diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-24-face-off-in-arctic.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-24-face-off-in-arctic.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..618cc91a --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-24-face-off-in-arctic.md @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Face-off In Arctic +author: Mathieu Boulegue and Duncan Depledge +date : 2024-05-24 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/dDMQg5n.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "The Face-off in a Fragmented Arctic: Who Will Blink First?" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_As uncertainty grows over the future of cooperation in the Arctic, the risk is that creeping alternatives will harden the dividing lines between Russia and the West._ + + + +With Russia’s war against Ukraine well into its third year, fears of a potential “spillover” into the Arctic remain high. With Sweden and Finland having recently joined NATO, three things become clear. First, there is now de facto “more NATO” in the Arctic. Second, Russia’s fears of strategic encirclement are not going away any time soon. Third, the dividing line between Russia and the West in the Arctic has never been starker – there is now what can be argued to be a “NATO 7 vs Russia” in the region. + +The implications for Arctic cooperation are significant. “Arctic exceptionalism” – the idea that the challenges facing the region encouraged cooperation and not geostrategic competition – which for so long was regarded as the guiding light for relations between the eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the US), has all but dissipated. The principle of “circumpolarity” (the idea that the Arctic 8 should collectively determine the region’s future) has also been eroded. The impact on the Permanent Participants (representing Arctic indigenous peoples) has been largely overlooked. + +The challenges faced by the Arctic Council (the premier forum for regional cooperation) over the past two years are emblematic of the current state of circumpolar affairs. Within weeks of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, seven of the eight member states (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the US) jointly “paused” their involvement in the Council and its affiliated bodies. Around a third of the Council’s 130 projects were reportedly put on hold, with new projects blocked and existing projects unable to be renewed. + +Gradually, the “Arctic 7” have found ways to resume activities with minimal participation from Russia. The handover of the chairship from Russia to Norway in 2023 proceeded smoothly. In February 2024, Norway announced that the Council’s Working Groups, where the organisation’s main work takes place, would be resumed with the participation of all states, including Russia – but only in a virtual format. + +Yet despite these steps to restore critical functions, there is still good reason to be concerned by the Arctic Council’s future prospects. Even as plans for the Working Groups to meet virtually were being drawn up, Moscow announced that it would suspend its annual payments to the Arctic Council until the organisation resumes its work in full. Since 2022, Russia has restricted access to scientific data that is crucial to monitoring climate change, and especially to assessing the potential impact of carbon dioxide and methane “bombs” being released by Russia’s melting permafrost as part of a feedback loop. Such a situation will negatively impact climate change prediction models at large. + +Signs of increasing collaboration in the Arctic between Russia and other members of the so-called BRICS+ (Brazil, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Saudia Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Ethiopia) have prompted further concern that Moscow may be preparing to pursue the commercial exploitation of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) independently of the Arctic 7. With Chinese interests in mind, such a situation could be to Moscow’s long-term detriment, as Beijing might be tempted to impose its own views on Arctic governance. + +___`The fragmentation of circumpolar cooperation is closing doors on diplomatic activity that could help to diffuse tensions and promote confidence-building measure`___ + +Meanwhile, Russia has shown little appetite for addressing circumpolar challenges relating to climate change, the rights of indigenous communities, the management of biodiversity and living resources, environmental pollution, and the threat of radioactive contamination from Soviet-era and current nuclear activities. + +Amid all this uncertainty over the future of Arctic cooperation and whether the Arctic Council can survive (without betraying the West’s commitment to Ukraine), military activity in the region has continued to increase. The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO necessarily requires a re-evaluation of the Alliance’s defence planning across the Wider North (comprising the North Atlantic, Arctic and Baltic). This is likely to become a significant point of contention with Moscow, particularly as it begins to drive the restructuring of commands in the European and Northern theatres, the reconfiguration of forces and deployments, and new patterns of training and exercising. + +Viewed from Moscow, the “enlargement” of NATO closer to Russian borders is feeding a sense of not only vindication but also increased conventional vulnerability. Furthermore, melting ice in the AZRF is no longer a reliable source of protection along Russia’s northern border, which is further strengthening the Kremlin’s Arctic insecurities. Russia’s own Arctic ground forces in the European High North have been largely decimated by war operations in Ukraine, which will continue to divert attention and resources away from the Arctic theatre. + +However, Moscow’s military posture in the Arctic has not changed in the context of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and it remains bent on obsessive control over the AZRF and countering NATO activity. Russia’s vast multi-layered network of Arctic-capable air and coastal defence systems has stayed in place along the AZRF and has not been tremendously impacted by the war against Ukraine. + +In this context – and judging by the sense of conventional vulnerability fuelling Russia’s Arctic insecurities – there is a risk that Moscow could engage in more overt nuclear sabre-rattling and escalatory behaviour. There remains an outside chance that Russia could resume nuclear weapons testing on the islands of Novaya Zemlya. This situation is compounded by the inherent risk of miscalculation provoked by accidents, incidents and tactical errors, left unchecked by the current absence of lines of communication. + +Meanwhile, the fragmentation of circumpolar cooperation is closing doors on diplomatic activity that could help to diffuse tensions and promote confidence-building measures. Prior to 2022, there was some discussion of re-establishing joint military forums or some form of “code of conduct”, but this dissipated quickly as Moscow’s designs on Ukraine became clear. The chances of a predictable Arctic in military security terms are growing slimmer. + +The risk of an armed conflict in the Arctic is clearly higher than it was. However, this does not mean that either NATO or Moscow is any more likely to seek a conflict in the Arctic than they were prior to Russia’s assault on Ukraine. Considering the complexity of the operating environment, there is little incentive for Moscow – or NATO – to escalate in the Arctic per se, let alone conduct high-intensity warfare operations there. + +___`For now, the most likely scenario is that we will continue to see a balancing and counterbalancing of NATO and Russian forces in the High North as both sides adjust to the realities of Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO`___ + +There is no sign yet (publicly at least) that either side is seeking to change the “facts on the ground” regarding critical international agreements, or even press claims in areas of disagreement – for instance, over how to interpret the Svalbard Treaty on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as it applies to the Northeast Passage (including the Northern Sea Route, or NSR) and the delimitation of extended continental shelves. + +Nevertheless, Russia remains determined to control “its” Arctic and the NSR. Over the past few years, successive waves of regulations have increasingly restricted passage through the NSR, placing it under Moscow’s tight control. If, even as the effects of climate change are felt, Russia maintains its dubious interpretation of the status of the NSR, or if the Kremlin seeks to further restrict passage along the route (especially for foreign military vessels), there could be more serious consideration of a US- or NATO-led Freedom of Navigation operation, even if it increases the risk of an armed clash. + +These issues are all the more critical in the context of the renewed US interest in Arctic affairs as part of the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR) and its 2023 Implementation Plan. Indeed, the NSAR is quite clear regarding protecting freedom of navigation across the Arctic region in accordance with UNCLOS. + +For now, the most likely scenario is that we will continue to see a balancing and counterbalancing of NATO and Russian forces in the High North as both sides adjust to the realities of Swedish and Finnish membership of NATO. The danger is that this could increase the risk of a miscalculation provoked by an accident escalating into something worse. More presence and platforms in a changing Arctic will undoubtedly bring about more incidents, including environmental catastrophes and human-made disasters, with indigenous peoples and other local communities bearing the brunt of the impact. + +Beyond that, we anticipate that the Arctic will remain in limbo until one side or the other makes a move to either restore or abandon the Arctic Council, or attempts to press a claim that undermines the commitment that all the Arctic states made in Ilulissat in 2008 (and again in 2018) to resolve their disputes in accordance with international law. The wider risk is that in the absence of a circumpolar approach, creeping alternatives will harden the dividing lines between Russia and the West. + +Neither side currently looks ready to blink first. China, meanwhile, may seek to exploit the fragmentation of Arctic governance to push for its own “free for all” approach. All the while, human insecurity and climate breakdown in the Arctic look set to worsen. + +--- + +__Mathieu Boulegue__ is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Polar Institute, a Consulting Fellow at Chatham House and a Non-resident Senior Fellow at CEPA. + +__Duncan Depledge__ is a Senior Lecturer in Geopolitics and Security at Loughborough University. He is an Associate Fellow of RUSI, where he previously worked on the Climate Change and Security Programme. In this role, he focused primarily on analysing how climate change is impacting global and regional dynamics of security and geopolitics, especially in the Arctic. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-beyond-deadlock.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-beyond-deadlock.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d8fff5e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-beyond-deadlock.md @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Beyond Deadlock +author: Sultan Barakat and Antonio Giustozzi +date : 2024-05-30 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/YNAyAfc.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Opportunities for Western Engagement with the Taliban" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_This paper highlights the Taliban’s perceptions, agendas and modes of operation to aid understanding of how to move forward with the question of future engagement with the Taliban._ + + + +While international media attention is currently diverted to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, the question of whether to engage with the Taliban’s de facto government remains a contentious topic actively deliberated in Western diplomatic circles. Rather than examining the merits of engaging (or not) with the Taliban, this Emerging Insights paper highlights the Taliban’s perceptions, agendas and modes of operation in order to gain a better understanding of how to move forward with the question of future engagement with the Taliban. The paper is specifically aimed at informing Western policymakers and is not intended to cover the wider spectrum of the Taliban’s perceptions of the external world, nor does it aim to analyse the group’s foreign policymaking. Thus, notwithstanding their undoubted importance, the paper does not cover the Taliban’s relations with Afghanistan’s neighbours. + + +### INTRODUCTION + +This paper is informed by recent research on the Taliban’s more than two years in government, supported by tens of meetings and interviews with Taliban officials and leaders, dating from well before August 2021 and up to the present day. Identities and all data emerging from these exchanges are either anonymised or unattributed, as specific sources cannot be identified. + +The paper has two main sections. The first section discusses the Taliban’s perception of Western countries and the second outlines the Taliban agenda towards Western countries. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications for Western powers of engaging with the Taliban. + + +### UNDERSTANDING THE TALIBAN PERCEPTION OF THE WEST + +#### RESENTMENT AND SUSPICION + +After more than two years of diplomatic negotiations and exchanges, the Taliban are sceptical about the value of engaging with the West. “We have had open discussion with many political figures over the past two years, diplomats and UN officials, but we see little progress as a result”, says one senior Taliban member. Still, this does not mean that the Taliban have given up on building bridges with the West – not yet. The Taliban recognises the Doha agreement of February 2020 as the main document regulating their relations with the US and by extension all Western countries, as the agreement refers to “the United States, its allies, and the Coalition”. Disagreements over the implementation of that agreement fuel Taliban distrust of the US and its allies – as well as US distrust of the Taliban. The US has repeatedly accused the Taliban of not having fully implemented the terms of the agreement, in particular with regard to their handling of groups linked to Al-Qaeda. + +The Doha agreement was rather imprecisely worded, asking the Taliban not to allow “any of its members, other individuals or groups, including al-Qa’ida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies”, to “prevent them from recruiting, training, and fundraising” and not to “host them” (note that the term “ally” lends itself to conflicting interpretations). It also asked the Taliban to “send a clear message that those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies have no place in Afghanistan” and to “instruct members of the … Taliban not to cooperate with groups or individuals threatening the security of the United States and its allies”. + +Perhaps more importantly, the US State Department is silent on whether the agreement still stands. The State Department has been vocal about the Taliban’s treatment of women and other rights issues, while gradually becoming more positive about the Taliban’s handling of foreign jihadists. + +The Taliban responded that, according to the Doha agreement: + +- The US was supposed to “initiate an administrative review of current U.S. sanctions and the rewards list against members of the … Taliban with