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MachText/ 000755 000765 000024 00000000000 12422306334 014634 5 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 MachText/Mach_1.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001661 12422306320 016464 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 DEDICATORY LETTER Niccolo Machiavelli to His Magnificence Lorenzo de' Medici Those who wish to be viewed with favour by a ruler usually approach him with things from among their possessions that are very dear to them, or with things that they expect will please him. Hence, it often happens that they are presented with horses, weapons, a cloth of gold, precious stones and similar ornaments, which are worthy of their exalted position. Wishing myself to offer Your Magnificence some token of my devotion to you, I have not found among my belongings anything that I hold more dear or valuable than my knowledge of the conduct of great men, learned through long experience of modern affairs and continual study of ancient history: I have reflected on and examined these matters with great care, and have summarised them in a small volume, which I proffer to Your Magnificence. And although I consider this work unworthy to be presented to Your MachText/Mach_10.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001614 12422306320 016542 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 But considerable problems arise if territories are annexed in a country that differs in language, customs and institutions, and great good luck and great ability are needed to hold them. One of the best and most effective solutions is for the conqueror to go and live there.d This makes the possession more secure and more permanent. This is what the Turks did in Greece: .. all the other measures taken by them to hold that country would not have sufficed, if they had not instituted direct rule. For if one does do that, troubles can be detected when they are just beginning and effective measures can be taken quickly. But if one does not, the troubles are encountered when they have grown, and nothing can be done about them. Moreover, under direct rule, the country will not be exploited by your officials; the subjects will be content if they have direct access to the ruler. Consequently, they will MachText/Mach_100.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001635 12422306325 016632 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 them, saying that he could not fight well with them, and he therefore wanted to confront the enemy with his own sling and knife. In short, weapons and armour belonging to others fall off you or weigh you down or constrict your movements. After Charles VII (father of King Louis XI) had liberated France from the English, through a combination of good luck and prowess, he recognised the need for France to be defended by national troops, and formed in his kingdom an army composed of cavalry and infantry. His son Louis later disbanded the infantry, and began to employ Swiss soldiers. This blunder being followed by the others, led (as is indeed now obvious) to the present dangerous position of that Kingdom. By strengthening the position of the Swiss, he demoralised the rest of his army, for he disbanded the infantry and made his own cavalry dependent on foreign soldiers. Since they are used to fighting together with MachText/Mach_101.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002151 12422306326 016626 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 the Swiss, they are not confident of being able to win battles without them. The outcome is that the French are inferior to the Swiss, and without the Swiss they make a poor showing against enemies. The French armies, then, have been of a mixed character, partly mercenary and partly national. Such a combination is much better than an army of auxiliaries or an army of mercenaries but much inferior to native troops. And let this example suffice: for the Kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the military system set up by Charles had been developed or, at least, preserved. But men have so little judgement and foresight that they initiate policies that seem attractive, without noticing any poison that is concealed, as I said earlier, when referring to consumptive fevers. Therefore, a ruler who does not recognise evils in the very early stages cannot be considered wise; this ability is given only to a few. If the beginning of the decline of the Roman Empire is sought, it will be found that it began only when the Goths started to be used as mercenaries, because that policy began to sap the strength of the Roman MachText/Mach_102.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001557 12422306326 016640 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Empire; and all the vigour that was drained from it was received by the Goths. I conclude, then, that any principality that does not have its own army cannot be secure; rather, it must rely completely on luck or the favour of others, because it lacks the strength to defend itself in difficult times. Wise men have always thought and held 'quod nihil sit tam infirmum aut instabile quam fama potentiae non sua vi nixa'. And one's own forces are those composed of subjects or citizens or of one's dependents; all the others are either mercenaries or auxiliaries. The right way to organise one's forces will be easily grasped, if the methods used by the four men I have cited above are examined, and if it is understood how Philip, father of Alexander the Great, and many other republics and rulers have armed and organised their states; I have complete faith in their methods. MachText/Mach_103.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001553 12422306326 016635 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 XIV: How a ruler should act concerning military matters A ruler, then, should have no other objective and no other concern, nor occupy himself with anything else except war and its methods and practices, for this pertains only to those who rule. And it is of such efficacy that it not only maintains hereditary rulers in power but very often enables men of private status to become rulers. On the other hand, it is evident that if rulers concern themselves more with the refinements of life than with military matters, they lose power. The main reason why they lose it is their neglect of the art of war; and being proficient in this art is what enables one to gain power. Because Francesco Sforza was armed, from being a private citizen he became Duke of Milan; since his descendants did not trouble themselves with military matters, from being dukes they became private MachText/Mach_104.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001543 12422306326 016635 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 citizens. For being unarmed (apart from other bad consequences) results in your being despised, which is one of those disgraceful things against which a ruler must always guard, as will be explained later. There is an enormous difference between an armed and an unarmed man; and it cannot be expected that a man who is armed will obey willingly a man who is unarmed, or that an unarmed man can be safe among armed servants. Since the latter will be contemptuous and the former suspicious and afraid, they will not be able to work well together. Therefore, apart from the other disadvantages already mentioned, a ruler who does not understand military matters cannot be highly regarded by his soldiers, and he cannot trust them. A ruler should therefore always be concerned with military matters, and in peacetime he should be even more taken up with them than in MachText/Mach_105.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002451 12422306326 016635 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 war. There are two ways of doing this: one is by going on exercises; the other is by study. With regard to exercises, besides keeping his troops well disciplined and trained, he should very frequently engage in hunting, thus hardening his body and, at the same time, becoming familiar with the terrain: how mountains rise, how valleys open out and plains spread out, as well as with the characteristics of rivers and swamps; he should concern himself very much with all these matters. This practical knowledge is valuable in two ways. First, one learns well the terrain of one's own country, and understands better its natural defences; secondly, through knowing and exercising in the countryside, one easily grasps the characteristics of any new terrain that must be explored. For the hills, valleys, plains, rivers and swamps that are found in,Tuscany, for instance, are in many respects similar to those found in other regions. Thus, knowing well the terrain of one region readily permits one to become familiar with that of other regions. A ruler who lacks such expertise lacks the elements of generalship. For it enables one to track down the enemy, to encamp one's army properly, to lead an army towards the enemy, to prepare for battle, to besiege fortresses or fortified towns, in ways that conduce to victory. MachText/Mach_106.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001552 12422306326 016637 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 One of the reasons why historians have praised Philopoemen, the leader of the Achaean League, is that in peacetime he was always thinking about military matters; and when he was in the countryside with companions, he often stopped and asked questions: 'If the enemy happened to be up on that hill, and we were here with our army, who would be better placed? How should we attack them, while still preserving proper military formation? How should we be able to retreat? If they retreated, how should we pursue them?' As they travelled he used to put to them all the situations in which an army might be placed. He used to listen to their opinions, then give his own, supporting.them with reasons. Because of these continual discussions, when he w'as leading his armies he was able to overcome any difficulties. As for mental exercise, a ruler should read historical works, MachText/Mach_107.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002215 12422306326 016635 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 especially for the light they shed on the actions of eminent men: to find out how they waged war, to discover the reasons for their victories and defeats, in order to avoid reverses and achieve conquests; and above all, to imitate some eminent man, who himself set out to imitate some predecessor of his who was considered worthy of praise and glory, always taking his deeds and actions as a model for himself, as it is said that Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar imitated Alexander, and Scipio imitated Cyrus. And anyone who reads the life of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will realise, when he considers Scipio's life and career, how greatly Scipio's imitation of Cyrus helped him to attain glory, and how much Scipio's sexual restraint, affability, humanity and generosity derived from his imitating the qualities of Cyrus, as recorded in this work by Xenophon. A wise ruler should act in such ways, and never remain idle in quiet times, but assiduously strengthen his position through such activities in order that in adversity he will benefit from them. Thus, when his situation worsens, he will be well equipped to overcome dangers and to flourish. MachText/Mach_108.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002116 12422306326 016636 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 XV: The things for which men, and especially rulers, are praised or blamed It remains now to consider in what ways a ruler should act with regard to his subjects and allies. And since I am well aware that many people have written about this subject I fear that I may be thought presumptuous, for what I have to say differs from the precepts offered by others, especially on this matter. But because I want to write what will be useful to anyone who understands, it seems to me better to concentrate on what really happens rather than on theories or speculations. For many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist. However, how men live is so different from how they should live that a ruler who does not do what is generally done, but persists in doing what ought to be done, will undermine his power rather than maintain it. If a ruler who wants always to act honourably is surrounded by many unscrupulous men his downfall is inevitable. Therefore, a ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared to act immorally when this becomes necessary. MachText/Mach_109.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001761 12422306326 016644 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 I shall set aside fantasies about rulers, then, and consider what happens in fact. I say that whenever men are discussed, and especially rulers (because they occupy more exalted positions), they are praised or blamed for possessing some of the following qualities. Thus, one man is considered generous, another miserly (I use this Tuscan term because avaro in our tongue also signifies someone who is rapacious, whereas we call misero someone who is very reluctant to use his own possessions); one is considered a free giver, another rapacious; one cruel, another merciful; one treacherous, another loyal; one effeminate and weak, another indomitable and spirited; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another moderate; one upright, another cunning; one inflexible, another easy-going; one serious, another frivolous; one devout, another unbelieving, and so on. I know that everyone will acknowledge that it would be most praiseworthy for a ruler to have all the above-mentioned qualities that are MachText/Mach_11.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001547 12422306320 016550 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 have more reason to be devoted to him if they intend to behave well, and to fear him if they do not. Any foreigners with designs on that state will proceed very carefully. Hence, if the state is ruled directly, it is very unlikely indeed to be lost. The other very good solution is to establish colonies in a few places, which become, as it were, fetters for the conquered territory. If this is not done, it will be necessary to hold it by means of large military forces. Colonies involve little expense; and so at little or no cost, one establishes and maintains them. The only people injured are those who lose their fields and homes, which are given to the new settlers; but only a few inhabitants are affected in this way. Moreover, those whom he injures can never harm him, because they are poor and scattered. All the other inhabitants remain unharmed, and should MachText/Mach_110.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001741 12422306326 016632 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 held to be good. But because it is not possible to have all of them, and because circumstances do not permit living a completely virtuous life, one must be sufficiently prudent to know how to avoid becoming notorious for those vices that would destroy one's power and seek to avoid those vices that are not politically dangerous; but if one cannot bring oneself to do this, they can be indulged in with fewer misgivings. Yet one should not be troubled about becoming notorious for those vices without which it is difficult to preserve one's power, because if one considers everything carefully, doing some things that seem virtuous may result in one's ruin, whereas doing other things that seem vicious may strengthen one's position and cause one to flourish. XVI: Generosity and meanness To begin, then, with the first of the above-mentioned qualities, I maintain that it would be desirable to be considered generous; nevertheless, if generosity is practised in such a way that you will be MachText/Mach_111.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001765 12422306326 016641 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 considered generous, it will harm you. If it is practised virtuously, and as it should be, it will not be known about, and you will not avoid acquiring a bad reputation for the opposite vice. Therefore, if one wants to keep up a reputation for being generous, one must spend lavishly and ostentatiously. The inevitable outcome of acting in such ways is that the ruler will consume all his resources in sumptuous display; and if he wants to continue to be thought generous, he will eventually be compelled to become rapacious, to tax the people very heavily, and raise money by all possible means. Thus, he will begin to be hated by his subjects and, because he is impoverished, he will be held in little regard. Since this generosity of his has harmed many people and benefited few, he will feel the effects of any discontent, and the first real threat to his power will involve him in grave difficulties. When he realises this, and changes his ways, he will very soon acquire a bad reputation for being miserly. MachText/Mach_112.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001565 12422306326 016640 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Therefore, since a ruler cannot both practise this virtue of generosity and be known to do so without harming himself, he would do well not to worry about being called miserly. For eventually he will come to be considered more generous, when it is realised that, because of his parsimony, his revenues are sufficient to defend himself against any enemies that attack him, and to undertake campaigns without imposing special taxes on the people. Thus he will be acting generously towards the vast majority, whose property he does not touch, and will be acting meanly towards the few to whom he gives nothing. Those rulers who have achieved great things in our own times have all been considered mean; all the others have failed. Although Pope Julius II cultivated a reputation for generosity in order to become pope, he did not seek to maintain it afterwards, because he wanted to be MachText/Mach_113.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002005 12422306326 016627 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 able to wage war. The present King of France has fought many wars without imposing any special taxes on his subjects, because his parsimonious habits have always enabled him to meet the extra expenses. If the present King of Spain had a reputation for generosity, he would not have successfully undertaken so many campaigns. Therefore, a ruler should worry little about being thought miserly: he will not have to rob his subjects; he will be able to defend himself; he will avoid being poor and despised and will not be forced to become rapacious. For meanness is one of those vices that enable him to rule. It may be objected that Caesar obtained power through his open-handedness, and that many others have risen to very high office because they were open-handed and were considered to be so. I would reply that either you are already an established ruler or you are trying to become a ruler. In the first case, open-handedness is harmful; in the second, it is certainly necessary to be thought open-handed. Caesar was one of MachText/Mach_114.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001576 12422306326 016644 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 those who sought power in Rome; but if after gaining power he had survived, and had not moderated his expenditure, he would have undermined his power. And if it should be objected that many rulers who have been considered very generous have had remarkable military successes, I would reply: a ruler spends either what belongs to him or his subjects, or what belongs to others. In the former case, he should be parsimonious; in the latter, he should be as open-handed as possible. A ruler who accompanies his army, supporting it by looting, sacking and extortions, disposes of what belongs to others; he must be openhanded, for if he is not, his soldiers will desert. You can be much more generous with what does not belong to you or to your subjects, as Cyrus, Caesar and Alexander were. This is because giving away what belongs to others in no way damages your reputation; rather, it enhances MachText/Mach_115.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001627 12422306327 016643 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 it. It is only giving away what belongs to yourself that harms you. There is nothing that is so self-consuming as generosity: the more you practise it, the less you will be able to continue to practise it. You will either become poor and despised or your efforts to avoid poverty will make you rapacious and hated. A ruler must above all guard against being despised and hated; and being generous will lead to both. Therefore, it is shrewder to cultivate a reputation for meanness, which will lead to notoriety but not to hatred. This is better than being forced, through wanting to be considered generous, to incur a reputation for rapacity, which will lead to notoriety and to hatred as well. XVII: Cruelty and mercifulness; and whether it is better to be loved or feared Turning to the other previously mentioned qualities, I maintain that every ruler should want to be thought merciful, not cruel; nevertheless, MachText/Mach_116.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001617 12422306327 016643 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 one should take care not to be merciful in an inappropriate way. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel, yet his harsh measures restored order to the Romagna, unifying it and rendering it peaceful and loyal. If his conduct is properly considered, he will be judged to have been much more merciful than the Florentine people, who let Pistoia be torn apart, in order to avoid acquiring a reputation for cruelty. Therefore, if a ruler can keep his subjects united and loyal, he should not worry about incurring a reputation for cruelty; for by punishing a very few he will really be more merciful than those who over-indulgently permit disorders to develop, with resultant killings and plunderings. For the latter usually harm a whole community, whereas the executions ordered by a ruler harm only specific individuals. And a new ruler, in particular, cannot avoid being considered harsh, since new states are full of MachText/Mach_117.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001473 12422306327 016644 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 dangers. Virgil makes Dido say: Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt moliri, et late fines custode tueri. Nevertheless, he should be slow to believe accusations and to act against individuals, and should not be afraid of his own shadow. He should act with due prudence and humanity so that being over-confident will not make him incautious, and being too suspicious will not render him insupportable. A controversy has arisen about this: whether it is better to be loved than feared, or vice versa. My view is that it is desirable to be both loved and feared; but it is difficult to achieve both and, if one of them has to be lacking, it is much safer to be feared than loved. For this may be said of men generally: they are ungrateful, fickle, feigners and dissemblers, a voiders of danger, eager for gain. While you MachText/Mach_118.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000003262 12422306327 016643 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 benefit them they are all devoted to you: they would shed their blood for you; they offer their possessions, their lives, and their sons, as I said before, when the need to do so is far off. But when you are hard pressed, they turn away. A ruler who has relied completely on their promises, and has neglected to prepare other defences, will be ruined, because friendships that are acquired with money, and not through greatness and nobility of character, are paid for but not secured, and prove unreliable just when they are needed. Men are less hesitant about offending or harming a ruler who makes himself loved than one who inspires fear. For love is sustained by a bond of gratitude which, because men are excessively self-interested, is broken whenever they see a chance to benefit themselves. But fear is sustained by a dread of punishment that is always effective. Nevertheless, a ruler must make himself feared in such a way that, even if he does not become loved, he does not become hated. For it is perfectly possible to be feared without incurring hatred. And this can always be achieved if he refrains from laying hands on the property of his citizens and subjects, and on their womenfolk. If it is necessary to execute anyone, this should be done only if there is a proper justification and obvious reason. But, above all, he must not touch the property of others, because men forget sooner the killing of a father than the loss of their patrimony. Moreover, there will always be pretexts for seizing property; and someone who begins to live rapaciously will always find pretexts for taking the property of others. On the other hand) reasons or pretexts for taking life are rarer and more fleeting. MachText/Mach_119.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001662 12422306327 016646 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Hovever, when a ruler is with his army, and commands a large force, he must not worry about being considered harsh, because armies are never kept united and prepared for military action unless their leader is thought to be harsh. Among the remarkable things recounted about Hannibal is that, although he had a very large army, composed of men from many countries, and fighting in foreign lands, there never arose any dissension, either among themselves or against their leader, whether things were going well or badly. This could be accounted for only by his inhuman cruelty which, together with his many good qualities, made him always respected and greatly feared by his troops. And if he had not been so cruel, his other qualities would not have been sufficient to achieve that effect. Thoughtless writers admire this achievement of his, yet condemn the main reason for it. That his other qualities would not have sufficed is proved by what MachText/Mach_12.