on-benefits.qmd

# On Benefits

[^81-1] You complain that you have met with an ungrateful person.
If this is your first experience of that sort, you should offer thanks either to your good luck or to your caution.
In this case, however, caution can effect nothing but to make you ungenerous.
For if you wish to avoid such a danger, you will not confer benefits; and so, that benefits may not be lost with another man, they will be lost to yourself.

It is better, however, to get no return than to confer no benefits.
Even after a poor crop one should sow again; for often losses due to continued barrenness of an unproductive soil have been made good by one year's fertility.

In order to discover one grateful person, it is worth while to make trial of many ungrateful ones.
No man has so unerring a hand when he confers benefits that he is not frequently deceived; it is well for the traveller to wander, that he may again cleave to the path.
After a shipwreck, sailors try the sea again.
The banker is not frightened away from the forum by the swindler.
If one were compelled to drop everything that caused trouble, life would soon grow dull amid sluggish idleness; but in your case this very condition may prompt you to become more charitable.
For when the outcome of any undertaking is unsure, you must try again and again, in order to succeed ultimately.

I have, however, discussed the matter with sufficient fulness in the volumes which I have written, entitled "On Benefits."[^81-2]

What I think should rather be investigated is this, -- a question which I feel has not been made sufficiently clear: "Whether he who has helped us has squared the account and has freed us from our debt, if he has done us harm later."
You may add this question also, if you like: "when the harm done later has been more than the help rendered previously."

If you are seeking for the formal and just decision of a strict judge, you will find that he checks off one act by the other, and declares: "Though the injuries outweigh the benefits, yet we should credit to the benefits anything that stands over even after the injury."
The harm done was indeed greater, but the helpful act was done first.
Hence the time also should be taken into account.

Other cases are so clear that I need not remind you that you should also look into such points as: How gladly was the help offered, and how reluctantly was the harm done, -- since benefits, as well as injuries, depend on the spirit.
"I did not wish to confer the benefit; but I was won over by my respect for the man, or by the importunity of his request, or by hope."

Our feeling about every obligation depends in each case upon the spirit in which the benefit is conferred; we weigh not the bulk of the gift, but the quality of the good-will which prompted it.
So now let us do away with guess-work; the former deed was a benefit, and the latter, which transcended the earlier benefit, is an injury.
The good man so arranges the two sides of his ledger[^81-3] that he voluntarily cheats himself by adding to the benefit and subtracting from the injury.

The more indulgent magistrate, however (and I should rather be such a one), will order us to forget the injury and remember the accommodation.

"But surely," you say, "it is the part of justice to render to each that which is his due, -- thanks in return for a benefit, and retribution,[^81-4] or at any rate ill-will, in return for an injury!"
This, I say, will be true when it is one man who has inflicted the injury, and a different man who has conferred the benefit; for if it is the same man, the force of the injury is nullified by the benefit conferred.
Indeed, a man who ought to be pardoned, even though there were no good deeds credited to him in the past, should receive something more than mere leniency if he commits a wrong when he has a benefit to his credit.

I do not set an equal value on benefits and injuries.
I reckon a benefit at a higher rate than an injury.
Not all grateful persons know what it involves to be in debt for a benefit; even a thoughtless, crude fellow, one of the common herd, may know, especially soon after he has received the gift; but he does not know how deeply he stands in debt therefor.
Only the wise man knows exactly what value should be put upon everything; for the fool whom I just mentioned, no matter how good his intentions may be, either pays less than he owes, or pays it at the wrong time or the wrong place.
That for which he should make return he wastes and loses.

There is a marvellously accurate phraseology applied to certain subjects,[^81-5] a long-established terminology which indicates certain acts by means of symbols that are most efficient and that serve to outline men's duties.
We are, as you know, wont to speak thus: "A. has made a return for the favour bestowed by B."
Making a return means handing over of your own accord that which you owe.
We do not say, "He has paid back the favour"; for "pay back" is used of a man upon whom a demand for payment is made, of those who pay against their will, of those who pay under any circumstances whatsoever, and of those who pay through a third party.
We do not say, "He has 'restored' the benefit," or 'settled' it; we have never been satisfied with a word which applies properly to a debt of money.

Making a return means offering something to him from whom you have received something.
The phrase implies a voluntary return; he who has made such a return has served the writ upon himself.

