Developer's certificate of origin の訳語 #1
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DCOに対応する日本語の適切な訳語は聞いたことがありません。確かに Origin に対応する良い単語が見つからないですね。源流か、出所か... 別のアイディアとしては それでも、コミュニティにパッチを出す人は少なくとも英語がそれなりには |
この案がいいと思います。略号の DCO を付けるとより親切かもしれませんね。 これに限らず、訳語集を作るとよさそうです。ja_JP/ の下に置きましょうか? |
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kernfs_remove supported NULL kernfs_node param to bail out but revent per-fs lock change introduced regression that dereferencing the param without NULL check so kernel goes crash. This patch checks the NULL kernfs_node in kernfs_remove and if so, just return. Quote from bug report by Jirka ``` The bug is triggered by running NAS Parallel benchmark suite on SuperMicro servers with 2x Xeon(R) Gold 6126 CPU. Here is the error log: [ 247.035564] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [ 247.036009] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 247.036009] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 247.036009] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 247.036009] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 247.058060] CPU: 1 PID: 6546 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.16.0393c3714081a53795bbff0e985d24146def6f57f+ torvalds#16 [ 247.058060] Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11DDW-L, BIOS 2.0b 03/07/2018 [ 247.058060] RIP: 0010:kernfs_remove+0x8/0x50 [ 247.058060] Code: 4c 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 49 c7 c4 f4 ff ff ff eb b2 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 <48> 8b 47 08 48 89 fd 48 85 c0 48 0f 44 c7 4c 8b 60 50 49 83 c4 60 [ 247.058060] RSP: 0018:ffffbbfa48a27e48 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 247.058060] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff89e31f98 RCX: 0000000080200018 [ 247.058060] RDX: 0000000080200019 RSI: fffff6760786c900 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 247.058060] RBP: ffffffff89e31f98 R08: ffff926b61b24d00 R09: 0000000080200018 [ 247.122048] R10: ffff926b61b24d00 R11: ffff926a8040c000 R12: ffff927bd09a2000 [ 247.122048] R13: ffffffff89e31fa0 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100 [ 247.122048] FS: 00007f01be0a8c40(0000) GS:ffff926fa8e40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 247.122048] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 247.122048] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001145c6003 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [ 247.122048] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 247.122048] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 247.122048] PKRU: 55555554 [ 247.122048] Call Trace: [ 247.122048] <TASK> [ 247.122048] rdt_kill_sb+0x29d/0x350 [ 247.122048] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0xa0 [ 247.122048] cleanup_mnt+0x131/0x190 [ 247.122048] task_work_run+0x5c/0x90 [ 247.122048] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x229/0x230 [ 247.122048] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x40 [ 247.122048] do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90 [ 247.122048] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 247.122048] RIP: 0033:0x7f01be2d735b ``` Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215696 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAE4VaGDZr_4wzRn2___eDYRtmdPaGGJdzu_LCSkJYuY9BEO3cw@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: 393c371 (kernfs: switch global kernfs_rwsem lock to per-fs lock) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jirka Hladky <jhladky@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jirka Hladky <jhladky@redhat.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427172152.3505364-1-minchan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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A crash was observed in the ORC unwinder: BUG: stack guard page was hit at 000000000dd984a2 (stack is 00000000d1caafca..00000000613712f0) kernel stack overflow (page fault): 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 93 PID: 23787 Comm: context_switch1 Not tainted 5.4.145 #1 RIP: 0010:unwind_next_frame Call Trace: <NMI> perf_callchain_kernel get_perf_callchain perf_callchain perf_prepare_sample perf_event_output_forward __perf_event_overflow perf_ibs_handle_irq perf_ibs_nmi_handler nmi_handle default_do_nmi do_nmi end_repeat_nmi This was really two bugs: 1) The perf IBS code passed inconsistent regs to the unwinder. 2) The unwinder didn't handle the bad input gracefully. Fix the latter bug. The ORC unwinder needs to be immune against bad inputs. The problem is that stack_access_ok() doesn't recheck the validity of the full range of registers after switching to the next valid stack with get_stack_info(). Fix that. [ jpoimboe: rewrote commit log ] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmtrmonakhov@yandex-team.ru> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1650353656-956624-1-git-send-email-dmtrmonakhov@yandex-team.ru Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
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kvm->arch.arm_pmu is set when userspace attempts to set the first PMU attribute. As certain attributes are mandatory, arm_pmu ends up always being set to a valid arm_pmu, otherwise KVM will refuse to run the VCPU. However, this only happens if the VCPU has the PMU feature. If the VCPU doesn't have the feature bit set, kvm->arch.arm_pmu will be left uninitialized and equal to NULL. KVM doesn't do ID register emulation for 32-bit guests and accesses to the PMU registers aren't gated by the pmu_visibility() function. This is done to prevent injecting unexpected undefined exceptions in guests which have detected the presence of a hardware PMU. But even though the VCPU feature is missing, KVM still attempts to emulate certain aspects of the PMU when PMU registers are accessed. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference like this one, which happens on an odroid-c4 board when running the kvm-unit-tests pmu-cycle-counter test with kvmtool and without the PMU feature being set: [ 454.402699] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000150 [ 454.405865] Mem abort info: [ 454.408596] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 454.411638] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 454.416901] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 454.419909] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 454.423010] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 454.427841] Data abort info: [ 454.430687] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 454.434484] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 454.437404] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000000c924000 [ 454.443800] [0000000000000150] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 454.450528] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 454.456036] Modules linked in: [ 454.459053] CPU: 1 PID: 267 Comm: kvm-vcpu-0 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc4 torvalds#113 [ 454.465697] Hardware name: Hardkernel ODROID-C4 (DT) [ 454.470612] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 454.477512] pc : kvm_pmu_event_mask.isra.0+0x14/0x74 [ 454.482427] lr : kvm_pmu_set_counter_event_type+0x2c/0x80 [ 454.487775] sp : ffff80000a9839c0 [ 454.491050] x29: ffff80000a9839c0 x28: ffff000000a83a00 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 454.498127] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00000a510000 [ 454.505198] x23: ffff000000a83a00 x22: ffff000003b01000 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 454.512271] x20: 000000000000001f x19: 00000000000003ff x18: 0000000000000000 [ 454.519343] x17: 000000008003fe98 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 454.526416] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 454.533489] x11: 000000008003fdbc x10: 0000000000009d20 x9 : 000000000000001b [ 454.540561] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000d00 x6 : 0000000000009d00 [ 454.547633] x5 : 0000000000000037 x4 : 0000000000009d00 x3 : 0d09000000000000 [ 454.554705] x2 : 000000000000001f x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 454.561779] Call trace: [ 454.564191] kvm_pmu_event_mask.isra.0+0x14/0x74 [ 454.568764] kvm_pmu_set_counter_event_type+0x2c/0x80 [ 454.573766] access_pmu_evtyper+0x128/0x170 [ 454.577905] perform_access+0x34/0x80 [ 454.581527] kvm_handle_cp_32+0x13c/0x160 [ 454.585495] kvm_handle_cp15_32+0x1c/0x30 [ 454.589462] handle_exit+0x70/0x180 [ 454.592912] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1c4/0x5e0 [ 454.597485] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x23c/0x940 [ 454.601280] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xf0 [ 454.605160] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 [ 454.608869] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xd4/0xfc [ 454.613527] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x90 [ 454.616803] el0_svc+0x34/0xb0 [ 454.619822] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x130 [ 454.624049] el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 [ 454.627675] Code: a9be7bfd 910003fd f9000bf3 52807ff3 (b9415001) [ 454.633714] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- In this particular case, Linux hasn't detected the presence of a hardware PMU because the PMU node is missing from the DTB, so userspace would have been unable to set the VCPU PMU feature even if it attempted it. What happens is that the 32-bit guest reads ID_DFR0, which advertises the presence of the PMU, and when it tries to program a counter, it triggers the NULL pointer dereference because kvm->arch.arm_pmu is NULL. kvm-arch.arm_pmu was introduced by commit 46b1878 ("KVM: arm64: Keep a per-VM pointer to the default PMU"). Until that commit, this error would be triggered instead: [ 73.388140] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 73.388189] Unknown PMU version 0 [ 73.390420] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 264 at arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c:36 kvm_pmu_event_mask.isra.0+0x6c/0x74 [ 73.399821] Modules linked in: [ 73.402835] CPU: 1 PID: 264 Comm: kvm-vcpu-0 Not tainted 5.17.0 torvalds#114 [ 73.409132] Hardware name: Hardkernel ODROID-C4 (DT) [ 73.414048] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 73.420948] pc : kvm_pmu_event_mask.isra.0+0x6c/0x74 [ 73.425863] lr : kvm_pmu_event_mask.isra.0+0x6c/0x74 [ 73.430779] sp : ffff80000a8db9b0 [ 73.434055] x29: ffff80000a8db9b0 x28: ffff000000dbaac0 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 73.441131] x26: ffff000000dbaac0 x25: 00000000c600000d x24: 0000000000180720 [ 73.448203] x23: ffff800009ffbe10 x22: ffff00000b612000 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 73.455276] x20: 000000000000001f x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 73.462348] x17: 000000008003fe98 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0720072007200720 [ 73.469420] x14: 0720072007200720 x13: ffff800009d32488 x12: 00000000000004e6 [ 73.476493] x11: 00000000000001a2 x10: ffff800009d32488 x9 : ffff800009d32488 [ 73.483565] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff800009d8a488 x6 : ffff800009d8a488 [ 73.490638] x5 : ffff0000f461a9d8 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001 [ 73.497710] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000000dbaac0 [ 73.504784] Call trace: [ 73.507195] kvm_pmu_event_mask.isra.0+0x6c/0x74 [ 73.511768] kvm_pmu_set_counter_event_type+0x2c/0x80 [ 73.516770] access_pmu_evtyper+0x128/0x16c [ 73.520910] perform_access+0x34/0x80 [ 73.524532] kvm_handle_cp_32+0x13c/0x160 [ 73.528500] kvm_handle_cp15_32+0x1c/0x30 [ 73.532467] handle_exit+0x70/0x180 [ 73.535917] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x20c/0x6e0 [ 73.540489] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2b8/0x9e0 [ 73.544283] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xf0 [ 73.548165] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 [ 73.551874] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xd4/0xfc [ 73.556531] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x90 [ 73.559808] el0_svc+0x28/0x80 [ 73.562826] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x130 [ 73.567054] el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4 [ 73.570676] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 73.575382] kvm: pmu event creation failed -2 The root cause remains the same: kvm->arch.pmuver was never set to something sensible because the VCPU feature itself was never set. The odroid-c4 is somewhat of a special case, because Linux doesn't probe the PMU. But the above errors can easily be reproduced on any hardware, with or without a PMU driver, as long as userspace doesn't set the PMU feature. Work around the fact that KVM advertises a PMU even when the VCPU feature is not set by gating all PMU emulation on the feature. The guest can still access the registers without KVM injecting an undefined exception. Signed-off-by: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220425145530.723858-1-alexandru.elisei@arm.com
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間違えてクローズしていたようです。忘れないように再オープンします。 |
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Resource dump menu may span over more than a single page, support it. Otherwise, menu read may result in a memory access violation: reading outside of the allocated page. Note that page format of the first menu page contains menu headers while the proceeding menu pages contain only records. The KASAN logs are as follows: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strcmp+0x9b/0xb0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812b2e1fd0 by task systemd-udevd/496 CPU: 5 PID: 496 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G B 5.16.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_01_10_23_12 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140 ? strcmp+0x9b/0xb0 ? strcmp+0x9b/0xb0 kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf ? strcmp+0x9b/0xb0 strcmp+0x9b/0xb0 mlx5_rsc_dump_init+0x4ab/0x780 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5_rsc_dump_destroy+0x80/0x80 [mlx5_core] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x286/0x400 ? raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50 ? aomic_notifier_chain_register+0x32/0x40 mlx5_load+0x104/0x2e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_init_one+0x41b/0x610 [mlx5_core] .... The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88812b2e0000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096 The buggy address is located 4048 bytes to the right of 4096-byte region [ffff88812b2e0000, ffff88812b2e1000) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:000000009d69807a refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88812b2e6000 pfn:0x12b2e0 head:000000009d69807a order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head|zone=2) raw: 8000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888100043040 raw: ffff88812b2e6000 0000000080040000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88812b2e1e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88812b2e1f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88812b2e1f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88812b2e2000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88812b2e2080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Fixes: 12206b1 ("net/mlx5: Add support for resource dump") Signed-off-by: Aya Levin <ayal@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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Current DP driver implementation has adding safe mode done at dp_hpd_plug_handle() which is expected to be executed under event thread context. However there is possible circular locking happen (see blow stack trace) after edp driver call dp_hpd_plug_handle() from dp_bridge_enable() which is executed under drm_thread context. After review all possibilities methods and as discussed on https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/483155/, supporting EDID compliance tests in the driver is quite hacky. As seen with other vendor drivers, supporting these will be much easier with IGT. Hence removing all the related fail safe code for it so that no possibility of circular lock will happen. Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.35-lockdep torvalds#6 Tainted: G W ------------------------------------------------------ frecon/429 is trying to acquire lock: ffffff808dc3c4e8 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 but task is already holding lock: ffffff808dc441e0 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac lock_crtcs+0xb4/0x124 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x330/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 ww_mutex_lock+0xb8/0x278 modeset_lock+0x304/0x4ac drm_modeset_lock+0x4c/0x7c drmm_mode_config_init+0x4a8/0xc50 msm_drm_init+0x274/0xac0 msm_drm_bind+0x20/0x2c try_to_bring_up_master+0x3dc/0x470 __component_add+0x18c/0x3c0 component_add+0x1c/0x28 dp_display_probe+0x954/0xa98 platform_probe+0x124/0x15c really_probe+0x1b0/0x5f8 __driver_probe_device+0x174/0x20c driver_probe_device+0x70/0x134 __device_attach_driver+0x130/0x1d0 bus_for_each_drv+0xfc/0x14c __device_attach+0x1bc/0x2bc device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x94/0x178 deferred_probe_work_func+0x1a4/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x5d4/0x9dc worker_thread+0x898/0xccc kthread+0x2d4/0x3d4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 -> #1 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: ww_acquire_init+0x1c4/0x2c8 drm_modeset_acquire_init+0x44/0xc8 drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0xb0/0x12dc drm_mode_getconnector+0x5dc/0xfe8 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 -> #0 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x2650/0x672c lock_acquire+0x1b4/0x4ac __mutex_lock_common+0x174/0x1a64 mutex_lock_nested+0x98/0xac dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode+0x4c/0xa0 dp_hpd_plug_handle+0x1f0/0x280 dp_bridge_enable+0x94/0x2b8 drm_atomic_bridge_chain_enable+0x11c/0x168 drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x500/0x740 msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x3e4/0x748 commit_tail+0x19c/0x278 drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x1dc/0x1f0 drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xd8 drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0xb4/0x134 drm_mode_setcrtc+0x688/0x1248 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x1e4/0x338 drm_ioctl+0x3a4/0x684 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x154 invoke_syscall+0x78/0x224 el0_svc_common+0x178/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x94/0x13c el0_svc+0x5c/0xec el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8 Changes in v2: -- re text commit title -- remove all fail safe mode Changes in v3: -- remove dp_panel_add_fail_safe_mode() from dp_panel.h -- add Fixes Changes in v5: -- to=dianders@chromium.org Changes in v6: -- fix Fixes commit ID Fixes: 8b2c181 ("drm/msm/dp: add fail safe mode outside of event_mutex context") Reported-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1651007534-31842-1-git-send-email-quic_khsieh@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
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The calling of siw_cm_upcall and detaching new_cep with its listen_cep should be atomistic semantics. Otherwise siw_reject may be called in a temporary state, e,g, siw_cm_upcall is called but the new_cep->listen_cep has not being cleared. This fixes a WARN: WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 201 at drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_cm.c:255 siw_cep_put+0x125/0x130 [siw] CPU: 2 PID: 201 Comm: kworker/u16:22 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.17.0-rc7 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: iw_cm_wq cm_work_handler [iw_cm] RIP: 0010:siw_cep_put+0x125/0x130 [siw] Call Trace: <TASK> siw_reject+0xac/0x180 [siw] iw_cm_reject+0x68/0xc0 [iw_cm] cm_work_handler+0x59d/0xe20 [iw_cm] process_one_work+0x1e2/0x3b0 worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0 ? rescuer_thread+0x390/0x390 kthread+0xe5/0x110 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Fixes: 6c52fdc ("rdma/siw: connection management") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d528d83466c44687f3872eadcb8c184528b2e2d4.1650526554.git.chengyou@linux.alibaba.com Reported-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Bernard Metzler <bmt@zurich.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Cheng Xu <chengyou@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
