diff --git a/MIP101/MIP101.md b/MIP101/MIP101.md index f0e573e82..10ddf1663 100644 --- a/MIP101/MIP101.md +++ b/MIP101/MIP101.md @@ -281,6 +281,12 @@ Facilitators must be careful in using their judgement and common sense to ensure Document identifiers do not have to be in order or be sequential. +### 1.1: Atlas v2 Upgrade Process + +When Atlas v2 is ready to function as a drop-in replacement for all MIP and Atlas functions, in preparation for Endgame Launch, the upgrade to Atlas v2 can be triggered through the weekly governance cycle using a regular governance poll. The Atlas v2 upgrade can be triggered by a Facilitator or the Maker Forum account Le_Bateleur representing the Atlas Core Development Ecosystem Actor Atlas Axis. + +When the Atlas v2 upgrade happens, all MIPs and legacy Atlas MIPs are deleted and their functionality fully replaced by Atlas v2. + ## 2: The Governance Scope - GOV The Governance Scope covers rules that regulate the critical balance of power, and adjudicate on appeals processes related to misalignment in the ecosystem. @@ -423,51 +429,47 @@ Delegating to Seasonally Active PDMs will qualify Lockstake Engine users for Gov #### 2.6.3: Aligned Delegate Budget and Participation Requirements -ADs are eligible to receive significant budget from the Maker Protocol if they are among the top ADs based on total votes delegated to their Seasonally Active PDMs, and they fulfill specific participation requirements. There are two budget levels for ADs: Prime Delegates (PDs) that receive the highest level of budget, enough to sustain full teams, and Reserve Aligned Delegates (RDs) that receive a lower level of budget. +ADs are eligible to receive budget from the Maker Protocol if they are among the top ADs based on total votes delegated to their PDM, and they fulfill specific participation requirements. Delegates receiving a budget are called Prime Delegates (PDs). ##### 2.6.3.1 -The Governance Scope Artifact specifies the number of PD slots, and the number of RD slots. +The Atlas Immutable Artifact specifies the number of PD slots. -###### 2.6.3.3.3 +###### 2.6.3.1.1 -The beneficiaries of the available PD and RD slots change in real time based on the top ranking of ADs. The top 1-3 ADs are the PDs. The top 4-6 ADs are the RDs. +The top 6 ADs by number of delegated votes are the PDs. -##### 2.6.3.4: AD Buffer +##### 2.6.3.2: AD Buffer -The AD Buffer is an account of NGT and NST that builds up when an AD achieves a budget rank of either PD or RD. The budget that an AD is responsible for accumulates in the AD buffer. It cannot be spent until it contains at least 1 month's worth of budget. Once monthly, all ADs can request payments from their buffers. An AD's monthly payment request can be any amount as long as there is still at least one month worth of budget remaining after the payments are made. Payments can be requested to multiple addresses at once and can include the address that controls the AD's PDM. ADs can include descriptions of what the payments are for, which can include personal compensation, compensation to team contributors, research expenses, and more. The Governance Facilitators then include the payments in the next Executive Spell. PDs must only use the full amounts of their budgets if they are contributing significant, best in class work towards the development of the Atlas, and their budget use must generally be scaled according to their level of Atlas contributions. +The AD Buffer is an account of NST that builds up when an AD achieves PD status. The budget that an AD is responsible for accumulates in the AD buffer. It cannot be spent until it contains at least 1 month’s worth of budget. At that point, the AD budget starts paying out the to account that controls the AD-PDM. ADs can use this budget for personal compensation, compensation to team contributors, research expenses, and more. -###### 2.6.3.4.1 +###### 2.6.3.2.1 -An AD buffer stops accumulating when it contains 3 months of an AD's budget. If an AD with 3 months of PD budget in their buffer moves from PD to RD, their buffer is not reduced but it does not continue to accumulate until it contains less than 3 months of RD budget. +If an AD loses all its budget stream, or loses a part of its budget stream by moving from PD to RD, the AD Buffer starts paying out the excess funds it contains so that it reaches 1 month’s equivalent budget. If an AD loses all its budget stream, this means that all of the contents of the AD Buffer can be spent. -###### 2.6.3.4.2 +###### 2.6.3.2.2 -If an AD loses all its budget stream, or loses a part of its budget stream by moving from PD to RD, the AD can request payment of any funds their AD buffer contains in excess of 1 month of their new budget. In case the AD now has no budget stream, this means that all of the contents of the AD Buffer can be spent. +The AD Buffer is also used as collateral for a whistleblower bounty, which is capped at one half of one month of an AD’s budget, in case the AD acts misaligned or has their privacy compromised. -###### 2.6.3.4.3 +##### 2.6.3.3 -The AD Buffer is also used as collateral for a whistleblower bounty, which is capped at one half of one month of an AD's budget, in case the AD acts misaligned or has their privacy compromised. +The budget that a PD is responsible for can be reduced if the PD doesn’t fully comply with participation requirements. -##### 2.6.3.5 - -The budget that a PD or RD is responsible for can be reduced if the ADs don’t fully comply with participation requirements. - -##### 2.6.3.6 +##### 2.6.3.4 Actual AD budget stream amounts are modified by voting activity metrics for the last 12 months, which includes overall voting activity in all of the votes that the ADs are able to vote on. If an AD is active in less than 95% of all votes over the last 6 months, they receive a reduced amount of AD budget. The reduction in budget is proportionally linear until it reaches 0 AD budget at 75% voting activity. If an AD falls below 75% voting activity over the last 6 months, it loses qualification for AD income and any AD budget rank they may be eligible for is passed on to the next highest AD by total amount of MKR delegated to