(PA-6699) Bump puppet-agent's bundled openssl 3.0 to address CVE-2024-5535

configs/components/openssl-3.0.rb

@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@
  'no-whirlpool'
  ]
 
+ # Remove this in 3.0.15 or later
+ pkg.apply_patch 'resources/patches/openssl/CVE-2024-5535.patch'
+
  if settings[:use_legacy_openssl_algos]
  pkg.apply_patch 'resources/patches/openssl/openssl-3-activate-legacy-algos.patch'
  else

resources/patches/openssl/CVE-2024-5535.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+From cf6f91f6121f4db167405db2f0de410a456f260c Fri May 31 11:14:33 2024 +0100
+author Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Fri May 31 11:14:33 2024 +0100
+committer Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Thu Jun 27 10:39:47 2024 +0100
+
+Fix SSL_select_next_proto
+
+Ensure that the provided client list is non-NULL and starts with a valid
+entry. When called from the ALPN callback the client list should already
+have been validated by OpenSSL so this should not cause a problem. When
+called from the NPN callback the client list is locally configured and
+will not have already been validated. Therefore SSL_select_next_proto
+should not assume that it is correctly formatted.
+
+We implement stricter checking of the client protocol list. We also do the
+same for the server list while we are about it.
+
+CVE-2024-5535
+
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24718)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 4ada436a1946cbb24db5ab4ca082b69c1bc10f37)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+index cb4e006ea7..e628140dfa 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+@@ -2952,37 +2952,54 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ unsigned int server_len,
+ const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
+ {
+- unsigned int i, j;
+- const unsigned char *result;
+- int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
++ PACKET cpkt, csubpkt, spkt, ssubpkt;
++
++ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)
++ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)
++ || PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt) == 0) {
++ *out = NULL;
++ *outlen = 0;
++ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Set the default opportunistic protocol. Will be overwritten if we find
++ * a match.
++ */
++ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&csubpkt);
++ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&csubpkt);
+
+ /*
+ * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
+ */
+- for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
+- for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
+- if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+- memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
+- /* We found a match */
+- result = &server[i];
+- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+- goto found;
++ if (PACKET_buf_init(&spkt, server, server_len)) {
++ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&spkt, &ssubpkt)) {
++ if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) == 0)
++ continue; /* Invalid - ignore it */
++ if (PACKET_buf_init(&cpkt, client, client_len)) {
++ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cpkt, &csubpkt)) {
++ if (PACKET_equal(&csubpkt, PACKET_data(&ssubpkt),
++ PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt))) {
++ /* We found a match */
++ *out = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(&ssubpkt);
++ *outlen = (unsigned char)PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt);
++ return OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
++ }
++ }
++ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the client list */
++ } else {
++ /* This should never happen */
++ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+ }
+- j += client[j];
+- j++;
+ }
+- i += server[i];
+- i++;
++ /* Ignore spurious trailing bytes in the server list */
+ }
+
+- /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+- result = client;
+- status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+-
+- found:
+- *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
+- *outlen = result[0];
+- return status;
++ /*
++ * There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. We use
++ * the default opportunistic protocol selected earlier
++ */
++ return OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+ }
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG