Closes #245: Add GCP Bulletins

vulnerabilities/gcp-2021-019.yaml

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+title: Dropped active Google Cloud Armor security policy
+slug: gcp-2021-019
+cves: null
+affectedPlatforms:
+- GCP
+affectedServices:
+- Cloud Armor
+image: https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1607217237228-a8b69908bad6?ixlib=rb-4.0.3&ixid=M3wxMjA3fDB8MHxwaG90by1wYWdlfHx8fGVufDB8fHx8fA%3D%3D&auto=format&fit=crop&w=3270&q=80
+severity: Low
+discoveredBy:
+ name: null
+ org: null
+ domain: null
+ twitter: null
+disclosedAt: null
+publishedAt: 2021/09/29
+exploitabilityPeriod: null
+knownITWExploitation: null
+summary: |
+ There is a known issue where updating a BackendConfig resource
+ using the v1beta1 API removes an active Google Cloud Armor 
+ security policy from its service. If you do not configure Google Cloud Armor
+ on your Ingress resources via the BackendConfig, then this issue does not affect your clusters.
+manualRemediation: |
+ Dropped Cloud Armor security policies must be manually reattached. 
+detectionMethods: null
+contributor: https://github.com/ramimac
+references:
+- https://cloud.google.com/support/bulletins#gcp-2021-019
+- https://cloud.google.com/anthos/clusters/docs/security-bulletins#gcp-2021-019

vulnerabilities/gcp-2021-022.yaml

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+title: Predictible seed in Anthos Identity Service LDAP module
+slug: gcp-2021-022
+cves: null
+affectedPlatforms:
+- GCP
+affectedServices:
+- Anthos
+image: https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1458014854819-1a40aa70211c?auto=format&fit=crop&q=80&w=2070&ixlib=rb-4.0.3&ixid=M3wxMjA3fDB8MHxwaG90by1wYWdlfHx8fGVufDB8fHx8fA%3D%3D
+severity: Low
+discoveredBy:
+ name: null
+ org: null
+ domain: null
+ twitter: null
+disclosedAt: null
+publishedAt: 2021/09/22
+exploitabilityPeriod: Ongoing
+knownITWExploitation: null
+summary: |
+ A vulnerability was discovered in the Anthos Identity Service (AIS) LDAP module
+ of Anthos clusters on VMware versions 1.8 and 1.8.1 where a seed key used in generating
+ keys is predictable. With this vulnerability, an authenticated user could add arbitrary
+ claims and escalate privileges indefinitely.
+manualRemediation: |
+ Upgrade your clusters to version 1.8.2.
+detectionMethods: null
+contributor: https://github.com/ramimac
+references:
+- https://cloud.google.com/support/bulletins#gcp-2021-022
+- https://cloud.google.com/anthos/clusters/docs/security-bulletins#gcp-2021-022

vulnerabilities/gcp-2022-011.yaml

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+title: GKE Sandbox side channel attack
+slug: gcp-2022-011
+cves: null
+affectedPlatforms:
+- GCP
+affectedServices:
+- GKE Sandbox
+image: https://images.pexels.com/photos/5371573/pexels-photo-5371573.jpeg?auto=compress&cs=tinysrgb&w=1260&h=750&dpr=2
+severity: Medium
+discoveredBy:
+ name: null
+ org: null
+ domain: null
+ twitter: null
+disclosedAt: null
+publishedAt: 2022/03/22
+exploitabilityPeriod: null
+knownITWExploitation: null
+summary: |
+ There was a misconfiguration with Simultaneous Multi-Threading (SMT),
+ also known as Hyper-threading, in GKE Sandbox images, causing nodes
+ to be potentially exposed to side channel attacks such as
+ Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS).
+manualRemediation: |
+ Upgrade nodes to versions 1.22.6-gke.1500 and later or 1.23.3-gke.1100 and later.
+detectionMethods: null
+contributor: https://github.com/ramimac
+references:
+- https://cloud.google.com/support/bulletins#gcp-2022-011
+- https://cloud.google.com/anthos/clusters/docs/security-bulletins#gcp-2022-011

vulnerabilities/gcp-2023-007.yaml

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+title: Privilege escalation in GCP Cloud SQL
+slug: gcp-2023-007
+cves: null
+affectedPlatforms:
+- GCP
+affectedServices:
+- Cloud SQL
+image: https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1544383835-bda2bc66a55d?auto=format&fit=crop&q=80&w=2036&ixlib=rb-4.0.3&ixid=M3wxMjA3fDB8MHxwaG90by1wYWdlfHx8fGVufDB8fHx8fA%3D%3D
+severity: Medium
+discoveredBy:
+ name: null
+ org: null
+ domain: null
+ twitter: null
+disclosedAt: null
+publishedAt: 2023/06/02
+exploitabilityPeriod: null
+knownITWExploitation: null
+summary: |
+ A vulnerability was discovered in Cloud SQL for SQL Server
+ that allowed customer administrator accounts to create triggers 
+ in the tempdb database and use those to gain sysadmin privileges in the instance. 
+ The sysadmin privileges would give the attacker access to system databases
+ and partial access to the machine running that SQL Server instance.
+manualRemediation: |
+ None required
+detectionMethods: null
+contributor: https://github.com/ramimac
+references:
+- https://cloud.google.com/support/bulletins#GCP-2023-007
+- https://cloud.google.com/sql/docs/security-bulletins#gcp-2023-007