the goal of removing these sanctions by August 27, 2020”, and that this did not happen. + +- The US was further supposed to “start diplomatic engagement with other members of the United Nations Security Council and Afghanistan to remove members of the … Taliban from the sanctions list with the aim of achieving this objective by May 29, 2020”, and that this did not happen either. + +- The US also committed to “refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan or intervening in its domestic affairs”. The Taliban claim is that the US is continually putting pressure on them on these matters. + +The Taliban also argue that the freezing of National Bank funds violates the spirit of the Doha agreement, as does the fact that the US continues to fly drones over Afghanistan. Sources were keen to stress this point, and claimed that leaders in the Taliban felt intimidated by the continuous drone surveillance, which some of them took as a sign of US bad faith. Some leaders argue that this unfriendly behaviour plays into the hands of hardliners opposed to engaging with the West, pushing pragmatists to prioritise internal Taliban unity over efforts to marginalise the hardliners. + +While there is a degree of defensiveness in evidence here, and there are other, perhaps more important, reasons why the hardliners gradually gained influence from September 2021, it is at least plausible that the more threatened the Taliban feel, and the more distrust towards Western countries there is within their ranks, the easier it will be for Taliban hostile to engaging with Western countries to impose their line. + +After more than 20 years of war, the Taliban’s distrust of Western countries (and vice versa) comes as no surprise. But it is, nonetheless, one factor contributing to why Afghanistan’s de facto government has so far shown little to no interest in responding to calls by foreign governments and institutions for policy change – with the assumption being that such governments and institutions cannot be trusted to reward Taliban concessions in any substantial way. The Taliban maintain that the centrality of Sharia Law to their system of governance is non-negotiable, and they also have their own ways of determining which interpretation of Sharia Law applies in a given case, with the prime authority in the field resting with the Taliban’s Amir, Haibatullah Akhundzada (who is the leader of the Taliban movement but does not have a formal role in the Taliban government). + +One noteworthy example of how Taliban distrust can have the effect of harming the Taliban themselves is the recent failure of the so-called “Doha II” meeting of 18 February 2024, when special envoys for Afghanistan gathered to discuss the report prepared by UN Special Coordinator Feridun Sinirlioğlu. Although the intention was to map a path towards the normalisation of relations, the Taliban interpreted the recommendation to appoint a UN special envoy for Afghanistan as an attempt to humiliate them. They also took exception to civil society representatives seemingly being accorded the same status as the Taliban at the meeting. Then, when it emerged that the UN Secretary-General would not chair the meeting with the Taliban, they took it as a snub (notwithstanding that Antonio Guterres could not meet the unrecognised de facto government in any case). Attempts to find an approach acceptable to the Taliban failed after the UN’s final proposal arrived too late for the Taliban’s slow policymaking arrangements, which required it to make the rounds between Kabul and Kandahar, gaining the acceptance of all the Taliban’s heavyweights. The end result was that the Taliban did not attend the meeting. + +#### SENSITIVITIES ABOUT CRITICISM + +The Taliban are especially proud of what they view as having achieved stability in Afghanistan and ending the very long war that began in 1978. State collapse, feared by many, has been averted and the Taliban have undoubtedly proven able to provide basic security. They consider this the main source of legitimacy of the new regime. Ordinary Afghans, they say, now enjoy the freedom to move around the country without risking their lives. “Many people have been able to visit their home villages for the first time in decades”, said one member. The Taliban also express irritation that among foreign diplomats there has either been no acknowledgement of their achievement of what they describe as the “neutralisation of the IS-K [Islamic State in Khorasan] threat” without external help, or, if the achievement is acknowledged, it is immediately undermined by what they see as a litany of complaints about the Taliban’s lack of respect for the rights of minorities and women. It seems clear that in the expectations of many Taliban, the group’s role in containing IS-K and averting state collapse should offset the other concerns of Western countries. + +Taliban leaders and officials say that they appreciate receiving advice, but remark that “there is a big difference between advice given by your enemy and advice given by a friend”, implying that Western countries are not “friends”. These words from another senior member of the Taliban show how the distrust for Western countries is apparent: + +> What we don’t appreciate is when the West and in particular the US occupies the moral higher ground and start[s] issuing advice to the IEA [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] on issues of human rights and freedoms – as if we don’t see and hear about their practices in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world – look what is going on in Gaza as we speak. + +The Taliban also harbour resentment about public criticism in the diplomatic arena: + +> When you advise someone with good faith, the advice and the way it is delivered must be peaceful and preferably confidential. One does it to receive reward from Allah and not to score goals or humiliate the other side. However, if the advice is public and confrontational, then the Taliban movement considers it offensive. + +The Taliban’s extreme sensitivity to public criticism is hardly unique – most governments would be sensitive – but theirs is likely reinforced by the sense of insecurity derived from their lack of diplomatic training and relative lack of experience in navigating the diplomatic arena. An additional factor, perhaps even more important, is that in the constant intra-Taliban tussle over competing foreign policy lines, Taliban interlocutors with Western countries feel humiliated by external criticism, which they believe undermines them in the eyes of their more sceptical colleagues. + +Conversely, the Taliban are often thirsty for Western appreciation. The July to October 2023 World Bank reports, for example, were greatly appreciated by some Taliban for their positive assessment of the financial and economic trends in Afghanistan. This illustrates how the Taliban – particularly the pragmatists among them – value acknowledgement and commendations. They interpreted the reports as a sign of political appreciation and as a rare piece of evidence of external appreciation that they can show to their more isolationist colleagues. + +Diverging foreign policy views among the Taliban could explain why, at a surface level, the Taliban have appeared resistant to taking advice from any source, Western or otherwise, public or private. Individual Taliban leaders and groups within the Taliban are reported by their colleagues to be willing to listen to advice from different sources – Qatar, the UAE, China or even in some cases the CIA – but contradictory pieces of advice tend to offset each another, resulting in little movement in policy terms. + +#### WHY THE TALIBAN THINK THEY NEED TO ENGAGE WITH THE WEST + +The Taliban tend to deny courting external support, while at the same time seeking it in certain circumstances. For example, senior Taliban contacted for this paper say that the main reason for the April 2022 ban