build(deps): bump idna from 3.4 to 3.7 in /drivers/gpu/drm/ci/xfails #1
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Bumps [idna](https://github.com/kjd/idna) from 3.4 to 3.7. - [Release notes](https://github.com/kjd/idna/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/kjd/idna/blob/master/HISTORY.rst) - [Commits](kjd/idna@v3.4...v3.7) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: idna dependency-type: direct:production ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
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When using --Summary mode, added MSRs in raw mode always print zeros. Print the actual register contents. Example, with patch: note the added column: --add msr0x64f,u32,package,raw,REASON Where: 0x64F is MSR_CORE_PERF_LIMIT_REASONS Busy% Bzy_MHz PkgTmp PkgWatt CorWatt REASON 0.00 4800 35 1.42 0.76 0x00000000 0.00 4801 34 1.42 0.76 0x00000000 80.08 4531 66 108.17 107.52 0x08000000 98.69 4530 66 133.21 132.54 0x08000000 99.28 4505 66 128.26 127.60 0x0c000400 99.65 4486 68 124.91 124.25 0x0c000400 99.63 4483 68 124.90 124.25 0x0c000400 79.34 4481 41 99.80 99.13 0x0c000000 0.00 4801 41 1.40 0.73 0x0c000000 Where, for the test processor (i5-10600K): PKG Limit #1: 125.000 Watts, 8.000000 sec MSR bit 26 = log; bit 10 = status PKG Limit #2: 136.000 Watts, 0.002441 sec MSR bit 27 = log; bit 11 = status Example, without patch: Busy% Bzy_MHz PkgTmp PkgWatt CorWatt REASON 0.01 4800 35 1.43 0.77 0x00000000 0.00 4801 35 1.39 0.73 0x00000000 83.49 4531 66 112.71 112.06 0x00000000 98.69 4530 68 133.35 132.69 0x00000000 99.31 4500 67 127.96 127.30 0x00000000 99.63 4483 69 124.91 124.25 0x00000000 99.61 4481 69 124.90 124.25 0x00000000 99.61 4481 71 124.92 124.25 0x00000000 59.35 4479 42 75.03 74.37 0x00000000 0.00 4800 42 1.39 0.73 0x00000000 0.00 4801 42 1.42 0.76 0x00000000 c000000 [lenb: simplified patch to apply only to package scope] Signed-off-by: Doug Smythies <dsmythies@telus.net> Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
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The idea behind this patch is to delay the freeing of PT entry objects
until the TLB flush is done.
This patch:
- Adds a tlb_flush_waitlist in amdgpu_vm_update_params which will keep the
objects that need to be freed after tlb_flush.
- Adds PT entries in this list in amdgpu_vm_ptes_update after finding
the PT entry.
- Changes functionality of amdgpu_vm_pt_free_dfs from (df_search + free)
to simply freeing of the BOs, also renames it to
amdgpu_vm_pt_free_list to reflect this same.
- Exports function amdgpu_vm_pt_free_list to be called directly.
- Calls amdgpu_vm_pt_free_list directly from amdgpu_vm_update_range.
V2: rebase
V4: Addressed review comments from Christian
- add only locked PTEs entries in TLB flush waitlist.
- do not create a separate function for list flush.
- do not create a new lock for TLB flush.
- there is no need to wait on tlb_flush_fence exclusively.
V5: Addressed review comments from Christian
- change the amdgpu_vm_pt_free_dfs's functionality to simple freeing
of the objects and rename it.
- add all the PTE objects in params->tlb_flush_waitlist
- let amdgpu_vm_pt_free_root handle the freeing of BOs independently
- call amdgpu_vm_pt_free_list directly
V6: Rebase
V7: Rebase
V8: Added a NULL check to fix this backtrace issue:
[ 415.351447] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
[ 415.359245] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ 415.365081] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ 415.370817] PGD 101259067 P4D 101259067 PUD 10125a067 PMD 0
[ 415.377140] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 415.382004] CPU: 0 PID: 25481 Comm: test_with_MPI.e Tainted: G OE 5.18.2-mi300-build-140423-ubuntu-22.04+ #24
[ 415.394437] Hardware name: AMD Corporation Sh51p/Sh51p, BIOS RMO1001AS 02/21/2024
[ 415.402797] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_vm_ptes_update+0x6fd/0xa10 [amdgpu]
[ 415.409648] Code: 4c 89 ff 4d 8d 66 30 e8 f1 ed ff ff 48 85 db 74 42 48 39 5d a0 74 40 48 8b 53 20 48 8b 4b 18 48 8d 43 18 48 8d 75 b0 4c 89 ff <48
> 89 51 08 48 89 0a 49 8b 56 30 48 89 42 08 48 89 53 18 4c 89 63
[ 415.430621] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000401f990 EFLAGS: 00010287
[ 415.436456] RAX: ffff888147bb82f0 RBX: ffff888147bb82d8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 415.444426] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9000401fa30 RDI: ffff888161f80000
[ 415.452397] RBP: ffffc9000401fa80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000401fa00
[ 415.460368] R10: 00000007f0cc0000 R11: 00000007f0c85000 R12: ffffc9000401fb20
[ 415.468340] R13: 00000007f0d00000 R14: ffffc9000401faf0 R15: ffff888161f80000
[ 415.476312] FS: 00007f132ff89840(0000) GS:ffff889f87c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 415.485350] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 415.491767] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000161d46003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 415.499738] PKRU: 55555554
[ 415.502750] Call Trace:
[ 415.505482] <TASK>
[ 415.507825] amdgpu_vm_update_range+0x32a/0x880 [amdgpu]
[ 415.513869] amdgpu_vm_clear_freed+0x117/0x250 [amdgpu]
[ 415.519814] amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_unmap_memory_from_gpu+0x18c/0x250 [amdgpu]
[ 415.527729] kfd_ioctl_unmap_memory_from_gpu+0xed/0x340 [amdgpu]
[ 415.534551] kfd_ioctl+0x3b6/0x510 [amdgpu]
V9: Addressed review comments from Christian
- No NULL check reqd for root PT freeing
- Free PT list regardless of needs_flush
- Move adding BOs in list in a separate function
V10: Added Christian's RB
V11: squash in list fix
Cc: Christian König <Christian.Koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling@amd.com>
Cc: Rajneesh Bhardwaj <rajneesh.bhardwaj@amd.com>
Acked-by: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling@amd.com>
Acked-by: Rajneesh Bhardwaj <rajneesh.bhardwaj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <Christian.Koenig@amd.com>
Tested-by: Rajneesh Bhardwaj <rajneesh.bhardwaj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Shashank Sharma <shashank.sharma@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
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An errant disk backup on my desktop got into debugfs and triggered the
following deadlock scenario in the amdgpu debugfs files. The machine
also hard-resets immediately after those lines are printed (although I
wasn't able to reproduce that part when reading by hand):
[ 1318.016074][ T1082] ======================================================
[ 1318.016607][ T1082] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 1318.017107][ T1082] 6.8.0-rc7-00015-ge0c8221b72c0 #17 Not tainted
[ 1318.017598][ T1082] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 1318.018096][ T1082] tar/1082 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 1318.018585][ T1082] ffff98c44175d6a0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x40/0x80
[ 1318.019084][ T1082]
[ 1318.019084][ T1082] but task is already holding lock:
[ 1318.020052][ T1082] ffff98c4c13f55f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x6a/0x250 [amdgpu]
[ 1318.020607][ T1082]
[ 1318.020607][ T1082] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 1318.020607][ T1082]
[ 1318.022081][ T1082]
[ 1318.022081][ T1082] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 1318.023083][ T1082]
[ 1318.023083][ T1082] -> #2 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 1318.024114][ T1082] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xe0/0x12f0
[ 1318.024639][ T1082] ww_mutex_lock+0x32/0x90
[ 1318.025161][ T1082] dma_resv_lockdep+0x18a/0x330
[ 1318.025683][ T1082] do_one_initcall+0x6a/0x350
[ 1318.026210][ T1082] kernel_init_freeable+0x1a3/0x310
[ 1318.026728][ T1082] kernel_init+0x15/0x1a0
[ 1318.027242][ T1082] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40
[ 1318.027759][ T1082] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[ 1318.028281][ T1082]
[ 1318.028281][ T1082] -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 1318.029297][ T1082] dma_resv_lockdep+0x16c/0x330
[ 1318.029790][ T1082] do_one_initcall+0x6a/0x350
[ 1318.030263][ T1082] kernel_init_freeable+0x1a3/0x310
[ 1318.030722][ T1082] kernel_init+0x15/0x1a0
[ 1318.031168][ T1082] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40
[ 1318.031598][ T1082] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[ 1318.032011][ T1082]
[ 1318.032011][ T1082] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[ 1318.032778][ T1082] __lock_acquire+0x14bf/0x2680
[ 1318.033141][ T1082] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2c0
[ 1318.033487][ T1082] __might_fault+0x58/0x80
[ 1318.033814][ T1082] amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x103/0x250 [amdgpu]
[ 1318.034181][ T1082] full_proxy_read+0x55/0x80
[ 1318.034487][ T1082] vfs_read+0xa7/0x360
[ 1318.034788][ T1082] ksys_read+0x70/0xf0
[ 1318.035085][ T1082] do_syscall_64+0x94/0x180
[ 1318.035375][ T1082] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
[ 1318.035664][ T1082]
[ 1318.035664][ T1082] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1318.035664][ T1082]
[ 1318.036487][ T1082] Chain exists of:
[ 1318.036487][ T1082] &mm->mmap_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex
[ 1318.036487][ T1082]
[ 1318.037310][ T1082] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1318.037310][ T1082]
[ 1318.037838][ T1082] CPU0 CPU1
[ 1318.038101][ T1082] ---- ----
[ 1318.038350][ T1082] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[ 1318.038590][ T1082] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire);
[ 1318.038839][ T1082] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[ 1318.039083][ T1082] rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
[ 1318.039328][ T1082]
[ 1318.039328][ T1082] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 1318.039328][ T1082]
[ 1318.040029][ T1082] 1 lock held by tar/1082:
[ 1318.040259][ T1082] #0: ffff98c4c13f55f8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x6a/0x250 [amdgpu]
[ 1318.040560][ T1082]
[ 1318.040560][ T1082] stack backtrace:
[ 1318.041053][ T1082] CPU: 22 PID: 1082 Comm: tar Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-00015-ge0c8221b72c0 #17 3316c85d50e282c5643b075d1f01a4f6365e39c2
[ 1318.041329][ T1082] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. B650 AORUS PRO AX/B650 AORUS PRO AX, BIOS F20 12/14/2023
[ 1318.041614][ T1082] Call Trace:
[ 1318.041895][ T1082] <TASK>
[ 1318.042175][ T1082] dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80
[ 1318.042460][ T1082] check_noncircular+0x145/0x160
[ 1318.042743][ T1082] __lock_acquire+0x14bf/0x2680
[ 1318.043022][ T1082] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2c0
[ 1318.043301][ T1082] ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80
[ 1318.043580][ T1082] ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80
[ 1318.043856][ T1082] __might_fault+0x58/0x80
[ 1318.044131][ T1082] ? __might_fault+0x40/0x80
[ 1318.044408][ T1082] amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read+0x103/0x250 [amdgpu 8fe2afaa910cbd7654c8cab23563a94d6caebaab]
[ 1318.044749][ T1082] full_proxy_read+0x55/0x80
[ 1318.045042][ T1082] vfs_read+0xa7/0x360
[ 1318.045333][ T1082] ksys_read+0x70/0xf0
[ 1318.045623][ T1082] do_syscall_64+0x94/0x180
[ 1318.045913][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180
[ 1318.046201][ T1082] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
[ 1318.046487][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180
[ 1318.046773][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180
[ 1318.047057][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180
[ 1318.047337][ T1082] ? do_syscall_64+0xa0/0x180
[ 1318.047611][ T1082] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
[ 1318.047887][ T1082] RIP: 0033:0x7f480b70a39d
[ 1318.048162][ T1082] Code: 91 ba 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb b2 e8 18 a3 01 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 80 3d a9 3c 0e 00 00 74 17 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5b c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 53 48 83
[ 1318.048769][ T1082] RSP: 002b:00007ffde77f5c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 1318.049083][ T1082] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000800 RCX: 00007f480b70a39d
[ 1318.049392][ T1082] RDX: 0000000000000800 RSI: 000055c9f2120c00 RDI: 0000000000000008
[ 1318.049703][ T1082] RBP: 0000000000000800 R08: 000055c9f2120a94 R09: 0000000000000007
[ 1318.050011][ T1082] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055c9f2120c00
[ 1318.050324][ T1082] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 0000000000000800
[ 1318.050638][ T1082] </TASK>
amdgpu_debugfs_mqd_read() holds a reservation when it calls
put_user(), which may fault and acquire the mmap_sem. This violates
the established locking order.
Bounce the mqd data through a kernel buffer to get put_user() out of
the illegal section.
Fixes: 445d85e ("drm/amdgpu: add debugfs interface for reading MQDs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+
Reviewed-by: Shashank Sharma <shashank.sharma@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
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At current x1e80100 interface table, interface #3 is wrongly connected to DP controller #0 and interface #4 wrongly connected to DP controller #2. Fix this problem by connect Interface #3 to DP controller #0 and interface #4 connect to DP controller #1. Also add interface #6, #7 and #8 connections to DP controller to complete x1e80100 interface table. Changs in V3: -- add v2 changes log Changs in V2: -- add x1e80100 to subject -- add Fixes Fixes: e3b1f36 ("drm/msm/dpu: Add X1E80100 support") Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Abhinav Kumar <quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@linaro.org> Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/585549/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1711741586-9037-1-git-send-email-quic_khsieh@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Abhinav Kumar <quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com>
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In current code, swiotlb_bounce() may do partial sync's correctly in some circumstances, but may incorrectly fail in other circumstances. The failure cases require both of these to be true: 1) swiotlb_align_offset() returns a non-zero "offset" value 2) the tlb_addr of the partial sync area points into the first "offset" bytes of the _second_ or subsequent swiotlb slot allocated for the mapping Code added in commit 868c9dd ("swiotlb: add overflow checks to swiotlb_bounce") attempts to WARN on the invalid case where tlb_addr points into the first "offset" bytes of the _first_ allocated slot. But there's no way for swiotlb_bounce() to distinguish the first slot from the second and subsequent slots, so the WARN can be triggered incorrectly when #2 above is true. Related, current code calculates an adjustment to the orig_addr stored in the swiotlb slot. The adjustment compensates for the difference in the tlb_addr used for the partial sync vs. the tlb_addr for the full mapping. The adjustment is stored in the local variable tlb_offset. But when #1 and #2 above are true, it's valid for this adjustment to be negative. In such case the arithmetic to adjust orig_addr produces the wrong result due to tlb_offset being declared as unsigned. Fix these problems by removing the over-constraining validations added in 868c9dd. Change the declaration of tlb_offset to be signed instead of unsigned so the adjustment arithmetic works correctly. Tested with a test-only hack to how swiotlb_tbl_map_single() calls swiotlb_bounce(). Instead of calling swiotlb_bounce() just once for the entire mapped area, do a loop with each iteration doing only a 128 byte partial sync until the entire mapped area is sync'ed. Then with swiotlb=force on the kernel boot line, run a variety of raw disk writes followed by read and verification of all bytes of the written data. The storage device has DMA min_align_mask set, and the writes are done with a variety of original buffer memory address alignments and overall buffer sizes. For many of the combinations, current code triggers the WARN statements, or the data verification fails. With the fixes, no WARNs occur and all verifications pass. Fixes: 5f89468 ("swiotlb: manipulate orig_addr when tlb_addr has offset") Fixes: 868c9dd ("swiotlb: add overflow checks to swiotlb_bounce") Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com> Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@atmark-techno.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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UBSAN catches undefined behavior in blk-iocost, where sometimes iocg->delay is shifted right by a number that is too large, resulting in undefined behavior on some architectures. [ 186.556576] ------------[ cut here ]------------ UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in block/blk-iocost.c:1366:23 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'u64' (aka 'unsigned long long') CPU: 16 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/16 Tainted: G S E N 6.9.0-0_fbk700_debug_rc2_kbuilder_0_gc85af715cac0 #1 Hardware name: Quanta Twin Lakes MP/Twin Lakes Passive MP, BIOS F09_3A23 12/08/2020 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x8f/0xe0 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x22c/0x280 iocg_kick_delay+0x30b/0x310 ioc_timer_fn+0x2fb/0x1f80 __run_timer_base+0x1b6/0x250 ... Avoid that undefined behavior by simply taking the "delay = 0" branch if the shift is too large. I am not sure what the symptoms of an undefined value delay will be, but I suspect it could be more than a little annoying to debug. Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404123253.0f58010f@imladris.surriel.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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…_file() cifs_get_fattr() may be called with a NULL inode, so check for a non-NULL inode before calling cifs_mark_open_handles_for_deleted_file(). This fixes the following oops: mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ...,vers=3.1.1 cd /mnt touch foo; tail -f foo & rm foo cat foo BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000005c0 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 2 PID: 696 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x5d/0x1c70 Code: 00 00 44 8b a4 24 a0 00 00 00 45 85 f6 0f 84 bb 06 00 00 8b 2d 48 e2 95 01 45 89 c3 41 89 d2 45 89 c8 85 ed 0 0 <48> 81 3f 40 7a 76 83 44 0f 44 d8 83 fe 01 0f 86 1b 03 00 00 31 d2 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000b37490 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888110021ec0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000000005c0 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000200 FS: 00007f2a1fa08740(0000) GS:ffff888157a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000005c0 CR3: 000000011ac7c000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x490 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x230 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __lock_acquire+0x5d/0x1c70 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2d0 ? cifs_mark_open_handles_for_deleted_file+0x3a/0x100 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x2d9/0x370 _raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x80 ? cifs_mark_open_handles_for_deleted_file+0x3a/0x100 [cifs] cifs_mark_open_handles_for_deleted_file+0x3a/0x100 [cifs] cifs_get_fattr+0x24c/0x940 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 cifs_get_inode_info+0x96/0x120 [cifs] cifs_lookup+0x16e/0x800 [cifs] cifs_atomic_open+0xc7/0x5d0 [cifs] ? lookup_open.isra.0+0x3ce/0x5f0 ? __pfx_cifs_atomic_open+0x10/0x10 [cifs] lookup_open.isra.0+0x3ce/0x5f0 path_openat+0x42b/0xc30 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 do_filp_open+0xc4/0x170 do_sys_openat2+0xab/0xe0 __x64_sys_openat+0x57/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a Fixes: ffceb76 ("smb: client: do not defer close open handles to deleted files") Reviewed-by: Meetakshi Setiya <msetiya@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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In case device is having a non fatal FW error during probe, the driver will report the error to user via devlink. This will trigger a WARN_ON, since mlx5 is calling devlink_register() last. In order to avoid the WARN_ON[1], change mlx5 to invoke devl_register() first under devlink lock. [1] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 227 at net/devlink/health.c:483 devlink_recover_notify.constprop.0+0xb8/0xc0 CPU: 5 PID: 227 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2023_06_12_12_38 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:08:00.0 mlx5_fw_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core] RIP: 0010:devlink_recover_notify.constprop.0+0xb8/0xc0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x79/0x120 ? devlink_recover_notify.constprop.0+0xb8/0xc0 ? report_bug+0x17c/0x190 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x60 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? devlink_recover_notify.constprop.0+0xb8/0xc0 devlink_health_report+0x4a/0x1c0 mlx5_fw_reporter_err_work+0xa4/0xd0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1bb/0x3c0 ? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0 worker_thread+0x4d/0x3c0 ? process_one_work+0x3c0/0x3c0 kthread+0xc6/0xf0 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Fixes: cf53021 ("devlink: Notify users when objects are accessible") Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <shayd@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409190820.227554-3-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When mlx5e_priv_init() fails, the cleanup flow calls mlx5e_selq_cleanup which calls mlx5e_selq_apply() that assures that the `priv->state_lock` is held using lockdep_is_held(). Acquire the state_lock in mlx5e_selq_cleanup(). Kernel log: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.8.0-rc3_net_next_841a9b5 #1 Not tainted ----------------------------- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/selq.c:124 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by systemd-modules/293: #0: ffffffffa05067b0 (devices_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: ib_register_client+0x109/0x1b0 [ib_core] #1: ffff8881096c65c0 (&device->client_data_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: add_client_context+0x104/0x1c0 [ib_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 4 PID: 293 Comm: systemd-modules Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3_net_next_841a9b5 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x8a/0xa0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x154/0x1a0 mlx5e_selq_apply+0x94/0xa0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_selq_cleanup+0x3a/0x60 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_priv_init+0x2be/0x2f0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_rdma_setup_rn+0x7c/0x1a0 [mlx5_core] rdma_init_netdev+0x4e/0x80 [ib_core] ? mlx5_rdma_netdev_free+0x70/0x70 [mlx5_core] ipoib_intf_init+0x64/0x550 [ib_ipoib] ipoib_intf_alloc+0x4e/0xc0 [ib_ipoib] ipoib_add_one+0xb0/0x360 [ib_ipoib] add_client_context+0x112/0x1c0 [ib_core] ib_register_client+0x166/0x1b0 [ib_core] ? 0xffffffffa0573000 ipoib_init_module+0xeb/0x1a0 [ib_ipoib] do_one_initcall+0x61/0x250 do_init_module+0x8a/0x270 init_module_from_file+0x8b/0xd0 idempotent_init_module+0x17d/0x230 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x61/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e </TASK> Fixes: 8bf30be ("net/mlx5e: Introduce select queue parameters") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <cjubran@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409190820.227554-8-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In cifs_sfu_make_node(), on success, instantiate rather than leave it with dentry unhashed negative to support callers that expect mknod(2) to always instantiate. This fixes the following test case: mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ...,sfu mkfifo /mnt/fifo ./xfstests/ltp/growfiles -b -W test -e 1 -u -i 0 -L 30 /mnt/fifo ... BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000034cec4e58 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 138098 Comm: growfiles Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-436.3987_1240945149.el9.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:_raw_callee_save__kvm_vcpu_is_preempted+0x0/0x20 Code: e8 15 d9 61 00 e9 63 ff ff ff 41 bd ea ff ff ff e9 58 ff ff ff e8 d0 71 c0 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 <48> 8b 04 fd 60 2b c1 99 80 b8 90 50 03 00 00 0f 95 c0 c3 cc cc cc RSP: 0018:ffffb6a143cf7cf8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff8a9bc30fb038 RBX: ffff8a9bc666a200 RCX: ffff8a9cc0260000 RDX: 00000000736f622e RSI: ffff8a9bc30fb038 RDI: 000000007665645f RBP: ffffb6a143cf7d70 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9bc666a200 R13: 0000559a302a12b0 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fbed1dbb740(0000) GS:ffff8a9cf0000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000034cec4e58 CR3: 0000000128ec6006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df ? __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x5f7/0x6a0 ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd ? page_fault_oops+0x134/0x170 ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x150 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? _pfx_raw_callee_save__kvm_vcpu_is_preempted+0x10/0x10 __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x5f7/0x6a0 ? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0x84/0xd0 pipe_write+0x47/0x650 ? do_anonymous_page+0x258/0x410 ? inode_security+0x22/0x60 ? selinux_file_permission+0x108/0x150 vfs_write+0x2cb/0x410 ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xf0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x22/0x40 ? do_syscall_64+0x6b/0xf0 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9/0xc0 ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x150 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 72bc63f ("smb3: fix creating FIFOs when mounting with "sfu" mount option") Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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Running a lot of VK CTS in parallel against nouveau, once every few hours you might see something like this crash. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 PGD 8000000114e6e067 P4D 8000000114e6e067 PUD 109046067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 7 PID: 53891 Comm: deqp-vk Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6+ #27 Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI/Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI-CF, BIOS F8 11/05/2021 RIP: 0010:gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0xe3/0x180 [nouveau] Code: c7 48 01 c8 49 89 45 58 85 d2 0f 84 95 00 00 00 41 0f b7 46 12 49 8b 7e 08 89 da 42 8d 2c f8 48 8b 47 08 41 83 c7 01 48 89 ee <48> 8b 40 08 ff d0 0f 1f 00 49 8b 7e 08 48 89 d9 48 8d 75 04 48 c1 RSP: 0000:ffffac20c5857838 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000004d8001 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 00000000004d8001 RSI: 00000000000006d8 RDI: ffffa07afe332180 RBP: 00000000000006d8 R08: ffffac20c5857ad0 R09: 0000000000ffff10 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa07af27e2de0 R12: 000000000000001c R13: ffffac20c5857ad0 R14: ffffa07a96fe9040 R15: 000000000000001c FS: 00007fe395eed7c0(0000) GS:ffffa07e2c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000011febe001 CR4: 00000000003706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ... ? gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0xe3/0x180 [nouveau] ? gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x37/0x180 [nouveau] nvkm_vmm_iter+0x351/0xa20 [nouveau] ? __pfx_nvkm_vmm_ref_ptes+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] ? __pfx_gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] ? __pfx_gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] ? __lock_acquire+0x3ed/0x2170 ? __pfx_gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] nvkm_vmm_ptes_get_map+0xc2/0x100 [nouveau] ? __pfx_nvkm_vmm_ref_ptes+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] ? __pfx_gp100_vmm_pgt_mem+0x10/0x10 [nouveau] nvkm_vmm_map_locked+0x224/0x3a0 [nouveau] Adding any sort of useful debug usually makes it go away, so I hand wrote the function in a line, and debugged the asm. Every so often pt->memory->ptrs is NULL. This ptrs ptr is set in the nv50_instobj_acquire called from nvkm_kmap. If Thread A and Thread B both get to nv50_instobj_acquire around the same time, and Thread A hits the refcount_set line, and in lockstep thread B succeeds at refcount_inc_not_zero, there is a chance the ptrs value won't have been stored since refcount_set is unordered. Force a memory barrier here, I picked smp_mb, since we want it on all CPUs and it's write followed by a read. v2: use paired smp_rmb/smp_wmb. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: be55287 ("drm/nouveau/imem/nv50: embed nvkm_instobj directly into nv04_instobj") Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240411011510.2546857-1-airlied@gmail.com
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Doug reported [1] the following hung task:
INFO: task swapper/0:1 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 5.15.149-21875-gf795ebc40eb8 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:swapper/0 state:D stack: 0 pid: 1 ppid: 0 flags:0x00000008
Call trace:
__switch_to+0xf4/0x1f4
__schedule+0x418/0xb80
schedule+0x5c/0x10c
rpm_resume+0xe0/0x52c
rpm_resume+0x178/0x52c
__pm_runtime_resume+0x58/0x98
clk_pm_runtime_get+0x30/0xb0
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x58/0x208
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208
clk_disable_unused_subtree+0x38/0x208
clk_disable_unused+0x4c/0xe4
do_one_initcall+0xcc/0x2d8
do_initcall_level+0xa4/0x148
do_initcalls+0x5c/0x9c
do_basic_setup+0x24/0x30
kernel_init_freeable+0xec/0x164
kernel_init+0x28/0x120
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
INFO: task kworker/u16:0:9 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 5.15.149-21875-gf795ebc40eb8 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u16:0 state:D stack: 0 pid: 9 ppid: 2 flags:0x00000008
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
__switch_to+0xf4/0x1f4
__schedule+0x418/0xb80
schedule+0x5c/0x10c
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x2c/0x48
__mutex_lock+0x238/0x488
__mutex_lock_slowpath+0x1c/0x28
mutex_lock+0x50/0x74
clk_prepare_lock+0x7c/0x9c
clk_core_prepare_lock+0x20/0x44
clk_prepare+0x24/0x30
clk_bulk_prepare+0x40/0xb0
mdss_runtime_resume+0x54/0x1c8
pm_generic_runtime_resume+0x30/0x44
__genpd_runtime_resume+0x68/0x7c
genpd_runtime_resume+0x108/0x1f4
__rpm_callback+0x84/0x144
rpm_callback+0x30/0x88
rpm_resume+0x1f4/0x52c
rpm_resume+0x178/0x52c
__pm_runtime_resume+0x58/0x98
__device_attach+0xe0/0x170
device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28
bus_probe_device+0x3c/0x9c
device_add+0x644/0x814
mipi_dsi_device_register_full+0xe4/0x170
devm_mipi_dsi_device_register_full+0x28/0x70
ti_sn_bridge_probe+0x1dc/0x2c0
auxiliary_bus_probe+0x4c/0x94
really_probe+0xcc/0x2c8
__driver_probe_device+0xa8/0x130
driver_probe_device+0x48/0x110
__device_attach_driver+0xa4/0xcc
bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xd8
__device_attach+0xf8/0x170
device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28
bus_probe_device+0x3c/0x9c
deferred_probe_work_func+0x9c/0xd8
process_one_work+0x148/0x518
worker_thread+0x138/0x350
kthread+0x138/0x1e0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
The first thread is walking the clk tree and calling
clk_pm_runtime_get() to power on devices required to read the clk
hardware via struct clk_ops::is_enabled(). This thread holds the clk
prepare_lock, and is trying to runtime PM resume a device, when it finds
that the device is in the process of resuming so the thread schedule()s
away waiting for the device to finish resuming before continuing. The
second thread is runtime PM resuming the same device, but the runtime
resume callback is calling clk_prepare(), trying to grab the
prepare_lock waiting on the first thread.
This is a classic ABBA deadlock. To properly fix the deadlock, we must
never runtime PM resume or suspend a device with the clk prepare_lock
held. Actually doing that is near impossible today because the global
prepare_lock would have to be dropped in the middle of the tree, the
device runtime PM resumed/suspended, and then the prepare_lock grabbed
again to ensure consistency of the clk tree topology. If anything
changes with the clk tree in the meantime, we've lost and will need to
start the operation all over again.
Luckily, most of the time we're simply incrementing or decrementing the
runtime PM count on an active device, so we don't have the chance to
schedule away with the prepare_lock held. Let's fix this immediate
problem that can be triggered more easily by simply booting on Qualcomm
sc7180.
Introduce a list of clk_core structures that have been registered, or
are in the process of being registered, that require runtime PM to
operate. Iterate this list and call clk_pm_runtime_get() on each of them
without holding the prepare_lock during clk_disable_unused(). This way
we can be certain that the runtime PM state of the devices will be
active and resumed so we can't schedule away while walking the clk tree
with the prepare_lock held. Similarly, call clk_pm_runtime_put() without
the prepare_lock held to properly drop the runtime PM reference. We
remove the calls to clk_pm_runtime_{get,put}() in this path because
they're superfluous now that we know the devices are runtime resumed.
Reported-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220922084322.RFC.2.I375b6b9e0a0a5348962f004beb3dafee6a12dfbb@changeid/ [1]
Closes: https://issuetracker.google.com/328070191
Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Cc: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Fixes: 9a34b45 ("clk: Add support for runtime PM")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325184204.745706-5-sboyd@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
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Drop support for virtualizing adaptive PEBS, as KVM's implementation is architecturally broken without an obvious/easy path forward, and because exposing adaptive PEBS can leak host LBRs to the guest, i.e. can leak host kernel addresses to the guest. Bug #1 is that KVM doesn't account for the upper 32 bits of IA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRL when (re)programming fixed counters, e.g fixed_ctrl_field() drops the upper bits, reprogram_fixed_counters() stores local variables as u8s and truncates the upper bits too, etc. Bug #2 is that, because KVM _always_ sets precise_ip to a non-zero value for PEBS events, perf will _always_ generate an adaptive record, even if the guest requested a basic record. Note, KVM will also enable adaptive PEBS in individual *counter*, even if adaptive PEBS isn't exposed to the guest, but this is benign as MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG is guaranteed to be zero, i.e. the guest will only ever see Basic records. Bug #3 is in perf. intel_pmu_disable_fixed() doesn't clear the upper bits either, i.e. leaves ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE set, and intel_pmu_enable_fixed() effectively doesn't clear ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE either. I.e. perf _always_ enables ADAPTIVE counters, regardless of what KVM requests. Bug #4 is that adaptive PEBS *might* effectively bypass event filters set by the host, as "Updated Memory Access Info Group" records information that might be disallowed by userspace via KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER. Bug #5 is that KVM doesn't ensure LBR MSRs hold guest values (or at least zeros) when entering a vCPU with adaptive PEBS, which allows the guest to read host LBRs, i.e. host RIPs/addresses, by enabling "LBR Entries" records. Disable adaptive PEBS support as an immediate fix due to the severity of the LBR leak in particular, and because fixing all of the bugs will be non-trivial, e.g. not suitable for backporting to stable kernels. Note! This will break live migration, but trying to make KVM play nice with live migration would be quite complicated, wouldn't be guaranteed to work (i.e. KVM might still kill/confuse the guest), and it's not clear that there are any publicly available VMMs that support adaptive PEBS, let alone live migrate VMs that support adaptive PEBS, e.g. QEMU doesn't support PEBS in any capacity. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240306230153.786365-1-seanjc@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZeepGjHCeSfadANM@google.com Fixes: c59a1f1 ("KVM: x86/pmu: Add IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR emulation for extended PEBS") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Cc: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com> Cc: Zhang Xiong <xiong.y.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Lv Zhiyuan <zhiyuan.lv@intel.com> Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@intel.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Acked-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307005833.827147-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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The uart_handle_cts_change() function in serial_core expects the caller
to hold uport->lock. For example, I have seen the below kernel splat,
when the Bluetooth driver is loaded on an i.MX28 board.