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When inserting a key range item (BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY) while logging a directory, we don't expect the insertion to fail with -EEXIST, because we are holding the directory's log_mutex and we have dropped all existing BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY keys from the log tree before we started to log the directory. However it's possible that during the logging we attempt to insert the same BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY key twice, but for this to happen we need to race with insertions of items from other inodes in the subvolume's tree while we are logging a directory. Here's how this can happen: 1) We are logging a directory with inode number 1000 that has its items spread across 3 leaves in the subvolume's tree: leaf A - has index keys from the range 2 to 20 for example. The last item in the leaf corresponds to a dir item for index number 20. All these dir items were created in a past transaction. leaf B - has index keys from the range 22 to 100 for example. It has no keys from other inodes, all its keys are dir index keys for our directory inode number 1000. Its first key is for the dir item with a sequence number of 22. All these dir items were also created in a past transaction. leaf C - has index keys for our directory for the range 101 to 120 for example. This leaf also has items from other inodes, and its first item corresponds to the dir item for index number 101 for our directory with inode number 1000; 2) When we finish processing the items from leaf A at log_dir_items(), we log a BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY key with an offset of 21 and a last offset of 21, meaning the log is authoritative for the index range from 21 to 21 (a single sequence number). At this point leaf B was not yet modified in the current transaction; 3) When we return from log_dir_items() we have released our read lock on leaf B, and have set *last_offset_ret to 21 (index number of the first item on leaf B minus 1); 4) Some other task inserts an item for other inode (inode number 1001 for example) into leaf C. That resulted in pushing some items from leaf C into leaf B, in order to make room for the new item, so now leaf B has dir index keys for the sequence number range from 22 to 102 and leaf C has the dir items for the sequence number range 103 to 120; 5) At log_directory_changes() we call log_dir_items() again, passing it a 'min_offset' / 'min_key' value of 22 (*last_offset_ret from step 3 plus 1, so 21 + 1). Then btrfs_search_forward() leaves us at slot 0 of leaf B, since leaf B was modified in the current transaction. We have also initialized 'last_old_dentry_offset' to 20 after calling btrfs_previous_item() at log_dir_items(), as it left us at the last item of leaf A, which refers to the dir item with sequence number 20; 6) We then call process_dir_items_leaf() to process the dir items of leaf B, and when we process the first item, corresponding to slot 0, sequence number 22, we notice the dir item was created in a past transaction and its sequence number is greater than the value of *last_old_dentry_offset + 1 (20 + 1), so we decide to log again a BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY key with an offset of 21 and an end range of 21 (key.offset - 1 == 22 - 1 == 21), which results in an -EEXIST error from insert_dir_log_key(), as we have already inserted that key at step 2, triggering the assertion at process_dir_items_leaf(). The trace produced in dmesg is like the following: assertion failed: ret != -EEXIST, in fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:3857 [198255.980839][ T7460] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [198255.981666][ T7460] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3617! [198255.983141][ T7460] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI [198255.984080][ T7460] CPU: 0 PID: 7460 Comm: repro-ghost-dir Not tainted 5.18.0-5314c78ac373-misc-next+ [198255.986027][ T7460] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 [198255.988600][ T7460] RIP: 0010:assertfail.constprop.0+0x1c/0x1e [198255.989465][ T7460] Code: 8b 4c 89 (...) [198255.992599][ T7460] RSP: 0018:ffffc90007387188 EFLAGS: 00010282 [198255.993414][ T7460] RAX: 000000000000003d RBX: 0000000000000065 RCX: 0000000000000000 [198255.996056][ T7460] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8b62b180 RDI: fffff52000e70e24 [198255.997668][ T7460] RBP: ffffc90007387188 R08: 000000000000003d R09: ffff8881f0e16507 [198255.999199][ T7460] R10: ffffed103e1c2ca0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 00000000ffffffef [198256.000683][ T7460] R13: ffff88813befc630 R14: ffff888116c16e70 R15: ffffc90007387358 [198256.007082][ T7460] FS: 00007fc7f7c24640(0000) GS:ffff8881f0c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [198256.009939][ T7460] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [198256.014133][ T7460] CR2: 0000560bb16d0b78 CR3: 0000000140b34005 CR4: 0000000000170ef0 [198256.015239][ T7460] Call Trace: [198256.015674][ T7460] <TASK> [198256.016313][ T7460] log_dir_items.cold+0x16/0x2c [198256.018858][ T7460] ? replay_one_extent+0xbf0/0xbf0 [198256.025932][ T7460] ? release_extent_buffer+0x1d2/0x270 [198256.029658][ T7460] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [198256.031114][ T7460] ? lock_acquired+0xbe/0x660 [198256.032633][ T7460] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [198256.034386][ T7460] ? lock_release+0xcf/0x8a0 [198256.036152][ T7460] log_directory_changes+0xf9/0x170 [198256.036993][ T7460] ? log_dir_items+0xba0/0xba0 [198256.037661][ T7460] ? do_raw_write_unlock+0x7d/0xe0 [198256.038680][ T7460] btrfs_log_inode+0x233b/0x26d0 [198256.041294][ T7460] ? log_directory_changes+0x170/0x170 [198256.042864][ T7460] ? btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier+0x60/0x60 [198256.045130][ T7460] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [198256.046568][ T7460] ? lock_release+0xcf/0x8a0 [198256.047504][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.048712][ T7460] ? ilookup5_nowait+0x81/0xa0 [198256.049747][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.050652][ T7460] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa9/0x100 [198256.051618][ T7460] ? __might_resched+0x128/0x1c0 [198256.052511][ T7460] ? __might_sleep+0x66/0xc0 [198256.053442][ T7460] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 [198256.054251][ T7460] ? iget5_locked+0xbd/0x150 [198256.054986][ T7460] ? run_delayed_iput_locked+0x110/0x110 [198256.055929][ T7460] ? btrfs_iget+0xc7/0x150 [198256.056630][ T7460] ? btrfs_orphan_cleanup+0x4a0/0x4a0 [198256.057502][ T7460] ? free_extent_buffer+0x13/0x20 [198256.058322][ T7460] btrfs_log_inode+0x2654/0x26d0 [198256.059137][ T7460] ? log_directory_changes+0x170/0x170 [198256.060020][ T7460] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [198256.060930][ T7460] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [198256.061905][ T7460] ? lock_contended+0x770/0x770 [198256.062682][ T7460] ? btrfs_log_inode_parent+0xd04/0x1750 [198256.063582][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.064432][ T7460] ? preempt_count_sub+0x18/0xc0 [198256.065550][ T7460] ? __mutex_lock+0x580/0xdc0 [198256.066654][ T7460] ? stack_trace_save+0x94/0xc0 [198256.068008][ T7460] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [198256.072149][ T7460] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x12a/0x430 [198256.073145][ T7460] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0xcd0/0xcd0 [198256.074341][ T7460] ? wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x20/0x20 [198256.075345][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.076142][ T7460] ? lock_contended+0x770/0x770 [198256.076939][ T7460] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x1c0/0x1c0 [198256.078401][ T7460] ? btrfs_sync_file+0x5e6/0xa40 [198256.080598][ T7460] btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x523/0x1750 [198256.081991][ T7460] ? wait_current_trans+0xc8/0x240 [198256.083320][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.085450][ T7460] ? btrfs_end_log_trans+0x70/0x70 [198256.086362][ T7460] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x16/0x80 [198256.087544][ T7460] ? lock_release+0xcf/0x8a0 [198256.088305][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.090375][ T7460] ? dget_parent+0x8e/0x300 [198256.093538][ T7460] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x1c0/0x1c0 [198256.094918][ T7460] ? lock_downgrade+0x420/0x420 [198256.097815][ T7460] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa9/0x100 [198256.101822][ T7460] ? dget_parent+0xb7/0x300 [198256.103345][ T7460] btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x48/0x60 [198256.105052][ T7460] btrfs_sync_file+0x629/0xa40 [198256.106829][ T7460] ? start_ordered_ops.constprop.0+0x120/0x120 [198256.109655][ T7460] ? __fget_files+0x161/0x230 [198256.110760][ T7460] vfs_fsync_range+0x6d/0x110 [198256.111923][ T7460] ? start_ordered_ops.constprop.0+0x120/0x120 [198256.113556][ T7460] __x64_sys_fsync+0x45/0x70 [198256.114323][ T7460] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0 [198256.115084][ T7460] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x3b/0x50 [198256.116030][ T7460] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [198256.116768][ T7460] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [198256.117555][ T7460] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [198256.118324][ T7460] ? sysvec_call_function_single+0x57/0xc0 [198256.119308][ T7460] ? asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0xa/0x20 [198256.120363][ T7460] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [198256.121334][ T7460] RIP: 0033:0x7fc7fe97b6ab [198256.122067][ T7460] Code: 0f 05 48 (...) [198256.125198][ T7460] RSP: 002b:00007fc7f7c23950 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a [198256.126568][ T7460] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc7f7c239f0 RCX: 00007fc7fe97b6ab [198256.127942][ T7460] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 000056167536bcf0 RDI: 0000000000000004 [198256.129302][ T7460] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000007ffffeb8 [198256.130670][ T7460] R10: 00000000000001ff R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000001 [198256.132046][ T7460] R13: 0000561674ca8140 R14: 00007fc7f7c239d0 R15: 000056167536dab8 [198256.133403][ T7460] </TASK> Fix this by treating -EEXIST as expected at insert_dir_log_key() and have it update the item with an end offset corresponding to the maximum between the previously logged end offset and the new requested end offset. The end offsets may be different due to dir index key deletions that happened as part of unlink operations while we are logging a directory (triggered when fsyncing some other inode parented by the directory) or during renames which always attempt to log a single dir index deletion. Reported-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/YmyefE9mc2xl5ZMz@hungrycats.org/ Fixes: 732d591 ("btrfs: stop copying old dir items when logging a directory") Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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We are accessing "desc->ops" in sof_pci_probe without checking "desc" pointer. This results in NULL pointer exception if pci_id->driver_data i.e desc pointer isn't defined in sof device probe: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000060 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:sof_pci_probe+0x1e/0x17f [snd_sof_pci] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffc043dff4. RSP: 0018:ffffac4b03b9b8d8 EFLAGS: 00010246 Add NULL pointer check for sof_dev_desc pointer to avoid such exception. Reviewed-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ajit Kumar Pandey <AjitKumar.Pandey@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426183357.102155-1-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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As reported by Alan, the CFI (Call Frame Information) in the VDSO time routines is incorrect since commit ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation."). DWARF has a concept called the CFA (Canonical Frame Address), which on powerpc is calculated as an offset from the stack pointer (r1). That means when the stack pointer is changed there must be a corresponding CFI directive to update the calculation of the CFA. The current code is missing those directives for the changes to r1, which prevents gdb from being able to generate a backtrace from inside VDSO functions, eg: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007fffffffd960 in ?? () #3 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 Backtrace stopped: frame did not save the PC Alan helpfully describes some rules for correctly maintaining the CFI information: 1) Every adjustment to the current frame address reg (ie. r1) must be described, and exactly at the instruction where r1 changes. Why? Because stack unwinding might want to access previous frames. 2) If a function changes LR or any non-volatile register, the save location for those regs must be given. The CFI can be at any instruction after the saves up to the point that the reg is changed. (Exception: LR save should be described before a bl. not after) 3) If asychronous unwind info is needed then restores of LR and non-volatile regs must also be described. The CFI can be at any instruction after the reg is restored up to the point where the save location is (potentially) trashed. Fix the inability to backtrace by adding CFI directives describing the changes to r1, ie. satisfying rule 1. Also change the information for LR to point to the copy saved on the stack, not the value in r0 that will be overwritten by the function call. Finally, add CFI directives describing the save/restore of r2. With the fix gdb can correctly back trace and navigate up and down the stack: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) up #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) Initial frame selected; you cannot go up. (gdb) down #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) Fixes: ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.11+ Reported-by: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220502125010.1319370-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
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With CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled, string functions will also perform dynamic checks for string size which can panic the kernel, like incase of overflow detection. In papr_scm, papr_scm_pmu_check_events function uses stat->stat_id with string operations, to populate the nvdimm_events_map array. Since stat_id variable is not NULL terminated, the kernel panics with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE enabled at boot time. Below are the logs of kernel panic: detected buffer overflow in __fortify_strlen ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:980! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] NIP [c00000000077dad0] fortify_panic+0x28/0x38 LR [c00000000077dacc] fortify_panic+0x24/0x38 Call Trace: [c0000022d77836e0] [c00000000077dacc] fortify_panic+0x24/0x38 (unreliable) [c00800000deb2660] papr_scm_pmu_check_events.constprop.0+0x118/0x220 [papr_scm] [c00800000deb2cb0] papr_scm_probe+0x288/0x62c [papr_scm] [c0000000009b46a8] platform_probe+0x98/0x150 Fix this issue by using kmemdup_nul() to copy the content of stat->stat_id directly to the nvdimm_events_map array. mpe: stat->stat_id comes from the hypervisor, not userspace, so there is no security exposure. Fixes: 4c08d4b ("powerpc/papr_scm: Add perf interface support") Signed-off-by: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220505153451.35503-1-kjain@linux.ibm.com
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'rmmod pmt_telemetry' panics with: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000040 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 1697 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G S W -------- --- 5.18.0-rc4 #3 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-P DDR5 RVP, BIOS ADLPFWI1.R00.3056.B00.2201310233 01/31/2022 RIP: 0010:device_del+0x1b/0x3d0 Code: e8 1a d9 e9 ff e9 58 ff ff ff 48 8b 08 eb dc 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 8d af 80 00 00 00 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 18 <4c> 8b 67 40 48 89 ef 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 31 RSP: 0018:ffffb520415cfd60 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000070 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000080 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: ffffb520415cfd78 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb520415cfd78 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f7e198e5740(0000) GS:ffff905c9f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000040 CR3: 000000010782a005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __xa_erase+0x53/0xb0 device_unregister+0x13/0x50 intel_pmt_dev_destroy+0x34/0x60 [pmt_class] pmt_telem_remove+0x40/0x50 [pmt_telemetry] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30 device_release_driver_internal+0xc1/0x150 driver_detach+0x44/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x74/0xd0 auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x12/0x20 pmt_telem_exit+0xc/0xe4a [pmt_telemetry] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x13a/0x250 ? syscall_trace_enter.isra.19+0x11e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f7e1803a05b Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 2d 4e 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d fd 4d 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 The probe function, pmt_telem_probe(), adds an entry for devices even if they have not been initialized. This results in the array of initialized devices containing both initialized and uninitialized entries. This causes a panic in the remove function, pmt_telem_remove() which expects the array to only contain initialized entries. Only use an entry when a device is initialized. Cc: "David E. Box" <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Cc: Mark Gross <markgross@kernel.org> Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Arcari <darcari@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220429122322.2550003-1-prarit@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
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Since commit f1131b9 ("net: phy: micrel: use kszphy_suspend()/kszphy_resume for irq aware devices") the following NULL pointer dereference is observed on a board with KSZ8061: # udhcpc -i eth0 udhcpc: started, v1.35.0 8<--- cut here --- Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000008 pgd = f73cef4e [00000008] *pgd=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 196 Comm: ifconfig Not tainted 5.15.37-dirty torvalds#94 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 SoloX (Device Tree) PC is at kszphy_config_reset+0x10/0x114 LR is at kszphy_resume+0x24/0x64 ... The KSZ8061 phy_driver structure does not have the .probe/..driver_data fields, which means that priv is not allocated. This causes the NULL pointer dereference inside kszphy_config_reset(). Fix the problem by using the generic suspend/resume functions as before. Another alternative would be to provide the .probe and .driver_data information into the structure, but to be on the safe side, let's just restore Ethernet functionality by using the generic suspend/resume. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f1131b9 ("net: phy: micrel: use kszphy_suspend()/kszphy_resume for irq aware devices") Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220504143104.1286960-1-festevam@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Function ice_plug_aux_dev() assigns pf->adev field too early prior
aux device initialization and on other side ice_unplug_aux_dev()
starts aux device deinit and at the end assigns NULL to pf->adev.