on the cultivation, production and trade of drugs was awareness of the devastation that hard drugs were bringing to Afghanistan itself, as well as the fact that Sharia Law bans the consumption of narcotics. However, the desire for external support is evident when they suggest, to one of the authors but also to foreign diplomats, that help in dealing with the large quantity of drug addicts in the country and providing alternative livelihoods to opium farmers would be welcomed. + +The Taliban also argue that consolidating an improved security situation depends on “improving people’s livelihoods and in particular new employment opportunities for young men from rural areas”, as a senior figure put it to one of the authors. The need for economic progress in Afghanistan is one of the main rationales for external engagement in the eyes of the Taliban. However, there is little readiness to accept trade-offs that might include what many Taliban consider external interference in their internal decision-making. The Taliban are, nevertheless, beginning to implement plans to open Afghanistan’s mining sector to investment, not least to encourage Western investment to counterbalance the expected heavy Chinese investment in the Afghan economy. + + +### THE TALIBAN’S AGENDA + +#### TALIBAN RIGIDITIES AND SOME EVOLUTION + +There is no question that the Taliban suffer from multiple rigidities in their policymaking. Some of these may be “ideological rigidities”, either genuine ones embedded in the Taliban’s origins, or ones rooted in the fear of being overtaken by more extreme groups. Others may have more to do with power struggles and internal competition among groups and leaders. Others still may be understood simply as a demonstration of sovereignty, a result of the Taliban’s desire to show that they are in charge. + +For example, Taliban pragmatists and modernists claim that the suspension of women’s and girls’ education, in high schools in September 2021 and in universities in December 2022, is the result of pressures from a minority group of ultra-conservative leaders, mostly concentrated in Kandahar, who genuinely believe that previous arrangements were not compliant with Sharia Law, and who have the support of the Amir. This is despite the fact that the policy is rather unpopular, even among Taliban themselves. Many Taliban officials say they do not take very seriously the view of figures such as Justice Minister Abdul Hakim Haqqani, who believe that jihad (intended as “mobilisation for struggle”) should continue until the establishment of a fully Islamic order – that is, a system of government very rigidly based on an institutionalised version of the Taliban’s understanding of Islam. For them, the jihad ended the moment Kabul fell in August 2021. However, even these Taliban justify the implementation of such policies with another ideological statement: that revolt against the “legitimate Amir” without “legitimate justification” (which can only be the Amir’s disbelief in Allah) is not permissible under Sharia Law. The Amir must, therefore, be obeyed even when he is “unjust”. Importantly, obedience to the Amir is also seen as key to the Taliban’s unity and, as one member explains, “our success rests on staying united”. + +In other areas, Taliban have claimed that some policy decisions were dictated less by their own convictions than by the desire to counter propaganda claims from IS-K that the Taliban have sold out to the West. This could of course be an excuse to justify policy shifts that many Taliban officials might find it difficult to justify otherwise, such as the suspension of women’s rights to education. There are, nonetheless, cases where this perceived vulnerability might have genuinely contributed to reshaping policy. In interviews with low-level officials of the Taliban Emirate in 2021–23, the Taliban clearly appeared to be concerned about some of their disgruntled members being attracted to IS-K. One example of this potentially having influenced policy is the decision to fully apply Sharia Law in criminal matters and the growing rigidity shown towards the Shia community from summer 2023 onwards, as Taliban failure to implement Sharia Law and the group’s courteous relations with the Shia community had been two key points of IS-K propaganda. + +Assessing the role of ideology in Taliban policymaking also requires consideration of the issue of intra-Taliban competition. While there are certainly many ultra-conservative ulema (senior clerics) within the Taliban, it is far from clear that the Amir is ideologically aligned with them. His record in 2016–21 was eminently pragmatic – see, for example, his willingness to accept Russian support for the Taliban in 2016, at the peak of the Russian intervention in Syria, despite widespread opposition within the leadership. This raises the issue of to what extent the Amir may be using the fatwas of his ulema to undermine those Taliban leaders who try to bypass his authority, including by reaching out to Western diplomats without his consent (as happened repeatedly in 2021–22). It is worth noting that, typically, suspensions of girls’ education rights came within days of meetings between Taliban officials and Western diplomats. + +Whatever is driving these rigidities, they are primarily endogenous factors that have had a major impact on how the Taliban interact with the rest of the world, even though they primarily concern the Emirate’s internal affairs. Evolution, or softening, is not impossible, however. The Taliban’s cautious approach towards foreign jihadists based in Afghanistan is an example. In the face of obvious IS-K attempts to attract foreign jihadists away from the Taliban, the Emirate was unwilling to put more than moderate pressure on the Pakistanis of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), despite very strong demands from Islamabad. The reason appears clear: the TTP’s thousands of fighters could destabilise eastern Afghanistan if they allied with IS-K. However, the Emirate placed the much smaller Uighur and Uzbek jihadist contingents under strict surveillance and then forced them to relocate, estimating that the damage caused by defections to IS-K would be limited, and aiming to win praise from Beijing and Tashkent. + +There are other examples. In September 2023, the Taliban responded to an incident in Sweden in which the Qur’an was burned by freezing all Swedish aid activities. One Taliban member commented: + +> It may not have been sanctioned by the government, [but] the only option for us is to sanction all Swedish activities. Having done that, we have done our very best to protect the property and personnel of Swedish aid organisations in the country, but we cannot go against the will of the Afghan people who feel badly hurt as a result of [this incident]. + +More recently, however, the Taliban have taken care not to be seen as promoting mobilisation in favour of Hamas in Gaza, for example, despite the issue being strongly felt by many within their ranks. This can probably be read as a signal to the West. Overall, the impression is of a Taliban leadership that is juggling its political capital, combining a rigid approach on some ideological issues related to internal affairs with considerable pragmatism on other issues, especially those related to the prospects of economic growth. They appear to have judged that dropping any kind of support for jihadist movements abroad will not hurt or impact them much, except in the case of the TTP in Pakistan. + +It is important to note, moreover, that despite their rigidities the Taliban do have a track record of sometimes responding positively to lobbying from NGOs, tribal and local elders, and even neighbouring countries – although at the centre, the rigidities appear harder to negotiate. Low-profile, discreet messaging appears to be more effective in influencing Taliban policymaking, while public statements, threats and ultimatums