reinstein_bibtex.bib

@article{abramowiczInformationMarketsAdministrative2004,
  ids = {Abramowicz2004,Abramowicz2004a},
  title = {Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis},
  author = {Abramowicz, Michael},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {The University of Chicago Law Review},
  pages = {933--1020},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  abstract = {FutureMAP, a project of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, was to involve experiments to determine whether information markets could improve Defense Department decisionmaking. Information markets are securities markets used to derive information from the prices of securities whose liquidation values are contingent on future events. The government intended to use such a market to assess the probabilities of potential political assassinations, and the indelicacy of this potential application contributed to a controversy leading to the cancellation of the program. In this Article, Professor Abramowicz assesses whether information markets in theory could be useful to administrative agencies, and it concludes that information markets could help discipline administrative agency predictions, but only if a number of technical hurdles such as the danger of manipulation can be overcome. Because the predictions of well-functioning information markets are objective, they function as a tool that exhibits many of the same virtues in predictive tasks that cost- benefit analysis offers for normative policy evaluation. Both approaches can help to overcome cognitive errors, thwart interest group manipulation, and discipline administrative agency decisionmaking. The Article suggests that the two forms of analysis might be combined to produce a ``predictive cost-benefit analysis.'' In such an analysis, an information market would predict the outcome of a retrospective cost- benefit analysis, to be conducted some years after the decision whether to enact a particular policy. As long as the identity of the eventual decisionmaker cannot be anticipated, predictive cost-benefit analysis estimates how an average decisionmaker would be expected to evaluate the policy. Because the predictive cost-benefit analysis assessment is not dependent on the identity of current agency officials, they cannot shade the numbers to justify policies that the officials prefer for idiosyncratic or ideological reasons.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{adamsPuttingTomorrowWhat2011,
  ids = {Adams2011,Adams2011a},
  title = {Putting off Tomorrow to Do What You Want Today: Planning for Retirement.},
  author = {Adams, Gary A and Rau, Barbara L},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {American Psychologist},
  volume = {66},
  number = {3},
  pages = {180},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  doi = {10.1037/a0022131},
  keywords = {retirement}
}

@article{adenaGivingOnceGiving2019,
  ids = {Adena2019},
  title = {Giving Once, Giving Twice: {{A}} Two-Period Field Experiment on Intertemporal Crowding in Charitable Giving},
  author = {Adena, Maja and Huck, Steffen},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {172},
  issn = {00472727},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.01.002},
  abstract = {We study intertemporal crowding between two fundraising campaigns for the same charitable organization by manipulating donors' beliefs about the likelihood of future campaigns in two subsequent field experiments. The data shows that initial giving is decreasing in the likelihood of a future campaign while subsequent giving increases in initial giving. While this refutes the predictions of a simple expected utility model, the pattern is in line with a model that allows for (anticipated or unanticipated) habit formation provided that donations in the two periods are substitutes.}
}

@article{advisoryHighNetWorth2017,
  ids = {Advisory2017},
  title = {High {{Net Worth Individuals}} Philanthropy Trends {{A}} Comparative Study of {{France}} and the {{Netherlands}}},
  author = {Advisory, Philanthropy},
  year = {2017},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{agranovIncentivesCompensationSchemes2013,
  ids = {Agranov2013,Agranov2013a},
  title = {Incentives and Compensation Schemes: {{An}} Experimental Study},
  author = {Agranov, Marina and Tergiman, Chloe},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization},
  volume = {31},
  number = {3},
  pages = {238--247},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.06.001},
  keywords = {incentives,real effort,tournaments,within-subject},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{ahnComingGoingExperiments2009,
  title = {Coming and Going: {{Experiments}} on Endogenous Group Sizes for Excludable Public Goods},
  author = {Ahn, T K and Isaac, R M and Salmon, T C},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {93},
  number = {1-2},
  pages = {336--351},
  issn = {0047-2727},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.06.007}
}

@article{ahnHeterogeneousPreferencesCollective2003,
  ids = {Ahn2003,Ahn2003a},
  title = {Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action},
  author = {Ahn, T K and Ostrom, E and Walker, J M},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Public Choice},
  volume = {117},
  number = {3},
  pages = {295--314},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1023/B:PUCH.0000003739.54365.fd}
}

@article{aimoneEndogenousGroupFormation2010,
  ids = {Aimone2010,Aimone2010a},
  title = {Endogenous {{Group Formation}} via {{Unproductive Costs}}},
  author = {Aimone, J and Iannaccone, L R and Makowsky, M D and Rubin, J},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Working Papers},
  publisher = {{Towson University, Department of Economics}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{alaouiValueUselessInformation2010,
  ids = {Alaoui2010,Alaoui2010b},
  title = {The Value of Useless Information.},
  author = {Alaoui, L},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Working Paper},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,behavioral,loss of face,theoretical}
}

@article{albertiThresholdPublicGood2011,
  ids = {Alberti2011},
  title = {Threshold Public Good Games and Impulse Balance Theory},
  author = {Alberti, Federica and Cartwright, Edward and Cartwright, Edward},
  year = {2011},
  number = {December 2013}
}

@article{albrechtEquilibriumDirectedSearch2006,
  ids = {Albrecht2006,Albrecht2006a},
  title = {Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications},
  author = {Albrecht, J and Gautier, P A and Vroman, S},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
  volume = {73},
  number = {4},
  pages = {869--891},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00400.x}
}

@book{alDoingMetaAnalysis,
  ids = {Harreretal},
  title = {Doing {{Meta-Analysis}} in {{R}}},
  author = {et {al}, Harrer}
}

@article{alecstephensonQuickIntroductionShiny2013,
  ids = {AlecStephenson2013},
  title = {A {{Quick Introduction}} to {{R Shiny}}},
  author = {{Alec Stephenson}},
  year = {2013},
  pages = {1--7}
}

@article{allenShortrunImpactUsing2013,
  ids = {Allen2013,Allen2013a},
  title = {The Short-Run Impact of Using Lotteries for School Admissions: Early Results from {{Brighton}} and {{Hove}}'s Reforms},
  author = {Allen, Rebecca and Burgess, Simon and McKenna, Leigh},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers},
  volume = {38},
  number = {1},
  pages = {149--166},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00511.x},
  keywords = {education,labor,nleduc,uk}
}

@book{allisonMissingData2002,
  title = {Missing Data},
  author = {Allison, Paul David},
  year = {2002},
  publisher = {{SAGE}},
  address = {{Thousand Oaks, Calif.; London}},
  abstract = {Using numerous examples and practical tips, this book offers a non-technical explanation of the standard methods for missing data (such as listwise or casewise deletion) as well as two newer methods, maximum likelihood and multiple imputation},
  isbn = {978-1-4129-8507-9},
  langid = {english},
  annotation = {OCLC: 896870843}
}

@article{alpizarAnonymityReciprocityConformity2008,
  ids = {Alpizar2008,Alpizar2008a,alpizar2008anonymity},
  title = {Anonymity, Reciprocity, and Conformity: {{Evidence}} from Voluntary Contributions to a National Park in {{Costa Rica}}},
  author = {Alpizar, F and Carlsson, F and {Johansson-Stenman}, O},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {92},
  number = {5-6},
  pages = {1047--1060},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.11.004}
}

@article{andersonAssortativeMatchingReputation2001,
  ids = {Anderson2001,Anderson2001a},
  title = {Assortative {{Matching}}, {{Reputation}}, and the {{Beatles Breakup}}},
  author = {Anderson, A and Smith, L},
  year = {2001},
  publisher = {{U of Michigan Working Paper}},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.292182}
}

@article{andersonEconomicPerspectivesChildhood2003,
  ids = {Anderson2003,Anderson2003b},
  title = {Economic {{Perspectives}} on {{Childhood Obesity}}.},
  author = {Anderson, P M and Butcher, K F and Levine, P B},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {27},
  number = {3},
  pages = {30--49},
  publisher = {{Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{andersonw.thomasjr.SociallyConsciousConsumer1972,
  ids = {AndersonW.ThomasJr.1972,AndersonW.ThomasJr.1972a},
  title = {The {{Socially Conscious Consumer}}},
  author = {{Anderson W. Thomas Jr.} and {Cunningham William H.}},
  year = {1972},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Journal of Marketing},
  volume = {36},
  number = {3},
  pages = {23--31},
  publisher = {{American Marketing Association}},
  issn = {0022-2429},
  abstract = {Who are the socially conscious consumers? This article typologically classifies socially conscious consumers and evaluates the relative sensitivity of demographic and sociopsychological variables in discriminating degree of social consciousness.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{andoLifeCycleHypothesis1963,
  ids = {Ando1963,Ando1963a},
  title = {The" Life Cycle" Hypothesis of Saving: {{Aggregate}} Implications and Tests},
  author = {Ando, Albert and Modigliani, Franco},
  year = {1963},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  pages = {55--84},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,retirement consulting}
}

@article{andreoniAvoidingAskField2017,
  ids = {andreoni2017avoiding},
  title = {Avoiding the Ask: {{A}} Field Experiment on Altruism, Empathy, and Charitable Giving},
  author = {Andreoni, James and Rao, Justin M and Trachtman, Hannah},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {125},
  number = {3},
  pages = {625--653},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press Chicago, IL}},
  doi = {10.1086/691703}
}

@article{andreoniCharitableGivingMarried2003,
  ids = {Andreoni2003b,Andreoni2003e},
  title = {Charitable {{Giving}} by {{Married Couples}}: {{Who Decides}} and {{Why Does It Matter}}?},
  author = {Andreoni, James and Brown, Eleanor and Rischall, Isaac},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {The Journal of Human Resources},
  volume = {38},
  number = {1},
  pages = {111--133},
  publisher = {{University of Wisconsin Press}},
  issn = {0022-166X},
  abstract = {We examine how charitable giving is influenced by who in the household is primarily responsible for giving decisions. Looking first at single-person households, we find men and women to have significantly different tastes for giving, setting up a potential conflict for married couples. We find that, with respect to total giving, married households tend to resolve these conflicts largely in favor of the husband's preferences. Bargaining over charitable giving, rather than letting one spouse take charge, is estimated to reduce giving by at least 6 percent. When the woman is the decisionmaker, she will still make a significantly different allocation of those charity dollars, preferring to give to more charities but to give less to each. Our results give new insights into both the demographics of charitable giving and the costliness of household bargaining.},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI,gender,philanthropy,survey data}
}

@article{andreoniCooperationPublicGoodsExperiments1995,
  ids = {Andreoni1995,Andreoni1995a},
  title = {Cooperation in {{Public-Goods Experiments}}: {{Kindness}} or {{Confusion}}?},
  author = {Andreoni, J},
  year = {1995},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {85},
  number = {4},
  pages = {891--904},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,experimental,philanthropy,social,VCM}
}

@article{andreoniExperimentalTestPublicGoods1993,
  ids = {Andreoni1993,Andreoni1993a},
  title = {An {{Experimental Test}} of the {{Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis}}},
  author = {Andreoni, James},
  year = {1993},
  month = dec,
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {83},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1317--1327},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  issn = {0002-8282},
  abstract = {This paper presents an experimental test of the proposition that government contributions to public goods, funded by lump-sum taxation, will completely crowd out voluntary contributions. It is found that crowding-out is incomplete and that subjects who are taxed are significantly more cooperative. This is true even though the tax does not affect the Nash equilibrium prediction. This result is taken as evidence for alternative models that assume people experience some private benefit from contributing to public goods.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,C92,crowding-out,experimental,H41,philanthropy,VCM}
}

@article{andreoniGovernmentGrantsPrivate2003,
  ids = {Andreoni2003,Andreoni2003c},
  title = {Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd out Giving or Fund-Raising?},
  author = {Andreoni, J and Payne, A A},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  pages = {792--812},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1257/000282803322157098},
  keywords = {crowding out,philanthropy,public economics}
}

@article{andreoniImpureAltruismDonations1990,
  ids = {Andreoni1990,Andreoni1990a},
  title = {Impure {{Altruism}} and {{Donations}} to {{Public Goods}}: {{A Theory}} of {{Warm-Glow Giving}}},
  author = {Andreoni, James},
  year = {1990},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {100},
  pages = {464--477},
  doi = {10.2307/2234133},
  keywords = {philanthropy,theory}
}

@article{andreoniSocialImage502009,
  ids = {andreoni2009social},
  title = {Social Image and the 50\textendash 50 Norm: {{A}} Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects},
  author = {Andreoni, James and Bernheim, B Douglas},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {77},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1607--1636},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.3982/ECTA7384}
}

@article{angristSchoolingVietnamEraGl2011,
  ids = {Angrist2011,Angrist2011a},
  title = {Schooling and the {{Vietnam-Era Gl Bill}}: {{Evidence}} from the {{Draft Lottery}}},
  author = {Angrist, Joshua D and Chen, Stacey H},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
  pages = {96--118},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1257/app.3.2.96},
  abstract = {Draft-lottery estimates of the causal effects of Vietnam-era military service using 2000 census data show marked schooling gains for veterans. We argue that these gains can be attributed to Vietnam veterans' use of the GI Bill rather than draft avoidance behavior At the same time, draft lottery estimates of the earnings consequences of Vietnam-era service are close to zero in 2000. The earnings and schooling results can be reconciled by a flattening of the ageearnings profile in middle age and a modest economic return to the schooling subsidized by the GI Bill. Other long-run consequences of Vietnam-era service include increases in migration and public sector employment.},
  keywords = {nled}
}

@article{anikFeelingGoodGiving2009,
  ids = {anik2009feeling},
  title = {Feeling Good about Giving: {{The}} Benefits (and Costs) of Self-Interested Charitable Behavior},
  author = {Anik, Lalin and Aknin, Lara and Norton, Michael and Dunn, Elizabeth},
  year = {2009},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.1444831}
}

@article{anikNortonHappinessMatchmaking2011,
  ids = {Anik2011,Anik2011a},
  title = {Norton.``{{The Happiness}} of {{Matchmaking}}.''},
  author = {Anik, Lalin and Michael, I},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Unpublished manuscript},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{arbakCanWagesSignal2005,
  ids = {Arbak2005,Arbak2005a},
  title = {Can {{Wages Signal Kindness}}?},
  author = {Arbak, Emrah and Kranich, Laurence and {Others}},
  year = {2005},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.906768}
}

@unpublished{armantierPresentationEconomicScience2012,
  ids = {Armantier2012,Armantier2012a},
  title = {Presentation at the {{Economic Science Association Conference}}.},
  author = {Armantier, Olivier},
  year = {2012}
}

@article{arnoldSimulationMethodsEstimate2011,
  ids = {Arnold2011},
  title = {Simulation Methods to Estimate Design Power : An Overview for Applied Research},
  author = {Arnold, Benjamin F and Hogan, Daniel R and Jr, John M Colford and Hubbard, Alan E},
  year = {2011},
  doi = {10.1186/1471-2288-11-94},
  keywords = {computer simulation,power,research design,sample size}
}

@article{arnotEthicalConsumersCare2006,
  ids = {Arnot2006,Arnot2006a},
  title = {Do {{Ethical Consumers Care About Price}}? {{A Revealed Preference Analysis}} of {{Fair Trade Coffee Purchases}}},
  author = {{Arnot}},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie},
  volume = {54},
  number = {4},
  pages = {555--565},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Synergy}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1744-7976.2006.00066.x},
  abstract = {The existing literature on socially responsible purchasing relies heavily on stated preference measures elicited through surveys that utilize hypothetical market choices. This paper explores consumers' revealed purchasing behavior with regard to fair trade coffee and is apparently the first to do so in an actual market setting. In a series of experiments, we investigated differences in consumer responsiveness to relative price changes in fair trade and non-fair trade brewed coffees. In order to minimize the hypothetical bias that may be present in some experimental settings, we conducted our experiments in cooperation with a vendor who allowed us to vary prices in an actual coffee shop. Using a choice model, we found that purchasers of fair trade coffee were much less price responsive than those of other coffee products. The demonstration of low sensitivity to price suggests that the market premiums identified by stated preference studies do indeed exist and are not merely artifacts of hypothetical settings.}
}

@article{arrowSocialResponsibilityEconomic1973,
  ids = {Arrow1973,Arrow1973a},
  title = {Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency},
  author = {Arrow, K J},
  year = {1973},
  journal = {Public Policy},
  volume = {21},
  number = {3},
  pages = {303--317},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{asfawRoleFoodPrice2006,
  ids = {Asfaw2006,Asfaw2006a},
  title = {The {{Role}} of {{Food Price Policy}} in {{Determining}} the {{Prevalence}} of {{Obesity}}: {{Evidence}} from {{Egypt}}},
  author = {Asfaw, A},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Review of Agricultural Economics},
  volume = {28},
  number = {3},
  pages = {305--312},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Synergy}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9353.2006.00291.x},
  keywords = {agriculture,development,empirical,food policy,obesity}
}

@article{atheyIdentificationInferenceNonlinear2006,
  ids = {Athey2006,Athey2006a},
  title = {Identification and {{Inference}} in {{Nonlinear Difference-in-Differences Models}}},
  author = {Athey, Susan and Imbens, Guido W},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {74},
  number = {2},
  pages = {431--497},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00668.x},
  abstract = {This paper develops a generalization of the widely used difference-in-differences method for evaluating the effects of policy changes. We propose a model that allows the control and treatment groups to have different average benefits from the treatment. The assumptions of the proposed model are invariant to the scaling of the outcome. We provide conditions under which the model is nonparametrically identified and propose an estimator that can be applied using either repeated cross section or panel data. Our approach provides an estimate of the entire counterfactual distribution of outcomes that would have been experienced by the treatment group in the absence of the treatment and likewise for the untreated group in the presence of the treatment. Thus, it enables the evaluation of policy interventions according to criteria such as a mean-variance trade-off. We also propose methods for inference, showing that our estimator for the average treatment effect is root-N consistent and asymptotically normal. We consider extensions to allow for covariates, discrete dependent variables, and multiple groups and time periods.}
}

@article{atheyMachineLearningMethods2019,
  ids = {Athey2019},
  title = {Machine {{Learning Methods Economists Should Know About}} | {{Stanford Graduate School}} of {{Business}}},
  author = {Athey, Susan and Imbens, Guido W},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Working Paper,},
  number = {March},
  abstract = {We discuss the relevance of the recent Machine Learning (ML) literature for eco- nomics and econometrics. First we discuss the differences in goals, methods and settings between the ML literature and the traditional econometrics and statistics literatures. Then we discuss some specific methods from the machine learning literature that we view as important for empirical researchers in economics. These include supervised learning methods for regression and classification, unsupervised learning methods, as well as matrix completion methods. Finally, we highlight newly developed methods at the intersection of ML and econometrics, methods that typically perform better than either off-the-shelf ML or more traditional econometric methods when applied to particular classes of problems, problems that include causal inference for average treat- ment effects, optimal policy estimation, and estimation of the counterfactual effect of price changes in consumer choice models.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{atkinsonDesignTaxStructure1976,
  ids = {Atkinson1976,Atkinson1976a},
  title = {The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation},
  author = {Atkinson, Anthony Barnes and Stiglitz, Joseph E},
  year = {1976},
  journal = {Journal of public economics},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {55--75},
  publisher = {{North-Holland}},
  doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(76)90041-4},
  keywords = {poorcard}
}

@article{atkinsonGivingOverseasPublic2009,
  ids = {Atkinson2009,Atkinson2009a},
  title = {Giving Overseas and Public Policy},
  author = {Atkinson, A B},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {93},
  number = {5-6},
  pages = {647--653},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  issn = {0047-2727},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.12.001}
}

@article{atkinsonMeasurementPoverty1987,
  ids = {Atkinson1987,Atkinson1987a},
  title = {On the {{Measurement}} of {{Poverty}}},
  author = {Atkinson, A B},
  year = {1987},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {55},
  number = {4},
  pages = {749--764},
  publisher = {{The Econometric Society}},
  issn = {00129682},
  doi = {10.2307/1911028},
  keywords = {development,measurement,theory}
}

@article{attribution-noncommercialQuantumMicroeconomics2009,
  ids = {Attribution-noncommercial2009a},
  title = {Quantum {{Microeconomics}}},
  author = {{Attribution-noncommercial}, Creative Commons and License, Unported and Commons, Creative},
  year = {2009},
  number = {January}
}

@article{attribution-noncommercialQuantumMicroeconomicsCalculus2009,
  ids = {Attribution-noncommercial2009},
  title = {Quantum {{Microeconomics}} with {{Calculus}}},
  author = {{Attribution-noncommercial}, Creative Commons and License, Unported and Commons, Creative},
  year = {2009},
  number = {January}
}

@article{autenCharitableContributionsIntergenerational1996,
  ids = {Auten1996,Auten1996a},
  title = {Charitable Contributions and Intergenerational Transfers},
  author = {Auten, G and Joulfaian, D},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {59},
  number = {1},
  pages = {55--68},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(94)01475-2}
}

@article{autenCharitableGivingIncome2002,
  ids = {Auten2002,Auten2002a},
  title = {Charitable {{Giving}}, {{Income}}, and {{Taxes}}: {{An Analysis}} of {{Panel Data}}},
  author = {Auten, Gerald E and Sieg, Holger and Clotfelter, Charles T},
  year = {2002},
  month = mar,
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {92},
  number = {1},
  pages = {371--382},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  issn = {0002-8282},
  doi = {10.1257/000282802760015793},
  keywords = {panel data,philanthropy,price of giving,public finance,survey data,taxation}
}

@incollection{averyShouldFinancialAid2004,
  ids = {Avery2004,Avery2004a},
  title = {Do and Should Financial Aid Packages Affect Students' College Choices?},
  booktitle = {College Choices: {{The}} Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay for It},
  author = {Avery, Christopher and Hoxby, Caroline Minter},
  year = {2004},
  pages = {239--302},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}},
  keywords = {education,nleduc}
}

@article{baadeWhatDeterminesAlumni1996,
  ids = {Baade1996,Baade1996a},
  title = {What Determines Alumni Generosity?},
  author = {Baade, R A and Sundberg, J O},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {Economics of Education Review},
  volume = {15},
  number = {1},
  pages = {75--81},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/0272-7757(95)00026-7},
  abstract = {Alumni giving is correlated with institutional characteristics, such as quality and development efforts, and student characteristics, such as quality and wealth. Empirical analysis is complicated by the expected correlation between institutional quality and student wealth, and the possible endogeneity between institutional expenditures on education (one common measure of quality) and the level of alumni support the institution receives. This paper uses a two-stage least squares approach with data on quality and variables correlated with student wealth to address these issues. Quality variables are found to have a positive impact on the average alumni gift, with that impact most significant for private universities and liberal arts colleges. Wealth variables also have a positive impact on the average gift, with the estimated coefficients most significant for public universities. Development effort is very important in determining the level of giving for all three types of institutions.},
  keywords = {alumni,empirical,philanthropy,survey data}
}

@article{backusCharityHomogeneousGood2010,
  ids = {Backus2010,Backus2010a},
  title = {Is Charity a Homogeneous Good?},
  author = {Backus, Peter},
  year = {2010},
  publisher = {{University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{backusHowSensitiveAverage2018,
  ids = {backus2018sensitive},
  title = {How Sensitive Is the Average Taxpayer to Changes in the Tax-Price of Giving?},
  author = {Backus, Peter G and Grant, Nicky L},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {International Tax and Public Finance},
  pages = {1--40},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@inproceedings{backusSubstitutingDonkeysReligion2008,
  ids = {Backus2008,Backus2008a},
  title = {Substituting {{Donkeys}} for {{Religion}}?: {{Testing}} the {{Homogeneity}} of {{Philanthropy}}},
  booktitle = {Paper Presented at {{NCVO-VSSN Conference}}},
  author = {Backus, Peter},
  year = {2008},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{baCompetitiveModelPrice,
  ids = {BA,BAa},
  title = {A {{Competitive Model}} of {{Price Dispersion}} in {{Online Retailing}}},
  author = {BA, S and STALLAERT, J A N and ZHANG, J},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.965774},
  keywords = {Industrial Organization,internet}
}

@incollection{baguesOnlineLaborMarket2009,
  ids = {Bagues2009,Bagues2009a},
  title = {Do {{Online Labor Market Intermediaries Matter}}? {{The Impact}} of Em {{AlmaLaurea}}/Em on the {{University-to-Work Transition}}},
  booktitle = {Studies of Labor Market Intermediation},
  author = {Bagues, Manuel F and Labini, Mauro Sylos},
  year = {2009},
  pages = {127--154},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}},
  keywords = {Education-Employment transition,EEP,labor,Labor}
}

@article{bainjoeBarriersNewCompetition1956,
  ids = {BainJoe1956,BainJoe1956a},
  title = {Barriers to {{New Competition}}},
  author = {Bain Joe, S},
  year = {1956},
  publisher = {{Cambridge, Harvard University Press}},
  doi = {10.4159/harvard.9780674188037},
  howpublished = {Harvard University Press},
  keywords = {classic,competition,entry,Industrial Organization},
  annotation = {Published: Harvard University Press}
}

@article{banerjeeRunningLeadershipEvidence2014,
  ids = {Banerjee2014,Banerjee2014a},
  title = {Running for {{Leadership}} : {{Evidence}} from an Artefactual Field Experiment in Matrilineal and Patriarchic Societies in {{India}}},
  author = {Banerjee, Debosree and D, Marcela Ibanez and Riener, Gerhard and Wollni, Meike},
  year = {2014},
  pages = {1--28},
  keywords = {gender,labor market,power,social exposure}
}

@article{banksEconomicCapabilitiesChoices2006,
  ids = {Banks2006,Banks2006a},
  title = {Economic {{Capabilities}}, {{Choices}} and {{Outcomes}} at {{Older Ages}}*},
  author = {Banks, James},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Fiscal Studies},
  volume = {27},
  number = {3},
  pages = {281--311},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-8578.2006.00036.x},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{banksUnderstandingPensionsCognitive2007,
  ids = {Banks2007,Banks2007a},
  title = {Understanding {{Pensions}}: {{Cognitive Function}}, {{Numerical Ability}} and {{Retirement Saving}}*},
  author = {Banks, James and Oldfield, Zoe},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Fiscal Studies},
  volume = {28},
  number = {2},
  pages = {143--170},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1475-5890.2007.00052.x},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{bardhanIrrigationCooperationEmpirical2000,
  ids = {Bardhan2000,Bardhan2000a},
  title = {Irrigation and Cooperation: {{An}} Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in {{South India}}},
  author = {Bardhan, P},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {Economic Development and Cultural Change},
  volume = {48},
  number = {4},
  pages = {847--865},
  publisher = {{UChicago Press}},
  doi = {10.1086/452480}
}

@article{barriosOPTIMALSTRATIFICATIONRANDOMIZED2014,
  ids = {Barrios2014,Barrios2014a,barriosOPTIMALSTRATIFICATIONRANDOMIZED2014a},
  title = {{{OPTIMAL STRATIFICATION IN RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENTS}} 1 . {{I}} Ntroduction {{Experimenters}} Often Face the Following Situation : They Are Ready to Assign Treatment to Some Subset of Units in an Experimental Group , They Have a Rich Amount of Information about Each u},
  author = {Barrios, Thomas},
  year = {2014},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{bartkeSocialComparisonNudges2017,
  ids = {Bartke2017},
  title = {Social Comparison Nudges\textemdash{{Guessing}} the Norm Increases Charitable Giving},
  author = {Bartke, Simon and Friedl, Andreas and Gelhaar, Felix and Reh, Laura},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {152},
  issn = {01651765},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.023},
  abstract = {Social comparison nudges that employ descriptive norms were found to increase charitable giving. This paper finds that individuals who receive a descriptive norm donate significantly more when they have to guess the descriptive norm beforehand. We argue that guessing draws attention to the norm and therefore increases its effectiveness. Our results suggest that the effectiveness of nudges that use descriptive norms depends on how the a priori beliefs about the descriptive norm are updated.}
}

@article{bassiNoteCharitableGiving2017,
  ids = {Bassi2017,bassiNoteCharitableGiving2017a},
  title = {A Note on Charitable Giving by Corporates and Aristocrats: {{Evidence}} from a Field Experiment},
  author = {Bassi, Vittorio and Huck, Steffen and Rasul, Imran},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics},
  volume = {66},
  issn = {22148051},
  doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2016.04.012},
  abstract = {Multiple sources of funding are becoming increasingly important for charitable organizations. Donations from corporate donors for example account for 25\textendash 35\% of charitable income for the largest US charities, across charitable sectors. This note presents some tentative first evidence from a natural field experiment to shed light on how different types of potential donors: individuals, corporates and aristocratically titled individuals, respond to the same fundraising drive. Each donor type was randomly assigned to treatments varying in two dimensions: (i) whether information was conveyed about the existence of an anonymous lead donor, and (ii) how individual donations would be matched by the anonymous lead donor. We find that aristocrats are significantly more likely to respond and that corporates give significantly more than individuals. Treatment effects moreover suggest that (proportional) matching is to be avoided for corporate donors.}
}

@article{basuLabelPerformanceWillingness,
  ids = {Basu,Basua},
  title = {Label Performance and the Willingness to Pay for {{Fair Trade}} Coffee: A Cross-National Perspective},
  author = {Basu, A K and Hicks, R L},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI}
}

@article{batorNewWaysPromote2000,
  ids = {Bator2000,Bator2000a},
  title = {New Ways to Promote Proenvironmental Behavior: The Application of Persuasion Theory to the Development of Effective Proenvironmental Public Service Announcements},
  author = {Bator, Renee J and Cialdini, Robert B},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {Journal of Social Issues},
  volume = {56},
  number = {3},
  pages = {527--541},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/0022-4537.00182}
}

@article{battalioOptimizationIncentivesCoordination2001,
  ids = {Battalio2001,Battalio2001a},
  title = {Optimization {{Incentives}} and {{Coordination Failure}} in {{Laboratory Stag Hunt Games}}},
  author = {Battalio, R and Samuelson, L and Van Huyck, J},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {69},
  number = {3},
  pages = {749--764},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Synergy}},
  doi = {10.1111/1468-0262.00212},
  abstract = {Compares 3 stag hunt games, in each risk dominance confliicts with payoff dominance, differences in incentives to optimize help explain results.},
  keywords = {coordination,experiments,ritual,stag hunt,theory}
}

@article{battigalliDynamicPsychologicalGames2005,
  ids = {Battigalli2005,Battigalli2005a},
  title = {Dynamic {{Psychological Games}}},
  author = {Battigalli, P and Dufwenberg, M},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,behavioral,lof,psychological games,theory}
}

@article{battigalliGuiltGames2007,
  ids = {Battigalli2007,Battigalli2007a},
  title = {Guilt in Games},
  author = {Battigalli, P and Dufwenberg, M},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {97},
  number = {2},
  pages = {170--176},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association Publications}},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.97.2.170}
}

@article{bauerCanWarFoster2016,
  ids = {bauer2016can},
  title = {Can War Foster Cooperation?},
  author = {Bauer, Michal and Blattman, Christopher and Chytilov{\'a}, Julie and Henrich, Joseph and Miguel, Edward and Mitts, Tamar},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {30},
  number = {3},
  pages = {249--274},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.30.3.249}
}

@article{baumEffectsRaceEthnicity2007,
  ids = {Baum2007,Baum2007a},
  title = {The Effects of Race, Ethnicity, and Age on Obesity},
  author = {Baum, C L},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Journal of Population Economics},
  volume = {20},
  number = {3},
  pages = {687--705},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s00148-006-0106-7},
  abstract = {@articlecourtemanche:rct, title=Rising Cigarette Taxes and Rising Obesity: Coincidence or Unintended Consequence?, author=Courtemanche, C. and Draft, P. About 30\% of Americans are obese, which is roughly a 100\% increase from 25 years ago. This study examines the effects of changes in the racial/ethnic composition and age distribution on the prevalence of obesity, identifies the portion of the increase in obesity caused by these changes, and projects the effects of future racial/ethnic and age changes on obesity using National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey data. Results indicate that racial/ethnic composition changes and age distribution changes have accounted for about 10\% of the increase in obesity over the last 25 years. However, future racial/ethnic and age changes are not projected to increase obesity substantially.},
  keywords = {empirical,obesity}
}

@article{baxterSecretTests1984,
  ids = {Baxter1984,Baxter1984a},
  title = {Secret Tests},
  author = {Baxter, L A and Wilmot, W W},
  year = {1984},
  journal = {Human Communication Research},
  volume = {11},
  number = {2},
  pages = {171--201},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2958.1984.tb00044.x}
}

@article{beberShortsellingBansWorld2013,
  ids = {beber2013short},
  title = {Short-Selling Bans around the World: {{Evidence}} from the 2007\textendash 09 Crisis},
  author = {Beber, Alessandro and Pagano, Marco},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {The Journal of Finance},
  volume = {68},
  number = {1},
  pages = {343--381},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01802.x}
}

@article{becchettiCoffeeBookAnatomy1999,
  title = {The {{Coffee Book}}: {{Anatomy}} of an {{Industry}} from {{Crop}} to the {{Last Drop}}},
  author = {Becchetti, L and Solferino, N and Dicum, G and Luttinger, N},
  year = {1999},
  journal = {AICCON-Universit\`a\vphantom\{\} di Bologna Working Paper, keywords = behavioral,ft,habit,pricing, number = q, title = The dynamics of ethical product differentiation and the habit formation of socially responsible consumers, year = 2004},
  abstract = {In our model of ethical product differentiation two duopolists (a zero profit socially concerned producer and a profit maximizing producer) compete over prices and (costly) ``socially and environmentally responsible'' features of their products under a given law of motion of consumer' habits. In a continuous time model in which the location of the zero profit social responsible entrant is fixed and the profit maximizing producer (PMP) limits himself to price competition without ethical imitation, we show that the optimal dynamic PMP's price is always lower than his optimal static price since the PMP producer knows that, by leaving too much market share to the other producer, he will reinforce the habit of socially responsible consumption and loose further market share in the future. We inspect the properties of equilibria when the PMP can ethically imitate the entrant and when the entrant is free to choose his location. We find that, in the first case, the threshold triggering a PMP strategy of ethical imitation and minimum price differentiation is lower in the dynamic than in the static case, depending on the PMP's shadow cost of changes in consumers social responsibility.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  note = {ft, coffee, agriculture}
}

@article{becchettiDynamicsFairTrade,
  ids = {BECCHETTI,BECCHETTIa},
  title = {The Dynamics of {{Fair Trade}} as a Mixed-Form Market},
  author = {BECCHETTI, L and HUYBRECHTS, B},
  doi = {10.1007/s10551-007-9544-8},
  abstract = {This article analyzes the Fair Trade sector as a ``mixed-form market'', i.e. a market in which different types of players (in this case, nonprofit, co-operative and for-profit organizations) coexist and compete. The purposes of this article are (1) to understand the factors that have led Fair Trade to become a mixed-form market and (2) to propose some trails to understand the market dynamics that result from the interactions between the different types of players. We start by defining briefly Fair Trade, its different dimensions (including the ``fair'' quality of the products) and its organizational landscape, focusing on the distinction between the pioneer ``Alternative Trading Organizations'' and the second-mover companies. Then, we recall the theoretical emergence factors for each type of organization (nonprofit, co-operative and for- profit) and apply these emergence factors to the context of Fair Trade. This analysis allows us to capture the specificities of each type of operator with regard to Fair Trade and, thus, to have a better understanding of the competition dynamics in the sector. The latter analysis includes elements on ethical imitation, consumers' behaviors, effects on welfare and the role of the government, in order to outline some of the major trends in this rapidly evolving secto},
  keywords = {FT,Industrial Organization,theory}
}

@article{becchettiEthicalProductDifferentiation2003,
  ids = {Becchetti2003,Becchetti2003a},
  title = {On Ethical Product Differentiation},
  author = {Becchetti, L and Solferino, N},
  year = {2003},
  publisher = {{CEIS Working Paper}},
  abstract = {In our model of ethical product differentiation two duopolists compete over prices and (costly) \^A``socially and environmentally responsible\^A'' features of their products. We show that the incumbent finds it optimal to reduce the price after the ethical producer's entry when his (non ethical) location is fixed. His optimal price is halfway between his zero profit price and the zero profit price of the ethical producer. By removing the fixed location hypothesis we find that the ethical producer\^A's entry has positive indirect effects on aggregate social and environmental responsibility since the incumbent finds it optimal to imitate him when consumers\^A' perception of ethical costs is sufficiently high. In the paper we also show that the solution of the three-stage game - in which location and prices are simultaneously chosen and the profit maximising producer is Stackelberg leader in location \^A\textendash{} has three main features: minimum price differentiation, ethical imitation and non minimal ethical differentiation. We explain the differences between these findings and those from a traditional Hotelling game as depending from three main features: i) the different goals of the two (profit maximising and zero profit) competitors; ii) the asymmetry in costs of "ethical" distance and iii) the lack of independence between ethical location and prices.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,entry,ft,FT,hotelling,Industrial Organization}
}

@article{beckerHumanCapitalTheoretical1964,
  ids = {Becker1964,Becker1964a},
  title = {Human {{Capital}}: {{A Theoretical}} and {{Empirical Analysis}}, with {{Special Reference}} to {{Education}}, by {{Gary S}}},
  author = {Becker, Gary Stanley},
  year = {1964},
  journal = {Becker},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,nleduc}
}

@article{beckerNobelLectureEconomic1993,
  ids = {Becker1993,Becker1993a},
  title = {Nobel Lecture: {{The}} Economic Way of Looking at Behavior},
  author = {Becker, Gary S},
  year = {1993},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  pages = {385--409},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1086/261880}
}

@article{beckerTheoryMarriagePart1973,
  ids = {Becker1973,Becker1973a},
  title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Marriage}}: {{Part I}}},
  author = {Becker, G S},
  year = {1973},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {81},
  number = {4},
  pages = {813},
  publisher = {{The University of Chicago Press}},
  doi = {10.1086/260084},
  keywords = {family,lof,marriage,matching models,theory}
}

@article{beckerTheoryMarriagePart1974,
  ids = {Becker1974a,Becker1974c},
  title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Marriage}}: {{Part II}}},
  author = {Becker, G S},
  year = {1974},
  publisher = {{NBER}},
  doi = {10.1086/260287},
  keywords = {family,lof,marriage,matching models,theory}
}

@article{beckerTheorySocialInteractions1974,
  ids = {Becker1974,Becker1974b},
  title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Social Interactions}}},
  author = {Becker, Gary S},
  year = {1974},
  month = nov,
  journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {82},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1063--1093},
  publisher = {{The University of Chicago Press}},
  issn = {0022-3808},
  doi = {10.1086/260265},
  keywords = {altruism,theory}
}

@article{bekkersGenerosityPhilanthropyLiterature2008,
  ids = {Bekkers2008,Bekkers2008a},
  title = {Generosity and {{Philanthropy}}: {{A Literature Review}}},
  author = {Bekkers, R and Wiepking, P},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Working paper.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,experimental,interdisciplinary,literature review,philanthropy,survey data}
}

@inproceedings{bekkersItNotAll2005,
  ids = {Bekkers2005,Bekkers2005a},
  title = {It's {{Not All}} in the {{Ask}}. {{Effects}} and {{Effectiveness}} of {{Recruitment Strategies Used}} by {{Nonprofits}} in {{The Netherlands}}},
  booktitle = {34rd {{Annual ARNOVA-Conference}}},
  author = {Bekkers, R},
  year = {2005},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{bekkersWhenWhyMatches2005,
  ids = {Bekkers2005b},
  title = {When and {{Why Matches}} Are {{More Effective Subsidies Than Rebates}}},
  author = {Bekkers, Ren{\'e}},
  year = {2005},
  pages = {1--21}
}

@article{belloniProgramEvaluationCausal2013,
  ids = {Belloni2013},
  title = {Program {{Evaluation}} and {{Causal Inference}} with {{High-Dimensional Data}}},
  author = {Belloni, Alexandre and Chernozhukov, Victor and {Fern{\'a}ndez-Val}, Ivan and Hansen, Christian},
  year = {2013},
  month = nov,
  eprint = {1311.2645},
  eprinttype = {arxiv},
  abstract = {In this paper, we provide efficient estimators and honest confidence bands for a variety of treatment effects including local average (LATE) and local quantile treatment effects (LQTE) in data-rich environments. We can handle very many control variables, endogenous receipt of treatment, heterogeneous treatment effects, and function-valued outcomes. Our framework covers the special case of exogenous receipt of treatment, either conditional on controls or unconditionally as in randomized control trials. In the latter case, our approach produces efficient estimators and honest bands for (functional) average treatment effects (ATE) and quantile treatment effects (QTE). To make informative inference possible, we assume that key reduced form predictive relationships are approximately sparse. This assumption allows the use of regularization and selection methods to estimate those relations, and we provide methods for post-regularization and post-selection inference that are uniformly valid (honest) across a wide-range of models. We show that a key ingredient enabling honest inference is the use of orthogonal or doubly robust moment conditions in estimating certain reduced form functional parameters. We illustrate the use of the proposed methods with an application to estimating the effect of 401(k) eligibility and participation on accumulated assets.},
  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
  arxivid = {1311.2645},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{bergstromPrivateProvisionPublic1986,
  ids = {Bergstrom1986,Bergstrom1986a},
  title = {On the Private Provision of Public Goods},
  author = {Bergstrom, T and Blume, L and Varian, H},
  year = {1986},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {29},
  number = {1},
  pages = {25--49},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(86)90024-1},
  keywords = {philanthropy,public goods,Public goods,theory}
}

@techreport{beshearsEffectProvidingPeer2011,
  ids = {Beshears2011a,Beshears2011d},
  title = {The Effect of Providing Peer Information on Retirement Savings Decisions},
  author = {Beshears, John and Choi, James J and Laibson, David and Madrian, Brigitte C and Milkman, Katherine L},
  year = {2011},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  abstract = {We conducted a field experiment in a 401(k) plan to measure the effect of disseminating information about peer behavior on savings. Low-saving employees received simplified plan enrollment or contribution increase forms. A randomized subset of forms stated the fraction of age-matched coworkers participating in the plan or age-matched participants contributing at least 6\% of pay to the plan. We document an oppositional reaction: the presence of peer information decreased the savings of non-participants who were ineligible for 401(k) automatic enrollment, and higher observed peer savings rates also decreased savings. Discouragement from upward social comparisons seems to drive this reaction.},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{bhalotraFertilityResponsesInfant,
  ids = {Bhalotra,Bhalotraa},
  title = {Fertility {{Responses}} to {{Infant}} and {{Maternal Mortality}}: {{Quasi-Experimental Evidence}} from 20th {{Century America}}},
  author = {Bhalotra, Sonia R and Hollywood, David and Venkataramani, Atheendar},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{bichlerCoreselectingCombinatorialClock2013,
  ids = {Bichler2013,Bichler2013a},
  title = {Do Core-Selecting {{Combinatorial Clock Auctions}} Always Lead to High Efficiency? {{An}} Experimental Analysis of Spectrum Auction Designs},
  author = {Bichler, Martin and Shabalin, Pasha and Wolf, Jurgen},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {16},
  number = {4},
  pages = {511--545},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10683-013-9350-3}
}

@article{biddleSleepAllocationTime1990,
  ids = {Biddle1990,Biddle1990a},
  title = {Sleep and the {{Allocation}} of {{Time}}},
  author = {Biddle, Jeff E and Hamermesh, Daniel S},
  year = {1990},
  month = oct,
  journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {98},
  number = {5},
  pages = {922--943},
  publisher = {{The University of Chicago Press}},
  issn = {0022-3808},
  doi = {10.1086/261713},
  abstract = {Using aggregated data for 12 countries, a cross section of microeconomic data, and a panel of households, we demonstrate that increases in time in the labor market reduce sleep. Our theory of the demand for sleep differs from standard models of time use by assuming that sleep affects wages by affecting labor market productivity. Estimates of a system of demand equations demonstrate that higher wage rates reduce sleep time among men but increase their waking nonmarket time by an equal amount. Among women the wage effect on sleep is negative but very small.},
  keywords = {[philanthropy],substitution,survey,time}
}

@article{bijmoltMetaAnalysisMarketingWhen2001,
  title = {Meta-{{Analysis}} in {{Marketing}} When {{Studies Contain Multiple Measurements}}},
  author = {Bijmolt, Tammo H A and Pieters, Rik G M},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {Marketing Letters},
  volume = {12},
  number = {2},
  pages = {157--169},
  issn = {09230645},
  doi = {10.1023/A:1011117103381},
  abstract = {Most meta-analyses in marketing contain studies which themselves contain multiple measurements of the focal effect. This paper compares alternative procedures to deal with multiple measurements through the analysis of synthetic data sets in a Monte Carlo Study and a re-analysis of a published marketing data set. We show that the choice of procedure to deal with multiple measurements is by no means trivial and that it has implications for the results and for the validity of the generalizations derived from meta-analyses. Procedures that use the complete set of measurements outperform procedures that represent each study by a single value, The commonly used method of treating all measurements as independent performs reasonably well but is not preferable. We show that the optimal procedure to account for multiple measurements in meta-analysis explicitly deals with the nested error structure, i.e., at the measurement level and at the study level, which has not been practiced before in marketing meta-analyses.},
  keywords = {Generalizations,meta-analysis,Meta-analysis,Monte Carlo simulation,Multiple measurements}
}

@article{bilodeauRivalCharities1997,
  ids = {Bilodeau1997,Bilodeau1997a},
  title = {Rival Charities},
  author = {Bilodeau, M and Slivinski, A},
  year = {1997},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {66},
  number = {3},
  pages = {449--467},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00046-7},
  keywords = {Industrial Organization,nonprofits,philanthropy}
}

@article{binmoreAmbiguityGameTheory,
  ids = {Binmoreb},
  title = {Ambiguity in {{Game Theory}} ?},
  author = {Binmore, Ken},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@techreport{blackDoesGriefTransfer2014,
  ids = {Black2014,Black2014a},
  title = {Does Grief Transfer across Generations? {{In-utero}} Deaths and Child Outcomes},
  author = {Black, Sandra E and Devereux, Paul J and Salvanes, Kjell G},
  year = {2014},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  abstract = {While much is now known about the effects of physical health shocks to pregnant women on the outcomes of the in-utero child, we know little about the effects of psychological stresses. One clear form of stress to the mother comes from the death of a parent. We examine the effects of the death of the mother's parent during pregnancy on both the short-run and the long-run outcomes of the infant. Our primary specification involves using mother fixed effects,\"A\^icomparing the outcomes of two children with the same mother but where a parent of the mother died during one of the pregnancies,\"A\^iaugmented with a control for whether there is a death around the time of the pregnancy in order to isolate true causal effects of a bereavement during pregnancy. We find small negative effects on birth outcomes, and these effects are bigger for boys than for girls. The effects on birth outcomes seems to be driven by deaths due to cardiovascular causes suggesting that sudden deaths are more difficult to deal with. However, we find no evidence of adverse effects on adult outcomes. The results are robust to alternative specifications.}
}

@article{blackNoise1986,
  ids = {black1986noise},
  title = {Noise},
  author = {Black, Fischer},
  year = {1986},
  journal = {The journal of finance},
  volume = {41},
  number = {3},
  pages = {528--543},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04513.x}
}

@article{blairDeclaringDiagnosingResearch2016,
  ids = {Blair2016},
  title = {Declaring and {{Diagnosing Research Designs}} \textdagger{} Meetings for Helpful Comments. {{We}} Thank},
  author = {Blair, Graeme and Cooper, Jasper and Coppock, Alexander and Humphreys, Macartan and Aronow, Peter and Br{\"u}ckner, Julian and Hartman, Erin and Green, Donald and Grimmer, Justin and Hansen, Kolby and Jacobs, Alan and Leavitt, Tom and Lin, Winston and Mildenberger, Matto and Orlowski, Matthias and Roberts, Molly and Slough, Tara and Gosha, Syun-Yaev and Wilke, Anna and Yamamoto, Teppei and York, Erin and Young, Lauren and Zhou, Yang-Yang and Correia, Clara and Fultz, Neal and Huang, Sisi and Konrad, Markus and Medina, Lily and Mohanty, Pete and Rudkin, Aaron and Singh, Shikhar and Sonnet, Luke and Ternovski, John},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Apsa},
  volume = {2016},
  abstract = {Researchers need to select high-quality research designs and communicate those designs clearly to readers. Both tasks are difficult. We provide a framework for formally "declaring" the analytically relevant features of a research design in a demonstrably complete manner, with applications to qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research. The approach to design declaration we describe requires defining a model of the world (M), an inquiry (I), a data strategy (D), and an answer strategy (A). Declaration of these features in code provides sufficient information for researchers and readers to use Monte Carlo techniques to diagnose properties such as power, bias, accuracy of qualitative causal inferences, and other "diag-nosands." Ex ante declarations can be used to improve designs and facilitate preregistration, analysis, and reconciliation of intended and actual analyses. Ex post declarations are useful for describing, sharing, reanalyzing, and critiquing existing designs. We provide open-source software, DeclareDesign, to implement the proposed approach. for their many contributions to the broader project. The methods proposed in this paper are implemented in an accompanying open-source software package, DeclareDesign (Blair et al. 2018).},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{blissettQuickIntroductionStata2016,
  ids = {Blissett2016},
  title = {A {{Quick Introduction}} to {{R}} (for {{Stata Users}})},
  author = {Blissett, Richard},
  year = {2016},
  pages = {1--17}
}

@article{blumkinAreIncomeConsumption2012,
  ids = {Blumkin2012,Blumkin2012a},
  title = {Are Income and Consumption Taxes Ever Really Equivalent? {{Evidence}} from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods},
  author = {Blumkin, Tomer and Ruffle, Bradley J and Ganun, Yosef},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {European Economic Review},
  volume = {56},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1200--1219},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.06.001},
  keywords = {public finance,real effort,within-subject}
}

@article{blundellReturnsHigherEducation2000,
  ids = {Blundell2000,Blundell2000a},
  title = {The Returns to Higher Education in {{Britain}}: Evidence from a {{British}} Cohort},
  author = {Blundell, R and Dearden, L and Goodman, A and Reed, H},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {110},
  number = {461},
  pages = {82--99},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/1468-0297.00508},
  note = {nled
\par
nled
\par
nled}
}

@article{boardReputationalTheoryFirm2010,
  ids = {Board2010,Board2010b},
  title = {A {{Reputational Theory}} of {{Firm Dynamics}} {${_\ast}$}},
  author = {Board, Simon and {Meyer-ter-vehn}, Moritz},
  year = {2010},
  pages = {1--21},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{bodvarssonEconomicsRestaurantGratuities1997,
  ids = {BODVARSSON1997,BODVARSSON1997a},
  title = {Economics and {{Restaurant Gratuities}}: {{Determining Tip Rates}}},
  author = {BODVARSSON, O and GIBSON, W A},
  year = {1997},
  journal = {American Journal of Economics and S x'ioloKy},
  volume = {56},
  number = {2},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Synergy}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,behavioral,field experiment,tipping}
}

@article{bohnetMoreOrderLess2001,
  ids = {bohnet2001more},
  title = {More Order with Less Law: {{On}} Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding},
  author = {Bohnet, Iris and Frey, Bruno S and Huck, Steffen},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {American Political Science Review},
  volume = {95},
  number = {1},
  pages = {131--144},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  doi = {10.1017/S0003055401000211}
}

@article{boltonAnonymityPunishmentUltimatum1995,
  ids = {Bolton1995,Bolton1995a},
  title = {Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining},
  author = {Bolton, G E and Zwick, R},
  year = {1995},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  volume = {10},
  number = {1},
  pages = {95--121},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1006/game.1995.1026}
}

@article{boltonBayesFactorsApplication2003,
  ids = {Bolton2003,Bolton2003a},
  title = {Bayes Factors with an Application to Experimental Economics},
  author = {Bolton, G E and Fong, D K H and Mosquin, P L},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {6},
  number = {3},
  pages = {311--325},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1023/A:1026281504189}
}

@article{boltonDictatorGameGiving1998,
  ids = {Bolton1998,Bolton1998b},
  title = {Dictator Game Giving: {{Rules}} of Fairness versus Acts of Kindness},
  author = {Bolton, G E and Katok, E and Zwick, R},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  volume = {27},
  number = {2},
  pages = {269--299},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s001820050072}
}

@article{boltonExperimentalTestCrowding1998,
  ids = {Bolton1998a,Bolton1998c},
  title = {An {{Experimental Test}} of the {{Crowding Out Hypothesis}}: {{The Nature}} of {{Beneficent Behavior}}},
  author = {Bolton, G E and Katok, E},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
  volume = {37},
  number = {3},
  pages = {315--331},
  publisher = {{Elsevier Science}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00091-2},
  keywords = {altruism,behavioral,crowding out,experimental,philanthropy}
}

@article{boltonWhichFairSex2001,
  ids = {Bolton2001,Bolton2001a},
  title = {Which Is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism* j},
  author = {Bolton, Gary and Charness, Gary and Croson, Rachel and Durlauf, Steven and Eckel, Catherine and Hoffman, Elizabeth and Kling, Catherine and Lynn, Michael},
  year = {2001},
  number = {February}
}

@article{bonaccorsiAddressingDisenchantmentUniversities2017,
  ids = {bonaccorsi2017addressing},
  title = {Addressing the Disenchantment: Universities and Regional Development in Peripheral Regions},
  author = {Bonaccorsi, Andrea},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Policy Reform},
  volume = {20},
  number = {4},
  pages = {293--320},
  publisher = {{Taylor \& Francis}},
  doi = {10.1080/17487870.2016.1212711},
  mendeley-tags = {Nleduc},
  keywords = {nleduc,Nleduc}
}

@article{bondDynamicPanelData2002a,
  ids = {Bond2002,bondDynamicPanelData2002},
  title = {Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods and Practice},
  author = {Bond, S R},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Portuguese Economic Journal},
  volume = {1},
  number = {2},
  pages = {141--162},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10258-002-0009-9}
}

@article{bondGovernmentInterventionInformation2015a,
  ids = {bondGovernmentInterventionInformation2015},
  title = {Government Intervention and Information Aggregation by Prices},
  author = {Bond, Philip and Goldstein, Itay},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {The Journal of Finance},
  volume = {70},
  number = {6},
  pages = {2777--2812},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/jofi.12303}
}

@article{bonitalondongeraldinedowneycherylbonicairispaltinSocialCausesConsequences2007,
  ids = {BonitaLondonGeraldineDowneyCherylBonicaIrisPaltin2007},
  title = {Social {{Causes}} and {{Consequences}} of {{Rejection Sensitivity}}},
  author = {{Bonita London Geraldine Downey Cheryl Bonica Iris Paltin}},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Journal of Research on Adolescence},
  volume = {17(3)},
  pages = {481--506},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,adolescence,behavioral,gender,isolation,lof,LoF,psychology,rejection sensitivity}
}

@article{boothHalfCheerFair2007,
  ids = {Booth2007,Booth2007a},
  title = {Half a {{Cheer}} for {{Fair Trade}}},
  author = {{Booth} and {Whetstone}},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Institute of Economic Affairs, Working Paper},
  keywords = {business,ft,FT}
}

@techreport{boothSinglesexClassesAffect2013,
  ids = {Booth2013,Booth2013a},
  title = {Do Single-Sex Classes Affect Exam Scores? {{An}} Experiment in a Coeducational University},
  author = {Booth, Alison L and {Cardona-Sosa}, Lina and Nolen, Patrick},
  year = {2013},
  institution = {{Discussion Paper Series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit}}
}

@article{borglohHaveYouPaid2009,
  ids = {Borgloh2009,Borgloh2009a},
  title = {Have {{You Paid Your Dues}}? {{On}} the {{Impact}} of the {{German Church Tax}} on {{Private Charitable Contributions}}},
  author = {Borgloh, S},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Working Paper, Centre for European Economic Research},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{bowlesEndogenousPreferencesCultural1998,
  ids = {Bowles1998,Bowles1998a},
  title = {Endogenous Preferences: {{The}} Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions},
  author = {Bowles, Samuel},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {Journal of economic literature},
  pages = {75--111},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{bowlesPoliciesDesignedSelfinterested2008,
  ids = {bowles2008policies},
  title = {Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine" the Moral Sentiments": {{Evidence}} from Economic Experiments},
  author = {Bowles, Samuel},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {science},
  volume = {320},
  number = {5883},
  pages = {1605--1609},
  publisher = {{American Association for the Advancement of Science}},
  doi = {10.1126/science.1152110}
}