This is wrong because pf->adev should always be non-NULL only when
aux device is fully initialized and ready. This wrong order causes
a crash when ice_send_event_to_aux() call occurs because that function
depends on non-NULL value of pf->adev and does not assume that
aux device is half-initialized or half-destroyed.
After order correction the race window is tiny but it is still there,
as Leon mentioned and manipulation with pf->adev needs to be protected
by mutex.
Fix (un-)plugging functions so pf->adev field is set after aux device
init and prior aux device destroy and protect pf->adev assignment by
new mutex. This mutex is also held during ice_send_event_to_aux()
call to ensure that aux device is valid during that call.
Note that device lock used ice_send_event_to_aux() needs to be kept
to avoid race with aux drv unload.
Reproducer:
cycle=1
while :;do
echo "#### Cycle: $cycle"
ip link set ens7f0 mtu 9000
ip link add bond0 type bond mode 1 miimon 100
ip link set bond0 up
ifenslave bond0 ens7f0
ip link set bond0 mtu 9000
ethtool -L ens7f0 combined 1
ip link del bond0
ip link set ens7f0 mtu 1500
sleep 1
let cycle++
done
In short when the device is added/removed to/from bond the aux device
is unplugged/plugged. When MTU of the device is changed an event is
sent to aux device asynchronously. This can race with (un)plugging
operation and because pf->adev is set too early (plug) or too late
(unplug) the function ice_send_event_to_aux() can touch uninitialized
or destroyed fields. In the case of crash below pf->adev->dev.mutex.
Crash:
[ 53.372066] bond0: (slave ens7f0): making interface the new active one
[ 53.378622] bond0: (slave ens7f0): Enslaving as an active interface with an u
p link
[ 53.386294] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): bond0: link becomes ready
[ 53.549104] bond0: (slave ens7f1): Enslaving as a backup interface with an up
link
[ 54.118906] ice 0000:ca:00.0 ens7f0: Number of in use tx queues changed inval
idating tc mappings. Priority traffic classification disabled!
[ 54.233374] ice 0000:ca:00.1 ens7f1: Number of in use tx queues changed inval
idating tc mappings. Priority traffic classification disabled!
[ 54.248204] bond0: (slave ens7f0): Releasing backup interface
[ 54.253955] bond0: (slave ens7f1): making interface the new active one
[ 54.274875] bond0: (slave ens7f1): Releasing backup interface
[ 54.289153] bond0 (unregistering): Released all slaves
[ 55.383179] MII link monitoring set to 100 ms
[ 55.398696] bond0: (slave ens7f0): making interface the new active one
[ 55.405241] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000080
[ 55.405289] bond0: (slave ens7f0): Enslaving as an active interface with an u
p link
[ 55.412198] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 55.412200] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 55.412201] PGD 25d2ad067 P4D 0
[ 55.412204] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 55.412207] CPU: 0 PID: 403 Comm: kworker/0:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S
5.17.0-13579-g57f2d6540f03 #1
[ 55.429094] bond0: (slave ens7f1): Enslaving as a backup interface with an up
link
[ 55.430224] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R750/06V45N, BIOS 1.4.4 10/07/
2021
[ 55.430226] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
[ 55.468169] RIP: 0010:mutex_unlock+0x10/0x20
[ 55.472439] Code: 0f b1 13 74 96 eb e0 4c 89 ee eb d8 e8 79 54 ff ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 65 48 8b 04 25 40 ef 01 00 31 d2 <f0> 48 0f b1 17 75 01 c3 e9 e3 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48
[ 55.491186] RSP: 0018:ff4454230d7d7e28 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 55.496413] RAX: ff1a79b208b08000 RBX: ff1a79b2182e8880 RCX: 0000000000000001
[ 55.503545] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff4454230d7d7db0 RDI: 0000000000000080
[ 55.510678] RBP: ff1a79d1c7e48b68 R08: ff4454230d7d7db0 R09: 0000000000000041
[ 55.517812] R10: 00000000000000a5 R11: 00000000000006e6 R12: ff1a79d1c7e48bc0
[ 55.524945] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ff1a79d0ffc305c0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 55.532076] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff1a79d0ffc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 55.540163] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 55.545908] CR2: 0000000000000080 CR3: 00000003487ae003 CR4: 0000000000771ef0
[ 55.553041] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 55.560173] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 55.567305] PKRU: 55555554
[ 55.570018] Call Trace:
[ 55.572474] <TASK>
[ 55.574579] ice_service_task+0xaab/0xef0 [ice]
[ 55.579130] process_one_work+0x1c5/0x390
[ 55.583141] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390
[ 55.587326] worker_thread+0x30/0x360
[ 55.590994] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390
[ 55.595180] kthread+0xe6/0x110
[ 55.598325] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 55.603116] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 55.606698] </TASK>
Fixes: f9f5301 ("ice: Register auxiliary device to provide RDMA")
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Ertman <david.m.ertman@intel.com>
Tested-by: Gurucharan <gurucharanx.g@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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Kernel panic when injecting memory_failure for the global huge_zero_page, when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM is enabled, as follows. Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x109ff9 at process virtual address 0x20ff9000 page:00000000fb053fc3 refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x109e00 head:00000000fb053fc3 order:9 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x17fffc000010001(locked|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) raw: 017fffc000010001 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000002ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(is_huge_zero_page(head)) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:2499! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 6 PID: 553 Comm: split_bug Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1+ torvalds#11 Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 3288b3c 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:split_huge_page_to_list+0x66a/0x880 Code: 84 9b fb ff ff 48 8b 7c 24 08 31 f6 e8 9f 5d 2a 00 b8 b8 02 00 00 e9 e8 fb ff ff 48 c7 c6 e8 47 3c 82 4c b RSP: 0018:ffffc90000dcbdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000000003c RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff823e4c4f RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff88843fffdb40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000fffeffff R10: ffffc90000dcbc48 R11: ffffffff82d68448 R12: ffffea0004278000 R13: ffffffff823c6203 R14: 0000000000109ff9 R15: ffffea000427fe40 FS: 00007fc375a26740(0000) GS:ffff88842fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fc3757c9290 CR3: 0000000102174006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: try_to_split_thp_page+0x3a/0x130 memory_failure+0x128/0x800 madvise_inject_error.cold+0x8b/0xa1 __x64_sys_madvise+0x54/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fc3754f8bf9 Code: 01 00 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 8 RSP: 002b:00007ffeda93a1d8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000001c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc3754f8bf9 RDX: 0000000000000064 RSI: 0000000000003000 RDI: 0000000020ff9000 RBP: 00007ffeda93a200 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000400490 R13: 00007ffeda93a2e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 We think that raising BUG is overkilling for splitting huge_zero_page, the huge_zero_page can't be met from normal paths other than memory failure, but memory failure is a valid caller. So we tend to replace the BUG to WARN + returning -EBUSY, and thus the panic above won't happen again. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f35f8b97377d5d3ede1bc5ac3114da888c57cbce.1651052574.git.xuyu@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: d173d54 ("mm/memory-failure.c: skip huge_zero_page in memory_failure()") Fixes: 6a46079 ("HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7") Signed-off-by: Xu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com> Suggested-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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The following VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO() is triggered when memory error event happens on the (thp/folio) pages which are about to be freed: [ 1160.232771] page:00000000b36a8a0f refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x16a000 [ 1160.236916] page:00000000b36a8a0f refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x16a000 [ 1160.240684] flags: 0x57ffffc0800000(hwpoison|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 1160.243458] raw: 0057ffffc0800000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 1160.246268] raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 1160.249197] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio)) [ 1160.251815] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1160.253438] kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:788! [ 1160.256162] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 1160.258172] CPU: 2 PID: 115368 Comm: mceinj.sh Tainted: G E 5.18.0-rc1-v5.18-rc1-220404-2353-005-g83111+ #3 [ 1160.262049] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014 [ 1160.265103] RIP: 0010:dump_page.cold+0x27e/0x2bd [ 1160.266757] Code: fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 81 f1 5a 98 e9 4c fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 a1 95 59 98 e9 40 fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 50 bf 5a 98 48 89 ef e8 9d 04 6d ff <0f> 0b 41 f7 c4 ff 0f 00 00 0f 85 9f fd ff ff 49 8b 04 24 a9 00 00 [ 1160.273180] RSP: 0018:ffffaa2c4d59fd18 EFLAGS: 00010292 [ 1160.274969] RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1160.277263] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff985995a1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 1160.279571] RBP: ffffdc9c45a80000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff [ 1160.281794] R10: ffffaa2c4d59fb08 R11: ffffffff98940d08 R12: ffffdc9c45a80000 [ 1160.283920] R13: ffffffff985b6f94 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffdc9c45a80000 [ 1160.286641] FS: 00007eff54ce1740(0000) GS:ffff99c67bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1160.289498] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1160.291106] CR2: 00005628381a5f68 CR3: 0000000104712003 CR4: 0000000000170ee0 [ 1160.293031] Call Trace: [ 1160.293724] <TASK> [ 1160.294334] get_hwpoison_page+0x47d/0x570 [ 1160.295474] memory_failure+0x106/0xaa0 [ 1160.296474] ? security_capable+0x36/0x50 [ 1160.297524] hard_offline_page_store+0x43/0x80 [ 1160.298684] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0 [ 1160.299829] new_sync_write+0xf9/0x160 [ 1160.300810] vfs_write+0x209/0x290 [ 1160.301835] ksys_write+0x4f/0xc0 [ 1160.302718] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 1160.303664] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 1160.304981] RIP: 0033:0x7eff54b018b7 As shown in the RIP address, this VM_BUG_ON in folio_entire_mapcount() is called from dump_page("hwpoison: unhandlable page") in get_any_page(). The below explains the mechanism of the race: CPU 0 CPU 1 memory_failure get_hwpoison_page get_any_page dump_page compound = PageCompound free_pages_prepare page->flags &= ~PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_PREP folio_entire_mapcount VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio)) So replace dump_page() with safer one, pr_err(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220427053220.719866-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 74e8ee4 ("mm: Turn head_compound_mapcount() into folio_entire_mapcount()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Do not allow to write timestamps on RX rings if PF is being configured. When PF is being configured RX rings can be freed or rebuilt. If at the same time timestamps are updated, the kernel will crash by dereferencing null RX ring pointer. PID: 1449 TASK: ff187d28ed658040 CPU: 34 COMMAND: "ice-ptp-0000:51" #0 [ff1966a94a713bb0] machine_kexec at ffffffff9d05a0be #1 [ff1966a94a713c08] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9d192e9d #2 [ff1966a94a713cd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff9d1941bd #3 [ff1966a94a713ce8] oops_end at ffffffff9d01bd54 #4 [ff1966a94a713d08] no_context at ffffffff9d06bda4 #5 [ff1966a94a713d60] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9d06c10c torvalds#6 [ff1966a94a713da8] do_page_fault at ffffffff9d06cae4 torvalds#7 [ff1966a94a713de0] page_fault at ffffffff9da0107e [exception RIP: ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+91] RIP: ffffffffc076db8b RSP: ff1966a94a713e98 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 16e3db9c6b7ccae4 RBX: ff187d269dd3c180 RCX: ff187d269cd4d018 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ff187d269cfcc644 R8: ff187d339b9641b0 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff187d269cfcc648 R13: ffffffff9f128784 R14: ffffffff9d101b70 R15: ff187d269cfcc640 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#8 [ff1966a94a713ea0] ice_ptp_periodic_work at ffffffffc076dbef [ice] torvalds#9 [ff1966a94a713ee0] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff9d101c1b torvalds#10 [ff1966a94a713f10] kthread at ffffffff9d101b4d torvalds#11 [ff1966a94a713f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff9da0023f Fixes: 77a7811 ("ice: enable receive hardware timestamping") Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dave Cain <dcain@redhat.com> Tested-by: Gurucharan <gurucharanx.g@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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Will reported the following splat when running with Protected KVM enabled: [ 2.427181] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2.427668] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c:489 __create_hyp_private_mapping+0x118/0x1ac [ 2.428424] Modules linked in: [ 2.429040] CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-00084-g8635adc4efc7 #1 [ 2.429589] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 2.430286] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 2.430734] pc : __create_hyp_private_mapping+0x118/0x1ac [ 2.431091] lr : create_hyp_exec_mappings+0x40/0x80 [ 2.431377] sp : ffff80000803baf0 [ 2.431597] x29: ffff80000803bb00 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 2.432156] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 2.432561] x23: ffffcd96c343b000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff80000803bb40 [ 2.433004] x20: 0000000000000004 x19: 0000000000001800 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 2.433343] x17: 0003e68cf7efdd70 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: fffffc81f602a2c8 [ 2.434053] x14: ffffdf8380000000 x13: ffffcd9573200000 x12: ffffcd96c343b000 [ 2.434401] x11: 0000000000000004 x10: ffffcd96c1738000 x9 : 0000000000000004 [ 2.434812] x8 : ffff80000803bb40 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : 544f422effff306b [ 2.435136] x5 : 000000008020001e x4 : ffff207d80a88c00 x3 : 0000000000000005 [ 2.435480] x2 : 0000000000001800 x1 : 000000014f4ab800 x0 : 000000000badca11 [ 2.436149] Call trace: [ 2.436600] __create_hyp_private_mapping+0x118/0x1ac [ 2.437576] create_hyp_exec_mappings+0x40/0x80 [ 2.438180] kvm_init_vector_slots+0x180/0x194 [ 2.458941] kvm_arch_init+0x80/0x274 [ 2.459220] kvm_init+0x48/0x354 [ 2.459416] arm_init+0x20/0x2c [ 2.459601] do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x238 [ 2.459809] do_initcall_level+0x94/0xb4 [ 2.460043] do_initcalls+0x54/0x94 [ 2.460228] do_basic_setup+0x1c/0x28 [ 2.460407] kernel_init_freeable+0x110/0x178 [ 2.460610] kernel_init+0x20/0x1a0 [ 2.460817] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 2.461274] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Indeed, the Protected KVM mode promotes __create_hyp_private_mapping() to a hypercall as EL1 no longer has access to the hypervisor's stage-1 page-table. However, the call from kvm_init_vector_slots() happens after pKVM has been initialized on the primary CPU, but before it has been initialized on secondaries. As such, if the KVM initcall procedure is migrated from one CPU to another in this window, the hypercall may end up running on a CPU for which EL2 has not been initialized. Fortunately, the pKVM hypervisor doesn't rely on the host to re-map the vectors in the private range, so the hypercall in question is in fact superfluous. Skip it when pKVM is enabled. Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com> [maz: simplified the checks slightly] Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220513092607.35233-1-qperret@google.com
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The splat below can be seen when running kvm-unit-test:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.18.0-rc7 #5 Tainted: G IOE
-----------------------------
/home/kernel/linux/arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:80 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
4 locks held by qemu-system-x86/35124:
#0: ffff9725391d80b8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x77/0x710 [kvm]
#1: ffffbd25cfb2a0b8 (&kvm->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: vcpu_enter_guest+0xdeb/0x1900 [kvm]
#2: ffffbd25cfb2b920 (&kvm->irq_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint+0x79/0x1e0 [kvm]
#3: ffffbd25cfb2b920 (&kvm->irq_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: irqfd_resampler_ack+0x5/0x110 [kvm]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 2 PID: 35124 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G IOE 5.18.0-rc7 #5
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9b
irqfd_resampler_ack+0xfd/0x110 [kvm]
kvm_notify_acked_gsi+0x32/0x90 [kvm]
kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint+0xc5/0x1e0 [kvm]
kvm_hv_set_msr_common+0xec1/0x1160 [kvm]
kvm_set_msr_common+0x7c3/0xf60 [kvm]
vmx_set_msr+0x394/0x1240 [kvm_intel]
kvm_set_msr_ignored_check+0x86/0x200 [kvm]
kvm_emulate_wrmsr+0x4f/0x1f0 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x6fb/0x7e0 [kvm_intel]
vcpu_enter_guest+0xe5a/0x1900 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x16e/0xac0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x279/0x710 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
resampler-list is protected by irq_srcu (see kvm_irqfd_assign), so fix
the false positive by using list_for_each_entry_srcu().