are generally rejected. + +#### TALIBAN UNDERSTANDINGS OF INCLUSION + +Greater inclusion of a variety of ethnic, religious and political groups in the Taliban government is a key demand not only of Western countries, but also of most neighbouring countries. When the Taliban are asked about inclusion today, they defend themselves by noting that their critics did not seem concerned with inclusion when the Taliban were entirely purged from the state apparatus in 2001. In comparison, they argue, the Taliban’s de facto government has at least retained most officials from the previous regime, such that the ministerial machinery mostly continues to function in the same way as before. In fact, junior officials were largely retained, while senior-level managers have been replaced, which leaves the issue of inclusiveness to a large extent unaddressed. The Taliban say that they are even retaining officials once linked to parties opposed to the Taliban, and that they make every effort to pay the salaries of officials on time (albeit at a considerably reduced rate), while many members of the Taliban themselves experience major delays. There is evidence that civilian officials do get paid, while, according to interviews, salaries to Taliban in the armed forces are often paid irregularly. + +With regard to specific communities, Taliban perceptions often represent an obstacle to a more inclusive government. The Taliban are dismissive about the possibility of ethnic tensions, both within Afghanistan and among the Taliban themselves. Sources quoted Interior Minister Serajuddin Haqqani’s assessment that “there are no racial and linguistic prejudices in the nation and the Islamic Emirate will not allow anyone to do this. People should be assured that there is full unity between the ethnic groups of Afghanistan”. Taliban with whom the authors met claimed to have recently defused conflict between Kuchi nomads and Hazara settlers in Behsud in Wardak province, and noted that they had recently invited Shia leaders, such as two of the most prominent leaders of Shia parties, Karim Khalili and Haji Mohaqeq, to return to Afghanistan. They seemed oblivious to the worsening of relations with the Shia community following clashes during Ashura observances in summer 2023, and to deteriorating relations between Pashtuns on one side and Uzbeks and Tajiks on the other, including among the Taliban themselves. + +Ultimately, the Taliban consider any debate about the system of government to be settled. In their view, the Islamic Emirate – an authoritarian system with the Taliban movement at its centre – is the solution, and the so-called “hybrid system”, bringing together elements of the 1990s Emirate and the Islamic Republic or even the monarchy (which was abolished in 1973) – which was still being discussed in the weeks following the Taliban takeover – is no longer under consideration. In reality, however, the Emirate system remains poorly defined, especially with regard to the distribution of powers and governance. Nevertheless, the firmly held belief is that the Islamic Emirate system “served the Taliban well during two decades of war” and, in the words of one contact, the pragmatists find it “difficult to convince leaders that something else might be more suitable for peacetime”. + +External demands to revisit this issue are considered interference in the internal affairs of the de facto government and are rejected. The Taliban acknowledge that lack of inclusiveness is still a problem, both in private and – more obliquely – in public. But they deny that there is any wish or intent on the part of the Taliban to discriminate against any particular ethnic group. Further, they intend to resolve this lack of inclusiveness in their own way: by incorporating individuals from different communities and rejecting the inclusion of organised groups. Actors such as former president Hamid Karzai and former CEO Dr Abdullah, who have been lobbying for greater political inclusiveness in Kabul, appear marginalised today. Political parties that were promised government positions immediately following the Taliban takeover, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami, had all but lost hope by October 2022. As of January 2024, there was only a handful of non-Taliban individuals at the top levels of government. An exact head count is difficult, as some avowedly non-Taliban individuals may have entertained discreet relations with the Taliban in the past, as is alleged in relation to Minister of Commerce Nooruddin Azizi and the minister of health, Qalandar Ibad. There are also five deputy ministers with no confirmed links to the Taliban: Sheikh Madar Ali Karimi Bamyani (urban development and land), Abdul Latif Nazari (economy), Hassan Ghiasi (health), Mohammad Azim Sultanzada and Mohammad Bashir (commerce). + +#### SEEKING ACCEPTANCE AS AN AUTHORITARIAN “PROBLEM SOLVER” + +The Taliban are aware that much of the wider region is ruled by authoritarian governments. Hence it is likely that they feel there is no particular reason for their own authoritarian regime not to be accepted too. + +Indeed, Taliban sources argue that their success in stabilising the Afghan economy derives from their “power to assert sovereignty” against local, factional, sectarian and tribal/ethnic interests. One example of this assertion of sovereignty, a senior figure explained, is the ban on the use of other currencies for trade within Afghanistan. The Taliban also point to their success in banning the production of drugs, including methamphetamine, as a sign of their ability to act as a result of their “assertion of sovereignty”. In other words, the Taliban believe they have demonstrated that their strong-handed approach works in their operating environment. + +The difference between the conservatives and the pragmatists is that in the latter’s view, the Taliban will in practice need to tackle particular issues, such as gender discrimination and inclusiveness – at least to some degree – before achieving full international acceptance, gaining diplomatic recognition and obtaining external aid. The conservatives, on the other hand, believe that to gain international acceptance, the Taliban simply need to demonstrate staying power and the ability to keep Afghanistan together. + + +### CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ENGAGEMENT + +The attitudes of Western countries towards engaging with the Taliban’s de facto government of Afghanistan vary, although a majority of governments now appear to favour some level of engagement, while staying away from formal recognition. Those governments favouring engagement must contend with: + +- The Taliban’s notions about the West, and the context of mutual distrust and mutual flawed perceptions. + +- The Taliban’s determination to retain the Emirate model of government. + +- Diverging strategic views among Taliban leaders. + +Distrust and misperceptions are inevitable after 20 years of war. One such misperception is about the degree to which the Taliban are being “ideological”. Some of what is usually viewed as ideological rigidity are in fact political tactics, which derive from the Taliban’s insecurity or from their internal power struggles. + +A more substantial and probably more long-term issue is the fact that the Taliban have seemingly given up altogether on political inclusion, which remains a key demand of most Western and neighbouring countries. Similarly, the Taliban do not even try to portray themselves as anything other than authoritarian, and they make it clear that this is not going to change. Therefore, even if in future engagement is unlocked by progress on female education, this engagement will remain limited – especially compared to the billions of dollars of development aid Afghanistan received before 2021 – and so any impact will only be seen in the medium and long term, and will be diluted over time. Another hard reality, however, is that any