log received invalid malfeasance proofs on DEBUG (#6232)

## Motivation Users don't need to be informed that a peer sends invalid proofs and the peer should be dropped.
spacemeshos · Aug 8, 2024 · ef93b78 · ef93b78
1 parent 714fa7b
commit ef93b78
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Showing 6 changed files with 13 additions and 10 deletions.
diff --git a/activation/malfeasance.go b/activation/malfeasance.go
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ func (mh *MalfeasanceHandler) Validate(ctx context.Context, data wire.ProofData)
 		msg1.InnerMsg.MsgHash != msg2.InnerMsg.MsgHash {
 		return msg1.SmesherID, nil
 	}
-	mh.logger.Warn("received invalid atx malfeasance proof",
+	mh.logger.Debug("received invalid atx malfeasance proof",
 		log.ZContext(ctx),
 		zap.Stringer("first_smesher", msg1.SmesherID),
 		zap.Object("first_proof", &msg1.InnerMsg),

diff --git a/hare3/malfeasance.go b/hare3/malfeasance.go
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ func (mh *MalfeasanceHandler) Validate(ctx context.Context, data wire.ProofData)
 		msg1.InnerMsg.MsgHash != msg2.InnerMsg.MsgHash {
 		return msg1.SmesherID, nil
 	}
-	mh.logger.Warn("received invalid hare malfeasance proof",
+	mh.logger.Debug("received invalid hare malfeasance proof",
 		log.ZContext(ctx),
 		zap.Stringer("first_smesher", hp.Messages[0].SmesherID),
 		zap.Object("first_proof", &hp.Messages[0].InnerMsg),

diff --git a/hare4/malfeasance.go b/hare4/malfeasance.go
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ func (mh *MalfeasanceHandler) Validate(ctx context.Context, data wire.ProofData)
 		msg1.InnerMsg.MsgHash != msg2.InnerMsg.MsgHash {
 		return msg1.SmesherID, nil
 	}
-	mh.logger.Warn("received invalid hare malfeasance proof",
+	mh.logger.Debug("received invalid hare malfeasance proof",
 		log.ZContext(ctx),
 		zap.Stringer("first_smesher", hp.Messages[0].SmesherID),
 		zap.Object("first_proof", &hp.Messages[0].InnerMsg),

diff --git a/malfeasance/handler.go b/malfeasance/handler.go
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ var (
 
 	errMalformedData = fmt.Errorf("%w: malformed data", pubsub.ErrValidationReject)
 	errWrongHash     = fmt.Errorf("%w: incorrect hash", pubsub.ErrValidationReject)
-	errInvalidProof  = fmt.Errorf("%w: invalid proof", pubsub.ErrValidationReject)
+	errUnknownProof  = fmt.Errorf("%w: unknown proof type", pubsub.ErrValidationReject)
 )
 
 type MalfeasanceType byte
@@ -153,19 +153,20 @@ func (h *Handler) HandleMalfeasanceProof(ctx context.Context, peer p2p.Peer, dat
 
 func (h *Handler) validateAndSave(ctx context.Context, p *wire.MalfeasanceGossip) (types.NodeID, error) {
 	if p.Eligibility != nil {
+		numMalformed.Inc()
 		return types.EmptyNodeID, fmt.Errorf(
 			"%w: eligibility field was deprecated with hare3",
 			pubsub.ErrValidationReject,
 		)
 	}
 	nodeID, err := h.Validate(ctx, p)
 	switch {
-	case errors.Is(err, errInvalidProof):
+	case errors.Is(err, errUnknownProof):
 		numMalformed.Inc()
 		return types.EmptyNodeID, err
 	case err != nil:
 		h.countInvalidProof(&p.MalfeasanceProof)
-		return types.EmptyNodeID, err
+		return types.EmptyNodeID, errors.Join(err, pubsub.ErrValidationReject)
 	}
 	if err := h.cdb.WithTx(ctx, func(dbtx *sql.Tx) error {
 		malicious, err := identities.IsMalicious(dbtx, nodeID)
@@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ func (h *Handler) validateAndSave(ctx context.Context, p *wire.MalfeasanceGossip
 func (h *Handler) Validate(ctx context.Context, p *wire.MalfeasanceGossip) (types.NodeID, error) {
 	mh, ok := h.handlersV1[MalfeasanceType(p.Proof.Type)]
 	if !ok {
-		return types.EmptyNodeID, fmt.Errorf("%w: unknown malfeasance type", errInvalidProof)
+		return types.EmptyNodeID, fmt.Errorf("%w: unknown malfeasance type", errUnknownProof)
 	}
 
 	nodeID, err := mh.Validate(ctx, p.Proof.Data)

diff --git a/malfeasance/handler_test.go b/malfeasance/handler_test.go
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ func TestHandler_HandleMalfeasanceProof(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 
 		err := h.HandleMalfeasanceProof(context.Background(), "peer", codec.MustEncode(gossip))
-		require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInvalidProof)
+		require.ErrorIs(t, err, errUnknownProof)
 		require.ErrorIs(t, err, pubsub.ErrValidationReject)
 	})
 
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ func TestHandler_HandleMalfeasanceProof(t *testing.T) {
 
 		err := h.HandleMalfeasanceProof(context.Background(), "peer", codec.MustEncode(gossip))
 		require.ErrorContains(t, err, "invalid proof")
+		require.ErrorIs(t, err, pubsub.ErrValidationReject)
 	})
 
 	t.Run("valid proof", func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -223,7 +224,7 @@ func TestHandler_HandleSyncedMalfeasanceProof(t *testing.T) {
 			"peer",
 			codec.MustEncode(proof),
 		)
-		require.ErrorIs(t, err, errInvalidProof)
+		require.ErrorIs(t, err, errUnknownProof)
 		require.ErrorIs(t, err, pubsub.ErrValidationReject)
 	})
 
@@ -291,6 +292,7 @@ func TestHandler_HandleSyncedMalfeasanceProof(t *testing.T) {
 			codec.MustEncode(proof),
 		)
 		require.ErrorContains(t, err, "invalid proof")
+		require.ErrorIs(t, err, pubsub.ErrValidationReject)
 	})
 
 	t.Run("valid proof", func(t *testing.T) {

diff --git a/mesh/malfeasance.go b/mesh/malfeasance.go
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ func (mh *MalfeasanceHandler) Validate(ctx context.Context, data wire.ProofData)
 		msg1.InnerMsg.MsgHash != msg2.InnerMsg.MsgHash {
 		return msg1.SmesherID, nil
 	}
-	mh.logger.Warn("received invalid ballot malfeasance proof",
+	mh.logger.Debug("received invalid ballot malfeasance proof",
 		log.ZContext(ctx),
 		zap.Stringer("first_smesher", bp.Messages[0].SmesherID),
 		zap.Object("first_proof", &bp.Messages[0].InnerMsg),