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Message-Id: <1652950153-12489-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The rcutorture module is used to run torture tests that validate RCU. rcutorture takes a variety of module parameters that configure the functionality of the test. Amongst these parameters are the types of synchronization mechanisms that the rcu_torture_writer and rcu_torture_fakewriter tasks may use, and the torture_type of the run which determines what read and sync operations are used by the various writer and reader tasks that run throughout the test. When the module is configured to only use sync types for which the specified torture_type does not implement the necessary operations, we can end up in a state where nsynctypes is 0. This is not an erroneous state, but it currently crashes the kernel with a #DE due to nsynctypes being used with a modulo operator in rcu_torture_fakewriter(). Here is an example of such a #DE: $ insmod ./rcutorture.ko gp_cond=1 gp_cond_exp=0 gp_exp=0 gp_poll_exp=0 gp_normal=0 gp_poll=0 gp_poll_exp=0 verbose=9999 torture_type=trivial ... [ 8536.525096] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 8536.525101] CPU: 30 PID: 392138 Comm: rcu_torture_fak Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S 5.17.0-rc1-00179-gc8c42c80febd torvalds#24 [ 8536.525105] Hardware name: Quanta Twin Lakes MP/Twin Lakes Passive MP, BIOS F09_3A23 12/08/2020 [ 8536.525106] RIP: 0010:rcu_torture_fakewriter+0xf1/0x2d0 [rcutorture] [ 8536.525121] Code: 00 31 d2 8d 0c f5 00 00 00 00 48 63 c9 48 f7 f1 48 85 d2 0f 84 79 ff ff ff 48 89 e7 e8 78 78 01 00 48 63 0d 29 ca 00 00 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 8b 04 95 00 05 4e a0 83 f8 06 0f 84 ad 00 00 00 7f 1f 83 [ 8536.525124] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000777fef0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 8536.525127] RAX: 00000000223d006e RBX: cccccccccccccccd RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 8536.525130] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff824315b9 RDI: ffffc9000777fef0 [ 8536.525132] RBP: ffffc9000487bb30 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 000000000002a580 [ 8536.525134] R10: ffffffff82c5f920 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881a2c35d00 [ 8536.525136] R13: ffff8881540c8d00 R14: ffffffffa04d39d0 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 8536.525137] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88903ff80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 8536.525140] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 8536.525142] CR2: 00007f839f022000 CR3: 0000000002c0a006 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [ 8536.525144] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 8536.525145] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 8536.525147] PKRU: 55555554 [ 8536.525148] Call Trace: [ 8536.525150] <TASK> [ 8536.525153] kthread+0xe8/0x110 [ 8536.525161] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 8536.525167] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 8536.525174] </TASK> The solution is to gracefully handle the case of nsynctypes being 0 in rcu_torture_fakewriter() by not performing any work. This is already being done in rcu_torture_writer(), though there is a missing return on that path which will be fixed in a subsequent patch. Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
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It can happen that the parent of a bfqq changes between the moment we decide two queues are worth to merge (and set bic->stable_merge_bfqq) and the moment bfq_setup_merge() is called. This can happen e.g. because the process submitted IO for a different cgroup and thus bfqq got reparented. It can even happen that the bfqq we are merging with has parent cgroup that is already offline and going to be destroyed in which case the merge can lead to use-after-free issues such as: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800693c0c0 by task runc:[2:INIT]/10544 CPU: 0 PID: 10544 Comm: runc:[2:INIT] Tainted: G E 5.15.2-0.g5fb85fd-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) f1f3b891c72369aebecd2e43e4641a6358867c70 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5a print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140 ? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b ? __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 __bfq_deactivate_entity+0x9cb/0xa50 ? update_curr+0x32f/0x5d0 bfq_deactivate_entity+0xa0/0x1d0 bfq_del_bfqq_busy+0x28a/0x420 ? resched_curr+0x116/0x1d0 ? bfq_requeue_bfqq+0x70/0x70 ? check_preempt_wakeup+0x52b/0xbc0 __bfq_bfqq_expire+0x1a2/0x270 bfq_bfqq_expire+0xd16/0x2160 ? try_to_wake_up+0x4ee/0x1260 ? bfq_end_wr_async_queues+0xe0/0xe0 ? _raw_write_unlock_bh+0x60/0x60 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0 bfq_idle_slice_timer+0x109/0x280 ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x4870/0x4870 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x37d/0x700 ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x1b0/0x1b0 ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x10 ? ktime_get_update_offsets_now+0x6f/0x280 hrtimer_interrupt+0x2c8/0x740 Fix the problem by checking that the parent of the two bfqqs we are merging in bfq_setup_merge() is the same. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20211125172809.GC19572@quack2.suse.cz/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 430a67f ("block, bfq: merge bursts of newly-created queues") Tested-by: "yukuai (C)" <yukuai3@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220401102752.8599-2-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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If bitmap area contains invalid data, kernel will crash then mdadm triggers "Segmentation fault". This is cluster-md speical bug. In non-clustered env, mdadm will handle broken metadata case. In clustered array, only kernel space handles bitmap slot info. But even this bug only happened in clustered env, current sanity check is wrong, the code should be changed. How to trigger: (faulty injection) dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=1 oflag=direct of=/dev/sda dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=1 oflag=direct of=/dev/sdb mdadm -C /dev/md0 -b clustered -e 1.2 -n 2 -l mirror /dev/sda /dev/sdb mdadm -Ss echo aaa > magic.txt == below modifying slot 2 bitmap data == dd if=magic.txt of=/dev/sda seek=16384 bs=1 count=3 <== destroy magic dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda seek=16436 bs=1 count=4 <== ZERO chunksize mdadm -A /dev/md0 /dev/sda /dev/sdb == kernel crashes. mdadm outputs "Segmentation fault" == Reason of kernel crash: In md_bitmap_read_sb (called by md_bitmap_create), bad bitmap magic didn't block chunksize assignment, and zero value made DIV_ROUND_UP_SECTOR_T() trigger "divide error". Crash log: kernel: md: md0 stopped. kernel: md/raid1:md0: not clean -- starting background reconstruction kernel: md/raid1:md0: active with 2 out of 2 mirrors kernel: dlm: ... ... kernel: md-cluster: Joined cluster 44810aba-38bb-e6b8-daca-bc97a0b254aa slot 1 kernel: md0: invalid bitmap file superblock: bad magic kernel: md_bitmap_copy_from_slot can't get bitmap from slot 2 kernel: md-cluster: Could not gather bitmaps from slot 2 kernel: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 1603 Comm: mdadm Not tainted 5.14.6-1-default kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) kernel: RIP: 0010:md_bitmap_create+0x1d1/0x850 [md_mod] kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffc22ac0843ba0 EFLAGS: 00010246 kernel: ... ... kernel: Call Trace: kernel: ? dlm_lock_sync+0xd0/0xd0 [md_cluster 77fe..7a0] kernel: md_bitmap_copy_from_slot+0x2c/0x290 [md_mod 24ea..d3a] kernel: load_bitmaps+0xec/0x210 [md_cluster 77fe..7a0] kernel: md_bitmap_load+0x81/0x1e0 [md_mod 24ea..d3a] kernel: do_md_run+0x30/0x100 [md_mod 24ea..d3a] kernel: md_ioctl+0x1290/0x15a0 [md_mod 24ea....d3a] kernel: ? mddev_unlock+0xaa/0x130 [md_mod 24ea..d3a] kernel: ? blkdev_ioctl+0xb1/0x2b0 kernel: block_ioctl+0x3b/0x40 kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xb0 kernel: do_syscall_64+0x59/0x80 kernel: ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ab/0x230 kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x40 kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x80 kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7f4a15fa722b kernel: ... ... kernel: ---[ end trace 8afa7612f559c868 ]--- kernel: RIP: 0010:md_bitmap_create+0x1d1/0x850 [md_mod] Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
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On our ZynqMP system we observe, that a NVMe drive that resets itself while doing a firmware update causes a Kernel crash like this: [ 67.720772] pcieport 0000:02:02.0: pciehp: Slot(2): Link Down [ 67.720783] pcieport 0000:02:02.0: pciehp: Slot(2): Card not present [ 67.720795] nvme 0000:04:00.0: PME# disabled [ 67.720849] Internal error: synchronous external abort: 96000010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 67.720853] nwl-pcie fd0e0000.pcie: Slave error Analysis: When nvme_dev_disable() is called because of this PCIe hotplug event, pci_is_enabled() is still true. And accessing the NVMe drive which is currently not available as it's in reboot process causes this "synchronous external abort" on this ARM64 platform. This patch adds the pci_device_is_present() check as well, which returns false in this "Card not present" hot-plug case. With this change, the NVMe driver does not try to access the NVMe registers any more and the FW update finishes without any problems. Signed-off-by: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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Use hypercall to emulate MSR read/write for the TDX platform. There are two viable approaches for doing MSRs in a TD guest: 1. Execute the RDMSR/WRMSR instructions like most VMs and bare metal do. Some will succeed, others will cause a #VE. All of those that cause a #VE will be handled with a TDCALL. 2. Use paravirt infrastructure. The paravirt hook has to keep a list of which MSRs would cause a #VE and use a TDCALL. All other MSRs execute RDMSR/WRMSR instructions directly. The second option can be ruled out because the list of MSRs was challenging to maintain. That leaves option #1 as the only viable solution for the minimal TDX support. Kernel relies on the exception fixup machinery to handle MSR access errors. #VE handler uses the same exception fixup code as #GP. It covers MSR accesses along with other types of fixups. For performance-critical MSR writes (like TSC_DEADLINE), future patches will replace the WRMSR/#VE sequence with the direct TDCALL. RDMSR and WRMSR specification details can be found in Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI) for Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX) specification, sec titled "TDG.VP. VMCALL<Instruction.RDMSR>" and "TDG.VP.VMCALL<Instruction.WRMSR>". Co-developed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220405232939.73860-10-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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A panic was reported in the init process on AMD: Run /sbin/init as init process init[1]: segfault at f7fd5ca0 ip 00000000f7f5bbc7 sp 00000000ffa06aa0 error 7 in libc.so[f7f51000+4e000] Code: 8a 44 24 10 88 41 ff 8b 44 24 10 83 c4 2c 5b 5e 5f 5d c3 53 83 ec 08 8b 5c 24 10 81 fb 00 f0 ff ff 76 0c e8 ba dc ff ff f7 db <89> 18 83 cb ff 83 c4 08 89 d8 5b c3 e8 81 60 ff ff 05 28 84 07 00 Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G W 5.18.0-rc7-next-20220519 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d panic+0x10f/0x28d do_exit.cold+0x18/0x48 do_group_exit+0x2e/0xb0 get_signal+0xb6d/0xb80 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x31/0x760 ? show_opcodes.cold+0x1c/0x21 ? force_sig_fault+0x49/0x70 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x131/0x1a0 irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x5/0x30 asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 RIP: 0023:0xf7f5bbc7 Code: 8a 44 24 10 88 41 ff 8b 44 24 10 83 c4 2c 5b 5e 5f 5d c3 53 83 ec 08 8b 5c 24 10 81 fb 00 f0 ff ff 76 0c e8 ba dc ff ff f7 db <89> 18 83 cb ff 83 c4 08 89 d8 5b c3 e8 81 60 ff ff 05 28 84 07 00 RSP: 002b:00000000ffa06aa0 EFLAGS: 00000217 RAX: 00000000f7fd5ca0 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000f7fd5b60 RDI: 00000000f7fd5b60 RBP: 00000000f7fd1c1c R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> The task's CX register got corrupted by commit 8c42819 ("x86/entry: Use PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS for compat"), which overlooked the fact that compat SYSCALL apparently stores the user's CX value in BP. Before that commit, CX was saved from its stashed value in BP: pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->cx (stashed in bp) */ But then it got changed to: pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */ So the wrong value got saved and later restored back to the user. Fix it by pushing the correct value again (BP) for regs->cx. Fixes: 8c42819 ("x86/entry: Use PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS for compat") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b5a26592c9dd60bbacdf97974a7433fd802a5593.1652985970.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
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When arm64 is configured with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y, a warning is printed from the patching code because patch_map(), e.g. | ------------[ cut here ]------------ | WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/arm64/kernel/patching.c:45 patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 | CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-00002-ge1a5d6c6be55 #1 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 800003c5 (Nzcv DAIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 | lr : patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 | sp : ffffa9bb312a79a0 | x29: ffffa9bb312a79a0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000000001 | x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000000402e8 | x23: ffffa9bb2c94c1c8 x22: ffffa9bb2c94c000 x21: ffffa9bb222e883c | x20: 0000000000000002 x19: ffffc1ffc100ba40 x18: ffffa9bb2cf0f21c | x17: 0000000000000006 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000004 | x14: 1ffff5376625b4ac x13: ffff753766a67fb8 x12: ffff753766919cd1 | x11: 0000000000000003 x10: 1ffff5376625b4c3 x9 : 1ffff5376625b4af | x8 : ffff753766254f0a x7 : 0000000041b58ab3 x6 : ffff753766254f18 | x5 : ffffa9bb312d9bc0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffffa9bb29bd90e4 | x2 : 0000000000000002 x1 : ffffa9bb312d9bc0 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 (P) | patch_map.constprop.0+0x120/0xd00 (L) | __aarch64_insn_write+0xa8/0x120 | aarch64_insn_patch_text_nosync+0x4c/0xb8 | arch_jump_label_transform_queue+0x7c/0x100 | jump_label_update+0x154/0x460 | static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0x1d8/0x280 | static_key_enable+0x2c/0x48 | early_randomize_kstack_offset+0x104/0x168 | do_early_param+0xe4/0x148 | parse_args+0x3a4/0x838 | parse_early_options+0x50/0x68 | parse_early_param+0x58/0xe0 | setup_arch+0x78/0x1f0 | start_kernel+0xa0/0x530 | __primary_switched+0x8c/0xa0 | irq event stamp: 0 | hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | softirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The warning has been produced since commit: 3e25d5a ("asm-generic: add an optional pfn_valid check to page_to_phys") ... which added a pfn_valid() check into page_to_phys(), and at this point in boot pfn_valid() will always return false because the vmemmap has not yet been initialized and there are no valid mem_sections yet. Before that commit, the arithmetic performed by page_to_phys() would give the expected physical address, though it is somewhat dubious to use vmemmap addresses before the vmemmap has been initialized. Aside from kernel image addresses, all executable code should be allocated from execmem (where all allocations will fall within the vmalloc area), and so there's no need for the fallback case when CONFIG_EXECMEM=n. Simplify patch_map() accordingly, directly converting kernel image addresses and removing the redundant fallback case. Fixes: 3e25d5a ("asm-generic: add an optional pfn_valid check to page_to_phys") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241202170359.1475019-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Multiple syzbot warnings have been reported. These warnings are mainly
about the lock order between trie->lock and kmalloc()'s internal lock.