collapse of the state in Afghanistan, or a deepening economic crisis, would drive hundreds of thousands more Afghans to migrate or seek asylum westwards. This raises the question of how wise it is for European countries to delay engagement. + +Some positive signalling could be useful to keep doors open and to strengthen the position of those Taliban pragmatists who believe that good relations with Western countries are important for the de facto government. Without such positive signalling, the pragmatists would be left empty handed and condemned to gradual marginalisation. Even small steps could begin a virtuous cycle. For example, helping to address issues such as the refusal of international banks to process payments to and from Afghanistan would involve very little engagement and have disproportionate positive impact, enabling investment into the country. Projects aimed at encouraging or facilitating private investment could similarly improve the diplomatic environment, without necessarily undermining Western demands concerning rights. + +An interesting test is the recent decision of the World Bank to unlock development funds for Afghanistan. The Taliban see this as a potential confidence-building measure. The question is whether Taliban policymakers in Kabul would then be able and willing to reciprocate, at least with some small, symbolic gesture, once funds began gradually translating into projects on the ground. + +It is worth adding that at the Doha II meeting in February 2024, China, Russia and Iran all supported the Taliban’s rejection of the proposal for a special envoy to Afghanistan, clearly expecting to gain from the failed take-off of Taliban–West relations. It is not clear to what extent Western countries are concerned about the possibility of Afghanistan falling into the orbit of these neighbours, but if they are, this would be one more reason not to delay engagement. + +--- + +__Sultan Barakat__ is a Professor in Public Policy at Qatar Foundation’s Hamad Bin Khalifa University and an Honorary Professor at the University of York. He is also the Founding Director of the newly established Global Institute for Strategic Research (GISR). + +__Antonio Giustozzi__ is a Senior Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team at RUSI. He has been working in and on Afghanistan since the 1990s, and has published extensively on the conflict there, and especially on the Taliban and the Islamic State. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-the-uk-as-an-ai-superpower.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-the-uk-as-an-ai-superpower.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c73982ab --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-30-the-uk-as-an-ai-superpower.md @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : The UK As An AI Superpower +author: Pia Hüsch and Noah Sylvia +date : 2024-05-30 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/l61XUAh.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "The Government’s Challenge Begins at Home" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_The UK has ambitions to be a global AI superpower. But even with the best intentions, fast-paced adoption and implementation of AI in the public sector will involve significant challenges._ + + + +The widespread adoption of AI technologies comes with much promise. In the public sector in particular, AI integration has the potential to bring greater efficiency, for example by speeding up administrative services, thereby saving taxpayer money and offering better services to citizens. On a more macro level, AI integration in the public sector – civilian and military alike – is also supposed to secure an economic and military advantage to the UK. + +The government already envisages widespread adoption of AI, and is encouraging civil servants to familiarise themselves with generative AI at work, for instance. The Cabinet Office is currently running a trial for an AI-powered chatbot, intended to make an interactive document analysis tool accessible to all civil servants. However, while the aim is for all government departments to use AI and support the wider goal of becoming a “global AI superpower”, in practice, many hurdles arise for the adoption of AI by the public sector. These range from the lack of skills and training in day-to-day engagement with AI technologies to a lack of flexible procurement and technical leadership. + + +### Knowledge and Skills in the Private Sector + +A key challenge the public sector faces is that much of the knowledge and experience around AI development, research and application currently lies in the private sector, whose deep pockets drive R&D and attract much sought-after talent. No public spending commitments come close to the budgets of the private sector – compare the UK’s £900 million commitment to build a supercomputer to the $35 billion committed by AWS to data centres in Virginia. Of course, many consultancies offer well paid advice to public sector entities on how to navigate this challenge. But it takes more and especially different kinds of partnerships with the private sector to enable greater information and knowledge exchange between public and private organisations. Such partnerships are needed not only to enable the public sector to reap the benefits of AI but also to design effective regulation and governance to mitigate any risks that arise. The National Cyber Security Centre’s Industry 100 scheme, through which public institutions host cyber security experts from the private sector for one day a week or month, is a laudable model that could be replicated in an AI context. This would allow the public sector to benefit from private-sector expertise while the private sector can access a greater network and gain insights into the government’s work. + + +### Learning from Defence Procurement + +Challenges also arise given the public sector’s slow procurement of AI technologies. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), for example, spent £25 billion with UK industry in 2022/23. Yet industry has long complained about the MoD as a customer, and these complaints extend to its procurement of AI. The MoD published its strategy for exploiting AI (the “Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy”) in 2022, but has since faced criticism for failing to sufficiently detail how it will become “the world’s most effective, efficient, trusted and influential Defence organisation for our size [in terms of AI]”. + +___`A greater range of partnerships are needed not only to enable the public sector to reap the benefits of AI but also to design effective regulation and governance to mitigate any risks that arise`___ + +Companies, both large and small, have not received clear demand signals on the MoD’s operational objectives, hindering the deployment of successful AI in defence. Besides a lack of clarity on priorities and requirements (which, granted, the Defence AI Centre hopes to rectify), uncertainty persists over how to integrate AI with existing systems. The MoD contains a myriad of “architectural standards, patterns and interfaces”, thereby limiting data accessibility (the lifeblood of AI functionality) and AI integration into decision-making, analysis and training processes. Similarly, the rather disparate efforts at AI procurement across a host of defence entities – from front-line commands to the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory – inhibit AI’s efficiency benefits. The Integration Design Authority (IDA) will alleviate some of these frictions by incorporating a level of AI oversight into its efforts; however, it cannot bear sole responsibility for this task, as the IDA was created to facilitate integration across the whole of Defence. + +Furthermore, most of the AI innovation occurs in smaller firms and start-ups, especially small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while many of the MoD’s