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001604 12422306320 016543 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 therefore be reassured, and will be afraid of causing trouble, for fear that they will be dispossessed, like the others. I conclude that these colonies are not expensive, are more loyal, and harm fewer people; and those that are harmed cannot injure you because, as I said, they are scattered and poor. It should be observed here that men should either be caressed or crushed; because they can avenge slight injuries, but not those that are very severe. Hence, any injury done to a man must be such that there is no need to fear his revenge. However, if military forces are sent instead of colonists, this is much more expensive, because all the revenue of the region will be consumed for its security. The outcome is that the territory gained results in loss to him; and it is much more injurious, because it harms the whole of that region when his troops move round the country. Everyone suffers MachText/Mach_120.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001655 12422306327 016640 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 happened to Scipio, considered a most remarkable man not only in his own times but in all others) whose armies rebelled against him in Spain. The only reason for this was that he was over-indulgent, and permitted his soldiers more freedom than was consistent with maintaining proper military discipline. Fabius Maximus rebuked him for this in the senate, and called him a corrupter of the Roman army. And when Locri was ravaged by one of Scipio's legates, the inhabitants were not avenged by him, and the legate was not punished for his arrogance, all because Scipio was too easy-going. Indeed, a speaker in the senate who wished to excuse him said that there were many men Who were better at not committing misdeeds themselves than punishing the misdeeds of others. This character of his would eventually have tarnished his fame and glory, if he had continued his military command unchecked; but since he was controlled by the senate, this MachText/Mach_121.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001525 12422306327 016635 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 harmful quality was not only concealed but contributed to his glory. Returning to the matter of being feared and loved) then, I conclude that whether men hear affection depends on themselves, but whether they are afraid will depend on what the ruler does. A wise ruler should rely on what is under his own control, not on what is under the control of others; he should contrive only to avoid incurring hatred, as I have said. XVIII: How rulers should keep their promises Everyone knows how praiseworthy it is for a ruler to keep his promises, and live uprightly and not by trickery. Nevertheless, experience shows that in our times the rulers who have done great things are those who have set little store by keeping their word, being skilful rather in cunningly deceiving men; they have got the better of those who have relied on being trustworthy. MachText/Mach_122.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001570 12422306327 016636 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 You should know, then, that there are two ways of contending: one by using laws, the other, force. The first is appropriate for men, the second for animals; but because the former is often ineffective, one must have recourse to the latter. Therefore, a ruler must know well how to imitate beasts as well as employing properly human means. This policy was taught to rulers allegorically by ancient writers: they tell how Achilles and many other ancient rulers were entrusted to Chiron the centaur, to be raised carefully by him. Having a mentor who was half-beast and half-man signifies that a ruler needs to use both natures, and that one without the other is not effective. Since a ruler, then, must know how to act like a beast, he should imitate both the fox and the lion, for the lion is liable to be trapped, whereas the fox cannot ward off wolves. One needs, then, to be a fox to MachText/Mach_123.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001620 12422306327 016633 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 recognise traps, and a lion to frighten away wolves. Those who rely merely upon a lion's strength do not understand matters. Therefore, a prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, when such fidelity would damage him, and when the reasons that made him promise are no longer relevant. This advice would not be sound if all men were upright; but because they are treacherous and would not keep their promises to you, you should not consider yourself bound to keep your promises to them. Moreover, plausible reasons can always be found for such failure to keep promises. One could give countless modern examples of this, and show how many peace treaties and promises have been rendered null and void by the faithlessness of rulers; and those best able to imitate the fox have succeeded best. But foxiness should be well concealed: one must be a great feigner and dissembler. And men are so naive, and so MachText/Mach_124.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002606 12422306327 016641 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 much dominated by immediate needs, that a skilful deceiver always finds plenty of people who will let themselves be deceived. I must mention one recent case: Alexander VI was concerned only with deceiving men, and he always found them gullible. No man ever affirmed anything more forcefully or with stronger oaths but kept his word less. Nevertheless, his deceptions were always effective, because he well understood the naivety of men. A ruler, then, need not actually possess all the above-mentioned qualities, but he must certainly seem to. Indeed, I shall be so bold as to say that having and always cultivating them is harmful, whereas seeming to have them is useful; for instance, to seem merciful, trustworthy, humane, upright and devout, and also to be so. But if it becomes necessary to refrain, you must be prepared to act in the opposite way, and be capable of doing it. And it must be understood that a ruler, and especially a new ruler, cannot always act in ways that are considered good because, in order to maintain his power, he is often forced to act treacherously, ruthlessly or inhumanely, and disregard the precepts of religion. Hence, he must be prepared to vary his conduct as the winds of fortune and changing circumstances constrain him and, as I said before, not deviate from right conduct if possible, but be capable of entering upon the path of wrongdoing when this becomes necessary. MachText/Mach_125.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001506 12422306327 016640 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 A ruler, then, should be very careful that everything he says is replete with the five above-named qualities: to those who see and hear him, he should seem to be exceptionally merciful, trustworthy, upright, humane and devout. And it is most necessary of all to seem devout. In these matters, most men judge more by their eyes than by their hands. For everyone is capable of seeing you, but few can touch you. Everyone can see what you appear to be, whereas few have direct experience of what you really are; and those few will not dare to challenge the popular view, sustained as it is by the majesty of the ruler's position. With regard to all human actions, and especially those of rulers, who cannot be called to account, men pay attention to the outcome. If a ruler, then, contrives to conquer, and to preserve the state, the means MachText/Mach_126.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001573 12422306327 016645 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 will always be judged to be honourable and be praised by everyone. For the common people are impressed by appearances and results. Everywhere the common people are the vast majority, and the few are isolated when the majority and the government are at one. One present- day ruler, whom it is well to leave unnamed, is always preaching peace and trust, although he is really very hostile to both; and if he had practised them he would have lost either reputation or power several times over. XIX: How contempt and hatred should be avoided Since I have already discussed the most important of the qualities previously mentioned, I want to discuss the others briefly under this general heading: that a ruler, as has already been partly explained, should avoid anything that will make him either hated or despised. If he does avoid this he will have done what he should, and none of his other MachText/Mach_127.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001554 12422306327 016645 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 censurable faults will involve him in any danger. What will make him hated, above all else, as I said, is being rapacious and seizing the property or womenfolk of his subjects: he must avoid doing these things. If the vast majority of men are not deprived of their property and honour they will live contentedly, and one will have to deal only with the ambition of a few men, which can easily be restrained in various ways. What will make him despised is being considered inconstant, frivolous, effeminate, pusillanimous and irresolute: a ruler must avoid contempt as if it were a reef. He should contrive that his actions should display grandeur, courage, seriousness and strength, and his decisions about the private disputes of his subjects should be irrevocable. He should maintain this reputation, so that no one should think of lying to him or scheming to trick him. MachText/Mach_128.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001616 12422306327 016645 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 A ruler who succeeds in creating such an image of himself will enjoy a fine reputation; and it will be difficult to plot against or to attack him (provided that he is known to be very able, and greatly respected and feared by his subjects). For rulers should have two main worries: one is internal, and concerns his subjects; the other is external, and concerns foreign powers. Against the latter threat, good troops and reliable allies are an effective defence; and possessing good armies always results in having allies who are reliable. If external relations are solidly based, internal affairs will give no trouble unless they have already been disturbed by conspiracy. Even if there are external threats, provided the ruler lives and arranges his affairs as I have recommended, and is not faint-hearted, he will always be able to repel any attacks, just as Nabis the Spartan did, as I mentioned earlier. MachText/Mach_129.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001607 12422306330 016640 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 But with regard to one's subjects, if there is no external threat, one's only fear must be that they may be plotting secretly. A ruler will effectively protect himself from this danger if he avoids incurring hatred and contempt, and keeps the people satisfied with him. It is essential to do this, as I said at length earlier. One of the best safeguards that a ruler has against plots is not being hated by the people. For plotters always believe that killing a ruler will satisfy the people. But if plotters think that the people will be angry, they will be most reluctant to undertake a conspiracy, because it always involves countless difficulties and dangers for them. There have been many conspiracies, but history has shown that few have succeeded. For a conspirator cannot act alone; yet he cannot seek help except from those whom he believes to be disaffected. But as soon as you have revealed MachText/Mach_13.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001661 12422306320 016547 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 this nuisance, and becomes hostile to the ruler. And they are dangerous enemies because, although defeated, they remain in their own homes. From every point of view, then, this military solution is misguided, whereas establishing colonies is extremely effective. Again, as I have said, anyone who rules a foreign country should take the initiative in becoming a protector of the neighbouring minor powers and contrive to weaken those who are powerful within the country itself. He should also take precautions against the possibility that some foreign ruler as powerful as himself may seek to invade the country when circumstances are favourable. Such invaders are always helped by malcontents within the country, who are moved either by their own overweening ambition or by fear, as happened in Greece, where the Aetolians were responsible for the invasion by the Romans. And in every country that the Romans attacked, some of the inhabitants MachText/Mach_130.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002033 12422306330 016622 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 your plan to a malcontent, you enable him to become contented, because obviously he can now expect to be amply rewarded. If he sees that there is certain gain to be had in this way, and only many dangers and uncertain gain from joining the plot, he must either be an exceptional friend or an implacable enemy of the ruler, if he fails to give you away. In short, for plotters there are only fears of discovery or betrayal, and the dreadful prospect of punishment; but the ruler has the prestige attaching to his office, together with the laws and resources of government at his disposal, as well as help from allies, all of which will help him to survive. It follows that, if popular goodwill is added to all these other advantages, only an exceedingly rash man would dare to conspire against him. Plotters normally have grounds for being afraid before the crime is carried out; but here what has to be feared as well is that afterwards, when the deed has been done, the people will be hostile and there will be no hope of being given refuge by them. MachText/Mach_131.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001575 12422306330 016635 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Countless examples could be given on this subject; but I shall limit myself to one, which occurred in our fathers' time. Messer Annibale Bentivoglio, grandfather of the present messer Annibale, who was ruler of Bologna, was conspired against and killed by the Canneschi family. His only son was messer Giovanni, who was a babe in arms. Immediately after this killing, the people rose up and slaughtered all the Canneschi. The reason for this was the popular goodwill towards the Bentivoglio at that time, which was very great. After Annibale's death, no member of the family was left in Bologna' who could govern that state. When it was heard from Florence that one of the Bentivoglio family (until then believed to be a blacksmith's son) was living there, the Bolognese came to Florence to find him and entrusted the government of that city to him; and he governed it until Giovanni was old MachText/Mach_132.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001640 12422306330 016627 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 enough to rule. I conclude, then, that rulers should worry little about being plotted against if their subjects are well disposed towards them, but if their subjects are hostile and hate them, they should be afraid of everything and everyone. Well-ordered states and wise rulers have always been very careful not to exasperate the nobles and also to satisfy the people and keep them contented; this is one of the most important things for a ruler to do. France is one of the best-ordered and best-governed modern kingdoms; and in that country there are countless good institutions, on which the liberty and security of the king is based. The most important of these is the parlement, which possesses great authority. For the man who reformed that kingdom was well aware of the ambition and arrogance of the nobles, and thought that they needed a bit in their mouths to restrain them. On the other hand, since he knew that the MachText/Mach_133.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001547 12422306330 016636 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 people hated the nobles because they were afraid of them, he wanted to protect the people. He did not want this restraint to be a special duty of the king, in order not to make him hated by the nobles because he favoured the people, and not to make him hated by the people because he favoured the nobles. Consequently, he set up another body to restrain the nobles and favour the people, without the king having to incur any hostility. There could have been no more prudent measure or better institution than this, or anything that has strengthened more the monarchy and the kingdom itself. Another important lesson can be learned from this: rulers should leave unpleasant tasks to others, but themselves do those things that increase their popularity. Again, I would emphasise that a ruler should respect the nobles, but not act in a way that makes the people hate him. MachText/Mach_134.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001625 12422306330 016634 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 It will perhaps seem to many people that, if the lives, careers and deaths of some of the Roman emperors are examined, they will provide evidence against the views I have expressed. For some emperors always lived admirable lives and displayed greatness of spirit, yet either lost power or were killed by their soldiers or courtiers, who plotted against them. I want to reply to these objections, then, consider the characters of some emperors and show the reasons why they failed (which are not inconsistent with what I have maintained). I also want to emphasise those things that are important for anyone who studies the deeds done in those times. I want to limit my survey to the emperors who ruled from Marcus the philosopher until Maximinus: namely, Marcus, his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julianus, Severus, his son Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander and Maximinus. The first point that should MachText/Mach_135.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001764 12422306330 016641 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 be made is that, whereas in other principalities only the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people had to be reckoned with, the Roman emperors were confronted by a third problem: they had to deal with the· cruelty and rapacity of the soldiers. This was such a great problem that it caused the downfall of many emperors. For it was hard to satisfy both the soldiers and the people: the reason was that the people liked a peaceful life, and consequently wanted to have moderate rulers, whereas the soldiers wanted warlike rulers, who were arrogant, cruel and rapacious. The soldiers wanted the people to be treated harshly by rulers, so that they could have double pay and give vent to their own rapacity and cruelty. The outcome was that those emperors who (either through natural deficiencies or lack of experience) did not acquire sufficient prestige to be able to restrain both the soldiers and the people always failed. And most of the emperors (especially those who came to the throne as new MachText/Mach_136.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001616 12422306330 016636 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 men), when they realised how difficult it was to satisfy these two conflicting tendencies, tried to satisfy the soldiers and worried little about the people being harmed. They were forced to follow this policy. Since rulers cannot avoid being hated in some quarters, the first thing they should do is to try not to be hated by everyone; and if this cannot be achieved, to strive assiduously to avoid the hatred of the groups that are most powerful. Consequently, the emperors who stood specially in need of support (because they were new rulers) favoured the soldiers rather than the people. However, whether this profited them or not depended on whether they were capable of keeping the respect of the soldiers. Marcus, Pertinax and Alexander, who all lived moderately, who loved justice and shunned cruelty, who were all humane and benevolent, came (apart from Marcus) to a bad end. Only Marcus lived and MachText/Mach_137.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001651 12422306330 016636 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 died honoured by all, because he became emperor by hereditary right, and did not owe his power either to the soldiers or to the people. Then, because he had many fine qualities, which made him greatly respected, throughout his reign he was able to keep both the soldiers and the people under control, and he always avoided being hated or despised. But Pertinax was made emperor against the will of the soldiers who, being used to doing as they pleased under Commodus, could not bear to live properly, as Pertinax wanted them to do. Thus he became hated and, since he was despised as well (because he was old), he was slain soon after the start of his reign. It should be remarked at this point that good deeds as well as bad may incur hatred. As I said earlier, a ruler who wants to maintain his power is often forced to act immorally. For if a group (whether it is the people or the soldiers or the nobles) whose support you consider MachText/Mach_138.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001565 12422306330 016643 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 necessary for maintaining your power is corrupt, you are forced to indulge its proclivities in order to satisfy it. In such circumstances, good deeds are inimical to you. But let us come to Alexander, whose rectitude was so notable that he was praised for many things. One of them was the fact that, during the fourteen years that he held power, he never had anyone executed without a triaL Nevertheless, because he was considered weak, and a man who allowed himself to be controlled by his mother, he came to be despised, the army plotted against him and he was killed. Let us now consider, by contrast, the characters of Commodus, Severus} Antoninus Caracalla and Maximinus: they were all exceedingly cruel and rapacious. In order to satisfy the soldiers, they did not hesitate to commit every kind of injury against the people; and all of them, except Severus, came to a bad end. MachText/Mach_139.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001504 12422306330 016635 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Severus possessed so much ability that he was able to keep the soldiers friendly, and rule successfully to the end, even though he oppressed the people. For his outstanding qualities made him so remarkable in the eyes of the soldiers and the people that the latter were astonished and awestruck, while the former were respectful and satisfied. For a new ruler, the deeds of this man were very impressive, so I want to show briefly how well he was able to imitate the fox and the lion, which I said earlier was necessary for a ruler to do. Severus was well aware of the indolence of the Emperor Julianus, and he persuaded the army he commanded in Slavonia that it would be a good idea to march on Rome, and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by his praetorian guard. Using this pretext, without revealing that he wanted MachText/Mach_14.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001467 12422306320 016554 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 aided their invasion. What usually happens is that, as soon as a strong invader attacks a country, all the less powerful men rally to him, because they are enviously hostile to the ruler who has held sway over them. The invader has no trouble in winning over these less powerful men, since they will all be disposed to support the new power he has acquired. He needs only to be careful that they do not acquire too much military power and influence. And using his own forces, and with their consent, he can easily put down those who are powerful, thus gaining complete control of that country. A ruler who does not act in this way will soon lose what he has gained and, even while he does hold it, he will be beset by countless difficulties and troubles. The Romans followed these policies very well in the countries they MachText/Mach_140.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001616 12422306330 016631 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 to become emperor, he took his army towards Rome with such speed that he reached Italy before it was known he had left Slavonia. When he arrived in Rome, the intimidated senate elected him emperor, and had Julianus killed. After this beginning, two difficulties remained to be overcome before Severus could control the whole Empire. One was in Asia, where Nigrinus, leader of the Asian armies, had been proclaimed emperor; the other was in the west, where Albin us also aspired to the imperial throne. Since Severus thought it would be dangerous to reveal his hostility to both men, he decided to attack only Nigrinus and to trick Albinus. Accordingly, he wrote to Albinus, saying that the senate had chosen him emperor, and that he wanted to share the office. And he sent Albinus the title of Caesar, saying that by decision of the senate Albin us should join him as co-emperor. Albin us thought all this was MachText/Mach_141.