their Seasonally Active PDM. A PD can lose their PD status this way, and even if their activity metric recovers they do not automatically become a PD again, except through the regular process of becoming a PD outside of the Election Season. -##### 2.6.3.7 +##### 2.6.3.5 Actual AD budget stream amounts are modified by AD communication metrics for the last 12 months, which requires the ADs to write an explanation for each vote. If the AD actively communicates on less than 95% of all votes over the last 6 months, they receive a reduced amount of AD budget. The reduction in budget is proportionally linear until it reaches 0 AD budget at 75% communication activity over the last 6 months. If an AD falls below 75% communication activity over the last 6 months, it loses qualification for AD budget and any AD budget rank they may be eligible for is passed on to the next highest AD by total amount of MKR delegated to their Seasonally Active PDM. A PD can lose their PD status this way, and even if their activity metric recovers they do not automatically become a PD again, except through the regular process of becoming a PD outside of the Election Season. -##### 2.6.3.8 +##### 2.6.3.6 -The PD slots each have a continually accruing budget equating to 650,000 NST and 3,960,000 NGT per year. +The PD slots each have a continually accruing budget equating to 48,000 NST per year. -##### 2.6.3.9 +##### 2.6.3.7 -The RD slots each have a continually accruing budget equating to 100,000 NST and of 360,000 NGT per year. +As an exception to the general requirements of Alignment Conservers, ADs are allowed to work on work related to Atlas improvement, drafting, data collection, in addition to their roles as PDs and ADs. #### 2.6.5: Aligned Delegate Alignment Risk Mitigation @@ -694,6 +696,81 @@ Before the Endgame State, the Governance Scope articles must be modified to acco The bootstrapping measures can override requirements and specifications in the Atlas as long as they are temporary and needed, and must all come to an end when the NewChain is launched. +### 2.13: Weekly Cycle Atlas Edits + +This article defines a Weekly Governance Cycle that provides a predictable framework for edits to the Atlas. + +#### 2.13.1 + +Every Monday, the Weekly Cycle for edits to the Atlas is carried out as governance polls, if any Weekly Cycle proposals have been submitted before the Monday giving the Governance Facilitators reasonable time to prepare the poll. The polls run for three days. Successful polls trigger direct edits to the Atlas. + +#### 2.13.2 + +PDs can trigger a Weekly Poll if they have at least 1 month of budget within their AD Buffer. To propose an Atlas Edit, a PD must post it in the Maker Improvement Proposal section on the forum, or reply to someone else’s proposal that they are submitting it to the weekly cycle. If it’s voted down, they lose their AD buffer. + +#### 2.13.3 + +Facilitators can reject a Weekly Poll if it is misaligned. If a Facilitator rejects a Weekly Poll for misalignment, the PD who triggered the poll loses their AD buffer. + +#### 2.13.4: Minimum Positive Participation + +Weekly Atlas Edits must have at least 20,000 MKR equivalent of yes votes to be accepted. + +### 2.14: Monthly Cycle Atlas Edits + +This article defines a Monthly Governance Cycle that provides a predictable framework for edits to the Atlas. + +To propose an Atlas Edit, the author must post it in the Maker Improvement Proposal section on the forum. + +The final version of an Atlas Edit must be posted 7 days before Formal Submission, and cannot be Formally Submitted if it was changed within the last 7 days. + +#### 2.14.1: Governance Cycle Breakdown + +The first Monday of each calendar month marks the beginning of the Monthly Governance Cycle. + +Time is inclusive and based on UTC (Coordinated Universal Time) and the Gregorian Calendar. + +##### First Wednesday after first Monday of the month + +Atlas Edit Authors can formally submit their Atlas Edit proposals before this Day. + +It is done through a message on the forum thread containing the Atlas Edit Proposal. + +##### Week 1, Thursday + +The Governance Facilitators must come to consensus on whether each submission warrants moving forward to a Ratification Poll. + +##### Week 2, Monday + +The Governance Facilitators publish the set of Ratification Polls. The format of these is defined in Atlas Article **2.14.2**. + +Ratification Polls are published to the community GitHub, submitted on-chain and appear on the official Voting Portal. + +##### Week 4, Monday + +The Ratification Polls conclude, and each proposal or set of proposals is marked as either Accepted or Rejected by the Governance Process Support Ecosystem Actors or Governance Facilitators. + +#### 2.14.2: Ratification Poll + +Ratification Polls under the Monthly Governance Cycle must meet these requirements: + +- Duration: 2 Weeks. +- Minimum Positive Participation: 10,000 MKR. +- Type: Binary Poll (yes/no/abstain). + +Ratification Polls under the Monthly Governance Cycle must contain: + +- Links to a specific version of a single proposal within the official Atlas GitHub. + +In order for a Ratification Poll to conclude successfully and the contained proposal(s) move to Accepted status, triggering an edit of the Atlas, each of the following conditions must be true: + +- Yes vote-weight must exceed No vote-weight when the poll closes. +- Yes vote-weight must exceed the Minimum Positive Participation value of 10,000 MKR when the poll closes. + +#### 2.14.3: Calendar Exceptions + +Due to the multitude of cultural and religious holidays occurring in and around the month of December, there will be no Monthly Governance Cycle in the December of each year. + ## 3: The Support Scope The Support Scope covers various critical tasks that support the ecosystem, including governance process infrastructure and management, SubDAO and Ecosystem Actor support, and management of the Public Good Purpose System. @@ -856,341 +933,7 @@ SUP12 must cover the long term Purpose System and the process for allocating pur ## 4: The Protocol Scope -The Protocol Scope covers all processes related to developing and maintaining NewChain and its core