procurement processes are overwhelmingly oriented towards the largest defence contractors – the so-called “defence primes”. The regulatory framework requires experience of navigating the complex MoD bureaucracy as well as sufficient capital to sustain one’s firm through the long process. SMEs often have neither the £25,000 monthly revenue stream to stay afloat, nor the decades of organisational knowledge about the MoD’s security and classification protocols: their choice is either to fail or to pivot away from the MoD to easier customers. Ongoing efforts to shorten innovation cycles include the new “Integrated Procurement Model” with a focus on software-oriented procurement, which requires maintaining a stronger relationship with companies in order to ensure constant, iterative updates. To secure the best technological advantage, MoD and wider public procurement need to become more agile to include smaller companies that provide cutting-edge technology, even if not at scale yet. + + +### Changing the Public Sector Career Mindset + +The MoD at least has an AI strategy; 76% of government departments don’t, even though over a third of surveyed government departments questioned on the use of AI by the public sector are already deploying AI. Declaring the aim to become a global AI superpower is perhaps an ambitious target, but it is by no means sufficient in terms of setting useful guidance and vision for government departments. The UK’s public sector needs more tangible goals to work towards. This means identifying in more concrete terms what being an “AI superpower” looks like in the next 3, 5, 10 and 20 years. + +___`Only when its people support the government’s aim of being an AI superpower will the UK be able to turn ambition into reality`___ + +Setting out and implementing such a vision needs credible leadership at all levels and in all government departments. Yet the career civil servants and generalists who often fill these positions can easily lack the technological understanding and vision that a technician from the private sector, or even a specialist within the public sector, might offer. Thus, external hiring needs to become more agile to offer private-sector tech visionaries and specialists the opportunity to come into the public sector on a senior level and for a shorter timeframe than is currently the case, while still benefitting from full integration and trust from public sector colleagues. Similarly, technology experts already working within the public sector must be able to be promoted to leadership positions, not only to offer their expertise on new levels but also to show that a long-lasting technology career within the public service is possible. Only by hiring and retaining adequate technology leadership will the public sector be able to successfully roll out AI technologies. + + +### Navigating the Talent Terrain + +Technically focused leaders are crucial for planning and envisioning strategies, but are entirely reliant upon the skills held within government departments to enact their policies. Unfortunately, the National Audit Office’s autumn 2023 survey of government bodies found that 70% of respondents described a lack of skills as a barrier to AI adoption. Difficulties in hiring and retaining individuals with the necessary skills to develop and deploy AI have intensified in recent years, exacerbated by uncompetitive salaries relative to the private sector (which faces its own skills shortage). Every entity of the UK government needs greater expertise in machine learning, data management and cloud computing, along with a broader spectrum of software skills and lawyers trained in AI ethics and the corresponding legal compliance. Yet the demand for skills must extend beyond experts. Non-technical employees must familiarise themselves with simple data processes while understanding the function of their organisation’s models in order to trust the outputs. + +The government is demonstrating its commitment to equipping younger generations with the skills for a data-driven world. But this investment is geared towards the long-term upskilling of the UK economy and does not mitigate the current shortcomings of an under-skilled civil service. Currently, the government is filling this gap with “contractors, agency workers, and temporary staff”, who comprise a third of “digital and data professionals”. Despite the government commitment to reduce reliance upon temporary workers in order to cut costs, the lead time on large-scale upskilling indicates that the government will need to continue to buy in skills before developed skills have matured. This transition must be accelerated by including data skills as part of on-the-job learning for all civil service roles, providing a boost in digital literacy without more major expenditure in formal training. Similarly, personnel management must become more porous to permit expertise to flow out of and back into government with ease. Flexible career paths between the public and private sectors are needed to ensure that private-sector knowledge, ideas and skills can be brought into government at no additional cost to the taxpayer. + + +### A People Challenge as Much as a Technology One + +Much can be debated about what the right aim is for a grand AI strategy, how the public sector can procure AI technologies and who has the vision and leadership to work towards AI implementation in the public sector. Most importantly, however, the UK cannot become an AI superpower unless the ambition is reflected in wider society. This includes early access to learning opportunities and safe engagement to try out human-machine teaming, as well as a clear signal of job opportunities rather than threats to the labour market. Critically, it also requires strong engagement with ethical concerns and other risks that need to be addressed to meaningfully assure the responsible use of AI. Only when its people support the government’s aim of being an AI superpower will the UK be able to turn ambition into reality. + +--- + +__Pia Hüsch__ is a Research Fellow in cyber, technology and national security. Her research focusses on the impact, societal risks and lawfulness of cyber operations and the geopolitical and national security implications of disruptive technologies, such as AI. + +__Noah Sylvia__ is a Research Analyst for C4ISR, especially its intersection with Emerging Technology, on the Military Sciences team at RUSI. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-31-how-wagner-lost-syria.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-31-how-wagner-lost-syria.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4d732c89 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-05-31-how-wagner-lost-syria.md @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : How Wagner Lost Syria +author: Antonio Giustozzi +date : 2024-05-31 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/DN3KjGv.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Despite the death of its former leader, the Wagner Group continues to operate in some parts of the world. In Syria, however, its presence has long since evaporated. What went wrong?