From cb0f0b11b5481771805be5196ee632cf1695d2b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hokoi Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 01:11:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] C2: Add HKers articles, 0x2e Nov.12 --- .../2024-10-22-the-military-use-of-ai.md | 314 ++++++++++++++++++ ...2024-10-23-china-in-multilateral-system.md | 184 ++++++++++ .../2024-10-24-democracy-and-human-rights.md | 278 ++++++++++++++++ .../_hkers/2024-10-24-trusted-chips.md | 135 ++++++++ 4 files changed, 911 insertions(+) create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-10-22-the-military-use-of-ai.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-10-23-china-in-multilateral-system.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-10-24-democracy-and-human-rights.md create mode 100644 _collections/_hkers/2024-10-24-trusted-chips.md diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-10-22-the-military-use-of-ai.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-10-22-the-military-use-of-ai.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..13f08624 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-10-22-the-military-use-of-ai.md @@ -0,0 +1,314 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : The Military Use Of AI +author: Cheng-Hung Hsu +date : 2024-10-22 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/Wu5hANr.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Challenges and Opportunities for Taiwan" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Increasing cross-strait tensions between China and Taiwan suggest the need for the latter to look into the advantages offered by new defence approaches. With a defence budget vastly outpaced by China, Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept recognises a need to look to cutting-edge technologies to offset scale imbalances._ _This paper examines the challenges and opportunities Taiwan will need to consider for the military application of one such emerging technology: AI._ + +Key challenges in the use of AI include: data-security concerns; ethical implications of autonomous weapons; unpredictability and unreliability of systems; high costs of implementation and maintenance; potential for increased use of armed force; issues of accountability and responsibility; risks associated with deepfake technology; and the danger of over-reliance on AI systems leading to a loss of traditional human military skills. + +In terms of opportunities, the paper discusses the potential benefits of AI in enhancing situational awareness, improving command-and-control capabilities, and enabling advanced simulations for military training and strategy development. AI-powered systems can process vast amounts of data quickly, providing comprehensive battlefield intelligence and enabling faster, more accurate decision-making. + +The paper emphasises the importance of carefully considering ethical, security and operational factors when integrating AI into Taiwan’s defence strategy. It suggests that effective use of AI could serve as a force multiplier for Taiwan’s military, potentially helping to offset China’s numerical and resource advantages. + +The research underscores the potential of AI to significantly enhance Taiwan’s defence capabilities, while also cautioning about the risks and challenges associated with its implementation. The paper advocates for a balanced approach that maximises the benefits of AI in military applications while mitigating potential drawbacks and ethical concerns. + + +### INTRODUCTION + +Scholars may differ on the probability of a Taiwan contingency, but cross-strait tensions between Taiwan and China are rising, and Beijing refuses to exclude the use of military force. The “One China” policy that many countries have adopted limits Taiwan’s ability to rely on collective defence or alliances. Taiwan can expect US support, but as the experience of Ukraine suggests, it needs to be resolute and prepared to defend itself. US allies in the region that are friendly to Taiwan (Japan, South Korea, Australia) may become involved, but there are no legally binding agreements or authoritative policy statements that would make that a reliable planning assumption. Given limitations in resources and difficulties in resupply to the island, to deter China and defend itself, Taiwan must seek advantage from emerging technologies and strategies, such as the military use of AI, while preserving interoperability with its sole security guarantor, the US, through alignment on concepts and systems. + +China’s economic growth over recent decades has given the country a defence budget more than 20 times that of Taiwan, changing the balance of military power across the Taiwan Strait. How can Taiwan respond? The answer lies in the asymmetric strategy of Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept (ODC), which uses the small to control the big, leveraging Taiwan’s lead in cutting-edge technologies to gain advantage through the military use of AI. The transformation of modern warfare relies on the collection, organisation and manipulation of data: the ODC attempts to maximise Taiwan’s defence advantages by matching the characteristics of the battlefield environment in the Taiwan Strait to the development and application of low-cost, high-efficiency, high-quantity and high-survival weapons. The ODC envisions a large number of miniature missile assault boats, land-launched missiles, mines, attack drones and anti-armour rockets. Its effectiveness requires the use of AI to synchronise situational awareness with kinetic and electromagnetic effects. AI can enhance Taiwan’s defence and operational capabilities, serving as a multidomain force multiplier for other combat platforms and formations. This paper explores the opportunities and challenges associated with the effective use and implementation of AI in Taiwan’s military. + +#### METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE + +The paper’s methodology primarily relied on a review of English-language literature from 2019 to 2024. This is due in part to the scarcity of Chinese-language publications on the subject. However, the main reason for a focus on English-language and in particular US literature is that the US is the only country legally obliged to support Taiwan in securing the means for its defence and committed by leadership statements to come to its assistance. Given Taiwan’s unusual diplomatic status, alignment with US concepts and initiatives is thus of particular importance. + +The paper has three main sections. The first offers a general outline of the advantages and disadvantages of military adoption of AI. The second explores starting points for the use of AI by Taiwan’s military and addresses the imperative to advance further. The third section evaluates AI prospects for Taiwan’s military and proposes solutions to overcome obstacles. The paper concludes with some key considerations for Taiwan’s government. + + +### CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MILITARY USE OF AI + +Coined by US computer scientist John McCarthy in 1956, the term “AI” referred to “the potential for creating machines that could simulate human intelligence”. AI denotes a machine’s capability to perform cognitive functions typically associated with the human mind. While there are risks associated with its use in a range of industries, from healthcare to finance, its application in the military domain carries unique challenges. + +#### RISKS AND CHALLENGES + +Miliary use of AI presents concerns particular to the risks that accompany the use of lethal force. These disadvantages highlight challenges and risks associated with military use of AI, and the importance of carefully considering the ethical, security, financial and human factors involved in leveraging AI technologies in defence strategies. + +1. __Data security:__ AI – like any other digital technology – can be hacked or manipulated. When systems are breached, sensitive information can be stolen and exploited, to the advantage of the adversary. In 2015, the US Office of Personnel Management suffered large-scale breaches of government data in the form of theft of confidential data affecting millions of federal employees and contractors. Sensitive personal information of approximately 21.5 million individuals who had undergone background checks, including 5.6 million fingerprint records, was stolen. The vulnerability of systems used to store and process sensitive information raises serious concerns about the ability to safeguard the systems on which AI would depend. + +2. __Ethics:__ While using robots in combat can reduce the number of human casualties and enhance operational efficiency, ethical questions arise when considering fully autonomous robotic soldiers. The concern is whether it is morally acceptable to allow machines to make life-and-death decisions without human oversight. The South Korean military considered deploying AI-powered sentry robots along the border with North Korea. These robots were equipped with automatic targeting and firing capabilities, raising significant ethical concerns about excluding human judgement. The prospect that they could engage and kill human targets without direct human oversight sparked widespread debate. Critics argued that delegating life-and-death decisions to autonomous machines inherently undermines human dignity and the principles of just war. The use of such AI-powered “killer robots” could lead to wars being fought entirely between autonomous systems, rather than between human soldiers, posing profound ethical questions about the role of human agency in warfare. Further challenges arose regarding accountability and responsibility if a malfunction in these robots were to cause civilian casualties. The “black box” non-transparent nature of the AI algorithms controlling the systems complicated the determination of accountability. + +3. __Unpredictability/unreliability:__ In 2021, an AI-powered drone strike carried out by the US military in Kabul, Afghanistan resulted in the deaths of 10 civilians, of whom seven were children, instead of the intended Islamic State in Khorasan target. The AI algorithms powering the drone’s target identification and engagement systems had failed to adequately discriminate between military and civilian targets, leading to the terrible loss of innocent and young life. The unpredictability of AI arises from the complexity and adaptability of these algorithms, which can learn, evolve and make decisions in ways that are not fully transparent in or constrained by their initial programming. As they encounter new situations and environments, their actions become increasingly difficult to anticipate with certainty, even when their ultimate goals are known. + +4. __Costs and maintenance:__ Building and maintaining AI systems in the military sector can incur significant costs, due to the systems’ complexity. Repair, maintenance and frequent upgrades add to the financial burden. In 2019, the US Department of Defense (DoD) awarded Microsoft a $10-billion cloud computing contract as part of its Cloud Strategy; known as the Joint Enterprise Defence Infrastructure (JEDI) project, it used AI to make it more effective. However, significant delays and cost overruns arose due to the complex engineering of the required AI systems. The “opaque nature” of the AI algorithms used in the JEDI project also “raised worries about unintended consequences” and the ability to properly test, validate and maintain these advanced technologies, which resulted in the Pentagon cancelling the contract. The need to ensure the security, reliability and transparency of these AI systems adds further to the complexity and cost of military modernisation, which can hamper the military’s efforts to integrate cutting-edge AI technologies. + +5. __Increased use of armed force:__ AI-driven information-processing systems could enable a proliferation of target information, broadening the use of force and potentially leading to more civilian casualties. According to a 2023 media report, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) used an AI system known as Habsora (“the Gospel”) to rapidly identify and recommend targets for airstrikes in Gaza. According to the IDF, by extracting information quickly and automatically, Habsora provides targeted recommendations that match exactly to the identifications made by humans. Habsora and Israel’s Target Division have helped to build a database of between 30,000 and 40,000 people suspected of being Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants. To put it another way, AI-driven systems have accelerated the compilation of a vast potential kill list. Before Habsora, it would take Israel up to a year to identify 50 potential targets in Gaza. During the May 2021 conflict, the AI system identified around 100 targets per day. + +6. __Accountability and responsibility:__ AI in the military raises both C2 and legal questions about accountability. Current research suggests AI systems need more rigorous testing to be validated and considered safe in risky military situations. Such systems often involve a complex network of stakeholders, including developers, data providers, users and regulators. Attributing responsibility can be challenging, as each stakeholder is likely to contribute to the operation of the system in different ways. Aside from humanitarian issues, the unpredictability of AI can, as the above example on unpredictability demonstrates, obscure who should be held accountable when things go wrong. The more AI systems become autonomous and capable of independent decisions, the more difficult it becomes to determine who should be held accountable for their actions. Should it be the AI system itself, its developers or its users? Developing and adapting C2 and legal structures to govern the use of AI is essential to maintain the military chain of command and establish lines of accountability. + +7. __Deepfake technology risks:__ In March 2023, The Intercept uncovered a US Special Operations Command procurement document that suggests the US military is seeking to develop deepfake or other AI-based technologies to deceive its adversaries. The document showed that the military wishes to use deepfakes to mislead enemies on the battlefield. However, there is a risk that use of deepfakes in combat could percolate up to the field of foreign relations. Militaries serving societies that believe in the principle of democratic control of armed forces should be wary of capabilities such as deepfakes that can undermine trust and the principle of truth, without which their democracies cannot function. + +8. __Path dependency:__ As militaries adopt AI-powered systems, there is a risk over time that they will lose the institutional memory of performing tasks the “old-fashioned” way (without AI support). Ultimately, the more reliant on AI systems a military becomes, the greater the cost when that system is penetrated. + +#### OPPORTUNITIES + +AI offers potentially significant advantages to military capability in terms of increased speed and accuracy, enhanced battlefield awareness and enhanced decision-making capabilities. Some of the examples examined below reflect bold claims, and it must be noted that technologies under development frequently fail to live up to early ambitions. However, given the immaturity and fast-moving nature of the AI field, it is appropriate to evaluate opportunities with an open mind about the potential range of utility. + +AI is changing not just how the military fights, but how it works from head to tail. It potentially offers better situational understanding, faster decisions, improved targeting, less risk to military personnel, and more efficient recruitment, training and logistics, gifting militaries cost savings and advantages in planning, executing and sustaining missions. Some of these benefits are unproven, others may never materialise in the form projected, and many are accompanied by vulnerabilities and risks of over-dependence. While there is a cost–benefit balance to be struck, no matter how much AI is adopted for a force, understanding how these systems may work and shape the way an adversary thinks and acts has become indispensable. + +1. __Situational awareness:__ With AI-powered sensors and technologies, military intelligence organisations can better understand battlefield conditions and provide a more comprehensive picture of adversary capabilities and intent. US Army researchers have developed machine learning algorithms that can operate in bandwidth-constrained environments to rapidly update situational awareness. These algorithms can compress data while maintaining near-optimal performance, allowing models to be frequently retrained on decentralised data sources, helping soldiers gain real-time analysis in a rapidly changing battlefield. The US Army is planning to integrate AI into tactical command posts by integrating disparate data sources into a common operational picture. AI systems can predict enemy actions, identify weaknesses, assess the environment, plan missions and suggest ways to avoid problems. By rapidly analysing disparate data sources, AI can provide precise intelligence forecasts, mission planning recommendations and situational assessments far quicker than human analysts alone. + +2. __Enhanced C2:__ AI systems allow the military to swiftly and precisely process large volumes of data and acquire nuanced insights, bringing unprecedented efficiency and accuracy to their decision-making process. The US DoD is creating an AI-powered system to combine data from different sensors into a single picture to help the joint force make better decisions. The US military has developed the CJADC2 (Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control) concept, which aims to increase interoperability and AI integration across all domains. By leveraging AI to rapidly collect, analyse and disseminate information on the battlefield, CJADC2 can identify and engage targets faster to create a well-informed force capable of defeating adversaries through accelerated decision-making cycles. By employing AI algorithms for predictive analytics and scenario modelling, the military can anticipate evolving threats and make immediate strategic adjustments to ensure agile, responsive C2. This capability is viewed by military strategists in both the US and China as a critical determinant that could prove decisive in shaping the outcomes of future armed conflicts and warfare scenarios. + +3. __Simulations and modelling:__ AI enables highly realistic simulations and modelling of complex military scenarios, systems and environments. This lets militaries test new ideas, strategies and equipment in a virtual environment before trying them in the real world. For example, the US Air Force is using AI-powered digital twins and simulations to model performance and maintenance requirements of aircraft such as the F-35 fighter. This helps accelerate innovation in areas such as predictive maintenance and mission planning. By personalising training regimens, AI enables more effective preparation of forces for dynamic real-world scenarios without compromising the safety of personnel. In the long term, AI-driven simulation training could be more cost effective than other kinds of realistic training simulations. + +4. __Lethal autonomous weapon systems:__ The integration of weaponry equipped with advanced sensors and algorithms offers a significant advance in military capability. These systems autonomously identify targets while ensuring human oversight for specific engagements, thereby enhancing precision, speed and efficiency. AI-supported autonomous systems have the processing power to draw on all the data-rich systems mentioned above to form an integrated, rapidly functional “kill chain” that can predict enemy actions, identify vulnerabilities, assess environmental conditions, evaluate mission strategies and recommend mitigation plans. By anticipating threats, optimising tactics and streamlining decision-making through AI-powered analytics, military forces can stay one step ahead of their targets, increasing operational effectiveness and mission success rates. + +5. __Training and recruitment:__ The US Air Force and the US Army have used AI-powered training tools that can reduce the time needed to complete training materials by up to 40%. AI-based chatbots have been used to assist with military recruitment, for example the US Army’s chatbot, Sergeant Star, which officially came into operation in 2006. The US Navy is deploying a conversational AI system called “Amelia” to handle and resolve the most common technical support questions from naval and civilian personnel, reducing the need for human support agents. The rollout of Amelia is part of the Navy’s $136-million Navy Enterprise Service Desk initiative to update and merge more than 90 IT support centres into a unified assistance platform. + +6. __Logistics:__ AI-driven solutions hold immense potential for streamlining logistics processes within the military domain. AI algorithms can analyse historical data on equipment use, maintenance schedules and operational rhythms to predict future demand for spare parts, ammunition, fuel and so on, enabling more proactive inventory management with the aim of avoiding stock-outs or surpluses of critical supplies. The US Army is using AI for predictive logistics, leveraging the technology to help forecast and manage the supply of parts and equipment more efficiently. + + +### TAIWAN’S MILITARY USE OF AI + +Taiwan is in a strategically central and commanding position in the Western Pacific. Its location across sea lanes connecting large economies and its proximity to the Chinese mainland make Taiwan vital in terms of defence and power projection for the major powers. Taiwan is also an important international trade hub and a partner in global supply chains. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/mSF50vm.png) +_▲ __Figure 1: Taiwan’s Location in the First Island Chain.__ Source: AndreaNicolini/Adobe Stock._ + +Figures from 2023 show Taiwan as the 17th-largest trading economy globally, with a trade volume of more than $900 billion in that year. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. One Taiwanese company, TSMC, dominates the global semiconductor market, with 57% of the market share of semiconductor foundries in 2021. If Taiwan were to be attacked and production disrupted, no country could fill the void, and a halt in the manufacture and distribution of semiconductors would cause a shortage of technology products such as smartphones, computers and cars, along with company closures. + +China expresses a preference for peaceful unification but has spent the past 20 years developing its military to conquer Taiwan. China’s leaders consistently communicate that Taiwan should be under Beijing’s control, and that they are willing to use force to achieve this. As Taiwan becomes more independent and less interested in unifying with China, Beijing may decide that force is the only way to achieve its political goals regarding Taiwan. + +#### TAIWAN’S STARTING POINTS + +Currently, the Taiwanese military is actively exploring and utilising AI technology to enhance military efficiency and strengthen defence capabilities. For example, the Tri-Service General Hospital, one of the largest teaching hospitals in Taiwan, receives more than 2 million visits per year. By combining a Microsoft large-scale language model with AI and the technical support of Microsoft’s Taiwan R&D centre, the hospital has brought together medical big data and Azure OpenAI to improve the accuracy of medical audio-visual recognition, to be automatically generated by AI to enable doctors and caregivers to improve the quality of diagnosis and care. The hospital’s medical information team will extend its technology development to record reports of doctors’ check-ups, outpatient clinics and surgeries, and the research results from medical image recognition, while reports of disease signs and symptoms and diagnoses will be generated and shared with the 13 military hospitals in the area of electrocardiography, to improve the speed of first aid through AI technology. + +China is rapidly increasing its intelligence-gathering capabilities against Taiwan, including through cyber attacks, surveillance aircraft (drones) and electronic warfare. A significant challenge for Taiwan is to monitor and analyse these multidomain threats. Taiwan is seeking to learn from countries such as Israel to improve its own use of these technologies to counter the growing Chinese threat. By leveraging AI algorithms for data fusion and pattern recognition, Taiwan can gain actionable insights into adversary intentions and activities. This includes using signal intelligence from communications and radar transmissions to understand China’s capabilities and intentions. Social media monitoring to detect disinformation campaigns or indications of impending military activity enables proactive decision-making and threat-mitigation strategies. + +As cyber threats become increasingly complex and pervasive, Taiwan must strengthen its cyber-defence capabilities to protect critical infrastructure and sensitive information. Taiwan has elevated cyber security as a national security priority and is taking proactive measures through initiatives such as the National Institute of Cyber Security and the Administration for Cyber Security of the Ministry of Digital Affairs, which is developing cutting-edge AI tools to detect fraudulent online activities, analyse suspicious messages and combat misinformation or false information campaigns. By further leveraging AI for threat hunting, anomaly detection and incident response, Taiwan can enhance its ability to defend against cyber attacks and minimise the impact of cyber incidents on military operations. + +In the ongoing Ukraine–Russia war, UAVs, especially smaller, low-cost drones adapted for combat roles, have demonstrated astonishing operational effectiveness in missions such as surveillance, targeting and precision-strike operations, enabling the outgunned Ukrainian army to deliver precise strikes and inflict significant damage against the quantitively superior Russian army. + +The ability to use missiles, drones and mines is critical for the defence of Taiwan, which needs to signal the ability to destroy invading ships and aircraft before they reach the main island. Taiwan could use drones with large payloads to attack China’s amphibious fleet, strike strategic targets and supplement crewed aircraft. They could also be used to serve as missile decoys and enable dispersed operations from roads if airbases are attacked. The use of multi-layered deterrence to maintain a solid defence posture is particularly suitable for Taiwan’s national defence strategy, which assumes lean military strength and tight procurement budget allocation. Taiwan’s drone capabilities are currently inferior to those of China. To catch up, Taiwan has set up the Drone National Team programme, which by mid-2024 had brought together companies and the military to produce more than 3,200 drones. + +The National Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) in Taoyuan City has indicated its plans to integrate AI and deep learning to develop an intelligent training environment that integrates live, virtual and constructive simulation into the more than 240 sets of simulation systems it has established for Taiwan’s army, including a drone-operated training simulator and the Brave Eagle training system, which has the potential to improve the comprehensive effectiveness of the army’s combat power. This year, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense established a National Defense Innovation Group. The ministry has demonstrated its determination to strengthen its asymmetric warfare capabilities, and has begun in-depth cooperation with the US Department of Commerce to promote projects such as drone systems, anti-drone systems, and AI use. + +#### CURRENT USE OF AI IN CHINA’S MILITARY + +China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been actively developing and deploying AI since the mid-2010s. These efforts are in line with China’s broader strategic initiatives, such as the Made in China 2025 plan from 2015 and the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, released in 2017. + +In July 2017, China’s State Council released a policy document, the “Developmental Regulations on a New Artificial Intelligence Generation”, which outlines the country’s AI development plan. The document demonstrates China’s ambition to become a world leader in AI by 2030. It stipulates that AI will be used for defence purposes, including command decision-making, military simulation and defence equipment. Since the release of the document, China has started to use AI more extensively in its military, particularly in the following areas: + +- __Unmanned combat systems:__ The PLA has been developing and using unmanned AI systems since 2015. These include drones for air, ground, sea and subsea operations. China has world-class capabilities in AI-dependent drone swarms with military potential. In April 2023, the PLA tested an AI system to help with artillery targeting, showing how AI is used in weapons. + +- __Battlefield awareness and decision-making:__ The PLA is using AI to improve awareness on the battlefield and in decision-making. This means combining data from different sources to get a complete up-to-date picture. Chinese military experts have discussed the idea of a “command brain”, to use AI for making plans at the tactical and operational levels. + +- __Multidomain operations:__ AI has been employed by China to conduct and coordinate actions across the domains of land, sea, air, space and cyber since at least 2020. AI helps to combine and analyse data from different domains to improve effectiveness. + +- __Predictive maintenance and logistics:__ China is using AI to maintain equipment and improve logistics. AI can predict when equipment might fail and help with decisions about where to put resources. China has been using AI in this area since at least 2020. This is part of a broader strategy to leverage AI for military advantage and modernisation. + +- __Information and electronic warfare:__ AI is being used in information and electronic warfare to help the PLA in modern conflict. For example, the PLA Navy Submarine Academy has awarded contracts related to AI-based adaptive beamforming techniques. + +- __Simulation and training:__ The PLA is using AI in training its military personnel through realistic and effective simulations of warfare. The PLA has been integrating AI technologies into various aspects of military training and operations as part of a shift towards “intelligentized warfare”. This shift began gaining significant momentum around 2015, when China emphasised the importance of AI Informatisation in its defence strategy. + +- __Command, control and communication:__ AI is being added to the PLA’s command, control and communication systems to improve military operations. This includes applications at all levels of warfare. + +China has ambitious plans to employ AI in the military, but limited transparency means that it is not always clear how advanced these systems are. The PLA is still working on overcoming challenges in testing, training and developing concepts for these AI-enabled systems. The development of military AI in the PLA is certainly changing. In the near future, changes will probably be small, but in the long term, they could be substantial. + +#### TAIWAN’S NECESSARY TILT TOWARDS AI + +Four areas that shape Taiwan’s defence are connected to the kinds of capability advantages presented by the military application of AI. + +1. AI’s centrality to China–US rivalry and the PLA’s modernisation make it a major consideration in Taiwan’s defence strategy. In 2021, veteran US diplomat Henry Kissinger warned that, among other things, a mutual failure to understand each other’s AI capability could lead to conflict. China’s President Xi Jinping talked about “emerging domain strategic capabilities” at the National People’s Congress on 11 March 2024, calling on the military to deepen reforms, promote innovation and enhance emerging strategic capabilities. AI is a source as well as an instrument of conflict between Taiwan’s principal ally and its principal adversary, so even if a resource imbalance makes it difficult for Taiwan to acquire capabilities at the same level as China, there is no escaping the need for it to understand the AI capabilities of both ally and adversary, and how those are shaping the future of warfare. + +2. US forces that might be available to defend Taiwan are based some distance away in Japan, Guam and elsewhere, making early warning of preparations for invasion essential to a successful defence strategy. It is equally important that decision-makers in Taiwan and the US base their judgements on sources of information that both can trust. The more AI and machine learning are adopted by the US to monitor and assess China’s intentions towards Taiwan, including any indications of a possible military build-up or preparations for invasion, the more important it becomes for Taiwan to keep pace and not allow a gap to open in terms of a common standard for indications and warnings. + +3. A successful invasion of Taiwan would require large amounts of materiel to cross the Taiwan Strait, making the underwater battlefield of particular importance. It is therefore natural that Taiwan is strongly incentivised to develop autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) powered by AI technology. The National Sun Yat-sen University successfully built Taiwan’s first marine-specific AUV with AI capabilities in 2020. It leverages AI and deep learning for object recognition, tracking, obstacle avoidance and self-correction during underwater operations. By integrating AI into autonomous systems, Taiwan can extend its operational reach and capabilities, enabling unmanned platforms to operate in contested environments and execute missions with minimal human oversight. + +4. The air domain has a twofold importance for Taiwan’s defence – as a means by which an invasion force could arrive, and as a means by which Taiwan’s own forces could be degraded or destroyed in advance of an invasion. According to the 2022 National Defense Technology Trend Assessment Report published in late 2022 by Taiwan’s defense think tank, the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense believes that drones should be the focus of Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare weaponry development. NCSIST, the main R&D organisation of the Armament Bureau of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, is developing AI-enabled weapon systems related to the use of drones. + +In conclusion, the integration of AI into Taiwan’s military is already offering many opportunities to enhance operational effectiveness and strengthen deterrence. As AI continues to advance, Taiwan must invest in R&D, talent acquisition and international collaboration to harness the full potential of AI technologies and secure its position as a resilient and capable force for peace and stability in the region. + + +### CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TAIWAN’S FUTURE MILITARY USE OF AI + +This section lays out seven principal challenges faced by Taiwan in advancing the implementation of AI for military functions, and makes recommendations for how to address them to continue its necessary tilt towards AI. + +#### CHALLENGE 1: DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONCERNS + +Information has always been vital in war, but in modern warfare, information – data – is the foundation for leveraging the power of AI to deliver military advantage. Implementing AI in military operations requires vast amounts of data, including information about tactics, personnel and equipment. Military drones with the latest sensors capture live intelligence on enemy movements and send the data to command centres for analysis. + +More data can only be beneficial if the problems of information overload can be managed and the data can be reliably fused into a single picture. Algorithms and machine learning find patterns, trends and problems in big data, helping to turn raw data into useful information, and helping leaders to make decisions and plan ahead. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense is implementing standardised protocols and secure cloud infrastructure to overcome information silos. This network lets data flow between different organisations, helping them work together and understand the operational landscape better. + +However, ensuring the security and privacy of this data presents a significant challenge. Concerns include unauthorised access, data breaches and exploitation by adversaries. Military personnel are encouraged to share information through user-friendly tools and platforms that let people in different places work together. But it is vital to ensure sharing technology is used properly. + +#### RECOMMENDATIONS + +- Use encryption to protect data stored on computers and sent over the internet. + +- Implement secure communication protocols to ensure that data transmitted between systems remains protected from interception or tampering. + +- Restrict access to data to authorised personnel. + +- Verify user identities for accessing sensitive information. + +- Prioritise anonymisation and pseudonymisation techniques to de-identify sensitive data, reducing the risk of exposure in the event of a breach while still allowing for meaningful analysis and use. + +- Engage advanced encryption to protect sensitive data during transmission and storage. + +- Use secure cloud infrastructure for scalable processing with robust access controls and data isolation. + +- Use strict data-handling protocols, such as applying anonymisation and secure deletion procedures. + +- Ensure continuous improvement based on feedback from military units, enhancing both performance and security. + +__`Real-world example:`__ _`The US DoD’s Project Maven, which uses AI for object recognition in military imagery and video data, makes use of advanced encryption and secure cloud infrastructure to protect the sensitive data used in its AI-powered object recognition systems for military intelligence.`_ + +#### CHALLENGE 2: TRANSPARENCY AND EXPLAINABILITY + +Many AI techniques, such as deep learning, are “black boxes”, in which the decision-making process is not transparent or easily explainable to human operators and decision-makers. Interpretable AI can help to identify potential biases or errors in the decision-making process, which is crucial for high-stakes military applications. + +#### RECOMMENDATIONS + +- Develop more transparent and interpretable AI models that allow military personnel to understand the “reasoning” behind the system’s decisions, enabling better oversight and trust in the technology. + +- Utilise research on AI explainability and visualisation techniques to improve the understandability of military AI systems. Visualisation techniques such as saliency maps and feature importance plots can help human operators quickly comprehend the factors influencing an AI system’s outputs. + +__`Real-world example:`__ _`The US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Explainable AI (XAI) programme, which ended in 2021, aimed to produce more transparent machine learning models while maintaining high performance, applicable to military decision-support systems.`_ + +#### CHALLENGE 3: ROBUSTNESS AND RELIABILITY + +AI systems have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks that can drastically reduce their performance, posing risks in high-stakes military applications. Robust security measures, such as adversarial training and model hardening, can help harden AI systems against intentional attacks designed to deceive or disable them. + +#### RECOMMENDATIONS + +- Implement robust security measures to protect AI models from external manipulation. + +- Continuously monitor for new vulnerabilities and develop countermeasures. + +- Use continuous monitoring and rapid response to emerging vulnerabilities. This is crucial to maintaining the reliability of military AI systems in the face of evolving threats. + +- Limit external access to critical AI models and defence techniques, which can help prevent adversaries from reverse-engineering or exploiting these systems. + +__`Real-world example:`__ _`The US Army Research Laboratory is developing AI systems that can detect and resist adversarial attacks, particularly for image recognition systems used in military applications.`_ + +#### CHALLENGE 4: TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS AND INTEGRATION COMPLEXITY + +Deploying AI systems in military environments often involves integrating complex technologies across diverse platforms and systems. Compatibility issues, interoperability challenges and limitations in AI capabilities may hinder seamless integration and adoption. + +#### RECOMMENDATIONS + +- Design AI systems with modular and scalable architectures to facilitate integration with existing military infrastructure. + +- Prioritise interoperability standards and protocols to ensure compatibility across different platforms and systems. + +- Conduct rigorous testing and evaluation of AI systems in realistic operational environments to identify and address technological limitations and performance gaps. + +- Implement iterative development processes to refine AI algorithms and improve system capabilities over time. + +- Pool resources and share knowledge, which can accelerate technological advances and facilitate smoother integration of AI into military operations. + +- Foster collaboration and partnerships with industry, academia and allies to leverage expertise and resources in AI research and development. + +__`Real-world example:`__ _`The US Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System uses a modular, open-systems approach to integrate AI capabilities across multiple platforms and domains. This approach enables rapid adaptation to new technologies and threats while maintaining cross-branch and allied forces interoperability.`_ + +#### CHALLENGE 5: INSUFFICIENT TRAINING DATA + +Many military applications lack the large, high-quality datasets typically required to train effective AI models using machine learning. + +#### RECOMMENDATIONS + +- When dealing with limited training data, techniques such as data augmentation can be employed to artificially expand the dataset. This includes methods such as cropping, flipping, rotating or adding noise to existing data samples. While not a complete solution, data augmentation can help increase the diversity and size of training datasets. + +- Instead of training models from scratch on limited data, transfer learning allows leveraging of models pre-trained on large, general datasets and then fine-tuning them on the smaller, domain-specific military datasets. This can significantly reduce data requirements while still achieving good performance. + +- For certain military use cases such as simulations or scenario modelling, it may be possible to generate synthetic training data using rule-based systems, physics engines or generative adversarial networks. While ensuring realism is crucial, synthetic data can supplement real-world data to increase the overall training dataset size. + +__`Real-world example:`__ _`The US Air Force’s Dataworks initiative aims to create high-quality diverse datasets for AI training in military applications, addressing the challenge of limited data in sensitive contexts. This initiative is crucial for overcoming data-scarcity challenges in developing AI for sensitive military applications.`_ + +#### CHALLENGE 6: KEEPING PACE WITH RAPID AI ADVANCES + +AI is changing fast, so it is challenging for the military’s testing and use to keep pace with developments in the technology. + +#### RECOMMENDATIONS + +- Agile development allows the military to be more responsive to the fast-paced changes in AI, rather than relying on traditional, lengthy procurement processes. + +- Continuous integration and testing help ensure new AI systems are thoroughly vetted before being deployed in operational environments. + +- Investing in internal AI R&D helps the military stay ahead of the curve and develop custom solutions tailored to its specific needs. + +- Attracting and retaining skilled AI researchers and engineers ensures the military has the necessary expertise to effectively leverage the latest advances. + +- Collaborating with academic and industry partners can help the military access the latest AI innovations and knowledge. + +__`Real-world example:`__ _`The US DoD’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) uses an agile development approach, allowing for rapid prototyping and iteration of AI systems. This approach allows JAIC to keep pace with rapid advancements in AI technology while ensuring that developed systems meet the specific needs of the military.`_ + +#### CHALLENGE 7: ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS + +AI raises complex ethical and legal issues around autonomy, compliance with international law and accountability for AI-driven decisions and actions. + +#### RECOMMENDATIONS + +- Develop comprehensive ethical guidelines and frameworks specific to the use of AI in military contexts. Ensure that these guidelines address issues such as human oversight, accountability and the responsible use of autonomous systems. + +- Engage with and draw on the work of international processes set up to explore and develop regulation on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) in the context of international humanitarian law, such as the Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS at the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva. + +- Ensure military AI applications comply with national and international regulations, including regulations governing the use of force, data protection and human rights. + +- Conduct legal reviews and assessments to identify and mitigate potential legal risks. + +- Foster transparency in AI systems by providing clear documentation of their capabilities, limitations and decision-making processes. + +- Establish mechanisms for accountability, including processes for reviewing and auditing AI-related decisions and actions. + +__`Real-world example:`__ _`The UK Ministry of Defence has established an AI Ethics Advisory Panel to provide external advice and scrutiny of its AI development and deployment, ensuring alignment with ethical principles and legal requirements.