@article{boyerNormsContributionBehavior2016,
  ids = {Boyer2016},
  title = {Do Norms on Contribution Behavior Affect Intrinsic Motivation? {{Field-experimental}} Evidence from {{Germany}}},
  author = {Boyer, Pierre C. and Dwenger, Nadja and Rincke, Johannes},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {144},
  issn = {00472727},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.10.003},
  abstract = {This paper studies how imposing norms on contribution behavior affects individuals' intrinsic motivation. We consider the church levy, which the Catholic Church in Germany collects as a charitable donation, despite the fact that the levy is legally a tax. We design a randomized field experiment with treatments informing individuals that the levy is a tax. We demonstrate that treatment effects differ across motivational types. Among weakly intrinsically motivated individuals, communicating the legal norm results in a significant crowd-out of intrinsic motivation. In contrast, strongly intrinsically motivated individuals do not show any treatment response.},
  mendeley-groups = {giving-keywords}
}

@article{brachingerHedonicMethodsPrice2002,
  ids = {Brachinger2002,Brachinger2002a},
  title = {Hedonic {{Methods}} in {{Price Statistics}}: {{Theory}} and {{Practice}}},
  author = {Brachinger, H W and Diewert, E W},
  year = {2002},
  publisher = {{Heidelberg: Springer}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,applied econometrics,hedonics,structural},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{brehenyRidgeRegressionRidge,
  ids = {Breheny,Breheny2016,brehenyRidgeRegressionRidge2016},
  title = {Ridge {{Regression Ridge}} Regression : {{Definition As}} Mentioned in the Previous Lecture , Ridge Regression},
  author = {Breheny, Patrick},
  pages = {1--22}
}

@article{bremanGiveMoreTomorrow2006,
  ids = {Breman2006,Breman2006a},
  title = {Give More Tomorrow: {{Evidence}} from a Randomized Field Experiment},
  author = {Breman, A},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Unpublished manuscript},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{bremanGiveMoreTomorrow2011,
  ids = {Breman2011,Breman2011a},
  title = {Give More Tomorrow: {{Two}} Field Experiments on Altruism and Intertemporal Choice},
  author = {Breman, A},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {95},
  number = {11},
  pages = {1349--1357},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.004}
}

@article{bristoljrLifeCycleAlumni1990,
  ids = {BristolJr1990,BristolJr1990a},
  title = {The {{Life Cycle}} of {{Alumni Donations}}.},
  author = {Bristol Jr, R B},
  year = {1990},
  journal = {Review of Higher Education},
  doi = {10.1353/rhe.1990.0011},
  abstract = {A study of the quantitative effects of life cycle differences and the reunion year on alumni donation rates and gift size used a 73,000-gift sample over 10 years in a small state university. Time patterns of life cycles was estimated by regression equations, whose potential was demonstrated by simulations. (Author/MSE)},
  keywords = {alumni,empirical,philanthropy}
}

@article{brobergGenerosityInvoluntary2007a,
  ids = {Broberg2007,brobergGenerosityInvoluntary2007},
  title = {Is Generosity Involuntary?},
  author = {Broberg, Tomas and Ellingsen, Tore and Johannesson, Magnus},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {94},
  number = {1},
  pages = {32--37},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2006.07.006}
}

@techreport{brockDictatingRiskExperimental2011,
  ids = {Brock2011,Brock2011a},
  title = {Dictating the Risk\textendash Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments},
  author = {Brock, J M and Lange, A and Ozbay, E Y},
  year = {2011}
}

@article{brosigIdentifyingCooperativeBehavior2002,
  ids = {Brosig2002,Brosig2002a},
  title = {Identifying Cooperative Behavior: Some Experimental Results in a Prisoners Dilemma Game},
  author = {Brosig, J},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Journal of Economic behavior and Organization},
  volume = {47},
  number = {3},
  pages = {275--290},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00211-6},
  abstract = {In recent years, experimental economists have discovered that people exhibit different patterns of cooperative behavior. This paper presents findings from a face-to-face experiment that analyzed whether individuals who possess a willingness to cooperate can credibly signal it and whether it is recognizable by the partner. Results revealed that both capabilities, signaling and recognizing, depend upon the individual's propensity to cooperate.}
}

@article{brownHouseholdDecisionsRegarding2000,
  ids = {Brown2000,Brown2000a},
  title = {Household {{Decisions Regarding Charitable Gifts}}},
  author = {Brown, Eleanor and Slivinski, Al},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {Working Paper},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,empirical,family,philanthropy}
}

@article{brownModellingCharitableDonations2009,
  ids = {Brown2009,Brown2009a},
  title = {Modelling {{Charitable Donations}} to an {{Unexpected Natural Disaster}}: {{Evidence}} from the {{US Panel Study}} of {{Income Dynamics}}},
  author = {Brown, S and Harris, M N and Taylor, K},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {IZA Discussion Papers},
  publisher = {{Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{brownPhilanthropySocialCapital2002,
  ids = {Brown2002,Brown2002a},
  title = {Philanthropy and {{Social Capital}} in {{Los Angeles}}. {{A Report}} to the {{John Randolph Haynes}} and {{Dora Haynes Foundation}}},
  author = {Brown, E and Ferris, J M},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {The Center on Philanthropy and Public Policy, School of Policy, Planning, and Development, University of Southern California},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,philanthropy,social capital,sociology}
}

@techreport{brownWhyDonPeople2008,
  ids = {Brown2008,Brown2008a},
  title = {Why Don't People Insure Late Life Consumption: {{A}} Framing Explanation of the under-Annuitization Puzzle},
  author = {Brown, Jeffrey R and Kling, Jeffrey R and Mullainathan, Sendhil and Wrobel, Marian V},
  year = {2008},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{bryantParticipationPhilanthropicActivities2003,
  ids = {Bryant2003,Bryant2003a},
  title = {Participation in Philanthropic Activities: {{Donating}} Money and Time},
  author = {Bryant, W K and {Jeon-Slaughter}, H and Kang, H and Tax, A},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Journal of Consumer Policy},
  volume = {26},
  number = {1},
  pages = {43--73},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1023/A:1022626529603}
}

@article{brynjolfssonConsumerSurplusDigital,
  ids = {BRYNJOLFSSON,BRYNJOLFSSONa},
  title = {Consumer {{Surplus}} in the {{Digital Economy}}: {{Estimating}} the {{Value}} of {{Increased Product Variety}} at {{Online Booksellers}}},
  author = {BRYNJOLFSSON, E and HU, Y U J and SMITH, M D},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI,business,empirical,hedonics,Industrial Organization,internet,long tail}
}

@article{brynjolfssonGoodbyeParetoPrinciple2007,
  ids = {BRYNJOLFSSON2007,BRYNJOLFSSON2007a},
  title = {Goodbye {{Pareto Principle}}, {{Hello Long Tail}}: {{The Effect}} of {{Search Costs}} on the {{Concentration}} of {{Product Sales}}},
  author = {BRYNJOLFSSON, E and HU, Y U J and SIMESTER, D},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Working paper},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,business,empirical,Industrial Organization,internet,long tail}
}

@article{brynjolfssonNichesRichesAnatomy2006,
  ids = {Brynjolfsson2006,Brynjolfsson2006a},
  title = {From {{Niches}} to {{Riches}}: {{Anatomy}} of the {{Long Tail}}},
  author = {Brynjolfsson, E and Hu, Y U and Smith, M D},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW},
  volume = {47},
  number = {4},
  pages = {67},
  publisher = {{SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW ASSOCIATION}},
  abstract = {Dozens of markets of all types are in the early stages of a revolution as the Internet and related technologies vastly expand the variety of products that can be produced, promoted and purchased. Although this revolution is based on a simple set of economic and technological drivers, the authors argue that its implications are far-reaching for managers, consumers and the economy as a whole. This article looks at what has been dubbed the "Long Tail" phenomenon, examining how customers derive value from an important characteristic of Internet markets: the ability of online merchants to help consumers locate, evaluate and purchase a far wider range of products than they can typically buy via the traditional brick-and-mortar channels. The article examines the Long Tail from both the supply side and the demand side and identifies several key drivers. On the supply side, the authors point out how e-tailers' expanded, centralized warehousing allows for more offerings, thus making it possible for them to cater to more varied tastes. On the demand side, tools such as search engines, recommender software and sampling tools are allowing customers to find products outside of their geographic area. The authors also look toward the future to discuss second order amplified effects of Long Tail, including the growth of markets serving smaller niches.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,business,empirical,Industrial Organization,internet,long tail}
}

@article{bulowMultimarketOligopolyStrategic1985,
  ids = {Bulow1985,Bulow1985a},
  title = {Multimarket Oligopoly: {{Strategic}} Substitutes and Complements},
  author = {Bulow, J I and Geanakoplos, J D and Klemperer, P D},
  year = {1985},
  journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
  pages = {488--511},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1086/261312}
}

@article{burdettLongTermPartnershipFormation1999,
  ids = {Burdett1999,Burdett1999a},
  title = {Long-{{Term Partnership Formation}}: {{Marriage}} and {{Employment}}},
  author = {Burdett, K and Coles, M G},
  year = {1999},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {109},
  number = {456},
  pages = {307--334},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Synergy}},
  doi = {10.1111/1468-0297.00435},
  keywords = {family,matching models,theory}
}

@article{burdettMarriageClass2006,
  ids = {Burdett2006,Burdett2006a},
  title = {Marriage and Class},
  author = {Burdett, K and Coles, M},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  volume = {129},
  pages = {81--113},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{burlandoHeterogeneousAgentsPublic2005,
  ids = {Burlando2005,Burlando2005a},
  title = {Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments},
  author = {Burlando, R M and Guala, F},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {8},
  number = {1},
  pages = {35--54},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10683-005-0436-4}
}

@article{burrowsImpactFairnessBargainin1994,
  ids = {Burrows1994,Burrows1994a},
  title = {The Impact of Fairness on Bargainin},
  author = {Burrows, P and Loomes, G},
  year = {1994},
  journal = {Empirical Economics},
  volume = {19},
  number = {2},
  pages = {201--221},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/BF01175872}
}

@article{butlerSocialRiskRole2014,
  ids = {Butler2014,Butler2014a},
  title = {Social {{Risk}} : The {{Role}} of {{Warmth}} and {{Competence}}},
  author = {Butler, Jeffrey V},
  year = {2014},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,betrayal aversion,intention,social perception,social risk,trust}
}

@article{cadarioWhichHealthyEating2017,
  ids = {Cadario2017},
  title = {Which {{Healthy Eating Nudges Work Best}}? {{A Meta-Analysis}} of {{Field Experiments}}},
  author = {Cadario, Romain and Chandon, Pierre},
  year = {2017},
  number = {July},
  abstract = {We examine the effectiveness in field settings of seven healthy eating nudges, classified according to whether they influence 1) cognition, via ``descriptive nutritional labeling,'' ``evaluative nutritional labeling,'' or ``salience enhancements''; 2) affect, via ``hedonic or sensory cues'' or ``healthy eating prods''; or 3) behavior, via ``convenience enhancements'' or ``plate and portion size changes.'' Compared with existing univariate meta-analyses, our multivariate three-level meta-analysis of 277 effect sizes controlling for eating behavior, population, and study characteristics yields smaller effect sizes overall. These effect sizes increase as the focus of the intervention shifts from cognition (d=.08, equivalent to -45 kcal/day) to affect (d=.22, -121 kcal) to behavior (d=.35, -186 kcal). Interventions are more effective at reducing unhealthy eating than at increasing healthy eating or reducing total eating. Effect sizes are larger in the US than in other countries, in restaurants or cafeterias than in grocery stores, and in studies including a control group. Effect sizes are similar for food selection vs. consumption, for children vs. adults, and are independent of study duration. Compared to the typical study, one testing the best nudge scenario should expect a fourfold increase in effectiveness, with half due to switching from cognitive to behavioral nudges.}
}

@article{caetanoSchoolSegregationIdentification2014,
  ids = {Caetano2014a},
  title = {School {{Segregation}} and the {{Identification}} of {{Tipping Behavior}}},
  author = {Caetano, Gregorio and Maheshri, Vikram},
  year = {2014},
  pages = {1--44}
}

@article{cainExperimentalInvestigationMotives1998,
  ids = {Cain1998,Cain1998a},
  title = {An Experimental Investigation of Motives and Information in the Prisoners Dilemma Game},
  author = {Cain, M},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {Advances in Group Processes},
  volume = {15},
  pages = {133--160},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{calzolariNudgingInformationRandomized2011,
  ids = {Calzolari2011,Calzolari2011a},
  title = {Nudging with Information: A Randomized Field Experiment on Reminders and Feedback},
  author = {Calzolari, Giacomo and Nardotto, Mattia},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Available at SSRN 1924901},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{cameraCoordinationValueMonetary2011,
  ids = {Camera2011,Camera2011a},
  title = {The Coordination Value of Monetary Exchange: {{Experimental}} Evidence},
  author = {Camera, Gabriele and Casari, Marco},
  year = {2011},
  publisher = {{Quaderni DSE Working Paper}},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.1861151},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{camererEffectsFinancialIncentives1999,
  ids = {Camerer1999,Camerer1999a},
  title = {The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: {{A}} Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework},
  author = {Camerer, Colin F and Hogarth, Robin M},
  year = {1999},
  journal = {Journal of risk and uncertainty},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1-3},
  pages = {7--42},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1023/A:1007850605129}
}

@article{camererEvaluatingReplicabilitySocial,
  ids = {Camerer},
  title = {Evaluating the {{Replicability}} of {{Social Science Experiments}} in {{Nature}} and {{Science}}},
  author = {Camerer, Colin F and Dreber, Anna and Holzmeister, Felix and Ho, Teck-hua and Johannesson, Magnus and Kirchler, Michael and Nave, Gideon and Pfeiffer, Thomas and Altmejd, Adam and Buttrick, Nick and Chan, Taizan and Chen, Yiling and Forsell, Eskil and Gampa, Anup and Heikensten, Emma and Hummer, Lily and Imai, Taisuke and Isaksson, Siri and Manfredi, Dylan and Rose, Julia and Wu, Hang},
  pages = {1--26}
}

@article{camererExperimentalTestsSequential1988,
  ids = {Camerer1988,Camerer1988b},
  title = {Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model},
  author = {Camerer, C and Weigelt, K},
  year = {1988},
  journal = {Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society},
  pages = {1--36},
  publisher = {{The Econometric Society}},
  doi = {10.2307/1911840},
  abstract = {The authors find that subjects' behavior in an incomplete-information, repeated-game experiment is roughly a sequent ial equilibrium. The deviations from sequential equilibrium can be explained by the existence of a "homemade prior" probability (about 17 percent) that players will cooperate even when they should not. The authors conclude that equilibrium concepts which are more complicated than Nash (such as sequential) can describe individual behavior well enough that theories using such equilibrium concepts are plausible.}
}

@article{camererGiftsEconomicSignals1988,
  ids = {Camerer1988a,Camerer1988c},
  title = {Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols},
  author = {Camerer, Colin},
  year = {1988},
  journal = {American Journal of Sociology},
  pages = {S180----S214},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1086/228946}
}

@article{camererIndividualDecisionMaking1995,
  ids = {Camerer1995,Camerer1995a},
  title = {Individual Decision Making},
  author = {Camerer, C},
  year = {1995},
  journal = {The handbook of experimental economics},
  volume = {3},
  pages = {587--704},
  publisher = {{Princeton University Press}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{cantonDemandHigherEducation2005,
  ids = {Canton2005,Canton2005a},
  title = {The Demand for Higher Education in {{The Netherlands}}, 1950-1999},
  author = {Canton, E and De Jong, F},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Economics of Education Review},
  volume = {24},
  number = {6},
  pages = {651--663},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econedurev.2004.09.006},
  abstract = {This paper investigates the role of economic factors in the university enrollment decision for the post-war period in The Netherlands. We include those factors standing at the heart of the idea that education is an investment. The econometric results suggest that students are not responsive to tuition fees, but financial support (the sum of loans and grants), the college premium on future labor market earnings, and the alternative wage are important in the enrollment decision.},
  note = {nled
\par
nled
\par
nled}
}

@article{caplinAIDSPolicyPsychology2003,
  ids = {Caplin2003,Caplin2003a},
  title = {{{AIDS Policy}} and {{Psychology}}: {{A Mechanism-Design Approach}}},
  author = {Caplin, Andrew and Eliaz, Kfir},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics},
  volume = {34},
  number = {4},
  pages = {631--646},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The RAND Corporation}},
  issn = {07416261},
  doi = {10.2307/1593781},
  abstract = {Economic theorists have given little attention to health-related externalities, such as those involved in the spread of AIDS. One reason for this is the critical role played by psychological factors, such as fear of testing, in the continued spread of the disease. We develop a model of AIDS transmission that acknowledges this form of fear. In this context we design a mechanism that not only encourages testing but also slows the spread of the disease through voluntary transmission. Our larger agenda is to demonstrate the power of psychological incentives in the public health arena.},
  keywords = {aids,behavioral,health,mechanism design,pop,psychology}
}

@article{caplinPsychologicalExpectedUtility2001,
  ids = {Caplin2001,Caplin2001a},
  title = {Psychological {{Expected Utility Theory}} and {{Anticipatory Feelings}}*},
  author = {Caplin, A and Leahy, J},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {116},
  number = {1},
  pages = {55--79},
  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
  doi = {10.1162/003355301556347},
  keywords = {anticipation,behavioral,pop,psychology}
}

@article{cardenasBehaviouralDevelopmentEconomics2008,
  ids = {Cardenas2008,Cardenas2008a},
  title = {Behavioural {{Development Economics}}: {{Lessons}} from {{Field Labs}} in the {{Developing World}}},
  author = {Cardenas, J C and Carpenter, J},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Journal of Development Studies},
  doi = {10.1080/00220380701848327},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{cardenasExperimentsEconomicDevelopment,
  ids = {Cardena,Cardenasa},
  title = {Experiments and {{Economic Development}}: {{Lessons}} from {{Field Labs}} in the {{Developing World}}},
  author = {Cardenas, J C and Carpenter, J},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{cardenasLocalEnvironmentalControl2000,
  ids = {Cardenas2000a,Cardenas2000c},
  title = {Local {{Environmental Control}} and {{Institutional}}},
  author = {Cardenas, Juan Camilo and Stranlund, John and Willis, Cleve},
  year = {2000},
  volume = {28},
  number = {10},
  pages = {1719--1733},
  keywords = {colombia,ð institutional crowding-out,experiments,external regulation,local environmental quality,south america}
}

@article{cardenasLocalEnvironmentalControl2000a,
  ids = {Cardenas2000,Cardenas2000b},
  title = {Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out},
  author = {Cardenas, J C and Stranlund, J and Willis, C},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {World Development},
  volume = {28},
  number = {10},
  pages = {1719--1733},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00055-3},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@techreport{cardUsingGeographicVariation1993,
  ids = {Card1993,Card1993a},
  title = {Using Geographic Variation in College Proximity to Estimate the Return to Schooling},
  author = {Card, David},
  year = {1993},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  abstract = {ABSTRACT A convincing analysis of the causal link between schooling and earnings requires an exogenous source of variation in education outcomes. This paper explores the use of college proximity as an exogenous determinant of schooling. Analysis of the NLS ...},
  keywords = {education,geography,nleduc}
}

@article{carliGenderSocialInfluence2001a,
  ids = {Carli2001,carliGenderSocialInfluence2001},
  title = {Gender and Social Influence},
  author = {Carli, L L},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {Journal of Social Issues: Gender, Hierarchy, and Leadership},
  volume = {57},
  pages = {725--742},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{carlsonPositiveMoodHelping1988,
  ids = {Carlson1988,Carlson1988a},
  title = {Positive Mood and Helping Behavior: A Test of Six Hypotheses.},
  author = {Carlson, Michael and Charlin, Ventura and Miller, Norman},
  year = {1988},
  journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
  volume = {55},
  number = {2},
  pages = {211},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.55.2.211},
  abstract = {Past research has shown rather consistently that positive mood states lead to increased helpfulness. In an expanded analysis of the published literature, we examined six distinct views about this relation: the focus of attention, objective self-awareness, separate process, social outlook, mood maintenance, and concomitance hypotheses. For each of 61 positive affect conditions in which it was possible to generate an effect-size estimate corresponding to the relative degree of helpfulness exhibited by positive mood subjects (compared with neutral affect subjects), judges assessed the contextual levels of variables relevant to each of the six hypotheses by reading the Method section of each article. Higher-order partial correlation coefficients were then calculated to isolate the independent contribution of each of the theoretically relevant variables to the variation among the 61 effect sizes. The results support the focus of attention, separate process, social outlook, and mood maintenance hypotheses, and partially support the objective self-awareness and concomitance hypotheses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {affect,social preferences}
}

@article{carlssonEasyComeEasy,
  ids = {Carlsson,Carlssona},
  title = {Easy Come, Easy Go-{{The}} Role of Windfall Money in Lab and Field Experiments},
  author = {Carlsson, F and He, H and Martinsson, P},
  journal = {rapport nr.: Working Papers in Economics 374},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{carmanSocialInfluencesPrivate2003,
  ids = {Carman2003,Carman2003a},
  title = {Social {{Influences}} and the {{Private Provision}} of {{Public Goods}}: {{Evidence}} from {{Charitable Contributions}} in the {{Workplace}}},
  author = {Carman, K G},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Manuscript, Stanford University},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,anonymity,field experiments,peers,philanthropy,reputation,social influence}
}

@article{carminesTwoFacesIssue1980,
  ids = {Carmines1980,Carmines1980a},
  title = {The Two Faces of Issue Voting},
  author = {Carmines, Edward G and Stimson, James A},
  year = {1980},
  journal = {The American Political Science Review},
  pages = {78--91},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.2307/1955648},
  keywords = {easy issues,listening,political}
}

@article{carpenterAmericanEconomicAssociation2014,
  ids = {Carpenter2014,Carpenter2014a},
  title = {American {{Economic Association Tournaments}} and {{Office Politics}} : {{Evidence}} from a {{Real Effort Experiment Tournaments}} and {{Office Politics}} : {{Evidence}} from a {{Real Effort Experiment}}},
  author = {Carpenter, Jeffrey and Matthews, Peter Hans and Schirm, John and The, Source and Economic, American and March, No and Carpenter, By Jeffrey},
  year = {2014},
  volume = {100},
  number = {1},
  pages = {504--517}
}

@article{carpenterCharityAuctionsField2008,
  ids = {Carpenter2008,Carpenter2008a},
  title = {Charity Auctions: A Field Experiment*},
  author = {Carpenter, J and Holmes, J and Matthews, P H},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {118},
  number = {525},
  pages = {92--113},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02105.x},
  keywords = {auctions,field experiments,philanthropy}
}

@article{carreeLocationalChoicesCosts2012,
  ids = {Carree2012,Carree2012a},
  title = {Locational Choices and the Costs of Distance: Empirical Evidence for {{Dutch}} Graduates},
  author = {Carree, Martin and Kronenberg, Kristin},
  year = {2012},
  abstract = {This study identifies and analyzes the effects of university/college graduates' personal, household and employment characteristics as well as the attributes of their study, work and home locations on their college-to-work, college-to-residence, and commuting distances. The results illustrate that graduates are drawn to prospering regions with ample job opportunities, supposedly in order to advance their careers. They choose their places of residence so as to balance their commuting distances and the distances to their previous places of study. Residential amenities have a comparatively small effect on graduates' locational choices, whereas they appear to value accessibility of the place of residence.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,nlGEOG}
}

@article{cartwrightImpulseBalanceFraming2019,
  title = {Impulse Balance and Framing Effects in Threshold Public Good Games},
  author = {Cartwright, Edward and Xue, Lian},
  year = {2019},
  number = {February 2018},
  doi = {10.1111/jpet.12359}
}

@article{casonFairnessSharingInnovation2002,
  ids = {Cason2002,Cason2002a},
  title = {Fairness and Sharing in Innovation Games: A Laboratory Investigation},
  author = {Cason, T N and Mui, V L},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
  volume = {48},
  number = {3},
  pages = {243--264},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00218-9},
  keywords = {behavioral,experimental,fairness,innovation}
}

@article{cawleyGUIDEADVICEECONOMISTS2003,
  ids = {Cawley2003,Cawley2003a},
  title = {A {{GUIDE}} ({{AND ADVICE}}) {{FOR ECONOMISTS ON THE U}}. {{S}}. {{JUNIOR ACADEMIC JOB MARKET}}},
  author = {Cawley, John},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Job Openings for Economists},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,job market}
}

@article{chaconProGit,
  ids = {Chacon},
  title = {Pro {{Git}}},
  author = {Chacon, Scott and Straub, Ben},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI}
}

@article{chadeMatchingNoiseAcceptance2006,
  ids = {Chade2006,Chade2006a},
  title = {Matching with Noise and the Acceptance Curse},
  author = {Chade, H},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  volume = {129},
  number = {1},
  pages = {81--113},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.008},
  keywords = {lof,matching models,theory}
}

@article{changPreanalysisPlanReplicate2017,
  ids = {Chang2017},
  title = {A {{Preanalysis Plan}} to {{Replicate Sixty Economics Research Papers That Worked Half}} of the {{Time}}},
  author = {Chang, Andrew C. and Li, Phillip},
  year = {2017},
  month = may,
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {107},
  number = {5},
  pages = {60--64},
  issn = {0002-8282},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.p20171034}
}

@article{charitiesindustryreportCharitiesGrappleFunddemanding2005,
  ids = {CharitiesIndustryReport2005,CharitiesIndustryReport2005a},
  title = {Charities Grapple with Fund-Demanding Crises},
  author = {Charities Industry Report, Unknown},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Economics of Education Review},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,fundraising,nonprofits,philanthropy,substitution},
  note = {Cited in Marketing
\par
Cited in Marketing
\par
Cited in Marketing}
}

@article{charnessBarePromisesExperiment2010,
  ids = {Charness2010a,Charness2010c},
  title = {Bare Promises: {{An}} Experiment},
  author = {Charness, Gary and Dufwenberg, Martin},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {107},
  number = {2},
  pages = {281--283},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2010.02.009}
}

@article{charnessExperimentalMethodsEliciting2013,
  ids = {Charness2013,Charness2013a,charnessExperimentalMethodsExtralaboratory2013},
  title = {Experimental Methods: {{Eliciting}} Risk Preferences},
  shorttitle = {Experimental Methods},
  author = {Charness, Gary and Gneezy, Uri and Imas, Alex},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  volume = {87},
  pages = {43--51},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.023},
  keywords = {Elicitation methods,Experimental methodology,Extra-laboratory experiments,field experiments,Field experiments,Laboratory experiments,Risk preferences},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/LDDXLA8A/S016726811200282X.html}
}

@article{charnessIncentivesExercise2009,
  ids = {Charness2009,Charness2009a},
  title = {Incentives to Exercise},
  author = {Charness, Gary and Gneezy, Uri},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {77},
  number = {3},
  pages = {909--931},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.3982/ECTA7416},
  keywords = {behavioral,experimental,nudge}
}

@article{charnessLabLaborWhat2010,
  ids = {Charness2010,Charness2010b},
  title = {Lab {{Labor}}: {{What Can Labor Economists Learn}} from the {{Lab}}?},
  author = {Charness, G and Kuhn, P},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {NBER Working Paper},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{charnessPromisesPartnership2006,
  ids = {Charness2006,Charness2006a},
  title = {Promises and Partnership},
  author = {Charness, G and Dufwenberg, M},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  pages = {1579--1601},
  publisher = {{Econometric Society}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x}
}

@article{charnessWhatNameAnonymity2008,
  ids = {Charness2008,Charness2008a},
  title = {What's in a Name? {{Anonymity}} and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games},
  author = {Charness, G and Gneezy, U},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2008.03.001},
  keywords = {anonymity,dictator games,experimental,social,ultimatum games}
}

@article{chaudhuriDoesStrategicPlay2011,
  ids = {Chaudhuri2011a,Chaudhuri2011c},
  title = {Does {{Strategic Play Explain}} the {{Decay}} in {{Contributions}} in a {{Public Goods Game}}? {{Experimental Evidence}}},
  author = {Chaudhuri, A and Paichayontvijit, T},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Mimeo},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,experiments,public goods,Public goods,vcms}
}

@article{chaudhuriSocialLearningNorms2006,
  ids = {Chaudhuri2006,Chaudhuri2006a},
  title = {Social Learning and Norms in a Public Goods Experiment with Inter-Generational Advice},
  author = {Chaudhuri, A and Graziano, S and Maitra, P},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
  volume = {73},
  number = {2},
  pages = {357},
  publisher = {{BLACKWELL PUBLISHERS}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.0379.x}
}

@article{chaudhuriSustainingCooperationLaboratory2011,
  ids = {Chaudhuri2010,Chaudhuri2010a,Chaudhuri2011,Chaudhuri2011b},
  title = {Sustaining Cooperation in Laboratory Public Goods Experiments: A Selective Survey of the Literature},
  author = {Chaudhuri, A},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {14},
  number = {1},
  pages = {47--83},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1},
  keywords = {c91,c92,conditional cooperation,jel classification c71,monetary punishments,moral suasion,non-monetary punishments,public goods,sorting}
}

@article{chaykennethy.SemiparametricCensoredRegression2001,
  ids = {ChayKennethY.2001,ChayKennethY.2001a},
  title = {Semiparametric {{Censored Regression Models}}},
  author = {{Chay Kenneth Y.} and {Powell James L.}},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {15},
  number = {4},
  pages = {29--42},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  issn = {0895-3309},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.15.4.29},
  keywords = {[philanthropy],corners,econometric,semiparametric}
}

@article{chenEffectLanguageEconomic2013,
  ids = {Chen2013,Chen2013a},
  title = {The Effect of Language on Economic Behavior: {{Evidence}} from Savings Rates, Health Behaviors, and Retirement Assets},
  author = {Chen, M Keith},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {103},
  number = {2},
  pages = {690--731},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.103.2.690}
}

@article{cherryHardnoseDictator2002,
  ids = {Cherry2002,Cherry2002a},
  title = {Hardnose the {{Dictator}}},
  author = {Cherry, T L and Frykblom, P and Shogren, J F},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {92},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1218--1221},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association Publications}},
  doi = {10.1257/00028280260344740},
  keywords = {altruism,anonymity,desert,dictator games,experimental,fairness,house money,philanthropy,vcm,VCM}
}

@techreport{chettyActiveVsPassive2012,
  ids = {Chetty2012,Chetty2012a},
  title = {Active vs. {{Passive Decisions}} and {{Crowdout}} in {{Retirement Savings Accounts}}: {{Evidence}} from {{Denmark}}},
  author = {Chetty, Raj and Friedman, John N and {Leth-Petersen}, Soren and Nielsen, Torben and Olsen, Tore},
  year = {2012},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}}
}

@article{cheVERYPRELIMINARYINCOMPLETE,
  ids = {Che,Chea,cheVERYPRELIMINARYINCOMPLETEa},
  title = {{{VERY PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE PLEASE DO NOT CIRCULATE}} ! 2 . {{Baseline Model}} : {{Two News-Sources Without Cost}} 3 . {{General Model}} 3 . 2 . {{Contradictory}} and {{Confirmatory Learning Strategies}} 3 . 3 . {{Characterization}} of the {{Optimal Policy}} 3 . 5 . {{Fully Patient}}},
  author = {Che, Yeon-koo and Mierendorff, Konrad and Cripps, Martin and Dean, Mark and Johannes, H and Botond, K},
  number = {Dm},
  pages = {1--67},
  keywords = {contradictory and confirmatory,learning strategies,limited attention,please do not circulate,very preliminary and incomplete,wald sequential decision problem}
}

@article{chisholmSpatialCompetitionAgglomeration,
  ids = {Chisholm,Chisholma},
  title = {Spatial {{Competition}} and {{Agglomeration}}: {{An Application}} to {{Motion Pictures}}},
  author = {Chisholm, D C and Norman, G},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{choiLearningNetworksExperimental2005,
  ids = {Choi2005,Choi2005b},
  title = {Learning in {{Networks}}: {{An Experimental Study}}},
  author = {Choi, Gale and {Kariv}},
  year = {2005},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{choiSavingRetirementPath2005,
  ids = {Choi2005a,Choi2005c},
  title = {Saving for Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance},
  author = {Choi, James J and Laibson, David and Madrian, Brigitte C and Metrick, Andrew},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {RODNEY L WHITE CENTER FOR FINANCIAL RESEARCH-WORKING PAPERS-},
  volume = {9},
  publisher = {{RODNEY WHITE CENTER-UNIVERSITY PENNSYLVANIA}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{choSignalingGamesStable1987,
  ids = {Cho1987,Cho1987a},
  title = {Signaling {{Games}} and {{Stable Equilibria}}},
  author = {Cho, I K and Kreps, D M},
  year = {1987},
  journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {102},
  number = {2},
  pages = {179--221},
  doi = {10.2307/1885060},
  keywords = {games,lof,signaling,theory}
}

@article{christensenTransparencyReproducibilityCredibility2018,
  ids = {Christensen2018},
  title = {Transparency , {{Reproducibility}} , and the {{Credibility}} of {{Economics Research}} \textdagger},
  author = {Christensen, Garret and Miguel, Edward},
  year = {2018},
  volume = {56},
  pages = {920--980},
  abstract = {There is growing interest in enhancing research transparency and reproducibility in economics and other scientific fields. We survey existing work on these topics within economics and discuss the evidence suggesting that publication bias, inability to replicate, and specification searching remain widespread in the discipline. We next discuss recent progress in this area, including through improved research design, study registration and pre-analysis plans, disclosure standards, and open sharing of data and materials, drawing on experiences in both economics and other social sciences. We discuss areas where consensus is emerging on new practices, as well as approaches that remain controversial, and speculate about the most effective ways to make economics research more credible in the future. ( JEL A11, C18, I23)}
}

@article{chuahBehaviouralEconomicsFinancial2011,
  ids = {Chuah2011,Chuah2011a},
  title = {Behavioural Economics and Financial Services Marketing: A Review},
  author = {Chuah, Swee-Hoon and Devlin, James},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {International Journal of Bank Marketing},
  volume = {29},
  number = {6},
  pages = {456--469},
  publisher = {{Emerald Group Publishing Limited}},
  doi = {10.1108/02652321111165257},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{chuaRoleUnitedCharities2003,
  ids = {Chua2003,Chua2003a},
  title = {The {{Role}} of {{United Charities}} in {{Fundraising}}: {{The Case}} of {{Singapore}}},
  author = {Chua, V C H and Ming Wong, C},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics},
  volume = {74},
  number = {3},
  pages = {433--464},
  doi = {10.1111/1467-8292.00230},
  keywords = {fundraising,nonprofits,philanthropy}
}

@article{chugunovaTimeOurSide2019,
  ids = {Chugunova2019},
  title = {Is {{Time}} on {{Our Side}} ? {{On}} the {{Benefits}} of {{Committing}} to {{Charities}} {${_\ast}$}},
  author = {Chugunova, Marina and Nicklisch, Andreas},
  year = {2019},
  pages = {1--24},
  keywords = {charitable giving,Charitable giving,redistribution,subsistence income,tim-}
}

@article{cialdiniIncreasingComplianceLegitimizing1976,
  ids = {cialdini1976increasing},
  title = {Increasing Compliance by Legitimizing Paltry Contributions: {{When}} Even a Penny Helps.},
  author = {Cialdini, Robert B and Schroeder, David A},
  year = {1976},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {34},
  number = {4},
  pages = {599},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.34.4.599}
}

@article{cialdiniPreferenceConsistencyDevelopment1995,
  ids = {Cialdini1995,Cialdini1995a},
  title = {Preference for Consistency: {{The}} Development of a Valid Measure and the Discovery of Surprising Behavioral Implications.},
  author = {Cialdini, R B and Trost, M R and Newsom, J T},
  year = {1995},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {69},
  number = {2},
  pages = {318--328},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.69.2.318}
}

@article{cialdiniTransgressionAltruismCase1973,
  ids = {Cialdini1973,Cialdini1973a},
  title = {Transgression and Altruism: {{A}} Case for Hedonism},
  author = {Cialdini, Robert B and Darby, Betty Lee and Vincent, Joyce E},
  year = {1973},
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
  volume = {9},
  number = {6},
  pages = {502--516},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/0022-1031(73)90031-0}
}

@article{cinyabugumaCooperationThreatExpulsion2005,
  ids = {Cinyabuguma2005,Cinyabuguma2005a},
  title = {Cooperation under the Threat of Expulsion in a Public Goods Experiment},
  author = {Cinyabuguma, Matthias and Page, Talbot and Putterman, Louis},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {89},
  number = {8},
  pages = {1421--1435},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011}
}

@book{cityphilanthropyBonusPledgeThink2016,
  title = {1\% {{Bonus Pledge Think Tank}} | {{City Philanthropy}}},
  author = {{City Philanthropy}},
  year = {2016}
}

@book{cityphilanthropyCallCityFirms2012,
  title = {Call for {{City}} Firms to Help {{Cabinet Office}} Research into `windfall' Giving | {{City Philanthropy}}},
  author = {{City Philanthropy}},
  year = {2012}
}

@article{clarkHouseMoneyEffects2002,
  ids = {Clark2002,Clark2002a},
  title = {House {{Money Effects}} in {{Public Good Experiments}}},
  author = {Clark, J},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {223--231},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1023/A:1020832203804},
  keywords = {experiments,house money,vcm,VCM}
}

@article{clotfelterAlumniGivingPrivate2003,
  title = {Alumni {{Giving}} to {{Private Colleges}} and {{Universities}}},
  author = {Clotfelter, C T},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Economics of Education Review},
  volume = {22},
  number = {2},
  pages = {109--120},
  doi = {10.1016/S0272-7757(02)00028-6},
  keywords = {alumni giving,empirical,philanthropy}
}

@article{collaborationPSYCHOLOGYEstimatingReproducibility2015,
  ids = {Collaboration2015,PSYCHOLOGYEstimatingReproducibility2015},
  title = {{{PSYCHOLOGY}}. {{Estimating}} the Reproducibility of Psychological Science},
  author = {Collaboration, Open Science},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Science (New York, N.Y.)},
  volume = {349},
  number = {6251},
  eprint = {1011.1669v3},
  eprinttype = {arxiv},
  pages = {aac4716},
  issn = {10959203},
  doi = {10.1126/science.aac4716},
  abstract = {Reproducibility is a defining feature of science, but the extent to which it characterizes current research is unknown. We conducted replications of 100 experimental and correlational studies published in three psychology journals using high-powered designs and original materials when available. Replication effects were half the magnitude of original effects, representing a substantial decline. Ninety-seven percent of original studies had statistically significant results. Thirty-six percent of replications had statistically significant results; 47\% of original effect sizes were in the 95\% confidence interval of the replication effect size; 39\% of effects were subjectively rated to have replicated the original result; and if no bias in original results is assumed, combining original and replication results left 68\% with statistically significant effects. Correlational tests suggest that replication success was better predicted by the strength of original evidence than by characteristics of the original and replication teams.},
  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
  arxivid = {arXiv:1011.1669v3},
  isbn = {1095-9203 (Electronic)\textbackslash r0036-8075 (Linking)},
  pmid = {26315443}
}

@article{collinsSpeedDatingProcess2008,
  ids = {Collins2008,Collins2008a},
  title = {Speed {{Dating}}: A Process of Forming Undergraduate Student Groups},
  author = {Collins, N and Goyder, J},
  year = {2008},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{companySampleSizePower,
  title = {Sample Size and Power Calculations},
  author = {Company, Electric},
  pages = {437--456}
}

@article{cooksonFramingEffectsPublic2000,
  ids = {Cookson2000,Cookson2000a},
  title = {Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments},
  author = {Cookson, R},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {3},
  number = {1},
  pages = {55--79},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1023/A:1009994008166}
}

@article{cooperForwardInductionBattleoftheSexes1993,
  ids = {Cooper1993,Cooper1993a},
  title = {Forward {{Induction}} in the {{Battle-of-the-Sexes Games}}},
  author = {Cooper, R and DeJong, D V and Forsythe, R and Ross, T W},
  year = {1993},
  journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
  volume = {83},
  pages = {1303},
  publisher = {{AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION}},
  keywords = {[ritual],⛔ No DOI found,Bos,experimental,forward induction,opt-out,signaling}
}

@article{cooperOtherRegardingPreferences2009,
  ids = {Cooper2009,Cooper2009a},
  title = {Other {{Regarding Preferences}}: {{A Selective Survey}} of {{Experimental Results}}},
  author = {Cooper, D J and Kagel, J H},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Handbook of Experimental Economics},
  volume = {2},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{cooterCharityPublicityDonation2005,
  ids = {Cooter2005,Cooter2005a},
  title = {Charity, {{Publicity}}, and the {{Donation Registry}}},
  author = {Cooter, R and Broughman, B J},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {The Economists' Voice},
  volume = {2},
  number = {3},
  pages = {4},
  publisher = {{bepress}},
  doi = {10.2202/1553-3832.1039},
  keywords = {anonymity,philanthropy,public policy,reputation,social,theory}
}

@article{coricelliPartnerSelectionPublic2004,
  ids = {Coricelli2004,Coricelli2004a},
  title = {Partner {{Selection}} in {{Public Goods Experiments}}},
  author = {Coricelli, Giorgio and Fehr, Dietmar and Fellner, Gerlinde},
  year = {2004},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  volume = {48},
  number = {3},
  pages = {356--378},
  doi = {10.1177/0022002704264143},
  abstract = {The effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good is examined. Participants are in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, they can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrate significantly higher cooperation in correspondence to unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching. Average monetary effort for being able to choose a partner is substantially high and remains stable.}
}

@article{CoronavirusStrictNew2020,
  title = {Coronavirus: {{Strict}} New Curbs on Life in {{UK}} Announced by {{PM}}},
  shorttitle = {Coronavirus},
  year = {2020},
  month = mar,
  journal = {BBC News},
  abstract = {Gatherings of more than two people are banned, shops ordered to close and social events halted as part of rules to keep Britons at home and stop the spread of coronavirus.},
  chapter = {UK},
  langid = {british}
}

@article{coxWhenAreWomen2006,
  ids = {Cox2006,Cox2006b,Cox2006d},
  title = {When Are Women More Generous than Men?},
  author = {Cox, James C and a. Deck, Cary},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Economic Inquiry},
  volume = {44},
  number = {4},
  pages = {587--598},
  doi = {10.1093/ei/cbj042},
  abstract = {Previous research on gender differences in behavior has led to seemingly contradictory findings about generosity. From data generated by 290 subject pairs, we find that women are more sensitive than men to the costs of generous actions when deciding whether to be generous. The factors that affect the level of generosity observed in our experiments are reciprocal motivation, the level of money payoffs, and the level of social distance in the experimental protocol. The relatively greater sensitivity of women to the costs of generous behavior can explain most of the apparent inconsistencies in previously reported findings. (JEL C70, C91, D63, D64)},
  keywords = {and from the walton,college of business,decision risk and management,experiments,gender,generosity,grant number ses9818561,helpful comments and suggestions,motives,nelson,program of the national,research support from the,science,science foundation,we are grateful for,were provided by william}
}

@article{craneUnpackingEthicalProduct2001,
  ids = {Crane2001,Crane2001a},
  title = {Unpacking the {{Ethical Product}}},
  author = {Crane, A},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {Journal of Business Ethics},
  volume = {30},
  number = {4},
  pages = {361--373},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1023/A:1010793013027},
  abstract = {Acknowledging the increasing attention in the literature devoted to the incorporation of ethical considerations into consumers'' purchase decisions, this paper explores the notion of an ethical product. It is argued that ethical issues have long been involved in consumers'' product evaluations, but that there has been little academic investigation of ethics in terms of product concepts and theories. Ethics are thus examined in the context of the augmented product concept, and two dimensions of ethical augmentation are identified: direction and content. These dimensions are set out and discussed at some length, and then they are used to construct an ethical product matrix. It is shown how this could be used to provide structure and coherence to examinations of the perceived ethics of any given product offering. The implications of the analysis offered in the paper are discussed, and a number of limitations of the ethical product notion are identified. Finally some conclusions and directions for future research are suggested.},
  keywords = {business,ethics,ft,FT}
}

@unpublished{crawfordCashPensionsHave2014,
  ids = {Crawford2014,Crawford2014a},
  title = {Cash and {{Pensions}}: {{Have}} the Elderly in {{England}} Saved Optimally for Retirement},
  author = {Crawford, Rowena and O'Dea, Cormac},
  year = {2014},
  month = sep,
  doi = {10.1920/wp.ifs.2014.1422}
}

@article{cremerNonlinearPricingRedistribution2002,
  ids = {Cremer2002,Cremer2002a},
  title = {Nonlinear Pricing, Redistribution, and Optimal Tax Policy},
  author = {Cremer, Helmuth and Gahvari, Firouz},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  volume = {4},
  number = {2},
  pages = {139--161},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/1467-9779.00092},
  keywords = {poorcard}
}

@article{cronqvistDesignChoicesPrivatized2004,
  ids = {Cronqvist2004,Cronqvist2004a},
  title = {Design Choices in Privatized Social-Security Systems: {{Learning}} from the {{Swedish}} Experience},
  author = {Cronqvist, Henrik and Thaler, Richard H},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  pages = {424--428},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1257/0002828041301632},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{crosonTheoriesCommitmentAltruism2007,
  ids = {Croson2007a,Croson2007d},
  title = {Theories of Commitment, Altruism and Reciprocity: {{Evidence}} from Linear Public Goods Games},
  author = {Croson, R T A},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Economic Inquiry},
  volume = {45},
  number = {2},
  pages = {199--216},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1465-7295.2006.00006.x}
}

@article{crossleyWealthSavingUK2010,
  title = {The Wealth and Saving of {{UK}} Families on the Eve of the Crisis},
  author = {Crossley, Thomas F and O'Dea, Cormac},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {The Institute for Fiscal Studies},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,retirement consulting}
}

@techreport{cuevaCharitableGivingSelfSignaling2010,
  ids = {Cueva2010,Cueva2010a},
  title = {Charitable {{Giving}} and {{Self-Signaling}}},
  author = {Cueva, Carlos and Dess, Roberta},
  year = {2010},
  institution = {{January 2011. mimeo}}
}

@article{cullenEffectSchoolChoice2006,
  title = {The Effect of School Choice on Participants: {{Evidence}} from Randomized Lotteries},
  author = {Cullen, Julie Berry and Jacob, Brian A and Levitt, Steven},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {74},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1191--1230},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00702.x}
}

@article{cummingNewStatisticsWhy2014a,
  ids = {cummingNewStatisticsWhy2014},
  title = {The New Statistics : {{Why}} and How},
  author = {Cumming, Geoff},
  year = {2014},
  doi = {10.1177/0956797613504966},
  keywords = {13,20,8,estimation,meta-analysis,received 7,replication,research integrity,research methods,revision accepted 8,statistical analysis,that most current,the new statistics,there is increasing concern},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/S9IBNJNQ/The new statistics.pdf}
}

@book{cunningham2018causal,
  ids = {cunninghamCausalInferenceMixtape2018,cunninghamCausalInferenceMixtape2018a},
  title = {Causal Inference: {{The}} Mixtape},
  author = {Cunningham, Scott},
  year = {2018},
  publisher = {{Yale University Press}},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/JCY5FKGK/books.html}
}

@article{cunninghamSCOTTCUNNINGHAMAU,
  title = {{{SCOTT CUNNINGHAM C AU S A L I N F E R E N C E}} : {{T H E M I X TA P E}}},
  author = {Cunningham, Scott},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{cziborDozenThingsExperimental2019,
  ids = {Czibor2019},
  title = {The {{Dozen Things Experimental Economists Should Do}} ({{More Of}})},
  author = {Czibor, Eszter and {Jimenez-Gomez}, David and List, John A.},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {SSRN Electronic Journal},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3313734},
  abstract = {What was once broadly viewed as an impossibility \textendash{} learning from experimental data in economics \textendash{} has now become commonplace. Governmental bodies, think tanks, and corporations around the world employ teams of experimental researchers to answer their most pressing questions. For their part, in the past two decades academics have begun to more actively partner with organizations to generate data via field experimentation. While this revolution in evidence- based approaches has served to deepen the economic science, recently a credibility crisis has caused even the most ardent experimental proponents to pause. This study takes a step back from the burgeoning experimental literature and introduces 12 actions that might help to alleviate this credibility crisis and raise experimental economics to an even higher level. In this way, we view our ``12 action wish list'' as discussion points to enrich the field. Eszter}
}

@article{daleEstimatingPayoffAttending2002,
  ids = {Dale2002,Dale2002a},
  title = {Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective College: {{An}} Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables},
  author = {Dale, Stacy Berg and Krueger, Alan B},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {117},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1491--1527},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
  doi = {10.1162/003355302320935089},
  abstract = {Estimates of the effect of college selectivity on earnings may be biased because elite colleges admit students, in part, based on characteristics that are related to future earnings. We matched students who applied to, and were accepted by, similar colleges to try to eliminate this bias. Using the College and Beyond data set and National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972, we find that students who attended more selective colleges earned about the same as students of seemingly comparable ability who attended less selective schools. Children from low-income families, however, earned more if they attended selective colleges.},
  keywords = {education,labor,nleduc}
}

@techreport{daleEstimatingReturnCollege2011,
  ids = {Dale2011,Dale2011a},
  title = {Estimating the {{Return}} to {{College Selectivity}} over the {{Career Using Administrative Earnings Data}}},
  author = {Dale, S and Krueger, A B},
  year = {2011},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  abstract = {We estimate the monetary return to attending a highly selective college using the College and Beyond (C\&B) Survey linked to Detailed Earnings Records from the Social Security Administration (SSA). This paper extends earlier work by Dale and Krueger (2002) that examined the relationship between the college that students attended in 1976 and the earnings they self-reported reported in 1995 on the C\&B follow-up survey. In this analysis, we use administrative earnings data to estimate the return to various measures of college selectivity for a more recent cohort of students: those who entered college in 1989. We also estimate the return to college selectivity for the 1976 cohort of students, but over a longer time horizon (from 1983 through 2007) using administrative data. We find that the return to college selectivity is sizeable for both cohorts in regression models that control for variables commonly observed by researchers, such as student high school GPA and SAT scores. However, when we adjust for unobserved student ability by controlling for the average SAT score of the colleges that students applied to, our estimates of the return to college selectivity fall substantially and are generally indistinguishable from zero. There were notable exceptions for certain subgroups. For black and Hispanic students and for students who come from less-educated families (in terms of their parents' education), the estimates of the return to college selectivity remain large, even in models that adjust for unobserved student characteristics.},
  note = {nled
\par
nled
\par
nled}
}

@article{datacampTidyverseBeginnersData,
  title = {Tidyverse for {{Beginners}} ({{R}} for {{Data Science}})},
  author = {{DataCamp}},
  journal = {Cheat Sheet},
  pages = {66}
}

@article{davisMeasuringBusinessStealing2006,
  ids = {Davis2006,Davis2006b},
  title = {Measuring the {{Business Stealing}}, {{Cannibalization}} and {{Market Expansion Effects}} of {{Entry}} in the {{US Motion Picture Exhibition Market}}},
  author = {Davis, P J and House, V},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
  volume = {54},
  number = {3},
  pages = {293--321},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00290.x}
}

@article{davisonNationalCulturesOrganisational1996,
  ids = {Davison1996,Davison1996a},
  title = {National {{Cultures}}, {{Organisational Forms}} and {{Group Support Systems}}},
  author = {Davison, R M},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {Retrieved August},
  volume = {7},
  pages = {2001},
  keywords = {[ritual],⛔ No DOI found,culture}
}

@article{davisSpatialCompetitionRetail2006,
  ids = {Davis2006a,Davis2006c},
  title = {Spatial Competition in Retail Markets: Movie Theaters},
  author = {Davis, P},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {RAND Journal of Economics},
  pages = {964--982},
  publisher = {{The RAND Corporation}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00066.x}
}

@article{dawesAnomaliesCooperation1988,
  ids = {Dawes1988,Dawes1988a},
  title = {Anomalies: {{Cooperation}}},
  author = {Dawes, R M and Thaler, R H},
  year = {1988},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {2},
  number = {3},
  pages = {187--197},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.2.3.187},
  keywords = {cooperation,experimental}
}

@article{deardenQualificationsEarningsBritain1999,
  ids = {Dearden1999,Dearden1999a},
  title = {Qualifications and Earnings in {{Britain}}: How Reliable Are Conventional {{OLS}} Estimates of the Returns to Education?},
  author = {Dearden, L},
  year = {1999},
  journal = {IFS Working Papers},
  publisher = {{Institute for Fiscal Studies}},
  abstract = {The paper estimates the returns to education for a cohort of individuals born in Britain in March 1958 who have been followed since birth until the age of 33. The data used has a wealth of information on family background including parental education, social class and interest shown in the child's education as well as measures of ability. The nature of our data allows us to directly assess the relative importance of omitted ability and family background bias as well as biases arising from measurement error in education quali\textbackslash AA\textbackslash poundsation variables which have been found to be important in other studies. The paper also looks at possible biases arising from compositional di\"A\textyen rences between individuals in work and those out of work. This \~N\textbackslash poundsomposition bias' arising from self-selection into employment is generally ignored in the returns to schooling literature and is why most studies focus only on men (for whom it is assumed this is much less of a problem). The paper also examines whether there is evidence of heterogeneity in the returns to education as well as the impact of education on gender wage di\"A\textyen rentials. The paper \textbackslash AA\textregistered ds that conventional OLS estimates, which assume that education is exogenous, are reasonable estimates of the true causal impact of education on wages. In the UK it would appear that the e\"A\textyen cts of measurement error bias and composition bias directly o\"A{$^3$}et the countervailing e\"A\textyen ct of unobserved ability and family background bias for most quali\textbackslash AA\textbackslash poundsations. The results from the paper suggest that conventional OLS estimates of the returns to education can generally be relied upon for policy decisions. The paper also \textbackslash AA\textregistered ds evidence of heterogeneity in the returns to education in Britain. The results fromthe paper suggest that individuals undertaking schooling involving some sort of formal quali\textbackslash AA\textbackslash poundsation have signi\textbackslash AA\textbackslash poundsantly larger rates of return than individuals who complete the same number of years of schooling but who obtain no formal quali\textbackslash AA\textbackslash poundsations. There is also some evidence that individuals with lower tastes for education, have signi\textbackslash AA\textbackslash poundsantly higher marginal returns to certain education quali\textbackslash AA\textbackslash poundsations. We also \textbackslash AA\textregistered d that post-school quali\textbackslash AA\textbackslash poundsations, particularly degree quali\textbackslash AA\textbackslash poundsations, play an important role in reducing gender wage di\"A\textyen rentials. The data used has a wealth of information on family background including parental education, social class and interest shown in the child's education as well as measures of ability. The nature of our data allows us to directly assess the relative importance of omitted ability and family background bias as well as biases arising from measurement error in education qualification variables which have been found to be important in other studies. The paper also looks at possible biases arising from compositional differences between individuals in work and those out of work. This \~N\textbackslash poundsomposition bias' arising from self-selection into employment is generally ignored in the returns to schooling literature and is why most studies focus only on men (for whom it is assumed this is much less of a problem). The paper also examines whether there is evidence of heterogeneity in the returns to education as well as the impact of education on gender wage differentials. The paper finds that conventional OLS estimates, which assume that education is exogenous, are reasonable estimates of the true causal impact of education on wages. In the UK it would appear that the effects of measurement error bias and composition bias directly o\"A{$^3$}et the countervailing effect of unobserved ability and family background bias for most qualifications. The results from the paper suggest that conventional OLS estimates of the returns to education can generally be relied upon for policy decisions. The paper also finds evidence of heterogeneity in the returns to education in Britain. The results fromthe paper suggest that individuals undertaking schooling involving some sort of formal qualification have significantly larger rates of return than individuals who complete the same number of years of schooling but who obtain no formal qualifications. There is also some evidence that individuals with lower tastes for education, have significantly higher marginal returns to certain education qualifications. We also find that post-school qualifications, particularly degree qualifications, play an important role in reducing gender wage differentials.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  note = {nled
\par
nled
\par
nled}
}

