removed suprious '~'s

QDdeVirtutibus.htm

@@ -1600,7 +1600,7 @@ <h3>translated by Ralph McInerny<br>
  <td>There is also another notion of knowing in them, from the fact that by this a man is directed in knowing other things. And similarly, with respect to contingent things to be done, there is not a single sense of knowing [1] the things that remain in us and are called do-able, as being our operations, concerning which we often err on account of passion and with which prudence is concerned, and [21 things outside us but makeable by us where art is directive and in which the passions of the soul do not vitiate estimation. Therefore, in <i>Ethics</i> 6 the Philosopher posits intellectual virtues, namely, wisdom, science, and understanding, prudence and art.
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  <td>Similiter etiam bonum appetitivae partis non secundum eamdem rationem se habet in omnibus rebus humanis. Huiusmodi autem bonum in tripartita materia quaeritur; scilicet in passionibus irascibilis et in passionibus concupiscibilis, et in operationibus nostris quae sunt circa res exteriores quae veniunt in usum nostrum, sicut est emptio et venditio, locatio et conductio, et huiusmodi alia. Bonum enim hominis in passionibus est, ut sic homo in eis se habeat, quod per earum impetum a rationis iudicio non declinet; unde si aliquae passiones sunt quae bonum rationis natae sint impedire per modum incitationis ad agendum vel prosequendum, bonum virtutis praecipue consistit in quadam refrenatione et retractione; sicut patet de temperantia, quae refrenat et compescit concupiscentias. Si autem passio nata sit praecipue bonum rationis impedire in retrahendo, sicut timor, bonum virtutis circa huiusmodi passionem erit in sustinendo; quod facit fortitudo. Circa res vero exteriores bonum rationis consistit in hoc quod debitam proportionem suscipiant, secundum quod pertinent ad communicationem humanae vitae; et ex hoc imponitur nomen iustitiae, cuius est dirigere, et aequalitatem in huiusmodi invenire.
- <td>No more does the good of the appetitive part always have the same sense in all human affairs. This good is sought in three kinds of matter, namely, in the passions of the irascible and in the passions of the concupiscible and in our acts which are concerned with external things or things which come into our use, as in buying and selling, placing, guiding, and other like things. Man’s good in the case of the passions is that he be so related to them that he does not turn from the judgment of reason because of their influence; hence, if there are passions which are such as to impede theq~ood of reason by mode of inciting to action or pursuit, the good of virtue consists chiefly in a restraint and holding back, as is evident in temperance, which refrains and holds back desires. If, however, a passion is such that it chiefly impedes the good of reason in withdrawal, as in fear, the good of virtue with respect to such a passion consists in sustaining, which is what courage does. With respect to external things, the good of reason consists in this, that they receive a fitting proportion, insofar as they pertain to the sharing of human life, and the word <i>justice</i> is imposed from this, since it directs and discovers equality in such things.
+ <td>No more does the good of the appetitive part always have the same sense in all human affairs. This good is sought in three kinds of matter, namely, in the passions of the irascible and in the passions of the concupiscible and in our acts which are concerned with external things or things which come into our use, as in buying and selling, placing, guiding, and other like things. Man’s good in the case of the passions is that he be so related to them that he does not turn from the judgment of reason because of their influence; hence, if there are passions which are such as to impede the good of reason by mode of inciting to action or pursuit, the good of virtue consists chiefly in a restraint and holding back, as is evident in temperance, which refrains and holds back desires. If, however, a passion is such that it chiefly impedes the good of reason in withdrawal, as in fear, the good of virtue with respect to such a passion consists in sustaining, which is what courage does. With respect to external things, the good of reason consists in this, that they receive a fitting proportion, insofar as they pertain to the sharing of human life, and the word <i>justice</i> is imposed from this, since it directs and discovers equality in such things.
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  <td>Sed considerandum est, quod tam bonum intellectivae partis quam appetitivae est duplex: scilicet bonum quod est ultimus finis, et bonum quod est propter finem; nec est eadem ratio utriusque. Et ideo praeter omnes virtutes praedictas, secundum quas homo bonum consequitur in his quae sunt ad finem, oportet esse alias virtutes secundum quas homo bene se habet circa ultimum finem, qui Deus est; unde et theologicae dicuntur, quia Deum habent non solum pro fine, sed etiam pro obiecto.
  <td>But it should be considered that both the good of the intellectual and of the appetitive part are twofold, namely, the good which is the ultimate end and the good that is for the sake of the end, and these do not have the same sense. Therefore, beyond the virtues mentioned, thanks to which a man pursues the good which is for the sake of the end, there must be other virtues thanks to which he is well related to the ultimate end which is God. That is why they are called theological: They have God not only for their end, but for their object.
@@ -1722,7 +1722,7 @@ <h3>translated by Ralph McInerny<br>
  <td>6. Moreover, if the perfection of virtue consists in the mean, the more perfect virtues would most consist in the mean, but virginity and poverty are more perfect virtues, because they are counsels which deal only with the greater good. Therefore, virginity and poverty are in the mean, which seems false, because virginity abstains from all venereal pleasure, and this is an extreme, and thus it is with poverty with respect to possessions, which rejects them all. Therefore, it is does not seem to be the mark of virtue to he in the mean.
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  <td>Praeterea, Boetius in arithmetica assignat triplex medium: scilicet arithmeticum, ut 6 inter 4 et 8, quia secundum aequalem quantitatem distat ab utroque; et medium geometricum, sicut 6 inter 9 et 4, quia secundum eamdem proportionem, scilicet sesquialteram, ab utroque extremo distat, licet non secundum eamdem quantitatem; et medium harmonicum, sive musicum, sicut 3 est medium inter 6 et 2, quia quae proportio est unius extremi ad alterum, scilicet 6 ad 2, eadem est proportio 3 (quod est differentia inter 6 et 3) ad 1, quod est differentia inter 2 et 3. Nullum autem istorum mediorum salvatur in virtute; quia non oportet quod medium virtutis aequaliter se habeat ad extremum neque secundum quantitatem, neque secundum proportionem et terminorum et differentiarum. Ergo virtus non est in medio.
- <td>7. Moreover, Boethius in <i>On arithmetic</i> speaks of a threefold mean, the arithmetical, as 6 between 4 and 8, which is an equal distance from both, and the geometrical, as 6 between 9 and 4, which is proportionally the same distance from both, namely, two-thirds, though not the same quantity, and the harmonic or musical mean, as 3 between 6 and 2 because there is the same proportion of one extreme to the other, namely, 3 (which is the difference between 6 and 3) to 1, ~which is the difference between 2 and 3. But none of these means is found in virtue, since the mean of virtue does not relate equally to extremes, nor in a quantitative way nor according to some proportion of the extremes and differences. Therefore, virtue does not he in the mean.
+ <td>7. Moreover, Boethius in <i>On arithmetic</i> speaks of a threefold mean, the arithmetical, as 6 between 4 and 8, which is an equal distance from both, and the geometrical, as 6 between 9 and 4, which is proportionally the same distance from both, namely, two-thirds, though not the same quantity, and the harmonic or musical mean, as 3 between 6 and 2 because there is the same proportion of one extreme to the other, namely, 3 (which is the difference between 6 and 3) to 1, which is the difference between 2 and 3. But none of these means is found in virtue, since the mean of virtue does not relate equally to extremes, nor in a quantitative way nor according to some proportion of the extremes and differences. Therefore, virtue does not he in the mean.
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  <td>Sed dicendum, quod virtus consistit in medio rationis, et non in medio rei, de quo dicit Boetius. —Sed contra, virtus, secundum Augustinum, computatur inter maxima bona, quibus nullus male utitur. Si ergo bonum virtutis est in medio, oportet quod medium virtutis maxime habeat rationem medii. Sed medium rei perfectius habet rationem medii quam medium rationis. Ergo medium virtutis magis est medium rei quam medium rationis.
  <td>8. But it might be replied that virtue consists in the mean of reason, not the real mean of which Boethius speaks. On the contrary, virtue, according to Augustine, is counted among the greatest goods and no one can use them badly. Therefore, if the good of virtue lies in the mean, it would be necessary that the mean of virtue be a mean in the fullest sense of the term. But the real mean has the note of mean more perfectly than does the mean of virtue. Therefore, the mean of virtue would have to be the real mean rather than the mean of reason.