`_ + + +### CONCLUSION + +AI appears to offer significant military advantages in terms of strategy (especially information processing and C2), operational capabilities, logistics and support. However, navigating the complexities of implementing AI in the military field requires careful consideration of not only technological capabilities but also ethical and organisational challenges. + +In Taiwan’s case, where material imbalances and political dependencies dominate the risks of conflict, those responsible for the island’s defence cannot afford to neglect any aspect of AI’s potential to gain time and level the playing field. Embracing AI in the military fosters a culture of innovation and adaptability to stay ahead of emerging threats and technological advances. By investing in R&D and fostering collaboration with international partners, Taiwan can design military AI systems with modular and scalable architectures that can accommodate updates and upgrades as the technology evolves, as well as remaining interoperable with its key ally, the US. + +By identifying and mitigating risks proactively, Taiwan’s military can make gains beyond enhancing its own defensive capabilities. Keeping up with the rapid pace of AI development through the recommendations in this paper will enable the military to more effectively integrate and leverage the latest AI innovations to maintain a world-class technological edge, making Taiwan a globally more attractive defence industry partner. The combination of Taiwan’s industrial and technological and skills base, experience in AI research and experimentation, and the pressures of its defence challenges position it to take a lead on the military application of AI. + +Ultimately, Taiwan must embrace military AI because its adversary uses it, and so does its ally, and Taiwan must align with them on critical defence judgements and for interoperability. Taiwan needs AI to offset its scale disadvantages in demographics and material capability. AI-powered automation can multiply the number of platforms without the need for large personnel outlays. Gains in administrative and logistic efficiency permit scarce military personnel to focus their efforts on more critical missions and tasks, thereby maximising operational effectiveness. + +Given the complex geopolitical situation and rapid advances in military AI, Taiwan faces a critical decision regarding the immediate development of AI for military use. + +#### KEY CONSIDERATIONS + +Key considerations for the Taiwanese government include: + +1. Strategic necessity: AI development is likely to be crucial for Taiwan’s asymmetric defence strategy against potential threats from China. As China continues to advance its military AI capabilities, Taiwan needs to develop countermeasures to maintain a credible deterrent. AI could significantly enhance Taiwan’s surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning systems, providing a vital edge in situational awareness and response time. + +2. Technological readiness: Taiwan has a strong technological foundation, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing, which could support AI development. However, it may face challenges in terms of data availability, computational power and specialised expertise for military AI applications. Careful assessment of these capabilities is necessary to ensure effective development and deployment. + +3. Economic considerations: Given Taiwan’s limited defence budget compared to China’s, investing in AI could be a cost-effective way to enhance military capabilities. AI systems could potentially provide force multiplication effects, allowing Taiwan to do more with less. However, the initial investment and ongoing maintenance costs must be carefully weighed against other defence priorities. + +4. Operational impact: Integrating AI into military operations will require significant changes in training, doctrine and organisational structure. Taiwan’s military will need to develop new skills and competencies to effectively utilise AI systems. Additionally, robust cyber-security measures must be implemented to protect AI systems from potential attacks or manipulation. + +To mitigate risks and accelerate the development and integration of AI capabilities in the military, Taiwan should consider: + +1. Focusing on specific AI applications that address critical defence needs. + +2. Leveraging international partnerships, particularly with the US, for technology sharing and expertise. + +3. Investing in education and training programmes to build a skilled workforce for AI development and implementation. + +4. Prioritising cyber security and resilience in AI system design and deployment. + +In conclusion, while there are challenges and risks associated with rapidly developing military AI, the strategic necessity for Taiwan appears to outweigh these concerns. In addition, China’s growing military capabilities, its future ambitions and the potential for AI to serve as a force multiplier make it crucial for Taiwan to consider prioritising the development of military AI applications. However, this should be done thoughtfully, with careful consideration of ethical implications, international norms and the need for robust security measures. + +--- + +__Cheng-Hung Hsu__ is the Chief of Operations Control at Taiwan’s Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command. His research interests include cyber security, defence strategy and Indo-Pacific policy. He holds a BA in Electronic Engineering and is a graduate of the Republic of China Air Force Air Command and Staff College. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-10-23-china-in-multilateral-system.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-10-23-china-in-multilateral-system.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e4d5b599 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-10-23-china-in-multilateral-system.md @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : China In Multilateral System +author: Daniel F. Runde and Austin Hardman +date : 2024-10-23 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/0am2B3m.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Great Power Competition in the Multilateral System" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_China is gaining influence within the international institutions that the United States has created, funded, and legitimized. China’s strategic positioning in multilateral bodies has allowed it to exert considerable influence, particularly within the UN system._ + + + +### Introduction + +The landscape of great power competition within multilateral institutions has significantly evolved over the past few decades, reflecting broader shifts in global power dynamics. The United States, historically dominant in these forums, now faces increasing competition from China and other emerging powers. Absent of a challenger, China is gaining influence within the international institutions that the United States has created, funded, and legitimized. China’s strategic positioning and substantial investments in multilateral bodies have allowed it to exert considerable influence, particularly within the United Nations system. + +China’s approach includes placing its citizens in key leadership positions, increasing staffing, and boosting unearmarked financial contributions to multilateral institutions. This strategy not only enhances China’s influence over global policies but also promotes its development model and geopolitical interests in the Global South. Despite being the largest financial contributor to many international organizations, the United States has seen a relative decline in its influence, partly due to financial constraints, strategic missteps, and underrepresentation in staffing. Building on the 2021 CSIS report The Future of U.S. Leadership in Multilateral Development Institutions: A Playbook for the Next 10 Years, this policy brief presents recent trends regarding the Global South’s growing alignment with China and suggests ways for the United States to reclaim its influence within the multilateral system. + + +### China’s Rising Influence in the Multilateral System + +Multilateral institutions play a crucial role in collaborative governance and consensus building, reflecting broader shifts in global power structures. Since their inception nearly eight decades ago, the United States has maintained a preeminent norm-setting role in these institutions, leveraging its economic and political influence to shape international agendas and advocate for Western values. However, this influence has been steadily declining, coinciding with the rise of China as a formidable player on the global stage. At the same time, developing countries have demanded a greater voice in shaping these institutions in ways that are distinct from the priorities of both the United States and China. + +> #### `Box 1. Exerting Influence in Multilateral Organizations` + +_`China has a track record of using multilateral institutions to promote its interests under the guise of the UN flag and in contravention of UN rules requiring agency heads to act as neutral international civil servants rather than agents of their home country.`_ + +- _`Under Chinese leadership, the International Civil Aviation Organization, which decides global flight paths and which airspace belongs to what countries, has excluded Taiwan from the organization.`_ + +- _`A UN whistleblower, a former employee of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), has alleged China’s use of intimidation of human rights defenders, bribery, and edited documents to remove mention of unflattering realities, such as facts about the origins of the Covid-19 virus and human rights abuses in China.`_ + +- _`In October 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted on whether to hold a debate on human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang after the OHCHR released an assessment that found evidence of serious abuses, including possible crimes against humanity. China managed to garner enough support to kill the resolution, with 19 votes against it, 17 in favor, and 11 abstentions. China successfully avoided further discussions and accountability for its human rights violations, including “mass arbitrary detention, widespread torture, sexual violence, coercive birth suppression, family separation, forced labor, and repression of religious and cultural practices in Xinjiang.”`_ + +- _`By placing Chinese nationals in senior positions, China aims to boost the presence of Chinese tech companies, garner support for Chinese state-backed initiatives, and push the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s authoritarian norms. After being reelected unopposed as the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) secretary general, Houlin Zhao, whose previous experience includes developing telecommunications standards for the Chinese government, insisted that allegations of Huawei’s 5G equipment being used for espionage were baseless and politically motivated. Under the pretense of digital inclusion, the ITU touted its role in Huawei’s rollout of digital infrastructure in nearly 80 countries, impacting 90 million people in remote areas. Huawei is the same Chinese corporation responsible for developing and implementing surveillance technology, including facial recognition and a “Uighur alert” system, to enable China’s techno-authoritarian model of governance. The CCP leverages the United Nations’ specialized agency for digital technologies to push for authoritarian norms and sell its mobile network equipment and surveillance systems to train its own artificial intelligence. The ITU has adopted dozens of standards proposals from Chinese companies such as Huawei. The ITU’s standards are then adopted by developing countries that lack regulatory agencies of their own. that lack regulatory agencies of their own.`_ + +China was largely uninvolved in the affairs of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations until the 1990s. Apart from issues relating to Taiwan, China rarely exercised interest or made voluntary contributions to the United Nations. China’s engagement increased rapidly once it started on the path toward globalizing its economy (see Box 1). China’s increasing influence in the United Nations has become evident through several trends: + +1. __Competing for Leadership Positions:__ Through its leadership roles in multilateral forums, China promotes efforts that support its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), influencing global standards and practices in ways that favor its economic and political values and interests. Beijing has cultivated UN leaders, such as Secretary-General António Guterres, to champion the BRI and align it with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Under Chinese leadership, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has emphasized projects that dovetail with BRI objectives, raising concerns among Western leaders about China’s potential to undermine the integrity of multilateral institutions. + + In 2021, Chinese nationals led 4 of the 15 major UN specialized agencies: the FAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Additionally, China sought leadership of a fifth agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization, but that effort was successfully thwarted. Nevertheless, the leadership positions held by Chinese nationals in key agencies underscore China’s strategic positioning within the UN system and its intent to influence global policies and priorities in critical areas such as international development and technological advancement. + + African nations, as the largest regional bloc in the United Nations, with a 28 percent voting share, have played a crucial role in supporting China’s rise within multilateral institutions. A robust focus on Africa continues to pay dividends for China in multilateral fora, as evidenced by African support in electing Chinese nationals to the lead positions in four UN principal agencies, as well as securing deputy slots in nine others. African votes have also been pivotal in the passage of U.S.-opposed Chinese resolutions and increasing China’s representation within the UN Secretariat and various UN funds and programs, further solidifying Beijing’s influence. + +2. __Increasing Its Personnel Footprint:__ China has strategically increased its presence within multilateral institutions by boosting staff numbers. The number of Chinese nationals employed by the United nations nearly doubled from 2009 to 2022, reaching 1,564 personnel in 2022. In tandem, China sponsored 32 UN junior professional officers (JPOs) and 590 other professional staff between 2015 and 2021, achieving rapid growth in just five years. To counterbalance China’s growing personnel footprint and increase the number of U.S. nationals in international organizations, the U.S. Department of State has made efforts over the past three years to publicize JPO vacancies in international institutions. + +3. __Flexing Its Financial Muscle:__ Over the past decade, China has more than quadrupled its discretionary contributions to multilateral development institutions, including significant voluntary funding directed to multilateral development bank (MDB) concessional financing windows and specialized UN entities.China’s role in the World Bank has also expanded significantly since it joined in 1980. By 2013, it had become the third-largest shareholder in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank’s lending arm, with 5.03 percent of the voting power. This not only reflects China’s economic growth but also deliberate policy choices aimed at enhancing its global influence. China’s level of funding is still a fraction of that provided by the United States, but China has been able to mobilize this funding to advance national priorities in ways that the United States has not. + + China’s financial influence also includes substantial contributions to the World Bank’s International Development Association and specialized UN entities such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the World Food Programme, and UNICEF. In addition, within the UN system, China created the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund in 2016 with a $200 million contribution over 10 years, supporting peacekeeping, rapid response, and conflict prevention and mediation. It remains the only donor to this fund and has explicitly stated that the fund is intended to align the United Nations’ Agenda 2030 with the BRI. Additionally, in 2018, due in part to African lobbying, China placed an 8,000-strong standby force at the United Nations’ disposal for crisis deployment, and China is now the largest troop contributor among the UN Security Council’s permanent members. + +4. __Leveraging New Institutions to Pursue Commercial Interests:__ To challenge the current global order, or to respond to what it sees as unfair treatment, China has established new multilateral organizations and partnerships, particularly with the Global South, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank, where it is the largest or co-largest shareholder and which exclude the United States. These institutions not only enhance China’s financial and strategic reach but also provide a platform for promoting its development model and policy preferences. + + The strategic engagement of Chinese firms in multilateral institutions further underscores China’s expanding influence. China’s ability to integrate its commercial interests with its strategic objectives has led to the prominence of Chinese firms in MDB contracts. In 2019 alone, Chinese firms won contracts worth $7.4 billion from major MDBs, representing 14 percent of total contracts by value. In recent years, Chinese firms have continued to rise to be the top or near-top recipients of contracts from MDBs. Between fiscal years 2013 and 2022, Chinese businesses were awarded around 20 percent of all contracts from the World Bank, positioning them as its top contract recipients. This dominance in procurement reflects institutional rules favoring the lowest bids and the substantial presence of Chinese firms in infrastructure sectors. China’s commercial benefits from these contracts align with its broader strategy of leveraging economic tools to gain political and strategic advantages within multilateral frameworks. + + +### China’s Strategic Engagement with the Global South + +China’s strategy extends beyond merely filling top positions and personnel in the multilateral system; it actively shapes the norms and policies of these institutions to align with its broader geopolitical goals. More importantly, China presents itself as a developing country and leading advocate for the Global South. + +Beijing has articulated a doctrine that places development and multilateralism at the forefront of Chinese foreign policy: “Big powers are the key, China’s periphery the priority, developing countries the foundation, and multilateral platforms the stage.” Through platforms such as the AIIB and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), Global South nations gain access to substantial economic aid, infrastructure development, and investment – critical for their development goals. China has had a long-standing relationship with the IsDB and, in recent years, established a partnership to assist bank members in constructing anti-pandemic infrastructure. China’s involvement provides these countries alternatives to Western-led financial institutions, often with more favorable terms and less-stringent conditions regarding governance and human rights standards. + +Additionally, China’s diplomatic strategy includes steering nations toward its commercial sector. In recent years, China has significantly increased its presence in countries such as Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Djibouti, Venezuela, Laos, and others through strategic and significant foreign direct investment and foreign aid. Many of these countries now align themselves more closely with China’s geopolitical interests, resulting in diminished reliance on traditional Western partners, including the United States. Nations that engage in deals with China do not face consequences from the United States, even when the United States is a major donor or trading partner. + +China is actively using personal engagement to strengthen ties and leverage its position, often filling the vacuum left by U.S. neglect in various regions. In Africa, for example, where U.S. influence has been waning in recent years, China has maintained leading engagement among the continent’s central, eastern, and southern countries. In these regions, China fosters visits and interactions with senior security leaders across various sectors, including the army, air force, navy, and police, supporting Beijing’s strategic goals and agenda on the continent. China has also established 53 embassies in Africa – three more than the United States. + +Moreover, high-level visits have not been a regular feature of U.S.-Africa relations. However, the Biden administration has recently increased its focus on China, leading to more high-level engagements with African nations. In 2023, 17 cabinet members and leaders of U.S. government departments and agencies visited 26 African countries. Despite this uptick, these efforts pale in comparison to China’s sustained attention to Africa. For 33 years, Chinese foreign ministers have consistently made Africa their first stop in annual overseas travel, a standard practice so routine it garners no special media attention. Xi Jinping personally made 10 visits to Africa between 2014 and 2020. + +As a result of these trends, China’s influence within multilateral institutions has profoundly shaped the positions and voting behaviors of Global South countries on key global issues. This influence became particularly evident through their voting patterns on critical matters such as the war in Ukraine, human rights violations, and the status of Taiwan. + +#### Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine + +Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many African, Asian, and Latin American countries have abstained from voting on resolutions condemning Russia’s actions. During the March 2022 emergency voting session on the “Aggression against Ukraine” resolution in the UN General Assembly, 17 African countries abstained from voting and an additional eight declined participation. This abstention reflects a diplomatic balancing act, influenced by economic and political ties with the West, China, and Russia. It demonstrates the nuanced positions these countries adopt to maintain favorable relations and avoid jeopardizing economic partnerships. + +The abstentions and opposition to the resolutions against Russian aggression may reveal a growing assertiveness among countries of the Global South in shaping their foreign policies independently of traditional power blocs. Alternatively, the abstentions could be a reaction against what is seen as “the West” prioritizing a war in Europe over deadly conflicts in the Global South. The abstentions may also reflect countries’ unwillingness to involve themselves in a conflict that does not concern them. Regardless, this trend is indicative of a broader shift toward a multipolar world where Global South countries seek to assert their independence and protect their interests on the global stage. + +#### Human Rights Violations + +In addition, China’s influence extends to human rights issues, where many Global South countries align with China’s positions on sensitive topics such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. During the 2022 vote on holding a Human Rights Council debate on human rights violations in Xinjiang, most African countries abstained or voted against the resolution in a show of support for China. This alignment stems from China’s extensive economic engagements and development assistance, which create an implicit expectation of political backing in international forums. China’s strategic investment and aid allow it to build a network of allies that support its positions in multilateral organizations. + +#### Status of Taiwan + +China’s influence also plays a critical role in issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly concerning Taiwan. Most Global South countries, influenced by their economic and diplomatic ties with China, not only profess adherence to the One China policy but go further by adopting Beijing’s preferred language of the “One China principle.” For example, Eswatini is the only African nation to recognize Taiwan. This diplomatic stance is crucial for China as it seeks to isolate Taiwan internationally. Support from these countries in international forums ensures that resolutions or statements potentially supportive of Taiwan rarely pass, consolidating China’s position and preventing any diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. + +The alignment of Global South countries with China often results in the dilution of Western-led efforts to address issues such as human rights abuses, democratic governance, and territorial disputes. This shift complicates the balance of power within multilateral institutions, making it more challenging for Western nations to garner support for their initiatives. Consequently, this dynamic can lead to a fragmented international order where achieving consensus on critical global issues becomes increasingly difficult, impacting the effectiveness of global governance. + + +### Recommendations + +The change in landscape discussed above may have initially caused some challenges, but it is time to reflect inward, assessing U.S. shortcomings in strategy and execution more than focusing on what others have done. An urgent mission objective for the United States and its allies should be to restore primacy in the multilateral system. Many of the actionable steps the United States can take toward reclaiming power ceded to China are connected and more complicated than they may appear, but they are critical to achieving foreign policy objectives through the multilateral system. + +- __Establish priorities, align resources, and coordinate across U.S. missions.__ + + To regain leadership in international organizations and counter China’s growing influence, the United States should establish regular communication channels between U.S. representatives at international organizations, relevant home bureaus at the State Department, and U.S. country missions worldwide. This will help the United States better understand the domestic environments and specific needs of Global South countries, enabling it to build support in capitals for its preferences, address reasons for their alignment with China, and strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships. + + Improving interagency cooperation within the U.S. government is another crucial step for achieving foreign policy goals and enhancing overall diplomatic effectiveness. Utilizing integrated digital platforms for communication and management of policy implementation, which allow for real-time sharing of data and insights, can significantly improve interagency workflow and efficiency. + + However, enhanced communication and coordination are meaningless without established priorities. The United States should develop a priority list of top multilateral issues for missions to focus on. This prioritization will help guide missions in addressing the most pressing global challenges and ensure that U.S. efforts are concentrated where they will have the greatest impact. This approach will enable the United States to effectively mobilize resources, advocate for key initiatives, and foster partnerships that align with its values and interests, countering the influence of other major players such as China in the Global South. Matching resources and communication channels to prioritizations will prevent wasted political capital and maximize the weight of influence wielded in multilateral organizations. + +- __Invest in the diplomatic corps.__ + + The United States should prioritize developing personal relationships with political leaders and decisionmakers to enhance its soft power in international diplomacy. This means prioritizing a personal, on-the-ground presence to build relationships and understand the interests and needs of other nations. These relationships are crucial, as they often influence decisions and ensure diplomats remain well informed through regular information sharing. The United States is already moving in this direction by opening new embassies in Pacific Island nations such as Tonga and Kiribati, demonstrating a commitment to foster closer ties. However, more needs to be done on this front. + + The United States should also prioritize improving training and providing incentives for diplomats to gain experience in multilateral institutions, with a focus on refining diplomacy skills. Training programs should be enhanced to include comprehensive modules on modern diplomacy, incorporating digital literacy, strategic communications, and crisis management. + + The United States is currently undergoing a major overhaul in its approach to training diplomats, making more training a career requirement and developing additional courses for diplomats at all career stages. The U.S. Congress has also mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2024 that training related to multilateral diplomacy be included and strengthened. This action recognizes that incentives, such as career advancement opportunities, financial rewards, and recognition, should be provided to encourage diplomats to take on challenging assignments within multilateral institutions. + + Establishing a multilateral “cone” for diplomats should be a part of the training overhaul. By having an entire portion of officers specializing in this niche of foreign affairs, diplomats will become knowledgeable of processes unique to these systems and will have already formed valuable personal relationships with diplomats from other countries in the same field. Formalizing a multilateral track within the Foreign Service would produce stronger personnel in vital roles within the multilateral system. + +- __Leverage technology and data.__ + + The United States should leverage advanced technology and data management systems to improve coordination and strategic decisionmaking in multilateral forums. As diplomacy increasingly demands data-driven insights, integrating technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and big data analytics will enable the United States to process and analyze vast amounts of information swiftly and accurately, identify patterns, predict trends, and respond to emerging issues more effectively. + + Incorporating these technologies can significantly enhance various diplomatic functions. For instance, AI can sift through social media data to conduct sentiment analysis, allowing diplomats to gauge public opinion and measure the impact of their diplomatic efforts. Big data analytics can also aid in negotiations by removing bias and developing possible scenarios, providing diplomats with a strategic edge. By ensuring continuity and efficiency, information can easily be passed from outgoing to incoming representatives, preventing years of work from being wasted. + + In 2021, the State Department released its first-ever enterprise data strategy, Enterprise Data Strategy – Empowering Data Informed Diplomacy, marking a significant step in the department’s shift toward a data-centric approach. This strategy aims to equip the department’s workforce with timely, data-driven insights crucial for making important mission and management decisions. Since 2021, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken has pressed to hire hundreds of data specialists and to build collaboration with the “policy” bureaus in what the State Department calls “Data Informed Diplomacy.” The State Department is now in the midst of deploying AI and considering the range of tasks where it can be of use, as Blinken discussed publicly in late June 2024. + + By investing in data analysis initiatives, equipping diplomats with the necessary skills, and fostering a data-centric culture, the United States can enhance its strategic capabilities. This approach will not only improve coordination and information sharing among U.S. diplomatic missions and international organizations but also offer a compelling alternative to the authoritarian models promoted by China. + +- __Prioritize strategic engagement with influential UN members.__ + + Prioritizing engagement with influential countries in the United Nations can help the United States build strategic alliances and regain leadership in international organizations. By understanding and addressing the unique interests and needs of these countries, the United States can foster stronger bilateral and multilateral relationships, thereby enhancing its diplomatic influence. + + Understanding the objectives of others helps the United States to be a better partner. For instance, Brazil seeks to lead initiatives focused on revitalizing multilateral organizations such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum. Brazil has also been advocating for UN Security Council reform to gain a permanent seat. By supporting these efforts, the United States can align with Brazil’s strategic goals, promoting cooperation on regional stability, economic development, and social progress. Additionally, Brazil is a key player in environmental issues and sustainable development, particularly given its stewardship of the Amazon rainforest. Collaborating on environmental issues could strengthen U.S.-Brazil relations while contributing to global climate goals. + + Similarly, involving Pakistan in dialogues about security, counterterrorism, and economic development can also open new avenues for cooperation and reinforce the United States’ commitment to stability in South Asia. The International Monetary Fund recently approved a $7 billion loan to Pakistan. Pakistan plays a key role in regional security, especially concerning the situation in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Pakistan is a significant participant in China’s BRI, with projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. By addressing Pakistan’s economic development needs and offering alternative partnerships, the United States can counterbalance China’s influence and strengthen bilateral ties. + +- __Increase U.S. leadership and staffing in multilateral organizations.__ + + As recommended in the 2021 CSIS report, actively advocating for U.S. candidates in leadership positions within multilateral organizations is essential for advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives and fostering cooperation on shared challenges. The United States must identify and develop qualified U.S. candidates with extensive experience and a deep understanding of international affairs. + + Public endorsements from high-ranking officials, such as the secretary of state, can significantly enhance the visibility and credibility of these candidates. For example, the early endorsement of Doreen Bogdan-Martin for the ITU secretary-general position by the State Department and USAID administrator Samantha Power highlighted a forward-looking strategy that should be emulated. Furthermore, the groundwork for Bogan-Martin was laid years prior under the Trump administration with a successful deputy secretary-general campaign, followed by strong efforts to clear the campaign field so that it was only the U.S. candidate running against Russia’s Rashid Ismailov. + + Such diplomatic efforts are vital in garnering support for U.S. candidates. Utilizing diplomatic channels, including embassies and international forums, to lobby for U.S. candidates is critical. Focusing on organizations where leadership positions are becoming vacant and where U.S. strategic interests are most significant – such as the ITU, International Maritime Organization, FAO, and World Bank – is essential. Collaborating with like-minded countries to counterbalance undemocratic competitors’ influence and maintaining engagement with organizations, even if U.S. candidates are not elected, will further secure U.S. interests. + + In addition, seconding staff to key UN agencies allows for the development of relationships with counterparts from other countries, fostering networks that can be leveraged to support U.S. initiatives and candidates for leadership positions. Such positions provide an opportunity to build a cadre of U.S. experts experienced in multilateral settings, improving the United States’ ability to navigate and influence these organizations in the long term. These seconded positions should be targeted toward strategic UN roles that align with U.S. foreign policy objectives and areas of interest. + +- __Invest in economic development to complement diplomatic efforts.__ + + Investing in economic development abroad is crucial for the United States to maintain its leadership role in the international arena and address global challenges effectively. By strengthening development efforts, the United States enhances its ability to shape international norms and standards. In this context, Africa emerges as a critical region where increased U.S. engagement can yield significant geopolitical and economic benefits. One critical aspect is increasing the frequency of visits by senior U.S. government officials and commercial officers to African countries, which can address mutual interests and foster stronger bilateral relationships. + + Enhancing trade and investment is another critical aspect. Reauthorizing initiatives such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act promotes stronger trade ties between the United States and African nations by offering African countries better access to the U.S. market and encouraging economic growth. + + Maintaining strategic dialogue with key African regional organizations, such as the African Union, is also crucial for fostering collaborative relationships and understanding regional priorities and challenges. This dialogue can lead to more effective cooperation on issues such as security, development, and governance, aligning U.S. and African interests. + + By committing to a more robust and consistent diplomatic presence, the United States can build long-term partnerships and counter China’s influence. This approach will not only support U.S. foreign policy objectives but also contribute to the stability and prosperity of developing regions. + +- __Promote modernization in the UN System.__ + + The United States should prioritize modernization and reform efforts within multilateral forums to ensure these institutions remain relevant and effective in addressing global challenges. As a major contributor to the UN budget, the United States has a vested interest in ensuring that funds are used appropriately. The United States should advocate for various reforms: + + - __Investing in the Latest Digital Tools and AI:__ Modernizing with the latest digital tools and AI is crucial for streamlining data sharing, analyzing global trends, and predicting crises. Such technological advancements can enhance the ability of multilateral organizations to respond swiftly and effectively to emerging issues under U.S. leadership. + + - __Enhancing Transparency and Accountability:__ This can be achieved through regular independent audits, public reporting of financial statements, and encouraging whistleblower protections within the United Nations. + + - __Supporting Security Council Reform:__ Advocating for the inclusion of new permanent seats for African and Latin American countries will help better reflect global power shifts. Reform to the UN Security Council regarding the permanent members is unlikely to be significant due to ongoing regional competition. Conflicts such as Brazil versus Mexico, Japan versus China, and the challenge of selecting a single African country for a permanent seat make substantial changes improbable. Instead, any changes that occur will remain at the margins, reflecting incremental adjustments rather than comprehensive reform. Additional proposals, such as expanding the G7 to include Australia, South Korea, and the European Union, have been put forward to form a “formal Democracies 10,” or D10, that would promote coordinated actions among democracies. + + - __Reforming the Human Rights Council:__ The current incentive structure allows bad actors to seek Human Rights Council membership to pursue their own immunity and protect fellow violators. There are no negative consequences for countries with low human rights standards sitting on the council. This is unacceptable. There must be increased accountability for those with poor marks on the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. + + - __Reviewing UN Procurement Policies:__ This ensures fair contract distribution, preventing a disproportionate allocation to countries such as China. Although China may not win the majority of UN contracts, its success rate appears higher compared to others, similar to its performance with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. This trend highlights the need for more transparent and equitable procurement practices within the United Nations to maintain a balanced and fair competitive environment for all participating countries. + + - __Introducing Clear Performance Metrics:__ Regular evaluations of UN agencies are essential to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations. The United States can support these efforts by advocating for the definition of key performance indicators, conducting regular impact assessments, and implementing feedback mechanisms involving beneficiaries and stakeholders. + +- __Pay late dues and leverage funding in the future.__ + + The United States should address the recurring issue of late payments to the United Nations. This may require paying double in one year to rectify the situation when Congress approves the following year. The Chinese Communist Party does not have the same appropriations process as the U.S. Congress. In pursuit of enabling the secretary of state, a designee of the secretary, or the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations to do their job from a position of strength, rather than constantly playing catch-up, an effort to reconcile the currently incongruent fiscal cycles of the U.S. government and the United Nations would be a worthy endeavor. + + Resolving late payments in Congress should be paired with empowering the secretary of state with clearer, more subjective control over the funds to establish greater diplomatic leverage at their disposal. To be clear, leveraging finances is a separate issue from paying dues on time, but the goal should be to have nothing potentially tainting the authority or credibility of the United States. As it now stands, U.S. diplomats have little to no flexibility in both authority and resource allocation to effectively administer repercussions for bad actors. + + +### Conclusion + +The United States cannot abandon its leadership role in the United Nations and other multilateral institutions despite legitimate criticisms of their performance, transparency, and oversight. The United States must “ride herd” on the multilateral system. To counterbalance China’s growing influence, the United States must enhance communication and coordination across its diplomatic missions, invest in training and incentives for its diplomats, leverage advanced technology and data, and prioritize personal diplomacy. Strengthening partnerships with influential UN members and increasing U.S. leadership in multilateral organizations are also critical. Additionally, promoting modernization and accountability within multilateral forums can ensure these institutions remain effective and aligned with democratic values. + +Implementing these recommendations is crucial for the United States to regain and sustain its influence, especially in the Global South. This region is becoming an increasingly significant arena in the great power competition between the United States and China, with its large voting blocs and strategic partnerships. For the next U.S. administration, prioritizing these actions will be essential to countering China’s growing dominance and ensuring that U.S. values and interests are upheld in the international arena. + +In this era of great power competition, it is imperative for the United States to adapt and reinforce its leadership within multilateral institutions. By doing so, the United States can better address global challenges, promote sustainable development, and maintain a balanced international order. Taking a proactive stance will enable the United States to effectively navigate the complexities of global diplomacy and secure a leading role in shaping the future of international relations. + +--- + +__Daniel F. Runde__ is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. + +__Austin Hardman__ is a research assistant with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-10-24-democracy-and-human-rights.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-10-24-democracy-and-human-rights.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..6aa6a981 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-10-24-democracy-and-human-rights.md @@ -0,0 +1,278 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Democracy And Human Rights +author: Michael J. Green and Derek Mitchell +date : 2024-10-24 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/DTaBvUE.