protocol, modules and smart contract ecosystem, and its bridges to other blockchains. It also covers other situations where the Maker Protocol has direct technical over something relevant to Maker Governance. - -### 4.1: Scope Improvement - PRO1 - -PRO1 must cover the key specifications and processes necessary for the Scope to reliably improve itself long term without risk of misalignment. - -#### 4.1.1 - -The Protocol Scope must have a specialized Advisory Council that is able to propose improvements to the language of the Scope Artifact that increases its Alignment Artifact Strength and increase efficiency and security of the Maker Ecosystem. - -#### 4.1.2 - -The Protocol Scope must have a customized strategy towards its display and interaction through the DAO Toolkit to make it maximally user friendly. - -### 4.2: NewChain Protocol Specification, Maintenance and Upgrades - PRO2 - -NewChain contains the complete Endgame specification and its deployment causes the Maker Ecosystem to reach the Endgame State. PRO2 must cover the required preparatory and development work to enable Maker Governance to activate NewChain and reach the Endgame State. - -#### 4.2.1: General Blockchain Requirements - -##### 4.2.1.1 - -NewChain must support native delegation compatible with the Lockstake Engine, and the staking power of nodes must be regulated by Maker Governance. - -##### 4.2.1.2 - -NewChain must have state rent. - -##### 4.2.1.3 - -Gas fees and state rent must be paid with NewGovToken, staking must be done with NewGovToken. - -##### 4.2.1.4 - -NewChain must have native protocol MEV capture. - -##### 4.2.1.5 - -NewChain must have a chain halt mechanism triggered by NewGovToken executive vote for scheduled chain upgrades or through an emergency halt mechanism where only a minority of NewGovToken voters are required. When a chain halt occurs, the chain must be restarted through a hard fork. This is specified in more in detail in *4.6*. - -##### 4.2.1.6 - -Native ZK rollups built into the protocol. - -##### 4.2.1.7 - -Neural Tokenomics and core governance processes built natively into the NewChain protocol. Specified in more detail in *4.3*. - -### 4.3: NewChain Native Governance Mechanics and Neural Tokenomics - PRO3 - -NewChain implements as native protocol modules all of the internal governance mechanics, incubation mechanics and tokenomics of MakerDAO and SubDAOs. PRO3 must cover the required preparatory and development work relevant for these concepts to enable Maker Governance to activate NewChain and reach the Endgame State. - -#### 4.3.1 - -The Core Pause Proxy of MakerDAO, has a governance delay defined by PRO3 and is used to hold external assets and perform forced liquidation or forced actions on SubDAOs. - -#### 4.3.2 - -The SubDAO proxies are core governance contracts that enable SubDAOs to take actions to create and control smart contracts. They have a security delay, and Maker Governance can veto their actions during this security delay. The safety measures around using the veto must be specified in PRO3. - -#### 4.3.3 - -NewGovToken and SubDAO tokens are covered by a protocol native token standard. As they are permanently inflationary, SubDAO tokens have a migration standard as they will need to migrate to new tokens in the long run when their supply gets too high. - -#### 4.3.4 - -The Incubator system creates new AllocatorDAOs and FacilitatorDAOs based on a fixed algorithm. - -##### 4.3.4.1 - -If there are less than 5 AllocatorDAOs, the Incubator immediately creates the amount of AllocatorDAOs required to bring the total to 5. - -##### 4.3.4.2 - -If there are less than 3 FacilitatorDAOs, the Incubator immediately incubates the amount of FacilitatorDAOs required to bring the total to 3. - -##### 4.3.4.3 - -If less than or equal to one third of all major SubDAOs are FacilitatorDAOs, then the next incubation will be a FacilitatorDAO. - -##### 4.3.4.4 - -If more than one third of all major SubDAOs are FacilitatorDAOs, then the next incubation will be an AllocatorDAO. - -##### 4.3.4.5 - -If 8 or more SubDAOs exist, then a new SubDAO is incubated at a time interval since the last SubDAO incubation. The interval in years is equivalent to the larger number of 1 or (number of SubDAOs divided by 16)^1.5. - -#### 4.3.5 - -The Native token standard allows NewGovToken and SubDAO tokens, and other tokens made with the Native token standard, to embed their tokens into an NFT following the native NFT standard, or mint a new NFT and embed into it. A token standard NFT can have its tokens extracted from the NFT again through the NFT marketplace simulation which penalizes extracting tokens from the NFT if a lot of users are extracting at the same time. The income from the penalties are then earned by the remaining NFT holders, increasing the amount of tokens embedded in their NFT. - -##### 4.3.5.1 - -The parameters for extracting NewGovToken and SubDAO tokens from NFTs are 1% of the total embedded supply that can be extracted per day, and users willing to pay the highest penalty are extracted first. - -#### 4.3.6 - -Native NewStable farms for farming NewGovToken and SubDAO tokens. Supports 4 modes of farming: - -##### 4.3.6.1: Free Token Farming - -This mode of farming gives the user tokens that are not lockstaked in the relevant lockstaking engine. The amount of tokens farmed are reduced by an amount equivalent to half of the relevant lockstaking exit fee. - -##### 4.3.6.2: Free NFT Farming - -This mode of farming embeds tokens into the users free NFT that is not lockstaked in the relevant lockstaking engine. The amount of tokens embedded are reduced by an amount equivalent to half of the relevant lockstaking exit fee. - -##### 4.3.6.3 Lockstaked Token Farming - -This mode of farming gives the user tokens that are lockstaked in the tokens native lockstaking engine. - -##### 4.3.6.4: Lockstaked NFT farming - -This mode of farming embeds tokens into the users lockstaked NFT that is lockstaked into the tokens native lockstaking engine. - -#### 4.3.7: Maker Lockstake Engine - -The Maker Lockstake Engine enables users to lock up their NewGovToken or NFT embedded with NewGovToken. - -##### 4.3.7.1 - -The Maker