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RFC 10: ROAST Schnorr signatures #601
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and our implementation must conform to it. | ||
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Schnorr signatures are incompatible with existing Bitcoin scripts, | ||
requiring the use of taproot scripts instead. |
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I think a link to an explainer of taproot scripts would help
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Follow-up issue
Left a few comments around hyperlinking extra info and some state stuff Additionally, I think adding more resources like https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FVW6Hgt_meg and https://github.com/robot-dreams/roast would be sweet |
I'm good here! I think it would be helpful to have someone from @keep-network/go check this out as well |
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Excellent RFC, and overdue for a merge.
and our implementation must conform to it. | ||
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Schnorr signatures are incompatible with existing Bitcoin scripts, | ||
requiring the use of taproot scripts instead. |
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Follow-up issue
=== DKG | ||
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The (51, 100) secret key for a tBTC-ROAST signing group (aka wallet) | ||
is produced using GJKR. |
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A link here would be 👌
Because of this, the only solution is to retry the signing | ||
until a set of signers with no misbehaving participants is stumbled upon. | ||
This means that even a small group of misbehaving participants | ||
can cause a dramatic slowdown in signing, |
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I think it's worth noting what the dramatic slowdown means: For 51-of-100 signing and 2 malicious members, we need 5 retries on average.
already widely used in Bitcoin. | ||
A signature for message m and public key point P | ||
is defined as the (point, scalar) pair `(R, s)` | ||
where `s * G = R + hash(R || P || m) * P`. |
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Is II
a byte concatenation or a logical alternative of bytes? I take the former but would be nice to define it in the RFC.
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Follow up issue
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The algorithm `Verify(pk, m, sig)` is defined as: | ||
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* Let `P = lift_x(int(pk))`; fail if that fails. |
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What is the lift_x
function doing?
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Created a follow up issue
Using ROAST and Schnorr signatures, we can significantly simplify threshold signing while achieving attributability of misbehaviour.