The wise man will inquire in his own mind into all the circumstances: how much he has received, from whom, when, where, how.
And so we[^81-6] declare that none but the wise man knows how to make return for a favour; moreover, none but the wise man knows how to confer a benefit, -- that man, I mean, who enjoys the giving more than the recipient enjoys the receiving.

Now some person will reckon this remark as one of the generally surprising statements such as we Stoics are wont to make and such as the Greeks call "paradoxes,"[^81-7] and will say: "Do you maintain, then, that only the wise man knows how to return a favour?
Do you maintain that no one else knows how to make restoration to a creditor for a debt?
Or, on buying a commodity, to pay full value to the seller?"
In order not to bring any odium upon myself, let me tell you that Epicurus says the same thing.
At any rate, Metrodorus remarks[^81-8] that only the wise man knows how to return a favour.

Again, the objector mentioned above wonders at our saying: "The wise man alone knows how to love, the wise man alone is a real friend."
And yet it is a part of love and of friendship to return favours; nay, further, it is an ordinary act, and happens more frequently than real friendship.
Again, this same objector wonders at our saying, "There is no loyalty except in the wise man," just as if he himself does not say the same thing!
Or do you think that there is any loyalty in him who does not know how to return a favour?

These men, accordingly, should cease to discredit us, just as if we were uttering an impossible boast; they should understand that the essence of honour resides in the wise man, while among the crowd we find only the ghost and the semblance of honour.
None but the wise man knows how to return a favour.
Even a fool can return it in proportion to his knowledge and his power; his fault would be a lack of knowledge rather than a lack of will or desire.
To will does not come by teaching.

The wise man will compare all things with one another; for the very same object becomes greater or smaller, according to the time, the place, and the cause.
Often the riches that are spent in profusion upon a palace cannot accomplish as much as a thousand *denarii* given at the right time.
Now it makes a great deal of difference whether you give outright, or come to a man's assistance, whether your generosity saves him, or sets him up in life.
Often the gift is small, but the consequences great.
And what a distinction do you imagine there is between taking something which one lacks, -- something which was offered, -- and receiving a benefit in order to confer one in return?

But we should not slip back into the subject which we have already sufficiently investigated.
In this balancing of benefits and injuries, the good man will, to be sure, judge with the highest degree of fairness, but he will incline towards the side of the benefit; he will turn more readily in this direction.

Moreover, in affairs of this kind the person concerned is wont to count for a great deal.
Men say: "You conferred a benefit upon me in that matter of the slave, but you did me an injury in the case of my father"; or, "You saved my son, but robbed me of a father."
Similarly, he will follow up all other matters in which comparisons can be made, and if the difference be very slight, he will pretend not to notice it.
Even though the difference be great, yet if the concession can be made without impairment of duty and loyalty, our good man will overlook it -- that is, provided the injury exclusively affects the good man himself.

To sum up, the matter stands thus: the good man will be easy-going in striking a balance; he will allow too much to be set against his credit.
He will be unwilling to pay a benefit by balancing the injury against it.
The side towards which he will lean, the tendency which he will exhibit, is the desire to be under obligations for the favour, and the desire to make return therefor.
For anyone who receives a benefit more gladly than he repays it is mistaken.
By as much as he who pays is more light-hearted than he who borrows, by so much ought he to be more joyful who unburdens himself of the greatest debt -- a benefit received -- than he who incurs the greatest obligations.

For ungrateful men make mistakes in this respect also: they have to pay their creditors both capital and interest,[^81-9] but they think that benefits are currency which they can use without interest.
So the debts grow through postponement, and the later the action is postponed the more remains to be paid.
A man is an ingrate if he repays a favour without interest.
Therefore, interest also should be allowed for, when you compare your receipts and your expenses.

We should try by all means to be as grateful as possible.