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001533 12422306330 016630 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 true. But when Severus had defeated and killed Nigrinus, and the eastern part of the Empire was calm, he returned to Rome and complained to the senate that Albinus, showing little gratitude for the benefits he had received, had treacherously attempted to kill him, and that it was therefore necessary to go and punish his ingratitude. Then Severus attacked Albinus in France, where he deprived him at once of his position and his life. If Severus's deeds are examined closely, it must be concluded that he was a very fierce lion and a very cunning fox, who was feared and respected by everyone, and was not hated by his soldiers. And it should not be a matter of surprise that he, a new ruler, was able to rule such a great empire: for his immense prestige always protected him from the hatred that the people might have had for him because of his rapacious MachText/Mach_142.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002243 12422306330 016630 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 deeds. His son Antoninus was also a man with many very fine qualities, who was greatly admired by the people and liked by the soldiers. For he was a hardened warrior, who despised delicate food and any kind of weakness; this endeared him to all his soldiers. Nevertheless, he committed very many deeds of unexampled barbarity and cruelty: countless individuals were killed, as well as most of the inhabitants of Rome and all those of Alexandria. As a result, he became greatly hated by everyone. Even those around him began to be afraid of him, and one day he was killed by a centurion in the midst of his own troops. Here it should be remarked that such assassinations, which result from the resolve of implacable enemies, cannot be guarded against by rulers, because anyone who does not fear death himself can kill a ruler. But since this happens very rarely, a ruler should be much less afraid of it. He should be careful only not to harm seriously or insult anyone who serves him or any courtiers, as Antoninus did: he had outrageously put to death a brother of that centurion, and had continually threatened the centurion himself; yet he kept the man in his bodyguard. This was a MachText/Mach_143.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001522 12422306331 016631 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 rash decision and likely to cause his downfall, as indeed happened. But let us consider Commodus, who should have found it very easy to retain power, since he had inherited it from his father Marcus. He needed only to follow in the footsteps of his father, and he would have satisfied both the soldiers and the people. But because he was naturally cruel and brutal, he began to curry favour with the soldiers and let them behave as they liked so as to satisfy his rapacity at the people's expense. Moreover, he was not careful to uphold his dignity, for he often went down into the theatres to fight with the gladiators; as he did other things that were very degrading, and not in keeping with his imperial rank, he became despised by the soldiers. Since he was hated by the people and despised by the soldiers, he was conspired against and killed. MachText/Mach_144.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001604 12422306331 016633 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was an extremely warlike man; and since the soldiers had greatly disliked the unmanly conduct of Alexander (whom I have mentioned earlier), after he had been killed the soldiers chose Maximinus as emperor. But he did not retain· power for very long, because two things made him hated and despised. One was that he was of very low birth: he had been a shepherd in Thrace (this was well known to everybody and caused him to be greatly despised). The other was that, at the beginning of his rule, he had put off going to Rome and taking possession of the imperial throne. This delay earned him a reputation for being cruel, because his prefects, carrying out his orders, had committed many cruel acts, both in Rome and in many other parts of the Empire. The result was that, since everyone was outraged by his low birth and filled with hatred, and MachText/Mach_145.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001552 12422306331 016636 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 because they were afraid of his brutality, first Africa revolted, then the senate and all the people of Rome; then the rest of ltaly rose up against him. Finally, his own army rebelled: his troops were besieging Aquileia, which they found a difficult operation; they became angry at his harshness, and taking courage from knowing that so many had turned against him, they killed him. I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus or Julianus: because they were generally despised, they were soon killed. I want to bring this survey to a close. I maintain that the rulers of our own times are not troubled by the need to satisfy their soldiers by violent and illegal means. Although they have to pay some attention to them, any problems are quickly resolved, because none of these rulers has raised armies that are used to being together for long periods, controlling and MachText/Mach_146.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002716 12422306331 016642 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 administering provinces, as the armies of the Roman Empire did. Hence, if it was then more necessary to satisfy the soldiers than the people, it was because the soldiers were more powerful. Nowadays, for all rulers, except the Sultans of Turkey and Egypt, it is more necessary to satisfy the people than the soldiers, because the people are now more powerful. The Sultan of Turkey is an exception because he always keeps twelve thousand foot-soldiers and fifteen thousand cavalry in his service near him, and the security and strength of his Kingdom depends on these forces. Hence, he must keep these forces friendly, and pay more regard to them than to others. Likewise, since the Kingdom of the Sultan of Egypt is completely in the hands of the soldiers, he too is obliged to keep them friendly, without considering what the people may want. Moreover, it should be noted that this Sultan's state is different from every other principality. It resembles the Papacy (which cannot be called either an hereditary principality or a new principality): for it is not the sons of the old ruler who are the heirs, and then become rulers, but the man who is elected to that position by those who are authorised. Since this institution is ancient, it cannot be called a new principality, for it lacks all the problems encountered in new principalities. Although its ruler is certainly new, the institutions of the state are old, and are ready to receive him as if he were an hereditary ruler. MachText/Mach_147.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001772 12422306331 016644 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 But let us return to our subject. I maintain that anyone who considers what I have written will realise that either hatred or contempt led to the downfall of the emperors I have discussed; he will recognise that some of them acted in one way and others in the opposite way, and that one ruler in each group was successful and the others ended badly. Because Pertinax and Alexander were new rulers, it was useless and harmful for them to act like Marcus, who was an hereditary ruler. Likewise, it was harmful for Caracalla, Commodus and Maximinus to act like Severus, because they lacked the ability required to follow in his footsteps. Therefore, a new ruler in a new principality ccmnot imitate the conduct of Marcus, nor again is it necessary to imitate that of Severus. Rather, he should imitate Severus in the courses of action that are necessary for establishing himself in power, and imitate Marcus in those that are necessary for maintaining power that is already established and secure, thus achieving glory. MachText/Mach_148.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001671 12422306331 016643 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 XX: Whether building fortresses, and many other things that rulers frequently do, are useful or not To maintain their power more securely, some rulers have disarmed their subjects; others have encouraged factions in towns subject to them; others have fostered hostility against themselves; others have sought to win over those of whom they were suspicious when they began to rule; some have built fortresses and others have destroyed them. Although a definite judgement cannot be passed on all these measures, unless the particular circumstances of those states in which such decisions are taken are examined, nevertheless I shall discuss the subject in terms as general as it permits. New rulers, then, never disarm their subjects; indeed, if they find them unarmed, they always provide them with weapons. For when you arm them, these weapons become your own: those whom you distrusted become loyal, those who were loyal remain so, and subjects are MachText/Mach_149.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001574 12422306331 016646 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 converted into firm adherents. Since it is not possible to provide all your subjects with arms, when you benefit those whom you arm, you will also be able to secure yourself better against the others. Since the former are treated favourably, they will be more attached to you. The latter will excuse your conduct, because they will realise the need to treat favourably those who carry out more dangerous duties. But if you disarm your subjects, you begin to offend them, for you show that you do not trust them, either because you are weak and cowardly or because you are too suspicious. And both these reasons cause you to become hated. Since you cannot remain without military forces, you will be forced to resort to employing mercenary troops which will be of the stamp I have previously indicated. And even if they happen to be effective, they cannot be sufficiently effective to defend MachText/Mach_15.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001671 12422306320 016552 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 conquered. They established colonies, they had friendly relations with the less powerful (though without increasing their influence), they put down the powerful, and they ensured that strong foreign powers did not acquire influence in them. I shall cite only Greece as an example. The Romans established friendly relations with the Achaeans and the Aetolians; the Macedonian Kingdom was put down; Antiochus was driven out;e they never permitted the Achaeans and the Aetolians to augment their power, despite the good offices rendered by them; Philip sought to be accepted as their ally, but they would not permit any revival of his power; and even the might of Antiochus could not constrain them to let him hold any dominions in that country. The Romans acted in these circumstances as all wise rulers should: for they have to deal not only with existing troubles, but with troubles that are likely to develop, and have to use every means to overcome MachText/Mach_150.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001552 12422306331 016632 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 you against powerful enemies and hostile subjects. As I have said, then, new rulers of new principalities always arm their subjects. History is full of examples of this. But when a ruler annexes a state, which is joined like a member to his old one, he must then disarm the inhabitants of that state, except those who have helped him to annex it. However, in time, and as opportunity permits, even these must be rendered weak and harmless, and you must arrange matters so that all the arms of your enlarged state are in the hands of your own soldiers, who served under you in your old state. Our ancestors, and those who were thought to be wise, used to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by means of the factions and Pisa by using fortresses. Accordingly, they fostered discords between their subjects in some towns, so that they could maintain their hold on them MachText/Mach_151.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001637 12422306331 016637 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 more easily. This policy may have been sound in the period when there was a certain equilibrium in Italy; but I do not think that it should be imitated today. My own view is that divisions never benefit anyone; on the contrary, when faction-ridden cities are threatened by an enemy force, they always fall very quickly. The reason is that the weaker faction always rallies to the invader, and the other is not strong enough to resist. The Venetians used to foster the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their subject-cities (acting for the reasons mentioned above, I think); although they never permitted bloodshed, they were careful to foment discords among them, so that the citizens would be so absorbed in their quarrels that they would not unite against the Venetians. This policy did not profit them, as was seen: after their defeat at Vaila, some of these cities were immediately emboldened to revolt, and they deprived MachText/Mach_152.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001547 12422306331 016640 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 the Venetians of all their land empire. The use of such methods, then, indicates that a ruler is weak: such divisions are never permitted in a strong principality, for they are useful only in peacetime, when they can be used to control one's subjects more easily. But when war comes, the folly of such methods becomes apparent. There is no doubt that rulers become great when they overcome difficulties and the attacks directed against them. For this reason fortune) especially when it wants to increase the power of a new ruler (who has more need to gain a reputation than an hereditary one) encourages the growth of enemies, and makes him fight against them, so that he will be able to vanquish them, and thus rise higher, as if by a ladder that his enemies have provided him with. Accordingly, many people consider that a shrewd ruler should seize any opportunity to MachText/Mach_153.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002111 12422306331 016625 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 encourage hostile forces cunningly, so that when he crushes them his reputation and power will be greatly increased. Rulers (especially new rulers) have often found that men whom they had regarded with suspicion in the early stages of their rule prove more reliable and useful than those whom they had trusted at first. Pandolfo Petrucci, ruler of Siena, governed his state more with the help of those men of whom he had been suspicious than with anyone else. But it is very difficult to generalise about this, since men and circumstances vary. I shall say only that a ruler will always find it very easy to win over those men who were hostile to him in the early stages of his regime, but who were insufficiently powerful to maintain their position without help. For their part, they are constrained to serve him faithfully, because they are well aware how necessary it is for them to act in such a way as to cancel his initially unfavourable view of them. Thus, he will always find them more useful than those who, because they feel very secure in their positions, tend to neglect his affairs. MachText/Mach_154.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001473 12422306331 016640 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Moreover, since this matter is important, I do not want to fail to remind any ruler who has recently gained power through being favoured by the inhabitants that he should be well aware of the reasons why those who helped him to gain power acted as they did. If it was not from natural affection for him, but only because they were discontented with the previous government, it will be very difficult and troublesome to keep them friendly, because he will not be able to satisfy them. Considering the reason for this (in the light of instances drawn from ancient and modern history), it is clear that it is much easier to win over men who are hostile to him because they were content under the previous regime than it is to keep attached to him those who became friendly towards him and helped him to become ruler because they MachText/Mach_155.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001563 12422306331 016641 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 were disaffected. Rulers have been accustomed to build fortresses to strengthen their power. These serve as a bit and bridle for those who might plot against them, and are designed to provide a secure refuge if they should be subjected to a sudden attack. I praise this practice, because it has been used since ancient times. Nevertheless, in our own times, Niccolo Vitelli destroyed two fortresses in Citta di Castello, so that he could maintain his rule over it.b Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, when he returned to his dominions, from which Cesare Borgia had driven him out,' razed to the ground all the fortresses of that region, because he considered that their destruction would make it less likely that he would lose power again. And when the Bentivoglio returned to power in Bologna they followed the same policy. Fortresses are sometimes useful, then, and sometimes not; it MachText/Mach_156.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002035 12422306332 016636 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 depends on the circumstances. Moreover, if they help you in some respects, they will be harmful in others. The subject may be clarified in the following way: if a ruler is more afraid of his own subjects than of foreigners, he should build fortresses; but a ruler who is more afraid of foreigners than of his own subjects should not build them. The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has been and will be a source of more trouble to the Sforza family than any other disorder of that state Hence, the best fortress a ruler can have is not to be hated by the people: for if you possess fortresses and the people hate you, having fortresses will not save you, since if the people rise up there will never be any lack of foreign powers ready to help them. Fortresses have never been an advantage to any ruler of recent times, except the Countess of Forli, when her husband Count Girolamo was assassinated. For the fortress there provided her with a refuge from the popular uprising: she was able to await help from Milan and then regain power. The MachText/Mach_157.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001546 12422306332 016645 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 circumstances were such that no foreign power was able to help the people. But fortresses were of little use to her later, when Cesare Borgia attacked, and her hostile subjects rallied to the invading forces. Hence, on both occasions, not being hated by the people would have made her more secure than any fortresses did. Bearing in mind all these things, then, I praise anyone who builds fortresses and anyone who does not, and I criticise anyone who relies upon fortresses, and does not worry about incurring the hatred of the people. XXI: How a ruler should act in order to gain reputation Nothing enables a ruler to gain more prestige than undertaking great campaigns and performing unusual deeds. In our own times Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of Spain is a notable example. He might almost be called a new ruler because, from being a weak king, he has MachText/Mach_158.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002675 12422306332 016652 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 become the most famous and glorious king in Christendom. And if his achievements are examined, they will all be found to be very remarkable, and some of them quite extraordinary. This man attacked Granada at the beginning of his reign, and this campaign laid the foundations of his state. First of all, he began this campaign when things were quiet and when he was not afraid of being opposed: he kept the minds of the barons of Castile occupied with that war, so that they would not plan any revolts. And he meanwhile was acquiring prestige, and increasing his hold over them before they were even aware of the fact. He was able to maintain armies with money from the Church and from his subjects, and during that long war he was able to develop a powerful army, whose achievements have subsequently brought him so much honour. Moreover, in order to undertake even greater campaigns, he continued to make use of religion, resorting to a cruel and apparently pious policy of unexampled wretchedness: that of hunting down the Moors and driving them out of his Kingdom. Using this same cloak, he attacked Africa; he invaded ltaly; and recently he has attacked France. Thus he has always plotted and achieved great things, which have never failed to keep his subjects in a state of suspense and amazement, as they await their outcome. And these deeds of his have followed one another so quickly that nobody has had enough time to be able to initiate a revolt against him. MachText/Mach_159.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002514 12422306332 016643 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 It is also very beneficial for a ruler to perform very unusual deeds within his kingdom, such as those recorded about messer Bernabo, the ruler of Milan. When it happens that someone does something extraordinary (whether good or bad) in social or political life, he should hit on some way of rewarding or punishing him that will be much talked about. Above all, a ruler must contrive to achieve through all his actions the reputation of being a great man of outstanding intelligence. A ruler is also highly regarded if he is either a true ally or an outright enemy, that is, if he unhesitatingly supports one ruler against another. This policy is always better than remaining neutral, since if two powerful rulers near you come to blows, either the eventual victor will become a threat to you, or he will not. In either situation, it will always be wiser to intervene in favour of one side and fight strongly. For in the former situation, if you do not declare yourself, you will always be liable to be despoiled by the victor (which would please and satisfy the loser), and you will deservedly be defenceless and friendless. For the victor does not want unreliable allies who did not help him when he was hard pressed; and the loser will not show you any favour, because you did not want to run the risk of sharing his fate by assisting him militarily. MachText/Mach_16.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001521 12422306320 016545 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 them. For if the first signs of trouble are perceived, it is easy to find a solution; but if one lets trouble develop, the medicine will be too late, because the malady will have become incurable. And what physicians say about consumptive diseases is also true of this matter, namely, that at the beginning of the illness, it is easy to treat but difficult to diagnose but, if it has not been diagnosed and treated at an early stage, as time passes it becomes easy to diagnose but difficult to treat. This also happens in affairs of state; for if one recognises political problems early (which only a shrewd and far-seeing man can do), they may be resolved quickly, but if they are not recognised, and left to develop so that everyone recognises them, there is no longer any remedy. The Romans, therefore, because they perceived troubles when they MachText/Mach_160.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001627 12422306332 016637 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Antiochus invaded Greece, invited there by the Aetolians in order to drive out the Romans. Antiochus sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were allies of the Romans, to advise them to remain neutral. On the other hand, the Romans exhorted them to take up arms on their behalf. This matter was discussed at a meeting of the Achaeans at which the envoy of Antiochus exhorted them to remain neutral. To this the Roman envoy replied: 'Quod autem isti dicunt non interponendi vos bello, nihil magis alienum rebus vestris est; sine gratia, sine dignitate, praemium victoris eritis.' A ruler who is not an ally will always want you to remain neutral, whereas one who is your ally will always want your armed support. In order to avoid present dangers, irresolute rulers usually prefer to remain neutral, and very often this is their undoing. However, let us assume that you strongly support one of the parties, who then emerges MachText/Mach_161.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001453 12422306332 016635 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 victorious: even if he is powerful and you are at his mercy, he is beholden to you and friendship is established between you. And men are never so dishonourable that they would attack you in such circumstances, and display so much ingratitude. Moreover, victories are never so decisive that the victor does not need to be careful, and especially about acting justly. But if the ruler whom you help loses, he will show gratitude to you and will help you as far as he can; thus you become an ally in a cause that may flourish again. In the second situation (when the rulers fighting each other cannot be a threat to you), it is wiser still to intervene: because you will contribute to the downfall of one ruler, and are helped by another ruler who, if he had been wise, would have saved him; and if together you MachText/Mach_162.