@article{deeseSerialEffectsRecall1957,
  ids = {Deese1957,Deese1957a},
  title = {Serial Effects in Recall of Unorganized and Sequentially Organized Verbal Material 1957},
  author = {{Deese} and {Kaufman}},
  year = {1957},
  volume = {54(3)},
  pages = {180--187},
  abstract = {recency},
  keywords = {[philanthropy],psychology,recall,recencys}
}

@techreport{delfinoDidItYour2013,
  ids = {Delfino2013,Delfino2013a},
  title = {I {{Did}} It {{Your Way}}. {{An Experimental Investigation}} of {{Peer Effects}} in {{Investment Choices}}},
  author = {Delfino, Alexia and Marengo, Luigi and Ploner, Matteo},
  year = {2013},
  institution = {{Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia}}
}

@article{dellavignaWhatMotivatesEffort2018,
  title = {What Motivates Effort? {{Evidence}} and Expert Forecasts},
  author = {Dellavigna, Stefano and Pope, Devin},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
  volume = {85},
  number = {2},
  issn = {1467937X},
  doi = {10.1093/restud/rdx033},
  abstract = {How much do different monetary and non-monetary motivators induce costly effort? Does the effectiveness line up with the expectations of researchers and with results in the literature? We conduct a large-scale real-effort experiment with eighteen treatment arms. We examine the effect of (1) standard incentives; (2) behavioural factors like social preferences and reference dependence; and (3) non-monetary inducements from psychology. We find that (1) monetary incentives work largely as expected, including a very low piece rate treatment which does not crowd out effort; (2) the evidence is partly consistent with standard behavioural models, including warm glow, though we do not find evidence of probability weighting; (3) the psychological motivators are effective, but less so than incentives.We then compare the results to forecasts by 208 academic experts. On average, the experts anticipate several key features, like the effectiveness of psychological motivators. A sizeable share of experts, however, expects crowd-out, probability weighting, and pure altruism, counterfactually. As a further comparison, we present a metaanalysis of similar treatments in the literature. Overall, predictions based on the literature are correlated with, but underperform, the expert forecasts.}
}

@techreport{demingSchoolChoiceSchool2011,
  ids = {Deming2011,Deming2011a},
  title = {School Choice, School Quality and Postsecondary Attainment},
  author = {Deming, David J and Hastings, Justine S and Kane, Thomas J and Staiger, Douglas O},
  year = {2011},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  abstract = {We study the impact of a public school choice lottery in Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools on college enrollment and degree completion. We find a significant overall increase in college attainment among lottery winners who attend their first choice school. Using rich administrative data on peers, teachers, course offerings and other inputs, we show that the impacts of choice are strongly predicted by gains on several measures of school quality. Gains in attainment are concentrated among girls. Girls respond to attending a better school with higher grades and increases in college-preparatory course-taking, while boys do not.},
  keywords = {education,gender,labor,lotteries,nleduc,NLeduc}
}

@article{deoliveiraGivingTypeIdentifying2011,
  title = {The Giving Type: {{Identifying}} Donors},
  author = {De Oliveira, Angela C M and Croson, Rachel T A and Eckel, Catherine},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {95},
  number = {5-6},
  pages = {428--435},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.012}
}

@article{deoliveiraOneBadApple2009,
  ids = {DeOliveira2009,DeOliveira2009a},
  title = {One Bad Apple: {{Uncertainty}} and Heterogeneity in Public Good Provision},
  author = {De Oliveira, A and Croson, R T A and Eckel, C},
  year = {2009},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.1883766}
}

@article{depelsmackerConsumerPreferencesMarketing2005,
  ids = {DePelsmacker2005,DePelsmacker2005b},
  title = {Consumer Preferences for the Marketing of Ethically Labelled Coffee},
  author = {De Pelsmacker, P and Janssens, W and Sterckx, E and Mielants, C},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {International Marketing Review},
  volume = {22},
  number = {5},
  pages = {512--530},
  publisher = {{Emerald Group Publishing Limited}},
  doi = {10.1108/02651330510624363},
  keywords = {ethics,ft,FT,marketing}
}

@article{depelsmackerConsumersCareEthics2005,
  ids = {DePelsmacker2005a,DePelsmacker2005c},
  title = {Do Consumers Care about Ethics? {{Willingness}} to Pay for Fair-Trade Coffee},
  author = {De Pelsmacker, P and Driesen, L and Rayp, G},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Consumer Affairs},
  volume = {39},
  number = {2},
  pages = {363--385},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Synergy}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1745-6606.2005.00019.x},
  keywords = {consumers,empirical,ethics,ft,FT}
}

@article{desmetAskYeShall2003,
  title = {Ask and Ye Shall Receive: {{The}} Effect of the Appeals Scale on Consumers' Donation Behavior},
  author = {Desmet, P and Feinberg, F M},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology},
  volume = {24},
  number = {3},
  pages = {349--376},
  doi = {10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00166-6},
  keywords = {appeals,fundraising,philanthropy,psychology}
}

@article{devenEconomicsGift2000,
  ids = {DeVen2000,DeVen2000a},
  title = {The Economics of the Gift},
  author = {{de Ven}, J},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {mimeo},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@techreport{diamondCapitalIncomeTaxes2009,
  ids = {Diamond2009,Diamond2009a},
  title = {Capital Income Taxes with Heterogeneous Discount Rates},
  author = {Diamond, Peter A and Spinnewijn, Johannes},
  year = {2009},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}}
}

@article{diamondCreatingEffectiveDirect2007,
  ids = {Diamond2007,Diamond2007a},
  title = {Creating Effective Direct Mail Charitable Solicitations: The Effects of Enclosures and Different Appeals},
  author = {Diamond, W D and Iyer, E S},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Journal of Nonprofit \& Public Sector Marketing},
  volume = {18},
  number = {1},
  pages = {81--100},
  publisher = {{Routledge}},
  doi = {10.1300/J054v18n01_05}
}

@article{dicksonUtilityNoSweat2001,
  title = {Utility of {{No Sweat Labels}} for {{Apparel Consumers}}: {{Profiling Label Users}} and {{Predicting Their Purchases}}},
  author = {Dickson, M A},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {Journal of Consumer Affairs},
  volume = {35},
  number = {1},
  pages = {96--119},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1745-6606.2001.tb00104.x},
  abstract = {This study empirically analyzed whether consumers making apparel purchases would use a label guaranteeing certain working conditions were present during garment production. While a potential market segment for the No Sweat label was identified, evidence suggests that only a small percentage of consumers would be influenced by the label. This small market segment was profiled on its psychographic and demographic characteristics, and the extent to which the No Sweat label would influence future purchases was examined.},
  keywords = {consumers,ethics,ft,FT,marketing,psychology}
}

@article{diecidueASPIRATIONLEVELPROBABILITY2008,
  title = {{{ASPIRATION LEVEL}}, {{PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE}}, {{AND EXPECTED UTILITY}}*},
  author = {Diecidue, E and {de Ven}, J},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {International Economic Review},
  volume = {49},
  number = {2},
  pages = {683--700},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00494.x}
}

@article{docs182019Vidi2019,
  ids = {Docs2019},
  title = {8/18/2019 {{Vidi}}+form+2018+def. V35 - {{Google Docs}}},
  author = {Docs, Google},
  year = {2019},
  pages = {1--64}
}

@article{dohmenIntergenerationalTransmissionRisk2012,
  title = {The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes},
  author = {Dohmen, Thomas and Falk, Armin and Huffman, David and Sunde, Uwe},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
  volume = {79},
  number = {2},
  pages = {645--677},
  doi = {10.1093/restud/rdr027},
  abstract = {Recent theories endogenize the attitude endowments of individuals, assuming that they are shaped by the attitudes of parents and other role models. This paper tests empirically for the relevance of three aspects of the attitude transmission process highlighted in this theoretical literature: (1) transmission of attitudes from parents to children; (2) an impact of prevailing attitudes in the local environment on child attitudes; and (3) positive assortative mating of parents, which enhances the ability of a parent to pass on his or her attitudes to the child. We focus on two fundamentally important attitudes, willingness to take risks and willingness to trust others. We find empirical support for all three aspects, providing an empirical underpinning for the literature. An investigation of underlying mechanisms shows that socialization is important in the transmission process. Various parental characteristics and aspects of family structure are found to strengthen the socialization process, with implications for modeling the socialization production function and for policies focused on affecting children's non-cognitive skills. The paper also provides evidence that the transmission of risk and trust attitudes affects a wide variety of child outcomes, implying a potentially large total effect on children's economic situation.}
}

@article{dohmenSixFactsRisk2005,
  title = {Six {{Facts}} about {{Risk Attitudes}}: {{Evidence}} from a {{Large}}, {{Representative}}, {{Experimentally-Validated Survey}}},
  author = {Dohmen, Thomas and Falk, Armin and Huffman, David and Sunde, Uwe and Schupp, Jurgen and Wagner, Gert G},
  year = {2005},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@techreport{dolanNeighborsKnowledgeNuggets2013,
  ids = {Dolan2013,Dolan2013a},
  title = {Neighbors, {{Knowledge}}, and {{Nuggets}}: {{Two Natural Field Experiments}} on the {{Role}} of {{Incentives}} on {{Energy Conservation}}},
  author = {Dolan, Paul and Metcalfe, Robert},
  year = {2013},
  institution = {{Centre for Economic Performance, LSE}},
  keywords = {behavioral,experimental,nudge,social norms}
}

@article{doughertyWhyAreReturns2005,
  ids = {Dougherty2005,Dougherty2005a},
  title = {Why Are the Returns to Schooling Higher for Women than for Men?},
  author = {Dougherty, Christopher},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Human Resources},
  volume = {40},
  number = {4},
  pages = {969--988},
  publisher = {{University of Wisconsin Press}},
  doi = {10.3368/jhr.XL.4.969},
  abstract = {Many studies have found that the impact of schooling on earnings is greater for females than for males, despite the fact that females tend to earn less, both absolutely and controlling for personal characteristics. This study investigates possible reasons for this effect, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-. One explanation is that education appears to have a double effect on the earnings of women. It increases their skills and productivity, as it does with men, and in addition it appears to reduce the gap in male and female earnings attributable to factors such as discrimination, tastes, and circumstances. The latter appear to account for about half of the differential in the returns to schooling.},
  keywords = {nleduc}
}

@article{douglasAffinitytestingInitialInteractions1987,
  ids = {Douglas1987,Douglas1987a},
  title = {Affinity-Testing in Initial Interactions},
  author = {Douglas, W},
  year = {1987},
  journal = {Journal of Social and Personal Relationships},
  volume = {4},
  number = {1},
  pages = {3--15},
  publisher = {{Sage Publications}},
  doi = {10.1177/0265407587041001}
}

@article{downeyImplicationsRejectionSensitivity1996,
  ids = {Downey1996,Downey1996a},
  title = {Implications of Rejection Sensitivity for Intimate Relationships.},
  author = {Downey, G and Feldman, S I},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
  volume = {70},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1327},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.70.6.1327},
  abstract = {People who are sensitive to social rejection tend to anxiously expect, readily perceive, and overreact to it. This article shows that this cognitive-affective processing disposition undermines intimate relationships. Study 1 describes a measure that operationalizes the anxious-expectations component of rejection sensitivity. Study 2 provides experimental evidence that people who anxiously expect rejection readily perceive intentional rejection in the ambiguous behavior of others. Study 3 shows that people who enter romantic relationships with anxious expectations of rejection readily perceive intentional rejection in the insensitive behavior of their new partners. Study 4 demonstrates that rejection-sensitive people and their romantic partners are dissatisfied with their relationships. Rejection-sensitive men's jealousy and rejection-sensitive women's hostility and diminished supportiveness help explain their partners' dissatisfaction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {losingface,psychology,romance}
}

@article{dragoTournamentsPieceRates1989,
  ids = {Drago1989,Drago1989a},
  title = {Tournaments, Piece Rates, and the Shape of the Payoff Function},
  author = {Drago, Robert and Heywood, John S},
  year = {1989},
  journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
  pages = {992--998},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1086/261639}
}

@article{dufloParticipationInvestmentDecisions2002,
  title = {Participation and Investment Decisions in a Retirement Plan: {{The}} Influence of Colleagues' Choices},
  author = {Duflo, E and Saez, E},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {85},
  number = {1},
  pages = {121--148},
  doi = {10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00098-6}
}

@article{dufloPoorRational2006,
  ids = {Duflo2006a,Duflo2006c},
  title = {Poor but {{Rational}}},
  author = {Duflo, E},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Understanding Poverty},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press, USA}},
  doi = {10.1093/0195305191.003.0024},
  keywords = {behavioral,development,survey}
}

@article{dufloRoleInformationSocial2003,
  ids = {Duflo2003,Duflo2003a},
  title = {The {{Role}} of {{Information}} and {{Social Interactions}} in {{Retirement Plan Decisions}}: {{Evidence From}} a {{Randomized Experiment}}*},
  author = {Duflo, E and Saez, E},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {118},
  number = {3},
  pages = {815--842},
  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
  doi = {10.1162/00335530360698432}
}

@techreport{dufloSavingIncentivesLowand2005,
  title = {Saving Incentives for Low-and Middle-Income Families: {{Evidence}} from a Field Experiment with {{H}}\&{{R Block}}},
  author = {Duflo, Esther and Gale, William and Liebman, Jeffrey and Orszag, Peter and Saez, Emmanuel},
  year = {2005},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{duncanSecretSantaReveals2009,
  ids = {Duncan2009,Duncan2009a},
  title = {Secret {{Santa}} Reveals the Secret Side of Giving},
  author = {Duncan, B},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Economic Inquiry},
  volume = {47},
  number = {1},
  pages = {165--181},
  publisher = {{John Wiley \& Sons}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00145.x}
}

@article{duncanTheoryImpactPhilanthropy2004,
  ids = {Duncan2004,Duncan2004a,Duncan2004b,Duncan2004c},
  title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Impact Philanthropy}}},
  author = {Duncan, B},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {88},
  number = {9-10},
  pages = {2159--2180},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00037-9},
  abstract = {This article develops a new model of altruism called impact philanthropy. An impact philanthropist is someone who wants to personally `make a difference.' While that motive is straightforward, its logical implications are significantly different from other models of philanthropy. For example, the contributions of other donors can reduce an impact philanthropist's charitable fulfillment. As a result, cooperation among impact philanthropists can reduce aggregate giving. In addition, impact philanthropy can lead to a codependent relationship between givers and receivers in which both benefit from the other. Finally, the model suggests a conflict between charitable organizations and its donors concerning the allocation of charitable gifts. In particular, a charitable organization prefers to spread a donor's contribution across many goods, whereas a donor prefers to target his or her contribution at a specific good.},
  keywords = {applied theory,crowd-out,ft,FT,impact,nonprofits,philanthropy,social,theory of giving},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{dunnSpendingMoneyOthers2008,
  ids = {Dunn2008,Dunn2008a},
  title = {Spending Money on Others Promotes Happiness},
  author = {Dunn, Elizabeth W and Aknin, Lara B and Norton, Michael I},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Science},
  volume = {319},
  number = {5870},
  pages = {1687--1688},
  publisher = {{American Association for the Advancement of Science}},
  doi = {10.1126/science.1150952}
}

@article{durDesireImpact2008,
  ids = {Dur2008,Dur2008a},
  title = {The Desire for Impact},
  author = {Dur, R and Glazer, A},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology},
  volume = {29},
  number = {3},
  pages = {285--300},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2007.10.006}
}

@article{durlaufEmpiricalStudiesSocial2003,
  ids = {Durlauf2003,Durlauf2003a},
  title = {Empirical Studies of Social Capital: A Critical Survey},
  author = {Durlauf, S N and Fafchamps, M},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Working papers},
  publisher = {{Wisconsin Madison-Social Systems}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{duvendackWhatMeantReplication2017,
  ids = {Duvendack2017},
  title = {What {{Is Meant}} by ``{{Replication}}'' and {{Why Does It Encounter Resistance}} in {{Economics}}?},
  author = {Duvendack, Maren and {Palmer-Jones}, Richard and Reed, W. Robert},
  year = {2017},
  month = may,
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {107},
  number = {5},
  pages = {46--51},
  issn = {0002-8282},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.p20171031}
}

@article{dwengerTuitionFeesAffect2012,
  ids = {Dwenger2012,Dwenger2012a},
  title = {Do Tuition Fees Affect the Mobility of University Applicants? {{Evidence}} from a Natural Experiment},
  author = {Dwenger, Nadja and Storck, Johanna and Wrohlich, Katharina},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Economics of Education Review},
  volume = {31},
  number = {1},
  pages = {155--167},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econedurev.2011.10.004},
  abstract = {Several German states recently introduced tuition fees for university education. We investigate whether these tuition fees influence the mobility of university applicants. Based on administrative data of applicants for medical schools in Germany, we estimate the effect of tuition fees on the probability of applying for a university in the home state. We find a small but significant reaction: The probability of applying for a university in the home state falls by 2 percentage points (baseline: 69\%) for high-school graduates who come from a state with tuition fees. Moreover, we find that students with better high-school grades react more strongly to tuition fees. This might have important effects on the composition of students across states.},
  keywords = {Mobility of high-school graduates,N,Tuition fees}
}

@article{dyckUsingPositiveVs1992,
  ids = {Dyck1992},
  title = {Using {{Positive}} vs. {{Negative Photographs}} for {{Third-World Fund Raising}}},
  author = {Dyck, E. J. and Coldevin, G.},
  year = {1992},
  journal = {Journalism \& Mass Communication Quarterly},
  volume = {69},
  number = {3},
  pages = {572--579},
  issn = {1077-6990},
  doi = {10.1177/107769909206900305},
  abstract = {This study compared fund raising appeals that used either (1) no photograph, (2) a pleasant ``positive'' photograph, or (3) a less pleasant, needy ``negative'' photograph. Working closely with World Vision Canada, a humanitarian relief and development organization, the authors used the organization's donor list to create three treatment groups of more than 15,000 each to receive fund raising letters. Dependent variables included response rate and amount of money donated. The no photograph condition resulted in the highest response rate but the letter with the positive photograph yielded the highest average contribution. The negative photograph resulted in fewest responses and lowest contributions.}
}

@article{eastwickSpeeddatingPowerfulFlexible2008,
  ids = {Eastwick2008,Eastwick2008a},
  title = {Speed-Dating: {{A}} Powerful and Flexible Paradigm for Studying Romantic Relationship Initiation},
  author = {Eastwick, P W and Finkel, E J},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Handbook of relationship initiation},
  pages = {217--234},
  publisher = {{Psychology Press/Taylor \& Francis}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{echeniqueExperimentalStudyDecentralized2011,
  ids = {Echenique2011,Echenique2011a},
  title = {An Experimental Study of Decentralized Matching.},
  author = {Echenique, F and Yariv, L},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Mimeo},
  publisher = {{California Institute of Technology}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{eckelAltruismAnonymousDictator1996,
  ids = {Eckel1996,Eckel1996a},
  title = {Altruism in {{Anonymous Dictator Games}}},
  author = {Eckel, C C and Grossman, P},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  volume = {16},
  number = {2},
  pages = {181--191},
  publisher = {{Academic Press}},
  doi = {10.1006/game.1996.0081},
  abstract = {Notes: Extension of PG to out-group giving},
  keywords = {[philanthropy],altruism,dictator games,experiments}
}

@article{eckelDonorsCareSubsidy2006,
  ids = {Eckel2006,Eckel2006a},
  title = {Do Donors Care about Subsidy Type? {{An}} Experimental Study},
  author = {Eckel, C C and Grossman, P J},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Research in experimental economics},
  volume = {11},
  pages = {163--182},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,experiment,experimental,framing,philanthropy}
}

@article{eckelExperimentalTestCrowding2005,
  ids = {Eckel2005,Eckel2005b},
  title = {An {{Experimental Test}} of the {{Crowding Out Hypothesis}}},
  author = {Eckel, C C and Grossman, P J and Johnston, R M},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {89},
  number = {8},
  pages = {1543--1560},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.012},
  keywords = {altruism,crowding out,dictator games,experiments,philanthropy,substitution}
}

@article{eckelFieldExperimentDirected2017,
  ids = {Eckel2017},
  title = {A Field Experiment on Directed Giving at a Public University},
  author = {Eckel, Catherine C. and Herberich, David H. and Meer, Jonathan},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics},
  volume = {66},
  issn = {22148051},
  doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2016.04.007},
  abstract = {The use of directed giving \textendash{} allowing donors to target their gifts to specific organizations or functions \textendash{} is pervasive in fundraising, yet little is known about its effectiveness. We conduct a field experiment at a public university in which prospective donors are presented with either an opportunity to donate to the unrestricted Annual Fund, or an opportunity of donating to the Annual Fund and directing some or all of their donation towards the academic college from which they graduated. While there is no effect on the probability of giving, donations are significantly larger when there is the option of directing. However, the value of the option does not come directly from use, as very few donors choose to direct their gift.}
}

@article{eckelIndependentVsCollaborative2019,
  ids = {Eckel2019},
  title = {Independent vs . {{Collaborative Fundraising}} : {{Understanding}} the {{Role}} of {{Information Independent}} vs . {{Collaborative Fundraising}} : {{Understanding}} the {{Role}} of {{Information}} *},
  author = {Eckel, Catherine and Eckel, Catherine and Guney, Begum and Uler, Neslihan},
  year = {2019},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{eckelSubsidizingCharitableContributions2005,
  ids = {Eckel2005a,Eckel2005c},
  title = {Subsidizing {{Charitable Contributions}}: {{A Field Test Comparing Matching}} and {{Rebate Subsidies}}},
  author = {Eckel, C C and Grossman, P J},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Manuscript, Virginia Tech},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,experimental,field experiment,framing,philanthropy}
}

@article{eckelSubsidizingCharitableContributions2008,
  ids = {Eckel2008,Eckel2008a,Eckel2008b},
  title = {Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: {{A}} Natural Field Experiment Comparing Matching and Rebate Subsidies},
  author = {Eckel, Catherine C. and Grossman, Philip J.},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {11},
  number = {3},
  pages = {234--252},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  issn = {13864157},
  doi = {10.1007/s10683-008-9198-0},
  abstract = {We report the results of a field experiment conducted in conjunction with a mailed fundraising campaign of a nonprofit organization. The experiment is designed to compare the response of donors to subsidies in the form of matching amounts or rebated amounts. Matching subsidies are used by many corporations as an employee benefit; the US federal tax system encourages giving using a rebate subsidy by making donations tax deductible. The design includes a control group and two levels of subsidy of each type. Our main result is that matching subsidies result in larger total donations to charities than rebate subsidies, a result that is qualitatively similar to the lab findings. The estimated price elasticities for the matching subsidy are very similar to (and insignificantly different from) the lab experiments, while rebate subsidies lead to lower contributions in the field than in the lab. Since rebates in the field involve substantial lags and additional complications as compared with the "instant rebates" of the lab, this latter difference is not unexpected. The matching results are an important step in validating lab estimates of responsiveness to subsidies of charitable giving.},
  isbn = {1386-4157},
  keywords = {Charitable giving,field experiment,Field experiment,Matching subsidy,Rebate subsidy}
}

@article{EconometricMediationAnalyses2015,
  title = {Econometric {{Mediation Analyses}}: {{Identifying}} the {{Sources}} of {{Treatment Effects}} from {{Experimentally Estimated Production Technologies}} with {{Unmeasured}} and {{Mismeasured Inputs}}},
  year = {2015}
}

@article{edmansFeedbackEffectsAsymmetric2015,
  ids = {edmans2015feedback},
  title = {Feedback Effects, Asymmetric Trading, and the Limits to Arbitrage},
  author = {Edmans, Alex and Goldstein, Itay and Jiang, Wei},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {105},
  number = {12},
  pages = {3766--3797},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.20141271}
}

@article{edwardsUnderstandingWhySuggestions2014,
  ids = {Edwards2014,Edwards2014a,edwardsUnderstandingWhySuggestions2014a},
  title = {Toward an Understanding of Why Suggestions Work in Charitable Fundraising: {{Theory}} and Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment},
  author = {Edwards, James T. and List, John A.},
  year = {2014},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {114},
  pages = {1--13},
  publisher = {{Elsevier B.V.}},
  issn = {0047-2727},
  doi = {10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2014.02.002},
  abstract = {People respond to those who ask. Within the charitable fundraising community, the power of the ask represents the backbone of most fundraising strategies. Despite this, the optimal design of communication strategies has received less formal attention. For their part, economists have recently explored how communication affects empathy, altruism, and giving rates to charities. Our study takes a step back from this literature to examine how suggestions\textendash a direct ask for a certain amount of money\textendash affect giving rates. We find that our suggestion amounts affect both the intensive and extensive margins: more people give and they tend to give the suggested amount. The resulting insights help us understand why people give, why messages work, and deepen practitioners' understanding of how to use messages to leverage more giving.},
  isbn = {00472727},
  keywords = {Charitable giving,Impure altruism,public economics,Public economics}
}

@article{ehrenbergEconometricStudiesHigher2004,
  ids = {Ehrenberg2004,Ehrenberg2004a},
  title = {Econometric Studies of Higher Education},
  author = {Ehrenberg, Ronald G},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {Journal of econometrics},
  volume = {121},
  number = {1},
  pages = {19--37},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2003.10.008}
}

@article{eichbergerAmbiguityCentipedeGame2016,
  ids = {Eichberger2016,Eichberger2016a},
  title = {Ambiguity and the {{Centipede Game}}},
  author = {Eichberger, J{\"u}rgen and Grant, Simon and Kelsey, David},
  year = {2016},
  number = {January}
}

@article{eideDoesItPay1998,
  ids = {Eide1998,Eide1998a},
  title = {Does It Pay to Attend an Elite Private College? {{Evidence}} on the Effects of Undergraduate College Quality on Graduate School Attendance},
  author = {Eide, Eric and Brewer, Dominic J and Ehrenberg, Ronald G},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {Economics of Education Review},
  volume = {17},
  number = {4},
  pages = {371--376},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0272-7757(97)00037-X},
  keywords = {nleduc}
}

@article{eisenseeNewsFloodsNews2007,
  ids = {Eisensee2007,Eisensee2007a},
  title = {News {{Floods}}, {{News Droughts}}, and {{US Disaster Relief}}},
  author = {Eisensee, T and Stromberg, D},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {122},
  number = {2},
  pages = {693--728},
  doi = {10.1162/qjec.122.2.693},
  keywords = {[philanthropy],crowding-out,development,disasters,empirical,Empirical,news,substitution}
}

@article{ekCausesAreMore2015,
  ids = {Ek2015b},
  title = {Some {{Causes}} Are {{More Equal}} than {{Others}} ? {{Behavioral Spillovers}} in {{Charitable Giving Some Causes}} Are {{More Equal}} than {{Others}} ? {{Behavioral Spillovers}} in {{Charitable Giving}}},
  author = {Ek, Claes and Ek, Claes},
  year = {2015},
  number = {October}
}

@article{elfenbeinCharitySubstituteReputation2012,
  ids = {Elfenbein2012},
  title = {Charity as a Substitute for Reputation: {{Evidence}} from an Online Marketplace},
  author = {Elfenbein, Daniel W. and Fisman, Ray and Mcmanus, Brian},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
  volume = {79},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1441--1468},
  issn = {00346527},
  doi = {10.1093/restud/rds012},
  abstract = {Consumers respond positively to products tied to charity, particularly from sellers that are relatively new and hence have limited alternative means of assuring quality.We establish this result using data from a diverse group of eBay sellers who ``experiment'' with charity by varying the presence of a donation in a set of otherwise matched product listings. Most of charity's benefits accrue to sellers without extensive eBay histories. Consistent with charity serving as a quality signal, we find fewer customer complaints among charity-intensive sellers.},
  isbn = {0034-6527},
  keywords = {altruism,Altruism,Corporate philanthropy,reputation,Reputation,Signalling,Social responsibility}
}

@article{elfenbeinGreaterPriceGreater2010,
  ids = {Elfenbein,elfenbein2010greater},
  title = {A Greater Price for a Greater Good? {{Evidence}} That Consumers Pay More for Charity-Linked Products},
  author = {Elfenbein, Daniel W and McManus, Brian},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  volume = {2},
  number = {2},
  pages = {28--60},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  doi = {10.1257/pol.2.2.28}
}

@article{ellemersPsychologyMoralityReview2019,
  ids = {Ellemers2019},
  title = {The {{Psychology}} of {{Morality}} : {{A Review}} and {{Analysis}} of {{Empirical Studies Published From}} 1940 {{Through}} 2017},
  author = {Ellemers, Naomi and Toorn, Jojanneke Van Der and Paunov, Yavor and Leeuwen, Thed Van},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.1177/1088868318811759},
  keywords = {by considering the research,examine the,moral behavior,moral emotions,moral judgment,moral reasoning,moral self-views,psychology of morality,questions and empirical,this review aims to}
}

@article{ellenEncouragingPeopleTheir2012,
  ids = {Ellen2012,Ellen2012a},
  title = {Encouraging People to Save for Their Future: {{Augmenting}} Current Efforts with Positive Visions of the Future},
  author = {Ellen, Pam Scholder and Wiener, Joshua L and Fitzgerald, M Paula},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Journal of Public Policy \& Marketing},
  volume = {31},
  number = {1},
  pages = {58--72},
  publisher = {{American Marketing Association}},
  doi = {10.1509/jppm.09.089},
  abstract = {Despite significant policy efforts to encourage Americans to save for retirement, the U.S. retirement savings rates have declined for more than two decades. Current policies and programs are largely driven by three implicit theories of why people do and do not save: trait theory, life cycle, and education. The authors' purpose is not to identify a singular best theory but rather to demonstrate the need to expand the theories used to address the retirement savings problem. Toward that end, they empirically examine each traditional theory and simultaneously explore the additional power of complementary theories: future-self theory and imagery. The results show that variables grounded in trait theory, life cycle, and education are significantly related to retirement planning. Moreover, people who reported greater and more vivid imagery of a positive future retired self had engaged in more retirement preparation, accounting for a significant amount of variance beyond the traditional theories.}
}

@article{ellingsenPayingRespect2007,
  ids = {Ellingsen2007,Ellingsen2007a},
  title = {Paying Respect},
  author = {Ellingsen, Tore and Johannesson, Magnus},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {21},
  number = {4},
  pages = {135--150},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.21.4.135}
}

@article{epleyMistakenlySeekingSolitude2014,
  ids = {Epley2014,Epley2014a},
  title = {Mistakenly {{Seeking Solitude}}.},
  author = {Epley, Nicholas and Schroeder, Juliana},
  year = {2014},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  abstract = {Connecting with others increases happiness, but strangers in close proximity routinely ignore each other. Why? Two reasons seem likely: Either solitude is a more positive experience than interacting with strangers, or people misunderstand the consequences of distant social connections. To examine the experience of connecting to strangers, we instructed commuters on trains and buses to connect with a stranger near them, to remain disconnected, or to commute as normal (Experiments 1a and 2a). In both contexts, participants reported a more positive (and no less productive) experience when they connected than when they did not. Separate participants in each context, however, expected precisely the opposite outcome, predicting a more positive experience in solitude (Experiments 1b and 2b). This mistaken preference for solitude stems partly from underestimating others' interest in connecting (Experiments 3a and 3b), which in turn keeps people from learning the actual consequences of social interaction (Experiments 4a and 4b). The pleasure of connection seems contagious: In a laboratory waiting room, participants who were talked to had equally positive experiences as those instructed to talk (Experiment 5). Human beings are social animals. Those who misunderstand the consequences of social interactions may not, in at least some contexts, be social enough for their own well-being. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI,losing face}
}

@article{erikssonPartnerSearchHeuristics2009,
  ids = {Eriksson2009,Eriksson2009a},
  title = {Partner Search Heuristics in the Lab: Stability of Matchings under Various Preference Structures},
  author = {Eriksson, K and Strimling, P},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Adaptive Behavior},
  volume = {17},
  number = {6},
  pages = {524--536},
  publisher = {{Sage Publications}},
  doi = {10.1177/1059712309341220},
  abstract = {When agents search for partners, the outcome is a matching. K. Eriksson and O. H\"aggstr\"om (2008) defined a measure of instability of matchings and proved that under a certain partner search heuristic, outcomes are likely to have low instability. They also showed that with regards to stability, the preference structure known as common preferences lie somewhere in between the extreme cases of homotypic and antithetical preferences. Following up on this theoretical work, we let human subjects search for a good partner in a computer game where preferences were set to be either common, homotypic, or antithetical. We find that total search effort and instability of the outcome vary in the predicted ways with the preference structure and the number of agents. A set of simulations show that these results are consistent with a model where agents use a simple search heuristic with a slight possibility of error.}
}

@article{erkalRelativeEarningsGiving2011,
  ids = {Erkal2011,Erkal2011a},
  title = {Relative Earnings and Giving in a Real-Effort Experiment},
  author = {Erkal, Nisvan and Gangadharan, Lata and Nikiforakis, Nikos},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {101},
  number = {7},
  pages = {3330},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.101.7.3330},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{erlandssonArgumentinconsistencyCharityAppeals,
  ids = {Erlandssona},
  title = {Argument-Inconsistency in Charity Appeals: {{Statistical}} Information about the Scope of the Problem Decrease Helping toward a Single Identified Victim but Not Helping},
  author = {Erlandsson, A and V{\"a}stfj{\"a}ll, D and Sundfelt, O and {of Economic}, P Slovic - Journal and 2016, undefined},
  journal = {Elsevier},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{erlandssonEmotionalReactionsPerceived2015,
  ids = {Erlandsson,Erlandsson2015,Erlandsson2015a,Erlandssonb,erlandssonEmotionalReactionsPerceived,erlandssonEmotionalReactionsPerceiveda},
  title = {Emotional Reactions, Perceived Impact and Perceived Responsibility Mediate the Identifiable Victim Effect, Proportion Dominance Effect and in-Group Effect Respectively},
  author = {Erlandsson, Arvid and Bj{\"o}rklund, Fredrik and B{\"a}ckstr{\"o}m, Martin},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes},
  volume = {127},
  pages = {1--14},
  publisher = {{Elsevier Inc.}},
  issn = {07495978},
  doi = {10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.11.003},
  abstract = {This study investigated possible mediators of the identifiable victim effect (IVE), the proportion dominance effect (PDE), and the in-group effect (IGE) in helping situations. In Studies 1-3, participants rated their emotional reactions (distress and sympathy toward the victims), perceived impact of helping, perceived responsibility to help, and helping motivation toward four versions of a helping situation. Gradually increasing victim identifiability in the helping situations primarily affected emotional reactions and sympathy completely mediated the IVE. Gradually making the reference-group smaller primarily affected perceived impact, and impact completely mediated the PDE. Gradually increasing in-groupness primarily affected perceived responsibility, and responsibility completely mediated the IGE. Study 4 included real monetary allocations and largely replicated the results using a between-subject design. Together, the results shed light on how contextual factors trigger help motivation, and indicate that different helping effects are primarily mediated by different mechanisms.},
  isbn = {0749-5978 1095-9920},
  keywords = {Decision modes,Emotional reactions,Helping,Identifiable victim effect,In-group bias,Perceived impact,Perceived responsibility,Proportion dominance effect,sympathy,Sympathy},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/UYJIZHMW/Emotional reactions, perceived impact and perceived responsibility mediate the identifiable victim effect, proportion dominance effect and in-group effect respectively-main.pdf}
}

@article{ermischStrongFamilyTies2010,
  ids = {Ermisch2010,Ermisch2010a},
  title = {Do Strong Family Ties Inhibit Trust?},
  author = {Ermisch, J and Gambetta, D},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  volume = {75},
  number = {3},
  pages = {365--376},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2010.05.007},
  keywords = {culture,trust}
}

@article{espositoEpidemicsConflictEvidence2017,
  ids = {Esposito2017},
  title = {Epidemics and {{Conflict}} : {{Evidence}} from the {{Ebola}} Outbreak in {{Western Africa Job Market Paper The}} Last Decades Have Seen the Emergence or Re-Emergence of Infectious Disease Outbreaks},
  author = {Esposito, Elena and Blattman, Chris and Ernesto, B and Brilli, Ylenia and Casey, Katherine and Tella, Rafael Di and Dordal, Marc and Faber, Ben and Kaba, Ibrahima and Kaur, Supreet and Kurmangaliyeva, Madina and Li, Nicholas and Loeser, John and Madestam, Andreas and Mogstad, Magne and Monarrez, Tomas and Morse, Ben and Nunn, Nathan and Roland, Gerard and Raul, S},
  year = {2017},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,africa,aid,collective action,Collective action,conflict,epidemics,public goods,Public goods,state coercion}
}

@article{estelamiEthnographicStudyConsumer2014,
  ids = {Estelami2014,Estelami2014a},
  title = {An Ethnographic Study of Consumer Financial Sophistication},
  author = {Estelami, Hooman},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Journal of Consumer Behaviour},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1002/cb.1472},
  abstract = {Existing research profiling consumer financial sophistication has examined specific decision errors that consumers may make in financial matters. While these errors have been replicated in multiple studies over the years, most have emerged from highly controlled experimental settings or through consumer surveys that measure only specific categories of financial behavior. This paper extends existing research on financial sophistication by utilizing an ethnographic study conducted over a 5-year time period. Results indicate that while some of the traditional categories of decision errors defined in earlier research affect consumers, decision errors not thoroughly examined in previous academic studies can have a notable and growing effect on consumers' financial decisions. Emerging categories of financial decision errors are identified, and shifts in consumers' financial behavior resulting from the financial crisis are profiled. Copyright {$\lnot$}\textcopyright{} 2014 John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd.},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{exleyExcusingSelfishnessCharitable2016,
  ids = {Exley2016c,Exley2016d,exleyExcusingSelfishnessCharitable2016a},
  title = {Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: {{The}} Role of Risk},
  author = {Exley, Christine L.},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
  issn = {1467937X},
  doi = {10.1093/restud/rdv051},
  abstract = {Decisions involving charitable giving often occur under the shadow of risk. A common finding is that potential donors give less when there is greater risk that their donation will have less impact. While this behavior could be fully rationalized by standard economic models, this paper shows that an additional mechanism is relevant: the use of risk as an excuse not to give. In a laboratory study, participants evaluate risky payoffs for themselves and risky payoffs for a charity. When their decisions do not involve tradeoffs between money for themselves and the charity, they respond very similarly to self risk and charity risk. By contrast, when their decisions force tradeoffs between money for themselves and the charity, participants act more averse to charity risk and less averse to self risk. These altered responses to risk bias participants towards choosing payoffs for themselves more often, consistent with excuse-driven responses to risk. Additional results support the existence of excuse-driven types.},
  isbn = {00346527},
  keywords = {altruism,Altruism,Charitable giving,Prosocial behaviour,risk preferences,Risk preferences},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/5AGIZ5QB/2461284.html;/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/QMCY5AR2/2461284.html}
}

@article{exleyImpactSurpriseDonation2018,
  title = {The {{Impact}} of a {{Surprise Donation Ask}}},
  author = {Exley, Christine L and Petrie, Ragan},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.12.015}
}

@article{exleyIncentivesProsocialBehavior2018,
  ids = {Exley2018a},
  title = {Incentives for Prosocial Behavior: {{The}} Role of Reputations},
  author = {Exley, Christine},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Management Science},
  volume = {64},
  number = {5},
  issn = {15265501},
  doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2016.2685},
  abstract = {Do monetary incentives encourage volunteering? Or, do they introduce concerns about appearing greedy and crowd out the motivation to volunteer? Since the importance of such image concerns is normally unobserved, the answer is theoretically unclear, and corresponding empirical evidence is mixed. To help counter this ambiguity, this paper proposes that the importance of image concerns-such as the desire to appear prosocial and not to appear greedy-relates to individuals' volunteer reputations. Experimental results support this possibility. Individuals with past histories of volunteering are less responsive to image concerns if their histories are public, or if their prosocial tendencies are already known. Consistent with a decreased importance of appearing prosocial, they are less likely to volunteer. Consistent with a decreased importance of not appearing greedy, they are less likely to be discouraged by public incentives.}
}

@article{exleyUsingCharityPerformance2019,
  title = {Using {{Charity Performance Metrics}} as an {{Excuse Not}} to {{Give}}},
  author = {Exley, Christine L},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Management Science},
  pages = {mnsc.2018.3268},
  issn = {0025-1909},
  doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2018.3268},
  abstract = {There is an increasing pressure to give wisely. GiveWell warns: "The wrong donation can accomplish nothing. Charities that demonstrably change lives are the exception, not the rule." In two studies, participants evaluate giving options to charities differentiated by their performance metrics. When participants decide how to allocate money between different charities, they give less to charities with lower metrics. When participants decide how to allocate money between themselves and charities, the reduced giving in response to lower metrics is more severe. This finding is consistent with participants overweighting their dislike of lower charity performance metrics as an excuse not to give.},
  keywords = {1159032,acknowledgements,altruism,Charitable giving,clexley,edu,excuses,exley,for,harvard business school,hbs,i gratefully acknowledge funding,nsf,prosocial behavior,self-serving biases,ses,this study from the}
}

@techreport{falkHaveWhatIt2006,
  ids = {Falk2006,Falk2006b},
  title = {Do {{I}} Have What It Takes? {{Equilibrium}} Search with Type Uncertainty and Non-Participation},
  author = {Falk, Armin and Huffman, David and Sunde, Uwe},
  year = {2006},
  institution = {{IZA Discussion Papers}},
  keywords = {behavioral,eep,EEP,job search,survey}
}

@article{falkingerEfficientPrivateProvision1996,
  ids = {Falkinger1996,Falkinger1996a},
  title = {Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods by Rewarding Deviations from Average},
  author = {Falkinger, J},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {62},
  number = {3},
  pages = {413--422},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(95)01549-3},
  abstract = {This paper proposes the following incentive scheme for the private provision of public goods: government should reward and penalize deviations from the mean contribution by an appropriate factor. This makes efficient contribution individually rational even if individuals see through the government budget constraint.},
  keywords = {mechanisms,public economics,public goods,Public goods,theory,vcm,VCM}
}

@article{faravelliMandatePaternalismTheory2012,
  ids = {Faravelli2012,Faravelli2012a},
  title = {Mandate and {{Paternalism}}: {{A Theory}} of {{Large Elections}}},
  author = {Faravelli, Marco and Man, Priscilla and Walsh, Randall},
  year = {2012},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,identification,impact altruism,public economics,voting}
}

@article{farrellCheapTalk1996,
  ids = {Farrell1996,Farrell1996a},
  title = {Cheap Talk},
  author = {Farrell, Joseph and Rabin, Matthew},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {10},
  number = {3},
  pages = {103--118},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.10.3.103}
}

@article{faulhaberFlybynightFirmsMarket1989,
  ids = {Faulhaber1989,Faulhaber1989a},
  title = {Fly-by-Night'' Firms and the Market for Product Reviews},
  author = {Faulhaber, G R and Yao, D A},
  year = {1989},
  journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
  volume = {38},
  number = {1},
  pages = {65--77},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.2307/2098399},
  abstract = {This paper presents a model that permits third-party information pro- vision in a market characterized by information asymmetries and reputation formation. The model is used to examine how the market for information provision affects prices and supply in the primary market. We find that decreasing the cost of providing and using information (i) increases rather than decreases the margins received by reputable service firms, (ii) decreases the price of new, untested service firms (so reputation is more costly to build), and (iii) leads to more high-quality firms and less "fly-by-night" firms.},
  keywords = {applied theory,asymmetric information,experience goods,Industrial Organization,movies,reviews}
}

@article{federationFairTradeFacts2002,
  ids = {Federation2002,Federation2002a},
  title = {Fair {{Trade Facts}}},
  author = {Federation, F T},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {URL cit. http://www. fairtradefederation. com/ab\_facts. html},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,ft,FT}
}

@article{feenbergdanielIntroductionTAXSIMModel1993,
  ids = {FeenbergDaniel1993,FeenbergDaniel1993a},
  title = {An {{Introduction}} to the {{TAXSIM Model}}},
  author = {{Feenberg Daniel} and {Coutts Elisabeth}},
  year = {1993},
  journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management},
  volume = {12},
  number = {1},
  pages = {189--194},
  publisher = {{John Wiley \& Sons}},
  issn = {0276-8739},
  doi = {10.2307/3325474},
  keywords = {data,public finance,software,taxes}
}

@article{feenbergTAXSIMRelatedFilesNBER2001,
  ids = {Feenberg2001,Feenberg2001a},
  title = {{{TAXSIM-Related Files}} at the {{NBER}}},
  author = {Feenberg, D},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {web-based tax simulation software: http://www. nber. org/taxsim/. Used Stata. ado file ``taxsim},
  keywords = {[philanthropy],⛔ No DOI found,data,public finance,software,taxes}
}

@article{fehrCooperationPunishmentPublic2000,
  ids = {Fehr2000,Fehr2000a},
  title = {Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments},
  author = {Fehr, Ernst and G{\"a}chter, Simon},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {90},
  number = {4},
  pages = {980--994},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.90.4.980}
}

@article{fehrEconomicsFairnessReciprocity2006,
  ids = {Fehr2006,Fehr2006a},
  title = {The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism\textendash Experimental Evidence and New Theories},
  author = {Fehr, Ernst and Schmidt, Klaus M},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Handbook on the economics of giving, reciprocity and altruism},
  volume = {1},
  pages = {615--691},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S1574-0714(06)01008-6}
}

@article{fehrernstFairnessRetaliationEconomics2000,
  ids = {FehrErnst2000,FehrErnst2000a},
  title = {Fairness and {{Retaliation}}: {{The Economics}} of {{Reciprocity}}},
  author = {{Fehr Ernst} and {Gachter Simon}},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {14},
  number = {3},
  pages = {159--181},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  issn = {0895-3309},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.14.3.159},
  keywords = {[LoF],[ritual],behavioral,experimental,fairness,incomplete contracts,literature survey,reciprocity}
}

@article{fehrWhySocialPreferences2002,
  ids = {Fehr2002,Fehr2002a},
  title = {Why Social Preferences Matter-the Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives},
  author = {Fehr, E and Fischbacher, U},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Economic Journal},
  pages = {1--33},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{fehrWorkersWorkMore2007,
  ids = {Fehr2007,Fehr2007a},
  title = {Do Workers Work More If Wages Are High? {{Evidence}} from a Randomized Field Experiment},
  author = {Fehr, Ernst and Goette, Lorenz},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  pages = {298--317},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI}
}

@article{feldsteinIncomeTaxCharitable1976,
  ids = {Feldstein1976a,Feldstein1976c},
  title = {The {{Income Tax}} and {{Charitable Contributions}}},
  author = {Feldstein, Martin and Taylor, Amy},
  year = {1976},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {44},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1201--1222},
  publisher = {{The Econometric Society}},
  issn = {0012-9682},
  doi = {10.2307/1914255},
  abstract = {Charitable contributions are an important source of basic finance for a wide variety of private nonprofit organizations that perform quasi-public functions. The tax treatment of charitable contributions substantially influences the volume and distribution of these gifts. The current study presents new estimates of the price and income elasticities of charitable giving. The parameter estimates are then used with the United States Treasury Tax File to simulate the effects of several possible alternatives to the current tax treatment of charitable giving.},
  keywords = {empirical,philanthropy,price of giving,public finance,taxes}
}

@article{feldsteinTaxIncentivesCharitable1976,
  ids = {Feldstein1976,Feldstein1976b},
  title = {Tax {{Incentives}} and {{Charitable Organizations}} in the {{United States}}},
  author = {Feldstein, M and Clotfelter, C},
  year = {1976},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {5},
  number = {1-2},
  pages = {1--26},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI,empirical,philanthropy,price of giving,public finance,taxes}
}

@article{fellnerCausesConsequencesCures2009,
  ids = {Fellner2009,Fellner2009a},
  title = {Causes, {{Consequences}}, and {{Cures}} of {{Myopic Loss Aversion}}\textendash{{An Experimental Investigation}}*},
  author = {Fellner, Gerlinde and Sutter, Matthias},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {119},
  number = {537},
  pages = {900--916},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02251.x},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{felsoBroadNarrowBracketing2014,
  ids = {Felso2014,Felso2014a},
  title = {Broad and Narrow Bracketing in Gift Certificate Spending},
  author = {Felso, Florian and Soetevent, Adriaan R},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {European Economic Review},
  volume = {66},
  number = {0},
  pages = {284--302},
  issn = {0014-2921},
  doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.11.011},
  abstract = {We survey 1050 consumers who have just redeemed one or more open loop gift certificates to learn whether they view gift certificate income, cash gifts and non-gift income as substitutes. We find that the majority (83\%) of recipients spend the certificates in the same way as cash. The other respondents (17\%) bought an item they would not have bought otherwise but adjustments in their shopping pattern do not seem to result from constraints in redeeming the certificates: 80\% of all respondents in this group says they have used the certificate to buy an item they really love to have. While inconsistent with standard microeconomic demand theory, this behavior can be explained by narrow bracketing: in spending gift certificates, these consumers consider a limited choice set of nice, personal items. Our data show that females are more likely to narrow bracket gift certificate income and that positive reciprocity towards the giver induces narrow bracketing in case the giver is a household member who suggests to buy a particular item using the certificate. Previous studies have found that both giving in-kind gifts (Waldfogel, 1993) as giving gift cards (Offenberg, 2007) entail a welfare loss of 10-30\% when compared to giving cash. We find that the welfare effects of open loop gift certificates among users are limited: the consumption of broad bracketing consumers is unaffected and narrow bracketing consumers seem to value the possibility to separate gift certificate income from other income sources.},
  keywords = {Gift giving}
}

@article{fetherstonhaughInsensitivityValueHuman1997,
  ids = {fetherstonhaugh1997insensitivity},
  title = {Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: {{A}} Study of Psychophysical Numbing},
  author = {Fetherstonhaugh, David and Slovic, Paul and Johnson, Stephen and Friedrich, James},
  year = {1997},
  journal = {Journal of Risk and uncertainty},
  volume = {14},
  number = {3},
  pages = {283--300},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1023/A:1007744326393}
}

@article{filippinReconsiderationGenderDifferences2014,
  ids = {Filippin2014,Filippin2014a},
  title = {A Reconsideration of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes},
  author = {Filippin, Antonio and Crosetto, Paolo},
  year = {2014},
  publisher = {{IZA Discussion Paper}},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2402139},
  keywords = {archive,linked data}
}

@article{filiz-ozbayDemandGivingMultiple,
  ids = {Filiz-ozbay},
  title = {Demand for {{Giving}} to {{Multiple Charities}} : {{An Experimental}}},
  author = {{Filiz-ozbay}, Emel and Uler, Neslihan},
  pages = {1--45},
  keywords = {c90,C90,charitable giving,Charitable giving,charities,competition,d62,D62,h41,H41,jel codes,price elasticity of giving,rebate subsidies,substitute and complementary}
}

@article{filiz-ozbayDemandGivingMultiple2017,
  ids = {Filiz-Ozbay2017},
  title = {Demand for {{Giving}} to {{Multiple Charities}}: {{Theory}} and {{Experiments}}},
  author = {{Filiz-Ozbay}, Emel and Uler, Neslihan},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Working Paper},
  pages = {1--40},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2782143},
  abstract = {We study how competition among charities affects individuals' giving behavior. We characterize a situation where a higher rebate subsidy shifts donations from one charity to another and increases total donations. We conduct two experiments: (i) individualized charitable giving where free riding incentives are shut down; and (ii) multi-donor charitable giving. We derive the demand for giving at different rebate conditions. Consistent with theory, the effect of competition on total donations is on average positive and its magnitude depends on the relative price. The social net benefit of rebate subsidies are calculated by comparing campaign costs and new donations generated.},
  keywords = {charitable giving,Charitable giving,competition,department of economics for,departmental research funds,emel filiz-ozbay thanks university,externalities,mitre funding from university,of maryland,of michigan to employ,ozbay,rebate subsidies,student assistants,their generous,useful comments by erkut,we appreciate all the,we are grateful to,y,yusufcan}
}

@article{finkelSpeeddatingInvaluableTool2007,
  ids = {FINKEL2007,FINKEL2007a},
  title = {Speed-Dating as an Invaluable Tool for Studying Romantic Attraction: {{A}} Methodological Primer},
  author = {FINKEL, E and EASTWICK, P W and MATTHEWS, J},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Personal Relationships},
  volume = {14},
  number = {1},
  pages = {149--166},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Synergy}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1475-6811.2006.00146.x},
  keywords = {lof,LoF,psychology,speed dating}
}

@article{finkelsteinAdverseSelectionInsurance2004,
  ids = {Finkelstein2004,Finkelstein2004a},
  title = {Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: {{Policyholder}} Evidence from the {{UK}} Annuity Market},
  author = {Finkelstein, Amy and Poterba, James},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {112},
  number = {1},
  pages = {183--208},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1086/379936},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{fiorina2000USPresidential2003,
  ids = {Fiorina2003,Fiorina2003a},
  title = {The 2000 {{US}} Presidential Election: {{Can}} Retrospective Voting Be Saved?},
  author = {Fiorina, Morris and Abrams, Samuel and Pope, Jeremy},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
  volume = {33},
  number = {2},
  pages = {163--187},
  publisher = {{Cambridge Univ Press}},
  doi = {10.1017/S0007123403000073},
  keywords = {listening,political}
}

@article{fischbacherArePeopleConditionally2001,
  ids = {Fischbacher2001,Fischbacher2001a},
  title = {Are People Conditionally Cooperative? {{Evidence}} from a Public Goods Experiment},
  author = {Fischbacher, U and G{\"a}chter, S and Fehr, E},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {71},
  number = {3},
  pages = {397--404},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00394-9},
  abstract = {We study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method. We find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50\% are conditional cooperators.},
  keywords = {[philanthropy],[ritual],behavioral,conditional cooperation,Conditional cooperation,experiment,publc goods,reciprocity,social giving}
}

@article{fischbacherSocialPreferencesBeliefs2010,
  ids = {Fischbacher2010},
  title = {Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments},
  author = {Fischbacher, Urs and G{\"a}chter, Simon},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {100},
  number = {1},
  pages = {541--556},
  issn = {00028282},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.100.1.541},
  abstract = {JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. In this paper we investigate the role of social preferences and beliefs for voluntary coopera tion. Numerous public goods experiments have shown that many people contribute more to the public good than pure self-interest can easily explain. An equally important observation, how ever, is that free riding increases in repeatedly played public goods experiments across various parameters and participant pools.1 The facts are clear, but their explanation is not. An obvious candidate for explaining the decline of cooperation was learning the free-rider strategy. However, Andreoni (1988) showed that cooperation resumed after a restart, which is inconsistent with a pure learning argument. In a subsequent paper he interpreted the decline in cooperation "to be due to frustrated attempts at kindness, rather than learning the free-riding},
  isbn = {0002-8282}
}

@article{fishbachBeBetterBe2007,
  ids = {Fishbach2007,Fishbach2007a},
  title = {Be Better or Be Merry: {{How}} Mood Affects Self-Control},
  author = {Fishbach, Ayelet and Labroo, Aparna A},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
  volume = {93},
  number = {2},
  pages = {158},
  publisher = {{APA AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION}},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.93.2.158},
  abstract = {In 6 studies, the authors tested whether the effect of mood on self-control success depends on a person's accessible goal. We propose that positive mood signals a person to adopt an accessible goal, whereas negative mood signals a person to reject an accessible goal; therefore, if a self-improvement goal is accessible, happy (vs. neutral or unhappy) people perform better on self-control tasks that further that goal. Conversely, if a mood management goal is accessible, happy people abstain from self-control tasks because the tasks are incompatible with this goal. This pattern receives consistent support across several self-control tasks, including donating to charity, demonstrating physical endurance, seeking negative feedback, and completing tests. Note (JEPR): "Fishbach and Labroo (2007) find that the effect of a positive mood on charitable giving is stronger when a participant is primed to think about long-term goals since giving to a charity 'serves the long-term goal of helping a charity campaign and the donor become a better perso'n"},
  keywords = {affect,philanthropy,pro-social behavior,self-control}
}