Lockstake Engine is usually accessed through an EGF, and using it requires that the NewGovTokens are delegated. - -##### 4.3.7.2 - -When lockstaked, NewGovTokens can farm any of the Major SubDAO tokens, or Dai from the Maker Surplus Buffer. The SubDAO tokens can be farmed either as free tokens, free NFTs, or Lockstaked NFTs. - -##### 4.3.7.3 - -NewGovTokens can also be used to generate Dai, with parameters set by the Stability Scope. - -##### 4.3.7.4 - -The Maker Lockstake Engine has an exit fee of 15%, when NewGovTokens exit the Maker Lockstake Engine 15% of the tokens or embedded tokens are burned. Additionally, for Lockstaked tokens, there is a 3 day delay until the tokens are free and can be sold. - -###### 4.3.7.4.1 - -When new tokens or NFTs with embedded tokens are lockstaked, the Maker Lockstake Engine emits NewGovToken equivalent to the exit fee in advance (15% of the newly lockstaked tokens) and sends them to the Maker Reverse Burn Engine. - -#### 4.3.8: Facilitator Lockstake Engine - -Each Facilitator is incubated with a native Facilitator Lockstake Engine. The Facilitator Lockstake Engine enables users to Lockstake an NFT embedded with FacilitatorDAO tokens. - -##### 4.3.8.1 - -The Facilitator Lockstake Engine is usually accessed through an EGF, and using it requires that the embedded FaciltiatorDAO tokens are delegated. - -##### 4.3.8.2 - -When lockstaked, the embedded FacilitatorDAO tokens self-farm additional FacilitatorDAO tokens that are directly embedded into the existing lockstaked NFT. - -##### 4.3.8.3 - -The FacilitatorDAO Lockstake Engine has an exit fee of 30%, when FacilitatorDAO tokens exit the FacilitatorDAO Lockstake Engine 30% of the tokens are transferred to a yield boost pool that increase the self- farming of the Lockstake Engine by transferring 1% of its contents per day as extra self-farming to the Facilitator Lockstake Engine users. - -#### 4.3.9: Allocator Lockstake Engine - -Each Allocator is incubated with a native Allocator Lockstake Engine. The Allocator Lockstake Engine enables users to lock up their AllocatorDAO tokens or NFT embedded with AllocatorDAO tokens. - -##### 4.3.9.1 - -The Allocator Lockstake Engine is usually accessed through an EGF, and using it requires that the AllocatorDAO tokens are delegated. - -##### 4.3.9.2 - -When lockstaked the AllocatorDAO tokens farm the AllocatorDAOs MiniDAO tokens. The MiniDAO tokens can be farmed as free tokens, free NFTs, or Lockstaked NFTs. - -##### 4.3.9.3 - -The Allocator Lockstake Engine has an exit fee of 25%, when AllocatorDAO tokens exit the Allocator Lockstake Engine 25% of the tokens are transferred to a yield boost pool that provide self-farming farming for the Lockstake Engine users by transferring 1% of its contents per day as self-farming directly embedded into the Lockstaked NFTs of the Allocator Lockstake Engine users. - -#### 4.3.10: MiniDAO Lockstake Engine - -Each MiniDAO is incubated with a native MiniDAO Lockstake Engine. The MiniDAO Lockstake Engine enables users to Lockstake an NFT embedded with MiniDAO tokens. - -##### 4.3.10.1 - -The MiniDAO Lockstake Engine is usually accessed through an EGF, and using it requires that the embedded MiniDAO tokens are delegated. - -##### 4.3.10.2 - -When lockstaked, the embedded MiniDAO tokens self-farm additional MiniDAO tokens that are directly embedded into the existing lockstaked NFT. - -##### 4.3.10.3 - -The MiniDAO Lockstake Engine has an exit fee of 40%, when MiniDAO tokens exit the MiniDAO Lockstake Engine 40% of the tokens are transferred to a yield boost pool that increase the self- farming of the MiniDAO Lockstake Engine by transferring 1% of its contents per day as extra self-farming to the MiniDAO Lockstake Engine users. - -#### 4.3.11: NewGovToken Emissions - -The Neural Tokenomics emits up to 2 billion NewGovTokens per year to power all of the tokenomics of the Maker Ecosystem. - -MKR is reversibly convertable to NewGovToken at the ratio of 1:24,000. So 1 MKR becomes 24,000 NewGovToken, and vice versa. - -##### 4.3.11.1 - -1.8 billion NewGovToken emissions that are recaptured. - -Recapturing the value of the emissions means that the emissions directly drive users or income to the protocol in some form. - -###### 4.3.11.1.1: 920 million NewGovToken to AllocatorDAO Axon - -920 million NewGovToken per year are sent to the AllocatorDAO Axon from where it is distributed to the AllocatorDAOs based on their Elixir holdings. - -###### 4.3.11.1.2: 300 million Facilitator Responsibility Rewards - -300 million NewGovToken per year are sent to the FacilitatorDAO Responsibility Reward system from where it is distributed to FacilitatorDAOs based on their Scope Responsibilities. - -###### 4.3.11.1.3: 240 million NewGovToken to FacilitatorDAO Axon - -240 million NewGovToken per year are sent to the FacilitatorDAO Axon from where it is distributed to the FacilitatorDAOs based on their Elixir holdings. - -###### 4.3.11.1.4: 200 million NewGovToken to Dai NewGovToken farming - -200 million NewGovToken per year are available in the standard Dai farms. - -###### 4.3.11.1.5: 140 million to SubDAO Incubation - -140 million NewGovToken per year accumulate in the Incubators reserve burn engine, and are used to fund the next SubDAO that launches. - -##### 4.3.11.2 - -200 million Governance upkeep emissions that are not recaptured. - -###### 4.3.11.2.1: 60 million NewGovToken for Prime Delegates - -Prime Delegates receive 60 million NewGovToken per year paid out through the AD PDMs. - -###### 4.3.11.2.2: 60 million NewGovToken for Purpose System - -60 million NewGovToken are accumulated per year in the Purpose System account, from where it is distributed to one of the AllocatorDAOs each year, based on their public impact performance. - -###### 4.3.11.2.3: 40 million to Validator operation rewards - -40 million NewGovToken are distributed per year in staking rewards to the NewChain validators. These rewards do not go to Lockstake Engine Lockstakers, who automatically stake to the Validators through their chosen delegates. - -###### 4.3.11.2.4: 20 million NewGovToken to Reserve Delegates - -Reserve Delegates receive 20 million NewGovToken per year paid out through