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001552 12422306332 016636 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 win, the ruler whom you help will be at your mercy. (And it is certainly to be expected that he will overcome his enemy, since he has your help.) Here it should be observed that a ruler should be careful never to ally himself with a ruler who is more powerful than himself in order to attack other powers, unless he is forced to, as has been said above. For if you are victorious together, you will be at his mercy, and rulers should do their best to avoid being at the mercy of other powers. The Venetians allied themselves with France against the Duke of Milan; they could have avoided this alliance, and the outcome was their downfall. But if it is not possible to avoid such a commitment (as happened to the Florentines, when the Pope and the King of Spain launched an attack against Lombardy), a ruler should then become involved for the reasons previously mentioned. MachText/Mach_163.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002451 12422306332 016636 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 No government should ever believe that it is always possible to follow safe policies. Rather, it should be realised that all courses of action involve risks: for it is in the nature of things that when one tries to avoid one danger another is always encountered. But prudence consists in knowing how to assess the dangers, and to choose the least bad course of action as being the right one to follow. A ruler should also show himself a lover of talent, and honour those who excel in any art. Moreover, he should encourage the citizens to follow quietly their ordinary occupations, both in trade and agriculture and every other kind, so that one man is not afraid to improve or increase his possessions for fear that they will be taken from him, and another does not hesitate to begin to trade for fear of the taxes that will be levied. Rather, he should offer rewards to anyone who wants to do such things, ahd to anyone who seeks in any way to improve his city or country. Furthermore, at appropriate times of the year, he should keep the people entertained with feasts and spectacles. And since every city is divided into guilds or family groups he should pay due attention to these groups, meeting them from time to time, and performing acts that display his own affability and munificence. But he should always be MachText/Mach_164.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001533 12422306332 016637 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 careful to preserve the prestige of his office, for this is something that should never be diminished. XXII: The secretaries of rulers The choosing of ministers is a very important matter for a ruler: whether or not they are good depends on whether he is shrewd. The first indications of the intelligence of a ruler are given by the quality of the men around him. If they are capable and loyal, he should always be taken to be shrewd, because he was able to recognise their ability and retain their loyalty. But if they are mediocre and disloyal, a low estimate of him will never be mistaken, because the most important error he has made is to choose them. Nobody who knew messer Antonio da Venafro as minister of Pandolfo Petrucci, ruler of Siena, could fail to judge Pandolfo a very able man, just because he had Antonio as his minister. There are three MachText/Mach_165.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001636 12422306332 016644 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 kinds of mind: the first grasps things unaided; the second when they are explained; the thit:d never understands at all. The first kind is exceptionally good, the second very good, the third useless. Consequently, even if Pandolfo did not belong to the first category, he certainly belonged to the second. For if a ruler shows judgement in discerning the worth of what another man says and does (even if he himself lacks originality of mind), he can discern the good or bad deeds of his minister, and reward the former but punish the latter. And since the minister realises that he cannot deceive his master, he is careful to behave well. There is an infallible way for a ruler to weigh up a minister. If you realise that he is thinking more about his own affairs than about yours, and that all his actions are designed to further his own interests, he will never make a good minister, and you can never trust him. For a man MachText/Mach_166.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001526 12422306332 016643 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 who governs a state' should never think about himself or his own affairs but always about the ruler, and concern himself only with the ruler's affairs. On the other hand, in order to ensure the minister's fidelity, the ruler should look after him, by honouring him, enriching him, attaching him to himself, conferring honours and offices on him; in short, treating the minister so that he will realise that he depends upon the ruler, and the many honours and riches will not make him want even more honours and riches, and his many offices will make him fear change. If ministers and rulers have such a relationship, then, each will have confidence in the other; but if they do not, the outcome will always be that one or the other is harmed. XXIII: How flatterers should be shunned I do not want to leave undiscussed an important subject, about which MachText/Mach_167.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001553 12422306332 016644 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 rulers easily make mistakes, unless they are very shrewd and are skilful at choosing men. I refer to flatterers, who are found everywhere in courts; for men are so wrapped up in their own affairs, in which they are so liable to make mistakes, that it is hard to defend oneself from this plague. Moreover, some ways of thing to protect oneself from flatterers involve the risk of becoming despised. For the only way to protect yourself from flattery is by letting it be known that being told the truth does not offend you. However, if anyone may speak frankly to you, respect for you will soon disappear. Therefore, a wise ruler will follow another way, and choose shrewd men for his service, permitting them alone to speak frankly, but only when he asks them and not otherwise. But he should ask them about everything, listen carefully to their views, and then make his own MachText/Mach_168.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001635 12422306332 016646 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 decisions. He should so conduct himself with his advisers that they will all realise that the more candidly they speak the more acceptable they will be. Apart from those he has chosen, he should refuse to listen to anyone, but pursue his aims steadfastly and not waver about decisions he has taken. Any ruler who does not act in this way either comes to grief among flatterers or changes his decisions often because of the conflicting advice he receives; as a result, he will be held in little esteem. I should like to cite a modern example of this. Father Luca, adviser of the present Emperor Maximilian, speaking about His Majesty, said that he never consulted anyone, and yet never acted as he really wanted; this resulted from his failing to behave in the way I have advised above. For the Emperor is a secretive man; he does not let anyone know what plans he has, and he does not seek advice. However, as he begins to MachText/Mach_169.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001556 12422306333 016652 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 carry out his plans, those in his court get to know about them, and then advise him to act differently. And since he is not of firm character, he allows himself to be dissuaded. This is why what he orders one day is countermanded the next, why it is never known what he wants or proposes to do, and why nobody can rely upon his decisions. A ruler, then, should never lack advice, but should have it when he wants it, not when others want to give it; rather, he should discourage anyone from giving advice uninvited. Nevertheless, he should be very ready to seek information and opinions and to listen patiently to candid views about matters that he raises. Indeed, if he learns that anyone is reticent for any reason, he should be angry. Although many hold that a ruler may properly be considered shrewd because of the high quality of his advisers, and not because he himself MachText/Mach_17.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001533 12422306320 016551 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 were merely brewing, were always able to overcome them. They never allowed them to develop in order to avoid fighting a war, for they knew that wars cannot really be avoided but are merely postponed to the advantage of others. This was why they wanted to wage war against Philip and Antioch us in Greece, so that they could avoid having to fight them in Italy; it was possible for them to have avoided fighting both of them in Greece, but they were resolved not to .. Moreover, the Romans never accepted a maxim heard every day on the lips of our own sages, to seek to benefit from temporising. They preferred to enjoy the benefits that derived from their own strength and prudence; because time brings all things with it, and can produce benefits as well as evils, evil as well as benefits. However, let us return to the King of France, and examine whether MachText/Mach_170.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001530 12422306333 016632 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 is shrewd, this is undoubtedly a mistaken view. For it is an infallible rule that a prince who is not himself wise cannot be soundly advised, unless he happens to put himself in the hands of a man who is very able and controls everything. Then he could certainly be well advised, but he would not last long, because such a governor would soon deprive him of his state. But if a ruler who is not shrewd takes advice from several men, he will always hear conflicting opinions, and will be incapable of reconciling them. For his advisers will all be thinking primarily of their own interests; and he will not understand this tendency or be able to control them. And this is inevitable because men will always prove of doubtful loyalty unless compelled to be faithful. Therefore, it should be concluded that good advice, from whomsoever it may come, must have MachText/Mach_171.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002044 12422306333 016634 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 its source in the shrewdness of the ruler; the ruler's shrewdness cannot derive from sound advice. XXIV: Why the rulers of Italy have lost their states If the above-mentioned measures are put into practice skilfully, they will make a new ruler seem very well established, and will quickly make his power more secure and stable than if he had always been a ruler. The actions of a new ruler are much more closely observed than those of an hereditary ruler. And if his actions are thought to be those of an able man, people are much more impressed and much more attached to him than if he had been of ancient lineage. For men are much more interested in present things than in those that are past, and if they find that their affairs are flourishing, they are content and do not seek changes. Indeed, they will do everything possible to defend a new ruler, as long as he is not deficient in other respects. Thus he will acquire a double glory: both for having founded a new principality, and for having adorned and strengthened it with good laws, strong arms, MachText/Mach_172.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001631 12422306333 016636 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 reliable allies and exemplary conduct. But a man who inherits a principality and loses it through lack of foresight and skill incurs a double disgrace. If one considers those Italian rulers who have lost power in recent times, such as the King ofNaples, the Duke of Milan and others, one finds in them, first, a common military weakness, for the reasons that have been discussed at length; secondly, one finds that some of them had the people hostile to them, and that others, although they kept the people friendly, were unable to secure their position against the nobles. For without these weaknesses, states that have the capacity to maintain an army in the field are not lost. Philip of Macedon (not the father of Alexander, but the one defeated by Titus Quintus) did not have much power and territory, compared with the might of Rome and Greece, which attacked him. Nevertheless, because he was a genuine warrior, MachText/Mach_173.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002242 12422306333 016636 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 and knew how to win over the people and how to deal with the nobles, he was able to carry on the war against them for many years. And although he eventually lost control of some cities, he still kept his Kingdom. Therefore, those of our rulers who lost their principalities, after having ruled them for many years, should not lament their bad luck but should blame their own indolence. For in quiet times they never thought that things could change (it is a common human failing when the weather is fine not to reckon on storms). When difficult times came, they thought only of fleeing and not of defending themselves; and they hoped that the people, angered by the arrogant conduct of the conquerors, would restore them to power. This policy is sound if no other is possible, but it is very bad to neglect other policies and choose this one. A man should never risk falling because he thinks it likely that he will be rescued. This may not happen, but even if it does it will not make you secure; such a defence is weak and cowardly, because it is outside your control. Only those defences that are under your control and based on your own ability are effective, certain and lasting. MachText/Mach_174.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001533 12422306333 016641 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 XXV: How much power fortune has over human affairs, and how it should be resisted I am not unaware that many have thought, and many still think, that the affairs of the world are so ruled by fortune and by God that the ability of men cannot control them. Rather, they think that we have no remedy at all; and therefore it could be concluded that it is useless to sweat much over things, but let them be governed by fate. This opinion has been more popular in our own times because of the great changes that have taken place and are still to be seen even now, which could hardly have been predicted. When I think about this, I am sometimes inclined, to some extent, to share this opinion. Nevertheless, so as not to eliminate human freedom, I am disposed to hold that fortune is the arbiter of half our actions, but that it lets us control roughly the other MachText/Mach_175.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002213 12422306333 016636 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 half. I compare fortune to one of those dangerous rivers that, when they become enraged, flood the plains, destroy trees and buildings, move earth from one place and deposit it in another. Everyone flees before it, everyone gives way to its thrust, without being able to halt it in any way. But this does not mean that, when the river is not in flood, men are unable to take precautions, by means of dykes and dams, so that when it rises next time, it will either not overflow its banks or, if it does, its force will not be so uncontrolled or damaging. The same happens with fortune, which shows its powers where no force has been organised to resist it, and therefore strikes in the places where it knows that no dykes or dams have been built to restrain it. And if you consider Italy, which has been the seat of these changes, and which has given rise to them, you will see a countryside devoid of any embankments or defences. If it had been protected by proper defences, like Germany, Spain and France, the flood would not have caused such great changes or it would not have occurred at all. But I have said enough in general terms about resisting fortune. MachText/Mach_176.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001706 12422306333 016645 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Considering the matter in more detail, I would observe that one sees a ruler flourishing today and ruined tomorrow, without his having changed at all in character or qualities. I believe this is attributable, first, to the cause previously discussed at length, namely, that a ruler who trusts entirely to luck comes to grief when his luck runs out. Moreover, I believe that we are successful when our ways are suited to the times and circumstances, and unsuccessful when they are not. For one sees that, in the things that lead to the end which everyone aims at, that is, glory and riches, men proceed in different ways: one man cautiously, another impetuously; one man forcefully, another cunningly; one man patiently, another impatiently, and each of these different ways of acting can be effective. On the other hand, of two cautious men, one may achieve his aims and the other fail. Again, two men may both succeed, although they have different characters, one MachText/Mach_177.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001722 12422306333 016644 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 acting cautiously and the other impetuously. The reason for these different outcomes is whether their ways of acting conform with the conditions in which they operate. Consequently, as I have said, two men, acting differently, may achieve the same results; and if two men act in the same way, one may succeed and the other fail. From this, again, arise changes in prosperity; because if a man acts cautiously and patiently, and the times and circumstances change in ways for which his methods are appropriate, he will be successful. But if the times and circumstances change again, he will come to grief, because he does not change his methods. And one does not find men who are so prudent that they are capable of being sufficiently flexible: either because our natural inclinations are too strong to permit us to change, or because, having always fared well by acting in a certain way, we do not think it a good idea to change our methods. Therefore, if it is necessary for a MachText/Mach_178.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001603 12422306333 016643 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 cautious man to act expeditiously, he does not know how to do it; this leads to his failure. But if it were possible to change one's character to suit the times and circumstances, one would always be successful. Pope Julius II always acted impetuously, and found the times and circumstances so suited to his ways that he was always successful. Consider the first expedition he made to Bologna, while messer Giovanni Bentivoglio was still alive. The Venetians were opposed to it, and so was the King of Spain; there were also discussions with the King of France about such an enterprise. Nevertheless, acting with his usual indomitable spirit and impetuosity, he led the expedition personally. This initiative caught the King of Spain and the Venetians off guard and constrained them to be passive spectators, the latter through fear and the former because of his desire to recover the whole of the MachText/Mach_179.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001554 12422306333 016651 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Kingdom of Naples. On the other hand, Julius involved the King of France: for that King saw the Pope moving and, because he wanted to cultivate the Pope's friendship with a view to reducing the power of Venice, he decided that he could not refuse him troops without offending him very openly. With this swift initiative, then, Julius achieved what no other pope, acting with consummate prudence, could have attained. If he had not left Rome until everything had been agreed and settled, as any other pope would have done, he would never have succeeded. For the King of France would have contrived to find countless excuses, and the others would have produced countless reasons why the Pope should hesitate. I shall not discuss his other actions, which were similar in character, and all turned out well for him. The shortness of his pontificate did not permit him to taste of MachText/Mach_18.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001432 12422306320 016550 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 he followed any of the policies I have advocated. I shall discuss Louis, not Charles; since he held possessions in Italy for a longer period, his conduct can be better studied. You will see that he did the opposite of what should be done in order to hold territory that is acquired in a foreign country. King Louis's invasion of ltaly was aided by the ambitious schemes of the Venetians, who wanted to gain half of Lombardy through that invasion. I do not wish to criticise the policy adopted by the King: since he wanted to gain a foothold in Italy, and did not have any allies in this country (rather he found every gate closed to him, because of the conduct of Charles) he was forced to make whatever alliances he could. And this good policy of his would have been successful, if he had MachText/Mach_180.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001534 12422306333 016637 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 failure. But if circumstances had changed so that it was imperative to act cautiously, he would have been undone; for he would never have deviated from the methods that were natural to him. I conclude, then, that since circumstances vary and men when acting lack flexibility, they are successful if their methods match the circumstances and unsuccessful if they do not. I certainly think that it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you want to control her, it is necessary to treat her roughly. And it is clear that she is more inclined to yield to men who are impetuous than to those who are calculating. Since fortune is a woman, she is always well disposed towards young men, because they are less cautious and more aggressive, and treat her more boldly. XXVI: Exhortation to liberate Italy from the barbarian yoke MachText/Mach_181.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002103 12422306333 016631 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Bearing in mind all the matters previously discussed, I ask myself whether the present time is appropriate for welcoming a new ruler in Italy, and whether there is matter that provides an opportunity for a far-seeing and able man to mould it into a form that will bring honour to him and benefit all its inhabitants. It seems to me that so many things are propitious for a new ruler that I am not aware that there has ever been a more appropriate time than this. I have maintained that the Israelites had to be enslaved in Egypt before the ability of Moses could be displayed, the Persians had to be oppressed by the Medes before Cyrus's greatness of spirit could be revealed, and the Athenians in disarray before the magnificent qualities ofTheseus could be demonstrated. Likewise, in order for the valour and worth of an Italian spirit to be recognised, Italy had to be reduced to the desperate straits in which it now finds itself: more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians, without an acknowledged leader, and without order or MachText/Mach_182.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001512 12422306333 016635 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 stability, beaten, despoiled, lacerated, overrun, in short, utterly devastated. And although recently a spark was revealed in one man that might have led one to think that he was ordained by God to achieve her redemption, yet it was seen that he was struck down by misfortune at the highest point of his career. Thus, remaining almost lifeless, Italy is waiting for someone to heal her wounds, and put an end to the ravaging of Lombardy, to the extortions in the Kingdom ofNaples and Tuscany, and to cure the sores that have been festering for so long. Look how Italy beseeches God to send someone to rescue her from the cruel and arrogant domination of the foreigners. Again, see how ready and willing she is to rally to a standard, if only there is someone to lead the way. There is no one in whom Italy can now place any hope except your MachText/Mach_183.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001721 12422306334 016641 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 illustrious family which (because it is successful and talented, and favoured by God and by the Church, of which it is now head)h can take the lead in saving her. It will not be very difficult, if you bear in mind the deeds and lives of the men named above. Although they were exceptional and remarkable men, they were still only human, and all of them had less favourable opportunities than the one that now exists, for their causes were not more righteous than this one, nor easier, nor more favoured by God. This is a very righteous cause: 'iustum enim est bellum quibus necessarium, et pia arma ubi nulla nisi in armis spes est'. Circumstances are now very favourable indeed, and the difficulties to be confronted cannot be very great when the circumstances are propitious, if only your family will imitate the methods of the men I have proposed as exemplars. Moreover, very unusual events, which are signs from God, have recently been observed here: the sea has opened; a MachText/Mach_184.