C2: Add HKers articles, 0x2e Oct.28

_collections/_hkers/2024-10-04-japans-new-security.md

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+---
+layout: post
+title : Japan’s New Security
+author: Daisuke Kawai
+date  : 2024-10-04 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/SEDU8qi.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "Balancing Tradition with Reality"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_Taking over as Japan’s new prime minister after narrowly winning the Liberal Democratic Party leadership, Shigeru Ishiba’s approach to foreign and security policy is likely to include several strategic adjustments._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+Shigeru Ishiba has succeeded in his long-standing ambition of leading Japan, becoming the new prime minister after winning the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership following five attempts. The 67-year-old narrowly beat conservative rival Sanae Takaichi in a tightly contested race of nine candidates. Winning by just 21 votes, Ishiba’s victory signals a shift in Japanese politics, ushering in a new era.
+
+
+### The Road to Victory: A Narrow Margin
+
+The LDP leadership election was a fierce contest between Ishiba, Takaichi and Shinjiro Koizumi. In the first round, Takaichi led the vote, with Ishiba close behind. It was the runoff, however, combining 367 parliamentary and 47 prefectural votes (totalling 414), that tipped the scales in Ishiba’s favour. Ishiba secured 215 votes to Takaichi’s 194, thanks largely to support from the faction of former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. While Takaichi appealed to the conservative base, her hardline stance worried many who thought it could hurt the LDP in the general election and strain relations with neighbouring countries. These concerns led to the perception that her leadership might complicate diplomacy, which played in Ishiba’s favour.
+
+Ishiba has spent decades at the centre of Japanese politics, holding key positions including Minister of Defence; Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; and Minister for Regional Revitalisation. Known for his deep understanding of security and agricultural issues and his pragmatic leadership, Ishiba is regarded as a steady hand in times of uncertainty. One notable proposal is to establish a Ministry of Disaster Prevention and introduce nuclear shelters nationwide, reflecting his focus on enhancing national resilience against natural disasters and geopolitical threats.
+
+Despite his experience, Ishiba faces major challenges within the LDP. Unlike some of his predecessors, he does not command a strong faction in the party. Hence, his success will largely depend on uniting the various LDP factions.
+
+___`Ishiba’s track record suggests a willingness to take a more assertive stance on key issues while fostering greater multilateral cooperation`___
+
+He appears to have skilfully managed his relationship with the influential Aso faction, once seen as an obstacle. To strengthen party cohesion, Ishiba appointed former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga as the LDP’s vice president and Taro Aso as the party’s supreme advisor. By including several Aso faction members in key Cabinet positions, he has smoothed over potential friction. These strategic appointments have reassured international policymakers about the stability and continuity of Japan’s leadership.
+
+
+### Foreign Policy Outlook: Continuity and Pragmatism
+
+Despite the change in leadership, the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” initiative will continue to serve as the guiding framework. Yet Ishiba’s approach to foreign policy is likely to include several strategic adjustments. His track record suggests a willingness to take a more assertive stance on key issues while fostering greater multilateral cooperation. A key test will be managing Japan’s delicate relationships with China, South Korea and the US.
+
+China: Ishiba’s firm stance on China is evident in his calls to remove Chinese buoys around the disputed Senkaku Islands, signalling a tough approach to territorial disputes. His August visit to Taiwan, where he met President Lai Ching-te and other senior ministers, underlined his concern over regional security amid rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait. While his support for Taiwan has drawn criticism from Beijing, Ishiba recognises the need to balance deterrence with diplomacy, as economic ties with China remain vital.
+
+South Korea: Perhaps the country most relieved by Ishiba’s victory is South Korea. Had Takaichi become prime minister, relations might have worsened due to her hawkish stance, whereas Ishiba holds moderate views on historical issues, reducing the likelihood of friction over past disputes. His approach offers an opportunity to improve bilateral relations and strengthen cooperation on shared security concerns, such as North Korea.
+
+The US: Strengthening the Japan–US alliance while advocating for a more equal partnership is a priority for Ishiba. He has called for a review of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to pursue joint management of US military bases in Japan, enhancing sovereignty over these facilities. Additionally, he proposes establishing training bases for the Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces (SDF) on US soil. Japan lacks sufficient space for full-scale training; utilising the US’s vastness would enhance the SDF’s proficiency. Ishiba suggests this arrangement would elevate mutual trust and grant Japan greater operational control. These measures aim to put the alliance on a more equal footing.
+
+However, revising SOFA would affect other US allies and require US Congress approval, making it complex regardless of the next US administration. Historically, SOFA issues have been addressed through operational changes or supplementary provisions rather than formal revisions. Ishiba’s proposals may require delicate negotiations to align with US policies and address domestic sensitivities. However, his initiatives could reshape the alliance’s dynamics, promoting shared responsibilities and deeper military integration.