the AD PDMs. - -#### 4.3.12: AllocatorDAO Emissions - -AllocatorDAOs have a genesis token emission that occurs over the first 10 years of its existence, and an additional permanent emission that continuously occurs forever. - -##### 4.3.12.1: AllocatorDAO Farm Distribution - -70% of all AllocatorDAO tokens emitted for farming are for Dai farming, and 30% of all AllocatorDAO tokens emitted for farming are for Lockstake Engine users. - -##### 4.3.12.2: AllocatorDAO Genesis Emissions - -The Genesis emissions of Allocators are 4.6 billion tokens over 10 years, with the following breakdown. - -###### 4.3.12.2.1: Genesis Farming Emissions - -4 billion Allocator tokens are for Genesis farming. - -###### 4.3.12.2.1.1 - -For the first 2 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 1 billion AllocatorDAO tokens per year - -###### 4.3.12.2.1.2 - -For the following 2 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 500 million AllocatorDAO tokens per year. - -###### 4.3.12.2.1.3 - -For the following 2years, the rate of Genesis farming is 250 million AllocatorDAO tokens per year. - -###### 4.3.12.2.1.4 - -For the final 4 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 125 million AllocatorDAO tokens per year. - -###### 4.3.12.2.2 - -The workforce bonus pool starts with 600 million AllocatorDAO tokens. The Workforce bonus pool can be further topped up through the permanent emissions. - -##### 4.3.12.3: AllocatorDAO Permanent Emissions - -The permanent emissions of AllocatorDAOs are a total of 10% tokens emitted per year. - -###### 4.3.12.3.1: Permanent MiniDAO Axon Emissions - -5% of the total supply is emitted per year for the MiniDAO Axon. - -###### 4.3.12.3.2: Permanent Farming Emissions - -3.75% of the total supply is emitted per year as farming emissions - -###### 4.3.12.3.3: Permanent Workforce Bonus Pool Emissions - -1% of the total supply is emitted per year as workforce bonus pool emissions, if the workforce bonus pool contains less than 5% of the total supply of AllocatorDAO tokens. - -###### 4.3.12.3.4: Permanent Purpose System Emissions - -0.25% of the total supply is emitted per year for the Purpose System. - -#### 4.3.13: FacilitatorDAO Emissions - -FacilitatorDAOs have a genesis token emission that occurs over the first 10 years of its existence, and an additional permanent emission that continuously occurs forever. - -##### 4.3.13.1: FacilitatorDAO Farm Distribution - -70% of all FacilitatorDAO tokens emitted for farming are for Dai farming, and 30% of all FacilitatorDAO tokens emitted for farming are for Lockstake Engine users. - -##### 4.3.13.2: FacilitatorDAO Genesis Emissions - -The Genesis emissions of Facilitators are 4.6 billion tokens over 10 years, with the following breakdown. - -###### 4.3.13.2.1: Genesis Farming Emissions - -4 billion FacilitatorDAO tokens are for Genesis farming. - -###### 4.3.13.2.1.1 - -For the first 2 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 1 billion FacilitatorDAO tokens per year - -###### 4.3.13.2.1.2 - -For the following 2 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 500 million FacilitatorDAO tokens per year. - -###### 4.3.13.2.1.3 - -For the following 2 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 250 million FacilitatorDAO tokens per year. - -###### 4.3.13.2.1.4 - -For the final 4 years, the rate of Genesis farming is 125 million FacilitatorDAO tokens per year. - -###### 4.3.13.2.2 - -The workforce bonus pool starts with 600 million FacilitatorDAO tokens. The Workforce bonus pool can be further topped up through the permanent emissions. - -### 4.9: Scope Bootstrapping - PRO9 - -Before NewChain launch the Protocol Scope must be adapted to accommodate the bootstrapping of the ecosystem. This allows parts of the Atlas to be temporarily overridden when needed to ensure a smooth launch and bootstrapping phase. This ends with the launch of NewChain. +In preparation for the upgrade to Atlas v2, the protocol scope is entirely defined by the Protocol Scope Bounded Mutable Alignment Artifact. ## 5: The Stability Scope diff --git a/MIP104/MIP104.md b/MIP104/MIP104.md index c29c77e33..0b802c112 100644 --- a/MIP104/MIP104.md +++ b/MIP104/MIP104.md @@ -941,3 +941,9 @@ WBTC-A, WBTC-B and WBTC-C are defined in *14.3* only for the purpose of Stabilit #### 14.3.5 All other collateral types must be offboarded when the Stability Facilitators considers it appropriate, and when there are new mechanisms in place that can take over the role the offboarded collateral covered. + +#### 14.3.6: Native Vault Engine Oracles + +The Native Vault Engine collateral types of ETH, STETH, WBTC will specifically use the Chronicle v3 oracle solution, until at least January 1st 2026. The Native Vault Engine collateral types must be migrated to the new version of the Chronicle v3 oracle when it is feasible to do so. + +Other oracle solutions, including diversified oracles, will only be considered until January 1st 2026 in case of unresolvable security concerns with the Chronicle v3 oracles. diff --git a/MIP106/MIP106.md b/MIP106/MIP106.md index 8d6d9b3cc..ba26aec97 100644 --- a/MIP106/MIP106.md +++ b/MIP106/MIP106.md @@ -316,39 +316,23 @@ The budget available to fund Governance Process Support tasks is: ¤¤¤ -## 3: DAO Toolkit Core Development +## 3: Atlas Core Development -The DAO Toolkit is a unified governance software system that is used to simplify, organize and standardize all of the governance processes and information of Maker Governance and the Scope Artifacts. Each Scope must, over time, be implemented using the DAO Toolkit as it is developed to make them interactive and make it easier for newcomers to understand how Maker Governance works. +The Atlas must be developed by the ecosystem to cover all necessary processes. -### 3.2: Standardized DAO Toolkit Patterns +### 3.1: Atlas Core Development Funding -The DAO Toolkit must be developed and used across all of the Scope Framework to unify the user experience of all aspects of Maker Governance as much as possible. +Atlas core development can be done by companies paid through the Launch Project, or direct funding from executive votes. -#### 3.2.1 +#### 3.1.1: Atlas Core Development