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001541 12422306334 016642 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 cloud has shown you the way; water has flowed from the rock; manna has rained down here. Everything points to your future greatness. But you must play your part, for God does not want to do everything, in order not to deprive us of our freedom and the glory that belong to us. It is not very surprising that none of the Italians previously mentioned was able to achieve what it is hoped your illustrious family will achieve, or that in all the great changes that have occurred in Italy and all the military campaigns, it always seems as if Italian military skill and valour no longer exist. The reason for this is that our old military practices were unsound, and there has been nobody capable of devising new ones. Nothing brings so much honour to a new ruler as new laws and new practices that he has devised. Such things, if they are solidly based and conduce MachText/Mach_185.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001705 12422306334 016645 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 to achieving greatness, will make him revered and admired; and in Italy there is no lack of matter to shape into any form. Here individuals have great skill and valour; it is the leaders who lack these qualities. Look how in duels and combats between several men Italians are superior in strength, skill and resourcefulness. But when it comes to fighting in armies, they do not distinguish themselves. And all this stems from the weakness of the leaders: those who are capable are not followed, and everyone thinks that he knows best. Until now nobody has had sufficient ability or luck to succeed in imposing himself to such an extent that the other leaders have recognised his superiority. The outcome has been that, for a long time, in all the wars that have been fought during the last twenty years, any armies composed only of Italian troops have always fared badly. What happened on the Taro, and at Alessandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna and Mestre all MachText/Mach_186.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001542 12422306334 016645 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 confirm this judgement. If your illustrious family, then, wants to emulate those great men who saved their countries, it is essential above all else, as a sound basis for every campaign, to form an army composed of your own men, for there can be no soldiers more loyal, more reliable or better. Even if each of these soldiers individually is brave, they will combine to form a better fighting force if they are led by their own ruler, and honoured and well treated by him. Hence, if ltalian skill and courage is to protect us from foreign enemies, it is essential to form an army of this kind. Although the Swiss and Spanish infantry are considered very formidable, both have weaknesses, so a different kind of army could not only fight them, but be confident of defeating them. For the Spaniards are very vulnerable against cavalry, and the Swiss lack confidence MachText/Mach_187.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002276 12422306334 016653 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 against infantry that fight as strongly as they do themselves. Thus, it has been seen, and experience will confirm it, that the Spaniards are very vulnerable against the French cavalry, and the Swiss have a fatal weakness against the Spanish infantry. And although there is no proof of the latter weakness, some evidence is provided by the battle of Ravenna when the Spanish infantry fought against the German battalions, which fight in the same way as the Swiss. In this battle, the Spaniards, using their agility and helped by their use of bucklers, penetrated under the long German pikes, and were able to inflict great damage. The Germans were unable to repel them, and if the cavalry had not attacked the Spaniards, the Germans would all have been killed. Once the weaknesses of both the Spanish and the Swiss infantry are recognised, then, it will be possible to form a new kind of infantry, which should be able to resist cavalry charges and not be intimidated by infantry. It will be possible to do this by the right choice of weapons and by changing battle formations. It is the introduction of such new methods of fighting that enhances the reputation of a new ruler, establishing him as a great leader. MachText/Mach_188.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001566 12422306334 016655 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 This opportunity to provide Italy with a liberator, then, after such a long time, must not be missed. I have no doubt at all that he would be received with great affection in all those regions that have been inundated by the foreign invasions, as well as with a great thirst for revenge, with resolute fidelity, with devotion and with tears of gratitude. What gate would be closed to him? What people would fail to obey him? What envious hostility would work against him? What Italian would deny him homage? This foreign domination stinks in the nostrils of everyone. Let your illustrious family, then, take up this mission, with the spirit and courage and the faith that inspires all just causes, so that under your standard our country may be ennobled, and under your auspices these words of Petrarch will come true: Virtu contra a furore prendera l'arme; e fia el combatter corto: MachText/Mach_19.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001617 12422306320 016556 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 not committed other errors. When he had conquered Lombardy, then, the King at once regained the power and prestige that had been lost by Charles. Genoa surrendered, the Florentines became his allies; the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, Bentivoglio, the Countess of Forli, the rulers ofFaenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, Piombino, and the people of Lucca, Pisa and Siena: all of them moved to ally themselves with him. At this point, the Venetians were able to understand the rashness of their policy: in order to gain a couple of possessions in Lombardy, they had enabled the King to become master of a third of Italy. Everyone will realise how easily the King could have maintained his standing in Italy if he had followed the above-mentioned rules, and had maintained and protected all those allies of his who, because there were many of them, and they were weak and fearful (some of the power of the MachText/Mach_2.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001547 12422306320 016470 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Magnificence, I trust very much that your humanity will lead you to accept it, since it is not in my power to offer you a greater gift than one which in a very short time will enable you to understand all that I have learned in so many years, and with much difficulty and danger. I have not embellished this work by filling it with rounded periods, with high -sounding words or fine phrases, or with any of the other beguiling artifices of apparent beauty which most writers employ to describe and embellish their subject-matter; for my wish is that, if it is to be honoured at all, only its originality and the importance of the subject should make it acceptable. I hope it will not be considered presumptuous for a man of very low and humble condition to dare to discuss princely government, and to lay down rules about it. For those who draw maps place themselves on MachText/Mach_20.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001615 12422306320 016544 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Church, some of the Venetians), were forced to remain allied to him. And with their help he could easily have dealt effectively with the remaining greater powers. But no sooner was Louis in Milan than he began to follow the opposite policy, by helping Pope Alexander to conquer the Romagna. Furthermore, he did not realise that this decision weakened him (because it alienated his allies and those who had thrown themselves in his lap) and aggrandised the Church, for it added much temporal power to the spiritual power, from which it derives so much authority. After he had made his first blunder, he was forced to follow it up, so that, to put a stop to Alexander's ambitions, and to ensure that he did not become master ofTuscany, Louis was himself compelled to invade Italy. It was not enough for him to have increased the power of the Church, and alienated his allies; because he coveted the Kingdom of MachText/Mach_21.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001541 12422306320 016543 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Naples, he divided it with the King of Spain. And whereas previously Louis had been arbiter of Italy, he now brought in a partner, so giving the ambitious men of that country and those who were discontented with him someone to turn to for help. Whereas he could have left in that Kingdom a tributary king, Louis removed him' and established there someone who could drive him out. Wanting to annex territory is indeed very natural and normal, and when capable men undertake it, they are always praised or, at least, not criticised. But if men who are not capable of achieving it are bent on undertaking it at all costs, this is a blunder that deserves censure. Hence, if the King of France could have attacked the Kingdom of Naples with his own troops, he should have done it; if he could not, he should not have tried to share it. And if sharing Lombardy with the MachText/Mach_22.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001566 12422306321 016554 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Venetians deserves to be excused, because it enabled him to gain a foothold in Italy, this other sharing deserves to be censured, since it was not necessary and, therefore, not excusable. Louis, then, made these five blunders: he extinguished the minor powers; he increased the power of a ruler who was already powerful in Italy; he brought into Italy a very strong foreign power; he did not institute direct rule, and he did not set up colonies. Nevertheless, these mistakes need not have damaged him during his lifetime if he had not committed a sixth: that of putting down the Venetians. For if he had neither aggrandised the Church nor brought the King of Spain into Italy, it would have been reasonable and necessary to put them down. But since he had followed these first two courses, he should never have permitted the ruin of the Venetians. Since the Venetians were powerful, MachText/Mach_23.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001770 12422306321 016552 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 they would always have prevented the other powers from intervening in Lombardy; they would never have permitted intervention if they were not to become masters of Lombardy themselves. And the other powers would not have wanted to take Lombardy from the King of France in order to give it to the Venetians, and they would not have had the strength to fight against both France and Venice. If anyone should urge that Louis ceded the Romagna to Alexander, and the Kingdom ofNaples to the King of Spain, in order to avoid waging war, I should reply with the arguments advanced before: that one should never permit troubles to develop in order to avoid having to fight a war; because it is never in fact' avoided but only postponed to your detriment. And if others should cite the promise the King made to the Pope (to undertake that campaign for him in return for the annulling of his marriage and making Rouen a cardinal), I would reply with arguments I shall advance later about how rulers should keep their promises. MachText/Mach_24.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001522 12422306321 016546 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 King Louis, then, lost Lombardy because he did not follow any of the policies followed by those who have annexed countries and been determined to keep them. And there is nothing extraordinary about this; it is a matter of course and to be expected. I discussed this matter at Nantes with the Cardinal of Rouen, when the Duke Valentino (as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was commonly called) was engaged in capturing the Romagna. When the Cardinal of Rouen remarked to me that Italians did not understand warfare, I replied that the French did not understand statecraft, for if they did they would not have permitted the Church to acquire so much power. And experience has shown that the power of both the Church and of the King of Spain, here in Italy, has been brought about by the King of France, and they have brought about his ruin. MachText/Mach_25.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001630 12422306321 016547 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 From this may be derived a generalisation, which is almost always valid: anyone who enables another to become powerful, brings about his own ruin. For that power is increased by him either through guile or through force, and both of these are reasons for the man who has become powerful to be on his guard. IV: Why the Kingdom of Darius, conquered by Alexander, did not rebel against his successors after Alexander's death Given the difficulties encountered in holding a newly conquered territory, the following facts may cause surprise. Alexander the Great became master of Asia within a few years and, not long afterwards, died. It might have been expected that the whole region would then rebel; nevertheless, Alexander's successors held it, and had to contend with no other difficulties than those arising from their own ambitious schemes. I reply that all principalities known to history have been ruled in one MachText/Mach_26.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001561 12422306321 016553 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 of two ways: either by one ruler, who is helped to govern the kingdom by others, who are in reality his servants, acting as ministers through his grace and favour; or else by a ruler and barons who hold that rank by hereditary right, not through the favour of the ruler. Such barons have their own territories and subjects, who recognise them as lords and are naturally devoted to them. In states governed by a ruler and his servants, the ruler has more authority, because throughout the country there is no one else who is recognised as a lord; and if the subjects obey others, it is because these are his ministers or officials, not because there is any personal devotion to them. Contemporary examples of these two types of government are the Turkish Sultan and the King of France. The whole Turkish Kingdom is governed by one ruler, the others all being his servants; and his MachText/Mach_27.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001532 12422306321 016552 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Kingdom is divided into sanjaks, to which he sends various administrators, whom he changes and moves as he pleases. But the King of France is placed amidst a great number of hereditary lords, recognised in that state by their own subjects, who are devoted to them. They have their own hereditary privileges, which the King disallows only at his peril. If these two kinds of state are considered, then, it will be found that it is difficult to overcome a state of the Turkish type but, if it has been conquered, very easy to hold it. On the other hand, in some respects it is easier to conquer a state like France, but it is very difficult to hold it. The reasons why it is hard to conquer the Turkish Kingdom are, first, there is no possibility that princes of the Kingdom will seek aid from a foreigner; secondly, there is no hope that the men surrounding MachText/Mach_28.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001660 12422306321 016555 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 the ruler will rebel, thus facilitating the invasion, for the reasons already mentioned. Since they are all servants and owe their position to him, it is harder to corrupt them, and if one does succeed, little advantage is to be hoped for, because they will not be followed by the inhabitants, for the reasons mentioned. It follows that anyone who attacks the Sultan of Turkey must expect to find the enemy united, and will be obliged to trust more in the strength of his own troops than in the disunity of his enemy. But if victory is achieved, and the defeat inflicted is so decisive that the enemy forces cannot regroup, there remains no other obstacle except the ruler's family. If they are wiped out, there is no other focus of resistance to be feared, since no one else enjoys any standing with the inhabitants. And just as the conqueror could expect no help from them before his victory, afterwards he will have no reason to fear them. MachText/Mach_29.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001601 12422306321 016551 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 The opposite occurs in kingdoms ruled like France, because it is easy for you to make headway, through winning over some barons of the kingdom (because there are always those who are disaffected and those who want to change the regime). For the reasons already given, they can assist your campaign and help you gain victory. Afterwards, when you want to keep what you have acquired, countless difficulties will be encountered, both from those who have helped you and from those who have suffered because of your invasion. It is not enough to wipe out the ruling family, since there remain these nobles, who are very ready to lead new revolts. Since you can neither satisfy nor destroy them, you will lose that state whenever circumstances are unfavourable. Now, if the character of the government of Darius is borne in mind, it will be found that it resembles the Turkish Kingdom. And therefore MachText/Mach_3.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001553 12422306320 016466 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 low ground, in order to understand the character of the mountains and other high points, and climb higher in order to understand the character of the plains. Likewise, one needs to be a ruler to understand properly the character of the people, and to be a man of the people to understand properly the character of rulers. May Your Magnificence, then, accept this little gift in the spirit in which I am sending it; if it is read and pondered diligently, my deep wish will be revealed, namely, that you should achieve that greatness which propitious circumstances and your fine qualities promise. And if Your Magnificence, from the heights of your exalted position, should sometimes deign to glance down towards these lowly places, you will see how much I am unjustly oppressed by great and cruel misfortune. I: The different kinds of principality and how they are acquired MachText/Mach_30.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001720 12422306321 016543 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Alexander was forced to make a frontal assault and win a decisive victory; afterwards, since Darius was dead, Alexander was able to maintain his power securely, for the reasons given above. And if his successors had remained united, they could easily have retained their power; for the only tumults arising in that Kingdom resulted from their own conduct. But it is impossible to hold without difficulty states organised like France. This explains why there were so many rebellions against the Romans in Spain, Gaul and Greece, for there were many principalities in these countries. While the memory of these principalities endured, the Romans could never be certain of keeping possession of these territories; but when it faded, after their own rule had been long established, their hold over them was assured. However, when the Romans later fell to fighting among themselves, each leader of a faction was able to dominate a region of these countries, according to how much MachText/Mach_31.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001666 12422306321 016555 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 authority he acquired within it. And because their old hereditary ruling families no longer existed, these provinces recognised only the authority of various Roman leaders. Bearing all these things in mind, then, nobody should be surprised how easy it was for Alexander to maintain his position in Asia, and how difficult it was for others to hold conquered territories, as Pyrrhus and many others discovered. This contrast does not depend upon how much ability the conquerors displayed but upon the different characteristics of the conquered states. V: How one should govern cities or principalities that, before being conquered, used to live under their own laws When states that are annexed have been accustomed to living under their own laws and in freedom, as has been said, there are three ways of holding them: the first, to destroy their political institutions; the second, to go to live there yourself; the third, to let them continue to MachText/Mach_32.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002015 12422306321 016543 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 live under their own laws, exacting tribute and setting up an oligarchical government that will keep the state friendly towards you. Since the government has been set up by that ruler, it knows that it will be dependent upon his goodwill and power, and will be very concerned to maintain the status quo. If one wants to preserve a city that is accustomed to being independent and having free institutions, it is more easily held by using its citizens to govern it than in any other way. The Spartans and the Romans provide good examples. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes by establishing oligarchies there; yet they eventually lost control over them. In order to hold Capua, Carthage and Numantia, the Romans destroyed theme and consequently never lost them. They tried to hold Greece in a similar manner to the Spartans, by granting it freedom and letting it live under its own laws. This was unsuccessful, so they were then forced to destroy many cities in that country, in order to maintain their hold over it. In fact, destroying MachText/Mach_33.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001561 12422306321 016551 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 cities is the only certain way of holding them. Anyone who becomes master of a city accustomed to a free way of life, and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it himself, because when it rebels, it will always be able to appeal to the spirit of freedom and its ancient institutions, which are never forgotten, despite the passage of time and any benefits bestowed by the new ruler. Whatever he does, whatever provisions he makes, if he does not foment internal divisions or scatter the inhabitants, they will never forget their lost liberties and their ancient institutions, and will immediately attempt to recover them whenever they have an opportunity, as Pisa did after enduring a century of subjection to the Florentines. However, when cities or countries are accustomed to living under a prince, and the ruling family is wiped out, the inhabitants are used to MachText/Mach_34.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001520 12422306321 016545 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 obeying but lack their older ruler; they are unable to agree on making one of themselves ruler, and they do not know how to embrace a free way of life. Consequently, they are slow to resort to arms, and a ruler can more easily win them over, and be sure that they will not harm him. But in republics there is greater vitality, more hatred, and a stronger desire for revenge; they do not forget, indeed cannot forget, their lost liberties. Therefore, the surest way is to destroy them or else go to live there. VI: New principalities acquired by one's own arms and ability Nobody should be surprised if, in discussing completely new principalities, both as regards the ruler and the type of government, I shall cite remarkable men as examples. For men almost always follow in the footsteps of others, imitation being a leading principle of human MachText/Mach_35.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001552 12422306321 016553 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 behaviour. Since it is not always possible to follow in the footsteps of others, or to equal the ability of those whom you imitate, a shrewd man will always follow the methods of remarkable men, and imitate those who have been outstanding, so that, even if he does not succeed in matching their ability, at least he will get within sniffing distance of it. He should act as skilful archers do, when their target seems too distant: knowing well the power of their bow, they aim at a much higher point, not to hit it with the arrow, but by aiming there to be able to strike their target. I maintain, then, that in a completely new principality, where there is a new ruler, the difficulty he will have in maintaining it will depend on how much ability he possesses. And because for a private citizen to become ruler presupposes that he is either able or lucky, it might seem MachText/Mach_36.