Directus allows redacted data extraction on the API through "alias"
Moderate severity
GitHub Reviewed
Published
May 13, 2024
in
directus/directus
•
Updated May 14, 2024
Description
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
May 13, 2024
Reviewed
May 13, 2024
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
May 14, 2024
Last updated
May 14, 2024
Summary
A user with permission to view any collection using redacted hashed fields can get access the raw stored version using the
alias
functionality on the API.Normally, these redacted fields will return
**********
however if we change the request to?alias[workaround]=redacted
we can instead retrieve the plain text value for the field.Steps to reproduce
The easiest way to confirm this vulnerability is by first visiting
/users/me
. You should be presented with a redacted JSON-object.Next, visit
/users/me?alias[hash]=password
. This time, the returned JSON object will included the raw password hash instead of the redacted value.Workaround
This can be avoided by removing permission to view the sensitive fields entirely from users or roles that should not be able to see them.
References