[ 85.119255] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 85.124413] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 27 at /drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:3453 uart_handle_cts_change+0xb4/0xec
[ 85.134694] Modules linked in: hci_uart bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc wlcore_sdio configfs
[ 85.143314] CPU: 0 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 6.6.3-00021-gd62a2f068f92 #1
[ 85.151396] Hardware name: Freescale MXS (Device Tree)
[ 85.156679] Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [bluetooth]
(...)
[ 85.191765] uart_handle_cts_change from mxs_auart_irq_handle+0x380/0x3f4
[ 85.198787] mxs_auart_irq_handle from __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x210
(...)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4d90bb1 ("serial: core: Document and assert lock requirements for irq helpers")
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Emil Kronborg <emil.kronborg@protonmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240320121530.11348-1-emil.kronborg@protonmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…git/netfilter/nf netfilter pull request 24-04-11 Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patches #1 and #2 add missing rcu read side lock when iterating over expression and object type list which could race with module removal. Patch #3 prevents promisc packet from visiting the bridge/input hook to amend a recent fix to address conntrack confirmation race in br_netfilter and nf_conntrack_bridge. Patch #4 adds and uses iterate decorator type to fetch the current pipapo set backend datastructure view when netlink dumps the set elements. Patch #5 fixes removal of duplicate elements in the pipapo set backend. Patch #6 flowtable validates pppoe header before accessing it. Patch #7 fixes flowtable datapath for pppoe packets, otherwise lookup fails and pppoe packets follow classic path. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function, which waits for the work to end if it has already started. However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired. The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since disabling aRFS deletes the rules. Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled. Kernel log: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I ------------------------------------------------------ ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90 arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0 kthread+0xd7/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ethtool/386089: #0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 #1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240 #2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x144/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? save_trace+0x3e/0x360 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80 ? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 ? ethnl_ops_begin+0xb0/0xb0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x53f/0x8f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e </TASK> Fixes: 45bf454 ("net/mlx5e: Enabling aRFS mechanism") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <cjubran@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240411115444.374475-7-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Currently normal HugeTLB fault ends up crashing the kernel, as p4dp derived from p4d_offset() is an invalid address when PGTABLE_LEVEL = 5. A p4d level entry needs to be allocated when not available while walking the page table during HugeTLB faults. Let's call p4d_alloc() to allocate such entries when required instead of current p4d_offset(). Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffff80000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000005 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 52-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000081da9000 [ffffffff80000000] pgd=1000000082cec003, p4d=0000000082c32003, pud=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 108 Comm: high_addr_hugep Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4 #48 Hardware name: Foundation-v8A (DT) pstate: 01402005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : huge_pte_alloc+0xd4/0x334 lr : hugetlb_fault+0x1b8/0xc68 sp : ffff8000833bbc20 x29: ffff8000833bbc20 x28: fff000080080cb58 x27: ffff800082a7cc58 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: fff0000800378e40 x24: fff00008008d6c60 x23: 00000000de9dbf07 x22: fff0000800378e40 x21: 0004000000000000 x20: 0004000000000000 x19: ffffffff80000000 x18: 1ffe00010011d7a1 x17: 0000000000000001 x16: ffffffffffffffff x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff8000816120d0 x12: ffffffffffffffff x11: 0000000000000000 x10: fff00008008ebd0c x9 : 0004000000000000 x8 : 0000000000001255 x7 : fff00008003e2000 x6 : 00000000061d54b0 x5 : 0000000000001000 x4 : ffffffff80000000 x3 : 0000000000200000 x2 : 0000000000000004 x1 : 0000000080000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: huge_pte_alloc+0xd4/0x334 hugetlb_fault+0x1b8/0xc68 handle_mm_fault+0x260/0x29c do_page_fault+0xfc/0x47c do_translation_fault+0x68/0x74 do_mem_abort+0x44/0x94 el0_da+0x2c/0x9c el0t_64_sync_handler+0x70/0xc4 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Code: aa000084 cb010084 b24c2c84 8b130c93 (f9400260) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a6bbf5d ("arm64: mm: Add definitions to support 5 levels of paging") Reported-by: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415094003.1812018-1-anshuman.khandual@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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On arm64, UBSAN traps can be decoded from the trap instruction. Add the add, sub, and mul overflow trap codes now that CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP exists. Seen under clang 19: Internal error: UBSAN: unrecognized failure code: 00000000f2005515 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240411-fix-ubsan-in-hardening-config-v1-0-e0177c80ffaa@kernel.org Fixes: 557f8c5 ("ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer") Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415182832.work.932-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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When I did hard offline test with hugetlb pages, below deadlock occurs: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ bash/46904 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffffabe68910 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 but task is already holding lock: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x6c/0x770 page_alloc_cpu_online+0x3c/0x70 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x397/0x5f0 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x71/0xe0 _cpu_up+0xeb/0x210 cpu_up+0x91/0xe0 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0x49/0xb0 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0xb7/0xe0 smp_init+0x25/0xa0 kernel_init_freeable+0x15f/0x3e0 kernel_init+0x15/0x1b0 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); lock(pcp_batch_high_lock); rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by bash/46904: #0: ffff98f6c3bb23f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 #1: ffff98f6c328e488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0 #2: ffff98ef83b31890 (kn->active#113){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0 #3: ffffffffabf9db48 (mf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: memory_failure+0x44/0xc70 #4: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40 stack backtrace: CPU: 10 PID: 46904 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x129/0x140 __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 RIP: 0033:0x7fc862314887 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007fff19311268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007fc862314887 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 000056405645fe10 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000056405645fe10 R08: 00007fc8623d1460 R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000c R13: 00007fc86241b780 R14: 00007fc862417600 R15: 00007fc862416a00 In short, below scene breaks the lock dependency chain: memory_failure __page_handle_poison zone_pcp_disable -- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) dissolve_free_huge_page __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio static_key_slow_dec cpus_read_lock -- rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) Fix this by calling drain_all_pages() instead. This issue won't occur until commit a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key"). As it introduced rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) in dissolve_free_huge_page() code path while lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) is already in the __page_handle_poison(). [linmiaohe@huawei.com: extend comment per Oscar] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: reflow block comment] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240407085456.2798193-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 amends a missing spot where the set iterator type is unset. This is fixing a issue in the previous pull request. Patch #2 fixes the delete set command abort path by restoring state of the elements. Reverse logic for the activate (abort) case otherwise element state is not restored, this requires to move the check for active/inactive elements to the set iterator callback. From the deactivate path, toggle the next generation bit and from the activate (abort) path, clear the next generation bitmask. Patch #3 skips elements already restored by delete set command from the abort path in case there is a previous delete element command in the batch. Check for the next generation bit just like it is done via set iteration to restore maps. netfilter pull request 24-04-18 * tag 'nf-24-04-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nf_tables: fix memleak in map from abort path netfilter: nf_tables: restore set elements when delete set fails netfilter: nf_tables: missing iterator type in lookup walk ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240418010948.3332346-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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On arm64 machines, swsusp_save() faults if it attempts to access
MEMBLOCK_NOMAP memory ranges. This can be reproduced in QEMU using UEFI
when booting with rodata=off debug_pagealloc=off and CONFIG_KFENCE=n:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffff8000000000
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000007
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000eeb0b000
[ffffff8000000000] pgd=180000217fff9803, p4d=180000217fff9803, pud=180000217fff9803, pmd=180000217fff8803, pte=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1] SMP
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000007 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: xt_multiport ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 libcrc32c iptable_filter bpfilter rfkill at803x snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg dwmac_generic stmmac_platform snd_hda_codec stmmac joydev pcs_xpcs snd_hda_core phylink ppdev lp parport ramoops reed_solomon ip_tables x_tables nls_iso8859_1 vfat multipath linear amdgpu amdxcp drm_exec gpu_sched drm_buddy hid_generic usbhid hid radeon video drm_suballoc_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm i2c_algo_bit drm_display_helper cec drm_kms_helper drm
CPU: 0 PID: 3663 Comm: systemd-sleep Not tainted 6.6.2+ #76
Source Version: 4e22ed63a0a48e7a7cff9b98b7806d8d4add7dc0
Hardware name: Greatwall GW-XXXXXX-XXX/GW-XXXXXX-XXX, BIOS KunLun BIOS V4.0 01/19/2021
pstate: 600003c5 (nZCv DAIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : swsusp_save+0x280/0x538
lr : swsusp_save+0x280/0x538
sp : ffffffa034a3fa40
x29: ffffffa034a3fa40 x28: ffffff8000001000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: ffffff8001400000 x25: ffffffc08113e248 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: 0000000000080000 x22: ffffffc08113e280 x21: 00000000000c69f2
x20: ffffff8000000000 x19: ffffffc081ae2500 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 6666662074736420 x16: 3030303030303030 x15: 3038666666666666
x14: 0000000000000b69 x13: ffffff9f89088530 x12: 00000000ffffffea
x11: 00000000ffff7fff x10: 00000000ffff7fff x9 : ffffffc08193f0d0
x8 : 00000000000bffe8 x7 : c0000000ffff7fff x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffffffa0fff09dc8 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000027
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 000000000000004e
Call trace:
swsusp_save+0x280/0x538
swsusp_arch_suspend+0x148/0x190
hibernation_snapshot+0x240/0x39c
hibernate+0xc4/0x378
state_store+0xf0/0x10c
kobj_attr_store+0x14/0x24
The reason is swsusp_save() -> copy_data_pages() -> page_is_saveable()
-> kernel_page_present() assuming that a page is always present when
can_set_direct_map() is false (all of rodata_full,
debug_pagealloc_enabled() and arm64_kfence_can_set_direct_map() false),
irrespective of the MEMBLOCK_NOMAP ranges. Such MEMBLOCK_NOMAP regions
should not be saved during hibernation.
This problem was introduced by changes to the pfn_valid() logic in
commit a7d9f30 ("arm64: drop pfn_valid_within() and simplify
pfn_valid()").
Similar to other architectures, drop the !can_set_direct_map() check in
kernel_page_present() so that page_is_savable() skips such pages.
Fixes: a7d9f30 ("arm64: drop pfn_valid_within() and simplify pfn_valid()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.14.x
Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: xiongxin <xiongxin@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: xiongxin <xiongxin@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yaxiong Tian <tianyaxiong@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240417025248.386622-1-tianyaxiong@kylinos.cn
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: rework commit message]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Florian reported the following kernel NULL pointer dereference issue on a BCM7250 board: [ 2.829744] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000c when read [ 2.838740] [0000000c] *pgd=80000000004003, *pmd=00000000 [ 2.844178] Internal error: Oops: 206 [#1] SMP ARM [ 2.848990] Modules linked in: [ 2.852061] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.8.0-next-20240305-gd95fcdf4961d #66 [ 2.860436] Hardware name: Broadcom STB (Flattened Device Tree) [ 2.866371] PC is at brcmnand_read_by_pio+0x180/0x278 [ 2.871449] LR is at __wait_for_common+0x9c/0x1b0 [ 2.876178] pc : [<c094b6cc>] lr : [<c0e66310>] psr: 60000053 [ 2.882460] sp : f0811a80 ip : 00000012 fp : 00000000 [ 2.887699] r10: 00000000 r9 : 00000000 r8 : c3790000 [ 2.892936] r7 : 00000000 r6 : 00000000 r5 : c35db440 r4 : ffe00000 [ 2.899479] r3 : f15cb814 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 00000000 r0 : 00000000 The issue only happens when dma mode is disabled or not supported on STB chip. The pio mode transfer calls brcmnand_read_data_bus function which dereferences ctrl->soc->read_data_bus. But the soc member in STB chip is NULL hence triggers the access violation. The function needs to check the soc pointer first. Fixes: 546e425 ("mtd: rawnand: brcmnand: Add BCMBCA read data bus interface") Reported-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com> Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: William Zhang <william.zhang@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20240320222623.35604-1-william.zhang@broadcom.com
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During the removal of the idxd driver, registered offline callback is
invoked as part of the clean up process. However, on systems with only
one CPU online, no valid target is available to migrate the
perf context, resulting in a kernel oops:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000000002a2b8
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 1470e1067 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 20 Comm: cpuhp/0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6-dsa+ #57
Hardware name: Intel Corporation AvenueCity/AvenueCity, BIOS BHSDCRB1.86B.2492.D03.2307181620 07/18/2023
RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x2e/0x50
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__die+0x24/0x70
page_fault_oops+0x82/0x160
do_user_addr_fault+0x65/0x6b0
__pfx___rdmsr_safe_on_cpu+0x10/0x10
exc_page_fault+0x7d/0x170
asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
mutex_lock+0x2e/0x50
mutex_lock+0x1e/0x50
perf_pmu_migrate_context+0x87/0x1f0
perf_event_cpu_offline+0x76/0x90 [idxd]
cpuhp_invoke_callback+0xa2/0x4f0
__pfx_perf_event_cpu_offline+0x10/0x10 [idxd]
cpuhp_thread_fun+0x98/0x150
smpboot_thread_fn+0x27/0x260
smpboot_thread_fn+0x1af/0x260
__pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x103/0x140
__pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
__pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
<TASK>
Fix the issue by preventing the migration of the perf context to an
invalid target.