For gratitude is a good thing for ourselves, in a sense in which justice, that is commonly supposed to concern other persons, is not; gratitude returns in large measure unto itself.
There is not a man who, when he has benefited his neighbour, has not benefited himself, -- I do not mean for the reason that he whom you have aided will desire to aid you, or that he whom you have defended will desire to protect you, or that an example of good conduct returns in a circle to benefit the doer, just as examples of bad conduct recoil upon their authors, and as men find no pity if they suffer wrongs which they themselves have demonstrated the possibility of committing; but that the reward for all the virtues lies in the virtues themselves.
For they are not practised with a view to recompense; the wages of a good deed is to have done it.[^81-10]

I am grateful, not in order that my neighbour, provoked by the earlier act of kindness, may be more ready to benefit me, but simply in order that I may perform a most pleasant and beautiful act; I feel grateful, not because it profits me, but because it pleases me.
And, to prove the truth of this to you, I declare that even if I may not be grateful without seeming ungrateful, even if I am able to return a benefit only by an act which resembles an injury; even so, I shall strive in the utmost calmness of spirit toward the purpose which honour demands, in the very midst of disgrace.
No one, I think, rates virtue higher or is more consecrated to virtue than he who has lost his reputation for being a good man in order to keep from losing the approval of his conscience.

Thus, as I have said, your being grateful is more conducive to your own good than to your neighbour's good.
For while your neighbour has had a common, everyday experience, -- namely, receiving back the gift which he had bestowed, -- you have had a great experience which is the outcome of an utterly happy condition of soul, -- to have felt gratitude.
For if wickedness makes men unhappy and virtue makes men blest, and if it is a virtue to be grateful, then the return which you have made is only the customary thing, but the thing to which you have attained is priceless, -- the consciousness of gratitude, which comes only to the soul that is divine and blessed.
The opposite feeling to this, however, is immediately attended by the greatest unhappiness; no man, if he be ungrateful, will be unhappy in the future.
I allow him no day of grace; he is unhappy forthwith.

Let us therefore avoid being ungrateful, not for the sake of others, but for our own sakes.
When we do wrong, only the least and lightest portion of it flows back upon our neighbour; the worst and, if I may use the term, the densest portion of it stays at home and troubles the owner.[^81-11]
My master Attalus used to say: "Evil herself drinks the largest portion of her own poison."
The poison which serpents carry for the destruction of others, and secrete without harm to themselves, is not like this poison; for this sort is ruinous to the possessor.

The ungrateful man tortures and torments himself; he hates the gifts which he has accepted, because he must make a return for them, and he tries to belittle their value, but he really enlarges and exaggerates the injuries which he has received.
And what is more wretched than a man who forgets his benefits and clings to his injuries?

Wisdom, on the other hand, lends grace to every benefit, and of her own free will commends it to her own favour, and delights her soul by continued recollection thereof.

Evil men have but one pleasure in benefits, and a very short-lived pleasure at that; it lasts only while they are receiving them.
But the wise man derives therefrom an abiding and eternal joy.
For he takes delight not so much in receiving the gift as in having received it; and this joy never perishes; it abides with him always.
He despises the wrongs done him; he forgets them, not accidentally, but voluntarily.

He does not put a wrong construction upon everything, or seek for someone whom he may hold responsible for each happening; he rather ascribes even the sins of men to chance.
He will not misinterpret a word or a look; he makes light of all mishaps by interpreting them in a generous way.[^81-12]
He does not remember an injury rather than a service.
As far as possible, he lets his memory rest upon the earlier and the better deed, never changing his attitude towards those who have deserved well of him, except in cases where the bad deeds far outdistance the good, and the space between them is obvious even to one who closes his eyes to it; even then only to this extent, that he strives, after receiving the preponderant injury, to resume the attitude which he held before he received the benefit.
For when the injury merely equals the benefit, a certain amount of kindly feeling is left over.

Just as a defendant is acquitted when the votes are equal, and just as the spirit of kindliness always tries to bend every doubtful case toward the better interpretation, so the mind of the wise man, when another's merits merely equal his bad deeds, will, to be sure, cease to feel an obligation, but does not cease to desire to feel it, and acts precisely like the man who pays his debts even after they have been legally cancelled.[^81-13]

But no man can be grateful unless he has learned to scorn the things which drive the common herd to distraction; if you wish to make return for a favour, you must be willing to go into exile, or to pour forth your blood, or to undergo poverty, or, -- and this will frequently happen, -- even to let your very innocence be stained and exposed to shameful slanders.
It is no slight price that a man must pay for being grateful.

We hold nothing dearer than a benefit, so long as we are seeking one; we hold nothing cheaper after we have received it.
Do you ask what it is that makes us forget benefits received?
It is our extreme greed for receiving others.
We consider not what we have obtained, but what we are to seek.
We are deflected from the right course by riches, titles, power, and everything which is valuable in our opinion but worthless when rated at its real value.