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Democracy, Human Rights, and American Grand Strategy: Towards a Bipartisan Consensus" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Authoritarian states are targeting weaknesses in democratic governance to undermine U.S. interests across the globe. It is time for a bipartisan strategy that rallies alliances, business, and civil society actors in defense of democratic governance and human rights._ + + + +Throughout its history, the United States has emphasized human rights and democracy as core tenets of global engagement but struggled to balance those priorities against the exigencies of immediate geopolitical threats. At home, the definition of democracy itself is increasingly contested in a hyper-partisan political environment that foreign adversaries seek to exploit for their own strategic gain. Both at home and abroad, key foreign policy strategists are questioning whether the United States and its allies have the consensus or capacity necessary to put values at the core of their resistance to coercion and cooption by aggrieved and autocratic adversaries. + +This report argues that the United States can – and must – do more to promote democracy and democratic norms internationally if it is to secure a favorable international order that preserves common prosperity and security as well as a dignified way of life for people everywhere in the twenty-first century. It further argues that it is precisely because of, not in spite of, the aggressive ambitions and methods of the autocratic powers that the United States must integrate defense of democracy and human rights into its national security strategy. It notes that despite divisions at home, a broad bipartisan commitment exists to defend and advance democratic values that can be harnessed to sustain such a strategy. The report further illustrates that in key regions of the world, U.S. allies and partners are themselves recognizing that both their security and their economic interests depend on the democratic resilience of vulnerable states in their near abroad. Many are articulating strategies and preparing tools that align with or complement U.S. approaches. + +The United States therefore has a requirement and opportunities to develop an integrated democracy strategy. The point is not that military, economic, or diplomatic objectives should be subordinated to human rights or democracy priorities, but rather that these strategies should be integrated in national security planning alongside diplomatic, military, and economic objectives. Key elements would include the following efforts: + +- __Harness democratic allies and partners:__ It is important that any democratic agenda not be seen as a special interest of the United States but as one shared by a diverse array of nations globally. This is not a matter of recruiting allies and partners to a singular strategy but rather empowering them to shape debates and reinforce democratic norms internationally and in their own regions. The best framing for this effort in Asia, Africa, or Latin America is around sovereignty, prosperity, resilience, and national self-strengthening rather than justice or strategic competition with China and Russia. Empirical demonstrations, for example, that accountability, transparency, rule of law mechanisms, and women’s empowerment enhance national wealth and strength will be powerful. One successful example of such a regional approach is the National Endowment for Democracy’s Sunnylands Initiative on Enhancing Democratic Partnership in the Indo-Pacific. + +- __Harness the business community:__ The U.S. business community should understand the competitive advantage of promoting a normative agenda that enhances openness and rules given their need for a level playing field in overseas markets and to counter the corruption and kleptocracy that have become business models for the modern-day authoritarian. Private sector engagement and trade policy levers can have significant impact on transparency and good governance that in turn reinforce accountability to the governed. + +- __Harness civil society and support democrats at risk:__ The United States should continue to underwrite the development of democratic institutions worldwide, including an independent civil society. U.S. leaders should be consistent in meeting with and speaking out on behalf of dissidents and champions of freedom to encourage those struggling on the front lines of the normative democratic challenge. State Department reporting on democracy and human rights, and the work of U.S. Agency for Global Media components such as Radio Free Asia and Voice of America, also promote norms of openness and free expression and protect democrats at risk. + +- __Enhance resilience of international institutions:__ China’s growing diplomatic influence in bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council has proven frustrating for U.S. interests. Efforts by autocracies to neuter or reshape international institutions should be a reason to increase U.S. diplomatic efforts rather than allow UN and regional bodies to become advocates for an authoritarian vision of regional and global order inconsistent with their origins. + +- __Enhance U.S. strategic communications:__ Authoritarian regimes can often prove more agile than democracies at disseminating information and maintaining message discipline, but democratic allies enjoy the advantage of representing norms desired by billions of people worldwide. The United States and its allies should develop a global information strategy that supports local independent media, facilitates access to balanced news and analysis, and actively counters false and self-interested narratives advanced by authoritarians. + +- __Harness digital technology:__ Digital technologies, particularly social media and artificial intelligence (AI), are playing an increasingly important role in enhancing the threat of algorithmically proliferated attacks on democracies and on the idea of democracy itself. Digital literacy, social media regulation, and support for those seeking to develop digital tools that are explicitly designed to enhance conversation and compromise (i.e., democratic norms), should be enhanced. The United States and its allies should also lead on establishing international principles on AI, oppose the unauthorized and unlabeled use of deep fakes, and establish digital norms, particularly around elections. + +- __Sustain bipartisan consensus:__ As with most foreign policy issues, bipartisan unity and executive-congressional consensus will ensure strategic continuity and enhance prospects for success in advancing U.S. interests. A deliberate bipartisan coalition would help advance a values-based foreign policy that reflects the best traditions of the United States and defend U.S. security, while demonstrating to allies, partners, democratic activists, and autocratic adversaries alike that American unity, solidarity, and sustained commitment to the issue is strategic and unshakable. + +Democracy is said to be in decline. But it is better understood to be under attack. Citizens today who are unhappy with their leaders, in democracies and autocracies alike, seek not less of a voice in political affairs, but more. Not fewer rights and protections, but more. Not less democracy, but better democracy. And they’re looking for allies. + +The good news is supporting democratic development is not financially costly and plays to America’s strengths. But some creativity and urgency in developing a coherent democracy support strategy is needed. Failing to do so while watching our adversaries shape global norms that conform to their illiberal model will have profound effects on U.S. and allied security. + + +### Introduction + +The essence of grand strategy is the ability to reconcile two seemingly contradictory objectives in the pursuit of national interest. No objective has been more fundamental to the founding of the American republic and the United States’ role in the world than the advancement of democracy and individual rights. And no objective has proven more vexing to those who have sought to secure the republic through balance of power strategies that pursue alignments and projection of power unencumbered by debates about the political nature of other states in the system. This tension is as old as the United States itself, but it has resurfaced in the context of renewed great power geopolitical competition. + +Can the United States formulate a grand strategy that incorporates liberal democratic values, avoids charges of hypocrisy, and withstands intensifying geopolitical fragmentation? This essay argues that we can – and must – do so if we are to secure a favorable international order that preserves common prosperity and security as well as the American way of life in the twenty-first century. Far from ignoring the complex realities of our times, such a strategy accounts for them. And while U.S. democracy itself is under unprecedented stress, and its return to health essential to any strategy’s success, addressing that urgent challenge should not distract us from the strategic importance of promoting international norms that support human dignity and have proved in both logic and empirical study to foster international peace, security, and development. Doing so can also help knit together common threads that have traditionally united Americans across the political divide and been a source of national strength. + +The premise of this report is that the United States and its allies and partners are engaged in a systems-level contest in which they must prevail. It begins with a review of the U.S. historical context and an assessment of the emerging conceptual obstacles and opportunities at home and abroad that confront any values-based foreign policy strategy. The report concludes by introducing a framework for integrating “democracy” and democratic values across all instruments of U.S. national power, not to the exclusion of realpolitik, hard power considerations but in thoughtful, creative, and effective combination with them. + + +### Values and the American Way of Statecraft + +Americans have long struggled to find the proper balance between our transformational democratic values and our more risk-averse pursuit of commercial and diplomatic advantage. When the Empress of China set sail from New York in 1784 to open commerce with the Qing Empire for the newly independent United States, Major Samuel Shaw was sent along as the country’s first diplomatic representative to what was then called the East Indies. Shaw was instructed not to emphasize U.S. democracy, which might offend the Celestial Emperor, but instead to emphasize the new republic’s support for anticolonialism as a contrast to the United States’ major geopolitical rival, Great Britain. Similar geopolitical concerns prompted top U.S. diplomats to downplay democratic norms well into the twentieth century, including the approach to China by Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, and Brent Scowcroft in the 1970s through the 1990s, as well as the stance of multiple administrations toward Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations. + +Other U.S. leaders have moved sharply in the opposite direction, prioritizing democracy, self-rule, and human rights over security and business interests. President Woodrow Wilson stunned the U.S. business and foreign policy establishments in 1913 by moving quickly to recognize the new Republic of China and simultaneously pushing out the Mexican junta of General Victoriano Huerta. In a similar vein, President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s rejected two decades of support for anticommunist allies and chose to condition security cooperation in Asia – namely with South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan – on improvements in human rights. + +Neither of these contrasting approaches – the hard power realpolitik of Shaw, Kissinger, and Scowcroft nor the undisciplined idealism of Wilson and Carter – proved durable. Kissinger’s realism invited the pendulum swing of the Carter administration, while President George H.W. Bush’s approach to the Tiananmen Square massacre invited a debilitating congressional backlash on trade relations with China that took a year to resolve. On the other side, Wilson retreated from his early idealism and rejected self-determination for non-European peoples at Versailles at the end of World War I, in the process turning a generation of idealistic nationalists into anti-American revolutionaries (including Ho Chi Minh). Carter’s clashes with the leaders of South Korea, the Philippines, and Central American republics in the late 1970s proved untenable in the face of Soviet expansionism in the less-developed world, and he was forced to drop human rights pressure on allies. Idealism divorced from realism proved no more enduring than realism divorced from idealism. + +Some leaders in U.S. history have been notably more successful at integrating values and power politics and avoiding these pendulum swings. Thomas Jefferson and later Commodore Matthew Perry, who opened Japan in 1853, both argued that the United States had a strategic interest in supporting independent, well-governed republics in the Pacific because they would be more resistant to the hegemonic aspirations of America’s expanding European rivals (this was based on the assumption, of course, that these independent republics would give the vote to white men only). The most influential strategic thinker in American history, Alfred Thayer Mahan, wrote in the 1890s that the United States needed both commercial and “moral” influence in Asia and the Caribbean. However, his idealism was limited by a recognition of the limits to the scope of this influence, and thus he discouraged extending this policy to further reaches of South America or the continent of Asia, where U.S. power and interests began to fade. Some would see this self-restraint as cynical, but Mahan saw it as a pragmatic form of a moral foreign policy. + +___`Idealism divorced from realism proved no more enduring than realism divorced from idealism.`___ + +After witnessing the counterproductive swings between idealism and realpolitik of the Wilson administration, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sought a better balance during World War II. He championed the Atlantic Charter and the “Four Freedoms” (freedom of speech and worship, and freedom from fear and want) and set the stage for inclusion of those norms in postwar international institutions. But he was also willing to accept close relations with dictatorships in Latin America and with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in order to keep them on side against Hitler – allegedly stating that “they may be SOBs, but they’re my SOBs.” + +These cycles of American enthusiasm for and against a values-based foreign policy have consistently been shaped – and often distorted by – geopolitical setbacks. The American entry into World War I, escalation in Vietnam, and the invasion of Iraq were all ostensibly driven primarily by hard-power considerations (restoring balance in the Euro-Atlantic, preventing the expansion of international communism, and reshaping Middle East security, respectively). However, presidents at the time framed the war efforts in moralistic terms that they believed the U.S. public would support. When the public turned against those wars in the 1920s, 1970s, and 2000s, the democratic imperative in U.S. foreign policy also became a casualty. The horrific battlefield experiences of the Great War fueled the isolationist America First movement and a distasteful tolerance on the right for Hitlerism that split the Republican Party before Pearl Harbor. The moral confusion of the Vietnam War prompted a backlash against democratic allies and a softer line toward the Soviet Union that split the Democratic Party in the 1970s (and gave birth to the neoconservative movement). The sagging enthusiasm for democracy promotion after the Iraq War had a similar effect. CSIS surveys of foreign policy specialists in the United States and Asia in 2014 found that the U.S. respondents’ prioritization of democracy, rule of law, women’s empowerment, and human rights briefly aligned more closely with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Singapore than democratic Japan, India, or South Korea. This same hangover from Iraq helps to explain why President Barack Obama expressed explicit appreciation of the realpolitik approach of Scowcroft and the George H.W. Bush administration during the 2008 campaign despite discomfort among prodemocracy advocates in his own party. + +After each of these instances, the American people’s support for values-based foreign policy reverted to the norm with the rise of new authoritarian threats. Roosevelt’s January 1941 Four Freedoms speech and August 1941 Atlantic Charter took hold because the pact between Axis powers had metastasized the spreading cancers of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The Truman Doctrine emerged from the early post–World War II clashes with Soviet ambitions in Greece and Eastern Europe. Ronald Reagan’s June 1982 Westminster Speech championing international democracy promotion was embraced at home and abroad because of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev’s invasion of Afghanistan three years earlier. And Joe Biden’s framing of a world clash between authoritarian and democratic states resonated in ways it would not have when he was vice president because of the menacing turns and growing strategic alignment of China and Russia. + +Ultimately, for all its inconsistency, hypocrisy, and vacillation over the years, no power in the history of the world has done more to advance human freedom and dignity than the United States of America. However, the United States cannot afford to continue framing its approach to democracy and human rights as a reaction to world events in a series of undisciplined pendulum swings – not if the goal is to shape global norms and the balance of power, build alliances, and deter authoritarian aggression, kinetic and otherwise – over the course of a multigenerational contest. History teaches that there is risk in overplaying values as the defining characteristic of strategic competition and even greater risk in failing to understand how fundamental democratic values are to the longer-term security of the United States. + +___`The United States cannot afford to continue framing its approach to democracy and human rights as a reaction to world events.`___ + +Realist scholars have long associated democracy with “idealism” and contrasted that with “realism.” But a “realist” foreign policy must recognize that competition over what – and whose – governance norms, rules, and standards will prevail in the twenty-first century is no less important than the more traditional competition for predominance in outer space, cyberspace, or undersea warfare. And as with those other domains, the United States will require a strategy that is premised on an understanding of the nature of the challenges of our time, including the ideational fight we face both abroad and at home. + + +### Difficult Terrain + +___Democracy’s Strategic Logic, Challenges, and Opportunities Abroad___ + +#### Why Democracy Matters + +The logic of democracy – transparent, accountable, inclusive, and representative governance under law – is instinctive to most Americans. Without transparency and rule of law, corruption festers. When national leaders are accountable to their citizens, they have an incentive to deliver public goods and practical solutions to national problems and less motivation to engage in foreign adventures. This is the logic behind democratic peace theory: that democracies do not go to war with one another. When citizens are treated with dignity, when they have a voice in how they are governed and who governs them, and when they have reasonable confidence in equal protection under law, they are less prone to resort to extralegal means of redress, including violence. And when they have agency at home, they have less reason to flee across borders in desperation to escape political and economic injustice, affecting the security and stability of neighbors. + +Overall, while some nondemocratic states may deliver positive outcomes in the short run, often by mortgaging the future for the present, the track record of autocrats is grim (see, for example, Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Myanmar, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Venezuela, or Zimbabwe), while the benefits of democracy are increasingly borne out in the data. Recent studies by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, Sweden’s V-Dem Institute, and others, for instance, have shown that democratic governance leads to better health, security, peace, and development outcomes. + +Equally important, there is also ample empirical evidence that how nations organize themselves internally will go a long way in determining how they seek to shape the environment outside their borders. If a nation’s leaders are afraid of the free flow of information at home, they will feel the same way internationally. If they rule by kleptocracy, they will welcome opaque systems of elite corruption elsewhere. If they prefer rule by law rather than rule of law domestically, odds are they will support the shaping of a similar system abroad. Allied with other powerful nations with similar illiberal values, these states can leverage their collective power to try to reshape the international system consistent with those values and their narrow self-interest rather than for the global good. + +___`How nations organize themselves internally will go a long way in determining how they seek to shape the environment outside their borders.`___ + +But the reverse is equally true: the alliance of common values and interests between the United States and democratic-minded citizens globally can have powerful strategic potential in the twenty-first century, particularly in the Global South with its rapidly growing, restless, and relatively youthful demographic demanding a greater voice in their future. + +#### The Challenges Internationally + +While some criticize Biden and members of Congress for framing strategic competition with China in ideational terms, the reality is that Beijing and Moscow have long viewed the spread of democracy as an existential threat, and seen strategic advantage in sowing doubts about, if not actively undermining, democratic practices. While China or Russia might have taken a more defensive stance in response to the color revolutions of the early 2000s, both have gone on the offensive in recent years. Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections is well documented even if the effects are debated. Around the same time, Beijing was caught pouring money into Australia’s parliament, which led to strict foreign interference laws by Canberra (Canada and New Zealand have since had the same experience). China’s foreign interference and elite capture strategies have had more success in Australia’s neighborhood, most notably with the 2022 security pact that China convinced the strategically situated Solomon Islands to sign after well-funded “study tours” for its leaders to Beijing. Leaders in China and Russia have also aligned in championing a counter-democracy coalition through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meetings and the expansion of the BRICS grouping to include Iran. + +In a kind of backhanded compliment, the PRC and Russia in recent years have even referred to themselves as democracies, albeit on their own illiberal terms. While seemingly absurd on its face, this is the latest of their attempts to redefine and thus frontally challenge accepted international norms, as witnessed in Chinese activity within UN agencies and other international institutions. The United States and its allies snicker at these subversive efforts at their own peril – even if in seeking to wrap themselves in democratic cloth, China and Russia inadvertently show their hand: their recognition of the power of the democratic idea, their fear of a world that conforms to true democratic norms, and their deep insecurity over the reality of their own systems. + +Under its new Global Civilization Initiative, Beijing asserts that ancient civilizations like China’s provide a superior cultural legitimacy over the democratic norms advocated by the United States and its allies and partners, and reflected in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Their message is that thinkers like John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Jefferson have no place in non-Western culture and emphasize wherever possible shortcomings in Western democratic practice. And even where Beijing and Moscow are not actively intervening, they offer diplomatic support to those resisting international pressure on democracy and human rights – most egregiously in the cases of North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, and Syria. + +This combination of cultural narratives, disparagement (or malign appropriation) of democracy, support for brutal dictatorships, and elite capture in weakly governed states is backed by an increasingly well-resourced and effective strategy of disinformation by Beijing and Moscow. In its first public report on Chinese interference and disinformation, the State Department found that: + +> The PRC’s information manipulation efforts feature five primary elements: leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing co-optation and pressure, and exercising control over Chinese-language media. + +It is becoming evident that the next phase of the PRC’s strategy is to harness the emerging information technology ecosystem to capture entire communities within a data environment that Beijing can control and manipulate. As the State Department report notes, Beijing is now offering to help developing countries to establish their own “smart cities” complete with Chinese technology for surveillance and one-way flows of data to Beijing. The technology competition of the twenty-first century is also fundamentally a competition about democratic norms of openness, transparency, and accountability. Beijing and Moscow’s aims are being abetted by the use of bots, deepfakes, and other tools of disinformation being made available in the digital space by artificial intelligence (AI). + +While Beijing and Moscow did not create all the conditions for deteriorating democratic norms globally, these powers have accelerated negative trend lines by actively exploiting and exacerbating areas of societal divisions and weak governance. According to Freedom House, 2023 was the 18th straight year of decline in global freedom. Freedom House noted that the key drivers globally were denial of press freedoms and increased risk of harm for expressing personal beliefs, coupled with increasing extremism and intolerance online. Put another way, it is the ability of the governed to hold their leaders accountable that is under assault while intolerance is being manipulated to divide, demonize, and marginalize legitimate debate – and these factors in turn create even more favorable conditions for strategies of foreign interference and elite capture by malign revisionist powers like China. + +___`While Beijing and Moscow did not create all the conditions for deteriorating democratic norms globally, these powers have accelerated negative trend lines.`___ + +#### The Opportunities Abroad + +Freedom House’s 2024 report notes that 2023 marked the 18th consecutive year of democratic decline, yet the world has more freedom today than it had 50 years ago, and in 2024 more people will have voted around the world than ever before in history – over half of all adults on the planet. And in Asia – the major arena for great power competition – Freedom House found that freedom began growing again in 2022. This finding is consistent with surveys of regional elites in the Indo-Pacific conducted by CSIS since 2009, which consistently found that thought leaders from India to Japan associated themselves more with democracy, rule of law, good governance, and human rights than contrasting themes offered by China such as “noninterference” or any sort of “Beijing consensus” around authoritarian development. This aspirational map does not mean that elites within less developed countries will automatically forego bribes on offer from Beijing (so-called elite capture) or that leaders of postcolonial states will instinctively look to the former imperial powers for lessons on democracy. But it does reinforce the point that citizens in China’s own region – and perhaps in China itself – expect greater empowerment and accountability of their governments and associate their own national success with democracy, good governance, and protection of human rights. + +There are indications that democratic governments are increasingly reflecting those norms in foreign policy strategies, while younger civil society activists are also taking action. In 2020, youth across East Asia formed the Milk Tea Alliance to support students marching for democracy in Hong Kong. In 2022, Japanese civil society groups reached out to form the Indo-Pacific Platform for Universal Values and established the first regional network to host political dissidents at risk. Through the Sunnylands Initiative started by CSIS and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 2019, thought leaders from across the Indo-Pacific have gathered each year to push for greater alignment of efforts in support of democratic norms. + +Once-reticent governments have also become more forward-leaning about the importance of democracy to their security. Japan incorporated support for universal values in its 2022 National Security Strategy and 2023 Development Cooperation Charter. South Korea has committed to reflecting universal values in its overall foreign policy, emphasized human rights and the rule of law in its 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, and hosted the third global Summit for Democracy in 2024. Australia launched a new International Development Policy that focused on supporting accountability, while its Home Affairs Ministry launched a Democracy Task Force to guard against foreign interference at home and in the region. While Australian diplomats sometimes caution their American counterparts against over-emphasizing democracy and human rights in the Pacific Islands, a 2024 public opinion survey by the University of Sydney’s U.S. Studies Centre found that average Australian and Japanese citizens were actually more likely than Americans to want their government to push for improvements in democracy abroad (72 percent of Australians, 69 percent of Japanese, and 61 percent of Americans). + +___`Once-reticent governments have also become more forward-leaning about the importance of democracy to their security.`___ + +To be clear, even close U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, or Australia will take a lighter approach on human rights or democracy issues with other states than the U.S. government or Congress. Part of this difference is size – few nations can withstand retaliation by China like the United States can. Part of the difference is cultural, since few went through anything like the American Revolution or the Civil War to define and safeguard the future of democracy. And part of the explanation is free-riding, since it has often been useful for the Americans to be the bad cop on human rights at times when Japan or South Korea were seeking relative economic gains in the region and around the world. + +Yet China’s coercive revisionism, foreign interference, and successful elite capture in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific have alerted the maritime democracies to an ideational threat to their strategic interests and national sovereignty. There is a pronounced alignment of government declaratory policy and civil society efforts across the region that could be harnessed as part of a grand strategy on democracy, if that strategy is iterative and not imposed from Washington. + +Since the Atlantic Charter, Europe has always been the natural partner for the United States in advancing democratic norms globally, but this transatlantic alignment has grown barnacles since Brexit and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Europeans are now less likely than publics in America’s Asian alliances to say that they share common democratic norms with the United States. The European Union has also been beset by internal democratic challenges and extremism from Hungary’s suppression of press and civil liberties to the electoral successes of the far right in Germany, as the round of European and then French elections demonstrated in the summer of 2024. Some member states like Denmark have long been active in advancing democracy abroad, but a lack of internal consensus on priorities has meant that most EU democracy support comes in the form of technical assistance when requested from host governments. And even with effective transatlantic alignment on democracy and human rights, Beijing or Moscow will be quick to paint those efforts as the return of the imperial masters (as China’s Global Times did in 2022 with a doctored photo of the G7 foreign ministers clad in the khaki uniforms and pith helmets of their armies during the Boxer Rebellion). + +Nevertheless, the combination of Russian and Chinese political interference and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has raised the focus of European governments and thought leaders on the democratic challenge facing the free world. The participation of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand (known as the IP4) in NATO summits indicates the possibility for greater unity of effort globally by the net exporters of security in the international system. Europeans may have soured on American democracy, but polls indicate they have soured on China more and are looking to expand strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia in ways they would not have five years ago. The coalition-building opportunity is to strengthen the Euro-Pacific link as much as it is to reenergize the transatlantic one. The American approach to sub-Saharan Africa also requires European partnership to be effective, and there is growing recognition in Brussels that democratic backsliding requires new efforts to keep open civil society space, broaden political participation to women and other groups, and beat China in the digital game to ensure a clean and open information environment. + +Latin America continues to hold democratic elections, but monitoring by Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Bertlesmann Stiftung Transformation Index in 2023 all found overall negative trends, including rising authoritarianism and political strife. China and Russia have enabled authoritarian sustainability in countries like Cuba and Venezuela and have largely been given a pass by democracies like Mexico or Brazil. Yet Latin America’s democracies continue to hold elections and maintain the key institutions of democratic governance and accountability, including functioning legislatures and courts and high levels of public education. The opportunity lies in international support for strengthening those institutions. + +In summary, despite a disturbing global landscape of democratic backsliding and closing civic space, there are multiple opportunities emerging for coalitions to form in support of democratic norms. When the Biden administration hosted the first Summit for Democracy in 2021, the aim was to harness just such a coalition. However, the terms of participation were largely dictated from the White House, and key partners ranging from Japan to India attended with trepidation at the signal being sent by excluding strategic swing states like Thailand and Singapore. + +___`Despite a disturbing global landscape of democratic backsliding and closing civic space, there are multiple opportunities emerging for coalitions to form in support of democratic norms.`___ + +The second Summit for Democracy in 2023 was cohosted with South Korea, the Netherlands, Costa Rica, and Zambia, giving a stronger sense of empowerment to regional – and, importantly, non-Western – democracies. The second summit faced some criticism because the host countries narrowed the focus of democratic challenges to fit their respective regional vantage points ratherthan addressing universal concerns. However, its efforts to provide a more inclusive space for discussions on addressing global democratic challenges were received as a much-welcomed approach by the participants, including those from Africa – where at least 24 countries, including many summit participants, held elections that year. The opportunity abroad is not to form what Robert Kaplan once called a “League of Democracies” under U.S. leadership, but rather to develop a strategy that recognizes the variable geometry of regional relations and looks for leadership within regions and civil society. + +By the time of the third summit, hosted by South Korea in March 2024, however, it was clear that an opportunity was missed to play to democracy’s strengths – its vibrancy, creativity, and direct connection to protecting human dignity. What could have been an opportunity to celebrate the fruits of free, democratic expression, such as music, art, literature, and debate, became a dreary long march of scripted panel discussions, leader statements, and commitments to “be better.” Nowhere was democracy precisely defined, an oversight when its definition is unclear to many and under attack by others. + +This requires a level of sophistication, nuance, and volume control that does not come naturally to American political discourse. But of course, domestic political support is essential. + + +### The Challenges and Opportunities at Home + +Formulating a strategy to counter these trends would be challenging enough if the threats were exogenous, but American democracy itself is also being corroded in the current environment by forces both international and domestic. In 2023, the Pew Research Center found that public trust in the federal government was ticking downward again after a brief uptick in 2020 and 2021, with fewer than 20 percent of Americans saying they trusted the government in Washington to do what is right. + +___`American democracy itself is also being corroded in the current environment by forces both international and domestic.`___ + +Declining trust in democratic governance is a problem across many of the societies that should be part of an international coalition to defend and advance democratic norms. Cambridge University’s Bennet Institute found in surveys that across the Western democracies, majorities of young respondents expressed lack of confidence in their own democracies. However, the United States suffers from particular structural factors at present, including gerrymandered districts, the rise of “angertainment” programs, the demise of local journalism, and the lack of compulsory voting – all of which tend to skew election results away from the ideological center and exacerbate partisanship. Partisanship has also infected the ability of Congress and the American people to rally around a common national vision for protecting and advancing democracy internationally. In 2023, a narrow majority of Republicans for the first time said that they favor less U.S. involvement in global affairs, reflecting a “make America great again” repudiation of Reagan’s vision in the 1982 Westminster speech. Yet Republicans are also far more likely than Democrats to believe that the United States is the greatest country in the world, given the left’s own growing penchant for casting the West and capitalism as illegitimate, a 2021 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found. This polarization between the increasingly vocal left and right wings of politics makes the very definition of a democracy agenda more complicated. Older Republican supporters of former president Donald Trump are far less likely to support democratic Ukraine, for example, while younger Democratic voters are equally less likely to support democratic Israel. + +Yet division at home is no reason to retreat from a robust strategy of supporting freedom abroad. The Founding Fathers did not promise the world a perfect government, just a system of government that would provide the opportunity to work toward a “more perfect union.” There are opportunities to forge a common national purpose around democracy at home because majorities of the American people also recognize what is at stake – and because the United States’ most important allies and partners do as well. + +#### The Opportunities for Consensus at Home + +Despite polarization overall, Americans agree on some key elements of what would constitute a strategy to advance democratic values globally. In the Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey cited above, Americans listed “strengthening democracy at home” as second only to “strengthening education” as a necessary tool to remain a leading power. In the same survey, 86 percent of Americans listed strengthening democracy abroad as either “important” or “very important,” with only 4 percent replying that it was “not important at all.” Congressional funding for the major tools of democracy promotion has increased over the past few years, with budgets for the NED and its affiliate institutes, the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), and internal State Department programs to counter Chinese and Russian disinformation all expanding at double-digit rates. + +___`Despite polarization overall, Americans agree on some key elements of what would constitute a strategy to advance democratic values globally.`___ + +Congressional support for the tools of democracy promotion reflects the growing recognition that democracy is at risk abroad, but perhaps the greatest driver is the national consensus that the United States must rally to defend its interests against an increasingly coercive and revisionist China. Indeed, China policy is one of the few areas of real bipartisan consensus in Washington today, as indicated by the comity of the cochairs and the activism of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Even the Heritage Foundation, which has attracted criticism from Democrats and many independent media for proposals in its Project 2025 to supercharge presidential authority in a second Trump administration, issued a report on China calling for an emphasis on democracy and human rights. This political consensus will prove a double-edged sword, though. On one side, the clarity of purpose around strategic competition with China is yielding resources, focus, and presidential-level attention. On the other side, casting this fight for democracy as a contest with China can alienate key allies and partners that will be critical to forming a coalition in support of democratic norms, and perhaps distract governments from problems with democratic governance that are important on their own merit and not just derivative of competition with China. + +It is also important to emphasize that despite the fascination with culture wars and authoritarianism on the right wing of the Republican Party, the mainstream Republican leadership includes some of the most vocal and active leaders on democracy and human rights in Congress, such as Senators Dan Sullivan and Marco Rubio. Similarly, while the progressive wing of the Democratic Party may criticize democratic nations such as Israel or India for perceived democratic regression (among other issues), the party overall sees no contradiction between speaking frankly with friends and allies about concerns – and accepting the same in return – and pursuing a strategic foreign policy. In short, there are leaders in Congress who could play a central role in forging a bipartisan consensus around championing democracy and human rights in U.S. foreign policy despite the polarization that besets the country and both parties. The key is for leaders in both parties to frame the strategy in ways that are inclusive of common values shared across the aisle and that reflect the interests of the American people regardless of party. + + +### Toward an Integrated Democracy Strategy + +A successful U.S. values-based foreign policy must move away from the historic pendulum swings between idealism and realism if it is to sustain domestic and international support and have strategic effects. Just as “integrated deterrence” has emerged as an essential component of defense strategy, so too the United States and its allies will need a new “integrated democracy strategy” to prevail in the battle of norms. The point is not that military, economic, or diplomatic objectives should be subordinated to human rights or democracy priorities, but rather that these strategies should be integrated in national security planning alongside diplomatic, military, and economic objectives. + +___`A successful U.S. values-based foreign policy must move away from the historic pendulum swings between idealism and realism.`___ + +One useful point of reference is the U.S. military’s traditional “DIME” construct for assessing threats and instruments of power. The diplomatic, military, and economic pillars have been fairly consistent over time, but the “I” has evolved from “intelligence” to “information.” One more evolution is needed, and that is to consider the ideational – that is not just the competition of information and narratives but the much more foundational competition of norms and ideas. This would reflect the reality that ideational contests, whether in the United States, Asia, Europe, or the Global South more broadly, are closely related to Chinese and Russian efforts to undermine U.S. power: its alliances, forward presence, economic interests, and political principles alike. If realism is about accurately assessing power dynamics, then it should be clear – as Joseph Nye noted in conceiving the concept of “soft power” – that the ideational dimension of competition is becoming as important as the diplomatic, military, or economic. Asserting the importance of information in the Information Age should not be a stunning insight. In the end, this is a matter of power and realism and not just à la carte idealism. + +An integrated democracy strategy would harness all tools of national power in an all-of-government but also all-of-society framework. Coalition building with democratic allies and partners along with businesses and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would reinforce the traditional approach of outreach to civil society groups. The incentives and risk tolerance for business, allies, civil society, and different government agencies will vary, so this is not a matter of a single operational plan to be implemented by all actors so much as a variable geometry of coalitions to attack key problems, such as corruption, free speech, electoral integrity, government oversight and accountability, information integrity, and rule of law. The strategy would have to be authorized by the president, drafted by the National Security Council, coordinated with Congress, overseen from within the White House, and ultimately operationalized by individual agencies in support and coordination with one another. The following are key elements of this strategy that would need to be implemented by the United States. + +___`An integrated democracy strategy would harness all tools of national power in an all-of-government but also all-of-society framework.`___ + +#### Harness Democratic Allies and Partners + +This is not a matter of recruiting allies and partners to a singular strategy but rather empowering them to shape debates and reinforce democratic norms internationally and in their own regions. The best framing for this effort in Asia, Africa, or Latin America is around sovereignty, prosperity, resilience, and national self-strengthening rather than justice or strategic competition with China and Russia. Empirical demonstrations that accountability, transparency, rule of law mechanisms, and women’s empowerment enhance national wealth and strength will be powerful. + +The NED’s Sunnylands Initiative on democracy in the Indo-Pacific is a useful example of how thought leaders in a region can help to validate and align a democracy strategy to their unique context while reinforcing that universal norms are indeed universal. First started in Sunnylands, California, by the NED and CSIS in 2020 and continued in Odawara, Japan, in 2022 and other locations in the Indo-Pacific, each Sunnylands meeting culminates in diverse regional thought leaders drafting and signing a joint statement with a vision and action plan for broad regional cooperation on advancing democratic norms and governance, including expanding support for democracy advocates at risk, grants to regional civil society organizations, and early warning of regional democratic setbacks. + +Similar initiatives in other regions would yield results. It is critical that democratic values be owned and advanced not just by Euro-Atlantic peoples but by a broad range of cultures and contexts to prevent self-interested autocrats from speciously claiming cultural alienation from those values. + +Critics of a democracy agenda often assume such a policy must entail dividing the world into strict blocs – democratic vs. authoritarian – and jettisoning relationships with those that are deemed nondemocratic. Admittedly, some talk in those terms, and there is little question that relationships among fellow democracies are fundamentally stronger and more sustainable than those with poor or deteriorating human rights records. But ultimately there is no reason one cannot promote democratic norms and still work closely and constructively with nondemocratic nations in areas of common purpose and strategic interest, including in the normative sphere. + +___`There is no reason one cannot promote democratic norms and still work closely and constructively with nondemocratic nations in areas of common purpose and strategic interest.`___ + +#### Harness the Business Community + +The business community should be particularly inclined to see the merit of this approach and positioned to shape outcomes based on the need for a level playing field in overseas markets. As a 2021 task force report by CSIS, the McCain Institute, and Freedom House put it: + +> Any serious effort to promote democracy and counter authoritarianism must include measures to combat corruption and kleptocracy, which have become business models for modern-day authoritarians. Corruption and its weaponization by authoritarians harms effective governance, undermines economic growth, and weakens the rule of law. It corrodes public trust and is interwoven with security issues like organized and transnational crime, terrorism, human rights abuses, and conflict. + +U.S. trade policy, though anemic compared with years past, can still provide an important tool to reinforce good governance and accountability. The Trans-Pacific Partnership agreements provided market access that incentivized Vietnam to improve labor rights and transparency. The current Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) offers no such market access opportunities but could still be utilized to strengthen rules on digital trade, labor rights, and the environment where those priorities align with other key partners like Japan, Australia, or South Korea. Global standards on anti-corruption can also be compelling for governments because of the clear link to improved investment and growth, as the Financial Action Task Force has demonstrated. The business community will be less well positioned to use its leverage to protect democrats at risk or impose punishments for human rights abuses, except when legislation, national policy, or reputational risk compel them to do so – as occurred with the Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act signed into law in 2022. Nevertheless, private sector and trade policy levers can have significant impacts on anti-corruption, transparency, and good governance that in turn reinforce accountability to the governed. + +___`The business community should be particularly inclined to see the merit of this approach and positioned to shape outcomes based on the need for a level playing field in overseas markets.`___ + +#### Harness Civil Society and Support Democrats at Risk + +An effective integrated democracy strategy would be an “all of the above” strategy. Companies or smaller allies might not be able to accept the risk associated with condemning human rights abuses or protecting democrats at risk. Size does matter, and the U.S. government can absorb retaliation in a ways no other state or firm can. Consequently, the president and the secretary of state should meet with and speak out for dissidents or champions of freedom like the Dalai Lama even when that carries diplomatic risk. Legislation passed in Congress by a wide margin in 2024 to counter disinformation against the Dalai Lama is another example of the bipartisanship that is possible on such issues. + +Consistency in this regard is critical: it encourages those on the front lines of freedom, it sets an example for other world leaders, it keeps authoritarian states on notice, and it prevents a backlash at home that could force overcompensation that proves more destabilizing for diplomacy. It is worth noting that Reagan developed a strong dialogue with Mikhail Gorbachev despite years of support for dissidents and George W. Bush did the same with former Chinese president Hu Jintao despite regular meetings with the Dalai Lama. The key was that these presidents did so out of conviction and not political calculation. That conviction must remain consistently in evidence to avoid the appearance that support for dissidents is gratuitous, episodic, or politically motivated. + +U.S. support for accurate reporting of democracy and human rights conditions is equally important. The organizations under the USAGM (such as Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio Marti) should remain robustly resourced and free to spotlight conditions as they find them. In the same vein, U.S. ambassadors need to understand the strategic value of democratic norms and be both authorized and equipped to speak confidently and assertively about them in their assigned countries. Likewise, officers in U.S. embassies must be authorized to report fully and accurately on issues such as trafficking, human rights, or women’s rights as they find them. + +Finally, U.S. funding of global democracy support work should continue to increase and U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding should continue going toward building capacity of democratic institutions, including domestic civil society groups. The funding should not – as most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) donors choose – be based on host government preferences. In fact, Japan and South Korea have begun debating how to delink some grants so that they can go directly to civil society groups. The U.S. government should encourage this trend and allies’ broader support of democratic institutions internationally. Support for marginalized groups may not always be popular with host governments, but it builds more resilient and accountable societies. For example, empowering women has proven an effective tool for achieving accountability in ceasefires and trade agreements, sustaining the peace once achieved, and increasing economic productivity. + +#### Do Not Cede International Institutions + +China’s growing diplomatic influence in bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council has proven frustrating for U.S. diplomacy. However, it is worth remembering these and other major international institutions are fundamentally American in origin. Eleanor Roosevelt herself lobbied to integrate her husband’s Four Freedoms into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, international institutions have proven useful in ways not originally envisioned. The Helsinki Accords were signed in 1975 with one basket (of four) focused on emigration, press freedom, and social issues. Most negotiators at the time had low expectations that these areas would be implemented, but they ultimately proved crucial to holding the Soviet Union to account for the free emigration of Jews and other human rights issues over the next 15 years. + +The United States cannot cede the field in these international institutions; rather, it should engage and seek to shape them in normative directions for which they were originally conceived. The position of the democracies is stronger than the results reveal. Beijing’s influence is a result of effort and not just size. When the Human Rights Council debated whether to put the UN Human Rights Commissioner’s report on crimes against humanity in Xinjiang on its agenda in 2022, President Xi Jinping personally called members of the council to persuade them to vote against the move. The United States relied on its ambassador in Geneva to rustle support and even then, China won by only two votes. + +Stepping up the effort on these battles is important, as retreat would + +- allow China, Russia, or Iran to increasingly turn these institutions into mouthpieces for their values and norms and against the United States and its allies with the Global South, while advancing resolutions endorsing China’s Global Civilization Initiative, defending Russia’s war in Ukraine, and reflexively condemning Israel + +- make it much more difficult to use these institutions to address true human rights violations + +- deny the United States a key forum for aligning positions on crucial human rights and democracy issues with allies and partners and to coordinate international approaches + +It will also be important to look beyond the UN institutions to consider regional organizations. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established an Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in 2009, which has underperformed in the face of coups in Thailand and Myanmar and shows a general division over values. Yet capacity building and engagement with the commission could yield future dividends in the ways the Helsinki Accords surprised many. The African Union established the Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1987 (when the grouping was still the Organization of African Unity). That commission is more active than ASEAN’s and regularly calls out member states for human rights violations. The United States has been relatively unengaged with the Pacific Islands Forum, which also has a secretariat with a charter to advance good governance and democracy. These regional organizations can be far more effective venues for advancing human rights and democracy for the obvious reason that they reflect regional values and priorities. Beijing is stepping up its own diplomatic engagement and offering significant funding to these regional organizations, for example, building the African Union’s new headquarters building in Addis Ababa. The United States and its allies should not be constructing buildings, but they can do more to invest in work on democracy, good governance, and human rights. + +#### Enhance U.S. Strategic Communications + +Authoritarian regimes can often prove more agile than democracies at disseminating information and maintaining message discipline, but they also have a far weaker brand to sell. Democratic allies enjoy the advantage of representing norms – including open access to quality information – that are desired by billions of people worldwide, along with an honest interest in the sovereignty and well-being of others. The United States and its allies ought to play to these strengths by developing an information strategy that supports local independent media, facilitates access to balanced news and analysis, and actively counters false and self-interested narratives advanced by authoritarians. In addition to ensuring adequate resourcing of existing USAGM global media entities, a new entity ought to be established to provide free-of-charge, fact-based information to Global South countries whose media are littered with PRC and other authoritarian-influenced propaganda. + +___`Democratic allies enjoy the advantage of representing norms – including open access to quality information – that are desired by billions of people worldwide.`___ + +The U.S. government has long suffered from an inability to develop, let alone coordinate, a disciplined strategic communications strategy, with the Pentagon focused on “cognitive warfare” and the State Department on “public diplomacy.” While strategic oversight from Washington is required, there is a risk of overcentralizing implementation. U.S. ambassadors in the field, in partnership with local embassy staff and civic partners, are likely to have a far more nuanced and effective understanding of local media and narrative environments. + +While in recent years the United States has become adept at using instruments such as the State Department’s Global Engagement Center to better understand how and where PRC and Russian disinformation have made inroads in third countries, the United States needs more tools to address the challenge, including those outside of government. One successful example is the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, which demonstrated how independent research institutions can sometimes move more nimbly, with more credibility, and have broader impact than the U.S. government can. In the democratic space, think tanks and independent NGOs have the reach to not only assess the challenge and be effective messengers on disinformation but also to build capacity, jointly develop solutions, and create networks among countries facing similar challenges. At the same time, it will be important that these institutions retain their independence and not be used as mouthpieces for U.S. or other governments’ national narratives. + +In short, while an “all of government” approach to countering disinformation has proven challenging, an “all of society” approach will bring certain advantages that closed, authoritarian states will not enjoy. + +#### Harness Digital Technology + +The State Department’s recent report on PRC disinformation activities highlighted the important role of digital technologies, particularly social media, in enhancing the growing threat of AI-enhanced deepfakes and algorithmically proliferated attacks on democracies and the idea of democracy itself. Those organizations working for democratic governance, particularly international NGOs, need support to develop and share the digital tools necessary to fight back. The conflict in Gaza has offered an alarming picture of what losing the digital information battle looks like, with one poll showing that the majority of young people who claim to support the slogan “from the river to the sea” do not know which river or which sea to which it refers. + +___`The United States and its allies must support digital literacy`___ + +The United States and its allies must support digital literacy not only at home but also in third countries. The U.S. government should partner with, and as needed regulate, social media giants to ensure that they take responsibility for the disinformation on their platforms. Governments should actively support those seeking to develop digital tools that are explicitly (and algorithmically) designed to enhance conversation and compromise – in other words, democratic norms – and not hate and division. The Open Technology Fund and similar democracy-affirming organizations should receive increased funding to this end. This is crucial in societies with relatively higher levels of political polarization and citizen mistrust toward traditional news media, which are more vulnerable to disinformation activities by domestic and foreign actors alike. In more open economies with a larger and more diverse set of competing advertising and social media markets, exposure and susceptibility to disinformation content is especially concerning. David Lauer’s study of social media platforms like Facebook, for example, underscores that their algorithms can exacerbate societal divisions and polarization by often promoting eye-catching and inflammatory content such as disinformation, extreme political views, and conspiracy theories to garner greater public engagement over their commercial rivals. + +The United States and its allies should also lead on establishing international principles on AI, oppose the unauthorized and unlabeled use of deep fakes, and establish norms that may be adopted in nations most vulnerable to Chinese or Russian disinformation, particularly around elections. The United States has already made significant strides in this area. In February 2024, the Biden administration launched the Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute Consortium (AISIC), fulfilling its commitment from the first global AI Safety Summit in the United Kingdom in November 2023. Collaborating with over 200 technology companies and organizations, including Apple, the consortium is housed within the U.S. AI Safety Institute and ensures that the U.S. government plays a pivotal role in setting national AI standards and developing tools to mitigate potential risks from the emerging technology. The U.S. AI Safety Institute will also collaborate with its international counterparts, already including the United Kingdom’s AI Safety Institute, on developing methods of evaluating the safety of AI tools and the systems that underpin them. + +Additionally, in July 2024 members of Congress proposed the Content Origin Protection and Integrity from Edited and Deepfaked Media Act (COPIED Act) to protect original content from unauthorized use in AI training. These moves reflect the increasing recognition among U.S. political and private industry leaders of the need for a robust approach to AI safety, both domestically and internationally. + +#### Sustain Bipartisan Consensus + +As with most foreign policy issues, bipartisan unity and executive-congressional consensus will ensure strategic continuity and enhance prospects for success in advancing U.S. interests. As noted, leading members of both parties in the Senate and the House have expressed strong commitment to defending and promoting democratic values globally to counteract the malign influence of China, Russia, and others. While differences remain between and within political parties on specific policies, their unity of principle offers a critical strategic opportunity that must be cultivated. In partnership with a compliant White House going forward, a bipartisan coalition could help frame, fund, and overcome political logjams to advance a values-based foreign policy that reflects the best traditions of the United States and defends U.S. security against the authoritarian onslaught, while demonstrating to allies, partners, democratic activists, and autocratic adversaries alike that American unity, solidarity, and sustained commitment to the issue are as strong as ever. + +___`Leading members of both parties in the Senate and the House have expressed strong commitment to defending and promoting democratic values globally to counteract the malign influence of China, Russia, and others.`___ + +_FINAL NOTE: DEMOCRACY AT HOME_ + +Some will charge that the United States has little credibility to promote democratic values globally when its own democracy is in such disrepair. This is a false dichotomy. There is no doubt that the American example matters. The United States does the authoritarians’ work for them when democratic practices are undermined at home or its politicians mirror the rhetoric, actions, and attitudes of authoritarians in their conduct. The U.S. democratic model is often considered the ultimate standard – despite endemic flaws throughout its history – so when egregiously dysfunctional, it can degrade the democratic brand overall. + +But the logic behind the intrinsic value of democracy and democratic norms in international affairs stands on its own, independent of the health of U.S. political society at any given time. America’s domestic challenges, if anything, only make it more urgent that other democratic nations step forward to fill gaps or complement U.S. democracy promotion work. Struggling populations around the world are not waiting for the United States to get its house in order before seeking dignity and rights for themselves. To the contrary, they are seeking international solidarity and support more than ever. Regardless of what is happening at home, the institutionalization of democratic norms globally will remain critical to U.S. strategic interests and those of other like-minded peoples around the world. + + +### Conclusion + +If a strategist were told that a single factor would advance global peace, development, health, and security outcomes while making one the natural ally of billions of people worldwide, one would think that issue would be considered a strategic priority. But dismissal of – if not hostility toward – considering a twenty-first-century democracy agenda remains far too prevalent. Saddled with mental baggage fortified by excesses from the recent past, too many policymakers and strategists resolutely avoid considering a careful and creative approach to integrating democracy promotion into the U.S. foreign policy tool box. + +___`If a strategist were told that a single factor would advance global peace, development, health, and security outcomes while making one the natural ally of billions of people worldwide, one would think that issue would be considered a strategic priority.`___ + +In many ways this is odd. For decades the United States and its allies have celebrated the advantages of a forward-leaning U.S. global posture to help shape the international security environment. It should not be a substantial conceptual leap, then, to pursuing a more active, forward-leaning, and thoughtful “shaping” policy in the political realm given the ever-increasing empirical data connecting a more democratic world to global security and development. + +Ultimately, a smartly implemented democracy agenda would play to one of the most valuable strategic assets in the U.S. arsenal: the power to inspire and attract billions of people worldwide who seek the same rights and dignity reflected in the American ideal. To that end, the concept of “democracy promotion” must never again be connected to the offensive application of U.S. military power, but instead conducted peacefully and confidently in support of the aspirations of billions around the world for more transparent, accountable, inclusive, representative governance under law. In so doing, democratically empowered citizens globally – in defense of their own interests, protecting their own sovereignty – may become force multipliers in the defining normative competition of the coming century. They can help counter China and Russia as those countries seek to unapologetically shape norms within their own countries and internationally – where might makes right, elite corruption is tolerated if not encouraged, individual freedom is suppressed, information is controlled or manipulated, and strongman rule replaces rule of law. + +Democracy is said to be in decline. But it is better understood to be under attack. From Myanmar to Belarus, Nicaragua to Hong Kong, Venezuela to Zimbabwe to Ukraine and beyond, millions of citizens in every corner of the globe continue to fight for their political rights and liberties even in the face of unspeakable violence. Those frustrated with the quality of their politics – including in troubled democracies – are seeking not less of a voice in political affairs but more. Not fewer rights and protections, but more. Not less democracy, but better democracy. And they’re looking for allies. + +The good news is supporting democratic development is not financially costly and plays to America’s strengths. But some creativity and urgency in developing a coherent democracy support strategy is needed. Failing to do so while watching American adversaries shape global norms that conform to their illiberal model will have profound effects on U.S. and allied security. + +In short, focusing only on the “three D’s” of U.S. foreign policy – defense, diplomacy and (economic) development – will be insufficient to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. A fourth “D” – democracy – must be added as the essential foundation for the rest. + +--- + +__Michael J. Green__ is a non-resident senior adviser and Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and professor and CEO of the United States Studies Centre Sydney. + +__Derek Mitchell__ is a non-resident senior advisor with the Presidential Office and Asia Program at CSIS. Between 2018 and 2023, Ambassador Mitchell was president of the National Democratic Institute, a U.S.-based nonprofit, nongovernment organization dedicated to supporting democratic development worldwide. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2024-10-24-trusted-chips.md b/_collections/_hkers/2024-10-24-trusted-chips.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..877b36f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2024-10-24-trusted-chips.md @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Trusted Chips +author: Andreas Schumacher +date : 2024-10-24 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/msZlENv.jpeg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Why the Discussion Risks Distracting from Solving Policy Issues" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_A quest for “trusted chips” risks sidetracking crucial semiconductor policy solutions. Aligned policy goals are needed to truly secure and de-risk supply chains, balancing national security, economic viability, and technological feasibility._ + + + +### Introduction + +The United States and its allies have taken significant actions to promote the de-risking of semiconductor supply chains. Protecting and controlling these supply chains also remain critical components of national and economic security discussions. To achieve this holistically, several sometimes-conflicting goals need to be met: + +1. Critical technologies and products need to be controlled. + +2. Export control sanctions must be enforced. + +3. Sensitive information must be safeguarded against attacks through compromised chips. + +4. Overreliance on nonmarket actors must be avoided. + +5. A competitive, commercially viable semiconductor supply must be ensured. + +Many of these policy goals have been recently subsumed under a general call for “trusted” or “trustworthy” chips. In reality, the goals are varied and complex, and trade-offs are unavoidable. For example, adding security features will increase costs and might not be technically feasible for most semiconductors. + +Without specific, clearly defined, and aligned policy goals – along with an appreciation of the technological boundary conditions and an understanding of the economic impacts along the supply chain – the discussions among the United States and its allies are unlikely to yield meaningful results. “Trusted chips” will continue to mean different things to different stakeholders, detracting from solving the underlying issues. + +This white paper offers three recommendations for policymakers to address pertinent questions about the semiconductor supply chain: + +1. Align on specific policy objectives rather than definitions. + +2. Use, refine, and align existing policy tools devised for specific objectives. + +3. Enable and seek industry involvement to ensure commercial viability and promote fast adoption. + + +### Mapping Wide-Ranging Policy Objectives onto a “Trusted Chip” Concept Will Fail + +Security typically deals with technical controls and processes, whereas trust is a social concept that goes a step further: It is fundamentally about relationship dynamics and the expectations that come with them. + +The term “trusted chip” thus sets a high bar. It might imply, for example, the confidence that the semiconductor will perform according to its specifications under all conditions and be free of unintended defects or malicious manipulation. It could also signal awareness or control over the product’s provenance – transparency about the chip’s exact supply chain, or at least certainty that critical steps in the supply chain took place outside the control of adversaries. + +Among semiconductor industry experts, the term “trust” historically means one of two narrowly defined concepts: + +> #### Trusted Microcontrollers + +> A dedicated microcontroller (MCU), or parts of an MCU designed to secure hardware through integrated cryptographic features, is called a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). TPMs have proliferated from sensitive defense or government applications to high-volume consumer devices such as personal computers and mobile phones. An ISO/IEC 11889 standard was published in 2009. Trusted MCUs are instrumental in achieving high system-level cybersecurity standards, such as those called for by the U.S. Cybersecurity Label for consumer and Internet of Things devices or the European Union’s Cyber Resilience Act. + +> #### Trusted Supply Chains + +> In 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense initiated a Trusted Foundry Program, now part of the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA)’s Trusted Supplier Program. As of early 2024, 16 out of 82 accredited trusted suppliers were also accredited for semiconductor foundry services, to provide services for advanced and foundational chips. The program is tailored to critical but less cost-sensitive defense and national security applications. + +The two concepts can be applied simultaneously. However, while the latter can be applied to all semiconductors, the former is limited to a specific product category. + +There are more recent attempts to broaden the concept of trusted semiconductors. Examples can be found in the 2023 European Chips Act, which advocates for “trusted, secure and green chips.” However, a clear definition remains elusive. + +In the context of controlling access to the most advanced artificial intelligence (AI) hardware, secure and governable AI chips have been proposed, expanding on the concept of trusted MCUs. + +Some policymakers even proposed the concept of trusted semiconductors as a trade remedy – that is, restricting access to U.S. and allied markets to trade with trusted chips. Lastly, it has been suggested that trusted chips could aid in verifying export control compliance. + +This short overview illustrates how the concept of trust, broadly applied to semiconductor markets, glosses over crucial details: Should it apply to all chips or only some? Should it benefit broad consumer markets or defense contractors? Do the costs of implementing a technical solution matter or not? Mapping wide-ranging policy objectives – such as export control, supply risk mitigation, trade policy, cybersecurity, and integrity of critical microelectronic systems – onto the “trust” concept is bound to fail. Worse, it will distract from meaningful discussions. + + +### Answering Four Questions Can Structure and Focus the Discussion + +Policy solutions to guide semiconductor export control, supply risk mitigation, trade policy, and cybersecurity are nevertheless pertinent. They need to be coupled with an appreciation for technological feasibility and private sector commercial incentives. + +Answering four questions will help to structure and focus the discussion (Figure 1). + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/AcVHFqr.png) +_▲ Figure 1: Option Space for Key Semiconductor Policy Questions_ + +1. __Which semiconductors should be covered?__ MCUs and microprocessors (MPUs) allow, in principle, the implementation of on-chip security features to establish trust, traceability, and, potentially, governance features. However, MCUs and MPUs combined cover less than 15 percent of the semiconductor market. On-chip security features are not technically feasible for much of the remaining 85 percent (e.g., sensors, power semiconductors, other discrete semiconductors). These devices lack the compute and memory capabilities to execute trust functionality. + + A unique, tamper-proof, chip-level identification for all semiconductors would be commercially prohibitive in most cases. Printing a unique marker on every semiconductor’s packaging would be cheaper, but it would still need to be backed by an industry-wide global database to detect misuse reliably. + +2. __Which systems should be covered?__ Critical applications – such as military command, control, communications, and computing equipment – require the highest technical level of device security and supply chain provenance. Additionally, the export of these application-specific or dual-use chips to adversaries often needs to be controlled. At the same time, the universe of parties that are affected by stringent requirements is relatively small: government agencies or prime contractors as buyers and a small number of accredited suppliers. Their willingness to shoulder the additional compliance and risk mitigation costs is high. + + Another example involves high-volume consumer devices, which can indeed provide a high level of trust. For instance, a laptop or mobile phone must protect personal information and securely execute payment transactions. While this can be achieved with on-chip hardware security (available to retail consumers as aftermarket products for less than $30), full end-to-end control of a mobile phone or laptop supply chain is not commercially viable. For instance, one major U.S. consumer electronics company’s supplier list includes 200 suppliers with 600 sites at locations across the globe. + + Basic connected consumer devices often fall short of any digital security standards, something the EU Cyber Resilience Act and the S. Cybersecurity Label seek to address. + +3. __What are the policy requirements?__ After deciding which parts of the semiconductor market and which systems should be covered, policymakers need to agree on who or what they are trying to protect and what degree of certainty constitutes success in achieving their goals. + + At the level of a single chip or microelectronic system, policy goals might include the control of exports and protecting the system (or data) from unauthorized access or manipulation. Alternatively, labeling trusted semiconductors could serve as a trade action in disguise to restrict imports from suppliers or countries engaging in nonmarket state practices and policies. + + At the level of the entire supply chain, policy goals may include the reliable supply of commercial semiconductor goods and supply chain transparency. In the case of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Trusted Supplier Program, the goal is very tight control over every step of the semiconductor supply chain. + + Along with these requirements come different definitions of what constitutes success. Trade remedies might be considered successful at the 80 percent level, an export control agency might be satisfied with 95 percent compliance, and defense-critical applications could demand an even higher level of confidence in the integrity of the respective semiconductor supply. + +4. __Is the solution commercially viable?__ If governments procure trusted chips for critical applications, they can set the economic incentives directly and compensate suppliers for the costs of manufacturing and controlled supply chains. Suppliers can price in the opportunity cost of export controls, that is, the fact that application-specific products cannot be sold in certain markets. + + The economics will play out very differently in the case of high-volume consumer applications, where end customers may or may not be willing to pay a premium for security or availability. In those scenarios, governments must work closely with industry and gradually influence economic incentives to steer commercial actors toward policy goals. + + Answering these questions theoretically results in a large number of different scenarios. However, these scenarios can be distilled into a limited number of practical policy challenges – and the tools to address those challenges are often already available. Policymakers should focus on refining these tools and achieving better alignment among allies regarding their use. + + +### Solve Practical Policy Challenges Instead of an Overarching Definition + +In reality, solving practical policy challenges is less complex. Semiconductor devices date back to 1947, as do the challenges to safeguard the technology, protect critical electronic systems and sensitive information from unreliable or malicious chips, and ensure a commercially viable supply of semiconductors. Even the risks of overreliance and state-subsidized industrial production are not new – although the scale of this risk might well be. + +- __Critical Electronic Systems:__ For national security reasons, the United States and its allies have long controlled the semiconductor supply chain for critical electronic systems, such as those used in defense applications. This may involve both hardware and supply chain solutions. Given the sensitive nature of the applications, tools like DMEA’s Trusted Supplier Program are typically deployed on a national level. In addition to whitelisting trustworthy suppliers, blacklisting certain entities is an effective option with a strong forward-signaling impact. Examples include the EU toolbox for 5G security (though deployed with varying urgency among member states) and the more targeted Section 5949 of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act of 2023. + + Commercial viability can typically be achieved due to the limited scope of applications, semiconductor volumes, and involved parties. + +- __Cybersecurity of Electronic (Sub-)Systems:__ This is another area where technical and commercially viable solutions either already exist (e.g., ISO/IEC 11889 for secure crypto-processors, ISO/SAE 21434 for automotive cybersecurity) or are being implemented (e.g., the S. Cybersecurity Label and the EU Cyber Resilience Act). More recently, the U.S. government proposed a rule to secure information and communications technology for connected vehicles. The rule would regulate hardware “designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by a person owned by, controlled by . . . the PRC or Russia.” Effectively, a concept of “non-trusted” semiconductors is being established, though without explicitly calling it that. + + Therefore, policy and commercial solutions are available or have been proposed for these use cases. + +- __Export Controls:__ Limiting the export of certain types of semiconductors, their underlying technology, and manufacturing equipment is an established practice for the United States and its allies. New frameworks might be needed to address shortcomings of existing multilateral export control regimes. Still, in the meantime, multilateral, case-by-case agreements have been successfully achieved (e.g., the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands reaching a deal to curb chipmaking exports to China). Enforcing export controls for advanced AI MPUs is challenging, and stopping the illicit flow of legacy semiconductors to Russia is even harder. Solutions have been proposed to improve export control compliance, but introducing the concept of trusted MCUs or trusted supply chains is not among them. Export control is not an inbound issue – ensuring the United States and its allies get trusted products – but an outbound issue – ensuring adversaries do not obtain them. + +- __Supply Chain Provenance Law:__ Various supply chain provenance requirements have been introduced in recent years. Examples include the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. In response to these requirements, companies – including semiconductor manufacturers – are implementing rigorous supply chain monitoring and verification systems, which, by definition, will apply to all their products. Introducing a “trusted chip” certification based on a geography- or entity-specific listing would be possible and might – considering the forward-signaling effect of various U.S. rulemaking proposals – already be expected by industry participants. Policymakers, however, need to carefully weigh the additional reporting burden on the industry against national and economic security goals. + +- __Trade Remedies:__ There is mounting concern that Chinese industrial policy, including in the semiconductor market, supports domestic firms that do not operate according to market principles. The United States and its allies can use tools – principally tariffs – to counter nonmarket policies and practices. However, these remedies often amount to too little, too late, especially if lengthy negotiations among allies precede them. Moreover, tariffs are applied to the end product entering a market – such as a computer, mobile phone, or industrial machinery control system. Relatively few chips enter the U.S. and allied markets as components; instead, they are part of a microelectronic system (which is predominantly assembled in Asia). In those cases, the amount of the subsidy on the chip is a very small percentage of the total value of the end product and thus not much of a deterrent. Other, more targeted, entity-based policies might be more effective in countering the threat of overreliance, but such discussions are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that introducing a “trusted chip buyers alliance” to exclude countries of concern from allied markets broadly would face significant legal and practical hurdles, in addition to the abovementioned technical and commercial challenges of providing supply chain provenance. + + +### Policy Recommendations + +Each of the above challenges must be addressed with specific policy solutions. Some, like secure MCUs, are specific to the semiconductor industry. Others, such as export controls or transparency and certification of supply chains, extend beyond semiconductors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make recommendations for each of them. As it pertains to the discussion about “trusted” or “trustworthy” chips, this paper offers the following recommendations to policymakers: + +- __Align on specific policy objectives rather than definitions.__ Acknowledging that challenges, tools, and policy prerogatives may differ, aligning on clear, specific policy goals is important. A shared understanding is key to enabling problem-specific solutions. Often, the implementation will have to be country-specific, but integrated and aligned measures are needed to avoid negative spillover effects or loopholes. This is easier to achieve for discrete policy challenges than for a broad concept like “trusted chips.” + +- __Use, refine, and align existing policy tools devised for specific objectives.__ Rules and tools already exist to address many of the current technical and geopolitical challenges facing the semiconductor industry. Policymakers should focus on jointly deploying these tools toward a common goal and augmenting national tool kits where there are gaps. + +- __Enable and seek industry involvement to ensure commercial viability and promote fast adoption.__ An innovative and competitive semiconductor ecosystem is essential for the United States and its allies. Implementing both “promote” and “protect” policies through regular exchanges with industry representatives is key. Moreover, industry compliance with those policies is crucial for their effectiveness. + +--- + +__Andreas Schumacher__ is a visiting technology fellow in the Economic Security and Technology Department and the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.