Executive Vote Funding -Similar concepts, items, modules and patterns that are implemented in DAO Toolkits for different Scope Frameworks, needs to be as consistent and easy to understand as possible. +The Support Facilitators can initiate direct funding through monthly Executive Votes to important Atlas contributors. -#### 3.2.2 +This can at most be 150,000 NST and 1,000,000 NGT per month. -The Support Facilitators must ensure that continuous processes are in place to detect, analyze and standardize repeating patterns that are implemented in the DAO Toolkit across the Scope Frameworks, and specify them in the subelements of this clause. +Payments must be based on requests from the contributors, and approved based on advice from Atlas Axis or another relevant Ecosystem Actor, and is triggered directly by the Support Facilitator. Payments can be requested to multiple addresses at once to accommodate contributor teams. -### 3.3: DAO Toolkit Best Practice - -The Support Scope must cover the general management and organizational design learnings that occur as the Scope Frameworks operate and implement the DAO Toolkit. The best practice for how to use it in a way that creates the best results and is Universally Aligned with the Atlas must be documented in as much detail as possible, to make it possible to monitor compliance. - -#### 3.3.1: DAO Toolkit Monitoring - -The Support Facilitators must ensure that the use of the DAO Toolkit by other scopes is continuously monitored and reviewed. - -##### 3.3.1.1 - -The compliance with best practice and following of standardized patterns by other Scope Frameworks must be verified, and when failures to comply are found the Support Facilitators must notify Maker Governance. - ---- - -##### 3.3.1.2 - -The Responsible Facilitators must ensure there are continuous attempts to find new reusable patterns and organizational design learnings when monitoring implementation of new concepts of the DAO Toolkit. +PDs and ADs are eligible to get paid through this process without breaking the Alignment Conserver commitment. ## 4: Governance Artificial Intelligence Tools (GAIT) diff --git a/MIP107/MIP107.md b/MIP107/MIP107.md index 3fcb3592c..ed151e48e 100644 --- a/MIP107/MIP107.md +++ b/MIP107/MIP107.md @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ The current approved Protocol Advisory Council Members are recorded in *1.1.1.6. Current list of Advisory Council Members: -* N/A +- N/A ¤¤¤ @@ -199,186 +199,92 @@ The Advisory Council project budget is as follows: The Protocol Scope DAO Toolkit module must be built to give a full overview of all smart contracts, code and other technical items and parameters that are relevant to understand the security and technical architecture of the Maker Ecosystem. The Protocol Scope must continue to develop ways to integrate access to the Scope into the DAO Toolkit. -## 2: NewChain Protocol Specification, Maintenance, and Upgrades +## 2: Core Tokens -The Protocol Facilitators and all relevant Ecosystem Actors must use their resources to support the early stages of research and development of NewChain, when relevant. +The two core tokens, Dai and MKR, play the central role in the usability and tokenomics of the Maker Ecosystem. -### 2.1: NewChain Bootstrapping Budget +### 2.1: Dai Stablecoin -The NewChain bootstrapping budget is available to be used on work related to the NewChain project. The NewChain bootstrapping budget is specified in *2.1.2B*, and is allocated to relevant projects through a manual governance poll and executive vote using the weekly cycle, when triggered by the Protocol Facilitators posting a message to the Maker Core forum containing the relevant information. It is a one time budget that can only be increased or renewed through the Aligned Scope Proposal process. Some of the budget is immediate and some of it relative. +Dai Stablecoin is the Stablecoin product of the Maker Protocol. It is designed to remain stable against the U.S. Dollar, and its supply is regulated through the PSM and the Allocation System, as governed by the Stability Scope. -#### 2.1.1 +#### 2.1.1: NewStable Upgrade -A relative budget means a budget that is only available if the Maker Protocol is generating enough income to actively burn, and the budget can then at most spend a smaller amount of what’s being burned, ensuring that the burn continues. +In the Endgame Token Launch Phase, NewStable is launched, which is an upgrade to Dai with new additional features, including Token Rewards. Dai is upgradeable and downgradable to and from NewStable at a rate of 1:1. -#### 2.1.2B +### 2.2: MKR Token -¤¤¤ - -The NewChain bootstrapping budget is: -- 1,000,000 DAI immediate budget available for use through the manual process using the Weekly Governance Cycle -- 9,000,000 DAI relative budget that only becomes available as DAI is being burned in the Smart Burn Engine. The conditions are: At least 20 million DAI must have been sent to the Smart Burn Engine before the relative budget begins to unlock. Once the minimum requirement has been met, the relative budget unlocks at a rate equivalent to 25% of the DAI that is sent to the Smart Burn Engine. This means that the full 9,000,000 DAI will be available once 36,000,000 DAI above the minimum requirement has been transferred to the Smart Burn Engine. - -¤¤¤ - -## 3: NewChain Native Governance and Neural Tokenomics - -The Protocol Facilitators and all relevant Ecosystem Actors must use their resources to support the early stages of research and development of the Native Governance and Neural Tokenomics modules of NewChain, when relevant. - -## 4: Two-stage Bridge - -The Protocol Facilitators and all relevant Ecosystem Actors must use their resources to support the early stages of research and development of the Two-stage bridge system, when relevant. - -### 4.1: Multichain Engineering Budget - -The Multichain Engineering budget is specified in *4.1.1B*. It is implemented as a DssVest stream that is controlled by the Protocol Facilitators, and paid out to Ecosystem Actors in order to do work necessary for Multichain Engineering to function properly. The Multichain engineering budget should eventually be