See report [1] as an example:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.10.0-rc7-syzkaller-00003-g4376e966ecb7 #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz.3.2069/15008 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88801544e6d8 (&n->list_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: get_partial_node ...
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88802dcc89f8 (&trie->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: trie_update_elem ...
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&trie->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x60
trie_delete_elem+0xb0/0x820
___bpf_prog_run+0x3e51/0xabd0
__bpf_prog_run32+0xc1/0x100
bpf_dispatcher_nop_func
......
bpf_trace_run2+0x231/0x590
__bpf_trace_contention_end+0xca/0x110
trace_contention_end.constprop.0+0xea/0x170
__pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x28e/0xcc0
pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath
queued_spin_lock_slowpath
queued_spin_lock
do_raw_spin_lock+0x210/0x2c0
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x42/0x60
__put_partials+0xc3/0x170
qlink_free
qlist_free_all+0x4e/0x140
kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x192/0x1e0
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x69/0x90
kasan_slab_alloc
slab_post_alloc_hook
slab_alloc_node
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x153/0x310
__alloc_skb+0x2b1/0x380
......
-> #0 (&n->list_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
check_prev_add
check_prevs_add
validate_chain
__lock_acquire+0x2478/0x3b30
lock_acquire
lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x560
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3a/0x60
get_partial_node.part.0+0x20/0x350
get_partial_node
get_partial
___slab_alloc+0x65b/0x1870
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xb0
__slab_alloc_node
slab_alloc_node
__do_kmalloc_node
__kmalloc_node_noprof+0x35c/0x440
kmalloc_node_noprof
bpf_map_kmalloc_node+0x98/0x4a0
lpm_trie_node_alloc
trie_update_elem+0x1ef/0xe00
bpf_map_update_value+0x2c1/0x6c0
map_update_elem+0x623/0x910
__sys_bpf+0x90c/0x49a0
...
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&trie->lock);
lock(&n->list_lock);
lock(&trie->lock);
lock(&n->list_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
[1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9045c0a3d5a7f1b119f7
A bpf program attached to trace_contention_end() triggers after
acquiring &n->list_lock. The program invokes trie_delete_elem(), which
then acquires trie->lock. However, it is possible that another
process is invoking trie_update_elem(). trie_update_elem() will acquire
trie->lock first, then invoke kmalloc_node(). kmalloc_node() may invoke
get_partial_node() and try to acquire &n->list_lock (not necessarily the
same lock object). Therefore, lockdep warns about the circular locking
dependency.
Invoking kmalloc() before acquiring trie->lock could fix the warning.
However, since BPF programs call be invoked from any context (e.g.,
through kprobe/tracepoint/fentry), there may still be lock ordering
problems for internal locks in kmalloc() or trie->lock itself.
To eliminate these potential lock ordering problems with kmalloc()'s
internal locks, replacing kmalloc()/kfree()/kfree_rcu() with equivalent
BPF memory allocator APIs that can be invoked in any context. The lock
ordering problems with trie->lock (e.g., reentrance) will be handled
separately.
Three aspects of this change require explanation:
1. Intermediate and leaf nodes are allocated from the same allocator.
Since the value size of LPM trie is usually small, using a single
alocator reduces the memory overhead of the BPF memory allocator.
2. Leaf nodes are allocated before disabling IRQs. This handles cases
where leaf_size is large (e.g., > 4KB - 8) and updates require
intermediate node allocation. If leaf nodes were allocated in
IRQ-disabled region, the free objects in BPF memory allocator would not
be refilled timely and the intermediate node allocation may fail.
3. Paired migrate_{disable|enable}() calls for node alloc and free. The
BPF memory allocator uses per-CPU struct internally, these paired calls
are necessary to guarantee correctness.
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241206110622.1161752-7-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add more test cases for LPM trie in test_maps: 1) test_lpm_trie_update_flags It constructs various use cases for BPF_EXIST and BPF_NOEXIST and check whether the return value of update operation is expected. 2) test_lpm_trie_update_full_maps It tests the update operations on a full LPM trie map. Adding new node will fail and overwriting the value of existed node will succeed. 3) test_lpm_trie_iterate_strs and test_lpm_trie_iterate_ints There two test cases test whether the iteration through get_next_key is sorted and expected. These two test cases delete the minimal key after each iteration and check whether next iteration returns the second minimal key. The only difference between these two test cases is the former one saves strings in the LPM trie and the latter saves integers. Without the fix of get_next_key, these two cases will fail as shown below: test_lpm_trie_iterate_strs(1091):FAIL:iterate #2 got abc exp abS test_lpm_trie_iterate_ints(1142):FAIL:iterate #1 got 0x2 exp 0x1 Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241206110622.1161752-10-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Hou Tao says: ==================== This patch set fixes several issues for LPM trie. These issues were found during adding new test cases or were reported by syzbot. The patch set is structured as follows: Patch #1~#2 are clean-ups for lpm_trie_update_elem(). Patch #3 handles BPF_EXIST and BPF_NOEXIST correctly for LPM trie. Patch #4 fixes the accounting of n_entries when doing in-place update. Patch #5 fixes the exact match condition in trie_get_next_key() and it may skip keys when the passed key is not found in the map. Patch torvalds#6~torvalds#7 switch from kmalloc() to bpf memory allocator for LPM trie to fix several lock order warnings reported by syzbot. It also enables raw_spinlock_t for LPM trie again. After these changes, the LPM trie will be closer to being usable in any context (though the reentrance check of trie->lock is still missing, but it is on my todo list). Patch torvalds#8: move test_lpm_map to map_tests to make it run regularly. Patch torvalds#9: add test cases for the issues fixed by patch #3~#5. Please see individual patches for more details. Comments are always welcome. Change Log: v3: * patch #2: remove the unnecessary NULL-init for im_node * patch torvalds#6: alloc the leaf node before disabling IRQ to low the possibility of -ENOMEM when leaf_size is large; Free these nodes outside the trie lock (Suggested by Alexei) * collect review and ack tags (Thanks for Toke & Daniel) v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241127004641.1118269-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/ * collect review tags (Thanks for Toke) * drop "Add bpf_mem_cache_is_mergeable() helper" patch * patch #3~#4: add fix tag * patch #4: rename the helper to trie_check_add_elem() and increase n_entries in it. * patch torvalds#6: use one bpf mem allocator and update commit message to clarify that using bpf mem allocator is more appropriate. * patch torvalds#7: update commit message to add the possible max running time for update operation. * patch torvalds#9: update commit message to specify the purpose of these test cases. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241118010808.2243555-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/ ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241206110622.1161752-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/ Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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System crash is observed with stack trace warning of use after free. There are 2 signals to tell dpc_thread to terminate (UNLOADING flag and kthread_stop). On setting the UNLOADING flag when dpc_thread happens to run at the time and sees the flag, this causes dpc_thread to exit and clean up itself. When kthread_stop is called for final cleanup, this causes use after free. Remove UNLOADING signal to terminate dpc_thread. Use the kthread_stop as the main signal to exit dpc_thread. [596663.812935] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:294! [596663.812950] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [596663.812957] CPU: 13 PID: 1475935 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G IOE --------- - - 4.18.0-240.el8.x86_64 #1 [596663.812960] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380p Gen8, BIOS P70 08/20/2012 [596663.812974] RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x17d/0x360 ... [596663.813008] Call Trace: [596663.813022] ? __dentry_kill+0x121/0x170 [596663.813030] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [596663.813034] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [596663.813039] ? wait_for_completion+0x35/0x190 [596663.813048] ? try_to_wake_up+0x63/0x540 [596663.813055] free_task+0x5a/0x60 [596663.813061] kthread_stop+0xf3/0x100 [596663.813103] qla2x00_remove_one+0x284/0x440 [qla2xxx] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241115130313.46826-3-njavali@marvell.com Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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Kernel will hang on destroy admin_q while we create ctrl failed, such as following calltrace: PID: 23644 TASK: ff2d52b40f439fc0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "nvme" #0 [ff61d23de260fb78] __schedule at ffffffff8323bc15 #1 [ff61d23de260fc08] schedule at ffffffff8323c014 #2 [ff61d23de260fc28] blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait at ffffffff82a3dba1 #3 [ff61d23de260fc78] blk_freeze_queue at ffffffff82a4113a #4 [ff61d23de260fc90] blk_cleanup_queue at ffffffff82a33006 #5 [ff61d23de260fcb0] nvme_rdma_destroy_admin_queue at ffffffffc12686ce torvalds#6 [ff61d23de260fcc8] nvme_rdma_setup_ctrl at ffffffffc1268ced torvalds#7 [ff61d23de260fd28] nvme_rdma_create_ctrl at ffffffffc126919b torvalds#8 [ff61d23de260fd68] nvmf_dev_write at ffffffffc024f362 torvalds#9 [ff61d23de260fe38] vfs_write at ffffffff827d5f25 RIP: 00007fda7891d574 RSP: 00007ffe2ef06958 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e8122a4d90 RCX: 00007fda7891d574 RDX: 000000000000012b RSI: 000055e8122a4d90 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffe2ef079c0 R8: 000000000000012b R9: 000055e8122a4d90 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 000055e8122923c0 R14: 000000000000012b R15: 00007fda78a54500 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This due to we have quiesced admi_q before cancel requests, but forgot to unquiesce before destroy it, as a result we fail to drain the pending requests, and hang on blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait() forever. Here try to reuse nvme_rdma_teardown_admin_queue() to fix this issue and simplify the code. Fixes: 958dc1d ("nvme-rdma: add clean action for failed reconnection") Reported-by: Yingfu.zhou <yingfu.zhou@shopee.com> Signed-off-by: Chunguang.xu <chunguang.xu@shopee.com> Signed-off-by: Yue.zhao <yue.zhao@shopee.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
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…A in a MM We currently assume that there is at least one VMA in a MM, which isn't true. So we might end up having find_vma() return NULL, to then de-reference NULL. So properly handle find_vma() returning NULL. This fixes the report: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6021 Comm: syz-executor284 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00187-gf868cd251776 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024 RIP: 0010:migrate_to_node mm/mempolicy.c:1090 [inline] RIP: 0010:do_migrate_pages+0x403/0x6f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1194 Code: ... RSP: 0018:ffffc9000375fd08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000375fd78 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88807e171300 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88803390c044 RBP: ffff88807e171428 R08: 0000000000000014 R09: fffffbfff2039ef1 R10: ffffffff901cf78f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: ffffc9000375fe90 R14: ffffc9000375fe98 R15: ffffc9000375fdf8 FS: 00005555919e1380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00005555919e1ca8 CR3: 000000007f12a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> kernel_migrate_pages+0x5b2/0x750 mm/mempolicy.c:1709 __do_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1727 [inline] __se_sys_migrate_pages mm/mempolicy.c:1723 [inline] __x64_sys_migrate_pages+0x96/0x100 mm/mempolicy.c:1723 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add unlikely()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241120201151.9518-1-david@redhat.com Fixes: 3974388 ("[PATCH] Swap Migration V5: sys_migrate_pages interface") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot+3511625422f7aa637f0d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/673d2696.050a0220.3c9d61.012f.GAE@google.com/T/ Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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…imary CPU Commit 5944ce0 ("arch_topology: Build cacheinfo from primary CPU") adds functionality that architectures can use to optionally allocate and build cacheinfo early during boot. Commit 6539cff ("cacheinfo: Add arch specific early level initializer") lets secondary CPUs correct (and reallocate memory) cacheinfo data if needed. If the early build functionality is not used and cacheinfo does not need correction, memory for cacheinfo is never allocated. x86 does not use the early build functionality. Consequently, during the cacheinfo CPU hotplug callback, last_level_cache_is_valid() attempts to dereference a NULL pointer: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000100 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEPMT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID 19 Comm: cpuhp/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc2 #1 RIP: 0010: last_level_cache_is_valid+0x95/0xe0a Allocate memory for cacheinfo during the cacheinfo CPU hotplug callback if not done earlier. Moreover, before determining the validity of the last-level cache info, ensure that it has been allocated. Simply checking for non-zero cache_leaves() is not sufficient, as some architectures (e.g., Intel processors) have non-zero cache_leaves() before allocation. Dereferencing NULL cacheinfo can occur in update_per_cpu_data_slice_size(). This function iterates over all online CPUs. However, a CPU may have come online recently, but its cacheinfo may not have been allocated yet. While here, remove an unnecessary indentation in allocate_cache_info(). [ bp: Massage. ] Fixes: 6539cff ("cacheinfo: Add arch specific early level initializer") Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Radu Rendec <rrendec@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andreas Herrmann <aherrmann@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.3+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241128002247.26726-2-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
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syzbot found [1] that after blamed commit, ub->ubsock->sk was NULL when attempting the atomic_dec() : atomic_dec(&tipc_net(sock_net(ub->ubsock->sk))->wq_count); Fix this by caching the tipc_net pointer. [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5896 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-next-20241203-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Workqueue: events cleanup_bearer RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:387 [inline] RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline] RIP: 0010:cleanup_bearer+0x1f7/0x280 net/tipc/udp_media.c:820 Code: 18 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 3c f7 99 f6 48 8b 1b 48 83 c3 30 e8 f0 e4 60 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 1a f7 99 f6 49 83 c7 e8 48 8b 1b RSP: 0018:ffffc9000410fb70 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000006 RBX: 0000000000000030 RCX: ffff88802fe45a00 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffc9000410f900 RBP: ffff88807e1f0908 R08: ffffc9000410f907 R09: 1ffff92000821f20 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52000821f21 R12: ffff888031d19980 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88807e1f0918 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556ca050b000 CR3: 0000000031c0c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: 6a2fa13 ("tipc: Fix use-after-free of kernel socket in cleanup_bearer().") Reported-by: syzbot+46aa5474f179dacd1a3b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/67508b5f.050a0220.17bd51.0070.GAE@google.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241204170548.4152658-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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If the FW log context memory is retained after FW reset, the existing code is not handling the condition correctly and zeroes out the data structures. This potentially will cause a division by zero crash when the user runs ethtool -w. The last_type is also not set correctly when the context memory is retained. This will cause errors because the last_type signals to the FW that all context memory types have been configured. Oops: divide error: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 53 UID: 0 PID: 7019 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.12.0-rc7+ #1 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-621C-TN12R/X13DDW-A, BIOS 1.4 08/10/2023 RIP: 0010:__bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] Code: 0a 31 d2 4c 89 6c 24 10 45 8b a5 fc df ff ff 4c 8b 74 24 20 31 db 66 89 44 24 06 48 63 c5 c1 e5 09 4c 0f af e0 48 8b 44 24 30 <49> f7 f4 4c 89 64 24 08 48 63 c5 4d 89 ec 31 ed 48 89 44 24 18 49 RSP: 0018:ff480591603d78b8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000100000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff23959e46740000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000100000 R09: ff23959e46740000 R10: ff480591603d7a18 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ff23959e46742008 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f04227c1740(0000) GS:ff2395adbf680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f04225b33a5 CR3: 000000108b9a4001 CR4: 0000000000773ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die+0x33/0x90 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80 ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] ? exc_divide_error+0x36/0x50 ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x16/0x20 ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0x86/0x160 [bnxt_en] ? __bnxt_copy_ctx_mem.constprop.0.isra.0+0xda/0x160 [bnxt_en] bnxt_get_ctx_coredump.constprop.0+0x1ed/0x390 [bnxt_en] ? __memcg_slab_post_alloc_hook+0x21c/0x3c0 ? __bnxt_get_coredump+0x473/0x4b0 [bnxt_en] __bnxt_get_coredump+0x473/0x4b0 [bnxt_en] ? security_file_alloc+0x74/0xe0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x78/0x120 bnxt_get_coredump_length+0x4b/0xf0 [bnxt_en] bnxt_get_dump_flag+0x40/0x60 [bnxt_en] __dev_ethtool+0x17e4/0x1fc0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xc/0x1d0 ? do_syscall_64+0x85/0x150 ? unmap_page_range+0x299/0x4b0 ? vma_interval_tree_remove+0x215/0x2c0 ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x10a/0x300 dev_ethtool+0xa8/0x170 dev_ioctl+0x1b5/0x580 ? sk_ioctl+0x4a/0x110 sock_do_ioctl+0xab/0xf0 sock_ioctl+0x1ca/0x2e0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x150 Fixes: 24d694a ("bnxt_en: Allocate backing store memory for FW trace logs") Signed-off-by: Hongguang Gao <hongguang.gao@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241204215918.1692597-3-michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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It is unclear if net/lapb code is supposed to be ready for 8021q. We can at least avoid crashes like the following : skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8aabe1f6 len:24 put:20 head:ffff88802824a400 data:ffff88802824a3fe tail:0x16 end:0x140 dev:nr0.2 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5508 Comm: dhcpcd Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00144-g66418447d27b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024 RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline] RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216 Code: 0d 8d 48 c7 c6 2e 9e 29 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 1a 6f 37 02 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 RSP: 0018:ffffc90002ddf638 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 7a24750e538ff600 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000201 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888034a86650 R08: ffffffff8174b13c R09: 1ffff920005bbe60 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520005bbe61 R12: 0000000000000140 R13: ffff88802824a400 R14: ffff88802824a3fe R15: 0000000000000016 FS: 00007f2a5990d740(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000110c2631fd CR3: 0000000029504000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636 nr_header+0x36/0x320 net/netrom/nr_dev.c:69 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3148 [inline] vlan_dev_hard_header+0x359/0x480 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:83 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3148 [inline] lapbeth_data_transmit+0x1f6/0x2a0 drivers/net/wan/lapbether.c:257 lapb_data_transmit+0x91/0xb0 net/lapb/lapb_iface.c:447 lapb_transmit_buffer+0x168/0x1f0 net/lapb/lapb_out.c:149 lapb_establish_data_link+0x84/0xd0 lapb_device_event+0x4e0/0x670 notifier_call_chain+0x19f/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __dev_notify_flags+0x207/0x400 dev_change_flags+0xf0/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:8922 devinet_ioctl+0xa4e/0x1aa0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1188 inet_ioctl+0x3d7/0x4f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1003 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1227 sock_ioctl+0x626/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1346 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot+fb99d1b0c0f81d94a5e2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/67506220.050a0220.17bd51.006c.GAE@google.