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001604 12422306321 016552 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 that one or other of these would, to some degree, mitigate many of the difficulties. Nevertheless, rulers maintain themselves better if they owe little to luck. It is also very helpful when the ruler is compelled to go and live in his principality, because he does not possess other states. However, to come to those who have become rulers through their own ability and not through luck or favour, I consider that the most outstanding were Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus and others of that stamp. And although one should not discuss Moses, because he was merely an executor of what had been ordained by God, yet he should be admired even if only for that favour which made him worthy to speak with God. But let us consider Cyrus and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms. They will all be found remarkable, and if their actions and methods are considered, they will not appear very different MachText/Mach_37.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001542 12422306321 016554 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 from those of Moses, who had such a great master. If their deeds and careers are examined, it will be seen that they owed nothing to luck except the opportunity to shape the material into the form that seemed best to them. If they had lacked the opportunity, the strength of their spirit would have been sapped; if they had lacked ability, the opportunity would have been wasted. It was necessary, then, for Moses to find the people of Israel in Egypt, enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, so that they would be disposed to follow him, in order to escape from their servitude. It was necessary that Romulus, who was exposed at birth in Alba, did not find there full scope for his abilities, so that he should have wanted to become King of Rome and, indeed, its founder. It was necessary that Cyrus should have found the Persians discontented under the rule of MachText/Mach_38.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002565 12422306321 016563 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 the Medes, and that the Medes should have been soft and weak because of the long peace. And Theseus could not have fully revealed his abilities had he not found the Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, then, permitted these men to be successful, and their surpassing abilities enabled them to recognise and grasp these opportunities; the outcome was that their own countries were ennobled and flourished greatly. Those who, like them, become rulers through their own abilities, experience difficulty in attaining power, but once that is achieved, they keep it easily. The difficulties encountered in attaining power arise partly from the new institutions and laws they are forced to introduce in order to establish their power and make it secure. And it should be realised that taking the initiative in introducing a new form of government is very difficult and dangerous, and unlikely to succeed. The reason is that all those who profit from the old order will be opposed to the innovator, whereas all those who might benefit from the new order are, at best, tepid supporters of him. This lukewarmness arises partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws on their side, partly from the sceptical temper of men, who do not really believe in new things unless they have been seen to work well. The result is that whenever those who are opposed to change have the chance to attack MachText/Mach_39.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001737 12422306321 016564 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 the innovator, they do it with much vigour, whereas his supporters act only half-heartedly; so that the innovator and his supporters find themselves in great danger. In order to examine this matter thoroughly, we need to consider whether these innovators can act on their own or whether they depend upon others; that is,·whether they need to persuade others if they are to succeed, or whether they are capable of establishing themselves by force. In the former case, they always fare badly and accomplish nothing. But if they do not depend upon others and have sufficient forces to take the initiative, they rarely find themselves in difficulties. Consequently, all armed prophets succeed whereas unarmed ones fail. This happens because, apart from the factors already mentioned, the people are fickle; it is easy to persuade them about something, but difficult to keep them persuaded. Hence, when they no longer believe in you and your schemes, you must be able to force them to believe. MachText/Mach_4.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001604 12422306320 016464 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 All the states, all the dominions that have held sway over men, have been either republics or principalities. Principalities are either hereditary (their rulers having been for a long time from the same family) or they are new. The new ones are either completely new (as was Milan to Francesco Sforza or they are like limbs joined to the hereditary state of the ruler who annexes them (as is the Kingdom of Naples to the King of Spain). States thus acquired are either used to living under a prince or used to being free; and they are acquired either with the arms of others or with one's own, either through luck or favour or else through ability. II: Hereditary principalities I shall not discuss republics, because I have previously treated them at length. I shall consider only principalities, and shall weave together the warps mentioned above, examining how principalities can be governed MachText/Mach_40.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001556 12422306321 016553 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus and Romulus had been unarmed, the new order which each of them established would not have been obeyed for very long. This is what happened in our own times to Fra' Girolamo Savonarola, who perished together with his new order as soon as the masses began to lose faith in him; and he lacked the means of keeping the support of those who had believed in him, as well as of making those who had never had any faith in him believe. Such innovators, then, have to confront many difficulties; all the dangers come after they have begun their enterprises, and need to be overcome through their own ability. But once they have succeeded, and begin to be greatly respected (after they have extinguished those envious of their success), they remain powerful, secure, honoured and successful. I should like to add a less important example than the eminent ones MachText/Mach_41.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001533 12422306322 016550 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 already discussed. But it certainly is worthy of mention in this context, so let it suffice for all the others like it: I refer to Hiero of Syracuse. From being a private citizen, he became ruler of Syracuse. He enjoyed a fine opportunity but, apart from that, his success owed nothing to luck. For when the Syracusans were in desperate straits, they chose him as their general; afterwards he was deservedly made their ruler. And even in private life he showed so much ability that it was written of him 'quod nihil illi deerat ad regnandum praeter regnum'. He disbanded the old army and raised a new one; he abandoned the old alliances and formed new ones; and as soon as he possessed his own troops and had reliable allies he could build any edifice he wanted upon this foundation. Thus, it was very difficult for him to attain power, but not to keep it. MachText/Mach_42.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000003377 12422306322 016561 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 VII: New principalities acquired through the power of others and their favour Private citizens who become rulers only through favour or luck achieve that rank with little trouble, but experience great difficulty in retaining it. In arriving at that position there are no problems, because they fly there; all the difficulties arise afterwards. This is the situation if a state or territory is granted to someone either for money or by favour of the giver, as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and the Hellespont, where Darius set up rulers so that they would hold them to increase his security and enhance his glory. Other cases are those private citizens who became emperors, attaining the imperial throne by bribing the soldiers. Such men are entirely dependent on the goodwill and prosperity of those who gave them their positions, and these are two things that are exceedingly variable and uncertain. Such men lack the knowledge and capacity to maintain their power. They lack the knowledge because, unless he has great intelligence and ability, it is not to be expected that a man who has always lacked direct experience of public life should know how to rule. They lack the capacity because they do not have devoted and loyal forces at their disposal. Moreover, like all other natural things that are born and grow rapidly, states that grow quickly cannot sufficiently develop their roots, trunks and branches, and will be destroyed by the first chill winds of adversity. This happens unless those who have so quickly become rulers have the ability to profit by what luck or favour has placed in their laps, and know how to make provision very speedily to preserve their power, developing afterwards the foundations that others have laid before they become rulers. MachText/Mach_43.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002003 12422306322 016543 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 To illustrate these two methods of becoming ruler, namely, through ability or through favour or luck, I want to cite two recent examples: Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, through using appropriate methods and exploiting his great ability, from being a private citizen became Duke of Milan; and he maintained with very little trouble the position that he attained only with countless difficulties. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, popularly called the Duke Valentino, attained his position through the favour and help of his father, and lost it when these disappeared, despite having used every means and having done all those things that a far-seeing and able man should do, in order to put down his roots in territories that he had acquired thanks to the power and favour of others. For, as I have said, a man who does not lay his foundations at first may be able to dq it later, if he possesses great ability, although this creates difficulties for the builder and the edifice itself may well prove unstable. MachText/Mach_44.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001507 12422306322 016554 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 If the whole career of the Duke is considered, then, it will be seen that he succeeded in laying very strong foundations for his future power. I do not consider it superfluous to discuss it, for I do not know what better precepts to offer to a new ruler than to cite his actions as a pattern; and although his efforts were in the end unsuccessful, he should not be blamed, because it resulted from extraordinarily bad luck. In seeking to make his son the Duke a great man, Alexander VI faced many difficulties, both present and future. First, he did not see how he could make him a ruler of any territory that was not part of the States of the Church. And if he were to appropriate one of the territories belonging to the Church, he was well aware that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not permit it (for Faenza and Rimini were MachText/Mach_45.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001542 12422306322 016554 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 already under the protection of the Venetians). Apart from this problem, Alexander saw that the Italian military forces (and especially those that he could have used most easily) belonged to those who had every reason to fear any increase of the Pope's power; therefore, he could not safely use them, because they all belonged to the Orsini and Colonna factions and their adherents. It was therefore necessary to sow disorder in Italy, making their states unstable, so as to be able to seize and hold some portion of them. This was easy for him, because he found that the Venetians, for other reasons, wanted to bring the French back into Italy. Not only did he not oppose this policy; he facilitated it by annulling the first marriage of King Louis. The King, then, invaded Italy with the help of the Venetians and the consent of Alexander. Louis was no sooner in MachText/Mach_46.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001532 12422306322 016554 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Milan than the Pope received troops from him for his own campaign in the Romagna, which was made easier because of the standing of the King. After the Duke had conquered the Romagna and defeated the Colonna faction, two things hindered him from holding that region securely and annexing more territory. One was that he had doubts about the loyalty of his troops, the other was the goodwill of the King of France. The Orsini troops, which he had used, might prove worthless when he attacked and not only prevent him from annexing more territory, but take from him what he had acquired. He also feared that the King might deprive him of what he possessed. He had a proof of the worth of the Orsini troops when, after having besieged Faenza, he attacked Bologna, because he saw them undertake that attack half-heartedly. And he understood the King's attitude MachText/Mach_47.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001557 12422306322 016564 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 when, after he had captured the Duchy of Urbino, he attacked Tuscany, for the King made him abandon the campaign. The Duke then decided not to depend any longer upon the troops and the favour of others. He first undermined the strength of the Orsini and Colonna factions in Rome, by making all their noble adherents his own nobles, heaping much wealth on them. He also honoured them, according to their merits, giving them military posts and responsibilities. The outcome was that within a few months they abandoned their ancient factional loyalties, and became completely attached to the Duke. After this, he waited for an opportunity to destroy the leaders of the Orsini faction, having already scattered those of the Colonna. A fine chance came, and he exploited it to the full. For the Orsini leaders realised, belatedly, that the great power of the Duke and of the Church MachText/Mach_48.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001546 12422306322 016563 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 spelt their ruin, and called a diet at Magione, in the province of Perugia. This meeting gave rise to the revolt in Urbino and disorders in the Romagna, and countless other dangers for the Duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. This restored his prestige, but he distrusted the King of France and all other external forces; in order not to risk depending on them, he resorted to trickery. He so cleverly concealed his intentions that the Orsini leaders, through the person of the Signor Paulo, became reconciled with him. The Duke treated Paulo very courteously and generously, giving him money, fine clothes and horses, in order to reassure him. Their naivety was such that it brought them to Senigallia, and into the hands of the Duke. Having killed these leaders, then, and won over their adherents to himself, the Duke had established a very MachText/Mach_49.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001654 12422306322 016564 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 good basis for his power, because he controlled all the Romagna, together with the Duchy of Urbino and, especially, he thought that the Romagna was well disposed towards him, and that he had won over all the inhabitants, for they had begun to enjoy prosperity. Since this policy of his should be known about, and imitated by others, I do not want to pass over it. After the Duke had conquered the Romagna, he found that it had been controlled by violent lords, who were more disposed to despoil their subjects than to rule them properly, thus being a source of disorder rather than of order; consequently, that region was full of thefts, quarrels and outrages of every kind. He considered it necessary to introduce efficient government, because he wanted the region to be peaceful and its inhabitants obedient to his monarchical authority. He therefore sent there messer Remirro de Orco, a cruel and energetic man, giving him full powers. MachText/Mach_5.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002070 12422306320 016463 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 and maintained. I say, then, that states which are hereditary, and accustomed to the rule of those belonging to the present ruler's family, are very much less difficult to hold than new states, because it is sufficient not to change the established order, and to deal with any untoward events that may occur; so that, if such a ruler is no more than ordinarily diligent and competent, his government will always be secure, unless some unusually strong force should remove him. And even if that happens, whenever the conqueror encounters difficulties, the former ruler can re-establish himself. To cite an Italian example: the Duke of Ferrara resisted the assaults of the Venetians in 1484, as well as those of Pope Julius in 1510, just because his family,vas very well established in that state. For a natural ruler has fewer reasons and less need to harm others. Consequently, men will be better disposed towards him; and if he is not hated for unusually vicious conduct, it is not surprising that he should be regarded with affection by his subjects. Moreover, the length and MachText/Mach_50.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001604 12422306322 016547 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Remirro quickly restored order and peace, and acquired a very formidable reputation. Later, the Duke considered that such great power was undesirable, because he was afraid it would incur hatred; and he set up a civil tribunal under a distinguished president, in the centre of the region, to which each city sent a lawyer. Because he recognised that the severe measures that had been taken had resulted in his becoming hated by some people, in order to dispel this ill-feeling and win everyone over to him, he wanted to show that if any cruel deeds had been committed they were attributable to the harshness of his governor, not to himself. And availing himself of an appropriate opportunity, one morning the Duke had Remirro placed in two pieces in the square at Cesena, with a block of wood and a blood -stained sword at his side. This terrible spectacle left the people both satisfied and amazed. MachText/Mach_51.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001576 12422306322 016560 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 But let me continue from where I left off. I say that the Duke was very powerful, and secure in some measure against existing dangers, because he possessed his own troops, and had largely destroyed those neighbouring forces that could have harmed him. Since he wanted to annex more territory, he had to be very careful about the King of France. For he recognised that the King, who had belatedly realised his mistake, would not tolerate this plan. The Duke therefore began to seek new alliances, and to temporise with the King of France when the French undertook a campaign in the Kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards, who were besieging Gaeta. His aim was to protect himself against them; if Alexander had not died, he would soon have succeeded. This was how he acted in relation to the existing situation. But as to the future, his main fear was that a new pope might be hostile to him, MachText/Mach_52.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001502 12422306322 016546 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 and seek to take away what Alexander had given to him. He decided to protect himself against this possibility by following four courses of action: first, to wipe out the families of the rulers whom he had dispossessed, so that a new pope could not restore them to power; secondly, to win over all the Roman nobles, as has been said, so that by using them he could check a new pope; thirdly, to have the college of cardinals as well disposed towards him as possible; fourthly, to extend his power so much, before the Pope died, that he would be capable of resisting the first attacks without outside aid. Of these four aims, he had achieved three by the time Alexander died, and had almost achieved the fourth. For he had killed as many of the old dispossessed rulers as he was able, and very few escaped from him. He had won over the MachText/Mach_53.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001755 12422306322 016561 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Roman nobles, and most of the cardinals. As for annexing new territories, he had planned to become master of Tuscany, he already held Perugia and Piombino, and had taken Pisa under his protection. And since he no longer needed to be worried by French power (which was indeed now the case, as the French had already been deprived of the Kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, with the result that each of them would have been obliged to purchase an alliance with him) he would swoop on Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena would have surrendered immediately, partly through envious hatred of the Florentines, partly through fear; and the Florentines could have done nothing. If he had succeeded in all this (and it could well have happened within the very year that Alexander died), he would have acquired so much military strength and so much prestige that he would have been solidly established in power, and would no longer have depended on the favour and arms of others, but on his own strength and ability. MachText/Mach_54.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001434 12422306322 016554 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 However, five years after the Duke had taken up the sword, Alexander died. He found himself firmly established only in the Romagna, with all his other possessions in the air, between two very powerful enemy armies, and critically ill. But the Duke possessed such indomitable spirit and so much ability, he was so well aware that men must either be won over or else destroyed, and had such a sound basis for his power, which he had established in such a short period, that he would have overcome all the difficulties if he had not had those armies on top of him, or if he had been in good health. That his power was firmly based is shown by the following facts. The Romagna waited for him for more than a month. In Rome no attack was made on him, even though he was half-dead; and although the MachText/Mach_55.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002021 12422306322 016546 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Baglioni, Vitelli and Orsini came to Rome, they were unable to stir anyone up against him. Moreover, if he was not able to have whatever cardinal he wanted chosen pope, at least he was able to prevent someone he objected to from being chosen. Everything would have been easy for him, if he had been well when Alexander died. And he told me himself, on the day Julius II was elected, that he had thought about what might happen when his father died, and had provided against everything, except that he had never thought that, when his father was dying, he too would be at death's door. Having reviewed all the actions of the Duke, then, I would not wish to criticise him; rather, he seems to me worthy to be held up as a model, as I have done, for all those who have risen to power through favour or luck and through the arms of others. For he could not have acted differently, given that he possessed a great spirit and had high ambitions. Only two things hindered his schemes: the shortness of Alexander's pontificate and his own illness. MachText/Mach_56.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001525 12422306322 016557 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Hence, anyone who considers it necessary in his new principality to deal effectively with his enemies, to gain allies, to conquer (whether by force or by cunning), to inspire both devotion and respectful fear in the people, to be obeyed and respectfully feared by troops, to neutralise or destroy those who can or must be expected to injure you, to replace old institutions with new ones, to be both severe and kind, both magnanimous and open-handed, to disband disloyal troops and form a new army, to maintain alliances with kings and other rulers in such a way that they will either be glad to benefit you or be slow to injure you: for all these, no better examples can be cited than the actions of this man. He can be criticised only with regard to the election of Pope Julius, in which he made a bad choice; as has been said, even if he could not MachText/Mach_57.