Fixes: 81dd4d4 ("dmaengine: idxd: Add IDXD performance monitor support")
Reported-by: Terrence Xu <terrence.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Terrence Xu <terrence.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240313214031.1658045-1-fenghua.yu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Fixes This patchset fixes the following issues: - During driver de-initialization the driver unregisters the EMAD response trap by setting its action to DISCARD. However the manual only permits TRAP and FORWARD, and future firmware versions will enforce this. In patch #1, suppress the error message by aligning the driver to the manual and use a FORWARD (NOP) action when unregistering the trap. - The driver queries the Management Capabilities Mask (MCAM) register during initialization to understand if certain features are supported. However, not all firmware versions support this register, leading to the driver failing to load. Patches #2 and #3 fix this issue by treating an error in the register query as an indication that the feature is not supported. v2: - Patch #2: - Make mlxsw_env_max_module_eeprom_len_query() void ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1713446092.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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syzbot was able to trigger a NULL deref in fib_validate_source() in an old tree [1]. It appears the bug exists in latest trees. All calls to __in_dev_get_rcu() must be checked for a NULL result. [1] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 2 PID: 3257 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.10.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:fib_validate_source+0xbf/0x15a0 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:425 Code: 18 f2 f2 f2 f2 42 c7 44 20 23 f3 f3 f3 f3 48 89 44 24 78 42 c6 44 20 27 f3 e8 5d 88 48 fc 4c 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 48 89 44 24 18 <42> 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 ef e8 d2 15 98 fc 48 89 5c 24 10 41 bf RSP: 0018:ffffc900015fee40 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88800f7a4000 RCX: ffff88800f4f90c0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000004001eac RDI: ffff8880160c64c0 RBP: ffffc900015ff060 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88800f7a4000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88800f4f90c0 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88800f7a4000 FS: 00007f938acfe6c0(0000) GS:ffff888058c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f938acddd58 CR3: 000000001248e000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ip_route_use_hint+0x410/0x9b0 net/ipv4/route.c:2231 ip_rcv_finish_core+0x2c4/0x1a30 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:327 ip_list_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612 [inline] ip_sublist_rcv+0x3ed/0xe50 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:638 ip_list_rcv+0x422/0x470 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:673 __netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5572 [inline] __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x6b1/0x890 net/core/dev.c:5620 __netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5672 [inline] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x9f9/0xdc0 net/core/dev.c:5764 netif_receive_skb_list+0x55/0x3e0 net/core/dev.c:5816 xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:257 [inline] xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:335 [inline] bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x1818/0x1d00 net/bpf/test_run.c:363 bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x81f/0x1170 net/bpf/test_run.c:1376 bpf_prog_test_run+0x349/0x3c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3736 __sys_bpf+0x45c/0x710 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5115 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5201 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5199 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5199 Fixes: 02b2494 ("ipv4: use dst hint for ipv4 list receive") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240421184326.1704930-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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If stack_depot_save_flags() allocates memory it always drops
__GFP_NOLOCKDEP flag. So when KASAN tries to track __GFP_NOLOCKDEP
allocation we may end up with lockdep splat like bellow:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc3+ #49 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kswapd0/149 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88811346a920
(&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}-{4:4}, at: xfs_reclaim_inode+0x3ac/0x590
[xfs]
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8bb33100 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
balance_pgdat+0x5d9/0xad0
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x7da/0x1030
lock_acquire+0x15d/0x400
fs_reclaim_acquire+0xb5/0x100
prepare_alloc_pages.constprop.0+0xc5/0x230
__alloc_pages+0x12a/0x3f0
alloc_pages_mpol+0x175/0x340
stack_depot_save_flags+0x4c5/0x510
kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x83/0x90
kmem_cache_alloc+0x15e/0x4a0
__alloc_object+0x35/0x370
__create_object+0x22/0x90
__kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x477/0x5b0
krealloc+0x5f/0x110
xfs_iext_insert_raw+0x4b2/0x6e0 [xfs]
xfs_iext_insert+0x2e/0x130 [xfs]
xfs_iread_bmbt_block+0x1a9/0x4d0 [xfs]
xfs_btree_visit_block+0xfb/0x290 [xfs]
xfs_btree_visit_blocks+0x215/0x2c0 [xfs]
xfs_iread_extents+0x1a2/0x2e0 [xfs]
xfs_buffered_write_iomap_begin+0x376/0x10a0 [xfs]
iomap_iter+0x1d1/0x2d0
iomap_file_buffered_write+0x120/0x1a0
xfs_file_buffered_write+0x128/0x4b0 [xfs]
vfs_write+0x675/0x890
ksys_write+0xc3/0x160
do_syscall_64+0x94/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79
Always preserve __GFP_NOLOCKDEP to fix this.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240418141133.22950-1-ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com
Fixes: cd11016 ("mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/a0caa289-ca02-48eb-9bf2-d86fd47b71f4@redhat.com/
Reported-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/f9ff999a-e170-b66b-7caf-293f2b147ac2@opensource.wdc.com/
Suggested-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Tested-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Issue reported by customer during SRIOV testing, call trace: When both i40e and the i40iw driver are loaded, a warning in check_flush_dependency is being triggered. This seems to be because of the i40e driver workqueue is allocated with the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag, and the i40iw one is not. Similar error was encountered on ice too and it was fixed by removing the flag. Do the same for i40e too. [Feb 9 09:08] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000004] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM i40e:i40e_service_task [i40e] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM infiniband:0x0 [ +0.000060] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 937 at kernel/workqueue.c:2966 check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000007] Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm cifs_md4 dns_resolver netfs qrtr rfkill sunrpc vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common irdma intel_uncore_frequency intel_uncore_frequency_common ice ipmi_ssif isst_if_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp gnss coretemp ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate ib_core iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support acpi_ipmi mei_me ipmi_si intel_uncore ioatdma i2c_i801 joydev pcspkr mei ipmi_devintf lpc_ich intel_pch_thermal i2c_smbus ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad xfs libcrc32c ast sd_mod drm_shmem_helper t10_pi drm_kms_helper sg ixgbe drm i40e ahci crct10dif_pclmul libahci crc32_pclmul igb crc32c_intel libata ghash_clmulni_intel i2c_algo_bit mdio dca wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse [ +0.000050] CPU: 0 PID: 937 Comm: kworker/0:3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-Feb-net_dev-Qiueue-00279-gbd43c5687e05 #1 [ +0.000003] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600BPB/S2600BPB, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0013.121520200651 12/15/2020 [ +0.000001] Workqueue: i40e i40e_service_task [i40e] [ +0.000024] RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000003] Code: ff 49 8b 54 24 18 48 8d 8b b0 00 00 00 49 89 e8 48 81 c6 b0 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 b0 97 fa 9f c6 05 8a cc 1f 02 01 e8 35 b3 fd ff <0f> 0b e9 10 ff ff ff 80 3d 78 cc 1f 02 00 75 94 e9 46 ff ff ff 90 [ +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffbd294976bcf8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ +0.000002] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff94d4c483c000 RCX: 0000000000000027 [ +0.000001] RDX: ffff94d47f620bc8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff94d47f620bc0 [ +0.000001] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffff7fff [ +0.000001] R10: ffffbd294976bb98 R11: ffffffffa0be65e8 R12: ffff94c5451ea180 [ +0.000001] R13: ffff94c5ab5e8000 R14: ffff94c5c20b6e05 R15: ffff94c5f1330ab0 [ +0.000001] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94d47f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ +0.000002] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ +0.000001] CR2: 00007f9e6f1fca70 CR3: 0000000038e20004 CR4: 00000000007706f0 [ +0.000000] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000001] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ +0.000001] PKRU: 55555554 [ +0.000001] Call Trace: [ +0.000001] <TASK> [ +0.000002] ? __warn+0x80/0x130 [ +0.000003] ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000002] ? report_bug+0x195/0x1a0 [ +0.000005] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 [ +0.000003] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 [ +0.000002] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [ +0.000006] ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000002] ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000002] __flush_workqueue+0x126/0x3f0 [ +0.000015] ib_cache_cleanup_one+0x1c/0xe0 [ib_core] [ +0.000056] __ib_unregister_device+0x6a/0xb0 [ib_core] [ +0.000023] ib_unregister_device_and_put+0x34/0x50 [ib_core] [ +0.000020] i40iw_close+0x4b/0x90 [irdma] [ +0.000022] i40e_notify_client_of_netdev_close+0x54/0xc0 [i40e] [ +0.000035] i40e_service_task+0x126/0x190 [i40e] [ +0.000024] process_one_work+0x174/0x340 [ +0.000003] worker_thread+0x27e/0x390 [ +0.000001] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000002] kthread+0xdf/0x110 [ +0.000002] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000002] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ +0.000003] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000001] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ +0.000004] </TASK> [ +0.000001] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 4d5957c ("i40e: remove WQ_UNBOUND and the task limit of our workqueue") Signed-off-by: Sindhu Devale <sindhu.devale@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com> Tested-by: Robert Ganzynkowicz <robert.ganzynkowicz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-2-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Aug 30, 2024
We can't allow spam in CI. Update 26th June 2018: This is still an issue: Update 23rd May 2019: You guessed it, still ocurring. [ 224.739686] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 224.739712] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2982 at net/sched/sch_generic.c:461 dev_watchdog+0x1fd/0x210 [ 224.739714] Modules linked in: vgem snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_pcm i915 asix usbnet mii mei_me mei prime_numbers i2c_hid pinctrl_sunrisepoint pinctrl_intel btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic [ 224.739775] CPU: 3 PID: 2982 Comm: gem_exec_suspen Tainted: G U W 4.18.0-rc2-CI-Patchwork_9414+ #1 [ 224.739777] Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9350/, BIOS 1.4.12 11/30/2016 [ 224.739780] RIP: 0010:dev_watchdog+0x1fd/0x210 [ 224.739781] Code: 49 63 4c 24 f0 eb 92 4c 89 ef c6 05 21 46 ad 00 01 e8 77 ee fc ff 89 d9 48 89 c2 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 88 4c 14 82 e8 a3 fe 84 ff <0f> 0b eb be 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 c7 47 [ 224.739866] RSP: 0018:ffff88027dd83e40 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 224.739869] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000102 [ 224.739871] RDX: 0000000080000102 RSI: ffffffff820c8c6c RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 224.739873] RBP: ffff8802644c1540 R08: 0000000071be9b33 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 224.739874] R10: ffff88027dd83dc0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8802644c1588 [ 224.739876] R13: ffff8802644c1160 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff88026a5dc728 [ 224.739878] FS: 00007f18f4887980(0000) GS:ffff88027dd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 224.739880] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 224.739881] CR2: 00007f4c627ae548 CR3: 000000022ca1a002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 224.739883] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 224.739885] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 224.739886] Call Trace: [ 224.739888] <IRQ> [ 224.739892] ? qdisc_reset+0xe0/0xe0 [ 224.739894] ? qdisc_reset+0xe0/0xe0 [ 224.739897] call_timer_fn+0x93/0x360 [ 224.739903] expire_timers+0xc1/0x1d0 [ 224.739908] run_timer_softirq+0xc7/0x170 [ 224.739916] __do_softirq+0xd9/0x505 [ 224.739923] irq_exit+0xa9/0xc0 [ 224.739926] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x9c/0x2d0 [ 224.739929] apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 [ 224.739931] </IRQ> [ 224.739934] RIP: 0010:delay_tsc+0x2e/0xb0 [ 224.739936] Code: 49 89 fc 55 53 bf 01 00 00 00 e8 6d 2c 78 ff e8 88 9d b6 ff 41 89 c5 0f ae e8 0f 31 48 c1 e2 20 48 09 c2 48 89 d5 eb 16 f3 90 <bf> 01 00 00 00 e8 48 2c 78 ff e8 63 9d b6 ff 44 39 e8 75 36 0f ae [ 224.740021] RSP: 0018:ffffc900002f7d48 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 [ 224.740024] RAX: 0000000080000000 RBX: 0000000649565ca9 RCX: 0000000000000001 [ 224.740026] RDX: 0000000080000001 RSI: ffffffff820c8c6c RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 224.740027] RBP: 00000006493ea9ce R08: 000000005e81e2ee R09: 0000000000000000 [ 224.740029] R10: 0000000000000120 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000002ad8d6 [ 224.740030] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: ffff88025caf5408 [ 224.740040] ? delay_tsc+0x66/0xb0 [ 224.740045] hibernation_debug_sleep+0x1c/0x30 [ 224.740048] hibernation_snapshot+0x2c1/0x690 [ 224.740053] hibernate+0x142/0x2a4 [ 224.740057] state_store+0xd0/0xe0 [ 224.740063] kernfs_fop_write+0x104/0x190 [ 224.740068] __vfs_write+0x31/0x180 [ 224.740072] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6f/0x80 [ 224.740075] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x29/0x50 [ 224.740078] ? __sb_start_write+0x152/0x1f0 [ 224.740080] ? __sb_start_write+0x168/0x1f0 [ 224.740084] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1a0 [ 224.740088] ksys_write+0x50/0xc0 [ 224.740094] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x190 [ 224.740097] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 224.740099] RIP: 0033:0x7f18f400a281 [ 224.740100] Code: c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 05 59 8d 20 00 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 8b 05 8a d1 20 00 85 c0 75 16 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 57 f3 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 49 89 d4 53 [ 224.740186] RSP: 002b:00007fffd1f4fec8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 224.740189] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f18f400a281 [ 224.740190] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00007f18f448069a RDI: 0000000000000006 [ 224.740192] RBP: 00007fffd1f4fef0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 224.740194] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e795d03400 [ 224.740195] R13: 00007fffd1f50500 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 224.740205] irq event stamp: 1582591 [ 224.740207] hardirqs last enabled at (1582590): [<ffffffff810f9f9c>] vprintk_emit+0x4bc/0x4d0 [ 224.740210] hardirqs last disabled at (1582591): [<ffffffff81a0111c>] error_entry+0x7c/0x100 [ 224.740212] softirqs last enabled at (1582568): [<ffffffff81c0034f>] __do_softirq+0x34f/0x505 [ 224.740215] softirqs last disabled at (1582571): [<ffffffff8108c959>] irq_exit+0xa9/0xc0 [ 224.740218] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2982 at net/sched/sch_generic.c:461 dev_watchdog+0x1fd/0x210 [ 224.740219] ---[ end trace 6e41d690e611c338 ]--- References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8037 References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196399 Acked-by: Martin Peres <martin.peres@linux.intel.com> Cc: Martin Peres <martin.peres@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170718082110.12524-1-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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If the MSI is already enabled, trying to enable it again results in an -EINVAL and on the first attempt a WARN. That WARN causes our CI to abort the run [on each first attempt to suspend]: <4> [463.142025] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2225 at drivers/pci/msi.c:1074 __pci_enable_msi_range+0x3cb/0x420 <4> [463.142026] Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel i915 snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic mei_hdcp x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul snd_intel_dspcfg ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_codec btusb btrtl btbcm btintel e1000e bluetooth snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ptp ecdh_generic snd_pcm ecc pps_core mei_me mei prime_numbers [last unloaded: i915] <4> [463.142045] CPU: 0 PID: 2225 Comm: kworker/u8:14 Tainted: G U 5.7.0-rc2-CI-CI_DRM_8350+ #1 <4> [463.142046] Hardware name: Intel Corporation NUC7i5BNH/NUC7i5BNB, BIOS BNKBL357.86A.0060.2017.1214.2013 12/14/2017 <4> [463.142049] Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn <4> [463.142051] RIP: 0010:__pci_enable_msi_range+0x3cb/0x420 <4> [463.142053] Code: 76 58 49 8d 56 48 48 89 df e8 31 73 fd ff e9 20 fe ff ff 31 f6 48 89 df e8 c2 e9 fd ff e9 d6 fe ff ff 45 89 fc e9 1a ff ff ff <0f> 0b 41 bc ea ff ff ff e9 0d ff ff ff 41 bc ea ff ff ff e9 02 ff <4> [463.142054] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000593cd0 EFLAGS: 00010202 <4> [463.142056] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: ffff888274051000 RCX: 0000000000000000 <4> [463.142057] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff888274051000 <4> [463.142058] RBP: ffff888238aa1018 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 <4> [463.142060] R10: ffffc90000593d90 R11: 00000000c79cdfd5 R12: ffff8882740510b0 <4> [463.142061] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001 <4> [463.142062] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888276c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 <4> [463.142064] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 <4> [463.142065] CR2: 000055706f347d80 CR3: 0000000005610003 CR4: 00000000003606f0 <4> [463.142066] Call Trace: <4> [463.142073] pci_enable_msi+0x11/0x20 <4> [463.142077] azx_resume+0x1ab/0x200 [snd_hda_intel] <4> [463.142080] ? pci_pm_thaw+0x80/0x80 <4> [463.142084] dpm_run_callback+0x64/0x280 <4> [463.142089] device_resume+0xd4/0x1c0 <4> [463.142093] ? dpm_watchdog_set+0x60/0 While this would appear to be a bug in snd-hda, it does appear inconsequential, at least for gfx-ci. Downgrade the warning to an info, like the other already-enabled error for MSI-X. References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8041 Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/1687 Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200423082753.3899018-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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Aug 30, 2024