_ + + + +The Wagner Group, a private military company (PMC) funded by the Russian state, deployed to Syria in 2015 and spent six years there. Its role in the country’s conflict was most clearly highlighted by the Battle of Khasham in February 2018, during which a mixed force of Wagnerite mercenaries and Syrian militiamen tried to seize control of an oil field from the US army and its allied militias. The Wagnerites and their allies were badly bruised by a thorough US air and artillery bombardment, and the incident was seen as very puzzling at a time when US-Russian deconflicting arrangements were still fully operational. In fact, the key question about the incident is whether the Russian command in Syria was aware of the Wagnerite plan or not. Wagner’s boss Yevgeny Prigozhin alleged that the Russian command knew, while the latter denied knowledge – hence claims by Prigozhin and his supporters that already at that time a jealous Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) was trying to undermine Wagner. + +Prigozhin’s claims can be interpreted as evidence of friction with the MoD, dating back to the early years of the Wagner Group. The narrative that emerges from both Syrian government and Russian government sources indicates, however, that until 2023, things were not so bad. Even after Prigozhin’s mutiny and subsequent death, Russian diplomatic and military sources rated Russia’s experience with mercenaries in Syria as quite positive. Syrian diplomatic, military and oil and gas industry sources were also adamant that the Russian authorities always defended Wagner against Syrian criticism and blocked Syrian attempts to take existing contracts, especially in the oil and gas sector, away from the group. It was only after the mutiny that the Russian authorities lifted their protection of Wagner and converged with the Syrians in terms of getting Wagnerites to leave the company or indeed the country. + +Having said this, Syrian sources all agree that they never had the impression that the Russian authorities were involved in Wagner’s expansion beyond the private military business and into oil and gas and related industries. The sources might, of course, have been unaware of Wagner’s arrangements with the Russian authorities, but it seems clear that Prigozhin was not sharing the bulk of his profits with the Kremlin authorities, other than paying some taxes in Russia. Given the shadowy nature of the business, one suspects that the taxes paid were a relatively small amount. + +Syrian views of Wagner and its operations in their country are not entirely negative. Wagner’s operations as a commando or shock force were seen as useful, given the shortage of aggressive, combat capable units in the Syrian armed forces and the unwillingness of the Russian MoD to commit regular Russian forces. Syrian businessmen who worked with Prigozhin were also generally happy about the collaboration: the extraordinary profits made by not paying taxes or customs were shared with Syrian business partners, who today describe that time as a bonanza. + +___`Wagner’s role in reclaiming control over Syrian oil and gas fields legitimised the exceptionally favourable conditions under which it was able to operate them afterwards`___ + +For a period, Prigozhin also took care of keeping the political elites happy. The Assad family was rewarded by contracting companies it controls, for example. Over time, however, the jealousy of the Syrian economic and political elite grew, not least because the oil and gas sector is one of only a few ways to make any money in Syria. Prigozhin, perhaps reassured by the protection he enjoyed from the Russian authorities, did not feel he had to distribute Wagner’s profits beyond a narrow number of Syrian business partners and the minister of oil and gas. + +The initial justification for Wagner’s entry into the oil and gas sector was of course that it played a key role in reclaiming control over the fields. This legitimised the exceptionally favourable conditions under which Wagner was able to operate them afterwards. By June 2020, however, with the war effectively over, both Syrian powerbrokers, who were not receiving their share, and Syrian officials, who were not seeing any gains for a Syrian state struggling to raise enough revenue to sustain itself, grew critical of Wagner and its privileges. + +There is a stark contrast here with the situation that emerged in Mali after Wagner’s 2023 mutiny. In Mali, the Russian government tried to take the contract with the Malian government away from Wagner, but Bamako objected and insisted on keeping Wagner in the country. In the end, a compromise was worked out where 80% of the old contract stayed with Wagner. The Malian government did not want Russian PMC Redut, which is in fact a branch of the MoD, to take over from Wagner. It assessed that Wagner would be a more pliable tool in its hands than Redut. + +In Syria, not only did the government not object to the Russian government’s plans to expel Wagner from the country, but it actively endorsed them. As in Mali, however, the government showed little interest in an expansion of the role of Redut (which already operated in the country in parallel with Wagner). The Russian authorities are still trying to “sell” an expanded Redut role to the Syrians, but the lengthy negotiations demonstrate a distinct lack of enthusiasm on the Syrian side, which would rather do without any Russian private military or security involvement in the oil and gas sector. + +___`It is clear that by and large Russia was never in a position to offer full, pervasive and long-term protection for Wagner across the geographic range of its operations`___ + +This seems to suggest that Wagner might only be replaceable by the likes of Redut to a limited extent, because customers do not want the Russian government to have too much say over how mercenaries are used. There are other reasons, too, as to why Wagner is hard to replace. According to senior staff of both Russian and Syrian companies previously operating under Wagner, once the Russian MoD took control of Wagner’s operations in the oil and gas sector, the profitability collapsed. This is not a matter of technical or managerial competence, because the staff have changed little, but of the shadowy business skills that were Prigozhin’s own turf. The Syrian authorities are now demanding that Russian companies in Syria pay taxes and customs. + +The paradox of the Wagner modus operandi in Syria was that it worked because of Prigozhin’s ability to break every rule, but it failed for the same reason. Prigozhin’s “wild capitalist” model was always bound to generate resistance, jealousies and criticism. Only by relying on the protection of the Russian state, which had huge leverage over the Syrian elite in 2015–20, could Prigozhin’s system work. Now the question is whether that model – assuming his son Pavel intends to continue with it – can operate autonomously and still turn out a profit. + +In Syria, the Prigozhin model was acceptable as long as the situation of extreme crisis allowed for little or no alternatives. Such a situation cannot last forever – it must evolve in one direction or another. Even if the model appears to be still viable for now in Mali and Central Africa, it is clear that by and large Russia was never in a position to offer full, pervasive and long-term protection for Wagner across the geographic range of its operations. Indeed, beyond Syria, the presence of the Russian state alongside Wagner deployments was always much thinner, and typically limited to diplomatic and technical support. This is a key difference between Prigozhin’s business model and that of, say, the British East India Company. Both models are/were driven by extreme rapaciousness, but the East India Company relied on a comparatively much greater ability of the British state to back up the Company’s “investments”. + +As a result, Prigozhin’s model was only really viable for relatively short burst of very intensive profit making. It might well have been designed with that in mind: in Syria, according to sources within Wagner’s financial operation, the organisation earned a war chest that continues to fund Wagner adventures elsewhere. As a venture capitalist, Prigozhin appears to have assumed that several of his operations would result in losses, but expected a few immensely successful ones to cover that and still leave a hefty profit, which might well have been the case. + +--- + +__Antonio Giustozzi__ is a Senior Research Fellow in the Terrorism and Conflict team at RUSI. He has been working in and on Afghanistan since the 1990s, and has published extensively on the conflict there, and especially on the Taliban and the Islamic State.