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241204141031.4030267-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When virtnet_close is followed by virtnet_open, some TX completions can possibly remain unconsumed, until they are finally processed during the first NAPI poll after the netdev_tx_reset_queue(), resulting in a crash [1]. Commit b96ed2c ("virtio_net: move netdev_tx_reset_queue() call before RX napi enable") was not sufficient to eliminate all BQL crash cases for virtio-net. This issue can be reproduced with the latest net-next master by running: `while :; do ip l set DEV down; ip l set DEV up; done` under heavy network TX load from inside the machine. netdev_tx_reset_queue() can actually be dropped from virtnet_open path; the device is not stopped in any case. For BQL core part, it's just like traffic nearly ceases to exist for some period. For stall detector added to BQL, even if virtnet_close could somehow lead to some TX completions delayed for long, followed by virtnet_open, we can just take it as stall as mentioned in commit 6025b91 ("net: dqs: add NIC stall detector based on BQL"). Note also that users can still reset stall_max via sysfs. So, drop netdev_tx_reset_queue() from virtnet_enable_queue_pair(). This eliminates the BQL crashes. As a result, netdev_tx_reset_queue() is now explicitly required in freeze/restore path. This patch adds it to immediately after free_unused_bufs(), following the rule of thumb: netdev_tx_reset_queue() should follow any SKB freeing not followed by netdev_tx_completed_queue(). This seems the most consistent and streamlined approach, and now netdev_tx_reset_queue() runs whenever free_unused_bufs() is done. [1]: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1598 Comm: ip Tainted: G N 6.12.0net-next_main+ #2 Tainted: [N]=TEST Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), \ BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 Code: b7 c2 49 89 e9 44 89 da 89 c6 4c 89 d7 e8 ed 17 47 00 58 65 ff 0d 4d 27 90 7e 0f 85 fd fe ff ff e8 ea 53 8d ff e9 f3 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 01 d2 44 89 d1 29 d1 ba 00 00 00 00 0f 48 ca e9 28 ff ff ff RSP: 0018:ffffc900002b0d08 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102398c80 RCX: 0000000080190009 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000006a RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888102398c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000000ca R11: 0000000000015681 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffc900002b0d68 R14: ffff88811115e000 R15: ffff8881107aca40 FS: 00007f41ded69500(0000) GS:ffff888667dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556ccc2dc1a0 CR3: 0000000104fd8003 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? die+0x32/0x80 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? do_error_trap+0x6d/0xb0 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 __free_old_xmit+0xff/0x170 [virtio_net] free_old_xmit+0x54/0xc0 [virtio_net] virtnet_poll+0xf4/0xe30 [virtio_net] ? __update_load_avg_cfs_rq+0x264/0x2d0 ? update_curr+0x35/0x260 ? reweight_entity+0x1be/0x260 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x28/0x1c0 net_rx_action+0x329/0x420 ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x35/0x90 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x1a0 handle_softirqs+0x138/0x3e0 do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa7/0xb0 virtnet_open+0xc8/0x310 [virtio_net] __dev_open+0xfa/0x1b0 __dev_change_flags+0x1de/0x250 dev_change_flags+0x22/0x60 do_setlink.isra.0+0x2df/0x10b0 ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0 ? netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 ? netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390 ? netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490 ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110 ? __nla_validate_parse+0x5f/0xee0 ? __pfx___probestub_irq_enable+0x3/0x10 ? __create_object+0x5e/0x90 ? security_capable+0x3b/0x70 rtnl_newlink+0x784/0xaf0 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x24/0x6d0 ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink+0x10/0x10 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390 netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490 ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x86/0xd0 ? __pte_offset_map+0x17/0x160 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x147/0x610 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? _raw_spin_trylock+0x13/0x60 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80 __sys_sendmsg+0x66/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f41defe5b34 Code: 15 e1 12 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 95 0f 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4c c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 89 55 RSP: 002b:00007ffe5336ecc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f41defe5b34 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe5336ed30 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffe5336eda0 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00007ffe5336f6f9 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000067452259 R14: 0000556ccc28b040 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> [...] Fixes: c8bd1f7 ("virtio_net: add support for Byte Queue Limits") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.11+ Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com> [ pabeni: trimmed possibly troublesome separator ] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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…nts' Koichiro Den says: ==================== virtio_net: correct netdev_tx_reset_queue() invocation points When virtnet_close is followed by virtnet_open, some TX completions can possibly remain unconsumed, until they are finally processed during the first NAPI poll after the netdev_tx_reset_queue(), resulting in a crash [1]. Commit b96ed2c ("virtio_net: move netdev_tx_reset_queue() call before RX napi enable") was not sufficient to eliminate all BQL crash scenarios for virtio-net. This issue can be reproduced with the latest net-next master by running: `while :; do ip l set DEV down; ip l set DEV up; done` under heavy network TX load from inside the machine. This patch series resolves the issue and also addresses similar existing problems: (a). Drop netdev_tx_reset_queue() from open/close path. This eliminates the BQL crashes due to the problematic open/close path. (b). As a result of (a), netdev_tx_reset_queue() is now explicitly required in freeze/restore path. Add netdev_tx_reset_queue() immediately after free_unused_bufs() invocation. (c). Fix missing resetting in virtnet_tx_resize(). virtnet_tx_resize() has lacked proper resetting since commit c8bd1f7 ("virtio_net: add support for Byte Queue Limits"). (d). Fix missing resetting in the XDP_SETUP_XSK_POOL path. Similar to (c), this path lacked proper resetting. Call netdev_tx_reset_queue() when virtqueue_reset() has actually recycled unused buffers. This patch series consists of six commits: [1/6]: Resolves (a) and (b). # also -stable 6.11.y [2/6]: Minor fix to make [4/6] streamlined. [3/6]: Prerequisite for (c). # also -stable 6.11.y [4/6]: Resolves (c) (incl. Prerequisite for (d)) # also -stable 6.11.y [5/6]: Preresuisite for (d). [6/6]: Resolves (d). Changes for v4: - move netdev_tx_reset_queue() out of free_unused_bufs() - submit to net, not net-next Changes for v3: - replace 'flushed' argument with 'recycle_done' Changes for v2: - add tx queue resetting for (b) to (d) above v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241204050724.307544-1-koichiro.den@canonical.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241203073025.67065-1-koichiro.den@canonical.com/ v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241130181744.3772632-1-koichiro.den@canonical.com/ [1]: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1598 Comm: ip Tainted: G N 6.12.0net-next_main+ #2 Tainted: [N]=TEST Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), \ BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 Code: b7 c2 49 89 e9 44 89 da 89 c6 4c 89 d7 e8 ed 17 47 00 58 65 ff 0d 4d 27 90 7e 0f 85 fd fe ff ff e8 ea 53 8d ff e9 f3 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 01 d2 44 89 d1 29 d1 ba 00 00 00 00 0f 48 ca e9 28 ff ff ff RSP: 0018:ffffc900002b0d08 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102398c80 RCX: 0000000080190009 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000006a RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888102398c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000000ca R11: 0000000000015681 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffc900002b0d68 R14: ffff88811115e000 R15: ffff8881107aca40 FS: 00007f41ded69500(0000) GS:ffff888667dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556ccc2dc1a0 CR3: 0000000104fd8003 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? die+0x32/0x80 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? do_error_trap+0x6d/0xb0 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290 __free_old_xmit+0xff/0x170 [virtio_net] free_old_xmit+0x54/0xc0 [virtio_net] virtnet_poll+0xf4/0xe30 [virtio_net] ? __update_load_avg_cfs_rq+0x264/0x2d0 ? update_curr+0x35/0x260 ? reweight_entity+0x1be/0x260 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x28/0x1c0 net_rx_action+0x329/0x420 ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x35/0x90 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x1a0 handle_softirqs+0x138/0x3e0 do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa7/0xb0 virtnet_open+0xc8/0x310 [virtio_net] __dev_open+0xfa/0x1b0 __dev_change_flags+0x1de/0x250 dev_change_flags+0x22/0x60 do_setlink.isra.0+0x2df/0x10b0 ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0 ? netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 ? netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390 ? netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490 ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110 ? __nla_validate_parse+0x5f/0xee0 ? __pfx___probestub_irq_enable+0x3/0x10 ? __create_object+0x5e/0x90 ? security_capable+0x3b/0x7�[I0 rtnl_newlink+0x784/0xaf0 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x24/0x6d0 ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink+0x10/0x10 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390 netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490 ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x86/0xd0 ? __pte_offset_map+0x17/0x160 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x147/0x610 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 ? _raw_spin_trylock+0x13/0x60 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80 __sys_sendmsg+0x66/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f41defe5b34 Code: 15 e1 12 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 95 0f 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4c c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 89 55 RSP: 002b:00007ffe5336ecc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f41defe5b34 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe5336ed30 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffe5336eda0 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00007ffe5336f6f9 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000067452259 R14: 0000556ccc28b040 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> [...] ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241206011047.923923-1-koichiro.den@canonical.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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This reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs
like the bellow:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070:
#0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
#0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
#1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
#2: ffff8880665d0078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914
#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline]
#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline]
#3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915
CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
__might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline]
hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939
hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline]
hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569
hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
</TASK>
Reported-by: syzbot+2fb0835e0c9cefc34614@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+2fb0835e0c9cefc34614@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2fb0835e0c9cefc34614
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by releasing the socket lock before enterning iso_listen_bis, to avoid any potential deadlock with hdev lock. [ 75.307983] ====================================================== [ 75.307984] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 75.307985] 6.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#22 Not tainted [ 75.307987] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 75.307987] kworker/u81:2/2623 is trying to acquire lock: [ 75.307988] ffff8fde1769da58 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO) at: iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth] [ 75.308021] but task is already holding lock: [ 75.308022] ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock) at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308053] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 75.308054] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 75.308055] -> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 75.308057] __mutex_lock+0xad/0xc50 [ 75.308061] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 75.308063] iso_sock_listen+0x143/0x5c0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308085] __sys_listen_socket+0x49/0x60 [ 75.308088] __x64_sys_listen+0x4c/0x90 [ 75.308090] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0 [ 75.308092] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 75.308095] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 75.308098] -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 75.308100] __lock_acquire+0x155e/0x25f0 [ 75.308103] lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300 [ 75.308105] lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x90 [ 75.308107] iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth] [ 75.308128] hci_connect_cfm+0x6c/0x190 [bluetooth] [ 75.308155] hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x27b/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308180] hci_le_meta_evt+0xe7/0x200 [bluetooth] [ 75.308206] hci_event_packet+0x21f/0x5c0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308230] hci_rx_work+0x3ae/0xb10 [bluetooth] [ 75.308254] process_one_work+0x212/0x740 [ 75.308256] worker_thread+0x1bd/0x3a0 [ 75.308258] kthread+0xe4/0x120 [ 75.308259] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 75.308261] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 75.308263] other info that might help us debug this: [ 75.308264] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 75.308264] CPU0 CPU1 [ 75.308265] ---- ---- [ 75.308265] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 75.308267] lock(sk_lock- AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 75.308268] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 75.308269] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 75.308270] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 75.308271] 4 locks held by kworker/u81:2/2623: [ 75.308272] #0: ffff8fdd66e52148 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x443/0x740 [ 75.308276] #1: ffffafb488b7fe48 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)), at: process_one_work+0x1ce/0x740 [ 75.308280] #2: ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3} at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308304] #3: ffffffffb6ba4900 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_connect_cfm+0x29/0x190 [bluetooth] Fixes: 02171da ("Bluetooth: ISO: Add hcon for listening bis sk") Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <iulia.tanasescu@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by reworking iso_sock_recvmsg, to ensure that the socket lock is always released before calling a function that locks hdev. [ 561.670344] ====================================================== [ 561.670346] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 561.670349] 6.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#26 Not tainted [ 561.670351] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 561.670353] iso-tester/3289 is trying to acquire lock: [ 561.670355] ffff88811f600078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth] [ 561.670405] but task is already holding lock: [ 561.670407] ffff88815af58258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: iso_sock_recvmsg+0xbf/0x500 [bluetooth] [ 561.670450] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 561.670452] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 561.670453] -> #2 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 561.670458] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670463] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [ 561.670467] bt_accept_dequeue+0x1a5/0x4d0 [bluetooth] [ 561.670510] iso_sock_accept+0x271/0x830 [bluetooth] [ 561.670547] do_accept+0x3dd/0x610 [ 561.670550] __sys_accept4+0xd8/0x170 [ 561.670553] __x64_sys_accept+0x74/0xc0 [ 561.670556] x64_sys_call+0x17d6/0x25f0 [ 561.670559] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670563] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670567] -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 561.670571] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670574] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [ 561.670577] iso_sock_listen+0x2de/0xf30 [bluetooth] [ 561.670617] __sys_listen_socket+0xef/0x130 [ 561.670620] __x64_sys_listen+0xe1/0x190 [ 561.670623] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0 [ 561.670626] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670629] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670632] -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 561.670636] __lock_acquire+0x32ad/0x6ab0 [ 561.670639] lock_acquire.part.0+0x118/0x360 [ 561.670642] lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0 [ 561.670644] __mutex_lock+0x18d/0x12f0 [ 561.670647] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 561.670651] iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth] [ 561.670687] iso_sock_recvmsg+0x3e9/0x500 [bluetooth] [ 561.670722] sock_recvmsg+0x1d5/0x240 [ 561.670725] sock_read_iter+0x27d/0x470 [ 561.670727] vfs_read+0x9a0/0xd30 [ 561.670731] ksys_read+0x1a8/0x250 [ 561.670733] __x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0 [ 561.670736] x64_sys_call+0x1b12/0x25f0 [ 561.670738] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 561.670741] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 561.670744] other info that might help us debug this: [ 561.670745] Chain exists of: &hdev->lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH [ 561.670751] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 561.670753] CPU0 CPU1 [ 561.670754] ---- ---- [ 561.670756] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH); [ 561.670758] lock(sk_lock AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 561.670761] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH); [ 561.670764] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 561.670767] *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: 07a9342 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Send BIG Create Sync via hci_sync") Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <iulia.tanasescu@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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hci_devcd_append may lead to the release of the skb, so it cannot be accessed once it is called. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888033cfabb0 by task kworker/0:3/82 CPU: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/0:3 Tainted: G U 6.6.40-lockdep-03464-g1d8b4eb3060e #1 b0b3c1cc0c842735643fb411799d97921d1f688c Hardware name: Google Yaviks_Ufs/Yaviks_Ufs, BIOS Google_Yaviks_Ufs.15217.552.0 05/07/2024 Workqueue: events btusb_rx_work [btusb] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xfd/0x150 print_report+0x131/0x780 kasan_report+0x177/0x1c0 btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk 03edd567dd71a65958807c95a65db31d433e1d01] btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x11c/0x1a0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec] btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 82: stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190 kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc+0x19f/0x360 skb_clone+0x132/0xf70 btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x104/0x1a0 [btusb] btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 Freed by task 1733: stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190 kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0xb0 ____kasan_slab_free+0xfd/0x170 kmem_cache_free+0x183/0x3f0 hci_devcd_rx+0x91a/0x2060 [bluetooth] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888033cfab40 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232 The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of freed 232-byte region [ffff888033cfab40, ffff888033cfac28) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000a174ba93 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x33cfa head:00000000a174ba93 order:1 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 anon flags: 0x4000000000000840(slab|head|zone=1) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 4000000000000840 ffff888100848a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888033cfaa80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc ffff888033cfab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888033cfab80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888033cfac00: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888033cfac80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Check if we need to call hci_devcd_complete before calling hci_devcd_append. That requires that we check data->cd_info.cnt >= MTK_COREDUMP_NUM instead of data->cd_info.cnt > MTK_COREDUMP_NUM, as we increment data->cd_info.cnt only once the call to hci_devcd_append succeeds. Fixes: 0b70151 ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: add MediaTek devcoredump support") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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Its used from trace__run(), for the 'perf trace' live mode, i.e. its
strace-like, non-perf.data file processing mode, the most common one.