@article{fismanGenderDifferencesMate2006,
  ids = {Fisman2006,Fisman2006b},
  title = {Gender {{Differences}} in {{Mate Selection}}: {{Evidence}} from a {{Speed Dating Experiment}}},
  author = {Fisman, Raymond and Iyengar, Sheena S and Kamenica, Emir and Simonson, Itamar},
  year = {2006},
  month = may,
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {121},
  number = {2},
  pages = {673--697},
  doi = {10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.673},
  keywords = {experiments,field experiments,gender,marriage market,preferences,search,speed dating},
  note = {available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v121y2006i2p673-697.html
\par
available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v121y2006i2p673-697.html
\par
available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v121y2006i2p673-697.html}
}

@article{fismanIndividualPreferencesGiving2005,
  ids = {Fisman2005,Fisman2005a},
  title = {Individual {{Preferences}} for {{Giving}}},
  author = {Fisman, R and Kariv, S and Markovits, D},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Yale Law \& Economics Research Paper},
  abstract = {Notes: GARP violations and price sensitivity of gifts},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,garp,heterogeneity,philanthropy,preferences,price of giving,rational altruism,theory}
}

@article{fitterWhoGainsProduct2001,
  ids = {Fitter2001,Fitter2001a},
  title = {Who Gains from Product Rents as the Coffee Market Becomes More Differentiated? {{A}} Value Chain Analysis},
  author = {Fitter, R and Kaplinsky, R},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {IDS Bulletin},
  volume = {32},
  number = {3},
  pages = {69--82},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1759-5436.2001.mp32003008.x},
  abstract = {This paper applies value chain analysis to an agricultural ``commodity'' which is in the process of significant change in final product markets. By focusing on the capacity of value chain analysis to map input-output relations, and by identifying power asymmetries along the chain, it is possible to analyse the factors explaining inter- country distributional outcomes in this sector. A major conclusion is that we are witnessing a simultaneous process of power concentration in importing countries, and power deconcentration in producing countries. It is hypothesised that similar trends can be observed in other agricultural-based value chains.},
  keywords = {business,coffee,differentiated products,FT,Industrial Organization}
}

@article{fochmannEffectsTaxSalience2011,
  ids = {Fochmann2011,Fochmann2011a},
  title = {The {{Effects}} of {{Tax Salience}} and {{Tax Experience}} on {{Individual Work Efforts}} in a {{Framed Field Experiment}}},
  author = {Fochmann, Martin and Weimann, Joachim},
  year = {2011},
  number = {6049},
  keywords = {field experiment,real effort experiment,tax perc}
}

@article{fochmannNetWageIllusion2013,
  ids = {Fochmann2013,Fochmann2013a},
  title = {Net {{Wage Illusion}} in a {{Real-Effort Experiment}}*},
  author = {Fochmann, Martin and Weimann, Joachim and Blaufus, Kay and Hundsdoerfer, Jochen and Kiesewetter, Dirk},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
  volume = {115},
  number = {2},
  pages = {476--484},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/sjoe.12007}
}

@article{fongTruthGivingExperimental2010,
  ids = {Fong,Fong2010,Fong2010a,Fong2011,Fong2011a,Fonga,M.Fong2011},
  title = {Truth in Giving: {{Experimental}} Evidence on the Welfare Effects of Informed Giving to the Poor},
  author = {Fong, Christina and {Oberholzer-Gee}, Felix},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  publisher = {{Elsevier B.V.}},
  abstract = {It is often difficult for donors to predict the value of charitable giving because they know little about their 22 recipients. This concern is particularly acute when making contributions to organizations that serve 23 heterogeneouspopulations.Priorresearchshowsthatdonorsaremoregenerousiftheyknowtheirassistance 24 benefitsagrouptheylike.Butweknowlittleaboutthedemandforsuchinformation.Tostartclosingthisgap, 25 we study transfers of income to real-world poor people in dictator games. Our dictators can purchase signals 26 about why the recipients are poor. We find that a third of the dictators are willing to pay money to learn more 27 about their recipient. Dictators who acquire information mostly use it to withhold resources from less- 28 preferred types, leading to a drastic decline in aggregate transfers. With endogenous information about 29 recipients, we find that all types of poor recipients are worse off. 30},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,Altruism,Charitable giving,Dictator games,experiments,Fairness,information,philanthropy,Philanthropy,Redistribution,self-serving motivations},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{forsytheFairnessSimpleBargaining1994,
  ids = {Forsythe1994,Forsythe1994a},
  title = {Fairness in {{Simple Bargaining Games}}},
  author = {Forsythe, R and Horowitz, J and Savin, N E and Sefton, M},
  year = {1994},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  volume = {6},
  number = {3},
  pages = {347--369},
  doi = {10.1006/game.1994.1021},
  keywords = {bargaining,behavioral,fairness,games}
}

@article{fosgaardPromisesUndoneHow2018,
  ids = {Fosgaard2018},
  title = {Promises {{Undone}} : {{How Committed Pledges Impact Donations}} to {{Charity}}},
  author = {Fosgaard, Toke R},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.3173585}
}

@article{francoisTrustSocialCapital2005,
  ids = {Francois2005,Francois2005a},
  title = {Trust, Social Capital, and Economic Development},
  author = {Francois, P and Zabojnik, J},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
  volume = {3},
  number = {1},
  pages = {51--94},
  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
  doi = {10.1162/1542476053295304}
}

@article{fraserEffectMatchingContribution1989,
  ids = {fraser1989effect},
  title = {The Effect of Matching Contribution Offers and Legitimization of Paltry Contributions on Compliance},
  author = {Fraser, Cynthia and Hite, Robert E},
  year = {1989},
  journal = {Journal of Applied Social Psychology},
  volume = {19},
  number = {12},
  pages = {1010--1018},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1559-1816.1989.tb01235.x}
}

@article{freyDoesMonitoringIncrease1993,
  ids = {Frey1993,Frey1993a},
  title = {Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? {{The}} Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty},
  author = {Frey, B S},
  year = {1993},
  journal = {Economic Inquiry},
  volume = {31},
  number = {4},
  pages = {663--670},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Publishing Ltd}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1465-7295.1993.tb00897.x},
  abstract = {Principal-agent theory suggests that tighter monitoring will raise an agent's work effort and will be applied provided that transaction costs are low. However, when a psychological contract exists between principals and agents, the agents perceive increased monitoring as an indication of distrust, and this induces them to reduce work effort. This "crowding out effect" is likely to dominate when the relationship between principals and agents is personal, while the "disciplining effect" is likely to dominate when the relationship is abstract, as in a competitive market setting. Empirical evidence from neighbouring sciences and from an econometric study supports this proposition.}
}

@article{freySocialComparisonsProSocial2004,
  ids = {Frey2004},
  title = {Social {{Comparisons}} and {{Pro-Social Behavior}}: {{Testing}} "{{Conditional Cooperation}}" in a {{Field Experiment}}},
  author = {{Frey} and {Meier}},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {AER},
  keywords = {behavioral,conditional cooperation,Conditional cooperation,field experiments,philanthropy,reciprocity,social giving}
}

@book{friedmanElementsStatisticalLearning2001,
  title = {The Elements of Statistical Learning},
  author = {Friedman, Jerome and Hastie, Trevor and Tibshirani, Robert and others},
  year = {2001},
  volume = {1},
  publisher = {{Springer series in statistics New York}}
}

@article{friedmanIncidenceMedicarePrescription2009,
  ids = {Friedman2009,Friedman2009a},
  title = {The Incidence of the {{Medicare}} Prescription Drug Benefit: Using Asset Prices to Assess Its Impact on Drug Makers},
  author = {Friedman, John N},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Harvard University},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{friedmanMethodologyPositiveEconomics1953,
  ids = {Friedman1953,Friedman1953a},
  title = {The Methodology of Positive Economics},
  author = {Friedman, Milton},
  year = {1953},
  journal = {The Philosophy of economics: an anthology},
  volume = {2},
  pages = {180--213},
  publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{friedrichInsensitivityValueHuman2014,
  ids = {Calandra2016,Friedrich2014,calandraNavigatingWallsizedDisplays2016},
  title = {Insensitivity to the {{Value}} of {{Human Life}} : {{A Study}} of {{Psychophysical Numbing Insensitivity}} to the {{Value}} of {{Human Life}} : {{A Study}} of {{Psychophysical Numbing}}},
  author = {Friedrich, James and Fetherstonhaugh, David},
  year = {2014},
  number = {June},
  doi = {10.1023/A},
  arxiv = {0005074v1 [arXiv:astro-ph]},
  arxivid = {arXiv:astro-ph/0005074v1},
  isbn = {1009982220290},
  pmid = {1284},
  keywords = {⚠️ Invalid DOI}
}

@article{friedrichPsychophysicalNumbingWhen1999,
  ids = {Friedrich1999},
  title = {Psychophysical Numbing: {{When}} Lives Are Valued Less as the Lives at Risk Increase},
  author = {Friedrich, James and Barnes, Paul and Chapin, Kathryn and Dawson, Ian and Garst, Valerie and Kerr, David},
  year = {1999},
  journal = {Journal of Consumer Psychology},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {277--299},
  issn = {10577408},
  doi = {10.1207/s15327663jcp0803_05},
  abstract = {Costly life-saving interventions can often be described not only in terms ofthe num-ber of lives that may be saved but also in terms of the proportion of lives saved out of some total number at risk. In a phenomenon that has been referred to as psychophysical numbing (PN), Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich (1997) found that participants rated an intervention saving a fixed number of lives to be less worth investing in when more total lives were at risk (i,e,, when saved lives represented a smaller proportion of the total threat or problem). In two new experi-ments, life-valuation correlates of PN responding, as well as manipulations of death salience, accountability, and economics focus, were explored in the context of stu-dents' willingness to support mandatory antilock brake requirements for new cars, PN responding was pervasive, but non-PN responders were clearly distinguished by the greater overall value they placed on saving lives. Salience and accountability manipu-lations did not debias judgments but did tend to rule out low-effort processing as an explanation for these quantity confusions. An emphasis on economic considerations was consistently related to greater PN responding. As participants in a larger social system, each of us is routinely called on to make judgments concerning the appropriateness of mandating risk-reducing and life-saving interventions. Many decisions of this type (e,g,, requiring costly auto safety features to prevent some number of injuries or deaths) have substantial con-sp,quences for consumers. How do we make such decisions? The dynamics influ-encing our choices are no doubt a complicated interplay of attitudes and ideology Requests for reprints should be sent to}
}

@article{fudenbergFolkTheoremRepeated1986,
  ids = {Fudenberg1986,Fudenberg1986a},
  title = {The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information},
  author = {Fudenberg, D and Maskin, E},
  year = {1986},
  journal = {Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society},
  pages = {533--554},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  issn = {0012-9682},
  doi = {10.2307/1911307}
}

@article{fushaoweiMakingStockMarket2008,
  ids = {2008},
  title = {The {{Making Stock Market}} of an {{Investment Banker}}: {{Shocks}}, {{Career Choice}}, and {{Lifetime Income}}},
  author = {{傅少伟}},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {The Journal of Finance},
  volume = {63},
  number = {6},
  pages = {2601--2628},
  issn = {00221082},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01409.x},
  abstract = {New graduates of elite MBA programs flock to Wall Street during bull markets and start their careers elsewhere when the stock market is weak. Given the transferability of MBA skills, it seems likely that any effect of stock returns on MBA placement would be short-lived. In this paper, I use a survey of Stanford MBAs from the classes of 1960 through 1997 to analyze the relationship between the state of financial market at graduation, initial job placement, and long- term labor market outcomes. Using stock market conditions at graduation as an instrument for first job, I show that there is a strong causal effect of initial placement in investment banking on the likelihood of working on Wall Street anywhere from three to twenty years later. I then measure the investment banking compensation premium relative to other jobs and estimate the additional income generated by anMBA cohort where a higher fraction starts in higher-paid jobs relative to a cohort that starts in lower-paid areas. The results lead to several conclusions. First, random factors play an important role in determining the industries and incomes of members of this high-skill group. Second, there is a deep pool of potential investment bankers in any given Stanford MBA class. During the time these people are in school, factors beyond their control sort them into or out of banking upon graduation. Finally, industry-specificortask-specific human capital appears to be important for young investment bankers.}
}

@article{gachterSocialLearningVoluntary2005,
  ids = {Gachter2005,Gachter2005a},
  title = {Social Learning and Voluntary Cooperation among Like-Minded People},
  author = {Gachter, S and Thoni, C},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
  volume = {3},
  number = {2-3},
  pages = {303--314},
  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI}
}

@article{gaechterEffectsIncentivizedBelief2010,
  ids = {Gaechter2010,Gaechter2010a},
  title = {The Effects of (Incentivized) Belief Elicitation in Public Goods Experiments},
  author = {Gaechter, Simon and Renner, Elke},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {13},
  number = {3},
  pages = {364--377},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10683-010-9246-4}
}

@article{gajicCosteffectivenessCashLottery2012,
  ids = {Gajic2012,Gajic2012a},
  title = {The Cost-Effectiveness of Cash versus Lottery Incentives for a Web-Based, Stated-Preference Community Survey},
  author = {Gajic, Aleksandra and Cameron, David and Hurley, Jeremiah},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {The European Journal of Health Economics},
  volume = {13},
  number = {6},
  pages = {789--799},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10198-011-0332-0},
  keywords = {lottery,participation,vaccine}
}

@article{galarragaEconomicTechniquesEstimate2004,
  ids = {Galarraga2004,Galarraga2004a},
  title = {Economic Techniques to Estimate the Demand for Sustainable Products: A Case Study for Fair Trade and Organic Coffee in the {{United Kingdom}}},
  author = {Galarraga, I and Markandya, A},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {Economia Agraria y Recursos Naturales},
  publisher = {{Economia Agraria y Recursos Naturales Volume 4, Number 7, Association}},
  abstract = {UMMARY: The hedonic approach is used in this paper to estimate how much is paid for the fair trade/organic characteristic of the coffee in the British market. This information is later combined with the Quantity Based Demand System (QBDS) model \textendash developed by the authors\textemdash{} and the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) to completely determine the demand function for different coffees. The QBDS model is easier to handle and less data demanding than the AIDS model in this study.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,business,demand estimation,empirical,ft,FT}
}

@article{galeCollegeAdmissionsStability1962,
  ids = {Gale1962,Gale1962a},
  title = {College {{Admissions}} and the {{Stability}} of {{Marriage}}},
  author = {Gale, D and Shapley, L S},
  year = {1962},
  month = jan,
  journal = {The American Mathematical Monthly},
  volume = {69},
  number = {1},
  pages = {9--15},
  publisher = {{Mathematical Association of America}},
  issn = {0002-9890},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI,cooperative games,education,marriage market,theory}
}

@article{gaskinsDynamicLimitPricing1971,
  ids = {Gaskins1971,Gaskins1971a},
  title = {Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing under Threat of Entry},
  author = {Gaskins, D},
  year = {1971},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  volume = {3},
  number = {3},
  pages = {306--322},
  doi = {10.1016/0022-0531(71)90025-1}
}

@article{gathergoodHowIndividualsRepay2018,
  ids = {Gathergood2018},
  title = {How {{Do Individuals Repay Their Debt}} ? {{The Balance-Matching Heuristic}} {${_\ast}$}},
  author = {Gathergood, John and Mahoney, Neale and Stewart, Neil and Weber, J{\"o}rg and D, J E L Codes},
  year = {2018},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,abby sussman,at berkeley haas,balance matching,ben keys,brigitte madrian,cepr european conference on,chicago,consumer borrowing,credit cards,d12,d14,david laibson,devin pope,dick,g02,g20,heuristics,hiro sakaguchi,household finance,jel codes,rational behavior,thaler and seminar participants,we thank joanne hsu}
}

@article{geanakoplosPsychologicalGamesSequential1989,
  ids = {Geanakoplos1989,Geanakoplos1989a},
  title = {Psychological {{Games}} and {{Sequential Rationality}}},
  author = {Geanakoplos, J and Pearce, D and Stacchetti, E},
  year = {1989},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  volume = {1},
  number = {1},
  pages = {60--79},
  doi = {10.1016/0899-8256(89)90005-5},
  keywords = {behavioral,game theory,Game theory,psychological games,sequential rationality,theory}
}

@article{geeBeliefsPeersMatter2018,
  ids = {Gee2018},
  title = {Do Beliefs about Peers Matter for Donation Matching? {{Experiments}} in the Field and Laboratory},
  author = {Gee, Laura K. and Schreck, Michael J.},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  volume = {107},
  issn = {10902473},
  doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.002},
  abstract = {A popular fundraising tool is donation matching, where every dollar is matched by a third party. But field experiments find that matching doesn't always increase donations. Individuals may believe that peers will exhaust the matching funds, so their donation isn't pivotal. We develop a theory of how beliefs about peers' donations affect one's likelihood of donation. We test our theory using novel ``threshold match'' treatments in field and laboratory experiments. One ``threshold match'' treatment more than doubles the donation rate relative to no match. To understand the mechanism behind this increase, we use a lab study to show that beliefs about peers' donations matter. Our theoretical, lab, and field results combined suggest people are more likely to donate when they believe they are more pivotal to securing matching money. Beliefs about others matter, and they should be taken into account when trying to increase donations.}
}

@article{georgellisCrowdingOutIntrinsic,
  ids = {Georgellis},
  title = {Crowding out Intrinsic Motivation in the Public Sector},
  author = {Georgellis, Y and Iossa, E and {of Public}, V Tabvuma - Journal and 2010, undefined},
  journal = {academic.oup.com},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{gerberSocialPressureVoter2008,
  ids = {Gerber2008,Gerber2008a},
  title = {Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: {{Evidence}} from a Large-Scale Field Experiment},
  author = {Gerber, A S and Green, D P and Larimer, C W},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {American Political Science Review},
  volume = {102},
  number = {01},
  pages = {33--48},
  publisher = {{Cambridge Univ Press}},
  doi = {10.1017/S000305540808009X}
}

@article{geyerStat5102Notes2003,
  ids = {Geyer2003,Geyer2003a,geyerStat5102Notes2003a},
  title = {Stat 5102 {{Notes}} : {{Nonparametric Tests}} and {{Confidence Intervals}}},
  author = {Geyer, Charles J},
  year = {2003},
  pages = {1--14},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{gibbonsBrokenFixedEffects2017,
  ids = {Gibbons2017a},
  title = {Broken or {{Fixed Effects}} ? {${_\ast}$}},
  author = {Gibbons, Charles E and Su, Juan Carlos},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.1515/jem-2017-0002}
}

@article{ginoMotivatedBayesiansFeeling2016,
  ids = {gino2016motivated},
  title = {Motivated {{Bayesians}}: {{Feeling}} Moral While Acting Egoistically},
  author = {Gino, Francesca and Norton, Michael I and Weber, Roberto A},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {30},
  number = {3},
  pages = {189--212},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.30.3.189}
}

@article{ginoWeListenAdvice2008,
  ids = {Gino2008},
  title = {Do We Listen to Advice Just Because We Paid for It? {{The}} Impact of Advice Cost on Its Use},
  author = {Gino, Francesca},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes},
  volume = {107},
  number = {2},
  pages = {234--245},
  issn = {07495978},
  doi = {10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.03.001},
  abstract = {When facing a decision, people often rely on advice received from others. Previous studies have shown that people tend to discount others' opinions. Yet, such discounting varies according to several factors. This paper isolates one of these factors: the cost of advice. Specifically, three experiments investigate whether the cost of advice, independent of its quality, affects how people use advice. The studies use the Judge-Advisor System (JAS) to investigate whether people value advice from others more when it costs money than when it is free, and examine the psychological processes that could account for this effect. The results show that people use paid advice significantly more than free advice and suggest that this effect is due to the same forces that have been documented in the literature to explain the sunk costs fallacy. Implications for circumstances under which people value others' opinions are discussed. \textcopyright{} 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
  isbn = {0749-5978},
  pmid = {21317316},
  keywords = {Advice taking,Information use,Judge-Advisor System,Paid-advice effect,Sunk costs}
}

@article{glazerSignalingExplanationCharity1996,
  ids = {Glazer1996,Glazer1996a},
  title = {A {{Signaling Explanation}} for {{Charity}}},
  author = {Glazer, Amihai and Konrad, Kai},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {86(4)},
  pages = {1019--1028},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,philanthropy,reputation,signaling,social giving,status,theory},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{gneezyAvoidingOverheadAversion2014,
  ids = {Gneezy2014,Gneezy2014a,Gneezy2014b},
  title = {Avoiding Overhead Aversion in Charity},
  author = {Gneezy, Uri and Keenan, Elizabeth A. and Gneezy, Ayelet},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Science},
  issn = {10959203},
  doi = {10.1126/science.1253932},
  abstract = {Donors tend to avoid charities that dedicate a high percentage of expenses to administrative and fundraising costs, limiting the ability of nonprofits to be effective. We propose a solution to this problem: Use donations from major philanthropists to cover overhead expenses and offer potential donors an overhead-free donation opportunity. A laboratory experiment testing this solution confirms that donations decrease when overhead increases, but only when donors pay for overhead themselves. In a field experiment with 40,000 potential donors, we compared the overhead-free solution with other common uses of initial donations. Consistent with prior research, informing donors that seed money has already been raised increases donations, as does a \$1:\$1 matching campaign. Our main result, however, clearly shows that informing potential donors that overhead costs are covered by an initial donation significantly increases the donation rate by 80\% (or 94\%) and total donations by 75\% (or 89\%) compared with the seed (or matching) approach.},
  isbn = {1095-9203 (Electronic)\textbackslash r0036-8075 (Linking)},
  pmid = {25359974}
}

@article{gneezyCareIfYou2017,
  ids = {gneezy2017care},
  title = {Do {{I}} Care If You Are Paid? {{A}} Field Experiment on Charitable Donations},
  author = {Gneezy, Uri and Rau, Holger Andreas and Samek, Anya Savikhin and Zhurakhovska, Lilia},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2938069}
}

@article{gneezyEvaluationPeriodsAsset2003,
  ids = {Gneezy2003a,Gneezy2003c},
  title = {Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market Experiment},
  author = {Gneezy, Uri and Kapteyn, Arie and Potters, Jan},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {The Journal of Finance},
  volume = {58},
  number = {2},
  pages = {821--838},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/1540-6261.00547},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{gneezyFinePrice2000,
  ids = {Gneezy2000,Gneezy2000a},
  title = {Fine Is a Price, As},
  author = {Gneezy, Uri and Rustichini, Aldo},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {J. Legal Stud.},
  volume = {29},
  pages = {1},
  publisher = {{HeinOnline}},
  doi = {10.1086/468061}
}

@article{gneezyPaywhatyouwantIdentitySelfsignaling2012,
  ids = {Gneezy2012,Gneezy2012a},
  title = {Pay-What-You-Want, Identity, and Self-Signaling in Markets},
  author = {Gneezy, A and Gneezy, U and Riener, G and Nelson, L D},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  volume = {109},
  number = {19},
  pages = {7236--7240},
  publisher = {{National Acad Sciences}},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.1120893109},
  keywords = {altruism,field experiments}
}

@article{gneezyPerformanceCompetitiveEnvironments2003,
  ids = {Gneezy2003,Gneezy2003b},
  title = {Performance in Competitive Environments: {{Gender}} Differences},
  author = {Gneezy, Uri and Niederle, Muriel and Rustichini, Aldo},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {118},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1049--1074},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
  doi = {10.1162/00335530360698496}
}

@article{goslingChangingDistributionMale2000,
  ids = {Gosling2000,Gosling2000a},
  title = {The Changing Distribution of Male Wages in the {{UK}}},
  author = {Gosling, A and Machin, S and Meghir, C},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
  volume = {67},
  number = {4},
  pages = {635},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
  doi = {10.1111/1467-937X.00148}
}

@article{goswamiWhenShouldAsk2016,
  ids = {Goswami2016},
  title = {When {{Should}} the {{Ask Be}} a {{Nudge}}? {{The Effect}} of {{Default Amounts}} on {{Charitable Donations}}},
  author = {Goswami, Indranil and Urminsky, Oleg},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Journal of Marketing Research},
  volume = {53},
  number = {5},
  issn = {00222437},
  doi = {10.1509/jmr.15.0001},
  abstract = {How does setting a donation option as the default in a charitable appeal affect people's decisions? In eight studies, comprising 11,508 participants making 2,423 donation decisions in both experimental settings and a large- scale natural field experiment, the authors investigate the effect of "choice- option" defaults on the donation rate, average donation amount, and the resulting revenue. They find (1) a "scale-back" effect, in which low defaults reduce average donation amounts; (2) a lower-bar" effect, in which defaulting a low amount increases donation rate; and (3) a "default- distraction" effect, in which introducing any defaults reduces the effect of other cues, such as positive charity information. Contrary to the view that setting defaults will backfire, defaults increased revenue in the field study. However, the findings suggest that defaults can sometimes be a "self- canceling" intervention, with countervailing effects of default option magnitude on decisions and resulting in no net effect on revenue. The authors discuss the implications of the findings for research on fundraising specifically, for choice architecture and behavioral interventions more generally, and for the use of "nudges" in policy decisions.}
}

@article{gourierouxc.PseudoMaximumLikelihood1984,
  ids = {GourierouxC.1984,GourierouxC.1984a},
  title = {Pseudo {{Maximum Likelihood Methods}}: {{Applications}} to {{Poisson Models}}},
  author = {Gourieroux C., A Monfort and Trognon, A},
  year = {1984},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {52},
  pages = {701--720},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI},
  note = {robustness of Poisson relative to Tobit
\par
robustness of Poisson relative to Tobit
\par
robustness of Poisson relative to Tobit}
}

@article{greeneAsymptoticBiasOrdinary1981,
  ids = {Greene1981,Greene1981a},
  title = {On the {{Asymptotic Bias}} of the {{Ordinary Least Squares Estimator}} of the {{Tobit Model}}},
  author = {Greene, William H},
  year = {1981},
  month = mar,
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {49},
  number = {2},
  pages = {505--513},
  publisher = {{The Econometric Society}},
  issn = {0012-9682},
  doi = {10.2307/1913323},
  abstract = {This paper presents a precise characterization of the bias of least squares in two limited dependent variable models, the Tobit model and the truncated regression model. For the cases considered, the method of moments can be used to correct the bias of OLS. For more general cases, the results provide approximations which appear to be relatively robust.},
  keywords = {asymptotics,corner solutions,econometrics,ols,tobit}
}

@article{gronbergluccasenAreTaxfinancedContributions2012,
  ids = {GronbergLuccasen2012,GronbergLuccasen2012a},
  title = {Are Tax-Financed Contributions to a Public Good Completely Crowded-out? {{Experimental}} Evidence},
  author = {Gronberg Luccasen, Turocy Van Huyck},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.04.001},
  abstract = {"In a scenario where donors are purely altruistic \textendash{} assuming fiscal transparency \textendash, a redistribution of donations through the tax system will have no effect on the total provision of the public good; a tax-and-spend policy will be neutral "},
  keywords = {crow,philanthropy}
}

@article{grossmanBeliefsSocialPreferences2008,
  ids = {Grossman2008,Grossman2008a},
  title = {Beliefs and {{Social Preferences}}},
  author = {Grossman, Zachary},
  year = {2008},
  abstract = {A person's willingness to sacrifice for others is highly sensitive to informational conditions, but it is unclear why. I conceptually and experimentally distinguish between three leading explanations, all based upon beliefs about the giver, which previous work has not adequately distinguished. 1) Social-signaling holds that a person wants others to think of her as fair- minded, 2) self-signaling says she would like to think of herself that way, and 3) beliefs-based altruism says that she cares about how her action makes another person feel. I present a model in which the decision-maker signals her preferences to an observer, which can correspond to each of these motivations. I experimentally test these interpretations using the model's predictions about a dictator game in which the outcome may be determined either by the dictator's choice or by chance. Limiting the recipient's ability to infer the dictator's choice lowers the frequency of giving, which is evidence of either social-signaling or beliefs-based altruism. However, I find little willingness to pay to in uence a recipient's beliefs about how he was treated by a third-party dictator, providing little support for belief-based altruism, and revealing partial information about the dictator's identity, while holding constant the recipient's information about his treatment, increases the frequency and amount of giving, suggesting social-signaling. Finally, lowering the expected cost of the decision to give by decreasing the likelihood that it will be implemented has little effect on dictator giving when the beliefs of the recipient are held constant, offering little support for self-signaling. This suggests that the act of giving is largely tied to what it says to others about the giver, as opposed to the self, or how it makes the recipient feel.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,altruism,behavioral,colleagues,dictator games,experiments,philanthropy,reputation,self-signaling,signaling,social giving}
}

@article{guisoDoesCultureAffect2006,
  ids = {Guiso2006,Guiso2006a},
  title = {Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?},
  author = {Guiso, L and Sapienza, P and Zingales, L},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {20},
  number = {2},
  pages = {23--48},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.20.2.23}
}

@article{guptaAreDonorCountries2006,
  ids = {Gupta2006,Gupta2006a},
  title = {Are {{Donor Countries Giving More}} or {{Less Aid}}?},
  author = {Gupta, S and Pattillo, C and Wagh, S},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Review of Development Economics},
  volume = {10},
  number = {3},
  pages = {535--552},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Synergy}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9361.2006.00344.x},
  keywords = {development,empirical,ODA,philanthropy},
  note = {Development aid
\par
Development aid
\par
Development aid}
}

@article{guthExperimentalAnalysisUltimatum1982,
  ids = {Guth1982,Guth1982a},
  title = {An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining},
  author = {Guth, Werner and Schmittberger, Rolf and Schwarze, Bernd},
  year = {1982},
  journal = {Journal of economic behavior \& organization},
  volume = {3},
  number = {4},
  pages = {367--388},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7}
}

@article{guthLeadingExampleExclusion2007,
  ids = {Guth2007,Guth2007a},
  title = {Leading by Example with and without Exclusion Power in Voluntary Contribution Experiments},
  author = {Guth, Werner and Levati, M Vittoria and Sutter, Matthias and {van der Heijden}, Eline},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {912007},
  number = {5-6},
  pages = {1023--1042},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.007},
  abstract = {We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contribution experiments. Leadership is implemented by letting one group member contribute to the public good before followers do. Such leadership increases contributions in comparison to the standard voluntary contribution mechanism, especially so when it goes along with authority in the form of granting the leader exclusion power. Whether leadership is fixed or rotating among group members has no significant influence on contributions. Only a minority of groups succeeds in endogenously installing a leader, even though groups with leaders are much more efficient than groups without a leader.},
  keywords = {exclusions,experiments,leadership,public goods,Public goods,reputation,social giving,vcm,VCM}
}

@article{guthProceduralFairnessAxioms,
  ids = {Guth,Gutha},
  title = {Procedural {{Fairness}} : {{Axioms}} and {{Experiments}}},
  author = {G{\"u}th, Werner},
  pages = {1--46}
}

@techreport{haapanenDoesHigherEducation2013,
  ids = {Haapanen2013,Haapanen2013a},
  title = {Does Higher Education Enhance Migration?},
  author = {Haapanen, Mika and B{\"o}ckerman, Petri},
  year = {2013},
  institution = {{IZA Discussion Paper}},
  abstract = {This paper examines the causal impact of education on within-country migration. A major higher education reform took place in Finland in the 1990s. It gradually transformed former vocational colleges into polytechnics and expanded higher education to all regions. The reform created exogenous variation in the regional supply of higher education. Using the reform as an instrument, our estimation results show that polytechnic graduates have a 7.5 (13.7) percentage points higher migration probability during a three-year (six-year) follow-up period than vocational college graduates.},
  keywords = {nlGEOG}
}

@article{haapanenMigrationHighlyEducated2012,
  ids = {Haapanen2012,Haapanen2012a},
  title = {Migration {{Of The Highly Educated}}: {{Evidence From Residence Spells Of University Graduates}}},
  author = {Haapanen, Mika and Tervo, Hannu},
  year = {2012},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Journal of Regional Science},
  volume = {52},
  number = {4},
  pages = {587--605},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9787.2011.00745.x},
  abstract = {We examine the inter-regional migration of university graduates from 1991 to 2003 in Finland. The results show that time matters: two-years before and during the graduation year the hazard rates of migration increase, and then decrease thereafter. Although university graduates are particularly mobile, we find that most of them do not move from their region of studies within 10 years after graduation. The out-migration, i.e., brain drain, is much higher among graduates in the more peripheral universities than in the growth centers (Helsinki in particular). Migration is also substantially more likely for those studying away from the home region than for those studying at home.},
  keywords = {nlGEOG}
}

@article{hahnAdaptiveExperimentalDesign2011,
  ids = {Hahn2011},
  title = {Adaptive Experimental Design Using the Propensity Score},
  author = {Hahn, Jinyong and Hirano, Keisuke and Karlan, Dean},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Journal of Business and Economic Statistics},
  volume = {29},
  number = {1},
  pages = {96--108},
  issn = {07350015},
  doi = {10.1198/jbes.2009.08161},
  abstract = {Many social experiments are run in multiple waves or replicate earlier social experiments. In principle, the sampling design can be modified in later stages or replications to allow for more efficient estimation of causal effects. We consider the design of a two-stage experiment for estimating an average treatment effect when covariate information is available for experimental subjects. We use data from the first stage to choose a conditional treatment assignment rule for units in the second stage of the experiment. This amounts to choosing the propensity score, the conditional probability of treatment given covariates. We propose to select the propensity score to minimize the asymptotic variance bound for estimating the average treatment effect. Our procedure can be implemented simply using standard statistical software and has attractive large-sample properties.},
  keywords = {Efficiency bound,Experimental design,Propensity score}
}

@article{hahnUsingInformationMarkets2003,
  ids = {Hahn2003,Hahn2003b},
  title = {Using Information Markets to Improve Public Decision Making},
  author = {Hahn, R and Tetlock, P},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Summer},
  pages = {4--18},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{hahnUsingInformationMarkets2005,
  ids = {Hahn2005,Hahn2005a},
  title = {Using Information Markets to Improve Public Decision Making},
  author = {Hahn, Robert and Tetlock, Paul},
  year = {2005},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{haisleyImpactAlternativeIncentive2012,
  ids = {Haisley2012,Haisley2012a},
  title = {The Impact of Alternative Incentive Schemes on Completion of Health Risk Assessments},
  author = {Haisley, Emily and Volpp, Kevin G and Pellathy, Thomas and Loewenstein, George},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {American Journal of Health Promotion},
  volume = {26},
  number = {3},
  pages = {184--188},
  publisher = {{PO Box 1897, 810 East 10th Street, Lawrence, KS 66044-8897}},
  doi = {10.4278/ajhp.100729-ARB-257},
  keywords = {behavioral,field experiment,group incentives,lotteries,Vaccines}
}

@article{hallEfficiencyequalityTradeoffPublic2010,
  ids = {Hall2010,Hall2010a},
  title = {The Efficiency-Equality Tradeoff in Public Sector Charity Provision},
  author = {Hall, Daniel T},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Research in Experimental Economics},
  volume = {13},
  pages = {77--111},
  publisher = {{Emerald Group Publishing Limited}},
  doi = {10.1108/S0193-2306(2010)0000013006}
}

@article{hansenEffectsIncentivesInterview2007,
  ids = {Hansen2007,Hansen2007a},
  title = {The Effects of Incentives, Interview Length, and Interviewer Characteristics on Response Rates in a {{CATI-study}}},
  author = {Hansen, Kasper M},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {112--121},
  publisher = {{WAPOR}},
  doi = {10.1093/ijpor/edl022}
}

@article{hansonShallWeVote2013,
  ids = {Hanson2013,Hanson2013a},
  title = {Shall We Vote on Values, but Bet on Beliefs?},
  author = {Hanson, Robin},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Journal of Political Philosophy},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/jopp.12008}
}

@article{harbaughNeuralResponsesTaxation2007,
  ids = {Harbaugh2007,Harbaugh2007a},
  title = {Neural Responses to Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations},
  author = {Harbaugh, W T and Mayr, U and Burghart, D R},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Science},
  volume = {316},
  number = {5831},
  pages = {1622},
  publisher = {{AAAS}},
  doi = {10.1126/science.1140738}
}

@article{harbaughWhatDonationsBuy1998,
  ids = {Harbaugh1998a,Harbaugh1998c},
  title = {What Do {{Donations Buy}}? {{A Model}} of {{Philanthropy Based}} on {{Prestige}} and {{Warm Glow}}},
  author = {Harbaugh, William T},
  year = {1998},
  month = may,
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {67(2)},
  number = {2},
  pages = {269--284},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  issn = {0002-8282},
  doi = {10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00062-5},
  keywords = {empirical,motives for giving,philanthropy,prestige,reputation,social giving,theory}
}

@article{harmonEstimatesEconomicReturn1995,
  ids = {Harmon1995,Harmon1995a},
  title = {Estimates of the Economic Return to Schooling for the {{United Kingdom}}},
  author = {Harmon, C and Walker, I},
  year = {1995},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {85},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1278--1286},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  abstract = {Abstract: This paper estimates the impact of schooling on the wages of men. It is important to know what the return on educational investments might be since a high return implies that there might be too little of such investments. The major preoccupation in this literature has been attempting to unravel the simultaneous relationship between schooling and wages. That is, wages depend on schooling since schooling enhances human capital, but schooling decisions depend on wages for one or more of a number of reasons - for example, individuals will invest in more schooling the greater is the return to that schooling. Traditional estimates of the return to an additional year of schooling in the UK suggest that this is in of the order of 7\%. However, the results here suggest much larger figures - perhaps in the order of 20\%. We use a large sample of UK males to address the potential endogeneity of schooling. By exploiting the experimental nature of two changes in the minimum school leaving age to uncover the effect of an exogenous increase in schooling on wages. Our results confirm recent US work. For example, Card (1993) and Butcher and Case (1994) suggest that the estimates of schooling returns using such methods are almost double that of simple least squares methods. However, the results here provide much greater precision than has previously been the case and so substantiate the US evidence of much larger rates of return to education than traditionally thought.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  note = {nled
\par
nled
\par
nled}
}

@article{harmsMakingNullEffects2018,
  ids = {harms2018making},
  title = {Making'null Effects' Informative: Statistical Techniques and Inferential Frameworks},
  shorttitle = {Making'null Effects' Informative},
  author = {Harms, Christopher and Lakens, Dani{\"e}l},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of clinical and translational research},
  volume = {3},
  number = {Suppl 2},
  pages = {382},
  publisher = {{Whioce Publishing Pte. Ltd.}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/DZXKF6T3/PMC6412612.html}
}

@article{harrisonglennw.ExperimentalEvaluationWeakest1989,
  ids = {HarrisonGlennW.1989,HarrisonGlennW.1989a},
  title = {An {{Experimental Evaluation}} of {{Weakest Link}}/{{Best Shot Models}} of {{Public Goods}}},
  author = {{Harrison Glenn W.} and {Hirshleifer Jack}},
  year = {1989},
  month = feb,
  journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {97},
  number = {1},
  pages = {201--225},
  publisher = {{The University of Chicago Press}},
  issn = {0022-3808},
  abstract = {In the supply of public goods, far less free-riding actually occurs than traditional theory predicts. As one explanation, the social composition function(SCF), which aggregates individual contributions into an available social total,may not always take the standard summation form. Theoretical considerations indicate that free-riding should be least for an SCF of the weakest-link type but greatest for the best-shot type. Using a sequential protocol, our experiments strongly confirmed theoretical anticipations under all three types of SCF. Even under the more onerous sealed-bid (simultaneous play) protocol, the experimental subjects were able to make some partial progress toward the theoretical ideal.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,assurance games,experiments,public goods,Public goods,vcm,VCM}
}

@article{harrisonIdentifyingAltruismLaboratory,
  ids = {HARRISON,HARRISONa},
  title = {Identifying {{Altruism}} in the {{Laboratory}}},
  author = {HARRISON, G W and JOHNSON, L},
  abstract = {Recent attempts to measure altruism toward other players or charities suffer from a potential confound: the act of giving is typically correlated with the size of the pie left on the experimenter's table. Altruistic acts could thus be more generous if subjects prefer that monies go toward other players, or charities, than be left on the table. On the other hand, revealed altruism could be lower if subjects are more altruistic toward the residual claimant than they are toward the agent to whom they are being asked to give. We demonstrate this point with simple laboratory experiments that derive from popular recent designs. We find a significant effect from the hypothesized confound, with revealed altruism dependent upon who is specified as the residual claimant.},
  keywords = {❓ Multiple DOI,altruism,experiments,house money,methods,philanthropy}
}

@article{harrisonIntroductionExperimentalEconomics2002,
  ids = {Harrison2002,Harrison2002a},
  title = {Introduction to {{Experimental Economics}}},
  author = {Harrison, G W},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {At http://dmsweb. badm. sc. edu/glenn/manila/presentations},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,experimental,methods,online,texts}
}

@article{harsanyiGeneralTheoryEquilibrium1988,
  ids = {harsanyi1988general},
  title = {A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games},
  author = {Harsanyi, John C and Selten, Reinhard and {Others}},
  year = {1988},
  journal = {MIT Press Books},
  volume = {1},
  publisher = {{The MIT Press}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{hartBanksAreWhere2014,
  ids = {Hart2014,Hart2014a},
  title = {Banks {{Are Where The Liquidity Is}}},
  author = {Hart, Oliver and Zingales, Luigi},
  year = {2014},
  pages = {1--40},
  keywords = {alp simsek,and participants in,and the university of,bailout,banking,boston college,cass business school,christian leuz,e41 g21,e51,finance,jel codes,liquidity,lse,robert vishny,seminars at mit,thank arnoud boot,the university of chicago,vania stavrakeva,we would like to}
}

@techreport{hartLiquidityInefficientInvestment2013,
  ids = {Hart2013,Hart2013a},
  title = {Liquidity and {{Inefficient Investment}}},
  author = {Hart, Oliver D and Zingales, Luigi},
  year = {2013},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}}
}

@article{haruvyEquilibriumSelectionRole2007,
  ids = {Haruvy2007,Haruvy2007a},
  title = {Equilibrium Selection and the Role of Information in Repeated Matching Markets},
  author = {Haruvy, E and Utku {\"U}nver, M},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {94},
  number = {2},
  pages = {284--289},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2006.07.002}
}

@techreport{hastingsAreDegreesWorth2013,
  ids = {Hastings2013,Hastings2013b},
  title = {Are Some Degrees Worth More than Others? Evidence from College Admission Cutoffs in {{Chile}}},
  author = {Hastings, Justine S and Neilson, Christopher A and Zimmerman, Seth D},
  year = {2013},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  abstract = {We use administrative data from Chile from 1985 through 2011 to estimate the returns to postsecondary admission as a function of field of study, course requirements, selectivity, and student socioeconomic status. Our data link high school and college records to labor market earnings from federal tax forms. We exploit hundreds of regression discontinuities from the centralized, score-based admissions system to estimate the causal impacts of interest. Returns are positive and significant only among more-selective degrees. Returns are highly heterogeneous by field of study, with large returns in health, law and social science, as well as selective technology and business degrees. We find small to negative returns in arts, humanities and education degrees. We do not find evidence that vocational curriculum focus increases returns for less selective degrees. We do not find differential outcomes for students coming from low- versus high-socioeconomic backgrounds admitted to selective degrees.},
  keywords = {nleduc}
}

@article{hastingsGenderPerformanceEvidence2006,
  ids = {Hastings2006,Hastings2006a},
  title = {Gender and Performance: {{Evidence}} from School Assignment by Randomized Lottery},
  author = {Hastings, Justine S and Kane, Thomas J and Staiger, Douglas O},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {The American economic review},
  pages = {232--236},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1257/000282806777211919}
}

@techreport{hastingsHowFinancialLiteracy2011,
  ids = {Hastings2011,Hastings2011a},
  title = {How Financial Literacy and Impatience Shape Retirement Wealth and Investment Behaviors},
  author = {Hastings, Justine S and Mitchell, Olivia S},
  year = {2011},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  abstract = {Two competing explanations for why consumers have trouble with financial decisions are gaining momentum. One is that people are financially illiterate since they lack understanding of simple economic concepts and cannot carry out computations such as computing compound interest, which could cause them to make suboptimal financial decisions. A second is that impatience or present-bias might explain suboptimal financial decisions. That is, some people persistently choose immediate gratification instead of taking advantage of larger long-term payoffs. We use experimental evidence from Chile to explore how these factors appear related to poor financial decisions. Our results show that our measure of impatience is a strong predictor of wealth and investment in health. Financial literacy is also correlated with wealth though it appears to be a weaker predictor of sensitivity to framing in investment decisions. Policymakers interested in enhancing retirement wellbeing would do well to consider the importance of these factors.},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{hauserUsingBigData,
  ids = {Hauser,Hausera,hauserUsingBigDataa},
  title = {Using {{Big Data}} and {{Targeted Nudges}} to {{Reduce Unethical Claiming}} of {{Government Benefits}}},
  author = {Hauser, Oliver P and Greene, Michael and Decelles, Katy and Norton, Michael I and Gino, Francesca},
  pages = {1--42}
}

@article{hausmanEconomicModelsCount1984,
  ids = {Hausman1984,Hausman1984a},
  title = {Economic {{Models}} for {{Count Data}} with an {{Application}} to the {{Patents-R}}\&{{D Relationship}}},
  author = {Hausman, J and Hall, B and Griliches, Z},
  year = {1984},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {52},
  pages = {909--938},
  doi = {10.2307/1911191}
}

@article{hayesEfficiencyFairTrade2006,
  ids = {Hayes2006,Hayes2006a},
  title = {On the Efficiency of Fair Trade},
  author = {Hayes, M},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Review of Social Economy},
  volume = {64},
  number = {4},
  pages = {447--468},
  publisher = {{Routledge}},
  doi = {10.1080/00346760601024419},
  abstract = {This paper uses competitive equilibrium theory to analyze the economic efficiency of international "fair trade" between ethical consumers and low-income producers. The main analytical innovations are the reconsideration of the labor supply decision in a state of Keynesian involuntary unemployment as a choice between work and, not leisure, but inferior production activities; and the application of Pigou and Robinson's theory of employer monopsony, leading to a focus on the "local fair trade organization", which has a similar effect to a labor union or minimum wage in eliminating monopsony rents. A price premium is found neither necessary nor sufficient for fair trade, and in a state of involuntary unemployment a premium does not lead to inefficient allocation. The conclusion is that fair trade improves welfare by strengthening competition for labor, and should be encouraged as a complementary element of an enlightened trade liberalization policy.},
  keywords = {ft,FT,ge,Industrial Organization,theoretical}
}

@article{heckmanEarningsFunctionsRates2006,
  ids = {Heckman2006,Heckman2006a},
  title = {Earnings Functions, Rates of Return and Treatment Effects: {{The Mincer}} Equation and Beyond},
  author = {Heckman, James J and Lochner, Lance J and Todd, Petra E},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Handbook of the Economics of Education},
  volume = {1},
  pages = {307--458},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S1574-0692(06)01007-5},
  abstract = {Numerous studies regress log earnings on schooling and report estimated coefficients as `Mincer rates of return'. A more recent literature uses instrumental variables. This chapter considers the economic interpretation of these analyses and how the availability of repeated cross section and panel data improves the ability of analysts to estimate the rate of return. We consider under what conditions the Mincer model estimates an ex post rate of return. We test and reject the model on six cross sections of U.S. Census data. We present a general nonparametric approach for estimating marginal internal rates of return that takes into account tuition, income taxes and forms of uncertainty. We also contrast estimates based on a single cross-section of data, using the synthetic cohort approach, with estimates based on repeated cross-sections following actual cohorts. Cohort-based models fitted on repeated cross section data provide more reliable estimates of ex post returns. Accounting for uncertainty affects estimates of rates of return. Accounting for sequential revelation of information calls into question the validity of the internal rate of return as a tool for policy analysis. An alternative approach to computing economic rates of return that accounts for sequential revelation of information is proposed and the evidence is summarized. We distinguish ex ante from ex post returns. New panel data methods for estimating the uncertainty and psychic costs facing agents are reviewed. We report recent evidence that demonstrates that there are large psychic costs of schooling. This helps to explain why persons do not attend school even though the financial rewards for doing so are high. We present methods for computing distributions of returns ex ante and ex post. We review the literature on instrumental variable estimation. The link of the estimates to the economics is not strong. The traditional instruments are weak, and this literature has not produced decisive empirical estimates. We exposit new methods that interpret the economic content of different instruments within a unified framework.},
  keywords = {education,human capital,labor,nleduc}
}

@article{hegerAltruismBegetsAltruism2019,
  ids = {Heger2019,Heger2019a,hegerAltruismBegetsAltruism2019a},
  title = {Altruism Begets Altruism: {{Nudging}} Our Way to a More Virtuous Society?},
  author = {Heger, Stephanie A and Slonim, Robert},
  year = {2019},
  number = {Ecbe 2019},
  pages = {0--27},
  abstract = {Economic research examining social preferences over the past several decades has increasingly focused on better understanding and teasing apart distinct motives. While the research has primarily focused on short term behavior, this paper goes beyond this literature to better understand how a short-term intervention, a nudge, can affect subsequent behavior. Using a popular policy nudge, the default option, we show that its effect on the choice to be more altruistic "today" causes an increase in altruism "tomorrow". We rule out that the nudge has a direct inter-temporal effect and instead show that our findings are consistent with a model of habit formation and moral consistency; that is, altruism begets altruism. Our local average treatment effect indicates that the nudge-induced giving in Round 1 of the experiment causes a 40 percentage point (or 200\%) increase in the propensity to give in Round 2. Our findings suggest a way forward in promoting a more virtuous society.},
  mendeley-groups = {giving-keywords}
}

@article{helsonAdaptationlevelTheory1964,
  ids = {Helson1964,Helson1964a},
  title = {Adaptation-Level Theory.},
  author = {Helson, Harry},
  year = {1964},
  publisher = {{Harper \& Row}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,giving and probability,retirement consulting}
}

@article{henrichSearchHomoEconomicus2001,
  ids = {Henrich2001,Henrich2001b},
  title = {In {{Search}} of {{Homo Economicus}}: {{Behavioral Experiments}} in 15 {{Small-Scale Societies}}},
  author = {Henrich, J and Boyd, R and Bowles, S and Camerer, C and Fehr, E and Gintis, H and McElreath, R},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
  volume = {91},
  number = {2},
  pages = {73--78},
  publisher = {{AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION}},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.91.2.73},
  keywords = {[development],altruism,cross-culture experiments,experimental,field experiments,rationality,ultimatum game}
}

@article{hernan2010causal,
  title = {Causal Inference},
  author = {Hern{\'a}n, Miguel A and Robins, James M},
  year = {2010},
  publisher = {{CRC Boca Raton, FL;}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{herrmannAntisocialPunishmentSocieties2008,
  ids = {Herrmann2008,Herrmann2008a},
  title = {Antisocial Punishment across Societies},
  author = {Herrmann, Benedikt and Th{\"o}ni, Christian and G{\"a}chter, Simon},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Science},
  volume = {319},
  number = {5868},
  pages = {1362--1367},
  publisher = {{American Association for the Advancement of Science}},
  doi = {10.1126/science.1153808}
}

@article{heTaxTransferFraming2012,
  ids = {He2012,He2012a},
  title = {Tax or {{Transfer}}? {{The Framing Effect}} of {{Redistribution Policy}}: {{Experimental Evidence}}},
  author = {He, Tai-Sen},
  year = {2012},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{hickeyNoTitle2015,
  ids = {Hickey2015,Hickey2015a,Hickey2015b,Hickey2015c,Hickey2015d},
  title = {No {{Title}}},
  author = {Hickey, Ross and Minaker, Bradley and Payne, A Abigail},
  year = {2015},
  number = {July},
  keywords = {charitable giving,disaster relief,donations,tax incentives}
}

@article{hickman2015gives,
  title = {Who Gives to Effective Charities? {{What}} Makes Them Give?},
  author = {Hickman, Peter},
  year = {2015},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{hirschmanExitVoiceFate1993,
  ids = {Hirschman1993,Hirschman1993a},
  title = {Exit, {{Voice}}, and the {{Fate}} of the {{German Democratic Republic}}: {{An Essay}} in {{Conceptual History}}},
  author = {Hirschman, A O},
  year = {1993},
  journal = {World Politics},
  volume = {45},
  number = {2},
  pages = {173--202},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.2307/2950657}
}

@article{hiscoxThereConsumerDemand2003,
  ids = {Hiscox2003,Hiscox2003a},
  title = {Is {{There Consumer Demand}} for {{Improved Labor Standards}}? {{Evidence}} from {{Field Experiments}} in {{Social Labeling}}},
  author = {{Hiscox} and {Smythe}},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Working Paper}
}

@article{hitschMatchingSortingOnline2010,
  ids = {Hitsch2010,Hitsch2010a},
  title = {Matching and {{Sorting}} in {{Online Dating}}},
  author = {Hitsch, G J and Hortacsu, A and Ariely, D},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {100},
  number = {1},
  pages = {130--163},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.100.1.130},
  abstract = {Using data on user attributes and interactions from an online dating site, weestimate mate preferences, and use the Gale-Shapley algorithm to predict sta-ble matches. The predicted matches are similar to the actual matches achievedby the dating site, and the actual matches are approximately efficient. Out-of-sample predictions of offline matches, i.e., marriages, exhibit assortativemating patterns similar to those observed in actual marriages. Thus, mate pref-erences, without resort to search frictions, can generate sorting in marriages.However, we underpredict some of the correlation patterns; search frictionsmay play a role in explaining the discrepancy. (JEL C78, J12)}
}

@article{hofflerReplicationEconomicsJournal2017,
  ids = {Hoffler2017},
  title = {Replication and {{Economics Journal Policies}}},
  author = {H{\"o}ffler, Jan H.},
  year = {2017},
  month = may,
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {107},
  number = {5},
  pages = {52--55},
  issn = {0002-8282},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.p20171032}
}

@article{hoffmanEntitlementsRightsFairness1985,
  ids = {Hoffman1985,Hoffman1985a},
  title = {Entitlements, {{Rights}}, and {{Fairness}}: {{An Experimental Examination}} of {{Subjects}}' {{Concepts}} of {{Distributive Justice}}},
  author = {Hoffman, E and Spitzer, M L},
  year = {1985},
  journal = {Journal of Legal Studies},
  volume = {14},
  pages = {259},
  publisher = {{HeinOnline}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{hoffmanPromptingStrategicReasoning2008,
  ids = {Hoffman2008,Hoffman2008b},
  title = {Prompting {{Strategic Reasoning Increases Other-regarding Behavior}}},
  author = {Hoffman, E and McCabe, K and Smith, V},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Handbook of Experimental Economics Results},
  volume = {1},
  pages = {423--428},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00048-0}
}

@article{hoffmanSocialDistanceOtherRegarding1996,
  ids = {Hoffman1996,Hoffman1996a},
  title = {Social {{Distance}} and {{Other-Regarding Behavior}} in {{Dictator Games}}},
  author = {Hoffman, E and McCabe, K and Smith, V L},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
  volume = {86},
  pages = {653--660},
  publisher = {{AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION}},
  abstract = {fd},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,altruism,behavioral,dictator games,experiments,philanthropy,social distance,social giving}
}

@article{hofmanSocialSystems2017,
  ids = {Hofman2017},
  title = {In {{Social Systems}}},
  author = {Hofman, Jake M and Sharma, Amit and Watts, Duncan J},
  year = {2017},
  volume = {488},
  number = {February},
  pages = {486--488}
}

@article{hollenbeckEmpiricalExaminationAntecedents1989,
  ids = {Hollenbeck1989,Hollenbeck1989a},
  title = {An Empirical Examination of the Antecedents of Commitment to Difficult Goals.},
  author = {Hollenbeck, John R and Williams, Charles R and Klein, Howard J},
  year = {1989},
  journal = {Journal of Applied Psychology},
  volume = {74},
  number = {1},
  pages = {18},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  doi = {10.1037/0021-9010.74.1.18},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{holmesEffectsThirddegreePrice1989,
  ids = {Holmes1989,Holmes1989a},
  title = {The Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly},
  author = {Holmes, Thomas J},
  year = {1989},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {79},
  number = {1},
  pages = {244--250},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{holtForthcomingTheoreticalExplanations2008,
  ids = {Holt2008,Holt2008a},
  title = {Forthcoming. {{Theoretical}} Explanations of Treatment Effects in Voluntary Contributions Experiments. {{C}}. {{Plott}}, {{V}}. {{Smith}}, Eds},
  author = {Holt, C A and Laury, S K},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Handbook of Experimental Economic Results},
  doi = {10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00090-X}
}

@article{honoreEstimationCrossSectional2004,
  ids = {Honore2004,Honore2004a},
  title = {Estimation of {{Cross Sectional}} and {{Panel Data Censored Regression Models}} with {{Endogeneity}}},
  author = {Honore, B E and Hu, L},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {J. Econometrics},
  volume = {122},
  pages = {293--316},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jeconom.2003.06.001},
  keywords = {[philanthropy],censoring,corner solutions,econometrics,endogeneity,iv,methods,panel data,semiparametric methods}
}

@article{honorePairwiseDifferenceEstimators1994,
  ids = {Honore1994,Honore1994a},
  title = {Pairwise {{Difference Estimators}} of {{Censored}} and {{Truncated Regression Models}}},
  author = {Honore, B E and Powell, J L},
  year = {1994},
  journal = {Journal of Econometrics},
  volume = {64},
  number = {2},
  pages = {241--278},
  doi = {10.1016/0304-4076(94)90065-5},
  keywords = {[philanthropy],censoring,corner solutions,econometrics,methods,panel data,semiparametric methods,truncation}
}

@article{honoreTrimmedLadLeast1992,
  ids = {Honore1992,Honore1992a},
  title = {Trimmed {{Lad}} and {{Least Squares Estimation}} of {{Truncated}} and {{Censored Regression Models}} with {{Fixed Effects}}},
  author = {Honore, Bo E},
  year = {1992},
  month = may,
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {60},
  number = {3},
  pages = {533--565},
  publisher = {{The Econometric Society}},
  issn = {0012-9682},
  doi = {10.2307/2951583},
  abstract = {This paper considers estimation of truncated and censored regression models with fixed effects in panel data. Up until now, no estimator has been shown to be consistent as the cross section dimension increases with the time dimension fixed. Trimmed least absolute deviations (LAD) and trimmed least squares estimators are proposed for the case where the panel is of length two, and it is proven that they are consistent and asymptotically normal under suitable regularity conditions. It is not necessary to maintain parametric assumptions on the error terms to obtain this result. Because three of the four estimators are defined as minimizers of nondifferentiable functions, traditional methods cannot be used to establish asymptotic normality. Instead, the approach of Pakes and Pollard (1989) is used. A small scale Monte Carlo study demonstrates that these estimators can perform well in small samples. Despite their nonlinear nature, the estimators are easy to calculate in practice, as are consistent estimators of their asymptotic variances. Generalization of the estimators to panels of arbitrary length is briefly discussed.},
  keywords = {[philanthropy],censoring,corner solutions,econometrics,endogeneity,fixed effects,methods,panel data,Panel data,semiparametric methods,truncated and censored regression}
}

@techreport{hoxbyMissingOneOffsHidden2012,
  ids = {Hoxby2012,Hoxby2012a},
  title = {The {{Missing}}" {{One-Offs}}": {{The Hidden Supply}} of {{High-Achieving}}, {{Low Income Students}}},
  author = {Hoxby, Caroline M and Avery, Christopher},
  year = {2012},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  abstract = {We show that the vast majority of very high-achieving students who are low-income do not apply to any selective college or university. This is despite the fact that selective institutions would often cost them less, owing to generous financial aid, than the resource-poor two-year and non-selective four-year institutions to which they actually apply. Moreover, high-achieving, low-income students who do apply to selective institutions are admitted and graduate at high rates. We demonstrate that these low-income students' application behavior differs greatly from that of their high-income counterparts who have similar achievement. The latter group generally follows the advice to apply to a few "par" colleges, a few "reach" colleges, and a couple of "safety" schools. We separate the low-income, high-achieving students into those whose application behavior is similar to that of their high-income counterparts ("achievement-typical" behavior) and those whose apply to no selective institutions ("income-typical" behavior). We show that income-typical students do not come from families or neighborhoods that are more disadvantaged than those of achievement-typical students. However, in contrast to the achievement-typical students, the income-typical students come from districts too small to support selective public high schools, are not in a critical mass of fellow high achievers, and are unlikely to encounter a teacher or schoolmate from an older cohort who attended a selective college. We demonstrate that widely-used policies-college admissions staff recruiting, college campus visits, college access programs-are likely to be ineffective with income-typical students, and we suggest policies that will be effective must depend less on geographic concentration of high achievers.},
  keywords = {education,inequality,nleduc,poli}
}

@article{hseeUnitAskingMethod2013,
  ids = {Hsee2013},
  title = {Unit {{Asking}} : {{A Method}} to {{Boost Donations}} and {{Beyond}}},
  author = {Hsee, Christopher K and Zhang, Jiao and Lu, Zoe Y and Xu, Fei},
  year = {2013},
  doi = {10.1177/0956797613482947},
  keywords = {11,12,13,4,considerable time,decision making,judgment,raising charitable donations requires,received 12,revision accepted 2}
}

@article{huberAddingAsymmetricallyDominated1982,
  ids = {Huber1982,Huber1982a},
  title = {Adding Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives: {{Violations}} of Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis},
  author = {Huber, J and Payne, J W and Puto, C},
  year = {1982},
  journal = {Journal of Consumer Research},
  volume = {9},
  number = {1},
  pages = {90},
  publisher = {{UChicago Press}},
  doi = {10.1086/208899}
}

@article{huckMatchedFundraisingEvidence2011,
  ids = {Huck2011,Huck2011a},
  title = {Matched Fundraising: {{Evidence}} from a Natural Field Experiment},
  author = {Huck, Steffen and Rasul, Imran},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {95},
  number = {5},
  pages = {351--362},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.10.005}
}

@article{hugh-jonesAnonymitySignalingContributions2009,
  ids = {Hugh-Jones2009,Hugh-Jones2009a},
  title = {Anonymity, {{Signaling}}, {{Contributions}} and {{Ritual}}},
  author = {{Hugh-Jones}, David and Reinstein, David},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Unpublished. See http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/{$\sim$}drein/ for a preliminary version.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{hugh-jonesExcludeBadActors2014,
  ids = {Hugh-Jones2013,Hugh-Jones2014,Hugh-Jones2014b},
  title = {Exclude the Bad Actors or Learn about the Groups},
  author = {{Hugh-Jones}, D and Reinstein, D},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Mimeo. See davidreinstein.wordpress.com/},
  publisher = {{University of Essex, Department of Economics}},
  keywords = {[experiments],⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{hugh-jonesSecretSantaAnonymity,
  ids = {Hugh-Jone,Hugh-Jonesa},
  title = {Secret {{Santa}}: {{Anonymity}}, {{Signaling}}, and {{Conditional Cooperation}}},
  author = {{Hugh-Jones}, D and Reinstein, D},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{hughesSimulatingPowerParamtest2017,
  ids = {Hughes2017},
  title = {Simulating {{Power}} with the Paramtest {{Package}}},
  author = {Hughes, Jeffrey},
  year = {2017},
  pages = {1--8}
}

@article{hungermanAreChurchState2005,
  ids = {Hungerman2005,Hungerman2005a},
  title = {Are {{Church}} and {{State Substitutes}}? {{Evidence}} from the 1996 {{Welfare Reform}}},
  author = {Hungerman, D},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {89},
  pages = {2245--2267},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.12.009}
}

@techreport{hungermanWhatPriceElasticity2016,
  ids = {hungerman2016price},
  title = {What Is the {{Price Elasticity}} of {{Charitable Giving}}? {{Toward}} a {{Reconciliation}} of {{Disparate Estimates}}},
  author = {Hungerman, Daniel M and {Ottoni-Wilhelm}, Mark},
  year = {2016},
  institution = {{mimeo, Lilly Family School of Philanthropy}}
}

@article{ichinoHowOftenShould2008,
  ids = {Ichino2008,Ichino2008a},
  title = {How Often Should You Open the Door?: {{Optimal}} Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents},
  author = {Ichino, Andrea and Muehlheusser, Gerd},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  volume = {67},
  number = {3},
  pages = {820--831},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2008.02.004}
}

@article{ikedaThirddegreePriceDiscrimination2009,
  ids = {Ikeda2009,Ikeda2009a,Ikeda2010,Ikeda2010b},
  title = {Third-Degree Price Discrimination, Quality Choice, and Welfare},
  author = {Ikeda, T and Toshimitsu, T},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,poorcard}
}

@article{ioannidesJobInformationNetworks,
  ids = {Ioannide,Ioannidesa},
  title = {Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality},
  author = {Ioannides, Y M and Loury, L D},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{iriberriRoleRoleUncertainty2011,
  ids = {Iriberri2011,Iriberri2011a},
  title = {The Role of Role Uncertainty in Modified Dictator Games},
  author = {Iriberri, Nagore and {Rey-Biel}, Pedro},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {14},
  number = {2},
  pages = {160--180},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10683-010-9261-5}
}

@article{isaacr.m.DivergentEvidenceFree1984,
  ids = {IsaacR.M.1984,IsaacR.M.1984a},
  title = {Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: {{An}} Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations.},
  author = {Isaac R. M., J Walker and Thomas, S},
  year = {1984},
  journal = {Public Choice},
  volume = {43(1)},
  pages = {113--149},
  doi = {10.1007/BF00140829},
  keywords = {experience.,experimental,free-riding,public goods,Public goods,vcm,VCM}
}

@article{isenEffectPhotographsHandicapped1979,
  ids = {isen1979effect},
  title = {The Effect of Photographs of the Handicapped on Donation to Charity: {{When}} a Thousand Words May Be Too Much},
  author = {Isen, Alice M and Noonberg, Aaron},
  year = {1979},
  journal = {Journal of Applied Social Psychology},
  volume = {9},
  number = {5},
  pages = {426--431},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1559-1816.1979.tb02716.x}
}

@article{jackLocalLeadershipVoluntary2012,
  ids = {Jack2012,Jack2012a},
  title = {Local Leadership and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: {{Field}} Evidence from {{Bolivia}}},
  author = {Jack, B Kelsey and Recalde, Maria P},
  year = {2012},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{jainWorldwideReachShort2013,
  ids = {jain2013worldwide},
  title = {Worldwide Reach of Short Selling Regulations},
  author = {Jain, Archana and Jain, Pankaj K and McInish, Thomas H and McKenzie, Michael},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Journal of Financial Economics},
  volume = {109},
  number = {1},
  pages = {177--197},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.012}
}

@article{jamisonDeceiveNotDeceive2008,
  ids = {Jamison2008,Jamison2008a},
  title = {To Deceive or Not to Deceive: {{The}} Effect of Deception on Behavior in Future Laboratory Experiments},
  author = {Jamison, Julian and Karlan, Dean and Schechter, Laura},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  volume = {68},
  number = {3},
  pages = {477--488},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.002},
  keywords = {Cross-experiment}
}

@article{jeitschkoYouWantFries2006,
  ids = {Jeitschko2006,Jeitschko2006a},
  title = {Do {{You Want Fries}} with {{That}}? {{An Exploration}} of {{Serving Size}}, {{Social Welfare}}, and {{Our Waistlines}}},
  author = {Jeitschko, T D and Pecchenino, R A},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Economic Inquiry},
  volume = {44},
  number = {3},
  pages = {442},
  publisher = {{WEAI}},
  doi = {10.1093/ei/cbj036},
  abstract = {Given increasing obesity rates, fingers are often pointed at "big food" and their marketing practices. Restaurant meals are indeed larger than home-cooked meals, and portion sizes have increased. We consider constrained "socially optimal"\textendash rather than decentralized profit-maximizing\textendash portions to see whether welfare maximizing strategies may also be waistline-increasing. We demonstrate that socially optimal restaurant meals are larger than average home-cooked meals, yet the choice to "super-size" alleviates the size discrepancy. Moreover, portion sizes at home and in restaurants increase with relative reductions in the marginal costs and/or relative increases in the fixed costs of meal preparation. (JEL I10, D11) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.},
  keywords = {empirical,obesity}
}

@article{jenniExplainingIdentifiableVictim1997,
  ids = {Jenni1997,Jenni1997a},
  title = {Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect},
  author = {Jenni, Karen and Loewenstein, George},
  year = {1997},
  journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty},
  volume = {14},
  number = {3},
  pages = {235--257},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1023/A:1007740225484},
  abstract = {It is widely believed that people are willing to expend greater resources to save the lives of identified victims than to save equal numbers of unidentified or statistical victims. There are many possible causes of this disparity which have not been enumerated previously or tested empirically. We discuss four possible causes of the ``identifiable victim effect'' and present the results of two studies which indicate that the most important cause of the disparity in treatment of identifiable and statistical lives is that, for identifiable victims, a high proportion of those at risk can be saved},
  keywords = {impact,philanthropy,psychological}
}

@article{jewitt2006,
  ids = {Jewitt2006,Jewitt2006b,Jewitt2006c,Jewitt2006e},
  title = {I n v i t a t i o n},
  author = {Jewitt, Ian},
  year = {2006},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{jewittOrderingAmbiguousActs2006,
  ids = {Jewitt2006a,Jewitt2006d},
  title = {Ordering {{Ambiguous Acts}}},
  author = {Jewitt, Ian and Mukerji, Sujoy},
  year = {2006},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,ambiguity,theory}
}

@article{jingpingFourEssaysEconomics2013,
  ids = {Jingping2013,Jingping2013a},
  title = {Four {{Essays}} on the {{Economics}} of {{Pro-Social Behaviors}}},
  author = {Jingping, L I},
  year = {2013},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{johnFieldExperimentsRandomized2014,
  ids = {John2014,John2014a},
  title = {Field Experiments and Randomized Controlled Trials Course {{A PRIL}} / {{M AY}}},
  author = {John, Peter},
  year = {2014},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{johnMeasuringPrevalenceQuestionable2012,
  ids = {john2012measuring},
  title = {Measuring the Prevalence of Questionable Research Practices with Incentives for Truth Telling},
  author = {John, Leslie K and Loewenstein, George and Prelec, Drazen},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Psychological science},
  volume = {23},
  number = {5},
  pages = {524--532},
  publisher = {{Sage Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA}},
  doi = {10.1177/0956797611430953}
}

@book{johnsonBitcoinBubbleNew,
  title = {Beyond the {{Bitcoin Bubble}} - {{The New York Times}}},
  author = {Johnson, Stephen; The New York Times},
  abstract = {The true purpose of bitcoin could be to reboot the internet. Right now the cryptocurrency and its cousins, like ethereum, are the province of wild speculation and vast, sudden accumulations of wealth. But as Steven Johnson writes for the New York Times, the underlying blockchain technology could become the new foundation of a secure, decentralized computer network\textemdash one where closed services from Facebook, Google, and Amazon exist in a radically different, more accountable form. Or, if those companies miss the boat, perhaps they won't exist at all.},
  keywords = {Stephen Johnson,The New York Times},
  note = {You can think of my Ethereum address as having elements of a bank account, an email address and a Social Security number. For now, it exists only on my computer as an inert string of nonsense, but the second I try to perform any kind of transaction \textemdash{} say, contributing to a crowdfunding campaign or voting in an online referendum \textemdash{} that address is broadcast out to an improvised worldwide network of computers that tries to verify the transaction. The results of that verification are then broadcast to the wider network again, where more machines enter into a kind of competition to perform complex mathematical calculations, the winner of which gets to record that transaction in the single, canonical record of every transaction ever made in the history of Ethereum. Because those transactions are registered in a sequence of ``blocks'' of data, that record is called the blockchain. The whole exchange takes no more than a few minutes to complete. From my perspective, the experience barely differs from the usual routines of online life. But on a technical level, something miraculous is happening \textemdash{} something that would have been unimaginable just a decade ago. I've managed to complete a secure transaction without any of the traditional institutions that we rely on to establish trust. No intermediary brokered the deal; no social-media network captured the data from my transaction to better target its advertising; no credit bureau tracked the activity to build a portrait of my financial trustworthiness. the potential power of this would-be revolution is being actively undercut by the crowd it is attracting, a veritable goon squad of charlatans, false prophets and mercenaries.}
}

@article{jonssonDiplomacyConflictResolution2008,
  ids = {Jonsson2008,Jonsson2008a,Jonsson2008b,Jonsson2008c,jonssonDiplomacyConflictResolution2008a},
  title = {Diplomacy and {{Conflict Resolution}}},
  author = {Jonsson, C and Aggestam, K},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution},
  pages = {33},
  publisher = {{Sage Publications Ltd}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,losing face}
}

@article{journalDeputyPMCriticizes2011,
  ids = {Journal2011,Journal2011a},
  title = {Deputy {{PM}} Criticizes Copper Tax},
  author = {Journal, Warsaw Business},
  year = {2011},
  month = dec,
  journal = {http://www.wbj.pl/article-57461-deputy-pm-criticizes-copper-tax.html, accessed on 1 Jan. 2014},
  volume = {30th Decem},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{jrDataInvestigatingVariation2014,
  ids = {Jr2014},
  title = {Data from {{Investigating Variation}} in {{Replicability}} : {{A}} `` {{Many Labs}} '' {{Replication Project}}},
  author = {Jr, Adams and Klein, Richard A and Ratliff, Kate A and Vianello, Michelangelo and Jr, Reginald B Adams},
  year = {2014},
  doi = {10.5334/jopd.ad},
  keywords = {context,generalizability,replication}
}

@article{kagelDynamicsReorganizationMatching2000,
  ids = {Kagel2000,Kagel2000a},
  title = {The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: {{A}} Laboratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Experiment},
  author = {Kagel, J H and Roth, A E},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {115},
  number = {1},
  pages = {201--235},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
  doi = {10.1162/003355300554719},
  abstract = {We create an environment in which congestion forces agents to match inefficiently early. We then introduce one of two centralized clearinghouse mechanisms. One of these has been successfully used to halt this kind of unraveling in a number of labor markets, while the other has failed. When it is costly for firms and workers to be mismatched compared with the costs of matching early, the experimental observations reproduce the field observations. Furthermore, the experiment permits us to observe the transition between a decentralized and a centralized market, both when the centralized market fails to control unraveling and when it succeeds, at a level of detail unavailable in field data.}
}

@article{kahnemanAnomaliesEndowmentEffect1991,
  ids = {Kahneman1991,Kahneman1991a},
  title = {Anomalies: {{The}} Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias},
  author = {Kahneman, D and Knetsch, J L and Thaler, R H},
  year = {1991},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  volume = {5},
  number = {1},
  pages = {193--206},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.5.1.193}
}

@article{kahnemanProspectTheoryAnalysis1979,
  ids = {Kahneman1979,Kahneman1979a},
  title = {Prospect {{Theory}}: {{An Analysis}} of {{Decision}} under {{Risk}}},
  author = {Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos},
  year = {1979},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {47},
  number = {2},
  pages = {263--291},
  publisher = {{The Econometric Society}},
  issn = {00129682},
  doi = {10.2307/1914185},
  abstract = {This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low probabilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling. CR - Copyright \&\#169; 1979 The Econometric Society},
  isbn = {0012-9682},
  pmid = {1914185}
}

@article{kamenicaGENDERDIFFERENCESMATE2006,
  ids = {Kamenica2006,Kamenica2006a},
  title = {{{GENDER DIFFERENCES IN MATE SELECTION}}: {{EVIDENCE FROM A SPEED DATING EXPERIMENT}}* {{Raymond Fisman Sheena S}}. {{Iyengar}}},
  author = {Kamenica, E and Simonson, I},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Technology},
  volume = {673},
  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{kaneLabormarketReturnsTwoand1995,
  ids = {Kane1995,Kane1995a},
  title = {Labor-Market Returns to Two-and Four-Year College},
  author = {Kane, Thomas J and Rouse, Cecilia Elena},
  year = {1995},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {85},
  number = {3},
  pages = {600--614},
  publisher = {{Princeton, NJ: American Economic Association, 1911-}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{kaplowMoralRulesMoral2007,
  ids = {Kaplow2007,Kaplow2007a},
  title = {Moral Rules, the Moral Sentiments, and Behavior: {{Toward}} a Theory of an Optimal Moral System},
  author = {Kaplow, L and Shavell, S},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {115},
  number = {3},
  publisher = {{UChicago Press}},
  doi = {10.1086/519927}
}

@article{karlanDoesPriceMatter2007,
  ids = {Karlan2007,Karlan2007a},
  title = {Does {{Price Matter}} in {{Charitable Giving}}? {{Evidence}} from a {{Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment}}},
  author = {Karlan, D and List, J A},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {97},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1774--1793},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association Publications}},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.97.5.1774},
  keywords = {classic,empirical,field experiments,philanthropy,political,price of giving,social giving}
}

@article{karlanEffectEffectivenessDonor2017a,
  ids = {Karlan2017,Karlan2017a,karlan2017effect,karlanEffectEffectivenessDonor2017,karlanEffectEffectivenessDonor2017b},
  title = {The Effect of Effectiveness: {{Donor}} Response to Aid Effectiveness in a Direct Mail Fundraising Experiment},
  author = {Karlan, Dean and Wood, Daniel H.},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics},
  volume = {66},
  eprint = {1011.1669v3},
  eprinttype = {arxiv},
  pages = {1--8},
  publisher = {{Elsevier Inc.}},
  issn = {22148051},
  doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2016.05.005},
  abstract = {We test how donors respond to new information about a charity's effectiveness. Freedom from Hunger implemented a test of its direct marketing solicitations, varying letters by whether they include a discussion of their program's impact as measured by scientific research. The base script, used for both treatment and control, included a standard qualitative story about an individual beneficiary. Adding scientific impact information has no effect on average likelihood of giving or average gift amount. However, we find important heterogeneity: large prior donors both are more likely to give and also give more, whereas small prior donors are less likely to give. This pattern is consistent with two different types of donors: warm glow donors who respond negatively to analytical effectiveness information, and altruism donors who respond positively to such information.},
  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
  arxivid = {arXiv:1011.1669v3},
  isbn = {9788578110796},
  mendeley-groups = {giving-keywords},
  pmid = {25246403},
  keywords = {Aid effectiveness,Charitable fundraising,Pure altruism,Warm glow}
}

@techreport{karlanGettingTopMind2010,
  ids = {Karlan2010,Karlan2010a},
  title = {Getting to the Top of Mind: {{How}} Reminders Increase Saving},
  author = {Karlan, Dean and McConnell, Margaret and Mullainathan, Sendhil and Zinman, Jonathan},
  year = {2010},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  abstract = {We develop and test a simple model of limited attention in intertemporal choice. The model posits that individuals fully attend to consumption in all periods but fail to attend to some future lumpy expenditure opportunities. This asymmetry generates some predictions that overlap with models of present-bias. Our model also generates the unique predictions that reminders may increase saving, and that reminders will be more effective when they increase the salience of a specific expenditure. We find support for these predictions in three field experiments that randomly assign reminders to new savings account holders.},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@techreport{karlanHowCanBill2012,
  ids = {Karlan2012,Karlan2012b},
  title = {How {{Can Bill}} and {{Melinda Gates Increase Other People}}'s {{Donations}} to {{Fund Public Goods}}?},
  author = {Karlan, Dean and List, John A},
  year = {2012},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{karlanNoTitle2015,
  ids = {Karlan2015,Wood2014,Wood2014a},
  title = {No {{Title}}},
  author = {Karlan, Dean and Wood, Daniel H},
  year = {2015},
  pages = {1--25},
  keywords = {aid effectiveness,Aid effectiveness,charitable fundraising,Charitable fundraising,d64,D64,h41,H41,jel codes,l31,o12,pure altruism,Pure altruism,warm glow,Warm glow}
}

@article{karlanUsingExperimentalEconomics2005,
  ids = {Karlan2005,Karlan2005a},
  title = {Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions},
  author = {Karlan, D S},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {95},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1688--1699},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association Publications}},
  doi = {10.1257/000282805775014407}
}

@article{karlssonOstrichEffectSelective2009,
  ids = {Karlsson2009,Karlsson2009a},
  title = {The Ostrich Effect: {{Selective}} Attention to Information},
  author = {Karlsson, Niklas and Loewenstein, George and Seppi, Duane},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty},
  volume = {38},
  number = {2},
  pages = {95--115},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s11166-009-9060-6},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{kasyDynamicExperimentalDesign2018,
  ids = {Kasy2018},
  title = {Dynamic Experimental Design for Policy Choice},
  author = {Kasy, Maximilian},
  year = {2018},
  pages = {1--8}
}

@article{kasyPitchDynamicExperiments,
  ids = {Kasy},
  title = {Pitch for `` {{Dynamic}} Experiments for Policy Choice ''},
  author = {Kasy, Maximilian},
  pages = {1--4}
}

@article{kasyWhyExperimentersMight2016,
  ids = {Kasy2015,Kasy2016b,kasyWhyExperimentersMight2015},
  title = {Why Experimenters Might Not Always Want to Randomize, and What They Could Do Instead},
  author = {Kasy, Maximilian},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Political Analysis},
  volume = {24},
  number = {3},
  pages = {324--338},
  issn = {14764989},
  doi = {10.1093/pan/mpw012},
  abstract = {Suppose that an experimenter has collected a sample as well as baseline information about the units in the sample. How should she allocate treatments to the units in this sample? We argue that the answer does not involve randomization if we think of experimental design as a statistical decision problem. If, for instance, the experimenter is interested in estimating the average treatment effect and evaluates an estimate in terms of the squared error, then she should minimize the expected mean squared error (MSE) through choice of a treatment assignment. We provide explicit expressions for the expected MSE that lead to easily implementable procedures for experimental design.},
  keywords = {decision theory,experimental design,Experimental design,field,nonparametric bayesian methods}
}

@techreport{katariaHonestlyWhyAre2012,
  ids = {Kataria2012,Kataria2012a},
  title = {Honestly, Why Are You Donating Money to Charity? {{An}} Experimental Study about Self-Awareness in Status-Seeking Behavior},
  author = {Kataria, Mitesh and Regner, Tobias},
  year = {2012},
  institution = {{Jena Economic Research Papers}},
  keywords = {philanthropy,real effort,social giving}
}

@article{katzevApplyingSocialPsychology1995,
  ids = {Katzev1995,Katzev1995a},
  title = {Applying {{Social Psychology}} to {{Charitable Donations}}: {{Three Experiments}} on {{Nonprofit Fundraising}}},
  author = {Katzev, R D},
  year = {1995},
  publisher = {{Technical Report, The Aspen Institute}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,experiments,field experiments,fundraising,literature survey,mail solicitations,nonprofts,philanthropy,psychology}
}

@article{kauManagersListenMarket2008,
  ids = {Kau2008,Kau2008a},
  title = {Do Managers Listen to the Market?},
  author = {Kau, James B and Linck, James S and Rubin, Paul H},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Journal of Corporate Finance},
  volume = {14},
  number = {4},
  pages = {347--362},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.002}
}

@article{keatingUnitedWayContributions1981,
  ids = {Keating1981,Keating1981a},
  title = {United {{Way Contributions}}: {{Coercion}}, {{Charity}} or {{Economic Self-Interest}}?},
  author = {Keating, Barry and Pitts, Robert and Appel, David},
  year = {1981},
  month = jan,
  journal = {Southern Economic Journal},
  volume = {47},
  number = {3},
  pages = {816--823},
  publisher = {{Southern Economic Association}},
  issn = {0038-4038},
  doi = {10.2307/1057377},
  keywords = {philanthropy,reputation,social giving}
}

@article{keckDoesCompetitionFoster2012,
  ids = {Keck2012,Keck2012a},
  title = {Does Competition Foster Trust? {{The}} Role of Tournament Incentives},
  author = {Keck, Steffen and Karelaia, Natalia},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {15},
  number = {1},
  pages = {204--228},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10683-011-9297-1},
  abstract = {Members of organizations are often called upon to trust others and to reciprocate trust while at the same time competing for bonuses or promotions. We suggest that competition affects trust not only within dyads including direct competitors, but also between individuals who do not compete against each other. We test this idea in a trust game where trustors and trustees are rewarded based either on their absolute performance or on how well they do relative to players from other dyads. In Experiment 1, we show that competition among trustors significantly increases trust. Competition among trustees decreases trustworthiness, but trustors do not anticipate this effect. In Experiment 2, we additionally show that the increase in trust under competition is caused by a combination of increased risk taking and lower sensitivity to non-financial concerns specific to trust interactions. Our results suggest that tournament incentives might have a ``blinding effect'' on considerations such as betrayal and inequality aversion.}
}

@book{kelleherFundamentalsMachineLearning2015,
  title = {Fundamentals of Machine Learning for Predictive Data Analytics: Algorithms, Worked Examples, and Case Studies},
  shorttitle = {Fundamentals of Machine Learning for Predictive Data Analytics},
  author = {Kelleher, John D. and Mac Namee, Brian and D'Arcy, Aoife},
  year = {2015},
  publisher = {{The MIT Press}},
  address = {{Cambridge, Massachusetts}},
  isbn = {978-0-262-02944-5},
  langid = {english},
  lccn = {Q325.5 .K455 2015},
  keywords = {Data mining,Machine learning,Prediction theory}
}

@article{kesslerGettingRichPowerful2019,
  ids = {Kessler2019},
  title = {Getting the Rich and Powerful to Give},
  author = {Kessler, Judd B. and Milkman, Katherine L. and Yiwei Zhang, C.},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Management Science},
  volume = {65},
  number = {9},
  issn = {15265501},
  doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2018.3142},
  abstract = {What motivates the rich and powerful to exhibit generosity? We explore this important question in a large field experiment. We solicit donations from 32,174 alumni of an Ivy League university, including thousands of rich and powerful alumni. Consistent with past psychology research, we find that the rich and powerful respond dramatically, and differently than others, to being given a sense of agency over the use of donated funds. Gifts from rich and powerful alumni increase by 100\%\textendash 350\% when they are given a sense of agency. This response arises primarily on the intensive margin with no effect on the likelihood of donating. Results suggest that motivating the rich and powerful to act may require tailored interventions.}
}

@article{kesslerIdentityCharitableGiving2018,
  ids = {Kessler2018},
  title = {Identity in Charitable Giving},
  author = {Kessler, Judd B. and Milkman, Katherine L.},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Management Science},
  volume = {64},
  number = {2},
  issn = {15265501},
  doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2016.2582},
  abstract = {How does priming identity affect charitable giving? We show that individuals are more likely to donate when a facet of their identity associated with a norm of generosity is primed in an appeal. In large charitable giving field experiments run by the American Red Cross, appeals that prime an individual's identity as a previous donor to the charity or as a member of a local community generate more donations. The primes are more effective when they highlight a facet of the potential donor's identity that we hypothesize to be more relevant to his sense of self: priming identity as a previous donor is more effective for more regular donors and priming identity as a local community member is more effective for people in smaller communities. Together, these results elucidate the impact of identity on behavior and demonstrate how identity primes can be implemented in practice to encourage public good provision. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.}
}

@techreport{kesslerSignalsSupportPublic2011,
  ids = {Kessler2011,Kessler2011a},
  title = {Signals of Support and Public Good Provision},
  author = {Kessler, Judd},
  year = {2011},
  institution = {{Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania}}
}

@article{ketelReturnsMedicalSchool2013,
  ids = {Ketel2013,Ketel2013a},
  title = {The Returns to Medical School in a Regulated Labor Market: {{Evidence}} from Admission Lotteries},
  author = {Ketel, Nadine and Leuven, Edwin and Oosterbeek, Hessel and {van der Klaauw}, Bas},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Mimeo, Latest version: March 2013.},
  publisher = {{Universiteit van Amsterdam}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,labor,lotteries,medicine,nleduc}
}

@article{khannaCharityDonationsUK1995,
  ids = {Khanna1995,Khanna1995a,Khanna1995b,Khanna1995c,khannaCharityDonationsUK1995a,khannaCharityDonationsUK1995b},
  title = {Charity Donations in the {{UK}}: {{New}} Evidence Based on Panel Data},
  author = {Khanna, J and Posnett, J and Sandler, T},
  year = {1995},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {56},
  number = {2},
  pages = {257--272},
  publisher = {{Elsevier Science}},
  doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(94)01421-J},
  isbn = {00472727},
  keywords = {empirical,H41,l31,L31,Non-profit sector,panel data,Panel data,Panel data JEL classification,philanthropy,Public goods}
}

@article{kiddTournamentOutcomesProsocial2013,
  ids = {Kidd2013,Kidd2013a},
  title = {Tournament Outcomes and Prosocial Behaviour},
  author = {Kidd, Michael and Nicholas, Aaron and Rai, Birendra},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Journal of economic psychology},
  volume = {39},
  pages = {387--401},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2013.05.011}
}

@article{kimjooyupConceptDynamicsFace1998,
  ids = {KimJooYup1998,KimJooYup1998a},
  title = {The {{Concept}} and {{Dynamics}} of {{Face}}: {{Implications}} for {{Organizational Behavior}} in {{Asia}}},
  author = {{Kim Joo Yup} and {Nam Sang Hoon}},
  year = {1998},
  month = jul,
  journal = {Organization Science},
  volume = {9},
  number = {4},
  pages = {522--534},
  publisher = {{INFORMS}},
  issn = {1047-7039},
  abstract = {Research on cross-cultural psychology, sociology, and anthropology suggests that the influence of face on social interactions is both pervasive and powerful in Asia. Face, however, has not gained general acceptance as an important theoretical concept in the literature on Asian organizational behavior and management. In this paper, we propose face as a key variable that can explain much of the complexity of social interactions in Asian organizations. We attempted to elaborate on the concept and dynamics of face in Asia in such a way as to capture its pervasive, significant but often subtle influences on organizational behavior. We also examined conditions, functions, and consequences of face dynamics to generate testable propositions for future research. We argue that scholars have to go beyond the individualistic assumptions about human behavior implicit in theories of organizational behavior in the West to better understand the richness of organizational behavior in Asia. In Asia, organizational behavior is better predicted by an individual's external attributes such as face than internal attributes such as desires, emotions, and cognition.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,business,Cross-Cultural Management,Face,lof,Self,Shame,sociology}
}

@article{kimmelRandomizedTrialLotterybased2012,
  ids = {Kimmel2012,Kimmel2012a},
  title = {Randomized Trial of Lottery-Based Incentives to Improve Warfarin Adherence},
  author = {Kimmel, Stephen E and Troxel, Andrea B and Loewenstein, George and Brensinger, Colleen M and Jaskowiak, Jane and Doshi, Jalpa A and Laskin, Mitchell and Volpp, Kevin},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {American heart journal},
  volume = {164},
  number = {2},
  pages = {268--274},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ahj.2012.05.005}
}

@article{kinsbergenExplainingMonetaryDonations2013,
  ids = {kinsbergen2013explaining},
  title = {Explaining Monetary Donations to International Development Organisations: {{A}} Factorial Survey Approach},
  author = {Kinsbergen, Sara and Tolsma, Jochem},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Social science research},
  volume = {42},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1571--1586},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ssresearch.2013.06.011}
}

@article{kircherFairnessCritiqueUtilitarian2009,
  ids = {Kircher2009,Kircher2009a},
  title = {Fairness: A Critique to the Utilitarian Approach},
  author = {Kircher, P and Sandroni, A and Ludwig, S},
  year = {2009},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{kleinRoleMarketForces1981,
  ids = {Klein1981,Klein1981a},
  title = {The {{Role}} of {{Market Forces}} in {{Assuring Contractual Performance}}},
  author = {Klein, B and Leffler, K B},
  year = {1981},
  journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {89},
  number = {4},
  pages = {615},
  publisher = {{UChicago Press}},
  doi = {10.1086/260996},
  keywords = {contracts,ft,FT}
}

@article{knackDoesSocialCapital1997,
  ids = {Knack1997,Knack1997a},
  title = {Does {{Social Capital Have An Economic Payoff}}? {{A Cross-Country Investigation}}*},
  author = {Knack, S and Keefer, P},
  year = {1997},
  journal = {Quarterly journal of economics},
  volume = {112},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1251--1288},
  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
  doi = {10.1162/003355300555475}
}

@article{knowlesTransactionCostsOpportunity2015,
  ids = {Knowles2015,Knowles2015a,knowlesTransactionCostsOpportunity2015a},
  title = {Transaction Costs, the Opportunity Cost of Time and Procrastination in Charitable Giving},
  author = {Knowles, Stephen and Serv{\'a}tka, Maro{\v s}},
  year = {2015},
  month = may,
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {125},
  pages = {54--63},
  publisher = {{North-Holland}},
  issn = {0047-2727},
  doi = {10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2015.03.001},
  abstract = {We conduct a laboratory experiment to study whether giving people more time to donate to charity reduces donations. People may intend to donate, but because of the transaction costs of doing so, postpone making the payment until they are less busy, and having postponed making the donation once, keep postponing. We conjecture that transaction costs will have a greater effect on donations if the solicitation is received when the opportunity cost of time is high. We find evidence of a transaction cost reducing donations, with the size of this effect depending on the opportunity cost of time, but no statistically significant evidence that giving people more time to donate increases procrastination and thus reduces donations.},
  isbn = {0047-2727},
  keywords = {Charitable giving,dictator game,Dictator game,Inattention,Opportunity cost of time,Procrastination,Transaction costs}
}

@article{knutssonGenderDifferencesAltruism2019,
  ids = {Knutsson2019},
  title = {Gender Differences in Altruism: {{Evidence}} from a Natural Field Experiment on Matched Donations},
  author = {Knutsson, Mikael and Martinsson, Peter and Persson, Emil and Wollbrant, Conny},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {176},
  issn = {01651765},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.029},
  abstract = {This paper reports new findings on gender differences in altruism. Conducting a natural field experiment (N = 2,164) we study donation behavior in a naturally occurring environment using a matched donation design. Contrary to previous research, we find that reducing the ``price of altruism'' by increasing matching efficiency has a significantly stronger effect on females than on males.}
}

@incollection{kogutHs2011,
  ids = {Kogut2011},
  title = {Hs},
  booktitle = {The {{Science}} of {{Giving}}: {{Experimental Approaches}} to the {{Study}} of {{Charity}}},
  author = {Kogut, Tehila and Ritov, Ilana},
  year = {2011},
  pages = {133--145},
  doi = {10.4324/9780203865972},
  abstract = {Why do people engage in charitable giving? Certainly there are many reasons for this. Social norms, social perceptions, religious convictions, and other considerations may all play a role. However, beyond all those reasons, the wish to help other people, particularly when those people are in need of external help, is the core motivation for charitable giving and helping behavior. Thus, in order to better understand the psychological motivation of charitable giving, it is important to explore the factors that may increase or decrease the fundamental wish to extend help. One of the main factors that affects the wish to aid is the characteristics of the target\textemdash the recipient of the help. Why do some targets elicit outpourings of sympathy and aid, while other targets do not? In this chapter we review experimental and theoretical work on the effect of victims identifiability on charitable giving. We integrate recent findings, concentrating on the psychological processes underlying the effect and its boundary conditions.},
  isbn = {978-0-203-86597-2}
}

@article{kogutIdentifiedVictimEffect2005,
  ids = {kogut2005identified},
  title = {The ``Identified Victim'' Effect: {{An}} Identified Group, or Just a Single Individual?},
  author = {Kogut, Tehila and Ritov, Ilana},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Behavioral Decision Making},
  volume = {18},
  number = {3},
  pages = {157--167},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1002/bdm.492}
}

@book{komterGiftInterdisciplinaryPerspective1996,
  ids = {Komter1996,Komter1996a},
  title = {The {{Gift}}: {{An Interdisciplinary Perspective}}},
  author = {Komter, A E},
  year = {1996},
  publisher = {{Amsterdam University Press}}
}

@article{koszegiEgoUtilityOverconfidence2006a,
  ids = {Koszegi2006,Koszegi2006a,Koszegi2006b,Koszegi2006c,koszegiEgoUtilityOverconfidence2006},
  title = {Ego Utility, Overconfidence, and Task Choice},
  author = {K{\"o}szegi, Botond},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
  volume = {4},
  number = {4},
  pages = {673--707},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1162/JEEA.2006.4.4.673},
  keywords = {behavioral,lof,overconfidence}
}

@article{kowalskiModelRandomizedExperiment,
  ids = {Kowalski},
  title = {A Model of a Randomized Experiment with an Application to the {{PROWESS}} Clinical Trial {{A Model}} of a {{Randomized Experiment}} with an {{Application}} to the {{PROWESS Clinical Trial}} {${_\ast}$}},
  author = {Kowalski, Amanda E and Kowalski, Amanda E},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{kranichGiftEquilibriaPareto1994,
  ids = {Kranich1994,Kranich1994a},
  title = {Gift Equilibria and {{Pareto}} Optimality Reconsidered},
  author = {Kranich, Laurence},
  year = {1994},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  volume = {64},
  number = {1},
  pages = {298--300},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1006/jeth.1994.1070},
  abstract = {Goldman 1978 modeled inefficient gift equilibria, found efficient outcomes were not stable Here, with additional structure, every efficient division of the simplex is stable. Goldman (Gift equilibria and Pareto optimality, J. Econ. Theory18, 1978, 368-370) demonstrated that the Second Welfare Theorem generally fails to hold in economies in which benevolent agents are permitted to make gifts. In this brief note, we point out that for the class of economies considered by Goldman, symmetry and a slight bias in favor of one,\"A{$\leq$}s own consumption restore the Second Welfare Theorem. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D62, D61, D50.}
}

@article{kuhnOwnSocialEffects2008,
  ids = {Kuhn2008,Kuhn2008a},
  title = {The {{Own}} and {{Social Effects}} of an {{Unexpected Income Shock}}: {{Evidence}} from the {{Dutch Postcode Lottery}}},
  author = {Kuhn, P and Kooreman, P and Soetevent, A R and Kapteyn, A},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {NBER working paper},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{laceteraAllMaterialIncentives2010,
  ids = {Lacetera2010,Lacetera2010a},
  title = {Do All Material Incentives for Pro-Social Activities Backfire? {{The}} Response to Cash and Non-Cash Incentives for Blood Donations},
  author = {Lacetera, Nicola and Macis, Mario},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology},
  volume = {31},
  number = {4},
  pages = {738--748},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.007},
  abstract = {A number of experimental studies have documented that financial rewards discourage the performance of altruistic activities because they conflict with intrinsic altruistic motivations. However, it is unclear whether this is evidence of a generalized aversion to rewards or, rather, an aversion to receiving specific material prizes, such as cash. We conducted a randomized-controlled experiment, through a survey administered to 467 blood donors in an Italian town, and found that donors are not reluctant to receive compensation in general; a substantial share of respondents declared that they would stop being donors if given 10 Euros in cash, but we do not find such effects when a voucher of the same nominal value is offered instead. The aversion to direct cash payments is particularly marked among women, but does not emerge among individuals who have only recently become donors. All of our findings are robust to regression analyses. Implications for research and public policy are discussed.},
  keywords = {crowd-out,field experiments,intrinsic Motivations,motivation,nature of payment,philanthropy}
}

@article{laceteraViralAltruismCharitable2016,
  ids = {lacetera2016viral},
  title = {Viral {{Altruism}}? {{Charitable Giving}} and {{Social Contagion}} in {{Online Networks}}.},
  author = {Lacetera, Nicola and Macis, Mario and Mele, Angelo},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Sociological Science},
  volume = {3},
  doi = {10.15195/v3.a11}
}

@article{laceteraWillThereBe2009,
  ids = {Lacetera2009,Lacetera2009a},
  title = {Will There Be {{Blood}}? {{Incentives}} and {{Displacement Effects}} in {{Pro-Social Behavior}}},
  author = {Lacetera, Nicola and Macis, Mario and Slonim, Robert},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{laceteraWillThereBe2012,
  ids = {Lacetera2012,Lacetera2012a},
  title = {Will There Be Blood? {{Incentives}} and Displacement Effects in pro-Social Behavior},
  author = {Lacetera, Nicola and Macis, Mario and Slonim, Robert},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  volume = {4},
  number = {1},
  pages = {186--223},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  doi = {10.1257/pol.4.1.186}
}

@article{laffontMacroeconomicConstraintsEconomic1975,
  ids = {Laffont1975,Laffont1975a},
  title = {Macroeconomic {{Constraints}}, {{Economic Efficiency}} and {{Ethics}}: {{An Introduction}} to {{Kantian Economics}}},
  author = {Laffont, Jean-Jacques},
  year = {1975},
  month = nov,
  journal = {Economica},
  series = {2},
  volume = {42},
  number = {168},
  pages = {430--437},
  publisher = {{The London School of Economics and Political Science}},
  issn = {0013-0427},
  doi = {10.2307/2553800},
  keywords = {altruism,ethics,macro,motivation for giving,philanthropy,philosophy,social giving}
}

@book{laffontTheoryIncentivesPrincipalagent2002,
  ids = {Laffont2002,Laffont2002a},
  title = {The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model},
  author = {Laffont, J J and Martimort, D},
  year = {2002},
  publisher = {{Princeton University Press}}
}

@article{laibsonSelfcontrolSavingRetirement1998,
  title = {Self-Control and Saving for Retirement},
  author = {Laibson, David I and Repetto, Andrea and Tobacman, Jeremy and Hall, Robert E and Gale, William G and Akerlof, George A},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {Brookings papers on economic activity},
  pages = {91--196},
  doi = {10.2307/2534671},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{lalondeEvaluatingEconometricEvaluations1986,
  ids = {LaLonde1986,LaLonde1986a},
  title = {Evaluating the {{Econometric Evaluations}} of {{Training Programs}} with {{Experimental Data}}},
  author = {LaLonde, R},
  year = {1986},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {76},
  number = {4},
  pages = {604--620},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,classic,corner solutions,econometrics,empirical,experimental,labor,literature survey,matching,methods,robust,training programs,treatment effects}
}

@article{langObesityGrowingIssue2005,
  ids = {Lang2005,Lang2005a},
  title = {Obesity: A Growing Issue for {{European}} Policy?},
  author = {Lang, T and Rayner, G},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of European Social Policy},
  volume = {15},
  number = {4},
  pages = {301},
  doi = {10.1177/0958928705057263},
  keywords = {obesity}
}

@article{laportaTrustLargeOrganizations1997,
  ids = {LaPorta1997,LaPorta1997a},
  title = {Trust in Large Organizations},
  author = {La Porta, R and {Lopez-de-Silanes}, F and Shleifer, A and Vishny, R W},
  year = {1997},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {87},
  number = {2},
  pages = {333--338},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{leclairFightingTideAlternative2002,
  ids = {LeClair2002,LeClair2002a},
  title = {Fighting the {{Tide}}: {{Alternative Trade Organizations}} in the {{Era}} of {{Global Free Trade}}},
  author = {LeClair, M S},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {World Development},
  volume = {30},
  number = {6},
  pages = {949--958},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00017-7},
  keywords = {development,ft,FT,trade}
}

@article{leeIdentifiableVictimEffect2016,
  title = {The Identifiable Victim Effect: {{A}} Meta-Analytic Review},
  author = {Lee, Seyoung and Feeley, Thomas Hugh},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Social Influence},
  volume = {11},
  number = {3},
  pages = {199--215},
  doi = {10.1080/15534510.2016.1216891}
}

@article{leeMoreSimilaritiesMore,
  title = {More Similarities or More Differences? {{Comparing}} Public and Nonprofit Managers' Job Motivations},
  author = {Lee, Y and Review, VM Wilkins - Public Administration and 2011, undefined},
  journal = {Wiley Online Library},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{leeProposeRoseSignaling2015,
  ids = {lee2015propose},
  title = {Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets},
  author = {Lee, Soohyung and Niederle, Muriel},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {18},
  number = {4},
  pages = {731--755},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10683-014-9425-9}
}

@article{leeTrainingWagesSample2018,
  ids = {Lee2018a},
  title = {Training , {{Wages}} , and {{Sample Selection}} : {{Estimating Sharp Bounds}} on {{Treatment Effects}}},
  author = {Lee, David S},
  year = {2018},
  number = {May},
  pages = {1071--1102}
}

@article{leeUSRetirementFinancial2011,
  ids = {LEE2011,LEE2011a},
  title = {{{US}} Retirement Financial Services Advertising's Financial Information Provisions, Communication Strategies and Judgmental Heuristic Cues},
  author = {LEE, TAEJUN DAVID and Haley, Eric and Yun, Tai Woong and Chung, Wonjun},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Journal of Consumer Affairs},
  volume = {45},
  number = {3},
  pages = {391--418},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1745-6606.2011.01210.x},
  abstract = {Retirement savings and investments have been two of the most important financial service vehicles for American consumers' futures in recent years. With this backdrop, policymakers and consumer educators need retirement financial service providers to play the crucial role of helping consumers make economic decisions with regard to retirement plans and ultimately build retirement assets. This research of how retirement financial services advertising attempted to inform, communicate and persuade investors during the past four years (2006-2009) includes two crucial events in the US retirement marketplace,\"A\^ithe Pension Protection Act of 2006 and the 2007/2008 US financial crisis. A content analysis examined the type of information, the communication strategies and the judgmental heuristic cues presented in a total of 1,430 retirement financial service advertisements in six national US business-finance magazines from 2006 to 2009. q},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@inproceedings{lefebvreFacingWorldCrisis2001,
  ids = {Lefebvre2001,Lefebvre2001a},
  title = {Facing a World Crisis},
  booktitle = {{{USENIX LISA}}},
  author = {Lefebvre, Bill and COM, C N N},
  year = {2001},
  volume = {82},
  pages = {89},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{lernerJournalBehavioralDecision,
  ids = {Lerner,Lernera,lernerJournalBehavioralDecisiona},
  title = {Journal of {{Behavioral Decision Making}},},
  author = {Lerner, Jennifer S},
  volume = {3},
  number = {2},
  pages = {140--142},
  keywords = {affect,anger,anger and decision making,decision making,emotions,judgment}
}

@article{levatiLeadingExamplePublic2007,
  ids = {Levati2007,Levati2007a},
  title = {Leading by {{Example}} in a {{Public Goods Experiment}} with {{Heterogeneity}} and {{Incomplete Information}}},
  author = {Levati, M Vittoria and Sutter, Matthias and {van der Heijden}, Eline},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  volume = {51},
  pages = {793--818},
  doi = {10.1177/0022002707302796},
  abstract = {We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a leader increases average contribution levels but less so than in case of homogeneous endowments. Leadership is almost ineffective, though, if participants do not know the distribution of endowments. Granting the leaders exclusion power does not lead to significantly higher contributions.},
  keywords = {[philanthropy],endowments,experimental,fairness,incomplete information,leadership,public goods,Public goods,reputation.,social giving,vcm,VCM}
}

@article{levineModelingAltruismSpitefulness1998,
  ids = {Levine1998,Levine1998a},
  title = {Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments},
  author = {Levine, D K},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {Review of economic dynamics},
  volume = {1},
  number = {3},
  pages = {593--622},
  publisher = {{Elsevier Inc.}},
  doi = {10.1006/redy.1998.0023}
}

@article{levinFurtherStudiesEffect1975,
  ids = {Levin1975,Levin1975a},
  title = {Further Studies on the Effect of Feeling Good on Helping},
  author = {Levin, Paula F and Isen, Alice M},
  year = {1975},
  journal = {Sociometry},
  pages = {141--147},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.2307/2786238},
  abstract = {Attempted to clarify and extend the findings of A. M. Isen and P. F. Levin's (see record 1972-22883-001) study by examining the effects of a person's positive affective state on his or her subsequent helpfulness to others in 2 experiments. The studies were conducted in divergent locations of a large eastern city, and Ss differed in ethnic and socioeconomic characteristics. As in the earlier investigation, "good mood" was induced by the discovery of a dime in the coin return of a public telephone. The dependent measure in the present experiments, however, was willingness to mail a sealed and addressed letter which had been left at the telephone, apparently by accident. Both stamped and unstamped letters were used. Results support the prediction that those finding a dime would be more helpful, even though all Ss saw the letter and even though the help did not involve interpersonal interaction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)}
}

@article{levittWhatLaboratoryExperiments,
  ids = {Levitt,Levitt2007b,Levitta},
  title = {What Do Laboratory Experiments Tell Us about the Real World?},
  author = {Levitt, S and List, J A},
  journal = {Unpublished manuscript},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,andreas ortmann,andrei,at the 2005 international,charles plott,classic,dan gilbert,dean,excellent,experiments,external validity,field experiments,for useful suggestions,gary becker,generalizability,glenn harrison,jayson lusk,jesse shapiro,karlan,kevin murphy,laboratory experiments,literature surveys,markets,meetings of the esa,methods,reid hastie,suggestions from nicholas bardsley,ted mcconnell,thanks to seminar participants,uri gneezy}
}

@article{levyTheoryReligionLinking2006,
  ids = {Levy2006,Levy2006a},
  title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Religion}}: {{Linking Individual Beliefs}}, {{Rituals}}, and {{Social Cohesion}}},
  author = {Levy, G and Razin, R},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Department of Economics WP, LSE},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,altruism,behavioral,colleagues,conditional cooperation,Conditional cooperation,religion,ritual,signaling,theory},
  note = {we are not aware of empirical papers which testm:linebreak/m:linebreak m:linebreak/m:linebreak m:linebreak/m:linebreakfor a relation between natural disasters (or economic booms) and them:linebreak/m:linebreaksize of religiousm:linebreak/m:linebreak m:linebreak/m:linebreak m:linebreak/m:linebreakorganizations. Th
\par
we are not aware of empirical papers which testm:linebreak/m:linebreak m:linebreak/m:linebreak m:linebreak/m:linebreakfor a relation between natural disasters (or economic booms) and them:linebreak/m:linebreaksize of religiousm:linebreak/m:linebreak m:linebreak/m:linebreak m:linebreak/m:linebreakorganizations. Th
\par
we are not aware of empirical papers which testm:linebreak/m:linebreak m:linebreak/m:linebreak m:linebreak/m:linebreakfor a relation between natural disasters (or economic booms) and them:linebreak/m:linebreaksize of religiousm:linebreak/m:linebreak m:linebreak/m:linebreak m:linebreak/m:linebreakorganizations. Th}
}

@article{liangInspireMeDonate,
  ids = {Liang},
  title = {Inspire Me to Donate: {{The}} Use of Strength Emotion in Donation Appeals},
  author = {Liang, J and Chen, Z and Psychology, J Lei - Journal of Consumer and 2016, undefined},
  journal = {Elsevier},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{liDoesWindfallMoney2018,
  ids = {Li2018},
  title = {Does {{Windfall Money Encourage Charitable Giving}}? {{An Experimental Study}}},
  author = {Li, Huafang and Liang, Jie and Xu, Hui and Liu, Yingxi},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Voluntas},
  issn = {09578765},
  doi = {10.1007/s11266-018-9985-y},
  abstract = {Recently, increasing numbers of nonprofit studies have used experiments to understand individuals' charitable giving decisions. One significant gap between experimental settings and the real world is the way in which individuals earn the incomes that they use for charitable donations. This study examined the relationship between individuals' income sources and their charitable giving decisions. To do so, we conducted a laboratory experiment with 188 college students and asked them to donate with windfall money or with money earned from a real task, respectively. The findings showed that participants donated more to charities if their funds derived from windfall gains. Implications for conducting experiments and motivating donors are also discussed.}
}

@article{limAdversityProtectsNumeracy2019,
  ids = {Lim2019},
  title = {Past {{Adversity Protects Against}} the {{Numeracy Bias}} in {{Compassion}}},
  author = {Lim, Daniel},
  year = {2019},
  number = {June},
  doi = {10.1037/emo0000655}
}

@article{limSocialLossAversion2010,
  ids = {Lim2010,Lim2010a},
  title = {Social {{Loss Aversion}} and {{Optimal Contest Design}}},
  author = {Lim, N},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {J. Marketing Res. forthcoming},
  doi = {10.1509/jmkr.47.4.777}
}