We inadvertently create a dependency on mmap_sem with a whole chain. This breaks any user who wants to take a lock and call rcu_barrier(), while also taking that lock inside mmap_sem: <4> [604.892532] ====================================================== <4> [604.892534] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected <4> [604.892536] 5.6.0-rc7-CI-Patchwork_17096+ #1 Tainted: G U <4> [604.892537] ------------------------------------------------------ <4> [604.892538] kms_frontbuffer/2595 is trying to acquire lock: <4> [604.892540] ffffffff8264a558 (rcu_state.barrier_mutex){+.+.}, at: rcu_barrier+0x23/0x190 <4> [604.892547] but task is already holding lock: <4> [604.892547] ffff888484716050 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: i915_gem_object_pin_to_display_plane+0x89/0x270 [i915] <4> [604.892592] which lock already depends on the new lock. <4> [604.892593] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: <4> [604.892594] -> #6 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}: <4> [604.892597] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.15+0xc3/0x1090 <4> [604.892598] ww_mutex_lock+0x39/0x70 <4> [604.892600] dma_resv_lockdep+0x10e/0x1f5 <4> [604.892602] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300 <4> [604.892604] kernel_init_freeable+0x17b/0x1dc <4> [604.892605] kernel_init+0x5/0x100 <4> [604.892606] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [604.892607] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}: <4> [604.892609] dma_resv_lockdep+0xec/0x1f5 <4> [604.892610] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300 <4> [604.892610] kernel_init_freeable+0x17b/0x1dc <4> [604.892611] kernel_init+0x5/0x100 <4> [604.892612] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [604.892613] -> #4 (&mm->mmap_sem#2){++++}: <4> [604.892615] __might_fault+0x63/0x90 <4> [604.892617] _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80 <4> [604.892619] perf_read+0x200/0x2b0 <4> [604.892621] vfs_read+0x96/0x160 <4> [604.892622] ksys_read+0x9f/0xe0 <4> [604.892623] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x220 <4> [604.892624] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe <4> [604.892625] -> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}: <4> [604.892626] __mutex_lock+0x9a/0x9c0 <4> [604.892627] perf_event_init_cpu+0xa4/0x140 <4> [604.892629] perf_event_init+0x19d/0x1cd <4> [604.892630] start_kernel+0x362/0x4e4 <4> [604.892631] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 <4> [604.892631] -> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}: <4> [604.892633] __mutex_lock+0x9a/0x9c0 <4> [604.892633] perf_event_init_cpu+0x6b/0x140 <4> [604.892635] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x9b/0x9d0 <4> [604.892636] _cpu_up+0xa2/0x140 <4> [604.892637] do_cpu_up+0x61/0xa0 <4> [604.892639] smp_init+0x57/0x96 <4> [604.892639] kernel_init_freeable+0x87/0x1dc <4> [604.892640] kernel_init+0x5/0x100 <4> [604.892642] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [604.892642] -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}: <4> [604.892643] cpus_read_lock+0x34/0xd0 <4> [604.892644] rcu_barrier+0xaa/0x190 <4> [604.892645] kernel_init+0x21/0x100 <4> [604.892647] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [604.892647] -> #0 (rcu_state.barrier_mutex){+.+.}: <4> [604.892649] __lock_acquire+0x1328/0x15d0 <4> [604.892650] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x1c0 <4> [604.892651] __mutex_lock+0x9a/0x9c0 <4> [604.892652] rcu_barrier+0x23/0x190 <4> [604.892680] i915_gem_object_unbind+0x29d/0x3f0 [i915] <4> [604.892707] i915_gem_object_pin_to_display_plane+0x141/0x270 [i915] <4> [604.892737] intel_pin_and_fence_fb_obj+0xec/0x1f0 [i915] <4> [604.892767] intel_plane_pin_fb+0x3f/0xd0 [i915] <4> [604.892797] intel_prepare_plane_fb+0x13b/0x5c0 [i915] <4> [604.892798] drm_atomic_helper_prepare_planes+0x85/0x110 <4> [604.892827] intel_atomic_commit+0xda/0x390 [i915] <4> [604.892828] drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x57/0xa0 <4> [604.892830] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x1c4/0x720 <4> [604.892830] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb0/0xf0 <4> [604.892831] drm_ioctl+0x2e1/0x390 <4> [604.892833] ksys_ioctl+0x7b/0x90 <4> [604.892835] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x11/0x20 <4> [604.892835] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x220 <4> [604.892836] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe <4> [604.892837] Changes since v1: - Use (*values)[n++] in perf_read_one(). Changes since v2: - Centrally allocate values. References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8042 Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200502171413.9133-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 disable BH when collecting stats via hardware offload to ensure concurrent updates from packet path do not result in losing stats. From Sebastian Andrzej Siewior. Patch #2 uses write seqcount to reset counters serialize against reader. Also from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior. Patch #3 ensures vlan header is in place before accessing its fields, according to KMSAN splat triggered by syzbot. * tag 'nf-24-08-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: flowtable: validate vlan header netfilter: nft_counter: Synchronize nft_counter_reset() against reader. netfilter: nft_counter: Disable BH in nft_counter_offload_stats(). ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822101842.4234-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Aug 30, 2024
Fix circular locking dependency on runtime suspend. <4> [74.952215] ====================================================== <4> [74.952217] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected <4> [74.952219] 6.10.0-rc7-xe #1 Not tainted <4> [74.952221] ------------------------------------------------------ <4> [74.952223] kworker/7:1/82 is trying to acquire lock: <4> [74.952226] ffff888120548488 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x1e0 [drm] <4> [74.952260] but task is already holding lock: <4> [74.952262] ffffffffa0ae59c0 (xe_pm_runtime_lockdep_map){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: xe_pm_runtime_suspend+0x2f/0x340 [xe] <4> [74.952322] which lock already depends on the new lock. The commit b1d90a8 ("drm/xe: Use the encoder suspend helper also used by the i915 driver") didn't do anything wrong. It actually fixed a critical bug, because the encoder_suspend was never getting actually called because it was returning if (has_display(xe)) instead of if (!has_display(xe)). However, this ended up introducing the encoder suspend calls in the runtime routines as well, causing the circular locking dependency. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2304 Fixes: b1d90a8 ("drm/xe: Use the encoder suspend helper also used by the i915 driver") Cc: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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Sep 3, 2024
This fixes the random kernel crash seen while removing the driver, when running the load/unload test over multiple iterations. 1) modprobe btnxpuart 2) hciconfig hci0 reset 3) hciconfig (check hci0 interface up with valid BD address) 4) modprobe -r btnxpuart Repeat steps 1 to 4 The ps_wakeup() call in btnxpuart_close() schedules the psdata->work(), which gets scheduled after module is removed, causing a kernel crash. This hidden issue got highlighted after enabling Power Save by default in 4183a7b (Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Enable Power Save feature on startup) The new ps_cleanup() deasserts UART break immediately while closing serdev device, cancels any scheduled ps_work and destroys the ps_lock mutex. [ 85.884604] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffd4a61638f258 [ 85.884624] Mem abort info: [ 85.884625] ESR = 0x0000000086000007 [ 85.884628] EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 85.884633] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 85.884636] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 85.884638] FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault [ 85.884642] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000041dd0000 [ 85.884646] [ffffd4a61638f258] pgd=1000000095fff003, p4d=1000000095fff003, pud=100000004823d003, pmd=100000004823e003, pte=0000000000000000 [ 85.884662] Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 85.890932] Modules linked in: algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg overlay fsl_jr_uio caam_jr caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes crct10dif_ce polyval_ce polyval_generic snd_soc_imx_spdif snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_ak5558 snd_soc_ak4458 caam secvio error snd_soc_fsl_spdif snd_soc_fsl_micfil snd_soc_fsl_sai snd_soc_fsl_utils gpio_ir_recv rc_core fuse [last unloaded: btnxpuart(O)] [ 85.927297] CPU: 1 PID: 67 Comm: kworker/1:3 Tainted: G O 6.1.36+g937b1be4345a #1 [ 85.936176] Hardware name: FSL i.MX8MM EVK board (DT) [ 85.936182] Workqueue: events 0xffffd4a61638f380 [ 85.936198] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 85.952817] pc : 0xffffd4a61638f258 [ 85.952823] lr : 0xffffd4a61638f258 [ 85.952827] sp : ffff8000084fbd70 [ 85.952829] x29: ffff8000084fbd70 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 85.963112] x26: ffffd4a69133f000 x25: ffff4bf1c8540990 x24: ffff4bf215b87305 [ 85.963119] x23: ffff4bf215b87300 x22: ffff4bf1c85409d0 x21: ffff4bf1c8540970 [ 85.977382] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff4bf1c8540880 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 85.977391] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000133 x15: 0000ffffe2217090 [ 85.977399] x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000000133 x12: 0000000000000139 [ 85.977407] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000a60 x9 : ffff8000084fbc50 [ 85.977417] x8 : ffff4bf215b7d000 x7 : ffff4bf215b83b40 x6 : 00000000000003e8 [ 85.977424] x5 : 00000000410fd030 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 85.977432] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff4bf1c4265880 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 85.977443] Call trace: [ 85.977446] 0xffffd4a61638f258 [ 85.977451] 0xffffd4a61638f3e8 [ 85.977455] process_one_work+0x1d4/0x330 [ 85.977464] worker_thread+0x6c/0x430 [ 85.977471] kthread+0x108/0x10c [ 85.977476] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 85.977488] Code: bad PC value [ 85.977491] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Preset since v6.9.11 Fixes: 86d55f1 ("Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Deasset UART break before closing serdev device") Signed-off-by: Neeraj Sanjay Kale <neeraj.sanjaykale@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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Sep 3, 2024
In the cited commit, bond->ipsec_lock is added to protect ipsec_list, hence xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete are called inside this lock. As ipsec_lock is a spin lock and such xfrmdev ops may sleep, "scheduling while atomic" will be triggered when changing bond's active slave. [ 101.055189] BUG: scheduling while atomic: bash/902/0x00000200 [ 101.055726] Modules linked in: [ 101.058211] CPU: 3 PID: 902 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4+ #1 [ 101.058760] Hardware name: [ 101.059434] Call Trace: [ 101.059436] <TASK> [ 101.060873] dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60 [ 101.061275] __schedule_bug+0x4e/0x60 [ 101.061682] __schedule+0x612/0x7c0 [ 101.062078] ? __mod_timer+0x25c/0x370 [ 101.062486] schedule+0x25/0xd0 [ 101.062845] schedule_timeout+0x77/0xf0 [ 101.063265] ? asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 [ 101.063724] ? __bpf_trace_itimer_state+0x10/0x10 [ 101.064215] __wait_for_common+0x87/0x190 [ 101.064648] ? usleep_range_state+0x90/0x90 [ 101.065091] cmd_exec+0x437/0xb20 [mlx5_core] [ 101.065569] mlx5_cmd_do+0x1e/0x40 [mlx5_core] [ 101.066051] mlx5_cmd_exec+0x18/0x30 [mlx5_core] [ 101.066552] mlx5_crypto_create_dek_key+0xea/0x120 [mlx5_core] [ 101.067163] ? bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding] [ 101.067738] ? kmalloc_trace+0x4d/0x350 [ 101.068156] mlx5_ipsec_create_sa_ctx+0x33/0x100 [mlx5_core] [ 101.068747] mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0x47b/0xaa0 [mlx5_core] [ 101.069312] bond_change_active_slave+0x392/0x900 [bonding] [ 101.069868] bond_option_active_slave_set+0x1c2/0x240 [bonding] [ 101.070454] __bond_opt_set+0xa6/0x430 [bonding] [ 101.070935] __bond_opt_set_notify+0x2f/0x90 [bonding] [ 101.071453] bond_opt_tryset_rtnl+0x72/0xb0 [bonding] [ 101.071965] bonding_sysfs_store_option+0x4d/0x80 [bonding] [ 101.072567] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x10c/0x1a0 [ 101.073033] vfs_write+0x2d8/0x400 [ 101.073416] ? alloc_fd+0x48/0x180 [ 101.073798] ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0 [ 101.074175] do_syscall_64+0x52/0x110 [ 101.074576] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 As bond_ipsec_add_sa_all and bond_ipsec_del_sa_all are only called from bond_change_active_slave, which requires holding the RTNL lock. And bond_ipsec_add_sa and bond_ipsec_del_sa are xfrm state xdo_dev_state_add and xdo_dev_state_delete APIs, which are in user context. So ipsec_lock doesn't have to be spin lock, change it to mutex, and thus the above issue can be resolved. Fixes: 9a56055 ("bonding: Add struct bond_ipesc to manage SA") Signed-off-by: Jianbo Liu <jianbol@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <jv@jvosburgh.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240823031056.110999-4-jianbol@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 sets on NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO for UDP packets less than 4 bytes payload from netdev/egress by subtracting skb_network_offset() when validating IPv4 packet length, otherwise 'meta l4proto udp' never matches. Patch #2 subtracts skb_network_offset() when validating IPv6 packet length for netdev/egress. netfilter pull request 24-08-28 * tag 'nf-24-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nf_tables_ipv6: consider network offset in netdev/egress validation netfilter: nf_tables: restore IP sanity checks for netdev/egress ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240828214708.619261-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Fix circular locking dependency on runtime suspend. <4> [74.952215] ====================================================== <4> [74.952217] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected <4> [74.952219] 6.10.0-rc7-xe #1 Not tainted <4> [74.952221] ------------------------------------------------------ <4> [74.952223] kworker/7:1/82 is trying to acquire lock: <4> [74.952226] ffff888120548488 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x1e0 [drm] <4> [74.952260] but task is already holding lock: <4> [74.952262] ffffffffa0ae59c0 (xe_pm_runtime_lockdep_map){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: xe_pm_runtime_suspend+0x2f/0x340 [xe] <4> [74.952322] which lock already depends on the new lock. The commit 'b1d90a86 ("drm/xe: Use the encoder suspend helper also used by the i915 driver")' didn't do anything wrong. It actually fixed a critical bug, because the encoder_suspend was never getting actually called because it was returning if (has_display(xe)) instead of if (!has_display(xe)). However, this ended up introducing the encoder suspend calls in the runtime routines as well, causing the circular locking dependency. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2304 Fixes: b1d90a8 ("drm/xe: Use the encoder suspend helper also used by the i915 driver") Cc: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cavitt <jonathan.cavitt@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240830183507.298351-2-rodrigo.vivi@intel.com Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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Sep 5, 2024
Fix circular locking dependency on runtime suspend. <4> [74.952215] ====================================================== <4> [74.952217] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected <4> [74.952219] 6.10.0-rc7-xe #1 Not tainted <4> [74.952221] ------------------------------------------------------ <4> [74.952223] kworker/7:1/82 is trying to acquire lock: <4> [74.952226] ffff888120548488 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_modeset_lock_all+0x40/0x1e0 [drm] <4> [74.952260] but task is already holding lock: <4> [74.952262] ffffffffa0ae59c0 (xe_pm_runtime_lockdep_map){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: xe_pm_runtime_suspend+0x2f/0x340 [xe] <4> [74.952322] which lock already depends on the new lock. The commit 'b1d90a86 ("drm/xe: Use the encoder suspend helper also used by the i915 driver")' didn't do anything wrong. It actually fixed a critical bug, because the encoder_suspend was never getting actually called because it was returning if (has_display(xe)) instead of if (!has_display(xe)). However, this ended up introducing the encoder suspend calls in the runtime routines as well, causing the circular locking dependency. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/2304 Fixes: b1d90a8 ("drm/xe: Use the encoder suspend helper also used by the i915 driver") Cc: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cavitt <jonathan.cavitt@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240830183507.298351-2-rodrigo.vivi@intel.com Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 8da1944) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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Error out if kvm_mmu_reload() fails when pre-faulting memory, as trying to fault-in SPTEs will fail miserably due to root.hpa pointing at garbage. Note, kvm_mmu_reload() can return -EIO and thus trigger the WARN on -EIO in kvm_vcpu_pre_fault_memory(), but all such paths also WARN, i.e. the WARN isn't user-triggerable and won't run afoul of warn-on-panic because the kernel would already be panicking. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000029ffffffffe8 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 22 PID: 1069 Comm: pre_fault_memor Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-332d2c1d713e-next-vm #548 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:is_page_fault_stale+0x3e/0xe0 [kvm] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000114bd48 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 00003fffffffffc0 RBX: ffff88810a07c080 RCX: ffffc9000114bd78 RDX: ffff88810a07c080 RSI: ffffea0000000000 RDI: ffff88810a07c080 RBP: ffffc9000114bd78 R08: 00007fa3c8c00000 R09: 8000000000000225 R10: ffffea00043d7d80 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810a07c080 R13: 0000000100000000 R14: ffffc9000114be58 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fa3c9da0740(0000) GS:ffff888277d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000029ffffffffe8 CR3: 000000011d698000 CR4: 0000000000352eb0 Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_tdp_page_fault+0xcc/0x160 [kvm] kvm_mmu_do_page_fault+0xfb/0x1f0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_pre_fault_memory+0xd0/0x1a0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x761/0x8c0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm CR2: 000029ffffffffe8 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 6e01b76 ("KVM: x86: Implement kvm_arch_vcpu_pre_fault_memory()") Reported-by: syzbot+23786faffb695f17edaa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000002b84dc061dd73544@google.com Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com> Tested-by: yuxin wang <wang1315768607@163.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240723000211.3352304-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Ethtool callbacks can be executed while reset is in progress and try to access deleted resources, e.g. getting coalesce settings can result in a NULL pointer dereference seen below. Reproduction steps: Once the driver is fully initialized, trigger reset: # echo 1 > /sys/class/net/<interface>/device/reset when reset is in progress try to get coalesce settings using ethtool: # ethtool -c <interface> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 11 PID: 19713 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G S 6.10.0-rc7+ #7 RIP: 0010:ice_get_q_coalesce+0x2e/0xa0 [ice] RSP: 0018:ffffbab1e9bcf6a8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000000c RBX: ffff94512305b028 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RDI: ffff9451c3f2e588 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff9451c3f2e580 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffff945121fa9000 R13: ffffbab1e9bcf760 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: ffffffff9e65dd40 FS: 00007faee5fbe740(0000) GS:ffff94546fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000106c2e005 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ice_get_coalesce+0x17/0x30 [ice] coalesce_prepare_data+0x61/0x80 ethnl_default_doit+0xde/0x340 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xf2/0x150 genl_rcv_msg+0x1b3/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5b/0x110 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x19c/0x290 netlink_sendmsg+0x222/0x490 __sys_sendto+0x1df/0x1f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7faee60d8e27 Calling netif_device_detach() before reset makes the net core not call the driver when ethtool command is issued, the attempt to execute an ethtool command during reset will result in the following message: netlink error: No such device instead of NULL pointer dereference. Once reset is done and ice_rebuild() is executing, the netif_device_attach() is called to allow for ethtool operations to occur again in a safe manner. Fixes: fcea6f3 ("ice: Add stats and ethtool support") Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Igor Bagnucki <igor.bagnucki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dawid Osuchowski <dawid.osuchowski@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Pucha Himasekhar Reddy <himasekharx.reddy.pucha@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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Steve French reported null pointer dereference error from sha256 lib. cifs.ko can send session setup requests on reused connection. If reused connection is used for binding session, conn->binding can still remain true and generate_preauth_hash() will not set sess->Preauth_HashValue and it will be NULL. It is used as a material to create an encryption key in ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey. ->Preauth_HashValue cause null pointer dereference error from crypto_shash_update(). BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 8 PID: 429254 Comm: kworker/8:39 Hardware name: LENOVO 20MAS08500/20MAS08500, BIOS N2CET69W (1.52 ) Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ksmbd] RIP: 0010:lib_sha256_base_do_update.isra.0+0x11e/0x1d0 [sha256_ssse3] <TASK> ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80 ? __die+0x24/0x80 ? page_fault_oops+0x99/0x1b0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2ee/0x6b0 ? exc_page_fault+0x83/0x1b0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 ? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3] ? lib_sha256_base_do_update.isra.0+0x11e/0x1d0 [sha256_ssse3] ? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3] ? __pfx_sha256_transform_rorx+0x10/0x10 [sha256_ssse3] _sha256_update+0x77/0xa0 [sha256_ssse3] sha256_avx2_update+0x15/0x30 [sha256_ssse3] crypto_shash_update+0x1e/0x40 hmac_update+0x12/0x20 crypto_shash_update+0x1e/0x40 generate_key+0x234/0x380 [ksmbd] generate_smb3encryptionkey+0x40/0x1c0 [ksmbd] ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey+0x72/0xa0 [ksmbd] ntlm_authenticate.isra.0+0x423/0x5d0 [ksmbd] smb2_sess_setup+0x952/0xaa0 [ksmbd] __process_request+0xa3/0x1d0 [ksmbd] __handle_ksmbd_work+0x1c4/0x2f0 [ksmbd] handle_ksmbd_work+0x2d/0xa0 [ksmbd] process_one_work+0x16c/0x350 worker_thread+0x306/0x440 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xef/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Fixes: f5a544e ("ksmbd: add support for SMB3 multichannel") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+ Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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When we cork messages in psock->cork, the last message triggers the flushing will result in sending a sk_msg larger than the current message size. In this case, in tcp_bpf_send_verdict(), 'copied' becomes negative at least in the following case: 468 case __SK_DROP: 469 default: 470 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, tosend); 471 sk_msg_apply_bytes(psock, tosend); 472 *copied -= (tosend + delta); // <==== HERE 473 return -EACCES; Therefore, it could lead to the following BUG with a proper value of 'copied' (thanks to syzbot). We should not use negative 'copied' as a return value here. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/socket.c:733! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3265 Comm: syz-executor510 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00060-gd07b43284ab3 #0 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 61400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:733 [inline] pc : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:728 [inline] pc : __sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x60 net/socket.c:745 lr : sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] lr : __sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60 net/socket.c:745 sp : ffff800088ea3b30 x29: ffff800088ea3b30 x28: fbf00000062bc900 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff800088ea3bc0 x25: ffff800088ea3bc0 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: f9f00000048dc000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff800088ea3d90 x20: f9f00000048dc000 x19: ffff800088ea3d90 x18: 0000000000000001 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 000000002002ffaf x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff8000815849c0 x9 : ffff8000815b49c0 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 000000000000003f x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 00000000000007e0 x4 : fff07ffffd239000 x3 : fbf00000062bc900 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000fffffdef Call trace: sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:733 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x60 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x274/0x2ac net/socket.c:2597 ___sys_sendmsg+0xac/0x100 net/socket.c:2651 __sys_sendmsg+0x84/0xe0 net/socket.c:2680 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2689 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2687 [inline] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x24/0x30 net/socket.c:2687 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x34/0xec arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730 el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598 Code: f9404463 d63f0060 3108441f 54fffe81 (d4210000) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 4f738ad ("bpf: create tcp_bpf_ulp allowing BPF to monitor socket TX/RX data") Reported-by: syzbot+58c03971700330ce14d8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240821030744.320934-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The fscache_cookie_lru_timer is initialized when the fscache module is inserted, but is not deleted when the fscache module is removed. If timer_reduce() is called before removing the fscache module, the fscache_cookie_lru_timer will be added to the timer list of the current cpu. Afterwards, a use-after-free will be triggered in the softIRQ after removing the fscache module, as follows: ================================================================== BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff803c9e9 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 21ffea067 P4D 21ffea067 PUD 21ffe6067 PMD 110a7c067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G W 6.11.0-rc3 #855 Tainted: [W]=WARN RIP: 0010:__run_timer_base.part.0+0x254/0x8a0 Call Trace: <IRQ> tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x627/0x810 __walk_groups.isra.0+0x47/0x140 tmigr_handle_remote+0x1fa/0x2f0 handle_softirqs+0x180/0x590 irq_exit_rcu+0x84/0xb0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xf/0x20 default_idle_call+0x38/0x60 do_idle+0x2b5/0x300 cpu_startup_entry+0x54/0x60 start_secondary+0x20d/0x280 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x148 </TASK> Modules linked in: [last unloaded: netfs] ================================================================== Therefore delete fscache_cookie_lru_timer when removing the fscahe module. Fixes: 12bb21a ("fscache: Implement cookie user counting and resource pinning") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826112056.2458299-1-libaokun@huaweicloud.com Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Commit 8c61291 ("mm: fix incorrect vbq reference in purge_fragmented_block") extended the 'vmap_block' structure to contain a 'cpu' field which is set at allocation time to the id of the initialising CPU. When a new 'vmap_block' is being instantiated by new_vmap_block(), the partially initialised structure is added to the local 'vmap_block_queue' xarray before the 'cpu' field has been initialised. If another CPU is concurrently walking the xarray (e.g. via vm_unmap_aliases()), then it may perform an out-of-bounds access to the remote queue thanks to an uninitialised index. This has been observed as UBSAN errors in Android: | Internal error: UBSAN: array index out of bounds: 00000000f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP | | Call trace: | purge_fragmented_block+0x204/0x21c | _vm_unmap_aliases+0x170/0x378 | vm_unmap_aliases+0x1c/0x28 | change_memory_common+0x1dc/0x26c | set_memory_ro+0x18/0x24 | module_enable_ro+0x98/0x238 | do_init_module+0x1b0/0x310 Move the initialisation of 'vb->cpu' in new_vmap_block() ahead of the addition to the xarray. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240812171606.17486-1-will@kernel.org Fixes: 8c61291 ("mm: fix incorrect vbq reference in purge_fragmented_block") Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Cc: Zhaoyang Huang <zhaoyang.huang@unisoc.com> Cc: Hailong.Liu <hailong.liu@oppo.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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When enable CONFIG_MEMCG & CONFIG_KFENCE & CONFIG_KMEMLEAK, the following
warning always occurs,This is because the following call stack occurred:
mem_pool_alloc
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof
slab_alloc_node
kfence_alloc
Once the kfence allocation is successful,slab->obj_exts will not be empty,
because it has already been assigned a value in kfence_init_pool.
Since in the prepare_slab_obj_exts_hook function,we perform a check for
s->flags & (SLAB_NO_OBJ_EXT | SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE),the alloc_tag_add function
will not be called as a result.Therefore,ref->ct remains NULL.
However,when we call mem_pool_free,since obj_ext is not empty, it
eventually leads to the alloc_tag_sub scenario being invoked. This is
where the warning occurs.
So we should add corresponding checks in the alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook.
For __GFP_NO_OBJ_EXT case,I didn't see the specific case where it's using
kfence,so I won't add the corresponding check in
alloc_tagging_slab_free_hook for now.
[ 3.734349] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 3.734807] alloc_tag was not set
[ 3.735129] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 40 at ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:130 kmem_cache_free+0x444/0x574
[ 3.735866] Modules linked in: autofs4
[ 3.736211] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 40 Comm: ksoftirqd/4 Tainted: G W 6.11.0-rc3-dirty #1
[ 3.736969] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 3.737258] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
[ 3.737875] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 3.738501] pc : kmem_cache_free+0x444/0x574
[ 3.738951] lr : kmem_cache_free+0x444/0x574
[ 3.739361] sp : ffff80008357bb60
[ 3.739693] x29: ffff80008357bb70 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 3.740338] x26: ffff80008207f000 x25: ffff000b2eb2fd60 x24: ffff0000c0005700
[ 3.740982] x23: ffff8000804229e4 x22: ffff800082080000 x21: ffff800081756000
[ 3.741630] x20: fffffd7ff8253360 x19: 00000000000000a8 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 3.742274] x17: ffff800ab327f000 x16: ffff800083398000 x15: ffff800081756df0
[ 3.742919] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 205d344320202020 x12: 5b5d373038343337
[ 3.743560] x11: ffff80008357b650 x10: 000000000000005d x9 : 00000000ffffffd0
[ 3.744231] x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x7 : ffff80008237bad0 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff
[ 3.744907] x5 : ffff80008237ba78 x4 : ffff8000820bbad0 x3 : 0000000000000001
[ 3.745580] x2 : 68d66547c09f7800 x1 : 68d66547c09f7800 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 3.746255] Call trace:
[ 3.746530] kmem_cache_free+0x444/0x574
[ 3.746931] mem_pool_free+0x44/0xf4
[ 3.747306] free_object_rcu+0xc8/0xdc
[ 3.747693] rcu_do_batch+0x234/0x8a4
[ 3.748075] rcu_core+0x230/0x3e4
[ 3.748424] rcu_core_si+0x14/0x1c
[ 3.748780] handle_softirqs+0x134/0x378
[ 3.749189] run_ksoftirqd+0x70/0x9c
[ 3.749560] smpboot_thread_fn+0x148/0x22c
[ 3.749978] kthread+0x10c/0x118
[ 3.750323] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 3.750696] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240816013336.17505-1-hao.ge@linux.dev
Fixes: 4b87369 ("mm/slab: add allocation accounting into slab allocation and free paths")
Signed-off-by: Hao Ge <gehao@kylinos.cn>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
rodrigovivi
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Binder objects are processed and copied individually into the target buffer during transactions. Any raw data in-between these objects is copied as well. However, this raw data copy lacks an out-of-bounds check. If the raw data exceeds the data section size then the copy overwrites the offsets section. This eventually triggers an error that attempts to unwind the processed objects. However, at this point the offsets used to index these objects are now corrupted. Unwinding with corrupted offsets can result in decrements of arbitrary nodes and lead to their premature release. Other users of such nodes are left with a dangling pointer triggering a use-after-free. This issue is made evident by the following KASAN report (trimmed): ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c Write of size 4 at addr ffff47fc91598f04 by task binder-util/743 CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 743 Comm: binder-util Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4 #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x19c binder_free_buf+0x128/0x434 binder_thread_write+0x8a4/0x3260 binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c [...] Allocated by task 743: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x110/0x270 binder_new_node+0x50/0x700 binder_transaction+0x413c/0x6da8 binder_thread_write+0x978/0x3260 binder_ioctl+0x18f0/0x258c [...] Freed by task 745: kfree+0xbc/0x208 binder_thread_read+0x1c5c/0x37d4 binder_ioctl+0x16d8/0x258c [...] ================================================================== To avoid this issue, let's check that the raw data copy is within the boundaries of the data section. Fixes: 6d98eb9 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying txn") Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822182353.2129600-1-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
rodrigovivi
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The main threat to data consistency in ice_xdp() is a possible asynchronous PF reset. It can be triggered by a user or by TX timeout handler. XDP setup and PF reset code access the same resources in the following sections: * ice_vsi_close() in ice_prepare_for_reset() - already rtnl-locked * ice_vsi_rebuild() for the PF VSI - not protected * ice_vsi_open() - already rtnl-locked With an unfortunate timing, such accesses can result in a crash such as the one below: [ +1.999878] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 14 [ +2.002992] ice 0000:b1:00.0: Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring 18 [Mar15 18:17] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 38: transmit queue 14 timed out 80692736 ms [ +0.000093] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout: VSI_num: 6, Q 14, NTC: 0x0, HW_HEAD: 0x0, NTU: 0x0, INT: 0x4000001 [ +0.000012] ice 0000:b1:00.0 ens801f0np0: tx_timeout recovery level 1, txqueue 14 [ +0.394718] ice 0000:b1:00.0: PTP reset successful [ +0.006184] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098 [ +0.000045] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ +0.000023] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ +0.000023] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ +0.000018] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ +0.000023] CPU: 38 PID: 7540 Comm: kworker/38:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7 #1 [ +0.000031] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0014.082620210524 08/26/2021 [ +0.000036] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [ +0.000183] RIP: 0010:ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice] [...] [ +0.000013] Call Trace: [ +0.000016] <TASK> [ +0.000014] ? __die+0x1f/0x70 [ +0.000029] ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4f0 [ +0.000029] ? schedule+0x3b/0xd0 [ +0.000027] ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180 [ +0.000022] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ +0.000031] ? ice_clean_tx_ring+0xa/0xd0 [ice] [ +0.000194] ice_free_tx_ring+0xe/0x60 [ice] [ +0.000186] ice_destroy_xdp_rings+0x157/0x310 [ice] [ +0.000151] ice_vsi_decfg+0x53/0xe0 [ice] [ +0.000180] ice_vsi_rebuild+0x239/0x540 [ice] [ +0.000186] ice_vsi_rebuild_by_type+0x76/0x180 [ice] [ +0.000145] ice_rebuild+0x18c/0x840 [ice] [ +0.000145] ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xc0 [ +0.000022] ? delay_tsc+0x92/0xc0 [ +0.000020] ice_do_reset+0x140/0x180 [ice] [ +0.000886] ice_service_task+0x404/0x1030 [ice] [ +0.000824] process_one_work+0x171/0x340 [ +0.000685] worker_thread+0x277/0x3a0 [ +0.000675] ? preempt_count_add+0x6a/0xa0 [ +0.000677] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x23/0x50 [ +0.000679] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000653] kthread+0xf0/0x120 [ +0.000635] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000616] ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 [ +0.000612] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ +0.000604] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ +0.000604] </TASK> The previous way of handling this through returning -EBUSY is not viable, particularly when destroying AF_XDP socket, because the kernel proceeds with removal anyway. There is plenty of code between those calls and there is no need to create a large critical section that covers all of them, same as there is no need to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() with rtnl_lock(). Add xdp_state_lock mutex to protect ice_vsi_rebuild() and ice_xdp(). Leaving unprotected sections in between would result in two states that have to be considered: 1. when the VSI is closed, but not yet rebuild 2. when VSI is already rebuild, but not yet open The latter case is actually already handled through !netif_running() case, we just need to adjust flag checking a little. The former one is not as trivial, because between ice_vsi_close() and ice_vsi_rebuild(), a lot of hardware interaction happens, this can make adding/deleting rings exit with an error. Luckily, VSI rebuild is pending and can apply new configuration for us in a managed fashion. Therefore, add an additional VSI state flag ICE_VSI_REBUILD_PENDING to indicate that ice_xdp() can just hot-swap the program. Also, as ice_vsi_rebuild() flow is touched in this patch, make it more consistent by deconfiguring VSI when coalesce allocation fails. Fixes: 2d4238f ("ice: Add support for AF_XDP") Fixes: efc2214 ("ice: Add support for XDP") Reviewed-by: Wojciech Drewek <wojciech.drewek@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
rodrigovivi
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If we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of them is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a race where we can end up either: 1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode's lock, triggering an assertion failures when assertions are enabled; 2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed. The race happens like this: 1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT; 2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example; 3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes, while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor. 4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread doing fsyncs; 5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the file's private to an on stack allocated private with the member 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true; 6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there's a private structure associated to the file which has 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true, so it skips locking the inode's VFS lock; 7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file's private to NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated. Then it unlocks the inode's VFS lock; 8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the assertion that checks the inode's VFS lock is held fails, since task B never locked it and task A has already unlocked it. The stack trace produced is the following: assertion failed: inode_is_locked(&inode->vfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G U OE 6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8 Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020 RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs] Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...) RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800 RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38 R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24 ? die+0x2e/0x50 ? do_trap+0xca/0x110 ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] btrfs_sync_file+0x21a/0x4d0 [btrfs bb26272d49b4cdc847cf3f7faadd459b62caee9a] ? __seccomp_filter+0x31d/0x4f0 __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x160 ? do_futex+0xcb/0x190 ? __x64_sys_futex+0x10e/0x1d0 ? switch_fpu_return+0x4f/0xd0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x72/0x220 ? do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Another problem here is if task B grabs the private pointer and then uses it after task A has finished, since the private was allocated in the stack of task A, it results in some invalid memory access with a hard to predict result. This issue, triggering the assertion, was observed with QEMU workloads by two users in the Link tags below. Fix this by not relying on a file's private to pass information to fsync that it should skip locking the inode and instead pass this information through a special value stored in current->journal_info. This is safe because in the relevant section of the direct IO write path we are not holding a transaction handle, so current->journal_info is NULL. The following C program triggers the issue: $ cat repro.c /* Get the O_DIRECT definition. */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <errno.h> #include <string.h> #include <pthread.h> static int fd; static ssize_t do_write(int fd, const void *buf, size_t count, off_t offset) { while (count > 0) { ssize_t ret; ret = pwrite(fd, buf, count, offset); if (ret < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; return ret; } count -= ret; buf += ret; } return 0; } static void *fsync_loop(void *arg) { while (1) { int ret; ret = fsync(fd); if (ret != 0) { perror("Fsync failed"); exit(6); } } } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { long pagesize; void *write_buf; pthread_t fsyncer; int ret; if (argc != 2) { fprintf(stderr, "Use: %s <file path>\n", argv[0]); return 1; } fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_DIRECT, 0666); if (fd == -1) { perror("Failed to open/create file"); return 1; } pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); if (pagesize == -1) { perror("Failed to get page size"); return 2; } ret = posix_memalign(&write_buf, pagesize, pagesize); if (ret) { perror("Failed to allocate buffer"); return 3; } ret = pthread_create(&fsyncer, NULL, fsync_loop, NULL); if (ret != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create writer thread: %d\n", ret); return 4; } while (1) { ret = do_write(fd, write_buf, pagesize, 0); if (ret != 0) { perror("Write failed"); exit(5); } } return 0; } $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdi $ mount /dev/sdi /mnt/sdi $ timeout 10 ./repro /mnt/sdi/foo Usually the race is triggered within less than 1 second. A test case for fstests will follow soon. Reported-by: Paulo Dias <paulo.miguel.dias@gmail.com> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219187 Reported-by: Andreas Jahn <jahn-andi@web.de> Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219199 Reported-by: syzbot+4704b3cc972bd76024f1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000044ff540620d7dee2@google.com/ Fixes: 939b656 ("btrfs: fix corruption after buffer fault in during direct IO append write") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