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001543 12422306322 016560 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 ensure that the man he favoured was made pope, he could have prevented certain other choices. And he should never have permitted any cardinals he had injured to be chosen, or any who, once he became pope, would have reason to be afraid of him. For men harm others because they fear them or because they hate them. Among those whom he had injured were San Fiero ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio and Ascanio; if any of the others had become pope, they would have been afraid of him, with the exceptions of Rouen and the Spaniards (the latter because of the bonds of relationship and obligation, the former because of his power, since he was supported by the Kingdom of France). The most important thing for the Duke, therefore, was to make a Spaniard pope and, if this was impossible, he should have arranged for Rouen to be chosen and not San Fiero ad Vincula. Anyone MachText/Mach_58.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001567 12422306322 016567 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 who thinks that new benefits make important men forget old injuries is mistaken. The Duke, then, blundered in this election, and it was the cause of his final downfall. VIII: Those who become rulers through wicked means But because there still remain two ways in which one can become a ruler, which cannot be attributed entirely either to favour or luck or to ability, I do not want to neglect them, even though one of them could be discussed at greater length when dealingwith republics. These two ways are seizing power through utterly wicked means, and a private citizen becoming ruler of his country through the favour of his fellow- citizens. Considering the first way now, I shall cite two examples, one ancient and the other modern, without considering explicitly the merits of this way of gaining power, for I think they should be enough for anyone who needs to imitate them. MachText/Mach_59.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001605 12422306323 016562 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Agathocles the Sicilian, who became King of Syracuse, was not only an ordinary citizen, but of the lowest and most abject origins. He was the son of a potter, and he always led a very dissolute life. Nevertheless, his evil deeds were combined with such energy of mind and body that, after having entered the militia, he rose through the ranks to become praetor of Syracuse. Holding that position, he resolved to become ruler, and to hold violently and without being beholden to others the power that had been conferred on him. In order to achieve this purpose, he conspired with Hamilcar the Carthaginian, who was campaigning in Sicily. One morning he called together the people and the senate of Syracuse, as if some matter concerning the republic had to be decided. Then, at a prearranged signal, his soldiers killed all the senators and the richest men of the city. After this massacre, he seized MachText/Mach_6.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002122 12422306320 016462 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 continuity of his family's rule extinguishes the memories of the causes of innovations: for any change always leaves a toothing-stone for further building. III: Mixed principalities However, it is in new principalities that there are real difficulties. First, if the principality is not completely new but is like a limb that is joined to another principality (which taken together may almost be called a mixed principality), its mutability arises first from a very natural problem, which is to be found in all new principalities. This is that men are very ready to change their ruler when they believe that they can better their condition, and this belief leads them to take up arms against him. But they are mistaken, because they later realise through hard experience that they have made their condition worse. This arises from another natural and normal constraint, which is that anyone who becomes a new ruler is always forced to injure his new subjects, both through his troops and countless other injuries that are involved in conquering a state. The outcome is that you make enemies of all those MachText/Mach_60.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001734 12422306323 016555 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 control of the city, and thereafter held it without any civil strife. Although he was twice defeated by the Carthaginians, and eventually besieged by them, he not only showed himself capable of defending his besieged city but, leaving part of his army to resist the siege, he attacked Africa with the rest. Very soon he was able to relieve Syracuse from the siege, and went on to reduce Carthage to the direst straits. Consequently, the Carthaginians were forced to make an agreement with him, according to which they were to remain in Africa and leave Sicily to Agathodes. If Agathocles's conduct and career are reviewed, then, it will be seen that luck or favour played little or no part in his success, since (as has been said above) it was not through anyone's favour, but through overcoming countless difficulties and dangers, that he rose up through the ranks of the militia, and gained power, which he afterwards maintained by undertaking many courageous and dangerous courses of MachText/Mach_61.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000003047 12422306323 016555 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 action. Yet it cannot be called virtue to kill one's fellow-citizens, to betray one's friends, to be treacherous, merciless and irreligious; power may be gained by acting in such ways, but not glory. If one bears in mind the ability displayed by Agathocles in confronting and surviving dangers, and his indomitable spirit in enduring and overcoming adversity, there is no reason for judging him inferior to even the ablest general. Nevertheless, his appallingly cruel and inhumane conduct, and countless wicked deeds, preclude his being numbered among the finest men. One cannot, then, attribute either to luck or favour or to ability what he achieved without either. In our own times, when Alexander VI was pope, Oliverotto of Fermo, whose father died when he was very young, was brought up by Giovanni Fogliani, his maternal uncle, and when still a youth was sent to train as a soldier under Paulo Vitelli, with a vie\v to his achieving high rank when he had become proficient in things military. After Paulo's execution, he trained under Vitellozzo, Paulo's brother; and since he was clever, and strong in body and spirit, in a very short time he became a leader of Vitellozzo's troops. But because he considered it demeaning to serve under another, he resolved to seize power in Fermo, with Vitellozzo's assistance, and with the help of some citizens of Fermo, to whom the servitude of their native city was preferable to its free institutions. Accordingly, he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani, saying that since he had been away from home for many years, he wanted to come MachText/Mach_62.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001570 12422306323 016555 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 to see him and his own city, and to inspect in some measure his own patrimony. Since achieving honour had been the only goal of all his efforts, so that his fellow-citizens would realise that he had not spent his time in vain, he \vanted to return in a way that did him honour, and accompanied by a hundred cavalrymen drawn from his friends and followers. And he beseeched Giovanni to arrange for him to be received with due honour by the citizens of Fermo; this would not only honour himself, but also Giovanni, who had educated him. Giovanni did not fail to treat his nephew with the utmost courtesy, and after the citizens {thanks to Giovanni) had received him with every honour, he was lodged in Giovanni's house, where, after he had spent some days secretly arranging everything that was necessary for carrying out his intencied crime, Oliverotto held a formal banquet, to which he MachText/Mach_63.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001627 12422306323 016561 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 invited Giovanni Fogliani and all the leading citizens of Fermo. After the banquet, and all the entertainments customary on such occasions, Oliverotto artfully raised some serious matters, speaking of the great power of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and of their various enterprises. \\'hen Giovanni and the others began to reply to what OHverotto had said, he suddenly arose, saying that such matters should be discussed in a more/private place. And he went into another room, followed by Giovanni and all the others. No sooner were they all seated than his soldiers emerged from hiding-places, and killed Giovanni and all the others. After this massacre, Oliverotto mounted his horse and rode through the city, taking possession of it, and besieged the chief magistrates in their palace. They were so afraid that they felt constrained to obey him, and they formed a new government, of which he made himself the MachText/Mach_64.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001754 12422306323 016563 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 head. And when he had killed all the malcontents who could have harmed him, he consolidated his power by means of new civil and military institutions, so that in the space of the year that he held power he was not only secure in the city of Fermo, but made all the neighbouring powers fear him. And ousting him would have been as difficult as ousting Agathocles, if he had not let himself be tricked by Cesare Borgia, when the Orsini leaders and Vitellozzo Vitelli were captured (as was previously related) at Senigallia. He too was captured there, a year after his parricide, and together with Vitellozzo, his former mentor in prowess and villainy, strangled. It may well be wondered how it could happen that Agathocles, and others like him, after committing countless treacherous and cruel deeds, could live securely in their own countries for a long time, defend themselves against external enemies and never be plotted against by their citizens. For many others have not been able to maintain their MachText/Mach_65.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001607 12422306323 016561 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 power by acting cruelly even in peaceful times let alone in times of war, which are always uncertain. I believe that this depends upon whether cruel deeds are committed well or badly. They may be called well committed (if one may use the word 'well' of that which is evil) when they are all committed at once, because they are necessary for establishing one's power, and are not afterwards persisted in, but changed for measures as beneficial as possible to one's subjects. Badly committed are those that at first are few in number, but increase with time rather than diminish. Those who follow the first method can in some measure remedy their standing both with God and with men, as Agathocles did. Those who follow the second cannot possibly maintain their power. Hence, it should be noted that a conqueror, after seizing power, must decide about all the injuries he needs to commit, and do all of MachText/Mach_66.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002033 12422306323 016554 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 them at once, so as not to have to inflict punishments every day. Thus he will be able, by his restraint, to reassure men and win them over by benefiting them. Anyone who does not act in this way, either because he is timid or because he lacks judgement, will always be forced to stand with sword in hand. He will never be able to rely upon his subjects,b for they can never feel safe with him, because of the injuries that continue to be inflicted. For injuries should be done all together so that, because they are tasted less, they will cause less resentment; benefits should be given out one by one, so that they will be savoured more. And above all a ruler must live with his subjects in such a way that no unexpected events, whether favourable or unfavourable, will make him change course. For when difficult times put you under pressure you will not have enough time to take harsh measures, and any benefits that you confer will not help you, because they will be considered to be done unwillingly, and so you will receive no credit for them. MachText/Mach_67.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001576 12422306323 016570 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 IX: The civil principality I turn now to the other case, when a private citizen becomes ruler of his own country through the favour of his fellow-citizens, not through villainy or intolerable violence of other kinds: this may be called a civil principality (and to attain it, it is not necessary to have only ability or only good luck, but rather a lucky astuteness). I say that one rises to this position either through being favoured by the people or through being favoured by the nobles; for these two classes are found in every city. And this situation arises because the people do not want to be dominated or oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles want to dominate and oppress the people. And from these two different dispositions there are three possible outcomes in cities: a principality, a republic or anarchy. This kind of principality is brought about either by the people or by MachText/Mach_68.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001503 12422306323 016557 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 the nobles, according to whether one or the other has the opportunity to act. As for the nobles, when they are unable to resist popular pressure, they begin to favour and advance one of themselves, and make him ruler so that, under his protection, they will be able to satisfy their appetites. On the other hand, the people, when they realise that they cannot resist the nobles, favour and advance one of themselves, and make him ruler, so that through his authority he will be able to protect them. A man who becomes ruler through the help of the nobles will find it harder to maintain his power than one who becomes ruler through the help of the people, because he is surrounded by many men who consider that they are his equals, and therefore he cannot give them orders or deal with them as he would wish. On the other hand, a man MachText/Mach_69.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002240 12422306323 016557 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 who becomes ruler through popular support finds himself standing alone, having around him nobody or very few not disposed to obey him. Moreover, the nobles cannot be satisfied if a ruler acts honourably, without injuring others. But the people can be thus satisfied, because their aims are more honourable than those of the nobles: for the latter want only to oppress and the former only to avoid being oppressed. Furthermore, a ruler can never protect himself from a hostile people, because there are too many of them; but he can protect himself from the nobles, because there are few of them. The worst that can befall a ruler from a hostile people is being deserted by them; but he has to fear not only being abandoned by hostile nobles, but also that they will move against him. Since they are more far-seeing and cunning, they are able to act in time to save themselves, and seek to ingratiate themselves with the one whom they expect to prevail. Again, a ruler is always obliged to co-exist with the same people, whereas he is not obliged to have the same nobles, since he is well able to make and unmake them at any time, advancing them or-reducing their power, as he wishes. MachText/Mach_7.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001532 12422306320 016467 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 whom you have injured in annexing a principality, yet you cannot retain the friendship of those who have helped you to become ruler, because you cannot satisfy them in the ways that they expect. Nor can you use strong medicine against them, since you have obligations to them. For even if one possesses very strong armies, the goodwill of the inhabitants is always necessary in the early stages of annexing a country. These were the reasons why Louis XII of France quickly annexed Milan, and just as quickly lost it; and Ludovico's own troops were sufficiently powerful to deprive him of it the first time. For when the people who had opened the gates to Louis found that they did not receive the benefits they had expected, they could not endure the oppressive rule of the new master It is certainly true that, after a country that has rebelled has been MachText/Mach_70.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001501 12422306323 016546 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 To clarify this matter, let me say that two main considerations need to be borne in mind with regard to the nobles. Either they conduct themselves in a way that links your success with theirs, or they do not. You should honour and esteem those of the former who are not rapacious. As for those who do not commit themselves to you, two different kinds of reason for their conduct must be distinguished. If they act in this way because of pusillanimity or natural lack of spirit, you should make use of them, especially those who are shrewd, because in good times they will bring you honour, and in troubled times you will have nothing to fear from them. But if they do not commit themselves to you calculatingly and because of ambition, it is a sign that they are thinking more of their own interests than of yours. And a ruler must MachText/Mach_71.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002160 12422306323 016551 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 watch these nobles very carefully, and fear them as much as if they were declared enemies, because if he finds himselfin trouble they will always do their best to bring him down. A man who becomes ruler through popular favour, then, must keep the people well disposed towards him. This will be easy, since they w·ant only not to be oppressed. But a man who becomes ruler against the wishes of the people, and through the favour of the nobles, must above all else try to win over the people, which will be easy if you protect them. And if men are well treated by those from whom they expected ill-treatment, they become more attached to their benefactor; the people will at once become better disposed towards him than if he had attained power through their favour. A ruler can win over the people in many ways; but because these vary so much according to the circumstances one cannot give any definite rules, and I shall therefore leave this matter on one side. I shall affirm only that it is necessary for a ruler to have the people well disposed towards him; otherwise, in difficult times he will find himself in desperate straits. MachText/Mach_72.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001475 12422306323 016562 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Nabis, ruler of the Spartans, withstood a siege by all the other Greek powers and by a triumphant Roman army, defending both his country and his own power against them. When danger threatened, he needed only to act against a few; but if the people had been hostile to him, this would not have been enough. And doubt should not be cast on my opinion by quoting the trite proverb, 'He who builds upon the people, builds upon mud.' This is true if it is a private citizen who builds his power upon them, and believes that the people will come to his rescue if he is oppressed by his enemies or by the rulers. In such circumstances one may often be disappointed, as the Gracchi were in Rome and messer Giorgio Scali in Florence. But if it is a ruler who builds his power upon the people, and if he knows how to command and if he is MachText/Mach_73.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001672 12422306324 016563 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 courageous, does not despair in difficult times, and maintains the morale of his people by his spiritedness and the measures that he takes, he will never find himself let down by them, and he will realise he had laid sound foundations for his power. These civil principalities tend to encounter grave difficulties if an attempt is made to transform them into absolute regimes. For civil rulers either rule directly or through public officials. In the latter case their position is weaker and more dangerous, because they depend completely on the goodwill of those citizens who act as their officials. And, especially in troubled times, they can very easily remove him from power, either by moving against him or simply by refusing to obey him. Moreover, in troubled times, the ruler does not have enough time to assume absolute authority, because the citizens or subjects, accustomed as they are to obeying the officials, will not be disposed to obey MachText/Mach_74.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001454 12422306324 016562 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 him in such a crisis. And in difficult times, he will always lack men on whom he can depend. For such a ruler cannot rely upon what he sees happen in peaceful times, when citizens have need of his government, because then everyone comes running, everyone is ready with promises, and everyone wants to die for him, when the prospect of death is far off. But in troubled times, when the government needs the services of the citizens, few are then to be found. And it is especially dangerous to have to test their loyalty, because it can be done only once. A shrewd ruler, therefore, must try to ensure that his citizens, whatever the situation may be, will always be dependent on the government and on him; and then they will always be loyal to him. X: How the strength of all principalities should be measured MachText/Mach_75.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001455 12422306324 016564 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 There is another consideration that must be borne in mind when examining the strength of principalities: namely, whether a ruler has sufficient territory and power to defend himself, when this is necessary, or whether he will always need some help from others. To clarify this matter, let me say that I consider that a ruler is capable of defending his state if he can put together an army that is good enough to fight a battle against any power that attacks it (either because he has many soldiers of his own or because he has sufficient money). But a ruler who cannot confront any enemy on the field of battle, and is obliged to take refuge within the walls of his city, and keep guard over them, will always need to be helped by others. The first case has already been discussed; and later I shall say more MachText/Mach_76.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002075 12422306324 016564 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 about it. No advice can be given with regard to the second case, except to exhort such a ruler to fortify and provision his city, and not seek to defend his rural territories. Others will be very slow to attack any ruler who fortifies his city well and deals with his subjects in the ways already discussed; and to be considered later. For men are always unwilling to undertake campaigns that they expect to be difficult; and it will never seem easy to attack a ruler who has his city well defended, and is not hated by the people. The cities of Germany are completely independent, have little rural territory, and obey the Emperor only when they want to. They do not fear him or any other neighbouring power. The reason is that they are so well fortified that everyone considers that besieging them is necessarily a tiresome and difficult undertaking. For they all possess strong walls and adequate moats, and sufficient artillery; and they always ensure that their public storehouses contain enough food, drink and fuel to last for a year. Moreover, in order to maintain the common MachText/Mach_77.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001544 12422306324 016565 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 people without public expense, they always have enough raw materials to keep the people engaged for a year in those occupations essential to the life of the city, and which sustain the common people. They also consider military exercises to be very important, and have many regulations for maintaining them. Therefore, a ruler who possesses a strong city and does not make himself hated is safe from attack; and anyone who should attack him is eventually forced to beat an ignominious retreat. For so many unexpected things can happen in this world that it is virtually impossible to keep an army encamped idly in a siege for a whole year. It may be urged that if the people have properties outside the city, and see them destroyed, they will lose patience, and that the length of the siege and self-interested considerations will sap their loyalty to their ruler. I MachText/Mach_78.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002360 12422306324 016563 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 reply that a strong and spirited ruler will always overcome such problems, by encouraging his subjects to believe that these evils will not last long, by warning them of the enemy's cruelty, and by dealing adroitly with those men who seem to him too outspoken. Furthermore, it is to be expected that the enemy forces will burn and pillage the countryside when they arrive, and at a time when the spirits of the defenders are still high and they are determined to hold out. Therefore, after some days, the ruler has much less reason to be afraid, when the ardour of the defenders has cooled, the damage already done, the injuries already sustained, and there is nothing to be done. They are then much more likely to support their ruler, because they will consider that he is indebted to them, since it is in his defence that their homes have been burned and their properties ruined. And men are so constituted that they are as much bound by the benefits they confer as by those they receive. Hence, if the whole matter is carefully considered, it is clear that it should not be difficult for a shrewd ruler to keep up the morale of his citizens throughout any siege, provided that they do not lack the means necessary for sustaining life and defending themselves. MachText/Mach_79.