+
+
+### Rethinking Regional Security: Beyond “Asian NATO”
+
+One of Ishiba’s more ambitious policies is creating an “Asian NATO”. He believes frameworks like the Japan–US alliance, the US–South Korea alliance and the ANZUS Treaty can be organically combined. While this concept seeks to integrate existing alliances, it faces significant challenges because Asia’s geopolitical landscape differs vastly from Europe’s, where NATO has been successful. The diversity of strategic interests and conflicting security priorities among Asian countries makes establishing a NATO-like collective defence system difficult. This will be compounded if Ishiba conflates “collective defence” – mutual defence against aggression – with “collective security”, a broader framework not targeting specific adversaries. Such distinctions, together with historical barriers, make the realisation of his vision unlikely.
+
+Furthermore, Ishiba has suggested that revisiting Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles – particularly the principle of “not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons” – may be necessary to strengthen Japan’s deterrence posture and participate more fully in regional security arrangements. He proposes exploring nuclear sharing with the US modelled after NATO’s nuclear policy. However, questions remain about the practicality of such an idea. The air-launched cruise missiles carried by US B-52 bombers with ranges of around 3,000 km can be effectively launched from US bases, making their deployment to Japan unnecessary. Additionally, the B-61 tactical nuclear bombs used in NATO’s sharing arrangements are designed for aerial delivery, but do not align well with Japan’s strategic environment or geography. Without specific details on the types of nuclear weapons to be introduced, Ishiba’s proposal remains speculative and raises more questions than it answers. Moreover, such a move would be highly controversial domestically and could exacerbate regional tensions, making its implementation challenging.
+
+A more viable alternative may lie in enhancing the latticework of alliances and partnerships gradually emerging in the Indo-Pacific. This framework builds on existing minilateral arrangements – such as the Quad, AUKUS and the Camp David Principles – to create flexible, issue-specific partnerships. The latticework model allows for cooperation on specific security concerns, like maritime security or cyber defence, without the rigid structure of a formal military bloc.
+
+Despite these challenges, there are reasons to believe that Japan’s security policy will move in a stable direction. Ishiba has appointed key figures with substantial expertise in defence and security, including the new foreign minister, defence minister and Special Advisor for National Security, all of whom possess a strong understanding of defence issues. This knowledgeable leadership at the helm of Japan’s defence policy provides reassurance that the country will pursue a pragmatic and stable approach as it navigates complex geopolitical dynamics.
+
+___`As global dynamics evolve, Ishiba’s leadership presents an opportunity for Japan to redefine its international role, embracing traditional values while strategically adapting to new realities`___
+
+Both Ishiba’s nuclear sharing proposal and his idea for an “Asian NATO” appear to be aimed largely at a domestic audience. While these bold proposals resonate with national security concerns in Japan, they are unlikely to be pushed aggressively on the international stage. In a recent interview, Ishiba acknowledged the need for careful pre-coordination with allies like the US before raising such issues at high-level meetings, signalling a pragmatic understanding of the complexities involved.
+
+
+### Conclusion: Navigating Japan’s Future Amid Global Uncertainties
+
+Ishiba’s ascent to prime minister marks a pivotal moment for Japan, potentially reshaping domestic governance and security policy. With 38 years of political experience and deep expertise in the defence arena, he is well-prepared to address the country’s complex challenges amid an uncertain global landscape.
+
+Ishiba’s success hinges on balancing continuity with innovation. While ambitious proposals like an “Asian NATO” and nuclear sharing attract attention, their practicality is limited by Indo-Pacific geopolitical realities. Focusing on enhancing existing alliances and cultivating flexible partnerships may offer a more sustainable path, strengthening Japan’s security posture without the complications of rigid alliances.
+
+Domestically, unifying the LDP is crucial. By incorporating diverse viewpoints and fostering collaboration between factions, Ishiba can build a cohesive government capable of effective policy implementation.
+
+Ultimately, his tenure will be defined internationally by his ability to balance assertiveness with diplomacy. Steering Japan through internal challenges and external pressures will determine the country’s role in promoting stability and security in the Indo-Pacific. As global dynamics evolve, Ishiba’s leadership presents an opportunity for Japan to redefine its international role, embracing traditional values while strategically adapting to new realities.
+
+---
+
+__Daisuke Kawai__ is a Project Assistant Professor and the Deputy Director of the Economic Security Programme at RCAST, The University of Tokyo. He also serves as an Asia Fellow at the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and Senior Advisor for Quad Strategic Planning to the Quad Investors Network (QUIN).

