From dcfae22ce7a5ad267bde51fe384fca529e8fe878 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maqsood Ahmad Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 11:15:59 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] (PA-6699) Bump puppet-agent's bundled openssl 3.0 to address CVE-2024-5535 --- configs/components/openssl-3.0.rb | 3 + resources/patches/openssl/CVE-2024-5535.patch | 106 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+) create mode 100644 resources/patches/openssl/CVE-2024-5535.patch diff --git a/configs/components/openssl-3.0.rb b/configs/components/openssl-3.0.rb index b60154ff8..27d0a2ede 100644 --- a/configs/components/openssl-3.0.rb +++ b/configs/components/openssl-3.0.rb @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ 'no-whirlpool' ] + # Remove this in 3.0.15 or later + pkg.apply_patch 'resources/patches/openssl/CVE-2024-5535.patch' + if settings[:use_legacy_openssl_algos] pkg.apply_patch 'resources/patches/openssl/openssl-3-activate-legacy-algos.patch' else diff --git a/resources/patches/openssl/CVE-2024-5535.patch b/resources/patches/openssl/CVE-2024-5535.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d1ef408ba --- /dev/null +++ b/resources/patches/openssl/CVE-2024-5535.patch @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +From cf6f91f6121f4db167405db2f0de410a456f260c Fri May 31 11:14:33 2024 +0100 +author Matt Caswell Fri May 31 11:14:33 2024 +0100 +committer Matt Caswell Thu Jun 27 10:39:47 2024 +0100 + +Fix SSL_select_next_proto + +Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid +entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already +have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When +called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and +will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto +should not assume that it is correctly formatted. + +We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the +same for the server list while we are about it. + +CVE-2024-5535 + +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24718) + +(cherry picked from commit 4ada436a1946cbb24db5ab4ca082b69c1bc10f37) + +diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c +index cb4e006ea7..e628140dfa 100644 +--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c +@@ -2952,37 +2952,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, + unsigned int server_len, + const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) + { +- unsigned int i, j; +- const unsigned char *result; +- int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; ++ PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt; ++ ++ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len) ++ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt) ++ || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) { ++ *out = NULL; ++ *outlen = 0; ++ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find ++ * a match. ++ */ ++ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt); ++ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt); + + /* + * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. + */ +- for (i = 0; i < server_len;) { +- for (j = 0; j < client_len;) { +- if (server[i] == client[j] && +- memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) { +- /* We found a match */ +- result = &server[i]; +- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; +- goto found; ++ if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) { ++ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) { ++ if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0) ++ continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */ ++ if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) { ++ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) { ++ if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt), ++ PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) { ++ /* We found a match */ ++ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt); ++ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt); ++ return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; ++ } ++ } ++ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */ ++ } else { ++ /* This should never happen */ ++ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; + } +- j += client[j]; +- j++; + } +- i += server[i]; +- i++; ++ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */ + } + +- /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ +- result = client; +- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; +- +- found: +- *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1; +- *outlen = result[0]; +- return status; ++ /* ++ * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use ++ * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier ++ */ ++ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; + } + + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG