An overview of the adversary and references to cited Intelligence.
Objectives: OceanLotus is thought to be a highly selective and well-resourced cyber threat actor whose objectives align with the interests of the Vietnamese government. This group is reported to have been operating since 2012 and may have logged operational successes as recently as 2022.1 OceanLotus' objective over time and across a diverse target set appears to have been the exfiltration of information that could be used to advance Vietnamese capabilities, suppress pro-democratic influencers, and inform strategic decision making.2 3 4
Target Industries: OceanLotus operations have been directed against private corporations in the manufacturing, consumer product, and hospitality sectors. As well as foreign governments, political dissidents, and journalists with pro-democratic rhetoric. Geographically, OceanLotus targets the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Australia, Germany, US, and inside of Vietnam.3 5
Operations: In terms of operational tradecraft, OceanLotus is distinguished by their highly targeted operations and continued development on file-less and modularized capabilities. OceanLotus is reported to have exploited zero-day vulnerabilities and has pursued actions on the objective using suites of custom malware, coupled with alternate execution methods such as Cobalt Strike, a customized Outlook C2, perl, and bash scripting.6 7
OceanLotus is reported to attain initial access using drive-by compromise (T1189) and phising (T1566.001, T1566.002).8 Once an initial foothold is established, OceanLotus often establishes persistence through creating a system service (T1569).6 9 10
OceanLotus has been reported to use the OSX.OceanLotus backdoor as a post-exploitation tool first reported in 2017 and last reported in 2020. A significant characteristic of this software is it's modularized capability, leveraging dynamic library files (.dylib files) to manage the network communications and additional plugin capabilities.7 10 In 2020, a Linux backdoor was discovered and named Rota Jakiro. Researchers found this implant had been undetected for three years. Based on community engagement, researchers were able to attribute the Rota Jakiro backdoor to the OceanLotus group. This software follows the same modularized structure as the OSX.OceanLotus software. However, rather than .dylib files Rota Jakiro leverages shared object files (.so) to manage plugin functionality.9 11
Associated Groups: APT32, SeaLotus, APT-C-00, Ocean Buffalo
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