Another attempt to suppress Slither false positives

solidity/contracts/l2/L1BitcoinDepositor.sol

@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ contract L1BitcoinDepositor is
     ///        attached to the call (as calculated by `quoteFinalizeDeposit`).
     /// @dev Implemented based on examples presented as part of the Wormhole SDK:
     ///      https://github.com/wormhole-foundation/hello-token/blob/8ec757248788dc12183f13627633e1d6fd1001bb/src/example-extensions/HelloTokenWithoutSDK.sol#L29
+    // slither-disable-next-line arbitrary-send-eth
     function _transferTbtc(uint256 amount, bytes32 l2Receiver) internal {
         // Wormhole supports the 1e8 precision at most. TBTC is 1e18 so
         // the amount needs to be normalized.
@@ -540,7 +541,6 @@ contract L1BitcoinDepositor is
         // Initiate a Wormhole token transfer that will lock L1 TBTC within
         // the Wormhole Token Bridge contract and assign Wormhole-wrapped
         // L2 TBTC to the corresponding `L2WormholeGateway` contract.
-        // slither-disable-next-line arbitrary-send-eth
         uint64 transferSequence = wormholeTokenBridge.transferTokensWithPayload{
             value: wormholeMessageFee
         }(
@@ -569,7 +569,6 @@ contract L1BitcoinDepositor is
         // contract receives it, it calls the `L2WormholeGateway` contract
         // that redeems Wormhole-wrapped L2 TBTC from the Wormhole Token
         // Bridge and use it to mint canonical L2 TBTC to the receiver address.
-        // slither-disable-next-line arbitrary-send-eth
         wormholeRelayer.sendVaasToEvm{value: cost - wormholeMessageFee}(
             l2ChainId,
             l2BitcoinDepositor,