diff --git a/src/asymmetric_cipher.c b/src/asymmetric_cipher.c
index a4f33083..7af90bed 100644
--- a/src/asymmetric_cipher.c
+++ b/src/asymmetric_cipher.c
@@ -296,12 +296,26 @@ static int p11prov_rsaenc_decrypt(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
         goto endsess;
     }
 
+    /* Special handling against PKCS#1 1.5 side channel leaking */
+    if (mechanism.mechanism == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
+        CK_ULONG cond;
+        ret = side_channel_free_Decrypt(encctx->provctx, sess, (void *)in,
+                                        inlen, out, &out_size);
+        /* the error case need to be handled in a side-channel free way, so
+         * conditionals need to be constant time. Always setting outlen is
+         * fine because out_size is initialized to the value of outlen
+         * and the value should not matter in an error condition anyway */
+        *outlen = out_size;
+        cond = constant_equal(ret, CKR_OK);
+        result = constant_select_int(cond, RET_OSSL_OK, RET_OSSL_ERR);
+        goto endsess;
+    }
+
     ret = p11prov_Decrypt(encctx->provctx, sess, (void *)in, inlen, out,
                           &out_size);
     if (ret != CKR_OK) {
         goto endsess;
     }
-
     *outlen = out_size;
     result = RET_OSSL_OK;
 
diff --git a/src/interface.c b/src/interface.c
index 6efa3173..77ef943a 100644
--- a/src/interface.c
+++ b/src/interface.c
@@ -450,3 +450,22 @@ CK_RV p11prov_module_reinit(P11PROV_MODULE *mctx)
     /* ------------- LOCKED SECTION */
     return ret;
 }
+
+/* This is needed to avoid side channels in the PKCS 1.5 decryption case */
+CK_RV side_channel_free_Decrypt(P11PROV_CTX *ctx, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                                CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
+                                CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+                                CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
+{
+    P11PROV_INTERFACE *intf = p11prov_ctx_get_interface(ctx);
+    CK_RV ret = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
+    if (!intf) {
+        P11PROV_raise(ctx, ret, "Can't get module interfaces");
+        return ret;
+    }
+    P11PROV_debug("Calling C_Decrypt");
+    /* Must not add any conditionals based on return value, so we just return
+     * straight */
+    return intf->Decrypt(hSession, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, pData,
+                         pulDataLen);
+}
diff --git a/src/interface.h b/src/interface.h
index 535b885f..37e835cf 100644
--- a/src/interface.h
+++ b/src/interface.h
@@ -127,4 +127,10 @@ CK_RV p11prov_SeedRandom(P11PROV_CTX *ctx, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
 CK_RV p11prov_GenerateRandom(P11PROV_CTX *ctx, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
                              CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen);
 
+/* Special side-channel free path against PKCS#1 1.5 side channel leaking */
+CK_RV side_channel_free_Decrypt(P11PROV_CTX *ctx, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
+                                CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
+                                CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
+                                CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen);
+
 #endif /* _INTERFACE_H */
diff --git a/src/util.h b/src/util.h
index c225216d..8443747a 100644
--- a/src/util.h
+++ b/src/util.h
@@ -100,4 +100,18 @@ CK_RV p11prov_mutex_destroy(P11PROV_CTX *provctx, pthread_mutex_t *lock,
 
 void p11prov_force_rwlock_reinit(pthread_rwlock_t *lock);
 
+static inline CK_ULONG constant_equal(CK_ULONG a, CK_ULONG b)
+{
+    return ((a ^ b) - 1U) >> (sizeof(CK_ULONG) * 8 - 1);
+}
+
+static inline int constant_select_int(CK_ULONG cond, int a, int b)
+{
+    volatile unsigned int A = (unsigned int)a;
+    volatile unsigned int B = (unsigned int)b;
+    volatile unsigned int mask = -(unsigned int)cond;
+
+    return (int)((A & mask) | (B & ~mask));
+}
+
 #endif /* _UTIL_H */