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001670 12422306324 016567 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 XI: Ecclesiastical principalities It remains now only to discuss ecclesiastical principalities, in which all the difficulties occur before they are acquired, for they are gained either through ability or through favour or luck, and maintained without the help of either. This in turn is because they are sustained by ancient religious institutions, which have been sufficiently strong to maintain their rulers in office however they live or act. Only they have states and do not defend them, and subjects whom they do not trouble to govern; and although their states are undefended, they are not deprived of them. And their subjects, although not properly governed, do not worry about it; they cannot get rid of these rulers, nor even think about doing so. Only these principalities, then, are secure and successful. However, since they are controlled by a higher power, which the human mind cannot comprehend, I shall refrain from discussing them; MachText/Mach_8.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001575 12422306320 016477 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 reconquered a second time, it is less likely to be lost, since the ruler, because of the rebellion, will be more ruthless in consolidating his power, in punishing the guilty, unmasking suspects, and remedying weaknesses in his government. Thus, a Duke Ludovico creating a disturbance on the borders was enough to cause the King of France to lose Milan the first time. But to lose it a second time, it was necessary to have all the powers acting against him, and for his armies to be defeated or driven out of Italy. This happened for the reasons mentioned above. Nevertheless, he did lose Milan twice. The general reasons for the first loss have been discussed; it remains now to discuss the reasons for the second, and to consider what solutions were available to him, and what someone in his position might do, in order to maintain better than the King of France did the territory annexed. MachText/Mach_80.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001563 12422306324 016560 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 since they are raised up and maintained by God, only a presumptuous and rash man would examine them. Nevertheless, someone might ask me how it has happened that the temporal power of the Church has become so great, although before Alexander's pontificate the leading Italian powers (and not only those called 'powers', but every baron and lord, however unimportant) held this temporal power in little account, whereas now a King of France stands in awe of it, for it has been able to drive him out of ltaly, and to ruin the Venetians. Accordingly it does not seem out of place to recall it, although it is well known. Before King Charles of France invaded Italy, this country was dominated by the popes, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan and the Florentines. Each of these powers had two main preoccupations: first, that a foreign power should not invade Italy; MachText/Mach_81.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001576 12422306324 016565 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 secondly, that none of the other Italian powers should acquire more territory and power. Those who caused most concern were the popes and the Venetians. To limit the power of Venice, the others had to form an alliance, as happened in the defence of Ferrara. And the Roman barons were used to limit papal power. As these were divided into two factions, the Orsini and the Colonna, they were always quarrelling among themselves, but carrying their arms under the very eyes of the popes, they kept the Papacy weak and ineffectual. And although there sometimes arose a spirited pope, such as Sixtus yet he could not overcome this problem, either because of the particular circumstances or because of lack of skill. The shortness of pontificates was the reason, for it was very difficult to destroy one of the factions during the period of ten years that most popes reigned. And if it happened that MachText/Mach_82.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001630 12422306324 016555 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 one pope almost succeeded in destroying the Colonna faction, the next pope would be hostile to the Orsini, which had the effect of reviving the Colonna faction, and yet he did not have enough time to destroy the Orsini faction. The result was that the temporal power of the Papacy was held in little regard in Italy. Then Alexander VI came to the papal throne; more than any previous pope, he showed how much a pope could achieve through money and military means. Using the Duke Valentino, and exploiting the opportunities provided by the French invasion, he did all those things which I have discussed above, when considering the career of the Duke. And although Alexander's aim was to aggrandise the Duke, not the Church, nevertheless the outcome was to increase the power of the Church which, after his death, and the downfall of the Duke, became the beneficiary of his labours. Then came Pope Julius, who found the MachText/Mach_83.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002346 12422306324 016563 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 Church already powerful, possessing all the Romagna, the Roman barons reduced to impotence, and their factions destroyed b:y the strong measures of Alexander. Moreover, Julius had opportunities for accumulating money never used before Alexander's time/julius not only followed these policies, he intensified them. He planned to capture Bologna, to destroy the power of Venice, and to expel the French from Italy. All these enterprises were successful, and it was very much to his credit that he did everything in order to increase the power of the Church, and not any individual. He kept the Orsini and Colonna factions in the same impotent condition in which he found them; and although they had some leaders capable of causing trouble, two factors militated against it. The first was the great power of the Church, which overawed them; the second was that there were no cardinals to lead either faction, the cause of the rivalries between them. These factions will always cause trouble whenever they have cardinals as leaders, because it is they who foster these factions, inside Rome and outside, and those barons are compelled to support their own factions. Thus, the ambition of prelates is at the root of the quarrels and tumults among the barons. MachText/Mach_84.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001546 12422306324 016565 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 His Holiness Pope Leo, then, has found the Papacy very powerful; and it is to be hoped that, just as his predecessors made it great by the use of force, he will make it very great and respected through his natural goodness and countless other virtues. XII: The different types of army, and mercenary troops I have discussed in detail all the different types of principality that I mentioned at the beginning, and have given some consideration to the reasons for their prosperity and decline; and I have examined the ways in which many men have sought to acquire them and to hold them. I now turn to consider in a general way the means that can be used in attacking and defending them. I said earlier how necessary it is for a ruler to have firm foundations for his power; otherwise, he will always come to grief. The main foundations of all states (whether they are MachText/Mach_85.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001516 12422306324 016563 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 new, old or mixed) are good laws and good armies. Since it is impossible to have good laws if good arms are lacking, and if there are good arms there must also be good laws, I shall leave laws aside and concentrate on arms. I say, then, that the arms with which a ruler defends his state are his own, or they are mercenaries, or auxiliaries, or a mixture of all three. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and anyone who relies upon mercenaries to defend his territories will never have a stable or secure rule. For they are disunited, ambitious, undisciplined and treacherous; they are powerful when among those who are not hostile, but weak and cowardly when confronted by determined enemies; they have no fear of God, and do not maintain commitments with men. One's ruin is only postponed until the time comes when they are MachText/Mach_86.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001520 12422306324 016557 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 required to fight. In peaceful times you will be despoiled by them, in war by your enemies. The reason for all this is that they have no affection for you or any other reason to induce them to fight for you, except a trifling wage, which is not sufficient to make them want to risk their lives for you. They are very glad to be in your service as long as you do not wage war, but in time of war they either flee or desert. I should not need to spend very much time in arguing this case, since the present ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than the reliance over so many years on mercenary armies. Some of these mercenary armies were not ineffective, and they appeared powerful when fighting other mercenary armies, but when the foreign invasions began, their real character was soon revealed. Thus, King Charles of France was permitted MachText/Mach_87.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000003006 12422306325 016562 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 to conquer Italy with a piece of chalk; and he who said that our sins were responsible spoke the truth. However, they were not the sins that he meant, but those that I have specified; and because they were the sins of rulers, they too have been punished for them. I want to show more effectively the defects of these troops. Mercenary generals are either very capable men, or they are not. If they are, you cannot trust them, because they will always be aspiring to achieve a great position for themselves, either by attacking you, their employer, or by attacking others contrary to your wishes. If they are mediocre, you will be ruined as a matter of course. And if it is objected that anyone who has forces at his disposal (whether mercenaries or not) will act in this way, I would reply by first drawing a distinction: arms are used either by a ruler or by a republic. If the former, the ruler should personally lead his armies, acting as the general. If the latter, the republic must send its own citizens as generals; and if someone is sent who turns out not to be very capable, he must be replaced; and if the general sent is capable, there should be legal controls that ensure that he does not exceed his authority. Experience has shown that only rulers and republics that possess their own armies are very successful, whereas mercenary armies never achieve anything, and cause only harm. And it is more difficult for a citizen to seize power in a republic that possesses its own troops than in one that relies upon foreign troops. MachText/Mach_88.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001657 12422306325 016575 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 For many centuries both Rome and Sparta were armed and independent. Today the Swiss are very well armed and completely independent. An example of the worth of ancient mercenaries is provided by the Carthaginians: they were attacked by their own mercenary troops after the first war against the Romans, despite the fact that the generals were Carthaginians. Similarly, after the death of Epaminondas, the Thebans made Philip of.Macedon general of their armies; and after he was victorious, he deprived them of their independence. After the death of Duke Filippo, the Milanese engaged Francesco Sforza to lead their armies against the Venetians. But when Sforza had defeated the Venetians at Caravaggio, he joined forces with them and attacked the Nlilanese, who had been his employers. Sforza's own father, who was employed as a general by Queen Giovanna ofNaples, suddenly left her unprotected; and, in order not to lose her Kingdom, she was MachText/Mach_89.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001611 12422306325 016564 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 forced to seek help from the King of Aragon. And although the Venetians and the Florentines augmented their dominions in the past by using mercenaries, and their generals did not seize power but defended them, my opinion is that in this matter the Florentines were very lucky; for some of the able generals who could have become a threat to them did not win victories, some met with opposition, and others went elsewhere to achieve their ambitions. The general who did not conquer was John Hawkwood; his loyalty could not be put to the test, just because he did not win victories; but everyone will acknowledge that if he had been victorious, the Florentines would have been at his mercy. The Sforza always had the Bracceschi troops to contend with, and each faction checked the other: Francesco went to Lombardy to satisfy his ambitions, and Braccio moved against the Church and the Kingdom of Naples. MachText/Mach_9.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002077 12422306320 016476 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 I say, then, that the territories a conqueror annexes and joins to his own well-established state are either in the same country, with the same language, or they are not. If they are, it is extremely easy to hold them, especially if they are not used to governing themselves. To hold them securely, it is enough to wipe out the family of the ruler who held sway over them, because as far as other things are concerned, the inhabitants will continue to live quietly, provided their old way of life is maintained and there is no difference in customs. This has happened with Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony and Normandy, which have been joined to France for a long time. Although there are some linguistic differences, nevertheless their way of life is similar, so no difficulties have arisen. Anyone who annexes such countries, and is determined to hold them, must follow two policies: the first is to wipe out their old ruling families; the second is not to change their laws or impose new taxes. Then the old principality and the new territory will very soon become a single body politic. MachText/Mach_90.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001627 12422306325 016563 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 But let us turn to more recent events. The Florentines made Paulo Vitelli their general; he was a very able man, who from modest beginnings had acquired a very high reputation. Nobody can deny that if he had captured Pisa, the Florentines would have been forced to retain his services because, if he had then become general of one of the armies of their enemies, the Florentines would have found themselves in desperate straits; and if they had retained him, he would have been in a commanding position. If the conquests of the Venetians arc reviewed, it is evident that they were secure and glorious when they fought their own wars (which was before they undertook campaigns in Italy), in which their nobles and the people in arms fought very skilfully and courageously. But when they began to fight on the mainland, they forsook this very effective policy, and followed the Italian custom. When they first began to MachText/Mach_91.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001550 12422306325 016557 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 expand their land empire, they had little reason to be afraid of their mercenary generals, because not very much territory had yet been annexed and because the reputation of Venice was very high. But as they expanded further, under Carmagnola, their blunder became evident. They knew that he was very able (since they had defeated the Duke of Milan under his command) but, on the other hand, they realised that he was pursuing the war half-heartedly. They decided that they would not be able to win again by using his services (because he did not want to win), and yet they could not dismiss him without losing the territory that had been annexed. Hence, to protect themselves, they were forced to kill him. Afterwards they had as generals Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the Count of Pitigliano and others. With regard to these generals, what they had to MachText/Mach_92.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001621 12422306325 016557 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 fear was losing, not the dangers arising from their being victorious, as indeed happened later at Vaila where, in a single battle, they lost what they had gained with so much effort over eight hundred years. For using mercenaries results only in slow, tardy and unimportant gains, but sudden and astonishing losses. Since these examples have brought me to Italy, which for many years has been controlled by mercenary armies, I want to examine them at greater length so that, when their rise and development have been surveyed, it will be easier to find a solution. You must realise, then, how in recent times the Empire began to lose much ground in Italy, the temporal power of the Papacy was greatly increased, and Italy came to be divided into many states. For in many of the large cities there were revolts against the nobles who (previously supported by the Emperor) had ruled oppressively, and the Church MachText/Mach_93.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001744 12422306325 016566 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 encouraged these revolts in order to increase its temporal power; and in many other cities rulers had emerged from the ranks of the citizens. Hence, because Italy had largely come under the control of the Church and of some republics, and because these priests and citizen-rulers had little experience of military matters, they all began to use outsiders to fight their battles. Alberigo da Cunio, a Romagnol, was the first to make these mercenary troops important. From this source other mercenary forces came to the fore, including those of Braccio and Sforza, who in their day were the arbiters of ltaly. After them came all the others who controlled mercenary armies up to our own times. And the result of their prowess has been that Italy has been overrun by Charles, plundered by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand and treated with contempt by the Swiss. What happened, first, was that to enhance their own reputations, they neglected the infantry. They did this because, since they were men who MachText/Mach_94.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001712 12422306325 016562 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 did not possess states of their own and lived by being mercenaries, small numbers of foot-soldiers did not enhance their position, and they were incapable of maintaining large numbers of them. Therefore, they resorted to having enough cavalry to maintain themselves and achieve a position of some importance. And things came to such a pass that an army of twenty thousand soldiers would contain scarcely two thousand foot-soldiers. Moreover, they employed all possible means to lessen the hardships and dangers, both to themselves and their troops, by inflicting few casualties in battle; instead, they took prisoners and did not demand ransoms. They did not attack fortified cities at night; mercenaries who defended cities were very reluctant to attack the besiegers; they did not fortify their camps with stockades or ditches; and they did not undertake sieges during winter. All these practices were permitted by the prevailing military code, and were adopted, as I MachText/Mach_95.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001523 12422306325 016563 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 have said, to avoid hardship and danger. The outcome of their activities is that Italy has become enslaved and despised. XIII: Auxiliaries, mixed troops and native troops Auxiliaries, which are the other kind of troops that are useless, are troops that are sent to you to aid and defend you, when you call on a powerful ruler for help. They were used recently by Pope Julius who, when he had seen the bad showing of his own mercenary troops in the campaign of Ferrara, resorted to auxiliaries, arranging with King Ferdinand of Spain that that ruler would help him with his own troops. In themselves, these auxiliaries can be capable and effective but they are almost always harmful to those who use them; for if they lose you will be ruined, and if they win you will be at their mercy. Although ancient history provides many examples, I do want to MachText/Mach_96.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000002015 12422306325 016561 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 discuss this recent case of Pope Julius II. His decision can only be judged rash: to put himself completely into the hands of a foreign ruler, in order to gain possession of Ferrara! But his good luck meant that he did not reap the fruits of his bad policy, for when the auxiliaries he was using were defeated at Ravenna, and the Swiss arrived and chased out the victors (contrary to what he and others had any reason to expect), he did not find himself at the mercy either of his enemies (who had fled) or of these auxiliaries, because the victory had been achieved by others, not by them. Again, the Florentines, because they were completely unarmed, brought ten thousand French troops to besiege Pisa: and this policy involved them in more danger than at any other time in their troubled history. Similarly, the Emperor of Constantinople; brought ten thousand Turkish troops in order to fight his fellow-Greeks; but when that war was finished they did not want to go away, which marked the beginning of the servitude of Greece to the MachText/Mach_97.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001605 12422306325 016566 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 infidels. Therefore, anyone who wants to be unable to conquer should use such troops, because they are much more dangerous than mercenaries: for with them ruin is complete. They form a united force, and are used to obeying others. But when mercenaries conquer, more time and greater opportunities are required before they will be in a position to do you harm. They do not form a united body, since they have been engaged and paid by you. And an outsider whom you appoint as their leader cannot at once assume such authority over them that harm to you will result. In short, with mercenaries, their cowardice or reluctance to fight is more dangerous; with auxiliaries their skill and courage. Wise rulers, then, always avoid using these troops, and form armies composed of their own men; and they prefer to lose using their own troops rather than to conquer through using foreign troops, for they do MachText/Mach_98.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001564 12422306325 016573 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 not consider a victory that is gained by using foreign forces to be genuine. I never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This Duke invaded the Romagna using auxiliaries (all his troops being French), and with them he captured Imola and Forli. But since he distrusted them, he then used mercenaries, which he thought less dangerous, employing the Orsini and Vitelli troops. When he later found them to be of doubtful value and loyalty, and therefore dangerous, he disbanded them and formed an army composed of his own men. And the difference between these kinds of army is very obvious if one compares the reputation of the Duke when he used only French troops or when he used the Orsini and Vitelli troops, and when he possessed his own soldiers, and was self-sufficient militarily. Then it became much greater, and he was never more esteemed than when everyone saw that MachText/Mach_99.txt 000644 000765 000024 00000001505 12422306325 016567 0 ustar 00justingrimmer staff 000000 000000 he was the complete master of his own forces. I am reluctant to cite examples that are neither Italian nor recent; nevertheless I must discuss Hiero of Syracuse, since I have already mentioned him. As I said, after the Syracusans had made him leader of their army, he realised at once that those mercenary troops were useless, for they were condottieri of the same stamp as our Italian ones. And since he considered that he could not continue to employ them or disband them, he had them all cut to pieces. Thereafter, he made war with his own troops and not foreign ones. I want also to recall a relevant example from the Old Testament. When David offered to Saul to go and fight Goliath, the Philistine champion, Saul gave him his own weapons and armour in order to imbue him with courage. But after David had put them on he rejected