@article{linAgnosticNotesRegression2013,
  ids = {Lin2013c},
  title = {Agnostic Notes on Regression Adjustments to Experimental Data: {{Reexamining Freedman}}'s Critique},
  author = {Lin, Winston},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Annals of Applied Statistics},
  volume = {7},
  number = {1},
  eprint = {1208.2301v2},
  eprinttype = {arxiv},
  pages = {295--318},
  issn = {19326157},
  doi = {10.1214/12-AOAS583},
  abstract = {Freedman [Adv. in Appl. Math. 40 (2008) 180\textemdash 193; Ann. Appl. Stat. 2 (2008) 176\textemdash 196] critiqued ordinary least squares regression adjustment of estimated treatment effects in randomized experiments, using Neyman's model for randomization inference. Contrary to conventional wisdom, he argued that adjustment can lead to worsened asymptotic precision, invalid measures of precision, and small-sample bias. This paper shows that in sufficiently large samples, those problems are either minor or easily fixed. OLS adjustment cannot hurt asymptotic precision when a full set of treatment\textemdash covariate interactions is included. Asymptotically valid confidence intervals can be constructed with the Huber\textemdash White sandwich standard error estimator. Checks on the asymptotic approximations are illustrated with data from Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos's [Am. Econ. J.: Appl. Econ. 1:1 (2009) 136\textemdash 163] evaluation of strategies to improve college students' achievement. The strongest reasons to support Freedman's preference for unadjusted estimates are transparency and the dangers of specification search. CR - Copyright \&\#169; 2013 Institute of Mathematical Statistics},
  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
  arxivid = {arXiv:1208.2301v2},
  keywords = {Analysis of covariance,Covariate adjustment,Program evaluation,Randomization inference,robust standard errors,Robust standard errors,Sandwich estimator,Social experiments}
}

@article{lindseyGROUNDSCOMPLAINT2004,
  ids = {Lindsey2004,Lindsey2004a},
  title = {{{GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT}}?},
  author = {Lindsey, B},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {Fair Trade and the Coffee Crisis},
  abstract = {sWhile affluent consumers in rich countries pay several dollars for a cup of latte at the local Starbucks, millions of small-scale coffee farmers are struggling as coffee bean prices have plummeted to historic lows. The juxtaposition of the designer coffee boom and rock-bottom raw material prices strikes market critics as compelling evidence of unfairness and exploitation. They blame multinational coffee roasters and retailers for profiting at poor farmers' expense, and they propose a number of schemes\textemdash including ``fair trade'' coffee, the use of new quality standards to restrict imports, and the return to political management of coffee exports\textemdash to help coffee farmers by propping up coffee bean prices. The coffee market is clearly far from the textbook model of frictionless efficiency. Its adjustment of supply and demand is subject to long lags and overshooting. Nevertheless, the story of the current coffee glut is at bottom a story of falling costs and productivity improvements on both the supply and the demand sides. In particular, prices have fallen so low primarily because of dramatically expanded production by low-cost suppliers in Brazil and Vietnam. And those low prices are a signal to high-cost producers\textemdash for example, in Central America\textemdash to supply a higher-value product or exit the market. However well-intentioned, interventionist schemes to lift prices above market levels ignore those market realities. Accordingly, they are doomed to end in failure\textemdash or to offer cures that are worse than the disease. There are constructive measures that can help to ease the plight of struggling coffee farmers, but they consist of efforts to improve the market's performance \textemdash not block it or demonize it.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,coffee,ft,FT}
}

@article{lindskoldEffectsDirectnessFacetoface1977,
  ids = {Lindskold1977,Lindskold1977a},
  title = {The Effects of Directness of Face-to-Face Requests and Sex of Solicitor on Streetcorner Donations},
  author = {Lindskold, S and Forte, R A and Haake, C S and Schmidt, E K},
  year = {1977},
  journal = {Journal of Social Psychology},
  volume = {101},
  number = {1},
  pages = {45--51},
  doi = {10.1080/00224545.1977.9923982}
}

@article{linStandardOperatingProcedures2016,
  ids = {Lin2016},
  title = {Standard {{Operating Procedures}}: {{A Safety Net}} for {{Pre-Analysis Plans}}},
  author = {Lin, Winston and Green, Donald P.},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {PS - Political Science and Politics},
  volume = {49},
  number = {3},
  pages = {495--499},
  issn = {15375935},
  doi = {10.1017/S1049096516000810},
  abstract = {\textbackslash textlessp\textbackslash textgreaterAcross the social sciences, growing concerns about research transparency have led to calls for pre-analysis plans (PAPs) that specify in advance how researchers intend to analyze the data they are about to gather. PAPs promote transparency and credibility by helping readers distinguish between exploratory and confirmatory analyses. However, PAPs are time-consuming to write and may fail to anticipate contingencies that arise in the course of data collection. This article proposes the use of ``standard operating procedures'' (SOPs)\textemdash default practices to guide decisions when issues arise that were not anticipated in the PAP. We offer an example of an SOP that can be adapted by other researchers seeking a safety net to support their PAPs.\textbackslash textless/p\textbackslash textgreater},
  isbn = {1287901511128}
}

@article{listAmericanEconomicAssociation2016,
  ids = {List2016,List2016a,List2016b},
  title = {American {{Economic Association The Deadweight Loss}} of {{Christmas}} : {{Comment Author}} ( s ): {{John A}} . {{List}} and {{Jason F}} . {{Shogren Source}} : {{The American Economic Review}} , {{Vol}} . 88 , {{No}} . 5 ( {{Dec}} ., 1998 ), Pp . 1350-1355 {{Published}} by : {{American Economic Associati}}},
  author = {List, By John A and Shogren, Jason F},
  year = {2016},
  volume = {88},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1350--1355}
}

@article{listDeadweightLossChristmas1998,
  ids = {List1998,List1998a},
  title = {The Deadweight Loss of {{Christmas}}: Comment},
  author = {List, John A and Shogren, Jason F},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {88},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1350--1355},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{listEffectsSeedMoney2002,
  ids = {List2002,List2002a},
  title = {The {{Effects}} of {{Seed Money}} and {{Refunds}} on {{Charitable Giving}}: {{Experimental Evidence}} from a {{University Capital Campaign}}},
  author = {List, J A and {Lucking-Reiley}, D},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {110},
  number = {1},
  pages = {215--233},
  doi = {10.1086/324392},
  keywords = {alumni donations,field experiments,framing,gift exchange,Gift Exchange,philanthropy,price of giving,seed money,Seed Money,social giving}
}

@article{listExaminingRoleSocial2004,
  ids = {List2004,List2004b},
  title = {Examining the {{Role}} of {{Social Isolation}} on {{Stated Preferences}}},
  author = {List, John A and Berrens, Robert P and Bohara, Alok K and Kerkvliet, Joe},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {94},
  number = {3},
  pages = {741--752},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  issn = {00028282},
  doi = {10.1257/0002828041464614},
  keywords = {behavioral,preferences,psychological,social,theory},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{listFriendFoeNatural2006,
  ids = {List2006,List2006a},
  title = {Friend or {{Foe}}? {{A Natural Experiment}} of the {{Prisoners Dilemma}}},
  author = {List, J A},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
  volume = {88},
  number = {3},
  pages = {463--471},
  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
  doi = {10.1162/rest.88.3.463}
}

@article{listImpactChallengeGifts2003,
  ids = {List2003,List2003a},
  title = {The Impact of Challenge Gifts on Charitable Giving: An Experimental Investigation},
  author = {List, J A and Rondeau, D},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {79},
  number = {2},
  pages = {153--159},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00300-2},
  keywords = {experiments,fundraising,philanthropy,reciprocity,seed money,Seed Money,social giving}
}

@article{listInterpretationGivingDictator2007,
  ids = {List2007,List2007a},
  title = {On the {{Interpretation}} of {{Giving}} in {{Dictator Games}}},
  author = {List, J A},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {115},
  number = {3},
  pages = {482--493},
  publisher = {{UChicago Press}},
  doi = {10.1086/519249},
  keywords = {altruism,behavioral,dictator games,experiments,literature surveys}
}

@article{listMultipleHypothesisTesting2019,
  ids = {list2019multiple},
  title = {Multiple Hypothesis Testing in Experimental Economics},
  author = {List, John A. and Shaikh, Azeem M. and Xu, Yang},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {22},
  number = {4},
  pages = {773--793},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10683-018-09597-5},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/9QB2UBJL/s10683-018-09597-5.html}
}

@article{listNoTitle2006,
  ids = {List2006b},
  title = {No {{Title}}},
  author = {List, John A and Andreoni, James and Bateman, Ian and Carson, Richard and Harbaugh, Bill and Green, Donald and Harrison, Glenn},
  year = {2006},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{listYoungSelfishMale2004,
  ids = {List2004a,List2004c},
  title = {Young, {{Selfish}} and {{Male}}: {{Field}} Evidence of Social Preferences*},
  author = {List, J A},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {114},
  number = {492},
  pages = {121--149},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Synergy}},
  doi = {10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.00180.x},
  abstract = {This study examines social preferences in three distinct field environments. In the first field setting, I allow consumers of all age and education levels to participate in one-shot and multiple-shot public goods games in a well-functioning marketplace. The second field study, an actual university capital campaign, gathers data from mail solicitations sent to 2,000 Central Florida residents. In the third field experiment, I examine data from an uncontrolled environment, a television gameshow, which closely resembles the classic prisoners dilemma game. Several insights emerge; perhaps the most provocative is that age and social preferences appear linked.},
  keywords = {age,alumni donations,experiments,field experiments,game shows,gender,philanthropy,public goods,Public goods,social giving,vcms}
}

@article{lockeBuildingPracticallyUseful2002,
  ids = {Locke2002,Locke2002a},
  title = {Building a Practically Useful Theory of Goal Setting and Task Motivation: {{A}} 35-Year Odyssey.},
  author = {Locke, Edwin A and Latham, Gary P},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {American psychologist},
  volume = {57},
  number = {9},
  pages = {705},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  doi = {10.1037/0003-066X.57.9.705},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{loewensteinAnomaliesIntertemporalChoice1992,
  ids = {Loewenstein1992,Loewenstein1992a},
  title = {Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: {{Evidence}} and an Interpretation},
  author = {Loewenstein, George and Prelec, Drazen},
  year = {1992},
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  pages = {573--597},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.2307/2118482},
  keywords = {behavioral,hyperbolic discounting,retirement con}
}

@article{loewensteinAnticipationValuationDelayed1987,
  ids = {Loewenstein1987,Loewenstein1987a},
  title = {Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption},
  author = {Loewenstein, George},
  year = {1987},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {97},
  number = {387},
  pages = {666--684},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.2307/2232929},
  keywords = {behavioral,eep,EEP}
}

@article{loewensteinNoTitle2006,
  ids = {Loewenstein2006,Loewenstein2006a,Loewenstein2006b},
  title = {No {{Title}}},
  author = {Loewenstein, George and Ubel, Peter A},
  year = {2006},
  pages = {1--33}
}

@article{loewensteinScarecrowTinMan2007,
  ids = {Loewenstein2007},
  title = {The {{Scarecrow}} and the {{Tin Man}} : {{The Vicissitudes}} of {{Human Sympathy}} and {{Caring}}},
  author = {Loewenstein, George and Small, Deborah A},
  year = {2007},
  volume = {11},
  number = {2},
  pages = {112--126},
  doi = {10.1037/1089-2680.11.2.112},
  keywords = {acted upon,altruism,emotion,empathy,helping behavior,is easily aroused but,its failure to,produce action is easily,quickly forgotten,rationalized,sympathy,we are softened,when remembered but not}
}

@article{lokenYourPlaceMine2013,
  ids = {Løken2013,Løken2013a},
  title = {Your {{Place}} or {{Mine}}? {{On}} the {{Residence Choice}} of {{Young Couples}} in {{Norway}}},
  author = {L{\o}ken, Katrine and Lommerud, Kjell and Lundberg, Shelly},
  year = {2013},
  month = feb,
  journal = {Demography},
  volume = {50},
  number = {1},
  pages = {285--310},
  doi = {10.1007/s13524-012-0142-8},
  abstract = {Norwegian registry data are used to investigate the location decisions of a full population cohort of young adults as they complete their education, establish separate households, and form their own families. We find that the labor market opportunities and family ties of both partners affect these location choices. Surprisingly, married men live significantly closer to their own parents than do married women, even if they have children, and this difference cannot be explained by differences in observed characteristics. The principal source of excess female distance from parents in this population is the relatively low mobility of men without a college degree, particularly in rural areas. Despite evidence that intergenerational resource flows, such as childcare and eldercare, are particularly important between women and their parents, the family connections of husbands appear to dominate the location decisions of less-educated married couples. Copyright Population Association of America 2013},
  keywords = {gender,Gender,marriage,Marriage,nled,nLED,nlGEOG,Residential location}
}

@article{london15SocialCauses2007,
  ids = {BonitaLondonGeraldineDowneyCherylBonicaIrisPaltin2007a,London2007},
  title = {15.7.7.\_{{Social}} Causes and Consequences of Rejection Sensitivity},
  author = {London, Bonita and Downey, Geraldine and Bonica, Cheryl and Paltin, Iris},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Journal of Research on Adolescence},
  volume = {17},
  number = {3},
  pages = {481--506},
  issn = {10508392},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1532-7795.2007.00531.x},
  abstract = {Predictions from the Rejection Sensitivity (RS) model concerning the social causes and consequences of RS were examined in a longitudinal study of 150 middle school students. Peer nominations of rejection, self-report measures of anxious and angry rejection expectations, and social anxiety, social withdrawal, and loneliness were assessed at two time points. Results indicate that peer rejection at Time 1 predicted an increase in anxious and angry expectations of rejection at Time 2, but only for boys. Being liked by peers, irrespective of level of dislike, predicted a reduction in anxious rejection expectations in both boys and girls. Further, anxious expectations of rejection were uniquely predictive of increased social anxiety and withdrawal. Angry expectations of rejection, an established unique predictor of increased aggression, predicted decreased social anxiety. Both anxious and angry expectations predicted increased loneliness, but neither were unique predictors of loneliness. Implications of viewing anxious and angry expectations of rejection as distinct cognitive\textendash affective vulnerabilities for adolescents are discussed.},
  isbn = {1532-7795},
  keywords = {adolescence,behavioral,gender,isolation,LoF,psychology,rejection sensitivity}
}

@article{londreganVotingCredibleThreat2006,
  ids = {Londregan2006,Londregan2006a},
  title = {Voting as a {{Credible Threat}}.},
  author = {Londregan, J and Vindigni, A},
  year = {2006},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{loomesModellingStochasticComponent2005,
  ids = {Loomes2005,Loomes2005a},
  title = {Modelling the {{Stochastic Component}} of {{Behaviour}} in {{Experiments}}: {{Some Issues}} for the {{Interpretation}} of {{Data}}},
  author = {Loomes, G},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {8},
  pages = {301--323},
  doi = {10.1007/s10683-005-5372-9},
  abstract = {This paper considers some of the questions raised by the fact that people's behaviour\textemdash including their behaviour in experimental environments\textemdash has a stochastic component. The nature of this component may be crucial to the interpretation of the patterns of data we observe and the choice of statistical criteria for favouring one hypothesis at the expense of others. However, it is arguable that insufficient consideration has been given to the way(s) in which the stochastic element is modelled. The paper aims to explore some of the issues involved.}
}

@article{loureiroObesityRatesOECD2005,
  ids = {Loureiro2005,Loureiro2005a},
  title = {Obesity {{Rates}} in {{OECD Countries}}: {{An International Perspective}}},
  author = {Loureiro, M L and Nayga Jr, R M},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {EAAE XI Congress, Copenhagen},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@techreport{lusardiNewWaysMake2009,
  ids = {Lusardi2009,Lusardi2009a},
  title = {New Ways to Make People Save: {{A}} Social Marketing Approach},
  author = {Lusardi, Annamaria and Keller, Punam An and Keller, Adam M},
  year = {2009},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  abstract = {In this study, we use a social marketing approach to develop a planning aid to help new employees at a not-for-profit institution contribute to supplementary pensions. We employed different methods, such as surveys, focus groups and in-depth interviews, to "listen" to employees' needs and difficulties with saving. Moreover, we targeted specific groups that were less likely to save and contribute to supplementary pensions, such as women and low-income employees. The program we developed is not only effective but also inexpensive. While this program was implemented at a single institution, it is suitable to be applied to a variety of employers and demographic groups.},
  keywords = {retirement}
}

@article{madhavanMarketMicrostructureSurvey2000,
  ids = {Madhavan2000,Madhavan2000a},
  title = {Market Microstructure: {{A}} Survey},
  author = {Madhavan, Ananth},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {Journal of Financial Markets},
  volume = {3},
  pages = {205--258},
  doi = {10.1016/S1386-4181(00)00007-0}
}

@article{maiettaHedonicPriceFair2003,
  ids = {Maietta2003,Maietta2003a},
  title = {The Hedonic Price of Fair Trade Coffee for the {{Italian}} Consumer},
  author = {Maietta, O W},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO: Where Are We Heading},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{makowskiAppropriationEfficiencyRevision1995,
  ids = {Makowski1995,Makowski1995a},
  title = {Appropriation and Efficiency: {{A}} Revision of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics},
  author = {Makowski, L and Ostroy, J M},
  year = {1995},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  pages = {808--827},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{mankiwConsumptionStockholdersNonstockholders1991,
  ids = {Mankiw1991,Mankiw1991a},
  title = {The Consumption of Stockholders and Nonstockholders},
  author = {Mankiw, N Gregory and Zeldes, Stephen P},
  year = {1991},
  journal = {Journal of Financial Economics},
  volume = {29},
  number = {1},
  pages = {97--112},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/0304-405X(91)90015-C}
}

@article{marianablancodirkengelmannBeliefElicitationThing,
  ids = {MarianaBlancoDirkEngelmann,MarianaBlancoDirkEngelmanna},
  title = {Belief {{Elicitation}} Thing},
  author = {Mariana Blanco Dirk Engelmann, Hans Theo Norman and {??}},
  journal = {Working Paper},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{martinDecollectivisationTradeUnions1991,
  ids = {Martin1991,Martin1991a},
  title = {The Decollectivisation of Trade Unions? {{Ballots}} and Collective Bargaining in the 1980s},
  author = {Martin, R and Fosh, P and Morris, H and Smith, P and Undy, R},
  year = {1991},
  journal = {Industrial Relations Journal},
  volume = {22},
  number = {3},
  pages = {197--208},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2338.1991.tb00637.x}
}

@techreport{martinEffectResearcherScrutiny2008,
  title = {The Effect of Researcher Scrutiny on Donation Behaviour.},
  author = {Martin, Richard and Randall, Johnphil},
  year = {2008},
  note = {nled@techreportdale2011estimating, title=Estimating the Return to College Selectivity over the Career Using Administrative Earnings Data, author=Dale, S. and Krueger, A.B., year=2011, institution=National Bureau of Economic Research \vphantom\{\}, author = Chetty, R and Friedman, J N and Hilger, N and Saez, E and Schanzenbach, D W and Yagan, D, institution = National Bureau of Economic Research, title = How does your kindergarten classroom affect your earnings? evidence from project star, year = 2010}
}

@article{martinHowDonationBehavior2007,
  ids = {Martin2008a},
  title = {How Is Donation Behavior Affected by the Donations of Others?},
  author = {Martin, Richard and Randal, Ohn},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,conditional cooperation,Conditional cooperation,ence,natural field experiment,public goods,Public goods,social influ-}
}

@article{mascletReputationFeedbackSystems2012,
  ids = {masclet2012reputation},
  title = {Do Reputation Feedback Systems Really Improve Trust among Anonymous Traders? {{An}} Experimental Study},
  author = {Masclet, David and P{\'e}nard, Thierry},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Applied Economics},
  volume = {44},
  number = {35},
  pages = {4553--4573},
  publisher = {{Taylor \& Francis}},
  doi = {10.1080/00036846.2011.591740}
}

@article{maskinUnforeseenContingenciesIncomplete1999,
  title = {Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts},
  author = {Maskin, Eric and Tirole, Jean},
  year = {1999},
  journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
  volume = {66},
  number = {1},
  pages = {83--114},
  doi = {10.1111/1467-937X.00079}
}

@article{mastrobuoniOrganizedCrimeNetworks2011,
  ids = {Mastrobuoni2011,Mastrobuoni2011a},
  title = {Organized {{Crime Networks}}: An {{Application}} of {{Network Analysis Techniques}} to the {{American Mafia}}},
  author = {Mastrobuoni, Giovanni and Patacchini, Eleonora},
  year = {2011},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{maynardCanGamesBuild2012,
  title = {Can {{Games Build Financial Capability}}?},
  author = {Maynard, Nicholas W and Mehta, Preeti and Parker, Jonas and Steinberg, Jeffrey},
  year = {2012},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{mayPoliciesDesignedUndermine2008,
  title = {Policies {{Designed}} for {{Undermine}} `` {{The Moral Sentiments}} '' : {{Evidence}} from {{Economic Experiments}}},
  author = {May, Self-interested Citizens and Bowles, Samuel},
  year = {2008},
  number = {June},
  pages = {1605--1610}
}

@article{mazarDishonestyEverydayLife,
  ids = {MAZARa,MAZARc},
  title = {Dishonesty in {{Everyday Life}} and Its {{Policy Implications}}},
  author = {MAZAR, N and ARIELY, D A N},
  doi = {10.1509/jppm.25.1.117}
}

@article{mazarDishonestyHonestPeople,
  title = {The {{Dishonesty}} of {{Honest People}}: {{A Theory}} of {{Self-Concept Maintenance}}},
  author = {MAZAR, N and AMIR, O N and ARIELY, D A N},
  doi = {10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633}
}

@article{mcconnellBehavioralEconomicsAging2013,
  title = {Behavioral Economics and Aging},
  author = {McConnell, Margaret},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {The Journal of the Economics of Ageing},
  volume = {1},
  pages = {83--89},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jeoa.2013.09.001},
  abstract = {Aging populations represent a growing health and economic challenge for many countries. While economists have studied aging extensively, the issue of aging has received less direct attention from the relatively younger field of behavioral economics. Nonetheless, many of the best-understood policies proposed by behavioral economics have implications for aging. In this paper, I review theoretical and empirical work in behavioral economics relevant to policies around global aging and highlight areas where more evidence is needed. I focus on interventions that encourage financial preparation for old age, policies that attempt to change health behaviors to mitigate the burden of non-communicable diseases and the implications of behavioral economics for policies that policies related to aging around health spending, insurance and regulation.},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{mcelduffWhenTestsWilcoxonMannWhitney2019,
  title = {When t -Tests or {{Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney}} Tests Won ' t Do},
  author = {Mcelduff, Fiona and {Cortina-borja}, Mario and Chan, Shun-kai and Wade, Angie and Mcelduff, F and Sk, Chan and When, Wade A},
  year = {2019},
  pages = {128--133},
  doi = {10.1152/advan.00017.2010}
}

@article{mcgeeSearchEffortLocus2011,
  ids = {McGee2011,McGee2011a},
  title = {Search, Effort, and Locus of Control},
  author = {McGee, Andrew and McGee, Peter},
  year = {2011},
  publisher = {{IZA Discussion Paper}},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.1922020}
}

@article{mcgrawExpectationsEmotionsOlympic2005,
  ids = {McGraw2005,McGraw2005a},
  title = {Expectations and Emotions of {{Olympic}} Athletes},
  author = {McGraw, A Peter and Mellers, Barbara A and Tetlock, Philip E},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
  volume = {41},
  number = {4},
  pages = {438--446},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jesp.2004.09.001},
  abstract = {In an often-cited study about counterfactuals, Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich (1995) found that bronze medalists appeared happier than silver medalists in television coverage of the 1992 Summer Olympics. Medvec et al. argued that bronze medalists compared themselves to 4th place finishers, whereas silver medalists compared themselves to gold medalists. These counterfactuals were the most salient because they were either qualitatively different (gold vs. silver) or categorically different (medal vs. no medal) from what actually occurred. Drawing on archival data and experimental studies, we show that Olympic athletes (among others) are more likely to make counterfactual comparisons based on their prior expectations, consistent with decision affect theory. Silver medalists are more likely to be disappointed because their personal expectations are higher than those of bronze medalists. We provide a test between expectancy-based versus category-based processing and discuss circumstances that trigger each type of processing.},
  keywords = {affect,emotions,prospect theory,reference points,sports}
}

@article{mckenzieEntryCostsProvide2006,
  ids = {McKenzie2006,McKenzie2006a},
  title = {Do {{Entry Costs Provide}} an {{Empirical Basis}} for {{Poverty Traps}}? {{Evidence}} from {{Mexican Microenterprises}}},
  author = {McKenzie, D J and Woodruff, C},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Economic Development and Cultural Change},
  volume = {55},
  number = {1},
  pages = {3--42},
  publisher = {{UChicago Press}},
  doi = {10.1086/505725}
}

@article{mckenzieTaxBegMandatory2008,
  ids = {McKenzie2008,McKenzie2008a},
  title = {Tax or {{Beg}}? {{Mandatory Payments}} to {{Charity}} and Their {{Effects}} on {{Donor Behavior}}},
  author = {McKenzie, Tom},
  year = {2008},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{meerABCsCharitableSolicitation2009,
  ids = {Meer2009},
  title = {The {{ABCs}} of Charitable Solicitation},
  author = {Meer, J and Rosen, H S},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {NBER Working Paper},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{meerBrotherCanYou2011,
  ids = {meer2011brother},
  title = {Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? {{Peer}} Pressure in Charitable Solicitation},
  author = {Meer, Jonathan},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {95},
  number = {7-8},
  pages = {926--941},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.026}
}

@article{meerDoesFundraisingCreate2017,
  ids = {Meer2017},
  title = {Does Fundraising Create New Giving?},
  author = {Meer, Jonathan},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {145},
  pages = {82--93},
  publisher = {{Elsevier B.V.}},
  issn = {00472727},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.009},
  abstract = {Despite an extensive literature on the impacts of a variety of charitable fundraising techniques, little is known about whether these activities increase overall giving or merely cause donors to substitute away from other causes. Using detailed data from Donorschoose.org, an online platform linking teachers with prospective donors, I examine the extent to which matching grants for donations to certain requests affect giving to others. Eligibility for matches is determined in entirely by observable attributes of the request, providing an exogenous source of variation in incentives to donate between charities. I find that, while matches increase giving to eligible requests, they do not appear to crowd out giving to similar ones, either contemporaneously or over time.},
  keywords = {altruism,Altruism,Charitable giving,competition,Competition,philanthropy,Philanthropy}
}

@article{meetingThInternationalMeeting2019,
  title = {6 Th {{International Meeting}} on {{Experimental}} and {{Behavioral Social Sciences}} ( {{IMEBESS}} )},
  author = {Meeting, International and Sciences, Behavioral Social},
  year = {2019},
  number = {May},
  pages = {1--55},
  keywords = {2,constrained contributions to public,cooperation in public good,framing,games,goods,leonard wolk 1,nathan chan 2,rational choice theory,reciprocity,sciences,th,topics in behavioral social}
}

@techreport{meghirEconometricMethodsResearch2010,
  ids = {Meghir2010,Meghir2010a},
  title = {Econometric Methods for Research in Education},
  author = {Meghir, C and Rivkin, S G},
  year = {2010},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  note = {nled
\par
nled
\par
nled}
}

@article{meierSubsidiesIncreaseCharitable2007,
  ids = {meier2007subsidies},
  title = {Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run? {{Matching}} Donations in a Field Experiment},
  author = {Meier, Stephan},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
  volume = {5},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1203--1222},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.6.1203}
}

@article{meirowitzPivotsSignalsElections2009,
  title = {Pivots versus Signals in Elections},
  author = {Meirowitz, A and Shotts, K W},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  volume = {144},
  number = {2},
  pages = {744--771},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.008},
  keywords = {politics,voting}
}

@article{mellersDecisionAffectTheory1997,
  ids = {Mellers1997,Mellers1997a},
  title = {Decision Affect Theory: {{Emotional}} Reactions to the Outcomes of Risky Options},
  author = {Mellers, B A and Schwartz, A and Ho, K and Ritov, I},
  year = {1997},
  journal = {Psychological Science},
  pages = {423--429},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9280.1997.tb00455.x},
  abstract = {Examined emotional experiences associated with the outcomes of risky options represented as gambles with monetary consequences. In Exp 1 with 67 undergraduates (aged 18\textendash 26 yrs), 25 gambles were presented to Ss: In Exp 2, with 47 undergraduates (aged 18\textendash 27 yrs), were presented 45 gambles to Ss. Results from the 2 experiments show that the emotional reaction to a monetary outcome is not a simple function of the utility of that outcome. Emotional responses also depend on probabilities and unobtained outcomes. Unexpected outcomes have greater emotional impact than expected outcomes. Furthermore, any given outcome is less pleasant if an unobtained outcome is better. The authors propose an account of emotional experiences associated with outcomes of decisions called decision affect theory. Decision affect theory incorporates utilities, expectations, and counterfactual comparisons into hedonic responses. Finally, the authors show that choices between risky options can be described as the maximization of expected emotional experiences, as predicted by decision affect theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {behavioral,effect,emotion,giving and probability,happiness,philanthropy,psychological,risk}
}

@article{mendoza-dentonSensitivityStatusbasedRejection2002,
  ids = {Mendoza-Denton2002,Mendoza-Denton2002a},
  title = {Sensitivity to Status-Based Rejection: Implications for {{African American}} Students' College Experience.},
  author = {{Mendoza-Denton}, R and Downey, G and Purdie, V J and Davis, A and Pietrzak, J},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Journal of personality and social psychology},
  volume = {83},
  number = {4},
  pages = {896},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.83.4.896}
}

@article{menonEffectMaritalEndowments,
  ids = {Menon},
  title = {The Effect of Marital Endowments on Domestic Violence in {{India}}.},
  author = {Menon, Seetha},
  pages = {1--41},
  keywords = {domestic violence,dowry,intra-household bargaining,j12,j14,j16,jel codes}
}

@article{meredithProductCannibalizationRole2010,
  title = {Product Cannibalization and the Role of Prices {{Product}} Cannibalization and the Role of Price s},
  author = {Meredith, Lindsay and Maki, Dennis},
  year = {2010},
  volume = {6846},
  number = {2001},
  doi = {10.1080/00036840010015769}
}

@article{merilainenPoliticianQualityIdeology2018,
  title = {Politician {{Quality}} , {{Ideology}} and {{Fiscal Policy}} *},
  author = {Meril{\"a}inen, Jaakko},
  year = {2018},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,close elections,economic ideology,fiscal policy,local government,political,quality of politicians,selection,supplementary materials}
}

@article{mesnardWealthEffectNew2006,
  ids = {MESNARD2006,MESNARD2006a},
  title = {The {{Wealth Effect}} on {{New Business Startups}} in a {{Developing Economy}}},
  author = {MESNARD, A and RAVALLION, M},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Economica},
  volume = {73},
  number = {291},
  pages = {367--392},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Synergy}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00515.x}
}

@article{micklewrightGivingDevelopmentWho2007,
  ids = {Micklewright2007,Micklewright2007a},
  title = {Giving to {{Development}}: {{Who Gives}} to {{Overseas Causes}}?},
  author = {Micklewright, J and Schnepf, S V},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {WeD International Conference},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  note = {Development aid
\par
Development aid
\par
Development aid}
}

@article{micklewrightPrivateDonationsInternational2008,
  ids = {MICKLEWRIGHT2008,MICKLEWRIGHT2008a},
  title = {Private {{Donations}} for {{International Development}}},
  author = {MICKLEWRIGHT, J and WRIGHT, A},
  year = {2008},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  note = {Development giving
\par
Development giving
\par
Development giving}
}

@article{milaniPublicOptionPrivate2010,
  ids = {Milani2010,Milani2010a},
  title = {Public Option and Private Profits},
  author = {Milani, Fabio},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Applied health economics and health policy},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {155--165},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.2165/11535510-000000000-00000}
}

@article{milbourneOlderPeoplePoverty2012,
  ids = {Milbourne2012,Milbourne2012a},
  title = {Older People and Poverty in Rural {{Britain}}: {{Material}} Hardships, Cultural Denials and Social Inclusions},
  author = {Milbourne, Paul and Doheny, Shane},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Journal of Rural Studies},
  volume = {28},
  number = {4},
  pages = {389--397},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jrurstud.2012.06.007},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{milinskiReputationHelpsSolve2002,
  ids = {Milinski2002,Milinski2002a},
  title = {Reputation Helps Solve the'tragedy of the Commons'.},
  author = {Milinski, M and Semmann, D and Krambeck, H J},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Nature},
  volume = {415},
  number = {6870},
  pages = {424--426},
  doi = {10.1038/415424a},
  abstract = {The problem of sustaining a public resource that everybody is free to overuse-the 'tragedy of the commons'-emerges in many social dilemmas, such as our inability to sustain the global climate. Public goods experiments, which are used to study this type of problem, usually confirm that the collective benefit will not be produced. Because individuals and countries often participate in several social games simultaneously, the interaction of these games may provide a sophisticated way by which to maintain the public resource. Indirect reciprocity, 'give and you shall receive', is built on reputation and can sustain a high level of cooperation, as shown by game theorists. Here we show, through alternating rounds of public goods and indirect reciprocity games, that the need to maintain reputation for indirect reciprocity maintains contributions to the public good at an unexpectedly high level. But if rounds of indirect reciprocation are not expected, then contributions to the public good drop quickly to zero. Alternating the games leads to higher profits for all players. As reputation may be a currency that is valid in many social games, our approach could be used to test social dilemmas for their solubility.},
  note = {NULL
\par
NULL
\par
NULL}
}

@article{mincerFamilyMigrationDecisions1978,
  ids = {Mincer1978,Mincer1978a},
  title = {Family {{Migration Decisions}}},
  author = {Mincer, Jacob},
  year = {1978},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {86},
  number = {5},
  pages = {749--773},
  doi = {10.1086/260710},
  abstract = {No abstract is available for this item.},
  keywords = {nled,nLED,nlgeog,nlGEOG,residential location,Residential location}
}

@article{mocanAsymmetricCrimeCycles2010,
  ids = {Mocan2010,Mocan2010a},
  title = {Asymmetric Crime Cycles},
  author = {Mocan, H Naci and Bali, Turan G},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
  volume = {92},
  number = {4},
  pages = {899--911},
  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
  doi = {10.1162/REST_a_00048}
}

@article{molisExperimentalResultsRoommate2010,
  ids = {Molis2010,Molis2010a},
  title = {Experimental Results on the Roommate Problem},
  author = {Molis, E and Veszteg, R F},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {CORE DP},
  volume = {11},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{molyneauxImpactTargetedFamily2000,
  ids = {Molyneaux2000,Molyneaux2000a},
  title = {The Impact of Targeted Family Planning Programs in {{Indonesia}}},
  author = {Molyneaux, J W and Gertler, P J},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {Population and Development Review},
  volume = {26},
  pages = {61--85},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{montmarquetteEmpiricalModelHousehold1987,
  ids = {Montmarquette1987,Montmarquette1987a},
  title = {An {{Empirical Model}} of a {{Household}}'s {{Choice}} of {{Activities}}},
  author = {Montmarquette, Claude and Monty, Luc},
  year = {1987},
  month = apr,
  journal = {Journal of Applied Econometrics},
  volume = {2},
  number = {2},
  pages = {145--158},
  publisher = {{John Wiley \& Sons}},
  issn = {0883-7252},
  doi = {10.1002/jae.3950020206},
  abstract = {This paper analyses how households of school-age children choose to participate in the labour force, volunteer work, democratic assemblies, and child-related leisure activities. Contrary to previous studies, the model presented in this paper treats all of these household's choice of activities involving time allocation decisions as simultaneously determined. The empirical section uses qualitative data estimation techniques which permit a wide range of joint and interaction effects among the variables of the model. The results confirm the importance of time-opportunity cost variables as major determinants of household's choice of activities with the mother's education constituting a particularly important factor.}
}

@article{mooreAffectAltruism1973,
  title = {Affect and Altruism.},
  author = {Moore, Bert S and Underwood, Bill and Rosenhan, David L},
  year = {1973},
  journal = {Developmental Psychology},
  volume = {8},
  number = {1},
  pages = {99},
  doi = {10.1037/h0033847},
  abstract = {Investigated the relationship between affect and altruism in 7- and 8-yr-old middle-class white children (N = 48 males and 24 females). Ss were asked to think of things that made them happy or sad, or they were assigned to control conditions. Ss were then given an opportunity to donate money to other children in the E's absence. In accord with predictions, Ss who experienced positive affect gave more than controls, while Ss who experienced negative affect gave less than controls. Females gave more than males overall. The relationship between self-reward and reward of others is discussed. (19 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)},
  keywords = {affect,altruism,children,philanthropy,psychology}
}

@article{mooreFairTradeMovement2004,
  ids = {Moore2004,Moore2004a},
  title = {The {{Fair Trade Movement}}: {{Parameters}}, {{Issues}} and {{Future Research}}},
  author = {Moore, G},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {Journal of Business Ethics},
  volume = {53},
  number = {1},
  pages = {73--86},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1023/B:BUSI.0000039400.57827.c3},
  abstract = {Abstract Although Fair Trade has been in existence for more than 40 years, discussion in the business and business ethics literature of this unique trading and campaigning movement between Southern producers and Northern buyers and consumers has been limited. This paper seeks to redress this deficit by providing a description of the characteristics of Fair Trade, including definitional issues, market size and segmentation and the key organizations. It discusses Fair Trade from Southern producer and Northern trader and consumer perspectives and highlights the key issues that currently face the Fair Trade movement. It then identifies an initial research agenda to be followed up in subsequent papers.}
}

@article{morenoGroupFairnessGame2008,
  ids = {Moreno2008,Moreno2008a},
  title = {Group {{Fairness}} and {{Game Theory}}},
  author = {Moreno, A T},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {School of Economics Working Papers},
  publisher = {{Universidad de Guanajuato}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{morenoLosingFace2009,
  ids = {Hugh-Jones2010,Hugh-Jones2010b,Moreno2009,Moreno2009a},
  title = {Losing {{Face}}},
  author = {Moreno, Alejandro and {Hugh-Jones}, David and Reinstein, David},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Unpublished. See http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/{$\sim$}drein/ for early draft.},
  publisher = {{University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers 691}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{moreyFallacyPlacingConfidence2016,
  title = {The Fallacy of Placing Confidence in Confidence Intervals},
  author = {Morey, Richard D and Hoekstra, Rink and Rouder, Jeffrey N and Lee, Michael D and Wagenmakers, Eric-jan},
  year = {2016},
  pages = {103--123},
  doi = {10.3758/s13423-015-0947-8},
  keywords = {bayesian inference and parameter,bayesian statistics,estimation,i do not think,it means,means,statistical inference,statistics,what you think it,word,you keep using that}
}

@article{moxnesEffectLeadershipPublic2003,
  ids = {Moxnes2003,Moxnes2003a},
  title = {The Effect of Leadership in a Public Bad Experiment},
  author = {Moxnes, E and {der Heijden}, E},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  volume = {47},
  number = {6},
  pages = {773--795},
  publisher = {{Sage Publications}},
  doi = {10.1177/0022002703258962},
  keywords = {experiments}
}

@article{mugermanLongTermSavings2014,
  ids = {Mugerman2014,Mugerman2014a},
  title = {Long {{Term Savings Decisions}}: {{Financial Reform}}, {{Peer Effects}} and {{Ethnicity}} Sup*/Sup},
  author = {Mugerman, Yevgeny and Sade, Orly and Shayo, Moses},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.002},
  abstract = {Highlights ,\"A\textcent{} In 2005, a reform in the Israeli capital market shifted the power to choose savings vehicles from employers to individuals. ,\"A\textcent{} We study individual decisions following the reform using personnel data from a large employer. ,\"A\textcent{} Individual choice of fund was not associated with observable measures of fund performance, but was strongly affected by the choices of co-workers from the same ethnic group. Abstract In 2005, a drastic reform in the Israeli capital market shifted the power to choose savings vehicles from employers to individuals. Using a unique dataset from a large employer, this event provides us a rare window into individuals' savings decisions and the effect of their social environment. In the first year following the reform's implementation, 7\% of the employees switched out of the fund in which they all previously saved. Choice of fund was not associated with observable measures of fund performance, but was strongly affected by the employees' social environment. Exploiting within-department variation in peer groups, we find that savings decisions were strongly influenced by the choices of co-workers from the same ethnic group. Interviews also point to the influence of non-professional colleagues.}
}

@book{mulhollandBorisJohnsonBankers2009,
  title = {Boris {{Johnson}}: {{Bankers}} Should Palliate Their Guilt by Giving Bonuses to Anti-Homelessness Drive | {{Politics}} | {{The Guardian}}},
  author = {Mulholland, Helene},
  year = {2009}
}

@article{munganFundraisingOptimalPolicy2012,
  ids = {Mungan2012,Mungan2012a},
  title = {Fundraising and Optimal Policy Rules},
  author = {Mungan, Murat C and Y{\"o}r{\"u}k, Bari K},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  volume = {14},
  number = {4},
  pages = {625--652},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9779.2012.01555.x}
}

@article{muradCeDExDiscussionPaper2014,
  ids = {Murad2014,Murad2014a},
  title = {{{CeDEx Discussion Paper Series}} the {{Centre}} or Contact},
  author = {Murad, Zahra and Sefton, Martin and Starmer, Chris and Robey, Suzanne},
  year = {2014},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@techreport{muradHowRiskAttitudes,
  ids = {Murad,Murada},
  title = {How Do Risk Attitudes Affect Measured Confidence?},
  author = {Murad, Zahra and Starmer, Chris and Sefton, Martin}
}

@article{myersACenturyRESEARCHAGRICULTURAL2010,
  ids = {Myers2010,Myers2010a},
  title = {{{ACentury OF RESEARCH ON AGRICULTURAL MARKETS}}},
  author = {Myers, R J and Sexton, R J and Tomek, W G},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Amer. J. Agr. Econ},
  volume = {92},
  number = {2},
  pages = {376--402},
  doi = {10.1093/ajae/aaq014}
}

@article{nalbantianMatchingEfficiencyBaseball1995,
  ids = {Nalbantian1995,Nalbantian1995a},
  title = {Matching and Efficiency in the Baseball Free-Agent System: An Experimental Examination},
  author = {Nalbantian, H R and Schotter, A},
  year = {1995},
  journal = {Journal of Labor Economics},
  pages = {1--31},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1086/298366}
}

@article{nederhofEffectsRepetitionConsistency1983,
  ids = {Nederhof1983,Nederhof1983a},
  title = {Effects of Repetition and Consistency of Personalization Treatments on Response Rate in Mail Surveys},
  author = {Nederhof, Anton J},
  year = {1983},
  journal = {Social Science Research},
  volume = {12},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--9},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/0049-089X(83)90006-6}
}

@article{nevoPractitionerGuideEstimation2000,
  title = {A {{Practitioner}} ' s {{Guide}} to {{Estimation}} of {{Random-Coef}} \'e Cients {{Logit Models}} of {{Demand}}},
  author = {Nevo, Aviv},
  year = {2000},
  volume = {9},
  number = {4},
  pages = {513--548}
}

@article{newPicnictableCrisis2013,
  title = {Beyond the Picnic-Table Crisis.},
  author = {New, The and Yorker, The New and Yorker, New},
  year = {2013},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{niederleMarketCultureHow2009,
  ids = {Niederle2009,Niederle2009a},
  title = {Market Culture: {{How}} Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance},
  author = {Niederle, M and Roth, A E},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
  volume = {1},
  number = {2},
  pages = {199--219},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  doi = {10.1257/mic.1.2.199},
  abstract = {Many markets have organizations that influence or try to establish norms concerning when offers can be made, accepted and rejected. Examining a dozen previously studied markets suggests that markets in which transactions are made far in advance are markets in which it is acceptable for firms to make exploding offers, and unacceptable for workers to renege on commitments they make, however early. But this evidence is only suggestive, because the markets differ in many ways other than norms concerning offers. Laboratory experiments allow us to isolate the effects of exploding offers and binding acceptances. In a simple environment, in which uncertainty about applicants' quality is resolved over time, we find inefficient early contracting when firms can make exploding offers and applicants' acceptances are binding. Relaxing either of these two conditions causes matching to take place later, when more information about applicants' qualities is available, and consequently results in higher efficiency and fewer blocking pairs. This suggests that elements of market culture may play an important role in influencing market performance.}
}

@article{niederleWomenShyAway2007,
  ids = {Niederle2007,Niederle2007a},
  title = {Do {{Women Shy Away}} from {{Competition}}? {{Do Men Compete Too Much}}?*},
  author = {Niederle, M and Vesterlund, L},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {122},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1067--1101},
  publisher = {{MIT Press}},
  doi = {10.1162/qjec.122.3.1067}
}

@article{nisticoFundingResearchOutcomes,
  ids = {Nistico,Nisticoa},
  title = {Funding and {{Research Outcomes}} in {{PhD Programs}}},
  author = {Nistico, Roberto},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,ac,e-mail address,essex,funding,h52,i am very grateful,i21,i22,i23,iv,j24,jel classifications,of naples federico ii,phd candidate at the,phd graduates,postdoctoral research fellow at,research outcomes,rnisti,to matthias parey,uk,university,university of essex and}
}

@article{oberholzer-geeFairnessExtendedDictator2004,
  ids = {Oberholzer-Gee2004,Oberholzer-Gee2004a},
  title = {Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments},
  author = {{Oberholzer-Gee}, F and Eichenberger, R},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {Manuscript},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{odonoghueDoingItNow1999,
  ids = {ODonoghue1999,ODonoghue1999a},
  title = {Doing It Now or Later},
  author = {O'Donoghue, T and Rabin, M},
  year = {1999},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {89},
  number = {1},
  pages = {103--124},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.89.1.103}
}

@article{oecdHouseholdSavingsIndicator2014,
  ids = {OECD2014,OECD2014a},
  title = {Household Savings (Indicator).},
  author = {{OECD}},
  year = {2014},
  doi = {10.1787/cfc6f499-en},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{oenigAbusePowerPervasive2001,
  title = {The {{Abuse}} of {{Power}} : {{The Pervasive Fallacy}} of {{Power Calculations}} for {{Data Analysis}}},
  author = {Oenig, John M H and Eisey, Dennis M H},
  year = {2001},
  volume = {55},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--6},
  keywords = {bioequivalence testing,burden of proof,observed power,power,retrospective power analysis,statistical,type ii error}
}

@article{ofECONSIDERATIONENDERIFFERENCES2014,
  ids = {Of2014,Of2014a},
  title = {A {{R ECONSIDERATION OF G ENDER D IFFERENCES IN R ISK A TTITUDES A NTONIO F ILIPPIN A Reconsideration}} of {{Gender Differences}} in {{Risk Attitudes}} \$},
  author = {Of, Econsideration},
  year = {2014},
  volume = {21501},
  number = {21522}
}

@article{oktenDeterminantsDonationsPrivate2000,
  ids = {Okten2000,Okten2000a},
  title = {Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Markets},
  author = {Okten, C and Weisbrod, B A},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {75},
  number = {2},
  pages = {255--272},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00066-3},
  keywords = {obesity,stylized facts}
}

@article{okunadeCharitableGivingAlumni1994,
  ids = {Okunade1994,Okunade1994a},
  title = {Charitable {{Giving}} of {{Alumni}}: {{Micro-Data Evidence}} from a {{Large Public University}}},
  author = {Okunade, Albert Ade. and Wunnava, Phanindra V and Walsh Raymond, Jr.},
  year = {1994},
  month = jan,
  journal = {American Journal of Economics and Sociology},
  volume = {53},
  number = {1},
  pages = {73--84},
  publisher = {{American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.}},
  issn = {0002-9246},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1536-7150.1994.tb02674.x},
  abstract = {This research examines the "age-donation" profile of gift-giving alumni at a large public university, based on a pooled micro-data random sample of 4,242 alumni (1926/27-1989/90 graduates) who gave cash gifts during the 1975/76-1989/90 fiscal years. The covariance regression model results indicate lack of statistically significant difference between gift-giving women and men. However, the School of Business graduates, alumni who proceeded to obtain graduate degrees from this university, and alumni members of non-Greek social organizations gave significantly more. Moreover, alumni contributions varied systematically over the business cycle and a 1962 Federal Court Order to desegregate the university racially reduced donations but not significantly. Given the 63-year cycle studied, the growth rates of alumni donations of money are projected to decline after roughly age 52, which falls short of the typical retirement age.},
  keywords = {age,alumni contributions,empirical,fundraising,life-cycle,philanthropy,stylized facts}
}

@article{okunadeGraduateSchoolAlumni1996,
  ids = {Okunade1996,Okunade1996a},
  title = {Graduate {{School Alumni Donations}} to {{Academic Funds}}: {{Micro-Data Evidence}}},
  author = {Okunade, Albert Ade.},
  year = {1996},
  month = apr,
  journal = {American Journal of Economics and Sociology},
  volume = {55},
  number = {2},
  pages = {213--229},
  publisher = {{American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.}},
  issn = {0002-9246},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1536-7150.1996.tb03201.x},
  abstract = {The giving profile of graduate degree alumni of a Carnegie-classified, U.S. "Doctoral Universities I" institution is investigated in this paper. For fundraising purposes, the likely gift-giving alumni are males holding old vintage Doctoral, MBA or MS degrees; however, they neither received their second graduate degree nor earned their baccalaureate degrees at this institution. Graduate degree alumni have decreasing giving profiles for many years following completion of their first graduate degree but this decrease bottoms out later in life. It continues seven more years for alumni who earned a second graduate degree at the university. The "wealth-accumulation" effect of giving tends to dominate the "earnings-effect." Doctoral degree alumni have the highest giving profile among graduate school alumni. Racial desegregation of the university is positively and strongly related to alumni giving. Inferences of the giving profile of undergraduate degree alumni reported in past work do not extend to graduate school alumni.},
  keywords = {age,alumni contributions,empirical,fundraising,life-cycle,philanthropy,stylized facts}
}

@article{oosterbeekCulturalDifferencesUltimatum2004,
  ids = {Oosterbeek2004},
  title = {Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: {{Evidence}} from a Meta-Analysis},
  author = {Oosterbeek, Hessel and Sloof, Randolph and Van De Kuilen, Gijs},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {7},
  number = {2},
  pages = {171--188},
  issn = {13864157},
  doi = {10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026978.14316.74},
  abstract = {This paper reports the findings of a meta-analysis of 37 papers with 75 results from ultimatum game experiments. We find that on average the proposer offers 40\% of the pie to the responder. This share is smaller for larger pie sizes and larger when a strategy method is used or when subjects are inexperienced. On average 16\% of the offers is rejected. The rejection rate is lower for larger pie sizes and for larger shares offered. Responders are less willing to accept an offer when the strategy method is employed. As the results come from different countries, meta-analysis provides an alternative way to investigate whether bargaining behavior in ultimatum games differs across countries. We find differences in behavior of responders (and not of proposers) across geographical regions. With one exception, these differences cannot be attributed to various cultural traits on which for instance the cultural classifications of Hofstede (1991) and Inglehart (2000) are based.},
  isbn = {1386-4157},
  keywords = {Cultural differences,meta-analysis,Meta-analysis,ultimatum game,Ultimatum game}
}

@book{oppenheimerExperimentalApproachesStudy2011,
  ids = {Oppenheimer2011a},
  title = {Experimental {{Approaches}} to the {{Study}} of {{Charity}}},
  author = {Oppenheimer, DM and Olivola, CY},
  year = {2011}
}

@article{osterUnobservableSelectionCoefficient2019,
  ids = {Oster2019,oster2019unobservable},
  title = {Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: {{Theory}} and Evidence},
  shorttitle = {Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability},
  author = {Oster, Emily},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Journal of Business \& Economic Statistics},
  volume = {37},
  number = {2},
  pages = {187--204},
  publisher = {{Taylor \& Francis}},
  doi = {10.1080/07350015.2016.1227711},
  keywords = {Coefficient stability,Omitted variable bias,Selection},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/MVX62WYJ/Oster - 2019 - Unobservable selection and coefficient stability .pdf;/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/DLNFVA7K/07350015.2016.html}
}

@article{ostromCollectiveActionEvolution2000,
  ids = {Ostrom2000,Ostrom2000a},
  title = {Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms},
  author = {Ostrom, E},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  pages = {137--158},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.14.3.137}
}

@article{ostroyExistenceWalrasianEquilibrium1984,
  ids = {Ostroy1984,Ostroy1984a},
  title = {On the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium in Large-Square Economies},
  author = {Ostroy, J M},
  year = {1984},
  journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics},
  volume = {13},
  number = {2},
  pages = {143--163},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/0304-4068(84)90014-4}
}

@article{oswaldReviewObesityUnhappiness2007,
  ids = {Oswald2007,Oswald2007a},
  title = {Review: {{Obesity}}, {{Unhappiness}}, and {{The Challenge}} of {{Affluence}}: {{Theory}} and {{Evidence}}},
  author = {Oswald, A J and Powdthavee, N},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {117},
  number = {521},
  pages = {441--454},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Synergy}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02077_1.x},
  keywords = {affluence,happiness,obesity,psychology,reviews,stylized facts}
}

@article{pageVoluntaryAssociationPublic,
  ids = {Page,Pagea,Pageb,Pagec,pageVoluntaryAssociationPublica},
  title = {Voluntary {{Association}} in {{Public Goods Experiments}} :},
  author = {Page, Talbot and Putterman, Louis and Unel, Bulent},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,and d23,and herbert gintis,and nsf grant ses-0001769,and punishment,c91,C91,collective action,Collective action,ernst fehr,foundation norms and preferences,grant from the macarthur,group formation,Group formation,h41,H41,jel classification,network,public goods,Public goods,robert boyd,the research reported here,was supported by a,we thank samuel bowles}
}

@article{pageVoluntaryAssociationPublic2005,
  ids = {Page2005,Page2005a},
  title = {Voluntary {{Association}} in {{Public Goods Experiments}}: {{Reciprocity}}, {{Mimicry}} and {{Efficiency}}},
  author = {Page, T and Putterman, L and Unel, B},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Economic Journal},
  volume = {115},
  number = {506},
  pages = {1032--1053},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01031.x}
}

@article{paisDecentralizedMatchingMarkets2012,
  ids = {Pais2012,Pais2012a},
  title = {Decentralized Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment},
  author = {Pais, J and Pinter, A and Veszteg, R F},
  year = {2012},
  publisher = {{ISEG-Departamento de Economia}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{pakesReconsiderationHedonicPrice2002,
  ids = {PAKES2002,PAKES2002a},
  title = {A {{Reconsideration}} of {{Hedonic Price Indices}} with an {{Application}} to {{PC}}'s},
  author = {PAKES, A},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {NBER Working Paper},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,applied econometric,computers,demand estimation,econometric,ft,FT,hedonics,Industrial Organization,price indices}
}

@article{palanProlificAcSubject2017,
  ids = {Palan2018,palan2017prolific},
  title = {Prolific. Ac\textemdash{{A}} Subject Pool for Online Experiments},
  author = {Palan, Stefan and Schitter, Christian},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/3II7PNHG/Palan, Schitter - 2018 - Prolific.ac—A subject pool for online experiments.pdf}
}

@article{palfreyAltuismReputationNoise1996,
  ids = {Palfrey1996,Palfrey1996a},
  title = {Altuism, Reputation and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments},
  author = {Palfrey, T R and Prisbrey, J E},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {61},
  number = {3},
  pages = {409--427},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(95)01544-2},
  abstract = {We report an experiment using a design that permits the direct measurement of individual decision rules in voluntary contribution games. We estimate the distribution of altruism in our subjects and find that observed `overcontribution' is attributable to a combination of random variation in behavior and a few altruistic players. We also employ Andreoni's partners/strangers design to measure reputation effects. The only difference observed is that the strangers treatment produces slightly more random variation in behavior. Our results explain some anomalies about contribution rates, and support past findings that reputation-building plays a minor role in such experiments.},
  keywords = {altruism,behavioral,experiments,heterogeneity,philanthropy,reciprocity,reputation,ritual,social giving,vcm,VCM}
}