rodrigovivi
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Sep 12, 2024
We observed a null-ptr-deref in fou_gro_receive() while shutting down a host. [0] The NULL pointer is sk->sk_user_data, and the offset 8 is of protocol in struct fou. When fou_release() is called due to netns dismantle or explicit tunnel teardown, udp_tunnel_sock_release() sets NULL to sk->sk_user_data. Then, the tunnel socket is destroyed after a single RCU grace period. So, in-flight udp4_gro_receive() could find the socket and execute the FOU GRO handler, where sk->sk_user_data could be NULL. Let's use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data() in fou_from_sock() and add NULL checks in FOU GRO handlers. [0]: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 80000001032f4067 P4D 80000001032f4067 PUD 103240067 PMD 0 SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.216-204.855.amzn2.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c5.large/, BIOS 1.0 10/16/2017 RIP: 0010:fou_gro_receive (net/ipv4/fou.c:233) [fou] Code: 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc e8 e7 2e 69 f4 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 f8 41 54 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 49 8b 80 88 02 00 00 <0f> b6 48 08 0f b7 42 4a 66 25 fd fd 80 cc 02 66 89 42 4a 0f b6 42 RSP: 0018:ffffa330c0003d08 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93d9e3a6b900 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: ffff93d9e3a6b900 RSI: ffff93d9e3a6b900 RDI: ffff93dac2e24d08 RBP: ffff93d9e3a6b900 R08: ffff93dacbce6400 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffb5f369b0 R12: ffff93dacbce6400 R13: ffff93dac2e24d08 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffb4edd1c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93daee800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000102140001 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? __die_body.cold (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:420) ? no_context (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:752) ? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:49 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:89 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1435 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1483) ? asm_exc_page_fault (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:571) ? fou_gro_receive (net/ipv4/fou.c:233) [fou] udp_gro_receive (include/linux/netdevice.h:2552 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:559) udp4_gro_receive (net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:604) inet_gro_receive (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1549 (discriminator 7)) dev_gro_receive (net/core/dev.c:6035 (discriminator 4)) napi_gro_receive (net/core/dev.c:6170) ena_clean_rx_irq (drivers/amazon/net/ena/ena_netdev.c:1558) [ena] ena_io_poll (drivers/amazon/net/ena/ena_netdev.c:1742) [ena] napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6847) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6917) __do_softirq (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:25 include/linux/jump_label.h:200 include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:299) asm_call_irq_on_stack (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:809) </IRQ> do_softirq_own_stack (arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:27 arch/x86/include/asm/irq_stack.h:77 arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c:77) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:393 kernel/softirq.c:423 kernel/softirq.c:435) common_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:239) asm_common_interrupt (arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:626) RIP: 0010:acpi_idle_do_entry (arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:49 arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:89 drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:114 drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:575) Code: 8b 15 d1 3c c4 02 ed c3 cc cc cc cc 65 48 8b 04 25 40 ef 01 00 48 8b 00 a8 08 75 eb 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 00 2d d5 09 55 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc cc e9 be fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffffffffb5603e58 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: ffff93dac0929c00 RCX: ffff93daee833900 RDX: ffff93daee800000 RSI: ffff93daee87dc00 RDI: ffff93daee87dc64 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffb5e7b6c0 R09: 0000000000000044 R10: ffff93daee831b04 R11: 00000000000001cd R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffffb5e7b740 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 ? sched_clock_cpu (kernel/sched/clock.c:371) acpi_idle_enter (drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:712 (discriminator 3)) cpuidle_enter_state (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:237) cpuidle_enter (drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c:353) cpuidle_idle_call (kernel/sched/idle.c:158 kernel/sched/idle.c:239) do_idle (kernel/sched/idle.c:302) cpu_startup_entry (kernel/sched/idle.c:395 (discriminator 1)) start_kernel (init/main.c:1048) secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:310) Modules linked in: udp_diag tcp_diag inet_diag nft_nat ipip tunnel4 dummy fou ip_tunnel nft_masq nft_chain_nat nf_nat wireguard nft_ct curve25519_x86_64 libcurve25519_generic nf_conntrack libchacha20poly1305 nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nft_objref chacha_x86_64 nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink poly1305_x86_64 ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel libchacha crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd glue_helper mousedev psmouse button ena ptp pps_core crc32c_intel CR2: 0000000000000008 Fixes: d92283e ("fou: change to use UDP socket GRO") Reported-by: Alphonse Kurian <alkurian@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240902173927.62706-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Chi Zhiling reported:
We found a null pointer accessing in tracefs[1], the reason is that the
variable 'ei_child' is set to LIST_POISON1, that means the list was
removed in eventfs_remove_rec. so when access the ei_child->is_freed, the
panic triggered.
by the way, the following script can reproduce this panic
loop1 (){
while true
do
echo "p:kp submit_bio" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
echo "" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
done
}
loop2 (){
while true
do
tree /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/
done
}
loop1 &
loop2
[1]:
[ 1147.959632][T17331] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead000000000150
[ 1147.968239][T17331] Mem abort info:
[ 1147.971739][T17331] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 1147.976172][T17331] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1147.982171][T17331] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1147.985906][T17331] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1147.989734][T17331] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 1147.995292][T17331] Data abort info:
[ 1147.998858][T17331] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 1148.005023][T17331] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 1148.010759][T17331] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 1148.016752][T17331] [dead000000000150] address between user and kernel address ranges
[ 1148.024571][T17331] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
[ 1148.030825][T17331] Modules linked in: team_mode_loadbalance team nlmon act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress bonding tls macvlan dummy ib_core bridge stp llc veth amdgpu amdxcp mfd_core gpu_sched drm_exec drm_buddy radeon crct10dif_ce video drm_suballoc_helper ghash_ce drm_ttm_helper sha2_ce ttm sha256_arm64 i2c_algo_bit sha1_ce sbsa_gwdt cp210x drm_display_helper cec sr_mod cdrom drm_kms_helper binfmt_misc sg loop fuse drm dm_mod nfnetlink ip_tables autofs4 [last unloaded: tls]
[ 1148.072808][T17331] CPU: 3 PID: 17331 Comm: ls Tainted: G W ------- ---- 6.6.43 #2
[ 1148.081751][T17331] Source Version: 21b3b386e948bedd29369af66f3e98ab01b1c650
[ 1148.088783][T17331] Hardware name: Greatwall GW-001M1A-FTF/GW-001M1A-FTF, BIOS KunLun BIOS V4.0 07/16/2020
[ 1148.098419][T17331] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 1148.106060][T17331] pc : eventfs_iterate+0x2c0/0x398
[ 1148.111017][T17331] lr : eventfs_iterate+0x2fc/0x398
[ 1148.115969][T17331] sp : ffff80008d56bbd0
[ 1148.119964][T17331] x29: ffff80008d56bbf0 x28: ffff001ff5be2600 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.127781][T17331] x26: ffff001ff52ca4e0 x25: 0000000000009977 x24: dead000000000100
[ 1148.135598][T17331] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 000000000000000b x21: ffff800082645f10
[ 1148.143415][T17331] x20: ffff001fddf87c70 x19: ffff80008d56bc90 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.151231][T17331] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff001ff52ca4e0
[ 1148.159048][T17331] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.166864][T17331] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffff8000804391d0
[ 1148.174680][T17331] x8 : 0000000180000000 x7 : 0000000000000018 x6 : 0000aaab04b92862
[ 1148.182498][T17331] x5 : 0000aaab04b92862 x4 : 0000000080000000 x3 : 0000000000000068
[ 1148.190314][T17331] x2 : 000000000000000f x1 : 0000000000007ea8 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 1148.198131][T17331] Call trace:
[ 1148.201259][T17331] eventfs_iterate+0x2c0/0x398
[ 1148.205864][T17331] iterate_dir+0x98/0x188
[ 1148.210036][T17331] __arm64_sys_getdents64+0x78/0x160
[ 1148.215161][T17331] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x108
[ 1148.219593][T17331] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
[ 1148.224977][T17331] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
[ 1148.228974][T17331] el0_svc+0x40/0x168
[ 1148.232798][T17331] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
[ 1148.237836][T17331] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
[ 1148.242182][T17331] Code: 54ffff6c f9400676 910006d6 f9000676 (b9405300)
[ 1148.248955][T17331] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The issue is that list_del() is used on an SRCU protected list variable
before the synchronization occurs. This can poison the list pointers while
there is a reader iterating the list.
This is simply fixed by using list_del_rcu() that is specifically made for
this purpose.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240829085025.3600021-1-chizhiling@163.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240904131605.640d42b1@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: 43aa6f9 ("eventfs: Get rid of dentry pointers without refcounts")
Reported-by: Chi Zhiling <chizhiling@kylinos.cn>
Tested-by: Chi Zhiling <chizhiling@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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The start_kthread() and stop_thread() code was not always called with the interface_lock held. This means that the kthread variable could be unexpectedly changed causing the kthread_stop() to be called on it when it should not have been, leading to: while true; do rtla timerlat top -u -q & PID=$!; sleep 5; kill -INT $PID; sleep 0.001; kill -TERM $PID; wait $PID; done Causing the following OOPS: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 885 Comm: timerlatu/5 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-test-00002-gbc754cc76d1b-dirty #125 a533010b71dab205ad2f507188ce8c82203b0254 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:hrtimer_active+0x58/0x300 Code: 48 c1 ee 03 41 54 48 01 d1 48 01 d6 55 53 48 83 ec 20 80 39 00 0f 85 30 02 00 00 49 8b 6f 30 4c 8d 75 10 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <0f> b6 3c 10 4c 89 f0 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 40 38 f8 7c 09 40 84 ff 0f RSP: 0018:ffff88811d97f940 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff88823c6b5b28 RCX: ffffed10478d6b6b RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: ffffed10478d6b6c RDI: ffff88823c6b5b28 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88823c6b5b58 R09: ffff88823c6b5b60 R10: ffff88811d97f957 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: 00000000000a801d R13: ffff88810d8b35d8 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffff88823c6b5b28 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88823c680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000561858ad7258 CR3: 000000007729e001 CR4: 0000000000170ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x40/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x154/0x230 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? hrtimer_active+0x58/0x300 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_locks_remove_file+0x10/0x10 hrtimer_cancel+0x15/0x40 timerlat_fd_release+0x8e/0x1f0 ? security_file_release+0x43/0x80 __fput+0x372/0xb10 task_work_run+0x11e/0x1f0 ? _raw_spin_lock+0x85/0xe0 ? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10 ? poison_slab_object+0x109/0x170 ? do_exit+0x7a0/0x24b0 do_exit+0x7bd/0x24b0 ? __pfx_migrate_enable+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_exit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_read_tsc+0x10/0x10 ? ktime_get+0x64/0x140 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x86/0xe0 do_group_exit+0xb0/0x220 get_signal+0x17ba/0x1b50 ? vfs_read+0x179/0xa40 ? timerlat_fd_read+0x30b/0x9d0 ? __pfx_get_signal+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_timerlat_fd_read+0x10/0x10 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x8c/0x570 ? __pfx_arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x10/0x10 ? vfs_read+0x179/0xa40 ? ksys_read+0xfe/0x1d0 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xbc/0x130 do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 ? fpregs_restore_userregs+0xdb/0x1e0 ? fpregs_restore_userregs+0xdb/0x1e0 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x116/0x130 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 ? do_syscall_64+0x74/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 RIP: 0033:0x7ff0070eca9c Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7ff0070eca72. RSP: 002b:00007ff006dff8c0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007ff0070eca9c RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 00007ff006dff9a0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ff006dffde0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ff000000ba0 R10: 00007ff007004b08 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 00007ff006dff9a0 R14: 0000000000000007 R15: 0000000000000008 </TASK> Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is because it would mistakenly call kthread_stop() on a user space thread making it "exit" before it actually exits. Since kthreads are created based on global behavior, use a cpumask to know when kthreads are running and that they need to be shutdown before proceeding to do new work. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240820130001.124768-1-tglozar@redhat.com/ This was debugged by using the persistent ring buffer: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240823013902.135036960@goodmis.org/ Note, locking was originally used to fix this, but that proved to cause too many deadlocks to work around: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240823102816.5e55753b@gandalf.local.home/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: "Luis Claudio R. Goncalves" <lgoncalv@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240904103428.08efdf4c@gandalf.local.home Fixes: e88ed22 ("tracing/timerlat: Add user-space interface") Reported-by: Tomas Glozar <tglozar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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Buffer 'card->dai_link' is reallocated in 'meson_card_reallocate_links()', so move 'pad' pointer initialization after this function when memory is already reallocated. Kasan bug report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in axg_card_add_link+0x76c/0x9bc Read of size 8 at addr ffff000000e8b260 by task modprobe/356 CPU: 0 PID: 356 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G O 6.9.12-sdkernel #1 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x94/0xec show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0x90 print_report+0xfc/0x5c0 kasan_report+0xb8/0xfc __asan_load8+0x9c/0xb8 axg_card_add_link+0x76c/0x9bc [snd_soc_meson_axg_sound_card] meson_card_probe+0x344/0x3b8 [snd_soc_meson_card_utils] platform_probe+0x8c/0xf4 really_probe+0x110/0x39c __driver_probe_device+0xb8/0x18c driver_probe_device+0x108/0x1d8 __driver_attach+0xd0/0x25c bus_for_each_dev+0xe0/0x154 driver_attach+0x34/0x44 bus_add_driver+0x134/0x294 driver_register+0xa8/0x1e8 __platform_driver_register+0x44/0x54 axg_card_pdrv_init+0x20/0x1000 [snd_soc_meson_axg_sound_card] do_one_initcall+0xdc/0x25c do_init_module+0x10c/0x334 load_module+0x24c4/0x26cc init_module_from_file+0xd4/0x128 __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x1f4/0x41c invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x78/0x13c do_el0_svc+0x30/0x40 el0_svc+0x38/0x78 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x12c el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Fixes: 7864a79 ("ASoC: meson: add axg sound card support") Cc: Stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arseniy Krasnov <avkrasnov@salutedevices.com> Reviewed-by: Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240911142425.598631-1-avkrasnov@salutedevices.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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Marc Hartmayer reported:
[ 23.133876] Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference in virtual kernel address space
[ 23.133950] Failing address: 0000000000000000 TEID: 0000000000000483
[ 23.133954] Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.
[ 23.133957] AS:000000001b8f0007 R3:0000000056cf4007 S:0000000056cf3800 P:000000000000003d
[ 23.134207] Oops: 0004 ilc:2 [#1] SMP
(snip)
[ 23.134516] Call Trace:
[ 23.134520] [<0000024e326caf28>] worker_thread+0x48/0x430
[ 23.134525] ([<0000024e326caf18>] worker_thread+0x38/0x430)
[ 23.134528] [<0000024e326d3a3e>] kthread+0x11e/0x130
[ 23.134533] [<0000024e3264b0dc>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[ 23.134536] [<0000024e333fb37a>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x38
[ 23.134552] Last Breaking-Event-Address:
[ 23.134553] [<0000024e333f4c04>] mutex_unlock+0x24/0x30
[ 23.134562] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops
With debuging and analysis, worker_thread() accesses to the nullified
worker->pool when the newly created worker is destroyed before being
waken-up, in which case worker_thread() can see the result detach_worker()
reseting worker->pool to NULL at the begining.