The trace__run() function will set trace->host using machine__new_host()
that is supposed to give a machine instance representing the running
machine, and since we'll use perf_env__arch_strerrno() to get the right
errno -> string table, we need to use machine->env, so initialize it in
machine__new_host().
Before the patch:
(gdb) run trace --errno-summary -a sleep 1
<SNIP>
Summary of events:
gvfs-afc-volume (3187), 2 events, 0.0%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
pselect6 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00%
GUsbEventThread (3519), 2 events, 0.0%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
poll 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00%
<SNIP>
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478
478 if (env->arch_strerrno == NULL)
(gdb) bt
#0 0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478
#1 0x00000000004b75d2 in thread__dump_stats (ttrace=0x14f58f0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4673
#2 0x00000000004b78bf in trace__fprintf_thread (fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>, thread=0x10fa0b0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0) at builtin-trace.c:4708
#3 0x00000000004b7ad9 in trace__fprintf_thread_summary (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4747
#4 0x00000000004b656e in trace__run (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:4456
#5 0x00000000004ba43e in cmd_trace (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:5487
torvalds#6 0x00000000004c0414 in run_builtin (p=0xec3068 <commands+648>, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:351
torvalds#7 0x00000000004c06bb in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:404
torvalds#8 0x00000000004c0814 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffdc4c, argv=0x7fffffffdc40) at perf.c:448
torvalds#9 0x00000000004c0b5d in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:560
(gdb)
After:
root@number:~# perf trace -a --errno-summary sleep 1
<SNIP>
pw-data-loop (2685), 1410 events, 16.0%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
epoll_wait 188 0 983.428 0.000 5.231 15.595 8.68%
ioctl 94 0 0.811 0.004 0.009 0.016 2.82%
read 188 0 0.322 0.001 0.002 0.006 5.15%
write 141 0 0.280 0.001 0.002 0.018 8.39%
timerfd_settime 94 0 0.138 0.001 0.001 0.007 6.47%
gnome-control-c (179406), 1848 events, 20.9%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
poll 222 0 959.577 0.000 4.322 21.414 11.40%
recvmsg 150 0 0.539 0.001 0.004 0.013 5.12%
write 300 0 0.442 0.001 0.001 0.007 3.29%
read 150 0 0.183 0.001 0.001 0.009 5.53%
getpid 102 0 0.101 0.000 0.001 0.008 7.82%
root@number:~#
Fixes: 54373b5 ("perf env: Introduce perf_env__arch_strerrno()")
Reported-by: Veronika Molnarova <vmolnaro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Veronika Molnarova <vmolnaro@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z0XffUgNSv_9OjOi@x1
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
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Move setting irq_chip.name from probe() function to the initialization of "irq_chip" struct in order to fix vGPIO driver crash during bootup. Crash was caused by unauthorized modification of irq_chip.name field where irq_chip struct was initialized as const. This behavior is a consequence of suboptimal implementation of gpio_irq_chip_set_chip(), which should be changed to avoid casting away const qualifier. Crash log: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc0ba81c0 /#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode /#PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation CPU: 33 UID: 0 PID: 1075 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-00077-g2e1b3cc9d7f7 #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Kaseyville RP/Kaseyville RP, BIOS KVLDCRB1.PGS.0026.D73.2410081258 10/08/2024 RIP: 0010:gnr_gpio_probe+0x171/0x220 [gpio_graniterapids] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alan Borzeszkowski <alan.borzeszkowski@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241204070415.1034449-2-mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
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flush_tlb_kernel_range() may use IPIs to flush the TLBs of all the cores, which triggers the following warning when the irqs are disabled: [ 3.455330] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/smp.c:815 smp_call_function_many_cond+0x452/0x520 [ 3.456647] Modules linked in: [ 3.457218] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-00010-g91d3de7240b8 #1 [ 3.457416] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS [ 3.457633] epc : smp_call_function_many_cond+0x452/0x520 [ 3.457736] ra : on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x1e/0x30 [ 3.457786] epc : ffffffff800b669a ra : ffffffff800b67c2 sp : ff2000000000bb50 [ 3.457824] gp : ffffffff815212b8 tp : ff6000008014f080 t0 : 000000000000003f [ 3.457859] t1 : ffffffff815221e0 t2 : 000000000000000f s0 : ff2000000000bc10 [ 3.457920] s1 : 0000000000000040 a0 : ffffffff815221e0 a1 : 0000000000000001 [ 3.457953] a2 : 0000000000010000 a3 : 0000000000000003 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 3.458006] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffffffffffffff a7 : 0000000000000000 [ 3.458042] s2 : ffffffff815223be s3 : 00fffffffffff000 s4 : ff600001ffe38fc0 [ 3.458076] s5 : ff600001ff950d00 s6 : 0000000200000120 s7 : 0000000000000001 [ 3.458109] s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : ff60000080841ef0 s10: 0000000000000001 [ 3.458141] s11: ffffffff81524812 t3 : 0000000000000001 t4 : ff60000080092bc0 [ 3.458172] t5 : 0000000000000000 t6 : ff200000000236d0 [ 3.458203] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: ffffffff800b669a cause: 0000000000000003 [ 3.458373] [<ffffffff800b669a>] smp_call_function_many_cond+0x452/0x520 [ 3.458593] [<ffffffff800b67c2>] on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x1e/0x30 [ 3.458625] [<ffffffff8000e4ca>] __flush_tlb_range+0x118/0x1ca [ 3.458656] [<ffffffff8000e6b2>] flush_tlb_kernel_range+0x1e/0x26 [ 3.458683] [<ffffffff801ea56a>] kfence_protect+0xc0/0xce [ 3.458717] [<ffffffff801e9456>] kfence_guarded_free+0xc6/0x1c0 [ 3.458742] [<ffffffff801e9d6c>] __kfence_free+0x62/0xc6 [ 3.458764] [<ffffffff801c57d8>] kfree+0x106/0x32c [ 3.458786] [<ffffffff80588cf2>] detach_buf_split+0x188/0x1a8 [ 3.458816] [<ffffffff8058708c>] virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0xb6/0x1f6 [ 3.458839] [<ffffffff805871da>] virtqueue_get_buf+0xe/0x16 [ 3.458880] [<ffffffff80613d6a>] virtblk_done+0x5c/0xe2 [ 3.458908] [<ffffffff8058766e>] vring_interrupt+0x6a/0x74 [ 3.458930] [<ffffffff800747d8>] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x7c/0xe2 [ 3.458956] [<ffffffff800748f0>] handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x86 [ 3.458978] [<ffffffff800786cc>] handle_simple_irq+0x9e/0xbe [ 3.459004] [<ffffffff80073934>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x1c/0x2a [ 3.459027] [<ffffffff804bf87c>] imsic_handle_irq+0xba/0x120 [ 3.459056] [<ffffffff80073934>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x1c/0x2a [ 3.459080] [<ffffffff804bdb76>] riscv_intc_aia_irq+0x24/0x34 [ 3.459103] [<ffffffff809d0452>] handle_riscv_irq+0x2e/0x4c [ 3.459133] [<ffffffff809d923e>] call_on_irq_stack+0x32/0x40 So only flush the local TLB and let the lazy kfence page fault handling deal with the faults which could happen when a core has an old protected pte version cached in its TLB. That leads to potential inaccuracies which can be tolerated when using kfence. Fixes: 47513f2 ("riscv: Enable KFENCE for riscv64") Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241209074125.52322-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
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The vmemmap's, which is used for RV64 with SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, page tables are populated using pmd (page middle directory) hugetables. However, the pmd allocation is not using the generic mechanism used by the VMA code (e.g. pmd_alloc()), or the RISC-V specific create_pgd_mapping()/alloc_pmd_late(). Instead, the vmemmap page table code allocates a page, and calls vmemmap_set_pmd(). This results in that the pmd ctor is *not* called, nor would it make sense to do so. Now, when tearing down a vmemmap page table pmd, the cleanup code would unconditionally, and incorrectly call the pmd dtor, which results in a crash (best case). This issue was found when running the HMM selftests: | tools/testing/selftests/mm# ./test_hmm.sh smoke | ... # when unloading the test_hmm.ko module | page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10915b | flags: 0x1000000000000000(node=0|zone=1) | raw: 1000000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 | raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 | page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(ptdesc->pmd_huge_pte) | ------------[ cut here ]------------ | kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:3080! | Kernel BUG [#1] | Modules linked in: test_hmm(-) sch_fq_codel fuse drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks backlight dm_mod | CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 514 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 6.12.0-00982-gf2a4f1682d07 #2 | Tainted: [W]=WARN | Hardware name: riscv-virtio qemu/qemu, BIOS 2024.10 10/01/2024 | epc : remove_pgd_mapping+0xbec/0x1070 | ra : remove_pgd_mapping+0xbec/0x1070 | epc : ffffffff80010a68 ra : ffffffff80010a68 sp : ff20000000a73940 | gp : ffffffff827b2d88 tp : ff6000008785da40 t0 : ffffffff80fbce04 | t1 : 0720072007200720 t2 : 706d756420656761 s0 : ff20000000a73a50 | s1 : ff6000008915cff8 a0 : 0000000000000039 a1 : 0000000000000008 | a2 : ff600003fff0de20 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000 | a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : c0000000ffffefff a7 : ffffffff824469b8 | s2 : ff1c0000022456c0 s3 : ff1ffffffdbfffff s4 : ff6000008915c000 | s5 : ff6000008915c000 s6 : ff6000008915c000 s7 : ff1ffffffdc00000 | s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : ff1ffffffdc00000 s10: ffffffff819a31f0 | s11: ffffffffffffffff t3 : ffffffff8000c950 t4 : ff60000080244f00 | t5 : ff60000080244000 t6 : ff20000000a73708 | status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ffffffff80010a68 cause: 0000000000000003 | [<ffffffff80010a68>] remove_pgd_mapping+0xbec/0x1070 | [<ffffffff80fd238e>] vmemmap_free+0x14/0x1e | [<ffffffff8032e698>] section_deactivate+0x220/0x452 | [<ffffffff8032ef7e>] sparse_remove_section+0x4a/0x58 | [<ffffffff802f8700>] __remove_pages+0x7e/0xba | [<ffffffff803760d8>] memunmap_pages+0x2bc/0x3fe | [<ffffffff02a3ca28>] dmirror_device_remove_chunks+0x2ea/0x518 [test_hmm] | [<ffffffff02a3e026>] hmm_dmirror_exit+0x3e/0x1018 [test_hmm] | [<ffffffff80102c14>] __riscv_sys_delete_module+0x15a/0x2a6 | [<ffffffff80fd020c>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x1f2/0x266 | [<ffffffff80fde0a2>] _new_vmalloc_restore_context_a0+0xc6/0xd2 | Code: bf51 7597 0184 8593 76a5 854a 4097 0029 80e7 2c00 (9002) 7597 | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- | Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Add a check to avoid calling the pmd dtor, if the calling context is vmemmap_free(). Fixes: c75a74f ("riscv: mm: Add memory hotplugging support") Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241120131203.1859787-1-bjorn@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
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…s_lock For storing a value to a queue attribute, the queue_attr_store function first freezes the queue (->q_usage_counter(io)) and then acquire ->sysfs_lock. This seems not correct as the usual ordering should be to acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. This incorrect ordering causes the following lockdep splat which we are able to reproduce always simply by accessing /sys/kernel/debug file using ls command: [ 57.597146] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 57.597154] 6.12.0-10553-gb86545e02e8c torvalds#20 Tainted: G W [ 57.597162] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 57.597168] ls/4605 is trying to acquire lock: [ 57.597176] c00000003eb56710 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: __might_fault+0x58/0xc0 [ 57.597200] but task is already holding lock: [ 57.597207] c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4 [ 57.597226] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 57.597233] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 57.597241] -> #5 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597255] down_write+0x6c/0x18c [ 57.597264] start_creating+0xb4/0x24c [ 57.597274] debugfs_create_dir+0x2c/0x1e8 [ 57.597283] blk_register_queue+0xec/0x294 [ 57.597292] add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548 [ 57.597302] brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338 [ 57.597309] brd_init+0x100/0x178 [ 57.597317] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4 [ 57.597326] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0 [ 57.597334] kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc [ 57.597342] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 57.597350] -> #4 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 57.597362] __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0 [ 57.597370] blk_register_queue+0xd4/0x294 [ 57.597379] add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548 [ 57.597388] brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338 [ 57.597395] brd_init+0x100/0x178 [ 57.597402] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4 [ 57.597410] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0 [ 57.597418] kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc [ 57.597426] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 57.597434] -> #3 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 57.597446] __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0 [ 57.597454] queue_attr_store+0x9c/0x110 [ 57.597462] sysfs_kf_write+0x70/0xb0 [ 57.597471] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b0/0x2ac [ 57.597480] vfs_write+0x3dc/0x6e8 [ 57.597488] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [ 57.597495] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597504] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597516] -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)torvalds#21){++++}-{0:0}: [ 57.597530] __submit_bio+0x5ec/0x828 [ 57.597538] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1e4/0x4f0 [ 57.597547] iomap_readahead+0x2a0/0x448 [ 57.597556] xfs_vm_readahead+0x28/0x3c [ 57.597564] read_pages+0x88/0x41c [ 57.597571] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1ac/0x2d8 [ 57.597580] filemap_get_pages+0x188/0x984 [ 57.597588] filemap_read+0x13c/0x4bc [ 57.597596] xfs_file_buffered_read+0x88/0x17c [ 57.597605] xfs_file_read_iter+0xac/0x158 [ 57.597614] vfs_read+0x2d4/0x3b4 [ 57.597622] ksys_read+0x84/0x144 [ 57.597629] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597637] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597647] -> #1 (mapping.invalidate_lock#2){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597661] down_read+0x6c/0x220 [ 57.597669] filemap_fault+0x870/0x100c [ 57.597677] xfs_filemap_fault+0xc4/0x18c [ 57.597684] __do_fault+0x64/0x164 [ 57.597693] __handle_mm_fault+0x1274/0x1dac [ 57.597702] handle_mm_fault+0x248/0x484 [ 57.597711] ___do_page_fault+0x428/0xc0c [ 57.597719] hash__do_page_fault+0x30/0x68 [ 57.597727] do_hash_fault+0x90/0x35c [ 57.597736] data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220 [ 57.597745] _copy_from_user+0xf8/0x19c [ 57.597754] sel_write_load+0x178/0xd54 [ 57.597762] vfs_write+0x108/0x6e8 [ 57.597769] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [ 57.597777] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597785] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597794] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597806] __lock_acquire+0x17cc/0x2330 [ 57.597814] lock_acquire+0x138/0x400 [ 57.597822] __might_fault+0x7c/0xc0 [ 57.597830] filldir64+0xe8/0x390 [ 57.597839] dcache_readdir+0x80/0x2d4 [ 57.597846] iterate_dir+0xd8/0x1d4 [ 57.597855] sys_getdents64+0x88/0x2d4 [ 57.597864] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597872] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597881] other info that might help us debug this: [ 57.597888] Chain exists of: &mm->mmap_lock --> &q->debugfs_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3 [ 57.597905] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 57.597911] CPU0 CPU1 [ 57.597917] ---- ---- [ 57.597922] rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); [ 57.597932] lock(&q->debugfs_mutex); [ 57.597940] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); [ 57.597950] rlock(&mm->mmap_lock); [ 57.597958] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 57.597965] 2 locks held by ls/4605: [ 57.597971] #0: c0000000137c12f8 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0xcc/0x154 [ 57.597989] #1: c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4 Prevent the above lockdep warning by acquiring ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue while storing a queue attribute in queue_attr_store function. Later, we also found[1] another function __blk_mq_update_nr_ hw_queues where we first freeze queue and then acquire the ->sysfs_lock. So we've also updated lock ordering in __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues function and ensured that in all code paths we follow the correct lock ordering i.e. acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAFj5m9Ke8+EHKQBs_Nk6hqd=LGXtk4mUxZUN5==ZcCjnZSBwHw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: kjain@linux.ibm.com Fixes: af28141 ("block: freeze the queue in queue_attr_store") Tested-by: kjain@linux.ibm.com Cc: hch@lst.de Cc: axboe@kernel.dk Cc: ritesh.list@gmail.com Cc: ming.lei@redhat.com Cc: gjoyce@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241210144222.1066229-1-nilay@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Similar to commit 65c4c94 ("usb: typec: ucsi: Fix a missing bits to bytes conversion in ucsi_init()"), there was a missing conversion from bits to bytes. Here the outcome is worse though: since the value is lower than UCSI_MAX_DATA_LENGTH, instead of bailing out with an error, it writes past the buffer size. The error is then seen in other places like below: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x891e812cd0ed968: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 UID: 110 PID: 906 Comm: prometheus-node Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-xe #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation Lunar Lake Client Platform/LNL-M LP5 RVP1, BIOS LNLMFWI1.R00.3222.D84.2410171025 10/17/2024 RIP: 0010:power_supply_get_property+0x3e/0xe0 Code: 85 c0 7e 4f 4c 8b 07 89 f3 49 89 d4 49 8b 48 20 48 85 c9 74 72 49 8b 70 18 31 d2 31 c0 eb 0b 83 c2 01 48 63 c2 48 39 c8 73 5d <3b> 1c 86 75 f0 49 8b 40 28 4c 89 e2 89 de ff d0 0f 1f 00 5b 41 5c RSP: 0018:ffffc900017dfa50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000011 RCX: c963b02c06092008 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0891e812cd0ed968 RDI: ffff888121dd6800 RBP: ffffc900017dfa68 R08: ffff88810a4024b8 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc900017dfa78 R13: ffff888121dd6800 R14: ffff888138ad2c00 R15: ffff88810c57c528 FS: 00007713a2ffd6c0(0000) GS:ffff88846f380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000c0004b1000 CR3: 0000000121ce8003 CR4: 0000000000f72ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6c/0x80 ? die_addr+0x37/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x1c1/0x440 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30 ? power_supply_get_property+0x3e/0xe0 power_supply_hwmon_read+0x50/0xe0 hwmon_attr_show+0x46/0x170 dev_attr_show+0x1a/0x70 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xaa/0x120 kernfs_seq_show+0x41/0x60 Just use the buffer size as argument to fix it. Fixes: 226ff2e ("usb: typec: ucsi: Convert connector specific commands to bitmaps") Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com> Reported-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <chaitanya.kumar.borah@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/SJ1PR11MB6129CCD82CD78D8EE6E27EF4B9362@SJ1PR11MB6129.namprd11.prod.outlook.com/ Suggested-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <chaitanya.kumar.borah@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241203200010.2821132-1-lucas.demarchi@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The current implementation removes cache tags after disabling ATS, leading to potential memory leaks and kernel crashes. Specifically, CACHE_TAG_DEVTLB type cache tags may still remain in the list even after the domain is freed, causing a use-after-free condition. This issue really shows up when multiple VFs from different PFs passed through to a single user-space process via vfio-pci. In such cases, the kernel may crash with kernel messages like: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014 PGD 19036a067 P4D 1940a3067 PUD 136c9b067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 74 UID: 0 PID: 3183 Comm: testCli Not tainted 6.11.9 #2 RIP: 0010:cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x163/0x590 ? exc_page_fault+0x72/0x190 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250 ? cache_tag_flush_range+0x5d/0x250 intel_iommu_tlb_sync+0x29/0x40 intel_iommu_unmap_pages+0xfe/0x160 __iommu_unmap+0xd8/0x1a0 vfio_unmap_unpin+0x182/0x340 [vfio_iommu_type1] vfio_remove_dma+0x2a/0xb0 [vfio_iommu_type1] vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0xafa/0x18e0 [vfio_iommu_type1] Move cache_tag_unassign_domain() before iommu_disable_pci_caps() to fix it. Fixes: 3b1d9e2 ("iommu/vt-d: Add cache tag assignment interface") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241129020506.576413-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
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The qi_batch is allocated when assigning cache tag for a domain. While for nested parent domain, it is missed. Hence, when trying to map pages to the nested parent, NULL dereference occurred. Also, there is potential memleak since there is no lock around domain->qi_batch allocation. To solve it, add a helper for qi_batch allocation, and call it in both the __cache_tag_assign_domain() and __cache_tag_assign_parent_domain(). BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000200 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 8104795067 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 223 UID: 0 PID: 4357 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-00028-g4b50c3c3b998-dirty #2632 Call Trace: ? __die+0x24/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x80/0x150 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x63/0x7b0 ? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x220 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? cache_tag_flush_range_np+0x13c/0x260 intel_iommu_iotlb_sync_map+0x1a/0x30 iommu_map+0x61/0xf0 batch_to_domain+0x188/0x250 iopt_area_fill_domains+0x125/0x320 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50 iopt_map_pages+0x63/0x100 iopt_map_common.isra.0+0xa7/0x190 iopt_map_user_pages+0x6a/0x80 iommufd_ioas_map+0xcd/0x1d0 iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x118/0x1c0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: 705c1cd ("iommu/vt-d: Introduce batched cache invalidation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <yi.l.liu@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241210130322.17175-1-yi.l.liu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
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into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.13, take #1 - Replace csr_write() with csr_set() for HVIEN PMU overflow bit
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If the KVP (or VSS) daemon starts before the VMBus channel's ringbuffer is fully initialized, we can hit the panic below: hv_utils: Registering HyperV Utility Driver hv_vmbus: registering driver hv_utils ... BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 CPU: 44 UID: 0 PID: 2552 Comm: hv_kvp_daemon Tainted: G E 6.11.0-rc3+ #1 RIP: 0010:hv_pkt_iter_first+0x12/0xd0 Call Trace: ... vmbus_recvpacket hv_kvp_onchannelcallback vmbus_on_event tasklet_action_common tasklet_action handle_softirqs irq_exit_rcu sysvec_hyperv_stimer0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_hyperv_stimer0 ... kvp_register_done hvt_op_read vfs_read ksys_read __x64_sys_read This can happen because the KVP/VSS channel callback can be invoked even before the channel is fully opened: 1) as soon as hv_kvp_init() -> hvutil_transport_init() creates /dev/vmbus/hv_kvp, the kvp daemon can open the device file immediately and register itself to the driver by writing a message KVP_OP_REGISTER1 to the file (which is handled by kvp_on_msg() ->kvp_handle_handshake()) and reading the file for the driver's response, which is handled by hvt_op_read(), which calls hvt->on_read(), i.e. kvp_register_done(). 2) the problem with kvp_register_done() is that it can cause the channel callback to be called even before the channel is fully opened, and when the channel callback is starting to run, util_probe()-> vmbus_open() may have not initialized the ringbuffer yet, so the callback can hit the panic of NULL pointer dereference. To reproduce the panic consistently, we can add a "ssleep(10)" for KVP in __vmbus_open(), just before the first hv_ringbuffer_init(), and then we unload and reload the driver hv_utils, and run the daemon manually within the 10 seconds. Fix the panic by reordering the steps in util_probe() so the char dev entry used by the KVP or VSS daemon is not created until after vmbus_open() has completed. This reordering prevents the race condition from happening. Reported-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Fixes: e0fa3e5 ("Drivers: hv: utils: fix a race on userspace daemons registration") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com> Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241106154247.2271-3-mhklinux@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Message-ID: <20241106154247.2271-3-mhklinux@outlook.com>
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syzbot reported the following crash [1] Issue came with the blamed commit. Instead of going through all the iov components, we keep using the first one and end up with a malformed skb. [1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2849 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6230 Comm: syz-executor132 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-syzkaller-00407-g96b6fcc0ee41 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/25/2024 RIP: 0010:__pskb_pull_tail+0x1568/0x1570 net/core/skbuff.c:2848 Code: 38 c1 0f 8c 32 f1 ff ff 4c 89 f7 e8 92 96 74 f8 e9 25 f1 ff ff e8 e8 ae 09 f8 48 8b 5c 24 08 e9 eb fb ff ff e8 d9 ae 09 f8 90 <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 0018:ffffc90004cbef30 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff8995c347 RBX: 00000000fffffff2 RCX: ffff88802cf45a00 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffffff2 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88807df0c06a R08: ffffffff8995b084 R09: 1ffff1100fbe185c R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100fbe185d R12: ffff888076e85d50 R13: ffff888076e85c80 R14: ffff888076e85cf4 R15: ffff888076e85c80 FS: 00007f0dca6ea6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f0dca6ead58 CR3: 00000000119da000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> skb_cow_data+0x2da/0xcb0 net/core/skbuff.c:5284 tipc_aead_decrypt net/tipc/crypto.c:894 [inline] tipc_crypto_rcv+0x402/0x24e0 net/tipc/crypto.c:1844 tipc_rcv+0x57e/0x12a0 net/tipc/node.c:2109 tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0x2bd/0x450 net/tipc/bearer.c:668 __netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5720 [inline] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x8b7/0x980 net/core/dev.c:5762 __netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5814 [inline] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0xa51/0xe30 net/core/dev.c:5905 gro_normal_list include/net/gro.h:515 [inline] napi_complete_done+0x2b5/0x870 net/core/dev.c:6256 napi_complete include/linux/netdevice.h:567 [inline] tun_get_user+0x2ea0/0x4890 drivers/net/tun.c:1982 tun_chr_write_iter+0x10d/0x1f0 drivers/net/tun.c:2057 do_iter_readv_writev+0x600/0x880 vfs_writev+0x376/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:1050 do_writev+0x1b6/0x360 fs/read_write.c:1096 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: de4f5fe ("iov_iter: add iter_iovec() helper") Reported-by: syzbot+4f66250f6663c0c1d67e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/675b61aa.050a0220.599f4.00bb.GAE@google.com/T/#u Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Joe Damato <jdamato@fastly.com> Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241212222247.724674-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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link down work may be scheduled before lgr freed but execute
after lgr freed, which may result in crash. So it is need to
hold a reference before shedule link down work, and put the
reference after work executed or canceled.
The relevant crash call stack as follows:
list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffffb638c9c0fe20,
but was 0000000000000000
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:51!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 6 PID: 978112 Comm: kworker/6:119 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G #1
Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 2221b89 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events smc_link_down_work [smc]
RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold+0x31/0x47
RSP: 0018:ffffb638c9c0fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010086
RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff942fb75e5128 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff943520930aa0 RSI: ffff94352091fc80 RDI: ffff94352091fc80
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb638c9c0fc38
R10: ffffb638c9c0fc30 R11: ffffffffa015eb28 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: ffffb638c9c0fe20 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff942f9cd051c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff943520900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f4f25214000 CR3: 000000025fbae004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x17e/0x470
smc_link_down_work+0x3c/0x60 [smc]
process_one_work+0x1ac/0x350
worker_thread+0x49/0x2f0
? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360
kthread+0x118/0x140
? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Fixes: 541afa1 ("net/smc: add smcr_port_err() and smcr_link_down() processing")
Signed-off-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Dec 27, 2024
Google Juniper and other Chromebook platforms have a very old bootloader which populates /firmware node without proper address/size-cells leading to warnings: Missing '#address-cells' in /firmware WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at drivers/of/base.c:106 of_bus_n_addr_cells+0x90/0xf0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0 #1 933ab9971ff4d5dc58cb378a96f64c7f72e3454d Hardware name: Google juniper sku16 board (DT) ... Missing '#size-cells' in /firmware WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at drivers/of/base.c:133 of_bus_n_size_cells+0x90/0xf0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.12.0 #1 933ab9971ff4d5dc58cb378a96f64c7f72e3454d Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: Google juniper sku16 board (DT) These platform won't receive updated bootloader/firmware, so add an exclusion for platforms with a "coreboot" compatible node. While this is wider than necessary, that's the easiest fix and it doesn't doesn't matter if we miss checking other platforms using coreboot. We may revisit this later and address with a fixup to the DT itself. Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Z0NUdoG17EwuCigT@sashalap/ Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wenst@chromium.org> Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
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@tgkz @KosukeFujimoto
SubmittingPatches の日本語訳の中で、意味不明な訳語の一つについての相談を
この issue で試してみます。
"Developer's certificate of origin" が「原作者の証明書」と訳されていますが、
"certificate of authorship" という意味にも解釈できてしまいます。
「開発者の源泉証明書」とすると、日本の場合は税金の「源泉徴収」の悪影響で
意味不明になってしまいます。
ちなみに、簡体中国語訳では「开发者来源证书」と訳されています。
ソースコードの「出どころ」の証明書の意味で使える origin の訳語が欲しいのです。
「出所」 「出所」 「由来」 「源流」 など、どれもしっくりしないですね。
DCO は LF が作ったものですが、これの定訳はあるのでしょうか？
単に "certificate of origin" の和訳を調べると、輸出入の「原産地証明書」になってしまい、
使えません。
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