@article{paolilloMonetaryIncentivesMail1984,
  ids = {Paolillo1984,Paolillo1984a},
  title = {Monetary Incentives and Mail Questionnaire Response Rates},
  author = {Paolillo, Joseph G P and Lorenzi, Peter},
  year = {1984},
  journal = {Journal of Advertising},
  volume = {13},
  number = {1},
  pages = {46--48},
  publisher = {{Taylor \& Francis}},
  doi = {10.1080/00913367.1984.10672874}
}

@article{papersWorKing2013,
  ids = {Papers2013},
  title = {Wor {{King}}},
  author = {Papers, Economics Working and Involvement, International Trade},
  year = {2013},
  number = {January},
  pages = {2000--2010},
  abstract = {This study designs two field experiments to estimate the effect of binding deadlines and reminders on charitable giving. We sent out 62,000 e-mails and text messages to prior donors of a large Danish charity while varying the length of the deadline and whether they received a reminder. We find that a reminder increases both the likelihood of making a donation and the amount donated. We find no effect of the deadlines on the propensity to give. Instead we observe a " now-or-never " effect; either donations are made immediately or not at all. In line with the " avoiding-the-ask " theory, both shorter deadlines and the reminder increase the number of requests to be taken off the mailing list.},
  keywords = {corruption,social capital,social norm,trust games}
}

@article{parseHumanBecomingTheory1997,
  ids = {Parse1997,Parse1997a},
  title = {The Human Becoming Theory: {{The}} Was, Is, and Will Be},
  author = {Parse, Rosemarie Rizzo},
  year = {1997},
  journal = {Nursing Science Quarterly},
  volume = {10},
  number = {1},
  pages = {32--38},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications}},
  doi = {10.1177/089431849701000111}
}

@article{pascarellaHowCollegeAffects2006,
  ids = {Pascarella2006,Pascarella2006a},
  title = {How College Affects Students: {{Ten}} Directions for Future Research},
  author = {Pascarella, Ernest T},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Journal of College Student Development},
  volume = {47},
  number = {5},
  pages = {508--520},
  publisher = {{The Johns Hopkins University Press}},
  doi = {10.1353/csd.2006.0060},
  keywords = {nleduc}
}

@article{payneDoesGovernmentCrowdout1998,
  ids = {Payne1998,Payne1998a},
  title = {Does the Government Crowd-out Private Donations? {{New}} Evidence from a Sample of Non-Profit Firms'},
  author = {Payne, A A},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {69},
  pages = {323--345},
  doi = {10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00005-X},
  keywords = {crowding out,empirical,nonprofits,philanthropy,public finance}
}

@article{pearlSevenToolsCausal2018,
  ids = {Pearl2018},
  title = {The {{Seven Tools}} of {{Causal Inference}} with {{Reflections}} on {{Machine Learning}}},
  author = {Pearl, Judea},
  year = {2018},
  volume = {1},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--6}
}

@article{perfectAmbiguityCentipedeGame2018,
  ids = {Perfect2018},
  title = {Ambiguity and the {{Centipede Game}} : {{Strategic Uncertainty}} in {{Multi-Stage Ambiguity}} and the {{Centipede Game}} : {{Strategic Uncertainty}} in {{Multi-Stage Games}} with {{Almost Perfect Information}} .},
  author = {Perfect, Almost and Institut, Alfred Weber},
  year = {2018},
  number = {June}
}

@article{petrinQuantifyingBenefitsNew2002,
  ids = {Petrin2002},
  title = {Quantifying the {{Benefits}} of {{New Products}} : {{The Case}} of the {{Minivan}}},
  author = {Petrin, Amil},
  year = {2002},
  volume = {110},
  number = {4}
}

@book{philosophyNoTitle,
  ids = {Philosophy},
  title = {No {{Title}}},
  author = {Philosophy, T H E and Economics, O F},
  isbn = {978-0-521-88350-4}
}

@article{pittmanEconomistBlamesAid2005,
  ids = {Pittman2005,Pittman2005a},
  title = {Economist {{Blames Aid For Africa Famine}}},
  author = {Pittman, Todd},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Associated Press},
  volume = {7/30/2005},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{pittSpecificationEstimationDemand,
  ids = {Pitt,Pitta},
  title = {The {{Specification}} and {{Estimation}} of the {{Demand}} for {{Goods}} within the {{Household}}},
  author = {Pitt, M M},
  journal = {In Harold Alderman and Lawrence Haddad (eds), Intrahousehold Resource Allocation: Policy Issues and Research Methods, , The Johns Hopkins University Press,},
  volume = {19--38},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,consumer,demand estimation,econometrics,family,household,modeling,theory}
}

@book{pledgeUsFoundersPledge2018,
  title = {About {{Us}} | {{Founders Pledge}}},
  author = {{pledge}, Founders},
  year = {2018}
}

@article{pollutionEnvironmentalResourceEconomics,
  ids = {Pollution,Pollutiona,pollutionEnvironmentalResourceEconomicsa},
  title = {Environmental and {{Resource Economics Nudging}} for {{Cleaner Air}} : {{Experimental Evidence}} from an {{RCT}} on {{Wood Stove Usage}}},
  author = {Pollution, Air and Intervention, Behavioral},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{pottersLeadingbyexampleSignalingVoluntary2007,
  ids = {Potters2007,Potters2007a},
  title = {Leading-by-Example and Signaling in Voluntary Contribution Games: An Experimental Study},
  author = {Potters, J and Sefton, M and Vesterlund, L},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Economic Theory},
  volume = {33},
  number = {1},
  pages = {169--182},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s00199-006-0186-3},
  keywords = {experiments,influence,vcm,VCM}
}

@article{pottersWhyAnnounceLeadership2001,
  ids = {Potters2001,Potters2001a},
  title = {Why {{Announce Leadership Contributions}}? {{An Experimental Study}} of the {{Signaling}} and {{Reciprocity Hypotheses}}},
  author = {Potters, J and Sefton, M and Vesterlund, L},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {University of Pittsburgh mimeo},
  abstract = {Why do fundraisers announce initial contributions to their charity? Potential explanations are that these announcements cause future donors to increase their contributions, either because they want to reciprocate the generosity of earlier donors, or because the initial contributions are seen as a signal of the charity's quality. Using experimental methods we investigate these two hypotheses. When only the first donor is informed of the public good's quality, subjects not only copy the initial contribu- tion, but the first donor also correctly anticipates this response. While this result is consistent with both the signaling and the reciprocity explanations, the latter is unlikely to be the driving force. The reason is that announcements have no effect on contribution levels when the quality of the public good is common knowledge. Thus our results provide strong support for the signaling hypothesis. (JEL C92, D82, H4},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,conditional cooperation,Conditional cooperation,experiment,leaders,philanthropy,public goods,Public goods,reciprocity,sequential PG,signaling,social giving,vcm,VCM}
}

@article{powellLeastAbsoluteDeviations1984,
  ids = {Powell1984,Powell1984a},
  title = {Least Absolute Deviations Estimation for the Censored Regression Model},
  author = {Powell, J L},
  year = {1984},
  journal = {Journal of Econometrics},
  volume = {25},
  number = {3},
  pages = {303--325},
  doi = {10.1016/0304-4076(84)90004-6},
  keywords = {applied econometrics,censoring,corner solutions,econometrics,philanthropy,semiparametric}
}

@article{prendergastImpetuousYoungstersJaded1996,
  ids = {Prendergast1996,Prendergast1996a},
  title = {Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: {{Acquiring}} a Reputation for Learning},
  author = {Prendergast, Canice and Stole, Lars},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  pages = {1105--1134},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1086/262055}
}

@article{pressDirectMeasurementUtility2018,
  ids = {Press2018},
  title = {The {{Direct Measurement}} of {{Utility}} and {{Subjective Probability Author}} ( s ): {{Eugene Galanter Source}} : {{The American Journal}} of {{Psychology}} , {{Vol}} . 75 , {{No}} . 2 ( {{Jun}} ., 1962 ), Pp . 208-220 {{Published}} by : {{University}} of {{Illinois Press Stable URL}} : {{http://www.js}}},
  author = {Press, Illinois},
  year = {2018},
  volume = {75},
  number = {2},
  pages = {208--220}
}

@article{pressSept11Donations2002,
  ids = {Press2002,Press2002a},
  title = {Sept. 11 Donations Swamp Charities},
  author = {Press, Associated},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Associated Press, accessed at http://www.sptimes.com/2002/09/04/911/Sept\_11\_donations\_swa.shtml on 10 January 2014.},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{prestonG021MicroeconomicsLecture,
  ids = {Preston},
  title = {G021 {{Microeconomics Lecture}} Notes},
  author = {Preston, Ian},
  pages = {1--29}
}

@article{qmUJQ2VMQi2b,
  ids = {Qm},
  title = {{{UJQ}}`{{2V MQi2b QM}} "{{hE UkyReV}}},
  author = {Qm, U J Q Mqib and Ami, Q},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{rabinIncorporatingFairnessGame1993,
  ids = {Rabin1993,Rabin1993a},
  title = {Incorporating {{Fairness}} into {{Game Theory}} and {{Economics}}},
  author = {Rabin, M},
  year = {1993},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {83},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1281--1302},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,behavioral,classic,colleagues,fairness,ft,FT,game theory,Game theory,lof,reciprocity,ritual,theory}
}

@techreport{rainerBrotherWhereArt2009,
  ids = {Rainer2009,Rainer2009a},
  title = {O Brother, Where Art Thou? {{The}} Effects of Having a Sibling on Geographic Mobility and Labour Market Outcomes},
  author = {Rainer, Helmut and Siedler, Thomas},
  year = {2009},
  number = {19784},
  institution = {{University of Munich, Department of Economics}},
  abstract = {This paper formulates a model to explain how parental care responsibilities and family structure interact in affecting children's mobility characteristics. Our main result is that the mobility of young adults crucially depends on the presence of a sibling. Siblings compete in location and employment decisions to direct parental care decisions towards their preferred outcome. Only children are not exposed to this kind of competition. This causes an equilibrium in which siblings exhibit higher mobility than only children, and also have better labour market outcomes. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we find evidence that confirms these patterns.},
  keywords = {nlGEOG}
}

@article{randolphDynamicIncomeProgressive1995,
  ids = {Randolph1995,Randolph1995a},
  title = {Dynamic {{Income}}, {{Progressive Taxes}}, and the {{Timing}} of {{Charitable Contributions}}},
  author = {Randolph, William C},
  year = {1995},
  month = aug,
  journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {103},
  number = {4},
  pages = {709--738},
  publisher = {{The University of Chicago Press}},
  issn = {0022-3808},
  doi = {10.1086/262000},
  abstract = {Using an econometric model of charitable giving and a 10-year panel of tax return data, I find that previous studies have underestimated the effects of permanent income and overestimated the effects of permanent changes in tax prices. The significant statutory tax changes that occurred during the 1980s, especially in 1986, serve to identify the key model parameters. My results imply that people smooth their giving when transitory income changes but also time their giving to exploit transitory changes in tax prices. The results also raise questions about how effectively the tax incentives permanently influence the level, rather than just the timing, of charitable giving by individuals.},
  keywords = {empirical,intertemporal,permanent income,philanthropy,public finance,taxes}
}

@article{ransomEconometricsTidyverseRegression,
  ids = {Ransom},
  title = {Econometrics in {{R}} ' s Tidyverse {{Regression}} Modeling {{Working}} with {{Data}}},
  author = {Ransom, Tyler},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{rasulTransactionsCostsCharitable2010,
  ids = {Rasul2010,Rasul2010b},
  title = {Transactions {{Costs}} in {{Charitable Giving}}: {{Evidence}} from {{Two Field Experiments}}},
  author = {Rasul, I and Huck, S},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {The BE Journal of Economic Analysis \& Policy},
  volume = {10},
  number = {1},
  publisher = {{Berkeley Electronic Press}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,field experiments,philanthropy}
}

@article{ravenMentalTestsUsed1936,
  ids = {Raven1936,Raven1936a},
  title = {Mental Tests Used in Genetic Studies: {{The}} Performance of Related Individuals on Tests Mainly Educative and Mainly Reproductive},
  author = {Raven, J C},
  year = {1936},
  journal = {Unpublished master's thesis, University of London},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{rawlsTheoryJustice1971,
  ids = {Rawl,Rawlsa},
  title = {A {{Theory}} of {{Justice}} (1971)},
  author = {Rawls, J},
  journal = {Robert Nozick},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,altruism,classic,ft,FT,motivation for giving,philanthropy,philosophy,political}
}

@article{raynoldsConsumerProducerLinks2002,
  ids = {Raynolds2002,Raynolds2002a},
  title = {Consumer/{{Producer Links}} in {{Fair Trade Coffee Networks}}},
  author = {Raynolds, L T},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Sociologia Ruralis},
  volume = {42},
  number = {4},
  pages = {404--424},
  publisher = {{Blackwell Synergy}},
  doi = {10.1111/1467-9523.00224},
  abstract = {This article analyzes the multifaceted connections linking consumers and producers in expanding North/South Fair Trade coffee networks. I develop a commodity network framework that builds on the commodity chain tradition, integrating insights from cultural studies, actor\textendash network theory, and conventions approaches. This framework illuminates how material and ideological relations are negotiated across production and consumption arenas. In the case of Fair Trade, progressive ideas and practices related to trust, equality, and global responsibility are intertwined with traditional commercial and industrial conventions. As I demonstrate, the negotiation of these divergent conventions shortens the social distance between Fair Trade coffee consumers and producers. I conclude that by re\textendash linking consumers and producers, commodity network analysis provides a robust entr\'e for academic inquiry and engagement in alternative food politics.},
  keywords = {development,food,ft,FT,sociology}
}

@article{rdinaryENERALEIGHTEDVERAGE2012,
  ids = {Rdinary2012},
  title = {A {{G ENERAL W EIGHTED A VERAGE R EPRESENTATION OF THE}}},
  author = {Rdinary, O and Tage, T W O and Quares, L East S},
  year = {2012},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{readingPartFundamentalsBayesian2015,
  ids = {Reading2015},
  title = {Part {{I Fundamentals}} of {{Bayesian Inference}}},
  author = {Reading, Further},
  year = {2015},
  pages = {25--28},
  isbn = {9780511808920}
}

@article{readsStataDiscussionPaper2016,
  ids = {Reads2016},
  title = {In {{Stata Discussion Paper}}},
  author = {Reads, Citations},
  year = {2016},
  number = {October 2013},
  doi = {10.17877/DE290R-5598}
}

@article{reeceCharitableContributionsNew1979,
  ids = {Reece1979,Reece1979a},
  title = {Charitable {{Contributions}}: {{New Evidence}} on {{Household Behavior}}},
  author = {Reece, William S},
  year = {1979},
  month = mar,
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {69},
  number = {1},
  pages = {142--151},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  issn = {0002-8282},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,empirical,philanthropy,stylized facts}
}

@article{regeImpactSocialApproval2004,
  ids = {Rege2004,Rege2004b},
  title = {The Impact of Social Approval and Framing on Cooperation in Public Good Situations},
  author = {Rege, M and Telle, K},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {88},
  number = {7-8},
  pages = {1625--1644},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00021-5},
  abstract = {Several economists have maintained that social and internalized norms can enforce cooperation in public good situations. This experimental study investigates how two important channels for social and internalized norms, social approval and framing, affect cooperation among strangers in a public good game. The experiment has two treatment effects. Firstly, it reveals each person's identity and his contribution to the public good. Secondly, it presents the public good game in a language that suggests associations to social and internalized norms for cooperation. The first treatment effect increases voluntary contributions significantly.},
  keywords = {altruism,applied theory,behavioral,conditional cooperation,Conditional cooperation,conformity,experiments,framing,government crowding,motivation for giving,philanthropy,public goods,Public goods,reciprocity,reputation,social giving,theory}
}

@article{regeSocialNormsPrivate2004,
  ids = {Rege2004a,Rege2004c},
  title = {Social {{Norms}} and {{Private Provision}} of {{Public Goods}}},
  author = {Rege, M},
  year = {2004},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {65--77},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00157.x},
  abstract = {The formation of social norms for voluntary contributions to a public good is analyzed in a game in which people have preferences for private consumption, a public good, and social approval. Each person chooses to be one of the two types: a contributor or a non-contributor. Thereafter, each person meets people who can observe his type. A non-contributor feels disapproval, whereas a contributor feels approval if he believes that a contributor observes his type. The game has two asymptotically stable states: one in which everybody is a contributor, and one in which nobody is a contributor. Governmental subsidization of the public good can move the society to the former state, whereas a governmental contribution to the public good can move the society to the latter. Indeed, this crowding in or crowding out prevails even after policy reversal.},
  keywords = {altruism,applied theory,conditional cooperation,Conditional cooperation,conformity,government crowding,motivation for giving,philanthropy,public goods,Public goods,reciprocity,reputation,social giving,theory}
}

@article{regnerMagnatuneVariablePricingMusic,
  ids = {Regner,Regnerb},
  title = {Magnatune-{{Variable Pricing}} for {{Music}}},
  author = {Regner, T and Barria, J A},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.721596}
}

@article{regnerWhyConsumersPay,
  ids = {Regnera,Regnerc},
  title = {Why {{Consumers Pay Voluntarily}}: {{Evidence}} from {{Online Music}}},
  author = {Regner, T},
  doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2014.10.006}
}

@book{regulatorAutomaticEnrolmentCommentary2014,
  title = {Automatic Enrolment {{Commentary}} and Analysis: {{April}} 2013 \textendash{} {{March}} 2014},
  author = {Regulator, The Pensions},
  year = {2014},
  publisher = {{The Pensions Regulator}},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@article{reinsteinDecomposingDesertTangibility2012,
  ids = {Reinstein2012,Reinstein2012e},
  title = {Decomposing Desert and Tangibility Effects in a Charitable Giving Experiment},
  author = {Reinstein, D and Riener, G},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  pages = {1--12},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,experiment,money,philanthropy}
}

@article{reinsteinDoesOneCharitable,
  ids = {Reinstein,Reinsteinc},
  title = {Does {{One Charitable Contribution Come}} at the {{Expense}} of {{Another}}?},
  author = {Reinstein, David A},
  journal = {The BE Journal of Economic Analysis \& Policy},
  volume = {11},
  number = {1},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{reinsteinEfficientConsumerAltruism2008,
  ids = {Reinstein2008,Reinstein2008a},
  title = {Efficient {{Consumer Altruism}} and {{Fair Trade}}},
  author = {Reinstein, D and Song, J},
  year = {2008},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{reinsteinEfficientConsumerAltruism2012,
  ids = {Reinstein2012d,Reinstein2012h},
  title = {Efficient {{Consumer Altruism}} and {{Fair Trade Products}}},
  author = {Reinstein, David and Song, Joon},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Journal of Economics and Management Strategy},
  volume = {21},
  number = {1},
  pages = {213--241},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00323.x},
  abstract = {Consumers have shown a willingness to pay a premium for products labeled as ``FT'' and a preference for retailers that are seen to be more generous to their suppliers/employees. A FT product is essentially a bundle of a base product and a donation to the supplier (e.g., a coffee farmer). An altruistic rational consumer will only choose this bundle if doing so is less expensive than buying the base product and making a direct donation. For FT to be sustainable either in a competitive equilibrium or in a monopolistic environment this bundling must yield an efficiency. This efficiency is generated in the following context. A supplier's investment reduces the retailer's cost or boosts the final product's quality, but this investment is not immediately observable and cannot be enforced, hence there exists a moral hazard problem. In this environment, the altruism of the consumer can facilitate a more efficient contract: by paying the supplier more the retailer can both extract more consumer surplus and increase the level of contracted investment, while preserving the supplier's incentive compatibility constraint. We assess our model in the context of the coffee industry.}
}

@article{reinsteinInfluenceExpertReviews2005,
  ids = {Reinstein2005,Reinstein2005a},
  title = {The {{Influence}} of {{Expert Reviews}} on {{Consumer Demand}} for {{Experience Goods}}: {{A Case Study}} of {{Movie Critics}}},
  author = {Reinstein, David and Snyder, Christopher J},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
  doi = {10.1111/j.0022-1821.2005.00244.x}
}

@article{reinsteinListenMarketHear2014,
  ids = {Reinstein2014b,Reinstein2014c,reinsteinListenMarketHear2014a},
  title = {Listen to the {{Market}}, {{Hear}} the {{Best Policy Decision}}, but Don ' t {{Always Choose It}}.},
  author = {Reinstein, David and Song, Joon},
  year = {2014},
  number = {748}
}

@article{reinsteinListenMarketHear2018,
  ids = {Reinstein2018,Reinstein2018a,reinsteinListenMarketHear2018a},
  title = {Listen to the Market , Hear the Best Policy Decision , but Don ' t},
  author = {Reinstein, David and Song, Joon and Chakravarty, Surajeet},
  year = {2018},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{reinsteinListenMarketHear2019,
  ids = {Reinstein2019},
  title = {Listen to the Market , Hear the Best Policy Decision , but Don ' t Always Choose It . {${_\ast}$}},
  author = {Reinstein, David and Song, Joon and Chakravarty, Surajeet},
  year = {2019},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{reinsteinReputationInfluenceCharitable2012,
  ids = {Reinstein2012b,Reinstein2012c,Reinstein2012f,Reinstein2012g,reinsteinReputationInfluenceCharitable2012a},
  title = {Reputation and Influence in Charitable Giving: {{An}} Experiment},
  author = {Reinstein, David and Riener, Gerhard},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Theory and Decision},
  volume = {72},
  number = {2},
  pages = {221--243},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s11238-011-9245-8},
  abstract = {Previous experimental and observational work suggests that people act more generously when they are observed and observe others in social settings. However, the explanation for this is unclear. An individual may want to send a signal of her generosity to improve her own reputation. Alternately (or additionally) she may value the public good or charity itself and, believing that contribution levels are strategic complements, give more to influence others to give more. We perform the first series of laboratory experiments that can separately estimate the impact of these two social effects, and test whether realized influence is consistent with the desire to influence, and whether either of these are consistent with anticipated influence. Our experimental subjects were given the opportunity to contribute from their endowment to Bread for the World, a development NGO. Depending on treatment, "leader" subjects' donations were reported to other subjects either anonymously or with their identities, and these were reported either before these "follower" subjects made their donation decisions. We find that "leaders" are influential only when their identities are revealed along with their donations, and female leaders are more influential than males. Identified leaders' predictions suggest that are aware of their influence. They respond to this by giving more than either the control group or the unidentified leaders. We find mixed evidence for "reputation-seeking."},
  keywords = {altruism,Altruism,Charitable giving,Experimental design,influence,Influence,Peer effects,reputation,Reputation}
}

@article{reinsteinSubstitutionCharitableContributions2010,
  ids = {Reinstein2010,Reinstein2010a},
  title = {Substitution {{Among Charitable Contributions}}: {{An Experimental Study}}},
  author = {Reinstein, D},
  year = {2010},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{reinsteinSubstitutionMotivationsCharitable2011,
  ids = {Reinstein2011,Reinstein2011b},
  title = {Substitution {{Between}} (and {{Motivations}} for) {{Charitable Contributions}}: {{An Experimental Study}}},
  author = {Reinstein, David},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Mimeo},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,colleagues,experimental,me,motivation for giving,philanthropy,social giving,substitution}
}

@article{renardFairTradeQuality2003,
  ids = {Renard2003,Renard2003a},
  title = {Fair Trade: Quality, Market and Conventions},
  author = {Renard, M C},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Journal of rural studies},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {87--96},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0743-0167(02)00051-7}
}

@article{ribarAltruisticJoyofgivingMotivations2002,
  ids = {Ribar2002,Ribar2002a},
  title = {Altruistic and Joy-of-Giving Motivations in Charitable Behavior.},
  author = {Ribar, C D and Wilhelm, M O},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {110},
  pages = {425--457},
  doi = {10.1086/338750},
  abstract = {Show that "pure altruism" motive becomes insignificant for a large public good.},
  keywords = {altruism,philanthropy,public goods,Public goods,theory}
}

@article{riedlWhyInvestorsHold2017,
  ids = {Riedl2017},
  title = {Why {{Do Investors Hold Socially Responsible Mutual Funds}}?},
  author = {Riedl, Arno and Smeets, Paul},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Finance},
  volume = {72},
  number = {6},
  pages = {2505--2550},
  issn = {15406261},
  doi = {10.1111/jofi.12547},
  abstract = {How to structure an introduction!},
  keywords = {experimental finance,social preferences,socially responsible investments}
}

@article{rimmEffectivenessVariousMailing1990,
  ids = {Rimm1990,Rimm1990a},
  title = {Effectiveness of Various Mailing Strategies among Nonrespondents in a Prospective Cohort Study},
  author = {Rimm, Eric B and Stampfer, Meir J and Colditz, Graham A and Giovannucci, Edward and Willett, Walter C},
  year = {1990},
  journal = {American Journal of Epidemiology},
  volume = {131},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1068--1071},
  publisher = {{Oxford Univ Press}},
  doi = {10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a115598},
  keywords = {personalized envelopes,tax or donate}
}

@article{risembergDateMatchingMethods1999,
  ids = {Risemberg1999,Risemberg1999a},
  title = {Date Matching Methods, {{US Patent}} 5,920,845},
  author = {Risemberg, R},
  year = {1999},
  journal = {(Source: Google Patents)},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  note = {US Patent 5,920,845
\par
US Patent 5,920,845
\par
US Patent 5,920,845}
}

@article{robbinsInterpersonalComparisonsUtility1938,
  ids = {Robbins1938,Robbins1938a},
  title = {Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment},
  author = {Robbins, Lionel},
  year = {1938},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {48},
  number = {192},
  pages = {635--641},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.2307/2225051},
  keywords = {happiness}
}

@article{robinsComparisonLaborSupply1985,
  ids = {Robins1985,Robins1985a},
  title = {A Comparison of the Labor Supply Findings from the Four Negative Income Tax Experiments},
  author = {Robins, Philip K},
  year = {1985},
  journal = {Journal of Human Resources},
  pages = {567--582},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.2307/145685}
}

@article{robinsonEconomicsImperfectCompetition1933,
  ids = {Robinson1933,Robinson1933a},
  title = {Economics of Imperfect Competition},
  author = {Robinson, Joan},
  year = {1933},
  publisher = {{Macmillan and Co., ltd.}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,3dpd,io,poorcard}
}

@article{rodriquezProgrammingStata2010,
  ids = {Rodriquez2010},
  title = {Programming {{Stata}}},
  author = {{Rodriquez}},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Stata tutorial - Princeton University},
  pages = {1--12},
  doi = {10.1201/b15081-8},
  isbn = {978-1-4665-8585-0}
}

@article{roemerKantianEquilibrium2010,
  ids = {Roemer2010,Roemer2010a},
  title = {Kantian Equilibrium},
  author = {Roemer, John E},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {The Scandinavian Journal of Economics},
  volume = {112},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--24},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9442.2009.01592.x}
}

@article{romanoWhyCharitiesAnnounce2001,
  ids = {Romano2001,Romano2001a},
  title = {Why Charities Announce Donations: A Positive Perspective},
  author = {Romano, R and Yildirim, H},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {81},
  number = {3},
  pages = {423--447},
  publisher = {{Elsevier BV}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00078-5},
  abstract = {Charities frequently announce contributions of donors as they accrue. Doing so induces donors to play a sequential-move rather than simultaneous-move game. We examine the conditions under which a charity prefers such sequential play. It is known that if donors only value contributions through their effect on the total provision of a public good, then the charity will not announce contributions sequentially. However, with more general utility functions that include additional effects such as warm-glow or snob appeal, the charity may benefit from announcing contributions.},
  keywords = {fundraising,motivation for giving,philanthropy,reputation,sequential public goods game,social giving,theory}
}

@article{rose-ackermanAltruismNonprofitsEconomic1996,
  ids = {Rose-Ackerman1996,Rose-Ackerman1996a},
  title = {Altruism, {{Nonprofits}}, and {{Economic Theory}}},
  author = {{Rose-Ackerman}, Susan},
  year = {1996},
  month = jun,
  journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
  volume = {34},
  number = {2},
  pages = {701--728},
  publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
  issn = {0022-0515},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,altruism,nonprofits,philanthropy,theory}
}

@article{rosenfeldSearchingMateRise2012,
  ids = {Rosenfeld2012,Rosenfeld2012a},
  title = {Searching for a {{Mate}}: {{The Rise}} of the {{Internet}} as a {{Social Intermediary}}},
  author = {Rosenfeld, M J and Thomas, R J},
  year = {2012},
  doi = {10.1177/0003122412448050},
  keywords = {losingface}
}

@article{rosenHedonicPricesImplicit1974,
  ids = {Rosen1974,Rosen1974a},
  title = {Hedonic {{Prices}} and {{Implicit Markets}}: {{Product Differentiation}} in {{Pure Competition}}},
  author = {Rosen, S},
  year = {1974},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  volume = {82},
  number = {1},
  pages = {34},
  publisher = {{UChicago Press}},
  doi = {10.1086/260169},
  keywords = {demand,hedonic,Industrial Organization,product differentiation}
}

@article{rotembergAltruismReciprocityCooperation2006,
  ids = {Rotemberg2006,Rotemberg2006b},
  title = {Altruism, Reciprocity and Cooperation in the Workplace},
  author = {Rotemberg, J J},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Handbook on the economics of giving, reciprocity and altruism},
  volume = {2},
  pages = {1371--1407},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S1574-0714(06)02021-5}
}

@article{rotembergHumanRelationsWorkplace1994,
  ids = {Rotemberg1994,Rotemberg1994a},
  title = {Human Relations in the Workplace},
  author = {Rotemberg, J J},
  year = {1994},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  pages = {684--717},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1086/261951}
}

@article{rothGameTheoryPart1991,
  ids = {Roth1991,Roth1991a},
  title = {Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics},
  author = {Roth, A E},
  year = {1991},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {101},
  number = {404},
  pages = {107--114},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.2307/2233845}
}

@techreport{rothRepugnanceConstraintMarkets2006,
  ids = {Roth2006,Roth2006a},
  title = {Repugnance as a {{Constraint}} on {{Markets}}},
  author = {Roth, Alvin E},
  year = {2006},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}}
}

@article{rstudioLubridate2019,
  ids = {RStudio2019},
  title = {Lubridate},
  author = {{RStudio}},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {R Cheat Sheet},
  pages = {2016--2017},
  isbn = {1511870400},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{rubin1976inference,
  title = {Inference and Missing Data},
  author = {Rubin, Donald B},
  year = {1976},
  journal = {Biometrika},
  volume = {63},
  number = {3},
  pages = {581--592},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
  doi = {10.1093/biomet/63.3.581}
}

@article{rubinsteinTheoristViewExperiments2001,
  ids = {Rubinstein2001,Rubinstein2001a},
  title = {A Theorist's View of Experiments},
  author = {Rubinstein, A},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {European Economic Review},
  volume = {45},
  number = {4},
  pages = {615--628},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00104-0}
}

@article{rwiLeeboundsLee20092012,
  ids = {Rwi2012},
  title = {Leebounds : {{Lee}} ' s ( 2009 ) Treatment Effects Bounds for Non-Random Sample Selection for {{Stata}}},
  author = {Rwi, Harald Tauchmann},
  year = {2012},
  number = {June},
  pages = {1--20}
}

@article{rydvalHowCertainUncertainty2009,
  ids = {Rydval2009,Rydval2009a},
  title = {How Certain Is the Uncertainty Effect?},
  author = {Rydval, Ond and Ortmann, Andreas and Prokosheva, Sasha and Hertwig, Ralph},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {12},
  number = {4},
  pages = {473--487},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10683-009-9224-x},
  abstract = {We replicate three tasks for which Gneezy, List and Wu (Q. J. Econ. 121(4):1283\textendash 1309, 2006) document the so-called uncertainty effect: People value a binary lottery over non-monetary outcomes less than other people value the lottery's worse outcome. While the authors implement verbal lottery descriptions, we use a physical lottery format and also provide subjects with complete information about the goods they are to value. We observe for all three pricing tasks that subjects' willingness to pay for the lottery is significantly higher than other subjects' willingness to pay for the lottery's worse outcome.}
}

@article{sagarinEthicalApproachPeeking2014,
  ids = {Sagarin2014,Sagarin2014a,sagarinEthicalApproachPeeking2014a},
  title = {An {{Ethical Approach}} to {{Peeking}} at {{Data}}},
  author = {Sagarin, Brad J and Ambler, James K and Lee, Ellen M},
  year = {2014},
  doi = {10.1177/1745691614528214},
  isbn = {1745-6924 (Electronic)\textbackslash r1745-6916 (Linking)},
  pmid = {26173265},
  keywords = {05,06 nearly as much,1277,1989,as the,ethics,god loves the,p,p values,research methods,rosnow and rosenthal,significance testing,surely}
}

@article{saijoSpitefulBehaviorVoluntary2008,
  ids = {Saijo2008,Saijo2008a},
  title = {Spiteful Behavior in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments},
  author = {Saijo, T},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Handbook of experimental economics results},
  volume = {1},
  pages = {802--816},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00085-6}
}

@article{sanbornFrequentistImplicationsOptional2014,
  ids = {sanborn2014frequentist},
  title = {The Frequentist Implications of Optional Stopping on {{Bayesian}} Hypothesis Tests},
  author = {Sanborn, Adam N and Hills, Thomas T},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Psychonomic bulletin \& review},
  volume = {21},
  number = {2},
  pages = {283--300},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.3758/s13423-013-0518-9}
}

@article{sandersSocialInfluencesCharitable2017,
  ids = {Sanders2016,Sanders2016a,Sanders2017,sanders2017social},
  title = {Social Influences on Charitable Giving in the Workplace},
  author = {Sanders, Michael},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics},
  volume = {66},
  pages = {129--136},
  publisher = {{Elsevier Inc.}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.socec.2015.12.004},
  keywords = {Altruism,Charitable giving,Field experiments,Social influences}
}

@article{sanz-de-galdeanoObesityEpidemicEurope2005,
  ids = {Sanz-de-Galdeano2005,Sanz-de-Galdeano2005a},
  title = {The {{Obesity Epidemic}} in {{Europe}}},
  author = {{Sanz-de-Galdeano}, A},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Centre for Studies},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,empirical,obesity}
}

@article{sargeantGiftGivingInterdisciplinary2007,
  ids = {Sargeant2007,Sargeant2007a},
  title = {Gift Giving: An Interdisciplinary Review},
  author = {Sargeant, A and Woodliffe, L},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing},
  volume = {12},
  number = {4},
  pages = {275--307},
  publisher = {{John Wiley \& Sons}},
  doi = {10.1002/nvsm.308},
  keywords = {philanthropy,surveys}
}

@article{sarriasDiscreteChoiceModels2016,
  ids = {Sarrias2016},
  title = {Discrete {{Choice Models}} with {{Random Parameters}} in {{R}} : {{The Rchoice Package}}},
  author = {Sarrias, Mauricio},
  year = {2016},
  volume = {74},
  number = {10},
  doi = {10.18637/jss.v074.i10},
  keywords = {discrete choice models,individual-specific estimates,r,random parameters,simulated maximum likelihood}
}

@article{sarvaryMarketingInformationCompetitive1997,
  ids = {Sarvary1997,Sarvary1997a},
  title = {Marketing {{Information}}: {{A Competitive Analysis}}},
  author = {Sarvary, Miklos and Parker, Philip M},
  year = {1997},
  journal = {Marketing Science},
  volume = {16},
  number = {1},
  pages = {24--38},
  publisher = {{INFORMS}},
  issn = {07322399},
  doi = {10.1287/mksc.16.1.24},
  abstract = {Selling information that is later used in decision making constitutes an increasingly important business in modern economies (Jensen 1991). Information is sold under a large variety of forms: industry reports, consulting services, database access, and/or professional opinions given by medical, engineering, accounting/financial, and legal professionals, among others. This paper is the first attempt in marketing to study competition in the rapidly emerging information sector. Specifically, we are interested in answering the following questions: (1) Is competition fundamentally different when competing firms sell information rather than traditional goods and services, and-if yes-why? (2) What are the implications of such differences for decision makers (marketers and regulators)? (3) Can we explain some of the observed marketing strategies in the information industry? As such, the audience of the paper includes academics as well as professionals who are interested in understanding what is specific about competition in information markets. Familiarity with the practical implications of such differences and understanding of the mechanisms that drive them is essential for those who are faced with the problem of marketing information. To answer the above research questions we build a simple game-theoretic model that consists of two firms selling information to a population of consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the quality of information. The most important features of the model are the following. Information products sold by the two firms are modeled as random draws from two normal distributions having equal mean. The variances of these distributions and their correlatedness constitute the product-attribute space, which is assumed to be common knowledge. Consumers are interested in assessing the mean of the distributions and to do so they can buy the sample from any of the firms or they can buy both samples and combine them to obtain a more accurate estimate. Quality of information is linked to the accuracy of consumers' estimate of the mean which in turn is influenced by the accuracy of each sample as well as by their correlatedness. Consumers' utility depends on the quality of information they purchased, on their inherent utility for quality (taste), and on the total price they paid to acquire information. Knowing consumer preferences, firms simultaneously price their information products. The main finding of the paper is that information markets face unique competitive structures. In particular, the qualitative nature of competition changes depending on basic product characteristics. While traditional products and services compete either as substitutes or as complements in the relevant product-attribute space, information may be one or the other, depending on its position within the same product-attribute space. Said differently, the nature of competition changes qualitatively with a continuous change in basic product-attribute levels. The intuition behind this finding is the following. When purchasing information, consumers facing important decisions may find it beneficial to purchase from several information sellers. This is more likely to happen when the reliability of information is low and the sources of information are independent. Under such conditions information products tend to be complements and, as a result, competition between sellers is relatively mild. In the opposite case, when information is reliable and/or sellers' sources are highly correlated, consumers are satisfied after consulting a single source. In this case, information products are substitutes and sellers tend to undercut one another's prices to induce consumers to choose their brand. Understanding this discontinuity in competitive structures has important implications for decision makers as very different strategies are optimal under different product characteristics. Under substitution, traditional strategies to avoid competition (e.g., differentiation) are recommended. When the competing products' reliability is generally low (they are complements) firms are better off accommodating competition. In fact, we find that a firm may benefit from "inviting" a competitor. Finally, our findings are also important for regulators of information markets. As the literature on complementarity suggests, price fixing agreements between firms offering complementary products may benefit firms as well as consumers.},
  keywords = {applied theory,business,consumers,differentiated products,experience goods,Industrial Organization,information,internet,marketing,movies,reviews,theory}
}

@techreport{sassDynamicsIndividualPreferences2012,
  ids = {Sass2012,Sass2012a},
  title = {The {{Dynamics}} of {{Individual Preferences}} in {{Repeated Public Good Experiments}}},
  author = {Sass, M and Weimann, J},
  year = {2012},
  institution = {{Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management}},
  keywords = {cooperation,experiments,Experiments,vcms},
  note = {There is evidence for declining cooperation in VCM's over time even in the absence of feedback; see Chaudhuri and XXPaichayontvijit, and, for conditional cooperation functions elicited using the strategy method,
\par
There is evidence for declining cooperation in VCM's over time even in the absence of feedback; see Chaudhuri and XXPaichayontvijit, and, for conditional cooperation functions elicited using the strategy method,
\par
There is evidence for declining cooperation in VCM's over time even in the absence of feedback; see Chaudhuri and XXPaichayontvijit, and, for conditional cooperation functions elicited using the strategy method,}
}

@article{scharfLiftShiftEffect2017,
  ids = {Scharf2017},
  title = {Lift and {{Shift}}: {{The Effect}} of {{Fundraising Interventions}} in {{Charity Space}} and {{Time}}},
  author = {Scharf, Kimberley and Smith, Sarah and {Ottoni-Wilhelm}, Mark},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.1920/wp.ifs.2017.W1720},
  keywords = {aid foundation for providing,d12,d64,D64,donations,h41,H41,helpful comments received at,in particular to susan,intertemporal substitution,jel codes,matt mclellan,pinkney and,seminars,substitution,thanks to the charities,the data,warm glow,Warm glow,we are grateful for,workshops and}
}

@article{scharfsteinHerdBehaviorInvestment1990,
  ids = {Scharfstein1990,Scharfstein1990a},
  title = {Herd Behavior and Investment},
  author = {Scharfstein, David S and Stein, Jeremy C},
  year = {1990},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  pages = {465--479},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{schervishMoneyMagnanimityNew1998,
  ids = {Schervish1998,Schervish1998a},
  title = {Money and {{Magnanimity}}: {{New Findings}} on the {{Distribution}} of {{Income}}, {{Wealth}}, and {{Philanthropy}}},
  author = {Schervish, P G and Havens, J J},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {Nonprofit Management and Leadership},
  volume = {8},
  number = {4},
  pages = {421--434},
  doi = {10.1002/nml.8409},
  keywords = {income distribution,nonprofits,philanthropy,stylized facts}
}

@article{schmalenseeOutputWelfareImplications1980,
  ids = {Schmalensee1980,Schmalensee1980a},
  title = {Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination},
  author = {Schmalensee, R},
  year = {1980},
  publisher = {{Massachusetts Institute of Technology}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,3dpd,differentiated products,Industrial Organization,monopolistic competition,monopoly,poorcard,price discrimination,pricing,public finance,theory,welfare}
}

@article{schmitzCharitableGivingZero2016,
  ids = {Schmitz2016,Schmitz2016a,Schmitz2016b},
  title = {Is {{Charitable Giving}} a {{Zero Sum Game}}? - {{The Effect}} of {{Competition Between Charities}} on {{Giving Behavior}}},
  author = {Schmitz, Jan},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Ssrn},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2862479},
  abstract = {The competition for donations between charities is tough. Yet, little is known about how people react to the extensive supply of charitable organizations. Do people have a need to satisfy their demand for giving by contributing to a particular charity? Or can the demand for doing good be satisfied by giving to any organization? In a donation dictator game competition between charities is simulated by altering the set of similar real charities to which subjects can give. I find weak substitution between charities when giving to more than one charity is possible, as the donated amounts to individual charities decrease with the size of the choice set. At the same time, the sum of donations to all charities increases when charities are in competition. Additionally, a reduced price in giving to one charity (matching grant) increases giving to the matched charity. However, a match does not result in a complete shift of donations to this charity. Further, subjects substitute part of their own contributions with the matching grant and leave their individual total contributions unchanged.},
  keywords = {C91,Charitable giving,Charitable Giving,competition,Competition,D64,Experimental Economics,H41,P43,social preferences,Social Preferences},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/CCPX2UGE/schmitz-2019-SSRN-id2862479.pdf}
}

@article{schokkaertPreferenceVariationPrivate2000,
  ids = {Schokkaert2000,Schokkaert2000a},
  title = {Preference Variation and Private Donations},
  author = {Schokkaert, E and Van Ootegem, L},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism, Macmillan, London},
  pages = {78--95},
  doi = {10.1007/978-1-349-62745-5_3},
  keywords = {heterogeneity,motivation for giving,philanthropy,reciprocity}
}

@article{schramSortingOutSeeking2000,
  ids = {Schram2000,Schram2000a},
  title = {Sorting out the Seeking: {{The}} Economics of Individual Motivations},
  author = {Schram, A},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {Public Choice},
  volume = {103},
  number = {3},
  pages = {231--258},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1023/A:1005036003561}
}

@article{seltenExperimentalSolidarityGame1998,
  ids = {Selten1998,Selten1998a},
  title = {An Experimental Solidarity Game},
  author = {Selten, R and Ockenfels, A},
  year = {1998},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
  volume = {34},
  number = {4},
  pages = {517--539},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00107-8},
  abstract = {Abstract 120 subjects played a three-person-game in which each player could win DM 10,00 with probability 2/3. Before the independent random decisions were made, the players had to decide under double blind conditions how much they were willing to give to one loser or each of two losers in the case of their winning. The great majority of subjects were willing to make substantial conditional gifts. The most common type of gift behavior does not lend itself to a straightforward interpretation as the result of altruistic utility maximization. We found an education effect, a gender effect, and a false consensus effect.}
}

@article{semeijnRoleEducationSelection2005,
  ids = {Semeijn2005,Semeijn2005a},
  title = {The Role of Education in Selection and Allocation in the Labour Market: An Empirical Study in the Medical Field},
  author = {Semeijn, Judith and {van der Velden}, Rolf and Heijke, Hans and {van der Vleuten}, Cees and Boshuizen, Henny},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Education economics},
  volume = {13},
  number = {4},
  pages = {449--477},
  publisher = {{Taylor \& Francis}},
  doi = {10.1080/09645290500252084},
  abstract = {In this study, we explore the role of education in explaining the labour market outcomes for a sample of graduates in medicine. More specifically, the following research question is answered: To what extent are labour market outcomes of physicians explained by the skills acquired in education, as indicated in the theory of human capital, or by competences already present at the start of education, as suggested by the screening theory? The study uses separate measurements of competence at the start and at the end of education. Moreover, we use a direct measurement of competence development during medical education. This enables us to disentangle the effects of the suggested mechanisms. The results suggest that after graduation human capital factors do not explain subsequent differences in labour market outcomes. The medical degree seems a sufficient signal of screening device as such. However, selection processes during education take place on human capital acquired before and during medical education.}
}

@article{servatkaSeparatingReputationSocial2009,
  ids = {Servatka2009,Servatka2009a,Zealand2009,Zealand2009b},
  title = {Separating Reputation, Social Influence, and Identification Effects in a Dictator Game},
  author = {Servatka, M},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {European Economic Review},
  volume = {53},
  number = {2},
  pages = {197--209},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.04.001},
  keywords = {experimental economics},
  note = {mentions the importance of "soft commitments" ... interesting survey of models including gul and pesendorfer choice set dependent utility and "temptation" ... That is, her utility is the commitment value of the fish less the difference in temptation values between the chosen item and the most tempting item. Because the last term must be negative it is always the case that u(f) /gteq u(f,s) and so the decision maker would prefer to choose from the smaller menu f\vphantom\{\}. If on the other hand the agent gives in to temptation and orders the steak, her utility is given by u(s), and again we see that u(f) gt u(s) so she would prefer to commit to the smaller menu., author = Bryan, G and Karlan, D and Nelson, S, journal = Annu. Rev. Econ., keywords = behavioral,commitment devices,philanthropy, number = 1, pages = 671\textendash 698, publisher = Annual Reviews, title = Commitment devices, volume = 2, year = 2010}
}

@article{shangFieldExperimentsCharitable2005,
  ids = {Shang2005,Shang2005a},
  title = {Field {{Experiments}} in {{Charitable Contribution}}: {{The Impact}} of {{Social Influence}} on the {{Voluntary Provision}} of {{Public Goods}}},
  author = {Shang, J and Croson, R},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Working paper},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,anonymity,field experiments,peers,philanthropy,reputation,social influence}
}

@article{shankouNoTitleXiaoFeiZheXingGuanNengPingJianiyoRuShiWeitonoGuanLianXing2013,
  ids = {2013},
  title = {No {{Title消費者型官能評価によ}} る食味との関連性},
  author = {山口, 悠 and 口田, 圭吾},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {日本畜産学会報},
  volume = {84},
  pages = {487--492},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{shanteauProbabilityAcceptanceDating1979,
  ids = {Shanteau1979,Shanteau1979a},
  title = {Probability of Acceptance in Dating Choice.},
  author = {Shanteau, J and Nagy, G F},
  year = {1979},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {37},
  number = {4},
  pages = {522},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.37.4.522}
}

@article{shapiroEquilibriumUnemploymentWorker1984,
  ids = {Shapiro1984,Shapiro1984a},
  title = {Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device},
  author = {Shapiro, C and Stiglitz, J E},
  year = {1984},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {74},
  number = {3},
  pages = {433--444},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{shapiroPremiumsHighQuality1983,
  ids = {Shapiro1983,Shapiro1983a},
  title = {Premiums for {{High Quality Products}} as {{Returns}} to {{Reputations}}},
  author = {Shapiro, C},
  year = {1983},
  journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {98},
  number = {4},
  pages = {659--680},
  doi = {10.2307/1881782},
  keywords = {applied theory,entry,experience goods,game theory,Game theory,Industrial Organization,movies,reputation,revise}
}

@article{shapiroThereDailyDiscount2005,
  ids = {Shapiro2005,Shapiro2005a},
  title = {Is There a Daily Discount Rate? {{Evidence}} from the Food Stamp Nutrition Cycle},
  author = {Shapiro, J M},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {89},
  number = {2},
  pages = {303--325},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.003},
  keywords = {behavioral,consumers,discounting,empirical,food,nutrition,obesity,poorcard}
}

@article{sheetAdvanced,
  title = {Advanced {{R}}},
  author = {Sheet, Cheat},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{sheetApplyFunctionsPurrr2017,
  ids = {Sheet2017a},
  title = {Apply Functions with Purrr : : {{CHEAT SHEET}}},
  author = {Sheet, Cheat},
  year = {2017},
  pages = {2--3}
}

@article{sheetGituhb2015,
  ids = {Sheet2015},
  title = {Gituhb},
  author = {Sheet, Cheat},
  year = {2015},
  pages = {1--2}
}

@article{shihGeneralAnalysisOutput1988,
  ids = {Shih1988,Shih1988a},
  title = {A General Analysis of the Output Effect under Third-Degree Price Discrimination},
  author = {Shih, Jun-ji and Mai, Chao-cheng and Liu, Jung-chao},
  year = {1988},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  pages = {149--158},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.2307/2233516},
  keywords = {poorcard}
}

@techreport{shillerFirstDegreePrice2013,
  title = {First {{Degree Price Discrimination Using Big Data}}},
  author = {Shiller, Benjamin Reed},
  year = {2013},
  abstract = {First-degree price discrimination, or person-specific pricing, had until recently rarely been observed. The reason, that reservation values were unobtainable, may no longer be true now that massive datasets tracking detailed individual behavior exist. Hence, a fundamental change in the way goods are priced may be underway. I investigate this claim in one context. I show demographics, which in the past could be used to personalize prices, poorly predict which consumers subscribe to Netflix. By contrast, modern web- browsing data, with variables such as visits to Amazon.com and internet use on Tuesdays - variables which reflect behavior - do substantially better. I then present a model to estimate demand and simulate outcomes had 1st degree PD been implemented. The model is structural, derived from canonical theory models, but resembles an ordered Probit, allowing a new method for handling massive datasets and addressing overfitting and high dimensionality. Simulations show using demographics alone to tailor prices raises profits by 0.8\%. Including nearly 5000 potential website browsing explanatory variables increases profits by much more, 12.2\%, increasingly the appeal of tailored pricing, and resulting in some consumers paying double the price others do for the exact same product. Implications for the overall economy and its structure are discussed. (JEL: D42, L130)},
  keywords = {poorcard}
}

@article{shiPredictionMechanismsThat2009,
  ids = {Shi2009,Shi2009a},
  title = {Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions},
  author = {Shi, P and Conitzer, V and Guo, M},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Internet and Network Economics},
  pages = {89--100},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_10}
}

@unpublished{siemrothWhenCanDecision2017,
  ids = {Siemroth2017},
  title = {When {{Can Decision Makers Learn}} from {{Financial Market Prices}}?},
  booktitle = {{{SSRN}}},
  author = {Siemroth, Christoph},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2980611},
  abstract = {I analyze a general setting where a policy maker needs information that financial market traders have in order to implement her optimal policy, and market prices can potentially reveal this information. Policy decisions, in turn, affect asset values, hence forward looking traders may have incentives to withhold information. I derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of fully revealing equilibria in competitive financial markets, which identifies all situations where learning from prices for policy purposes works, and where it does not. Full revelation may be impossible because the pricing problem is a self-defeating prophecy. Using the result, I demonstrate that some corporate prediction markets are ill-designed and punish traders for revealing their information, and show how to fix it. I also discuss the possibility of using market information for banking supervision and central banking, and the general problem of asset design.},
  keywords = {Asset Design,asymmetric information,Asymmetric Information,D53,D82,D84,Financial Markets,G10,policy,Policy,Price Informativeness,Rational Expectations Equilibrium,Self-Defeating Prophecy}
}

@book{simcoeXTPQMLStataModule2007,
  title = {{{XTPQML}}: {{Stata}} Module to Estimate {{Fixed-effects Poisson}} ({{Quasi-ML}}) Regression with Robust Standard Errors},
  author = {Simcoe, T},
  year = {2007}
}

@article{simmonsFalsepositivePsychologyUndisclosed2011,
  ids = {simmons2011false},
  title = {False-Positive Psychology: {{Undisclosed}} Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant},
  author = {Simmons, Joseph P and Nelson, Leif D and Simonsohn, Uri},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Psychological science},
  volume = {22},
  number = {11},
  pages = {1359--1366},
  publisher = {{Sage Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA}},
  doi = {10.1177/0956797611417632}
}

@article{simonsohnPcurveKeyFiledrawer2014,
  ids = {simonsohn2014p},
  title = {P-Curve: A Key to the File-Drawer.},
  author = {Simonsohn, Uri and Nelson, Leif D and Simmons, Joseph P},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
  volume = {143},
  number = {2},
  pages = {534},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  doi = {10.1037/a0033242}
}

@article{simonsohnTwoLinesValid2018,
  ids = {Simonsohn2018,simonsohn2018two},
  title = {Two Lines: {{A}} Valid Alternative to the Invalid Testing of {{U-shaped}} Relationships with Quadratic Regressions},
  shorttitle = {Two Lines},
  author = {Simonsohn, Uri},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {538--555},
  publisher = {{SAGE Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA}},
  doi = {10.1177/2515245918805755},
  isbn = {2515245919},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/JXC9X6XU/2515245918805755.html}
}

@article{simpsonAltruismIndirectReciprocity2008,
  ids = {Simpson2008,Simpson2008a},
  title = {Altruism and {{Indirect Reciprocity}}: {{The Interaction}} of {{Person}} and {{Situation}} in {{Prosocial Behavior}}},
  author = {Simpson, B and Willer, R},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Social Psychology Quarterly},
  volume = {71},
  number = {1},
  pages = {37--52},
  publisher = {{American Sociological Association}},
  doi = {10.1177/019027250807100106},
  abstract = {Abstract: A persistent puzzle in the social and biological sciences is the existence of prosocial behavior, actions that benefit others, often at a cost to oneself. Recent theoretical models and empirical studies of indirect reciprocity show that actors behave prosocially in order to develop an altruistic reputation and receive future benefits from third parties. Accordingly, individuals should stop investing in reputations via prosocial behavior when a future benefit (via indirect reciprocity) is unlikely. The conclusion that the absence of reputational incentives necessarily leads to egoistic behavior contrasts sharply with models of heterogeneous social preferences. Such models demonstrate the theoretical plausibility of populations composed of egoists and altruists. Results of Study One show that actors classified a priori as egoists respond strategically to reputational incentives, whereas those classified a priori as altruists are less affected by these incentives. Egoists act prosocially when reputational incentives are at stake but not when opportunities for indirect reciprocity are absent, while altruists tend to act prosocially regardless of whether reputational incentives are present. These results suggest that altruistic behavior can result from non-strategic altruism or reputation-building egoism. Study Two replicates these results and explores indirect reciprocation of others' prosocial acts. We found that altruists indirectly reciprocate at higher levels than egoists, and individuals tend to discount others' prosocial behaviors when they occur in the presence of reputational incentives. As a result, public prosocial behaviors are indirectly reciprocated less than private prosocial behaviors. In line with our argument that altruists pay less attention to reputational incentives, egoists showed a greater tendency than altruists to discount others' public prosocial behaviors. The results support the growing focus on heterogeneity of individuals' social preferences in models of altruism and indirect reciprocity},
  keywords = {altrusm,evolution,experiments,heterogeneity,philanthropy,psychology,reciprocity,ritual,social giving}
}

@article{sitziaImplementingTheoreticalModels2011,
  ids = {Sitzia2011,Sitzia2011a},
  title = {Implementing Theoretical Models in the Laboratory, and What This Can and Cannot Achieve},
  author = {Sitzia, S and Sugden, R},
  year = {2011},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Methodology},
  volume = {18},
  number = {4},
  pages = {323--343},
  publisher = {{Taylor \& Francis}},
  doi = {10.1080/1350178X.2011.628101},
  keywords = {experiments,external generalizability,methodology,microeconomics}
}