replaced by a permanent budget. Prior to the launch of NewChain, the multichain engineering budget can be used for limited bootstrapping purposes of other technologies in addition to the Two-Stage Bridge. - -#### 4.1.1B - -¤¤¤ - -The current Multichain Engineering budget is: -- 2,300,000 DAI per year implemented through DssVest streaming linearly, expiring May 2024. - -¤¤¤ - -## 5: Developer Tools and Support - -The Protocol Facilitators and all relevant Ecosystem Actors must use their resources to support the early stages of research and development of Developer tools and support, when relevant. - -## 6: NewChain Halt - -The Protocol Facilitators and all relevant Ecosystem Actors must use their resources to support the early stages of research and development of NewChain halt and restart procedures, when relevant. - -## 7: SubDAO Frontend Client Diversity - -The Protocol Facilitators and all relevant Ecosystem Actors must use their resources to support the early stages of research and development of NewChain client diversity, when relevant. - -## 8: The Dai Stablecoin +MKR is the governance token of the Maker Protocol. It grants voting rights in the Maker Governance system. Its liquidity is boosted by the Smart Burn Engine (governed by the Stability Scope). -The Protocol Facilitators must ensure that no development of Dai or NewStable occurs that is misaligned with the permissionlessness and unseizability requirements specified in *ATL4.8*. When NewStable is launched, it must be possible to wrap from Dai to NewStable 1:1 in unlimited amounts. +#### 2.2.1: NewGovToken Upgrade -### 8.1: Stablecoin Recovery +In the Endgame Token Launch Phase, NewGovToken is launched as an upgrade to MKR. MKR is upgradeable and downgradable to and from NewGovToken at a rate of 1:24,000. -The Protocol Facilitators must facilitate the development of a system for returning stuck and accidentally burned Dai and NewStable in situations where it can be proven that they are guaranteed to be permanently stuck. +## 3: NewBridge -## 9: Scope Bootstrapping +NewBridge is a multichain system that enables native crosschain transfer of Maker Ecosystem related tokens to other blockchains, including Ethereum L2s and major L1s. -Before the launch of NewChain, some Articles have been modified to override their Atlas requirements, and additional Articles have been added. +### 3.1: Multichain supported native mechanisms -Before the launch of NewChain, the key concerns that these articles cover must be taken over by other parts of the Scope Artifacts. +On all NewBridge Destination Chains, a number of Native Mechanisms can be included with the NewBridge deployment, these include: Savings Rate Mechanism (including sNewStable), and Token Rewards Mechanism and Activation Mechanism. -## 10: Ethereum Core Protocol Development +## 4: Savings Rate and Token Reward Mechanism -Before the launch of NewChain, the Ethereum Core Protocol must be developed to support bootstrapping efforts. Facilitators and the relevant Ecosystem Actors must work together to develop, launch and maintain these +The Savings Rate and Token Reward Mechanism increase the value for Dai Stablecoin users and NewStable users by giving them rewards for holding the Stablecoin. -### 10.1: Ethereum Core Protocol Features +### 4.1: Savings Rate Mechanism -A number of Ethereum Core Protocol features must be developed and launch as a prerequisite to the development of NewChain. The different features must be developed to coordinate around multiple launch phases. After the delivery of Launch Phase 3, all resources must be focused on the complete launch of NewChain which marks the end of the bootstrapping period and the beginning of the Endgame State. +The Savings Rate Mechanism includes both the legacy Dai Savings Rate Mechanism, and the upcoming NewStable Savings Rate. The NewStable Savings Rate includes a built-in sNewStable mechanism. The Savings Rate is governed by the Stability Scope. -#### 10.1.1 +### 4.2: Token Rewards Mechanism -Launch Phase 1 +At the Token Launch Phase of Endgame, the first Token Rewards Mechanism is deployed, providing NewGovToken Token Rewards to NewStable users. SubDAO tokens are also distributed through a Token Rewards Mechanism. -##### 10.1.1.1 +## 5: Activation Mechanisms -NewStable with a 1:1 wrap from and to Dai available. +Activation Mechanisms are methods to gain different types of rewards on NewGovToken and SubDAO tokens, designed to incentivize governance participation and long-term commitment to the Maker ecosystem. -##### 10.1.1.2 +### 5.1: NewGovToken Activation -NewGovToken with a 1:24000 wrap from and to MKR available. +At Spark Launch NewGovToken Activation will become available. It can be done instantly by any NewGovToken Holder through the NewGovToken Activation Mechanism available on Ethereum Mainnet and NewBridge Deployments. NewGovToken Activation can provide NewStable Rewards and SubDAO Token Rewards. -##### 10.1.1.3 +### 5.2: SubDAO Token Activation -Smart Burn Engine for NewStable/NewGovToken pair. +At Spark Launch SubDAO Token Activation will become available. SubDAO Tokens can be Activated instantly by any SubDAO Token holder. It is available on Ethereum Mainnet, and NewBridge Destination Chains. SubDAO Token Activation provides NewGovToken Rewards. -##### 10.1.1.4 +### 5.3: Sealed Activation -Savings Rate for NewStable with referral code system. +Sealed Activation becomes available shortly after NewStable, NewGovToken, and Endgame app launch. Sealed Activation is available both for NewGovToken and MKR holders, with 1 MKR counting as 24,000 NewGovToken. Sealed Activation Seals the principal tokens behind an Exit Fee. Sealed Activation provides NewStable Rewards or SubDAO Token Rewards. Sealed Activation users can also generate NewStable using the NewStable content of the Smart Burn Engine as collateral, based on how much equivalent of NewGovToken they have Sealed, as governed by the Stability Scope. -##### 10.1.1.5 +#### 5.3.1: Sealed Activation Exit Fee -NewGovToken farm for NewStable with referral code system. +The Sealed Activation Exit Fee starts at 5%, and increases by 1% every 6 months from launch, until it reaches its