test: authority rotation integration tests

state-chain/amm/src/common.rs

@@ -335,13 +335,13 @@ pub(super) fn sqrt_price_at_tick(tick: Tick) -> SqrtPriceQ64F96 {
 	/* Proof that r is never zero (therefore avoiding the divide by zero case here):
 		We can think of an application of the `handle_tick_bit` macro as increasing the index I of r's MSB/`r.ilog2()` (mul by constant), and then decreasing it by 128 (the right shift).
 
-		Note the increase in I caused by the constant mul will be atleast constant.ilog2().
+		Note the increase in I caused by the constant mul will be at least constant.ilog2().
 
 		Also note each application of `handle_tick_bit` decreases (if the if branch is entered) or else maintains r's value as all the constants are less than 2^128.
 
 		Therefore the largest decrease would be caused if all the macros application's if branches where entered.
 
-		So we assuming all if branches are entered, after all the applications `I` would be atleast I_initial + bigsum(constant.ilog2()) - 19*128.
+		So we assuming all if branches are entered, after all the applications `I` would be at least I_initial + bigsum(constant.ilog2()) - 19*128.
 
 		The test `r_non_zero` checks with value is >= 0, therefore imply the smallest value r could have is more than 0.
 	*/

state-chain/amm/src/limit_orders.rs

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ impl FloatBetweenZeroAndOne {
 
 		let (mul_div_normalised_mantissa, div_normalise_shift) = {
 			// As the denominator <= U256::MAX, this div will not right-shift the mantissa more than
-			// 256 bits, so we maintain atleast 256 accurate bits in the result.
+			// 256 bits, so we maintain at least 256 accurate bits in the result.
 			let (d, div_remainder) =
 				U512::div_mod(mul_normalised_mantissa, U512::from(denominator));
 			let d = if div_remainder.is_zero() { d } else { d + U512::one() };
@@ -96,11 +96,11 @@ impl FloatBetweenZeroAndOne {
 			Self { normalised_mantissa: mul_div_normalised_mantissa, negative_exponent }
 		} else {
 			// This bounding will cause swaps to get bad prices, but this case will effectively
-			// never happen, as atleast (U256::MAX / 256) (~10^74) swaps would have to happen to get
-			// into this situation. TODO: A possible solution is disabling minting for pools "close"
-			// to this minimum. With a small change to the swapping logic it would be possible to
-			// guarantee that the pool would be emptied before percent_remaining could reach this
-			// min bound.
+			// never happen, as at least (U256::MAX / 256) (~10^74) swaps would have to happen to
+			// get into this situation. TODO: A possible solution is disabling minting for pools
+			// "close" to this minimum. With a small change to the swapping logic it would be
+			// possible to guarantee that the pool would be emptied before percent_remaining could
+			// reach this min bound.
 			Self { normalised_mantissa: U256::one() << 255, negative_exponent: U256::MAX }
 		}
 	}

state-chain/cf-integration-tests/Cargo.toml

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ targets = ['x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu']
 
 [dependencies]
 state-chain-runtime = { path = '../runtime' }
+log = { version = '0.4.16', default-features = false }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 libsecp256k1 = { version = "0.7", features = ['static-context'] }
@@ -79,3 +80,4 @@ sp-std = { git = "https://github.com/chainflip-io/substrate.git", tag = "chainfl
 sp-transaction-pool = { git = "https://github.com/chainflip-io/substrate.git", tag = "chainflip-monthly-2023-08+2" }
 sp-version = { git = "https://github.com/chainflip-io/substrate.git", tag = "chainflip-monthly-2023-08+2" }
 sp-consensus-grandpa = { git = "https://github.com/chainflip-io/substrate.git", tag = "chainflip-monthly-2023-08+2" }
+sp-timestamp = { git = "https://github.com/chainflip-io/substrate.git", tag = "chainflip-monthly-2023-08+2" }

state-chain/cf-integration-tests/src/account.rs

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ fn account_deletion_removes_relevant_storage_items() {
 		let vanity_names = VanityNames::<Runtime>::get();
 		assert_eq!(*vanity_names.get(&backup_node).unwrap(), elon_vanity_name.as_bytes().to_vec());
 
+		// Redeem all
 		network::Cli::redeem(
 			&backup_node,
 			RedemptionAmount::Max,