Impact
When submitting a Job to run via a Job Button, only the model-level extras.run_job permission is checked (i.e., does the user have permission to run Jobs in general?). Object-level permissions (i.e., does the user have permission to run this specific Job?) are not enforced by the URL/view used in this case (/extras/job-button/<uuid>/run/) The effect is that a user with permissions to run even a single Job can actually run all configured JobButton Jobs.
Not all Jobs can be configured as JobButtons; only those implemented as subclasses of JobButtonReceiver can be used in this way, so this vulnerability only applies specifically to JobButtonReceiver subclasses.
Additionally, although the documentation states that both extras.run_job permission and extras.run_jobbutton permission must be granted to a user in order to run Jobs via JobButton, the extras.run_jobbutton permission is not actually enforced by the view code, only by the UI by disabling the button from being clicked normally. Furthermore, the extras.run_jobbutton permission never prevented invoking Jobs (including JobButtonReceiver subclasses) via the normal "Job Run" UI, so after some discussion, we've decided that the extras.run_jobbutton permission is redundant, and as it never achieved its stated/documented purpose, the fixes below will remove the UI check for extras.run_jobbutton and all other references to the extras.run_jobbutton permission, rather than adding enforcement of this previously unenforced permission.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Fix will be available in Nautobot 1.6.8 (nautobot/nautobot#4995) and 2.1.0 (nautobot/nautobot#4993)
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Partial mitigation can be achieved by auditing JobButtonReceiver subclasses defined in the system and restricting which users are permitted to create or edit JobButton records.
References
References
abdikanipd Reporter
Impact
When submitting a Job to run via a Job Button, only the model-level
extras.run_jobpermission is checked (i.e., does the user have permission to run Jobs in general?). Object-level permissions (i.e., does the user have permission to run this specific Job?) are not enforced by the URL/view used in this case (/extras/job-button/<uuid>/run/) The effect is that a user with permissions to run even a single Job can actually run all configured JobButton Jobs.Additionally, although the documentation states that both
extras.run_jobpermission andextras.run_jobbuttonpermission must be granted to a user in order to run Jobs via JobButton, theextras.run_jobbuttonpermission is not actually enforced by the view code, only by the UI by disabling the button from being clicked normally. Furthermore, theextras.run_jobbuttonpermission never prevented invoking Jobs (includingJobButtonReceiversubclasses) via the normal "Job Run" UI, so after some discussion, we've decided that theextras.run_jobbuttonpermission is redundant, and as it never achieved its stated/documented purpose, the fixes below will remove the UI check forextras.run_jobbuttonand all other references to theextras.run_jobbuttonpermission, rather than adding enforcement of this previously unenforced permission.Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Fix will be available in Nautobot 1.6.8 (nautobot/nautobot#4995) and 2.1.0 (nautobot/nautobot#4993)
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Partial mitigation can be achieved by auditing
JobButtonReceiversubclasses defined in the system and restricting which users are permitted to create or edit JobButton records.References
References