We do not know how to weigh matters;[^81-14] we should take counsel regarding them, not with their reputation but with their nature; those things possess no grandeur wherewith to enthral our minds, except the fact that we have become accustomed to marvel at them.
For they are not praised because they ought to be desired, but they are desired because they have been praised; and when the error of individuals has once created error on the part of the public, then the public error goes on creating error on the part of individuals.

But just as we take on faith such estimates of values, so let us take on the faith of the people this truth, that nothing is more honourable than a grateful heart.
This phrase will be echoed by all cities, and by all races, even those from savage countries.
Upon this point good and bad will agree.

Some praise pleasure, some prefer toil; some say that pain is the greatest of evils, some say it is no evil at all; some will include riches in the Supreme Good, others will say that their discovery meant harm to the human race, and that none is richer than he to whom Fortune has found nothing to give.
Amid all this diversity of opinion all men will yet with one voice, as the saying is, vote "aye" to the proposition that thanks should be returned to those who have deserved well of us.
On this question the common herd, rebellious as they are, will all agree, but at present we keep paying back injuries instead of benefits, and the primary reason why a man is ungrateful is that he has found it impossible to be grateful enough.

Our madness has gone to such lengths that it is a very dangerous thing to confer great benefits upon a person; for just because he thinks it shameful not to repay, so he would have none left alive whom he should repay.
"Keep for yourself what you have received; I do not ask it back; I do not demand it.
Let it be safe to have conferred a favour."[^81-15]
There is no worse hatred than that which springs from shame at the desecration of a benefit.[^81-16]
Farewell.

[^81-1]: The reader will be interested to compare this letter with the treatise (or essay) *Of Benefits*, translated by Thomas Lodge in 1614 from Seneca's work *De Beneficiis*, which was dedicated to Aebutius Liberalis, the subject of *Ep.* xci.

[^81-2]: See *De Ben.* i. 1. 9 f. *non est autem quod tardiores faciat ad bene merendum turba ingratorum*.

[^81-3]: *Calculi* were counters, spread out on the *abacus*, or counting-board; they ran in columns, by millions, hundred thousands, etc.

[^81-4]: *Talio* (from *talis*, "just so much") is the old Roman law of "eye for eye and tooth for tooth." As law became less crude, it gave way to fines.

[^81-5]: This "long-established terminology" applies to the *verborum proprietas* of philosophic diction, with especial reference to τὰ καθήκοντα, the appropriate duties of the philosopher and the seeker after wisdom. Thus, *referre* is distinguished from *reddere, reponere, solvere*, and other financial terms.

[^81-6]: *i.e.*, the Stoics.

[^81-7]: *e.g.*, "Only the wise man is king," "there is no mean between virtue and vice," "pain is no evil," "only the wise man is free," "riches are not a good" etc.

[^81-8]: Frag. 54 Körte.

[^81-9]: Literally, "more than the capital and in addition to the rate of interest."

[^81-10]: Beneficence is a subdivision of the second cardinal virtue of the Stoics, Justice. Cicero discusses this topic at length in *De Off.* i. 42 ff.

[^81-11]: Perhaps a figure from the vintage. For the same metaphor, though in a different connexion, see *Ep.* i. 5, and *Ep.* cviii. 26: *quemadmodum ex amphora primum, quod est sincerissimum, effluit, gravissimum quodque turbidumque subsidit, sic in aetate nostra quod est optimum, in primo est*.

[^81-12]: *Cf.* § 6: "The good man so arranges the two sides of his ledger that he voluntarily cheats himself by adding to the benefit and subtracting from the injury." *Cf.* also § 17: "The good man will be easy-going in striking a balance; he will allow too much to be set against his credit."

[^81-13]: When by law or special enactment *novae tabellae* were granted to special classes of debtors, their debts, as in our bankruptcy courts, were cancelled.

[^81-14]: *Cf.* *Ep.* xxxi. 6 *quid ergo est bonum? rerum scientia*.

[^81-15]: The words are put into the mouth of an imaginary benefactor who fears for his own life.

[^81-16]: *Cf.* Tac. *Agric.* 42 *proprium humani ingenii est odisse quem laeseris*.