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potential-dos-on-tls-client-renegotiation.md

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name severity cvss-score cvss-vector cwe-id cwe-name compliance
Potential DoS on TLS Client Renegotiation
low
5.3
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
CWE-264
Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls
HIPAA ISO 27001 owasp10 pci PCI v4.0
164.306(a), 164.312(c)(1), 164.312(e)(1)
A.5.14, A.8.9, A.8.24
A2
4.1, 6.5.4
pci4-4.2.1, pci4-6.2.4

The server allows client-initiated renegotiation handshakes. Renegotiation allows a client to negotiate new session parameters, such as a new cipher suite.

When a client starts a new TLS connection, the server will expend more CPU resources than the client. The client may exploit this resource usage asymmetry to launch a DoS attack. It may request a large number of renegotiation attempts until the server runs out of CPU.

The CVE for this type of vulnerability is CVE-2011-1473.

How to fix

{% tabs potential-dos-on-tls-client-renegotiation %} {% tab potential-dos-on-tls-client-renegotiation generic %} TLS 1.3 explicitly forbids renegotiation, since it closes a window of opportunity for an attack.

A strong argument in favor of disabling renegotiation is the fact that none of the world's top 5 sites by traffic allow renegotiation. If they serve most of the world and they don't need renegotiation, the remaining question is: do you really have a valid reason for allowing renegotiation? {% endtab %}

{% endtabs %}