduce amongst us cannibalism,
+And in his book On Duty he says expressly, regarding the burial of +parents: ‟When our parents decease we should use +the simplest forms of burial, as though the body—like +the nails or teeth or hair—were nothing to us, and we +need bestow no care or attention on a thing like it. +Hence, also, men should make use of the flesh, when +it is good, for food, just as also when one of their own +parts, such as the foot, is cut off, it would be proper that +it and the like parts should be so used; but when the +flesh is not good, they should either bury it and leave +it, or burn it up and let the ashes lie, or cast it far away +and pay no more regard to it than to nails or hair.”
+Of such a kind are most of the philosophers’
+theories; but they would not dare to put them into
+practice unless they lived under the laws of the
+Cyclopes or Laestrygones.
+Moreover, if the art of living comes into existence
+in men, it so comes either by nature or through learning
+and teaching. But if it is by nature, then the
+art of living will arise in them either in so far as they
+are men, or in so far as they are not men. Certainly
+not in so far as they are not men; for it is not a fact
+that they are not men. But if it is in so far as they
+are men, then prudence
+Neither, then, in so far as they are men will the art of
+living belong to them. Therefore it does not accrue
+by nature. And again, since they insist that art is
+‟a system of co-exercised apprehensions,”
+But neither is it acquired by teaching and learning. +For in order that these should subsist, three things +must first be agreed upon—the matter which is being +taught, the teacher and the learner, and the method +of learning. But none of these subsists; neither, +then, does teaching.
+Thus, for instance, the matter of instruction is
+either true or false; if false it would not be taught;
+for they assert that falsehood is non-existent, and of
+non-existents there could be no teaching. Nor yet
+if it were said to be true; for we have shown in our
+chapter ‟On the Criterion”
+And the matter taught is either apparent or non-evident. +But if it is apparent, it will not require +teaching; for things apparent appear to all alike. +And if it is non-evident, then, since things non-evident +are, as we have often shown, inapprehensible +owing to the undecided controversy about them, it +will be incapable of being taught; for how could +anyone teach or learn what he does not apprehend? +But if neither the apparent is taught nor the +non-evident, nothing is taught.
+Again, what is taught is either corporeal or +incorporeal, and each of these being either apparent or +non-evident is incapable of being taught, according +to the argument we have just now stated. Nothing, +therefore, is taught.
+Further, either the existent is taught or the non-
+existent. Now the non-existent is not taught; for
+if the non-existent is taught the non-existent will be
+true, since teaching is held to be of things true. And
+if it is true, it will also subsist; for they declare that
+‟a true thing is what subsists and is opposed to
+something.”
+Yet neither is the existent. For if the
+existent is taught, it is taught either in so far as it is
+existent or in so far as it is something else. But if it
+is to be taught in so far as it is existent, it will be one
+of the existing things, and therefore a thing incapable
+of being taught; for teaching ought to proceed
+from certain acknowledged facts which require no
+teaching.
+Nor, in fact, in so far as it is something else. For the existent has +not anything else which is non-existent attached to it, +so that if the existent in so far as it is existent is +not taught, neither will it be taught in so far as it is +something else; for whatsoever thing is attached to +it is existent. And further, whether the existent +thing which, they will say, is taught be apparent or +non-evident, as it is subject to the absurdities we have +stated, it will be incapable of being taught. But if +neither the existent nor the non-existent is taught, +there is nothing that is taught.
+Now with the refutation of this is involved that of
+both the teacher and the learner; though they are
+just as much open to doubt on their own account.
+For either the expert artist teaches the expert, or
+the non-expert the non-expert, or the non-expert the
+expert, or the expert the non-expert. Now the expert
+does not teach the expert; for neither of them, qua
+expert, needs teaching. Nor does the non-expert
+teach the non-expert, any more than the blind can
+lead the blind.
+The only thing left is to say
+that the expert teaches the non-expert; and this,
+too, is a thing impossible. For it is declared to be
+wholly impossible that an expert artist should exist,
+since neither do we see anyone existing spontaneously
+and from birth as an expert, nor does anyone turn
+into an expert from being a non-expert. For either
+one lesson and one apprehension can make an expert
+of the non-expert or they cannot do so at all.
+But if one apprehension makes the non-expert an
+expert, it will be open to us to declare, firstly, that
+art is not a system of apprehensions;
+For in the case of individual men we could not point +to one who, being still a non-expert, will become an +expert by acquiring one additional principle; for no +one, to be sure, has such a command of the numeration +of the principles of each art as to be able to say, +by numbering off the known principles, how many +are still needed to make up the full number of the +principles of the art. So then the learning of one +principle does not make the non-expert an expert.
+But if this is true, seeing that no one acquires all the +principles of the arts at once, but each .one singly, +if at all—this point also being granted by way of +assumption—the man who is said to acquire the principles +of the art one by one will not be termed an +expert; for we recall the conclusion that the learning +of one principle cannot make an expert of the non- +expert. No one, then, becomes an expert from +being a non-expert. Hence, on these grounds too, +the expert artist appears to be non-existent. And +therefore the teacher also.