@article{slobValueChainAnalysis,
  ids = {Slob,Sloba},
  title = {A Value Chain Analysis of the Coffee Sector},
  author = {Slob, Bart},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,business,coffee,ft,FT}
}

@article{smithAreTimePreference2005,
  ids = {Smith2005,Smith2005a},
  title = {Are {{Time Preference}} and {{Body Mass Index Associated}}? {{Evidence}} from the {{National Longitudinal Survey}} of {{Youth}}},
  author = {Smith, P K and Bogin, B and Bishai, D},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Economics and Human Biology},
  volume = {3},
  number = {2},
  pages = {259--270},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ehb.2005.05.001},
  keywords = {behavioral,discounting,health,obesity,time preference. empirical}
}

@article{smithDynamicsContributionsBeliefs2014,
  ids = {Smith2014a,Smith2014d},
  title = {On the {{Dynamics}} of {{Contributions}} and {{Beliefs}} in {{Repeated Public Good Games}}},
  author = {Smith, Alexander},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Woring Paper WPI 2014-002},
  abstract = {Using data from a repeated public good game, I conduct a Granger causality test and find that contributions and beliefs about the contributions of others decline together, with neither variable leading the other. As a result, I model contributions and beliefs using a system of simultaneous equations. Estimating the system provides evidence on the magnitude of the projection bias. Since contributions and beliefs move together, indicating that current and/or past values of one series are not useful for predicting future values of the other, I develop and test the hypothesis that contribution heterogeneity predicts changes in average contributions. I find support for my hypothesis using data from a variety of public good game experiments (with and without belief elicitation; fixed and random matching).},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
  note = {submitted ot JEBO There is simultaneity between the two variables that should be reflected in dynamic models of behavior in such games. Second, my estimates provide the first evidence of which I am aware on the magnitude of the `projection bias,' which is the tendency for actions to cause beliefs because people project their behavior on to others. I estimate that unit increases in contributions increase beliefs by 0.15 units. In contrast, where as the previous literature (Neugebauer et al., 2009; Fischbacher and Gaechter, 2010; Smith, 2013) models beliefs as a function of past beliefs and the average contributions of others in the previous round, here I add contributions in order to estimate the magnitude of the projection bias, and capture any tendency for contributions and beliefs 7 to move together. The estimated effect of contributions on beliefs provides evidence on the magnitude of the projection bias. Specifically, unit increases in contributions increase beliefs by 0.15. Thus, an increase in contribution from 3 to 5 is estimated to increase belief by ...
\par
submitted ot JEBO There is simultaneity between the two variables that should be reflected in dynamic models of behavior in such games. Second, my estimates provide the first evidence of which I am aware on the magnitude of the `projection bias,' which is the tendency for actions to cause beliefs because people project their behavior on to others. I estimate that unit increases in contributions increase beliefs by 0.15 units. In contrast, where as the previous literature (Neugebauer et al., 2009; Fischbacher and Gaechter, 2010; Smith, 2013) models beliefs as a function of past beliefs and the average contributions of others in the previous round, here I add contributions in order to estimate the magnitude of the projection bias, and capture any tendency for contributions and beliefs 7 to move together. The estimated effect of contributions on beliefs provides evidence on the magnitude of the projection bias. Specifically, unit increases in contributions increase beliefs by 0.15. Thus, an increase in contribution from 3 to 5 is estimated to increase belief by ...
\par
submitted ot JEBO There is simultaneity between the two variables that should be reflected in dynamic models of behavior in such games. Second, my estimates provide the first evidence of which I am aware on the magnitude of the `projection bias,' which is the tendency for actions to cause beliefs because people project their behavior on to others. I estimate that unit increases in contributions increase beliefs by 0.15 units. In contrast, where as the previous literature (Neugebauer et al., 2009; Fischbacher and Gaechter, 2010; Smith, 2013) models beliefs as a function of past beliefs and the average contributions of others in the previous round, here I add contributions in order to estimate the magnitude of the projection bias, and capture any tendency for contributions and beliefs 7 to move together. The estimated effect of contributions on beliefs provides evidence on the magnitude of the projection bias. Specifically, unit increases in contributions increase beliefs by 0.15. Thus, an increase in contribution from 3 to 5 is estimated to increase belief by ...}
}

@article{smithEvaluatingCriticismsFair2009,
  ids = {Smith2009,Smith2009b},
  title = {Evaluating the {{Criticisms}} of {{Fair Trade}}},
  author = {Smith, A M},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Economic Affairs},
  volume = {29},
  number = {4},
  pages = {29--36},
  publisher = {{John Wiley \& Sons}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0270.2009.01944.x}
}

@article{smithIncomeInequalityConditional2012,
  ids = {Smith2012,Smith2012d},
  title = {Income {{Inequality}} and {{Conditional Charitable Giving}}},
  author = {Smith, Alexander},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {mimeo},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{smithInquiryNatureCauses1796,
  ids = {Smith1796,Smith1796a},
  title = {An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations},
  author = {Smith, Adam},
  year = {1796},
  publisher = {{Printed by (Philadelphia)}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{smithNaturePessimismTaking2014,
  ids = {Smith2014b,Smith2014e,Smith2015,Smith2015d},
  title = {On the {{Nature}} of {{Pessimism}} in {{Taking}} and {{Giving Games}}},
  author = {Smith, Alexander},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Mimeo},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{smithStudyingCharitableGiving2014,
  ids = {Smith2014,Smith2014c},
  title = {Studying {{Charitable Giving Using}} the {{Sequential}} and {{Strategy Methods}}},
  author = {Smith, Alexander},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Mimeo},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@techreport{snowbergHowPredictionMarkets2011,
  ids = {Snowberg2011,Snowberg2011a},
  title = {How Prediction Markets Can Save Event Studies},
  author = {Snowberg, Erik and Wolfers, Justin and Zitzewitz, Eric},
  year = {2011},
  institution = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}}
}

@article{societyObservingViolationsTransitivity2014,
  ids = {Society2014},
  title = {Observing {{Violations}} of {{Transitivity}} by {{Experimental Methods Author}} ( s ): {{Graham Loomes}} , {{Chris Starmer}} and {{Robert Sugden}}},
  author = {Society, The Econometric},
  year = {2014},
  volume = {59},
  number = {2},
  pages = {425--439},
  keywords = {decision theory,experiments,preference reversal,regret theory,transitiv-}
}

@article{soeteventAnonymityGivingNatural2005,
  ids = {Soetevent2005,Soetevent2005a},
  title = {Anonymity in {{Giving}} in a {{Natural Context}}: {{An Economic Field Experiment}} in {{Thirty Churches}}},
  author = {Soetevent, A R},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {89},
  number = {11-12},
  pages = {2301--2323},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.11.002},
  abstract = {The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in thirty Dutch churches. For a period of 29 weeks, the means by which offerings are gathered is determined by chance, prescribing for each offering the use of either `closed\'collection bags or open collection baskets. When using baskets, attendants\'contributions can be identified by their direct neighbors, and attendants can observe the total amount given by the people who preceded them. Initially, contributions to the services\'second offerings increase by 10\% when baskets are used, whereas no effect is found for first offerings. The positive effect of using baskets peters out over the experimental period. Additional data on the coins collected show that in both offerings, people switch to giving larger coins when baskets are used.},
  keywords = {field experiments,philanthropy,religion.,reputation,social giving}
}

@article{soley-boriDealingMissingData2013,
  title = {Dealing with Missing Data: {{Key}} Assumptions and Methods for Applied Analysis},
  author = {{Soley-Bori}, Marina},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Boston University},
  volume = {4},
  pages = {1--19},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{sonnemansQuadraticScoringRule2001,
  ids = {Sonnemans2001,Sonnemans2001a},
  title = {Is the Quadratic Scoring Rule Really Incentive Compatible?},
  author = {Sonnemans, J and Offerman, T},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {University of Amsterdam manuscript},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{spenceJobMarketSignaling1973,
  ids = {Spence1973,Spence1973a},
  title = {Job {{Market Signaling}}},
  author = {Spence, M},
  year = {1973},
  journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {87},
  number = {3},
  pages = {355--374},
  doi = {10.2307/1882010},
  keywords = {asymmetric information,labor,lof,LoF,ritual,signaling,theory}
}

@article{stanleyWheatChaffMetaanalysis2001,
  ids = {stanley2001wheat},
  title = {Wheat from Chaff: {{Meta-analysis}} as Quantitative Literature Review},
  author = {Stanley, Tom D},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {Journal of economic perspectives},
  volume = {15},
  number = {3},
  pages = {131--150},
  doi = {10.1257/jep.15.3.131}
}

@article{stanleyWheatChaffMetaAnalysis2016,
  ids = {Stanley2016},
  title = {Wheat from {{Chaff}} : {{Meta-Analysis}} as {{Quantitative Literature Review Published}} by : {{American Economic Association Stable URL}} : {{http://www.jstor.org/stable/2696560}} {{Wheat From Chaff}} : {{Meta-Analysis As Quantitative Literature Review}}},
  author = {Stanley, Author T D and Stanley, T D},
  year = {2016},
  volume = {15},
  number = {3},
  pages = {131--150}
}

@article{stataProgrammingStata,
  ids = {Stata},
  title = {Programming {{Stata}}},
  author = {Stata, Programming},
  pages = {1--54}
}

@misc{StatisticalAnalysisMissing,
  title = {Statistical {{Analysis}} with {{Missing Data}} | {{Wiley Series}} in {{Probability}} and {{Statistics}}},
  howpublished = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781119013563},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/AUH886L9/9781119013563.html}
}

@article{steinbergRatioDiscriminationCharity2010,
  ids = {steinberg2010ratio},
  title = {Ratio Discrimination in Charity Fundraising: {{The}} Inappropriate Use of Cost Ratios Has Harmful Side-Effects},
  author = {Steinberg, Richard and Morris, Debra},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Voluntary Sector Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {1},
  pages = {77--95},
  publisher = {{Policy Press}},
  doi = {10.1332/204080510X497028},
  mendeley-groups = {giving-keywords}
}

@article{steinbergShouldDonorsCare1986,
  ids = {Steinberg1986,Steinberg1986a},
  title = {"{{Should Donors Care About Fundraising}}."},
  author = {{Steinberg}},
  year = {1986},
  keywords = {fundraising,philanthropy}
}

@article{stiglerTheoryOligopoly1964,
  ids = {Stigler1964,Stigler1964a},
  title = {A Theory of Oligopoly},
  author = {Stigler, George J},
  year = {1964},
  journal = {The Journal of Political Economy},
  pages = {44--61},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1086/258853}
}

@article{stiglitzCreditRationingMarkets1981,
  ids = {Stiglitz1981,Stiglitz1981a},
  title = {Credit {{Rationing}} in {{Markets}} with {{Imperfect Information}}},
  author = {Stiglitz, Joseph E and Weiss, Andrew},
  year = {1981},
  month = jun,
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {71},
  number = {3},
  pages = {393--410},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{stolePriceDiscriminationImperfect2005,
  ids = {Stole2005,Stole2005a},
  title = {Price {{Discrimination}} and {{Imperfect Competition}}},
  author = {Stole, L},
  year = {2005},
  journal = {Handbook of Industrial Organization},
  volume = {3},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{straubFundraisingCrowdoutCharitable2003,
  ids = {Straub2003,Straub2003a},
  title = {Fundraising and {{Crowd-out}} of {{Charitable Contributions}}: {{New Evidence}} from {{Contributions}} to {{Public Radio}}},
  author = {Straub, J D},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Texas A\&M University (Department of Economics) Working paper},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{studyJournalEconomicScience,
  ids = {Study,Studya},
  title = {Journal of the {{Economic Science Association}}},
  author = {Study, Original},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{sturdyBestPracticesTransparent2019,
  ids = {Sturdy2019},
  title = {Best {{Practices}} for {{Transparent}}, {{Reproducible}}, and {{Ethical Research}}},
  author = {Sturdy, Jennifer},
  year = {2019},
  number = {February}
}

@article{sugdenBetterJudgedThemselves2017,
  ids = {Sugden2017b},
  title = {`{{Better}} off, as Judged by Themselves': A Reply to {{Cass Sunstein}}},
  author = {Sugden, Robert},
  year = {2017},
  month = jul,
  journal = {International Review of Economics},
  issn = {1865-1704},
  doi = {10.1007/s12232-017-0281-8}
}

@article{sugdenEconomicsPhilanthropy1982,
  ids = {Sugden1982,Sugden1982a},
  title = {On the {{Economics}} of {{Philanthropy}}},
  author = {Sugden, R},
  year = {1982},
  journal = {Economic Journal},
  volume = {92},
  number = {366},
  pages = {341--350},
  doi = {10.2307/2232444}
}

@article{sugdenPeopleReallyWant2017,
  ids = {Sugden2017c},
  title = {Do People Really Want to Be Nudged towards Healthy Lifestyles?},
  author = {Sugden, Robert},
  year = {2017},
  month = jun,
  journal = {International Review of Economics},
  volume = {64},
  number = {2},
  pages = {113--123},
  issn = {1865-1704},
  doi = {10.1007/s12232-016-0264-1}
}

@article{sugdenReciprocitySupplyPublic1984,
  ids = {Sugden1984,Sugden1984a},
  title = {Reciprocity: {{The Supply}} of {{Public Goods Through Voluntary Contributions}}},
  author = {Sugden, Robert},
  year = {1984},
  month = dec,
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  volume = {94},
  number = {376},
  pages = {772--787},
  publisher = {{Royal Economic Society}},
  issn = {0013-0133},
  doi = {10.2307/2232294}
}

@article{suhonenAreThereReturns2013,
  ids = {Suhonen2013,Suhonen2013a},
  title = {Are There Returns from University Location in a State-Funded University System?},
  author = {Suhonen, Tuomo},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Regional Science and Urban Economics},
  volume = {43},
  number = {3},
  pages = {465--478},
  doi = {10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.02.008},
  abstract = {A location in an economically active, high-amenity region could in many ways be a significant advantage for a university and its students and thus could also be positively linked to students' subsequent earnings. Based on this hypothesis, the present study empirically examines the effect of university location choice on earnings in Finland, focusing on the following question: To what extent does the choice of university location explain the observed positive early-career earnings premium for students graduating from the Helsinki metropolitan area rather than from one of the nine other university cities? The results suggest that no positive average earnings premium exists for metro area graduates after differences in students' pre-university characteristics are taken into account. However, the metro area university premium is found to be, to some extent, heterogeneous across fields and regional labour markets. The findings also indicate the importance of accounting for the selective nature of individuals' migration behaviour when conditioning on post-university region in the estimation of university location effects.},
  keywords = {Earnings,Regional labour marke,University choice}
}

@article{sumnerUsingPredictionMarkets2008,
  ids = {Sumner2008,Sumner2008a},
  title = {Using {{Prediction Markets}} to {{Guide Global Warming Policy}}},
  author = {Sumner, Scott and Jackson, Aaron L},
  year = {2008},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{sunderMarketInformationExperimental1992,
  ids = {Sunder1992,Sunder1992a},
  title = {Market for {{Information}}: {{Experimental Evidence}}},
  author = {Sunder, S},
  year = {1992},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {60},
  number = {3},
  pages = {667--695},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.2307/2951588}
}

@article{suvorovGoalSettingSelfregulation2008,
  ids = {Suvorov2008,Suvorov2008a},
  title = {Goal Setting as a Self-Regulation Mechanism},
  author = {Suvorov, Anton and {de Ven}, Jeroen},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Available at SSRN 1286029},
  keywords = {[experiments],⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{tadelisWhatNameReputation1999,
  ids = {Tadelis1999,Tadelis1999a},
  title = {What's in a Name? {{Reputation}} as a Tradeable Asset, 1999},
  author = {Tadelis, S},
  year = {1999},
  journal = {Am. Econ. Rev},
  volume = {89},
  pages = {548},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.89.3.548}
}

@article{talbotWhereDoesYour1997,
  ids = {Talbot1997,Talbot1997a},
  title = {Where Does Your Coffee Dollar Go?: {{The}} Division of Income and Surplus along the Coffee Commodity Chain},
  author = {Talbot, J M},
  year = {1997},
  journal = {Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID)},
  volume = {32},
  number = {1},
  pages = {56--91},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/BF02696306},
  abstract = {This article analyzes the division of the total income and surplus generated along the coffee commodity chain during the period 1971\textendash 1995. Until the late 1980s, coffee growers and producing states retained over a third of the total income and about half of the total surplus that was available. This was due in part to the collective actions of coffee-producing states, which led to the imposition of a regulatory regime involving export quotas, creating rents for the producing countries. By the late 1980s, coffee TNCs had consolidated their control over core markets, and began to use their market power to increase their shares of both income and surplus. This shift was greatly accelerated by the breakdown of the export quota regime in 1989. The article concludes that these results necessitate a reformulation of commodity chain analysis.}
}

@article{taylorPovertyAlleviationParticipation2002,
  ids = {Taylor2002,Taylor2002a},
  title = {Poverty Alleviation through Participation in {{Fair Trade}} Coffee Networks: Synthesis of Case Study Research Question Findings},
  author = {Taylor, P L},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Colorado State University. Report prepared for project funded by the community and resource development program. The Ford Foundation. New York},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{teamApplyingBehaviouralInsights2013,
  ids = {team2013applying},
  title = {Applying Behavioural Insights to Charitable Giving},
  author = {Team, Behavioural Insights},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Cabinet Office},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{teamEASTFourSimple2014,
  ids = {Team2014,Team2014a},
  title = {{{EAST}}: {{Four}} Simple Ways to Apply Behavioural},
  author = {Team, Behavioural Insights},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Mimeo: Behavioural Insights Team in conjunction with the UK Cabinet Office},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,behavioral,popular,retirement consulting}
}

@article{teamUnderlyingProximateDeterminants1991,
  ids = {Team1991,Team1991a},
  title = {Underlying and {{Proximate Determinants}} of {{Child Health}}: {{The Cebu Longitudinal Health}} and {{Nutrition Survey}}},
  author = {Team, C},
  year = {1991},
  journal = {American Journal of Epidemiology},
  volume = {33},
  number = {2},
  pages = {185--201},
  doi = {10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a115857}
}

@article{thalerLibertarianPaternalism2003,
  ids = {Thaler2003,Thaler2003a},
  title = {Libertarian Paternalism},
  author = {Thaler, R H and Sunstein, C R},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {93},
  number = {2},
  pages = {175--179},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.1257/000282803321947001},
  keywords = {nudge,philosophy}
}

@article{timesManyDismissingDonor2006,
  ids = {Times2006,Times2006a},
  title = {Many {{Dismissing}} `{{Donor Fatigue}}' as {{Myth}}},
  author = {Times, New York},
  year = {2006},
  volume = {April 30,}
}

@book{tinderTinderMatchChat,
  title = {Tinder | {{Match}}. {{Chat}}. {{Meet}}. {{Modern Dating}}.},
  author = {{Tinder}}
}

@article{toninDisentanglingSourcesProsocially2010,
  ids = {Tonin2010,Tonin2010b},
  title = {Disentangling the Sources of Pro-Socially Motivated Effort: {{A}} Field Experiment},
  author = {Tonin, Mirco and Vlassopoulos, Michael},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {94},
  number = {11},
  pages = {1086--1092},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.08.011}
}

@article{toninSocialIncentivesMatter2012,
  ids = {Tonin2012,Tonin2012a},
  title = {Social Incentives Matter: {{Evidence}} from an Online Real Effort Experiment},
  author = {Tonin, Mirco and Vlassopoulos, Michael},
  year = {2012},
  publisher = {{IZA Discussion Paper}},
  doi = {10.2139/ssrn.2114896}
}

@article{townsendRiskInsuranceVillage1994,
  ids = {Townsend1994,Townsend1994a},
  title = {Risk and {{Insurance}} in {{Village India}}},
  author = {Townsend, Robert M},
  year = {1994},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {62},
  number = {3},
  pages = {539--591},
  publisher = {{The Econometric Society}},
  issn = {00129682},
  doi = {10.2307/2951659},
  abstract = {The full insurance model is tested using data from three poor, high risk villages in the semi-arid tropics of southern India. The model presented here incorporates a number of salient features of the actual village economies. Although the model is rejected statistically, it does provide a surprisingly good benchmark. Household consumptions comove with village average consumption. More clearly, household consumptions are not much influenced by contemporaneous own income, sickness, unemployment, or other idiosyncratic shocks, controlling for village consumption (i.e. for village level risk). There is evidence that the landless are less well insured than their village neighbors in one of the three villages.}
}

@article{tverskyLossAversionRiskless1991,
  ids = {Tversky1991,Tversky1991a},
  title = {Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: {{A}} Reference-Dependent Model},
  author = {Tversky, A and Kahneman, D},
  year = {1991},
  journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  volume = {106},
  number = {4},
  pages = {1039--1061},
  publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
  doi = {10.2307/2937956},
  keywords = {behavioral,loss aversion,prospect theory}
}

@techreport{ukgovernmentGivingWhitePaper2012,
  ids = {DepartmentforDigitalCulture2012},
  title = {Giving {{White Paper}} - {{GOV}}.{{UK}}},
  author = {{UK Government}},
  year = {2012}
}

@article{underwoodAttentionNegativeAffect1976,
  ids = {Underwood1976,Underwood1976a},
  title = {Attention, Negative Affect, and Altruism: {{An}} Ecological Validation},
  author = {Underwood, Bill and Berenson, James F and Berenson, Ronald J and Cheng, Kenneth K and Wilson, Dayna and Kulik, James and Moore, Bert S and Wenzel, Gary},
  year = {1976},
  journal = {Personality and social psychology bulletin},
  volume = {3},
  number = {1},
  pages = {54--58},
  publisher = {{Sage Publications}},
  doi = {10.1177/014616727600300106},
  abstract = {This field study attempted to replicate the finding that sadness decreases generosity and also to test the plausi bility of the suggestion that sadness decreases generosity because it decreases the radius of attention. Donations to a well-known charity were collected both prior to and after movies which had independently been rated as sad or neutral. The sad movies produced significantly lower donation rates than the neutral movies. An attention manipulation did not alter this relationship, suggesting that the negative mood effect is not mediated by a decreased radius of attention.},
  keywords = {affect,altruism,field experiments,philanthropy}
}

@article{unknownTournamentOutcomesProsocial,
  ids = {Unknown,Unknowna},
  title = {"{{Tournament Outcomes}} and {{Prosocial Behaviour}}"},
  author = {{Unknown}},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology}
}

@article{urbanAmericanEconomicAssociation2009,
  ids = {Urban2009},
  title = {American {{Economic Association Published}} by : {{American Economic Association Stable URL}} : {{http://www.jstor.org/stable/2564867}}},
  author = {Urban, R and Economics, Regional and Journal, Source and Sep, No},
  year = {2009},
  volume = {36},
  number = {3},
  pages = {1910--1918}
}

@article{vanbeestWhenInclusionCosts2006,
  ids = {VanBeest2006,VanBeest2006a},
  title = {When {{Inclusion Costs}} and {{Ostracism Pays}}, {{Ostracism Still Hurts}}},
  author = {{van Beest}, I and Williams, K D},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY},
  volume = {91},
  number = {5},
  pages = {918},
  publisher = {{APA AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION}},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.91.5.918},
  abstract = {Recent research indicates that ostracism is painful even in the face of mitigating circumstances. However, in all previous experiments, there have been no costs to inclusion or benefits for ostracism. If being included meant losing money and being ostracized meant retaining money, would individuals still be distressed when ostracized? In 2 studies, the authors attempted to "load the dice" against inclusion in favor of ostracism. Participants played a variant of Cyberball called euroyberball (pronounced Euroball), in which ostracism and inclusion were crossed with whether the participants earned or lost money for each ball toss they received. In 2 experiments, the authors found that even when being ostracized meant retaining more money than the other players, it was painful. In Study 2, the authors also introduced conditions in which participants were overincluded. In these conditions, participants were sensitive to financial incentives. However, even then participants felt worse when given no positive attention than when given punitive attention.},
  keywords = {lof,ostracism,psychology}
}

@article{vanbergWhyPeopleKeep2008,
  ids = {Vanberg2008,Vanberg2008a},
  title = {Why {{Do People Keep Their Promises}}? {{An Experimental Test}} of {{Two Explanations}}},
  author = {Vanberg, C},
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {94(376)},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{vance-mcmullenWORKINGPAPERNOT2013,
  ids = {Vance-mcmullen2013},
  title = {{{WORKING PAPER}} - {{DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR Better Together}}? {{Experimental Evidence Regarding}} the {{Impact}} of {{Simultaneous Solicitations}} on {{Charitable Giving Danielle Vance-McMullen}}},
  author = {{Vance-mcmullen}, Danielle},
  year = {2013},
  number = {2009}
}

@article{vandalenPerceptionsExpectationsPension2010,
  ids = {VanDalen2010,VanDalen2010a},
  title = {Perceptions and Expectations of Pension Savings Adequacy: A Comparative Study of {{Dutch}} and {{American}} Workers},
  author = {Van Dalen, Hendrik P and Henkens, Kene and Hershey, Douglas A},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Ageing and Society},
  volume = {30},
  number = {05},
  pages = {731--754},
  publisher = {{Cambridge Univ Press}},
  doi = {10.1017/S0144686X09990651},
  abstract = {What drives the perceptions of pension savings adequacy and what do workers expect to receive when they retire ? These questions are assessed among married workers using an identical survey distributed to Dutch and American workers in 2007. Despite marked differences in expected pension replacement rates - where the Dutch replacement rates are systematically higher than the American rates - the perceived savings adequacy is more or less the same across Dutch and American workers. In both countries, about half of the respondents were confident they had amassed sufficient retirement savings. Individuals' perceived savings adequacy was found to be influenced by three groups of factors : trust in pension institutions (pension funds, banks, insurance companies and governments), social forces and psychological dispositions. This study shows that differences in the dispositions of workers (with respect to future orientation and financial planning) played a far larger role in explaining differences in perceptions of savings adequacy in the United States than in The Netherlands. Dutch workers rely and trust their pension fund and seem to leave thinking about and planning for retirement to its managers. KEY},
  keywords = {retirement consulting}
}

@book{vanderheijdenLeadingExampleInvestment2003,
  title = {Leading by Example? {{Investment}} Decisions in a Mixed Sequential-Simultaneous Public Bad Experiment},
  author = {{Van der Heijden}, E and Moxnes, E},
  year = {2003},
  publisher = {{Tilburg University}},
  abstract = {This paper investigates the effect of having a leader in a laboratory public bad experiment with five subjects in each group. The control treatment is a standard public bad experiment, while in the leader treatments the design is such that in each group the leader decides first on his or her investment in the public bad. After being informed about the leader's decision, the four ,\"A\`ofollowers' in each group make their investment decision. Two treatments of the leadership game are played with each group. In the same-leader-costs treatment, all subjects are confronted with the same costs, while in the no-leader-costs treatment the leader faces no direct costs of acting socially. It is found that followers invest significantly less in the public bad when there is a leader compared with a situation when there is no leader. Comparing the two treatments, we find, moreover, that the leadership effect is somewhat stronger when leaders face the same costs as followers compared with the situation in which leaders bear no costs. Randomly chosen leaders set an example by investing less than average players in a standard public bad game, and leader investments are lowest when the costs of leading are low.}
}

@article{vandevenDemandSocialApproval2002,
  ids = {VandeVen2002,VandeVen2002a},
  title = {The Demand for Social Approval and Status as a Motivation to Give},
  author = {{van de Ven}, J},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE},
  volume = {158},
  number = {3},
  pages = {464--482},
  publisher = {{Mohr Siebeck}},
  doi = {10.1628/0932456022975349}
}

@article{vandiepenDoesIrritationInduced2009,
  ids = {Diepen2009,Diepen2009a,VanDiepen2009,VanDiepen2009a},
  title = {Does Irritation Induced by Charitable Direct Mailings Reduce Donations?},
  author = {Van Diepen, M and Donkers, B and Franses, P H},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {International Journal of Research in Marketing},
  volume = {26},
  number = {3},
  pages = {180--188},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.ijresmar.2009.03.007},
  keywords = {experiments,field experiments,philanthropy,social pressure}
}

@article{vandiepenIrritationDueDirect2006,
  ids = {VanDiepen2006,VanDiepen2006a},
  title = {Irritation Due to Direct Mailings from Charities},
  author = {Van Diepen, M and Donkers, B and Franses, P H},
  year = {2006},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,experiments,field experiments,philanthropy,social pressure}
}

@article{varianPriceDiscriminationSocial1985,
  ids = {Varian1985,Varian1985a},
  title = {Price Discrimination and Social Welfare},
  author = {Varian, Hal R},
  year = {1985},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  pages = {870--875},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,poorcard}
}

@article{varianSequentialContributionsPublic1994,
  ids = {Varian1994,Varian1994a},
  title = {Sequential Contributions to Public Goods},
  author = {Varian, H R},
  year = {1994},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {53},
  number = {2},
  pages = {165--186},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/0047-2727(94)90019-1},
  abstract = {I examine games involving private contributions to a public good and show that less of the public good will be supplied if agents move sequentially than if they move simultaneously. If the agents bid for the right to move first, the agent who values the public good least will win. If each agent chooses the rate at which he will subsidize the other agent's contributions, the subsidies that support the Lindahl allocation are the unique equilibrium outcome. I also describe two related subsidy-setting games that yield Lindahl allocations in n-person games with general utility functions.}
}

@book{variousHandbookRelationshipInitiation2008,
  ids = {Various2008,Various2008a},
  title = {Handbook of {{Relationship Initiation}}},
  author = {{Various}},
  editor = {Sprecher, S and Wenzel, A and Harvey, J},
  year = {2008},
  publisher = {{Psychology Press}}
}

@book{veblenTheoryLeisureClass1899,
  ids = {Veblen1899,Veblen1899a},
  title = {The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions},
  author = {Veblen, T},
  year = {1899},
  publisher = {{Macmillan, New York}}
}

@article{veigaPriceManipulationExperimental2009,
  ids = {Veiga2009,Veiga2009a},
  title = {Price Manipulation in an Experimental Asset Market},
  author = {Veiga, Helena and Vorsatz, Marc},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {European Economic Review},
  volume = {53},
  number = {3},
  pages = {327--342},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.05.004}
}

@book{verkaikDonorsReallyCare2016,
  title = {Do Donors Really Care about Impact Information? {{A}} Dual Process Account},
  author = {Verkaik, Dave},
  year = {2016}
}

@article{versionComparativeFMRIMeta2019,
  ids = {Version2019},
  title = {A Comparative {{fMRI}} Meta \- Analysis of Altruistic and Strategic Decisions to Give},
  author = {Version, Article Accepted and Daniel, A},
  year = {2019},
  pages = {227--241},
  doi = {10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.09.009.This},
  keywords = {⚠️ Invalid DOI}
}

@article{vesterlundInformationalValueSequential2003,
  ids = {Vesterlund2003,Vesterlund2003b},
  title = {The {{Informational Value}} of {{Sequential Fund-raising}},},
  author = {Vesterlund, L D},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {87},
  pages = {1278--1293},
  doi = {10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00187-6}
}

@article{vesterlundWhyPeopleGive2006,
  ids = {Vesterlund2006,Vesterlund2006a},
  title = {Why {{Do People Give}}?},
  author = {Vesterlund, L},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook},
  volume = {2},
  pages = {168--190},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@incollection{vickreyOneEconomistView1962,
  ids = {Vickrey1962a,Vickrey1962c},
  title = {One Economist's View of Philanthropy},
  booktitle = {Philanthropy and Public Policy},
  author = {Vickrey, William},
  year = {1962},
  pages = {31--56},
  publisher = {{UMI}}
}

@incollection{vickreyPhilanthropyPublicPolicy1962,
  ids = {Vickrey1962,Vickrey1962b},
  title = {Philanthropy and {{Public Policy}}},
  author = {Vickrey, William S},
  editor = {Dickenson, F G},
  year = {1962},
  pages = {31--56},
  publisher = {{National Bureau of Economic Research}},
  address = {{New York}},
  chapter = {One Econom}
}

@article{vishwanathJobSearchStigma1989,
  ids = {Vishwanath1989,Vishwanath1989a},
  title = {Job {{Search}}, {{Stigma Effect}}, and {{Escape Rate}} from {{Unemployment}}},
  author = {Vishwanath, T},
  year = {1989},
  journal = {Journal of Labor Economics},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {487},
  publisher = {{University of Chicago Press}},
  doi = {10.1086/298218},
  abstract = {This article formulates job search models, incorporating certain types of the "stigma" effect of unemployment. It is assumed that the probability of getting a job offer, given the unemployment individual contacts the firm, is influenced by the duration of unemployment and is justified in a signaling context. The optimal search is analyzed for one sector, as well as across several independent labor-market segments. It is shown that there are reasonably general conditions on the search environments, for which both the individual reservation wage and escape rate are negative-duration dependent, a fact observed in empirical studies}
}

@techreport{visserBridgingGreatDivide2006,
  ids = {Visser2006,Visser2006a},
  title = {Bridging the {{Great Divide}} in {{South Africa}}: {{Inequality}} and {{Punishment}} in the {{Provision}} of {{Public Goods}}},
  author = {Visser, M and Burns, J},
  year = {2006},
  institution = {{Working Papers in Economics}},
  abstract = {We explore the effect of income inequality and peer punishment on voluntary provision of public goods in an experimental context. Our sample draws from nine fishing communities in South-Africa where high levels of inequality prevail. We find that aggregate cooperation is higher in both the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) and punishment treatments for unequal groups. Once peer sanctioning is introduced over-contribution by low relative to high endowment players observed in the VCM treatment is significantly enhanced. Demand for punishment by low and high endowment players are similar, irrespective of differences in relative costs, and in unequal groups free-riding is punished more, specifically by low endowment players. We observe inequality aversion both in endowments and with respect to the interaction of endowments and contributions: high endowment players receive more punishment, but also receive more punishment for negative deviation from the group mean share.s}
}

@article{vitellConsumerEthicsResearch2003,
  ids = {Vitell2003,Vitell2003a},
  title = {Consumer {{Ethics Research}}: {{Review}}, {{Synthesis}} and {{Suggestions}} for the {{Future}}},
  author = {Vitell, S J},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Journal of Business Ethics},
  volume = {43},
  number = {1},
  pages = {33--47},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1023/A:1022907014295},
  abstract = {This manuscript reviews and synthesizes most of the major research studies in the area of consumer ethics that have appeared since 1990. It examines both conceptual and empirical works with an objective of encouraging researchers to pursue research in the consumer ethics area. Toward this end, the paper also suggests directions for future research.}
}

@article{vivaltHeterogeneousTreatmentEffects2015,
  ids = {vivalt2015heterogeneous},
  title = {Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in Impact Evaluation},
  author = {Vivalt, Eva},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {105},
  number = {5},
  pages = {467--470},
  doi = {10.1257/aer.p20151015},
  file = {/Users/yosemite/Zotero/storage/87M83GDM/Vivalt - 2015 - Heterogeneous treatment effects in impact evaluati.pdf}
}

@article{vivaltHowConcernedShould2015,
  ids = {Vivalt2015},
  title = {How {{Concerned Should We Be About Selection Bias}} , {{Hawthorne Effects}} and {{Retrospective Evaluations}} ?},
  author = {Vivalt, Eva},
  year = {2015},
  pages = {1--40},
  abstract = {While impact evaluations can be used to measure the causal effect of a program, there are several potential factors that could challenge their external validity. First, it is possible that the projects that are selected for evaluation respond differently to treatment. If this is the case, the results of these evaluations will poorly predict the performance of future programs. Further, while Hawthorne effects could occur within a study, project implementers could also act differently when their project is being evaluated. In this case, the effect of the program would be confounded with the effect of the impact evaluation. Retrospective studies could also facilitate specification searching and be particularly selected. While others have considered these issues in individual cases, it has been difficult to gauge to what extent the problems are systemic. I use World Bank data on projects that did and did not receive impact evaluations and find a large gap in performance ratings between the projects that received impact evaluations and those that did not. Part of this difference may be a direct effect of the impact evaluations themselves improving project performance, however, part appears due to selection bias. Biases due to retrospective analysis appear largest of all.}
}

@article{vivaltHowMuchCan2016,
  ids = {vivalt2016much},
  title = {How Much Can We Generalize from Impact Evaluations?},
  author = {Vivalt, Eva},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {{Stanford University}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{vollanCampaignsFeaturingImpact2017,
  ids = {Vollan2017},
  title = {Do Campaigns Featuring Impact Evaluations Increase Donations? {{Evidence}} from a Survey Experiment},
  author = {Vollan, Bj{\"o}rn and Henning, Karla and Staewa, Deniza},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Development Effectiveness},
  volume = {9},
  number = {4},
  issn = {19439407},
  doi = {10.1080/19439342.2017.1377752},
  abstract = {We examine whether advertising the scientific soundness of an aid project or advertising the quality of an aid organisation influences donation behaviour compared to a standard emotional appeal. Using survey experiments at three universities in Austria and Germany (n = 578), we find that average donations of 14 Euros increased by 8 Euros in the treatment group that received information indicating that the project was evaluated using a randomised controlled trial (RCT). We find no effect for advertising that the organisation has earned a seal of quality. Since the majority of non-profits have already earned such a seal, people might become sceptical if an aid agency emphasises their trustworthiness, a trait that is assumed to be a given. Our results highlight that not only aid recipients but also aid organisations can benefit from adopting rigorously evaluated projects and carrying out RCTs in terms of increased income from charitable giving.}
}

@article{volppP4P4PAgendaResearch2009,
  ids = {Volpp2009,Volpp2009a},
  title = {{{P4P4P}}: An Agenda for Research on Pay-for-Performance for Patients},
  author = {Volpp, Kevin G and Pauly, Mark V and Loewenstein, George and Bangsberg, David},
  year = {2009},
  journal = {Health Affairs},
  volume = {28},
  number = {1},
  pages = {206--214},
  publisher = {{Health Affairs}},
  doi = {10.1377/hlthaff.28.1.206}
}

@article{waldfogelDeadweightLossChristmas1993,
  ids = {Waldfogel1993,Waldfogel1993a},
  title = {The Deadweight Loss of {{Christmas}}},
  author = {Waldfogel, Joel},
  year = {1993},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {83},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1328--1336},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found}
}

@article{walesEffectCollegeQuality1973,
  ids = {Wales1973,Wales1973a},
  title = {The {{Effect}} of {{College Quality}} on {{Earnings}}: {{Results}} from the {{NBE R-Thorndike Data}}},
  author = {Wales, Terence J},
  year = {1973},
  journal = {Journal of Human Resources},
  pages = {306--317},
  publisher = {{JSTOR}},
  doi = {10.2307/144705},
  keywords = {nleduc}
}

@article{walsterImportancePhysicalAttractiveness1966,
  ids = {Walster1966,Walster1966a},
  title = {Importance of Physical Attractiveness in Dating Behavior},
  author = {Walster, E and Aronson, V and Abrahams, D and Rottman, L},
  year = {1966},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {4},
  number = {5},
  pages = {508--516},
  doi = {10.1037/h0021188}
}

@article{wangTransactionCostsStructure1999,
  ids = {Wang1999,Wang1999a},
  title = {Transaction {{Costs}} and the {{Structure}} of the {{Market}}: {{A Case Study}}},
  author = {Wang, Ning},
  year = {1999},
  month = oct,
  journal = {American Journal of Economics and Sociology},
  volume = {58},
  number = {4},
  pages = {783--805},
  publisher = {{American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.}},
  issn = {0002-9246},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1536-7150.1999.tb03394.x},
  abstract = {Drawing upon the development of fish markets in a Chinese fishery community, this paper investigates the impact of transaction costs on the institutional structure of exchange. Fish markets in this region are connected and organized into a hierarchical network. This structure of fish markets dramatically reduces the cost for geographically distanced fishermen and consumers to execute trades. However, the provision of the market itself requires entrepreneurial efforts. In this study, the market is conceptualized as a continuum of middlemen, whose entrepreneurial efforts of buying and selling make the market work. When the middleman makes profits, the market is at work. Otherwise, the market fails to emerge. Comparing the different ways of organizing fish transportation at two distinct villages, this paper shows that the choice of the market or the firm to organize fish transportation is determined by the cost of putting the market to work.}
}

@article{webbinkReturnsUniversityEducation2007,
  ids = {Webbink2007,Webbink2007a},
  title = {Returns to University Education: Evidence from a {{Dutch}} Institutional Reform},
  author = {Webbink, D},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Economica},
  volume = {74},
  number = {293},
  pages = {113--134},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0335.2006.00534.x},
  abstract = {In 1982 the duration of university education in the Netherlands was reduced from five to four years. This institutional reform is here used to estimate the causal effect of one year of university education on wages. I find that the fifth year of university education increased wages by 7\%\textendash 9\%. This differential is found by comparing wages of cohorts of graduates enrolling five years before and five years after the reform in a difference-in-differences approach.},
  note = {nled
\par
nled
\par
nled}
}

@article{westFinancialLiteracyEducation2012,
  ids = {West2012,West2012a},
  title = {Financial Literacy Education and Behaviour Unhinged: {{Combating}} Bias and Poor Product Design},
  author = {West, Jason},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {International Journal of Consumer Studies},
  volume = {36},
  number = {5},
  pages = {523--530},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1470-6431.2012.01118.x},
  keywords = {retirement consultin}
}

@article{weyantApplicationComplianceTechniques1996,
  ids = {Weyant1996,Weyant1996a},
  title = {Application of Compliance Techniques to Direct-Mail Requests for Charitable Donations},
  author = {Weyant, J M},
  year = {1996},
  journal = {Psychology and Marketing},
  volume = {13},
  number = {2},
  pages = {157--170},
  doi = {10.1002/(SICI)1520-6793(199602)13:2<157::AID-MAR3>3.0.CO;2-E}
}

@article{weyantEffectsMoodStates1978,
  ids = {Weyant1978,Weyant1978a},
  title = {Effects of Mood States, Costs, and Benefits on Helping.},
  author = {Weyant, James M},
  year = {1978},
  journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
  volume = {36},
  number = {10},
  pages = {1169},
  publisher = {{American Psychological Association}},
  doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.36.10.1169},
  abstract = {Note (JEPR): Participants told they performed better in an anagram task were subsequently more generous to charities},
  keywords = {affect,philanthropy}
}

@article{weyantGettingMoreAsking1987,
  ids = {Weyant1987,Weyant1987a},
  title = {Getting {{More}} by {{Asking}} for {{Less}}: {{The Effects}} of {{Request Size}} on {{Donations}} of {{Charity1}}},
  author = {Weyant, James M and Smith, Stephen L},
  year = {1987},
  journal = {Journal of Applied Social Psychology},
  volume = {17},
  number = {4},
  pages = {392--400},
  publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1559-1816.1987.tb00320.x}
}

@article{wickhamDataScience2017,
  ids = {Wickham2017},
  title = {R for {{Data Science}}},
  author = {Wickham, Hadley and Grolemund, Garrett},
  year = {2017},
  volume = {77},
  number = {April},
  pages = {1--3},
  doi = {10.18637/jss.v077.b01},
  isbn = {9781491910399}
}

@article{wickhamDataScienceCookbook2016,
  ids = {Wickham2016},
  title = {R for {{Data Science Cookbook}}},
  author = {Wickham, Hadley and Grolemund, Garrett},
  year = {2016},
  number = {January},
  isbn = {9781784390815}
}

@article{wickhamLayeredGrammarGraphics2010,
  ids = {Wickham2010},
  title = {A {{Layered}} Grammar of Graphics},
  author = {Wickham, Hadley},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {3--28},
  issn = {10618600},
  doi = {10.1198/jcgs.2009.07098},
  abstract = {A grammar of graphics is a tool that enables us to concisely describe the components of a graphic. Such a grammar allows us to move beyond named graphics (e.g., the ``scatterplot'') and gain insight into the deep structure that underlies statistical graphics. This article builds on Wilkinson, Anand, and Grossman (2005), describing extensions and refinements developed while building an open source implementation of the grammar of graphics for R, ggplot2. The topics in this article include an introduction to the grammar by working through the process of creating a plot, and discussing the components that we need. The grammar is then presented formally and compared to Wilkinson's grammar, highlighting the hierarchy of defaults, and the implications of embedding a graphical grammar into a programming language. The power of the grammar is illustrated with a selection of examples that explore different components and their interactions, in more detail. The article concludes by discussing some perceptual issues, a...},
  isbn = {1061-8600},
  keywords = {Grammar of graphics,Statistical graphics}
}

@article{wikipediaEffectiveAltruism2014,
  ids = {Wikipedia2014},
  title = {Effective Altruism},
  author = {Wikipedia, From},
  year = {2014},
  pages = {1--10}
}

@techreport{wilhelmIntergenerationalTransmissionGenerosity2002,
  ids = {Wilhelm2002,Wilhelm2002a},
  title = {The {{Intergenerational Transmission}} of {{Generosity}}},
  author = {Wilhelm, M and Brown, E and Rooney, P and Steinberg, R},
  year = {2002},
  institution = {{Working paper, IUPUI}}
}

@article{wilhelmNewDataCharitable2006,
  ids = {Wilhelm2006,Wilhelm2006a},
  title = {New Data on Charitable Giving in the {{PSID}}},
  author = {Wilhelm, M O},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  volume = {92},
  number = {1},
  pages = {26--31},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2006.01.009}
}

@article{wilkinsonFairTradeDynamic2007,
  ids = {Wilkinson2007,Wilkinson2007a},
  title = {Fair {{Trade}}: {{Dynamic}} and {{Dilemmas}} of a {{Market Oriented Global Social Movement}}},
  author = {Wilkinson, J},
  year = {2007},
  journal = {Journal of Consumer Policy},
  volume = {30},
  number = {3},
  pages = {219--239},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/s10603-007-9036-3}
}

@article{willemainAlumniGivingInfluences1994,
  ids = {Willemain1994,Willemain1994a},
  title = {Alumni Giving: {{The}} Influences of Reunion, Class, and Year},
  author = {Willemain, T R and Goyal, A and Van Deven, M and Thukral, I S},
  year = {1994},
  journal = {Research in Higher Education},
  volume = {35},
  number = {5},
  pages = {609--629},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  doi = {10.1007/BF02497090},
  abstract = {Abstract We analyzed fifty years of inflation-adjusted data on the Annual Giving program of Princeton University. Most of the variation in both average size of gifts and percentage of class giving can be explained with simple models having three factors: reunion number, class identity, and fiscal year. Besides providing insights into factors influencing donations, these models provide a way to unmask features that are not evident in the raw data, such as trends in giving behavior and exceptional performances by particular classes in particular year}
}

@article{willerGroupsRewardIndividual,
  ids = {Willer,Willera},
  title = {Groups {{Reward Individual Sacrifice}}: {{The Status Solution}} Ot the {{Collective Action Problem}}.},
  author = {Willer, Rob},
  doi = {10.1177/000312240907400102},
  abstract = {Collective Action and Status My dissertation research addressed a central puzzle of social science: How is social order possible among individuals who are tempted to behave selfishly? Why and when do individuals pursue social goals rather than egoistic ones? My research develops and evaluates an explanation of how the "free-rider problem" of collective action can be overcome by individuals' desires for social status, and the availability of increased status for those who contribute to public goods. In a series of laboratory experiments, I show that contributors to collective action (a) enjoy improved status in the eyes of group members, (b) have greater influence on subsequent group tasks, and (c) benefit from "indirect reciprocity" in the form of gifts as well as higher rates of cooperation. Results suggest that contributions are a sign of generosity, rather than wealth or the ability to contribute (as suggested by most "costly signaling" accounts), or a sign of obligation to reciprocate (as suggested by exchange theory). A fourth study investigated the group-level impact of status rewards for contributions, indicating that they promote productivity, solidarity, and identification.}
}

@techreport{winterMentalEquilibrium2008,
  ids = {Winter2008,Winter2008a},
  title = {Mental Equilibrium},
  author = {Winter, Eyal and {Garcia-Jurado}, Ignacio and {Mendez-Naya}, Jose Mendez-Naya Luciano},
  year = {2008},
  institution = {{Discussion Paper}},
  abstract = {We introduce emotions into an equilibrium notion. In a mental equilibrium each player ``selects'' an emotional state which determines the player's preferences over the outcomes of the game. These preferences typically differ from the players' material preferences. The emotional states interact to play a Nash equilibrium and in addition each player's emotional state must be a best response (with respect to material preferences) to the emotional states of the others. We first discuss the concept behind the definition of mental equilibrium and show that this behavioral equilibrium notion organizes quite well the results of some of the most popular experiments in the literature of experimental economics. We expose some attractive properties of mental equilibria which are useful for deriving the set of mental equilibria for specific games.},
  keywords = {Behavioral Economics,emotions,Emotions,Equilibrium,Keywords: Games,losing face}
}

@techreport{wolbertMeasuringTimeRisk2013,
  ids = {Wolbert2013,Wolbert2013a},
  title = {Measuring {{Time}} and {{Risk Preferences}}: {{Realiability}}, {{Stability}}, {{Domain Specificity}}},
  author = {Wolbert, Eva and Riedl, Arno},
  year = {2013},
  institution = {{CESifo Working Paper}},
  keywords = {cross-experiment,Cross-experiment}
}

@techreport{wolfersPredictionMarketsTheory2006,
  ids = {Wolfers2006,Wolfers2006a},
  title = {Prediction Markets in Theory and Practice},
  author = {Wolfers, J and Zitzewitz, E},
  year = {2006},
  institution = {{national bureau of economic research}}
}

@article{wooldridgeDistributionfreeEstimationNonlinear1999,
  ids = {Wooldridge1999,Wooldridge1999a},
  title = {Distribution-Free Estimation of Some Nonlinear Panel Data Models},
  author = {Wooldridge, J M},
  year = {1999},
  journal = {Journal of Econometrics},
  volume = {90},
  number = {1},
  pages = {77--97},
  publisher = {{Elsevier}},
  doi = {10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00033-5}
}

@article{workingCashPensionsHave,
  ids = {Working,Workinga},
  title = {Cash and {{Pensions}} : {{Have}} the Elderly in {{England}} Saved Optimally for Retirement {{Cash}} and {{Pensions}} : {{Have}} the Elderly in {{England}} Saved Optimally for Retirement ?},
  author = {Working, I F S and Paper, W and Crawford, Rowena},
  keywords = {⛔ No DOI found,dynamic programming,lifecycle model,savings,wealth}
}

@article{yeomansHowDoesFundraising2018,
  ids = {Yeomans2018},
  title = {How Does Fundraising Affect Volunteering? {{Evidence}} from a Natural Field Experiment},
  author = {Yeomans, Michael and {Al-Ubaydli}, Omar},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Psychology},
  volume = {64},
  issn = {01674870},
  doi = {10.1016/j.joep.2017.11.004},
  abstract = {Can fundraising solicitations have an effect on other types of giving, like volunteering? We report results from a field experiment in which a non-profit firm asked their current volunteers to donate money, in a randomly-staggered roll-out. We observe volunteers' entire portfolio of giving to the firm \textendash{} both donations, and volunteer hours before and after the call. Overall, these results suggested there was some decline in volunteer hours among volunteers who were newer to the firm. By contrast, long-time volunteers maintained their volunteering after the call, and were also more likely to donate in the first place. Substitution was rare, as the donors themselves did not decrease their volunteer hours after donating. Our findings provide new evidence for how personal history can shape charitable giving decisions, and provide new practical guidance for fundraisers.}
}

@article{yeUnderstandingImpactsDark2016,
  ids = {Ye2016},
  title = {Understanding the {{Impacts}} of {{Dark Pools}} on {{Price Discovery}}},
  author = {Ye, Linlin},
  year = {2016},
  eprint = {1612.08486v1},
  eprinttype = {arxiv},
  pages = {1--67},
  archiveprefix = {arXiv},
  arxivid = {arXiv:1612.08486v1}
}

@article{yoeliPoweringIndirectReciprocity2013,
  ids = {yoeli2013powering},
  title = {Powering up with Indirect Reciprocity in a Large-Scale Field Experiment},
  author = {Yoeli, Erez and Hoffman, Moshe and Rand, David G and Nowak, Martin A},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  volume = {110},
  number = {Supplement 2},
  pages = {10424--10429},
  publisher = {{National Acad Sciences}},
  doi = {10.1073/pnas.1301210110}
}

@article{yorukEffectMediaCharitable2012,
  ids = {Yoruk2012,Yoruk2012b},
  title = {The {{Effect}} of {{Media}} on {{Charitable Giving}} and {{Volunteering}}: {{Evidence}} from the `{{Give Five}}' {{Campaign}}},
  author = {Yoruk, Bar{$f\pm$}s K},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {Journal of Policy Analysis and Management},
  volume = {31},
  number = {4},
  pages = {813--836},
  doi = {10.1002/pam.21634},
  abstract = {Fundraising campaigns advertised via mass media are common. To what extent such campaigns affect charitable behavior is mostly unknown, however. Using giving and volunteering surveys conducted biannually from 1988 to 1996, I investigate the effect of a national fundraising campaign, "Give Five", on charitable giving and volunteering patterns. The widely advertised "Give Five" campaign was aimed to encourage people to give five percent of their income and volunteer five hours a week. After controlling for selection into being informed about the "Give Five", I find that people who were informed about the campaign increased their weekly volunteering activity on average by almost half an hour, but their giving behavior was not significantly affected. I discuss the policy implications associated with this result and argue that although the "Give Five" campaign did not achieve its goal, its economic impact was considerable.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)}
}

@article{yorukHowResponsiveAre2009,
  ids = {Yoruk2009,Yoruk2009a,Yoruk2009b},
  title = {How Responsive Are Charitable Donors to Requests to Give?},
  author = {Y{\"o}r{\"u}k, Bar{\i}{\c s} K.},
  year = {2009},
  month = oct,
  journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
  volume = {93},
  number = {9-10},
  pages = {1111--1117},
  publisher = {{North-Holland}},
  issn = {0047-2727},
  doi = {10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2009.06.001},
  abstract = {People are more likely to contribute to a charity when they are asked to. Although this so-called `power of asking' is well-known among fundraisers, the existing literature does not pay much attention to the role of donation requests in charitable giving. This paper uses a unique survey that includes a question on whether the respondent is asked to give to estimate the causal effects of charitable solicitations on giving behavior. In order to address the endogeneity of the donation requests due to non-random solicitation of charitable donors, I link this survey to IRS data on charitable organizations and propose identifying instruments. After controlling for the endogeneity, I find that donation requests increase the propensity to give by about nineteen percentage points for those who are asked to give. This effect is robust under different specifications and with different sets of instruments, and is much larger than the estimates from univariate models, which assume that charitable solicitations are exogenous. I argue that this result is counterintuitive and discuss some possible explanations.},
  keywords = {Charitable contributions Fundraising Power of aski}
}

@article{zhuDarkPoolsHarm2014,
  title = {Do Dark Pools Harm Price Discovery?},
  author = {Zhu, Haoxiang},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Review of Financial Studies},
  volume = {27},
  number = {3},
  pages = {747--789},
  issn = {08939454},
  doi = {10.1093/rfs/hht078},
  abstract = {Dark pools are equity trading systems that do not publicly display orders. Dark pools offer potential price improvements but do not guarantee execution. Informed traders tend to trade in the same direction, crowd on the heavy side of the market, and face a higher execution risk in the dark pool, relative to uninformed traders. Consequently, exchanges are more attractive to informed traders, and dark pools are more attractive to uninformed traders. Under certain conditions, adding a dark pool alongside an exchange concentrates price-relevant information into the exchange and improves price discovery. Improved price discovery coincides with reduced exchange liquidity.}
}

@article{zizzoExperimenterDemandEffects2010,
  ids = {Zizzo2010,Zizzo2010a},
  title = {Experimenter Demand Effects in Economic Experiments},
  author = {Zizzo, D J},
  year = {2010},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  volume = {13},
  number = {1},
  pages = {75--98},
  publisher = {{Springer}},
  issn = {1386-4157},
  doi = {10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z}
}