_collections/_hkers/2024-10-09-uncertainty-for-russian-army.md

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+---
+layout: post
+title : Uncertainty For Russian Army
+author: Nick Reynolds
+date  : 2024-10-09 12:00:00 +0800
+image : https://i.imgur.com/QQVaKLr.jpeg
+#image_caption: ""
+description: "The Russian Army Faces an Uncertain Everything"
+excerpt_separator: <excerpt/>
+---
+
+_The Russian Army in Ukraine performed poorly as a result of degraded unit quality due to attrition and operational failures, but has adapted by improving electronic warfare, air defense, and drone integration, making it more lethal and survivable._
+
+<excerpt/>
+
+![image01](https://i.imgur.com/f3J44OO.jpeg)
+
+- Despite setbacks with Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), Russia could reconstitute its military capabilities post-war, potentially focusing on more effective combined arms formations. Institutional corruption and neglect of personnel remain significant barriers to modernization, but some military leaders are pushing for reforms.
+
+- Russia’s military future depends on addressing these deep-rooted issues while adjusting its doctrine and force structure.
+
+
+### How Russia’s Army May Rebuild and Evolve After the War in Ukraine
+
+The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been a bruising debacle for Russia’s ground forces. Despite staving off outright defeat in 2022 and 2023, the quality of its units degraded due to attrition.
+
+Nevertheless, the institution has adapted by varying degrees, and how it reconstitutes itself and modernizes after the current high-intensity period of the war ends is worth considering, for this will shape the threat that Russia poses in the future.
+
+The Russian Army bogged down in the Donbas and the Kursk Oblast, is currently absorbed with recruiting, training, arming, and equipping personnel to replace those it is hemorrhaging through battlefield losses. Operationally, it is for the most part holding ground while exerting pressure along Ukraine’s extended front line. This appears to be taking up the majority of the planning capacity of its senior leadership, and bureaucratic and logistical apparatus.
+
+Despite periodic discussions of the possibility of the Russian state collapsing, the resilience of the war economy and Putin regime has been notable. More likely is that Russia is eventually forced to scale back or cease current high-intensity operations, and must return to other methods of undermining Ukraine. Bar the unlikely possibility that internal problems topple the government, Russia’s conventional forces will restructure and rebuild their capabilities.
+
+It is impossible to predict with any certainty what direction the Russian Army might take. Nevertheless, a necessary question that might shed light on this is what the Russian Army perceives its most important lessons learned to be.
+
+What changes have already taken place are likely to be here to stay. Russia has the benefit of optimizing for a single, clearly understood task, trench warfare, which has shaped its operational force structure and decisions of what new capabilities to invest in, but many of these are either transferable or have obvious and broad utility.
+
+Advances in electronic warfare for force protection, their robust air defense network, the integration of new sensors into a more-developed targeting cycle, and the way that uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) such as Lancet, Orlan, and Shahid are employed have made Russian ground forces more survivable and lethal and have created a deeper and more dangerous battlespace for any enemy facing them.
+
+At a higher level, structural changes such as the split of the Western Military District into the Moscow and Leningrad military districts indicate re-posturing towards a potential war in the Baltic region, a longer-term change in posture indicative of a more confrontational approach to NATO.
+
+More questionable is the shape of future Russian formations. Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) were essentially abandoned due to ineffectiveness and replaced by a more traditional, hierarchical military structure. Aside from suffering from a shortage of infantry, an essential component for any combined arms formation, Russia’s logistics system had not been adjusted in line with the BTG concept and was not able to support the large number of small and complicated formations that were initially deployed.
+
+The increasing use of assault detachments fit within a long-standing practice of concentrating better-trained and equipped personnel into sub-units dedicated to maneuver and assault while setting low standards and expectations for most of the infantry. Yet the way they are currently used does not scale well, while useful for local tactical actions, they do not help ground forces conduct larger-scale offensive maneuvers.
+
+Likewise, armored forces are not currently competitive against the mix of precise lethal systems that are fielded by both sides in Ukraine, tanks can be held in reserve for fire support and to blunt enemy breakthroughs, but suffer when brought closer to the front line.
+
+Therefore, a future development to watch for is what kind of combined arms formation the Russians design and build once they have sufficient breathing space. This may be a return to a better implementation of the BTG concept, with logistics issues resolved and the balance of capabilities adjusted, or may focus on rebuilding Russia’s brigades.
+
+Russian doctrine is conceptually viable as a way of war. However, due to Russia’s military culture and comprehensive neglect of its personnel, operations are at best unwieldy and more often simply unimplementable with the force available. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Russia’s military leadership recognizes the need for cultural change in this area.
+
+Where there have been changes are in making corruption and systemic dishonesty less acceptable. These are deep-rooted issues and are also a necessity of a system that forces officers to obfuscate their unit’s readiness assessments. Some within Russia’s military leadership are attempting and this could pave the way for a more effective force in the future, though it faces a great deal of institutional inertia and may be worsened by repression.
+
+These are perhaps the greatest barriers to change and will be the key dynamics to watch when assessing future modernization efforts regardless of what Russia’s senior leaders unveil on paper or in military displays in Moscow.
+
+---
+
+__Nick Reynolds__ is the Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).