+Neither can the so-called learner, if he is non-
+expert, learn and apprehend the principles of the art
+wherein he is non-expert. For just as the man who
+is blind from birth, in so far as he is blind, will not
+acquire perception of colours, nor, similarly, he who
+is deaf from birth, of sound,
+But if neither the expert teaches the expert, nor the non-expert the non- +expert, nor the non-expert the expert, nor the expert +the non-expert, and these are all the alternatives +possible, then neither the teacher exists nor the +taught.
+And if neither the learner nor the teacher exists, +the method of teaching also is abolished.
+And it is no less disputed on the following grounds. The method
+of teaching comes to exist either by ocular evidence
+or by speech;
Now teaching does not come by ocular evidence, +since ocular evidence consists in things exhibited. +But what is exhibited is apparent to all; and the +apparent, qua apparent, is perceptible by all; and +what is perceptible by all in common is incapable of +being taught; therefore nothing is capable of being +taught by ocular evidence.
+Nor, in fact, is anything taught by speech. For
+speech either signifies something or signifies nothing.
+But if it signifies nothing, neither will it be capable
+of teaching anything. And if it signifies something,
+it does so either by nature or by convention.
+But it is not significant by nature
+And if it is significant by convention, evidently those who +have grasped beforehand the objects to which the +several words are assigned will perceive those objects, +not through being taught by the words things of +which they were ignorant, but by recollecting and +recovering things which they knew; whereas those +who require to learn what they do not know, and +who are ignorant of the objects to which the words +are assigned, will have no perception of anything.
+Consequently, the method of learning also will be
+incapable of subsisting. For, in fact, the teacher
+ought to impart to the learner an apprehension of
+the principles of the art he is teaching, so that the
+latter by apprehending them as a system may thus
+become an expert artist. But, as we have shown
+above,
+Such, then, are the objections put forward regarding
+learning and teaching in general. And the same
+difficulties may also be alleged in the case of the
+so-called art of living. Thus, for instance, we have
+shown above
+Probably it is superfluous even to refer to the other cases; but if the prudent
+man teaches prudence to the imprudent, and prudence is
+‟knowledge
+But, according to them, imprudence +is certainly not capable of perceiving these +things, since, if it were, the imprudent man will be +prudent. Therefore, according to the definition of +prudence, the imprudent man does not grasp what +is said or done by the prudent. And, as he fails to +grasp, he will not be taught by him, especially since, +as we have said above, he cannot be taught either +by ocular evidence or by means of speech. But, in +fine, if the so-called art of living is not imparted to +anyone either by means of learning and teaching or +by nature, then the art of living, so harped on by +the philosophers, is indiscoverable.
+Yet even were one to grant, as an act of bounty, +that this visionary art of living is imparted to someone, +it will show itself to be hurtful to its possessors, +and a cause of perturbation, rather than beneficial.
+Thus, for instance—to take a few arguments out
+of many by way of example—the art of living might
+be thought to benefit the wise man by furnishing
+him with temperance
+He, then, who is termed by them a temperate sage is called temperate either in
+virtue of his never feeling the impulse towards good
+or repulsion from evil,
+But in respect of his freedom from +bad resolutions he will not be self-controlled; for he +will not control what he does not possess. And just +as one would not call a eunuch temperate in sex- +indulgence, or a man with a poor stomach temperate +in respect of the pleasures of the table (for they feel +no attraction at all towards such things, so that they +might rise superior to the attraction through temperance), +—in the same way we ought not to term the +sage temperate, because he possesses no natural +feeling over which he may exercise control.
+And if they shall claim that he is temperate in virtue
+of his forming bad resolutions but overcoming them
+by reason, then, firstly, they will be admitting that
+prudence was of no benefit to him just when he was
+in a state of perturbation and needed assistance, and,
+secondly, he is found to be even more unfortunate
+than those they term bad.
+though he is perturbed if he is feeling +an impulse, yet ceases from his perturbation if he +gains his desires.
+So, then, the sage does not become temperate in
+virtue of his prudence; or if he does become so, he
+is of all men the most miserable, so that the art of
+living has brought him no benefit but the uttermost
+perturbation. And we have shown above
+We must, then, declare that, if there is no agreement +as to the existence of things good and bad and +indifferent, and the art of living is possibly non- +existent, or—if its existence is provisionally admitted +—brings no benefit to its possessors but, on the +contrary, causes them extreme perturbations, then +the Dogmatists would seem to be vainly puffed up in +respect of the so-called Ethical division of what they +term ‟philosophy.”
+Having now treated of the subject of Ethics also +at sufficient length for an account in outline, +we conclude at this point our third book, and with it the +complete treatise on ‟Pyrrhonean Outlines,” adding +only this final section:
+The Sceptic, being a lover of his kind, desires to
+cure by speech, as best he can, the self-conceit
+and rashness
+and employs those which are weighty and capable by their stringency of +disposing of the Dogmatists' ailment, self-conceit, in +cases where the mischief is due to a severe attack of +rashness, while he employs the milder arguments in +the case of those whose ailment of conceit is superficial and +easy to cure, and whom it is possible to restore to +health by milder methods of persuasion. +Hence the adherent of Sceptic principles does not +scruple to propound at one time arguments that are +weighty in their persuasiveness, and at another time +such as appear less impressive,—and he does so on +purpose, as the latter are frequently sufficient to +enable him to effect his object.