permanent long term value at 15%. The Exit Fee increases are introduced directly through an Executive Vote when needed. -###### 10.1.1.5.1 +## 7: Emissions -Emissions of 200 million NewGovTokens per year. +NewGovToken and SubDAO Tokens are emitted for various tokenomics and bootstrapping reasons. For the reward mechanisms that are multichain, the rate of distribution is balanced across each NewBridge destination deployment to attempt to target an equal Reward Rate per supplied NewStable or Activated token. -##### 10.1.1.6 +### 7.1: NewGovToken emissions for tokenomics happen for two reasons, NewStable Token Rewards and SubDAO Token Activation -AllocatorDAO Vaults +#### 7.1.1: NewGovToken NewStable Token Rewards -#### 10.1.2 +600 million NewGovToken are emitted per year to be distributed through the NewStable Token Reward Mechanism. Every time a new SubDAO is launched and begins its NewGovToken SubDAO Token Activation Rewards, the NewGovToken NewStable Token Reward amount is reduced by an amount equivalent to the newly added rewards. -Launch Phase 2 +#### 7.1.2: NewGovToken SubDAO Token Activation Rewards -##### 10.1.2.1 +Every SubDAO that launches, starting with Spark, will have SubDAO Token Activation Rewards in NewGovToken at a rate of 80m NewGovToken per year. Whenever a SubDAO Launches, the NewGovToken NewStable Token Reward rate is reduced by 80m NewGovToken per year. -6 Core SubDAO proxies. +### 7.2: SubDAO Emissions -##### 10.1.2.2 - -Dssvest of 80 million NewGovToken per year for the 4 AllocatorDAO proxies and 100 million NewGovToken per year for the 2 FacilitatorDAO proxies. - -##### 10.1.2.3 - -6 farms with a referral code system that enables users to farm the 6 SubDAO tokens with NewStable. Tokenomics as per the Atlas. - -#### 10.1.3 - -Launch Phase 3 - -##### 10.1.3.1 - -Lockstake Engine. - -###### 10.1.3.1.1 - -A 6 month launch bonus period where the yield farming is boosted with an amount of SubDAO tokens equivalent to the amount of SubDAO tokens that would have been farmed by Lockstaked users if the Lockstake Engine had launched already in Launch Phase 2. - -##### 10.1.3.2 - -6 farms that enable users to farm 80 million NewGovToken per year with each SubDAO token. - -## 11: Governance Security Engineering Work - -Governance Security Engineering work includes development and deployment of spells in a secure manner. - -* Writing Spells -* Developer checklists for governance security handover -* Writing Governance Security rulesets -* Developing other related materials - -### 11.1: Governance Security Engineering Budget - -The Governance Security Engineering budget is specified in *11.1.1B*. It is implemented as a DssVest stream that is controlled by the Protocol Engineering Facilitators, and paid out to Ecosystem Actors in order to do work necessary for Governance Security Engineering to function properly. The Governance Security engineering budget should eventually be replaced by a permanent budget. - -#### 11.1.1B - -¤¤¤ - -The current Governance Security Engineering budget is: -- 2,200,000 DAI per year implemented through DssVest streaming linearly, expiring May 2024. - -¤¤¤ +Every SubDAO Distributes a total of 4.9 billion SubDAO tokens as its genesis emissions, used for Token Rewards, Contributor Bonuses, and other bootstrapping uses. -## 12: Ethereum Core Protocol Maintenance and Upgrades +#### 7.2.1: SubDAO Token NewStable Token Rewards -Core work involves any engineering efforts that lead to smart contract additions in the Maker MCD system and/or related repos beyond spell development. Without listing all the Core contracts, summarizing the scope of this area as: +Every SubDAO Distributes a total of 2.8 billion SubDAO tokens to NewStable holders receiving Token Rewards. The rate is 700 million SubDAO tokens per year for the first 2 years, 350 million per year from year 3-4, 175 million per year from year 5-6, 87.5 million per year from year 7-10. -Core engineering code: +#### 7.2.2: SubDAO Token NewGovToken Activation Rewards -* The bulk of all 113 Maker solidity repos and associated modules -* Maintenance - rolling tasks: - * Integrations and implementation updates - * Keepers - * Supporting Infrastructure updates (compilers etc) - * Keeping on top of L1 and any EIP changes, and e.g. gas optimization opportunities +Every SubDAO Distributes a total of 600 million SubDAO tokens to Activated NewGovToken holders. The rate is 150 million SubDAO tokens per year for the first 2 years, 75 million per year from year 3-4, 37.5 million per year from year 5-6, 18.75 million per year from year 7-10. -Tooling: +#### 7.2.3: SubDAO Token NewGovToken Sealed Activation Rewards -* On-chain automation and integration tools -* Reusable command line tools -* Developer and internal scripts and maintenance -* Inheritable testing and interface modules -* External tooling support as needed to meet core unit objectives (i.e. foundry support) +Every SubDAO Distributes a total of 600 million SubDAO tokens to Sealed NewGovToken holders. The rate is 150 million SubDAO tokens per year for the first 2 years, 75 million per year from year 3-4, 37.5 million per year from year 5-6, 18.75 million per year from year 7-10. diff --git a/MIP113/MIP113.md b/MIP113/MIP113.md index ef7be6977..7bf1fab74 100644 --- a/MIP113/MIP113.md +++ b/MIP113/MIP113.md @@ -443,20 +443,6 @@ AD Recognition Submission ¤¤¤ -### 6.3: Prime Delegate and Reserve Delegate Slots - -The number of PD and RD slots is modifiable over time, and must be adjusted to align with the talent available. The current number of PD and RD slots is specified in *6.3.1A*. This single number applies separately to the number of PDs and RDs. The Governance Facilitators can unanimously, directly increase or decrease the number with 1 every 3 months. The Governance Facilitators can trigger a weekly governance poll to change the number to a new arbitrary number. - -#### 6.3.1A - -¤¤¤ - -The current number of Prime Delegate and Reserve Delegate slots (applies separately to both): - -- 3 - -¤¤¤ - ## 7: FacilitatorDAOs and Facilitators The Governance Facilitators must ensure that all the rules of FacilitatorDAOs and Facilitators are followed as specified in *ATL2.7*