Move the code "worker->pool = NULL;" out from detach_worker() to fix the
problem.
worker->pool had been designed to be constant for regular workers and
changeable for rescuer. To share attaching/detaching code for regular
and rescuer workers and to avoid worker->pool being accessed inadvertently
when the worker has been detached, worker->pool is reset to NULL when
detached no matter the worker is rescuer or not.
To maintain worker->pool being reset after detached, move the code
"worker->pool = NULL;" in the worker thread context after detached.
It is either be in the regular worker thread context after PF_WQ_WORKER
is cleared or in rescuer worker thread context with wq_pool_attach_mutex
held. So it is safe to do so.
Cc: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87wmjj971b.fsf@linux.ibm.com/
Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: f4b7b53 ("workqueue: Detach workers directly in idle_cull_fn()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.11+
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following batch contains two fixes from Florian Westphal: Patch #1 fixes a sk refcount leak in nft_socket on mismatch. Patch #2 fixes cgroupsv2 matching from containers due to incorrect level in subtree. netfilter pull request 24-09-12 * tag 'nf-24-09-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nft_socket: make cgroupsv2 matching work with namespaces netfilter: nft_socket: fix sk refcount leaks ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240911222520.3606-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Sep 18, 2024
…_module_init() Move nf flowtable bpf initialization in nf_flow_table module load routine since nf_flow_table_bpf is part of nf_flow_table module and not nf_flow_table_inet one. This patch allows to avoid the following kernel warning running the reproducer below: $modprobe nf_flow_table_inet $rmmod nf_flow_table_inet $modprobe nf_flow_table_inet modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'nf_flow_table_inet': Invalid argument [ 184.081501] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 184.081527] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1362 at kernel/bpf/btf.c:8206 btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081550] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1362 Comm: modprobe Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.11.0-0.rc5.22.el10.x86_64 #1 [ 184.081553] Hardware name: Red Hat OpenStack Compute, BIOS 1.14.0-1.module+el8.4.0+8855+a9e237a9 04/01/2014 [ 184.081554] RIP: 0010:btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081558] RSP: 0018:ff22cfb38071fc90 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 184.081559] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 184.081560] RDX: 000000000000006e RSI: ffffffff95c00000 RDI: ff13805543436350 [ 184.081561] RBP: ffffffffc0e22180 R08: ff13805543410808 R09: 000000000001ec00 [ 184.081562] R10: ff13805541c8113c R11: 0000000000000010 R12: ff13805541b83c00 [ 184.081563] R13: ff13805543410800 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffffffc0e2259a [ 184.081564] FS: 00007fa436c46740(0000) GS:ff1380557ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 184.081569] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 184.081570] CR2: 000055e7b3187000 CR3: 0000000100c48003 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 [ 184.081571] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 184.081572] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 184.081572] PKRU: 55555554 [ 184.081574] Call Trace: [ 184.081575] <TASK> [ 184.081578] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0 [ 184.081580] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0 [ 184.081582] ? __register_btf_kfunc_id_set+0x199/0x200 [ 184.081585] ? btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081586] ? __warn.cold+0x93/0xed [ 184.081590] ? btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081592] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140 [ 184.081594] ? handle_bug+0x3a/0x70 [ 184.081596] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 [ 184.081597] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 184.081601] ? btf_populate_kfunc_set+0x23c/0x330 [ 184.081602] __register_btf_kfunc_id_set+0x199/0x200 [ 184.081605] ? __pfx_nf_flow_inet_module_init+0x10/0x10 [nf_flow_table_inet] [ 184.081607] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300 [ 184.081611] do_init_module+0x60/0x230 [ 184.081614] __do_sys_init_module+0x17a/0x1b0 [ 184.081617] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160 [ 184.081620] ? __count_memcg_events+0x58/0xf0 [ 184.081623] ? handle_mm_fault+0x234/0x350 [ 184.081626] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x347/0x640 [ 184.081630] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80 [ 184.081633] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80 [ 184.081634] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80 [ 184.081637] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 184.081639] RIP: 0033:0x7fa43652e4ce [ 184.081647] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8213be18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af [ 184.081649] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e7b3176c20 RCX: 00007fa43652e4ce [ 184.081650] RDX: 000055e7737fde79 RSI: 0000000000003990 RDI: 000055e7b3185380 [ 184.081651] RBP: 000055e7737fde79 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 000055e7b3179bd0 [ 184.081651] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000 [ 184.081652] R13: 000055e7b3176fa0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055e7b3179b80 Fixes: 391bb65 ("netfilter: Add bpf_xdp_flow_lookup kfunc") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240911-nf-flowtable-bpf-modprob-fix-v1-1-f9fc075aafc3@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
rodrigovivi
pushed a commit
that referenced
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Sep 18, 2024
We can't allow spam in CI. Update 26th June 2018: This is still an issue: Update 23rd May 2019: You guessed it, still ocurring. [ 224.739686] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 224.739712] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2982 at net/sched/sch_generic.c:461 dev_watchdog+0x1fd/0x210 [ 224.739714] Modules linked in: vgem snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_pcm i915 asix usbnet mii mei_me mei prime_numbers i2c_hid pinctrl_sunrisepoint pinctrl_intel btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic [ 224.739775] CPU: 3 PID: 2982 Comm: gem_exec_suspen Tainted: G U W 4.18.0-rc2-CI-Patchwork_9414+ #1 [ 224.739777] Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9350/, BIOS 1.4.12 11/30/2016 [ 224.739780] RIP: 0010:dev_watchdog+0x1fd/0x210 [ 224.739781] Code: 49 63 4c 24 f0 eb 92 4c 89 ef c6 05 21 46 ad 00 01 e8 77 ee fc ff 89 d9 48 89 c2 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 88 4c 14 82 e8 a3 fe 84 ff <0f> 0b eb be 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 c7 47 [ 224.739866] RSP: 0018:ffff88027dd83e40 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 224.739869] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000102 [ 224.739871] RDX: 0000000080000102 RSI: ffffffff820c8c6c RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 224.739873] RBP: ffff8802644c1540 R08: 0000000071be9b33 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 224.739874] R10: ffff88027dd83dc0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8802644c1588 [ 224.739876] R13: ffff8802644c1160 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff88026a5dc728 [ 224.739878] FS: 00007f18f4887980(0000) GS:ffff88027dd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 224.739880] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 224.739881] CR2: 00007f4c627ae548 CR3: 000000022ca1a002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 224.739883] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 224.739885] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 224.739886] Call Trace: [ 224.739888] <IRQ> [ 224.739892] ? qdisc_reset+0xe0/0xe0 [ 224.739894] ? qdisc_reset+0xe0/0xe0 [ 224.739897] call_timer_fn+0x93/0x360 [ 224.739903] expire_timers+0xc1/0x1d0 [ 224.739908] run_timer_softirq+0xc7/0x170 [ 224.739916] __do_softirq+0xd9/0x505 [ 224.739923] irq_exit+0xa9/0xc0 [ 224.739926] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x9c/0x2d0 [ 224.739929] apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 [ 224.739931] </IRQ> [ 224.739934] RIP: 0010:delay_tsc+0x2e/0xb0 [ 224.739936] Code: 49 89 fc 55 53 bf 01 00 00 00 e8 6d 2c 78 ff e8 88 9d b6 ff 41 89 c5 0f ae e8 0f 31 48 c1 e2 20 48 09 c2 48 89 d5 eb 16 f3 90 <bf> 01 00 00 00 e8 48 2c 78 ff e8 63 9d b6 ff 44 39 e8 75 36 0f ae [ 224.740021] RSP: 0018:ffffc900002f7d48 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 [ 224.740024] RAX: 0000000080000000 RBX: 0000000649565ca9 RCX: 0000000000000001 [ 224.740026] RDX: 0000000080000001 RSI: ffffffff820c8c6c RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 224.740027] RBP: 00000006493ea9ce R08: 000000005e81e2ee R09: 0000000000000000 [ 224.740029] R10: 0000000000000120 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000002ad8d6 [ 224.740030] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: ffff88025caf5408 [ 224.740040] ? delay_tsc+0x66/0xb0 [ 224.740045] hibernation_debug_sleep+0x1c/0x30 [ 224.740048] hibernation_snapshot+0x2c1/0x690 [ 224.740053] hibernate+0x142/0x2a4 [ 224.740057] state_store+0xd0/0xe0 [ 224.740063] kernfs_fop_write+0x104/0x190 [ 224.740068] __vfs_write+0x31/0x180 [ 224.740072] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6f/0x80 [ 224.740075] ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x29/0x50 [ 224.740078] ? __sb_start_write+0x152/0x1f0 [ 224.740080] ? __sb_start_write+0x168/0x1f0 [ 224.740084] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1a0 [ 224.740088] ksys_write+0x50/0xc0 [ 224.740094] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x190 [ 224.740097] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 224.740099] RIP: 0033:0x7f18f400a281 [ 224.740100] Code: c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 05 59 8d 20 00 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 8b 05 8a d1 20 00 85 c0 75 16 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 57 f3 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 49 89 d4 53 [ 224.740186] RSP: 002b:00007fffd1f4fec8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 224.740189] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f18f400a281 [ 224.740190] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 00007f18f448069a RDI: 0000000000000006 [ 224.740192] RBP: 00007fffd1f4fef0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 224.740194] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055e795d03400 [ 224.740195] R13: 00007fffd1f50500 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 224.740205] irq event stamp: 1582591 [ 224.740207] hardirqs last enabled at (1582590): [<ffffffff810f9f9c>] vprintk_emit+0x4bc/0x4d0 [ 224.740210] hardirqs last disabled at (1582591): [<ffffffff81a0111c>] error_entry+0x7c/0x100 [ 224.740212] softirqs last enabled at (1582568): [<ffffffff81c0034f>] __do_softirq+0x34f/0x505 [ 224.740215] softirqs last disabled at (1582571): [<ffffffff8108c959>] irq_exit+0xa9/0xc0 [ 224.740218] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2982 at net/sched/sch_generic.c:461 dev_watchdog+0x1fd/0x210 [ 224.740219] ---[ end trace 6e41d690e611c338 ]--- References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8037 References: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196399 Acked-by: Martin Peres <martin.peres@linux.intel.com> Cc: Martin Peres <martin.peres@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170718082110.12524-1-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
rodrigovivi
pushed a commit
that referenced
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Sep 18, 2024
If the MSI is already enabled, trying to enable it again results in an -EINVAL and on the first attempt a WARN. That WARN causes our CI to abort the run [on each first attempt to suspend]: <4> [463.142025] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2225 at drivers/pci/msi.c:1074 __pci_enable_msi_range+0x3cb/0x420 <4> [463.142026] Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel i915 snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic mei_hdcp x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul snd_intel_dspcfg ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_codec btusb btrtl btbcm btintel e1000e bluetooth snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ptp ecdh_generic snd_pcm ecc pps_core mei_me mei prime_numbers [last unloaded: i915] <4> [463.142045] CPU: 0 PID: 2225 Comm: kworker/u8:14 Tainted: G U 5.7.0-rc2-CI-CI_DRM_8350+ #1 <4> [463.142046] Hardware name: Intel Corporation NUC7i5BNH/NUC7i5BNB, BIOS BNKBL357.86A.0060.2017.1214.2013 12/14/2017 <4> [463.142049] Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn <4> [463.142051] RIP: 0010:__pci_enable_msi_range+0x3cb/0x420 <4> [463.142053] Code: 76 58 49 8d 56 48 48 89 df e8 31 73 fd ff e9 20 fe ff ff 31 f6 48 89 df e8 c2 e9 fd ff e9 d6 fe ff ff 45 89 fc e9 1a ff ff ff <0f> 0b 41 bc ea ff ff ff e9 0d ff ff ff 41 bc ea ff ff ff e9 02 ff <4> [463.142054] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000593cd0 EFLAGS: 00010202 <4> [463.142056] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: ffff888274051000 RCX: 0000000000000000 <4> [463.142057] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff888274051000 <4> [463.142058] RBP: ffff888238aa1018 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 <4> [463.142060] R10: ffffc90000593d90 R11: 00000000c79cdfd5 R12: ffff8882740510b0 <4> [463.142061] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001 <4> [463.142062] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888276c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 <4> [463.142064] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 <4> [463.142065] CR2: 000055706f347d80 CR3: 0000000005610003 CR4: 00000000003606f0 <4> [463.142066] Call Trace: <4> [463.142073] pci_enable_msi+0x11/0x20 <4> [463.142077] azx_resume+0x1ab/0x200 [snd_hda_intel] <4> [463.142080] ? pci_pm_thaw+0x80/0x80 <4> [463.142084] dpm_run_callback+0x64/0x280 <4> [463.142089] device_resume+0xd4/0x1c0 <4> [463.142093] ? dpm_watchdog_set+0x60/0 While this would appear to be a bug in snd-hda, it does appear inconsequential, at least for gfx-ci. Downgrade the warning to an info, like the other already-enabled error for MSI-X. References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8041 Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/1687 Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200423082753.3899018-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
rodrigovivi
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Sep 18, 2024
We inadvertently create a dependency on mmap_sem with a whole chain. This breaks any user who wants to take a lock and call rcu_barrier(), while also taking that lock inside mmap_sem: <4> [604.892532] ====================================================== <4> [604.892534] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected <4> [604.892536] 5.6.0-rc7-CI-Patchwork_17096+ #1 Tainted: G U <4> [604.892537] ------------------------------------------------------ <4> [604.892538] kms_frontbuffer/2595 is trying to acquire lock: <4> [604.892540] ffffffff8264a558 (rcu_state.barrier_mutex){+.+.}, at: rcu_barrier+0x23/0x190 <4> [604.892547] but task is already holding lock: <4> [604.892547] ffff888484716050 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: i915_gem_object_pin_to_display_plane+0x89/0x270 [i915] <4> [604.892592] which lock already depends on the new lock. <4> [604.892593] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: <4> [604.892594] -> #6 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}: <4> [604.892597] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.15+0xc3/0x1090 <4> [604.892598] ww_mutex_lock+0x39/0x70 <4> [604.892600] dma_resv_lockdep+0x10e/0x1f5 <4> [604.892602] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300 <4> [604.892604] kernel_init_freeable+0x17b/0x1dc <4> [604.892605] kernel_init+0x5/0x100 <4> [604.892606] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [604.892607] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}: <4> [604.892609] dma_resv_lockdep+0xec/0x1f5 <4> [604.892610] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300 <4> [604.892610] kernel_init_freeable+0x17b/0x1dc <4> [604.892611] kernel_init+0x5/0x100 <4> [604.892612] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [604.892613] -> #4 (&mm->mmap_sem#2){++++}: <4> [604.892615] __might_fault+0x63/0x90 <4> [604.892617] _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80 <4> [604.892619] perf_read+0x200/0x2b0 <4> [604.892621] vfs_read+0x96/0x160 <4> [604.892622] ksys_read+0x9f/0xe0 <4> [604.892623] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x220 <4> [604.892624] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe <4> [604.892625] -> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}: <4> [604.892626] __mutex_lock+0x9a/0x9c0 <4> [604.892627] perf_event_init_cpu+0xa4/0x140 <4> [604.892629] perf_event_init+0x19d/0x1cd <4> [604.892630] start_kernel+0x362/0x4e4 <4> [604.892631] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 <4> [604.892631] -> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}: <4> [604.892633] __mutex_lock+0x9a/0x9c0 <4> [604.892633] perf_event_init_cpu+0x6b/0x140 <4> [604.892635] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x9b/0x9d0 <4> [604.892636] _cpu_up+0xa2/0x140 <4> [604.892637] do_cpu_up+0x61/0xa0 <4> [604.892639] smp_init+0x57/0x96 <4> [604.892639] kernel_init_freeable+0x87/0x1dc <4> [604.892640] kernel_init+0x5/0x100 <4> [604.892642] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [604.892642] -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}: <4> [604.892643] cpus_read_lock+0x34/0xd0 <4> [604.892644] rcu_barrier+0xaa/0x190 <4> [604.892645] kernel_init+0x21/0x100 <4> [604.892647] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [604.892647] -> #0 (rcu_state.barrier_mutex){+.+.}: <4> [604.892649] __lock_acquire+0x1328/0x15d0 <4> [604.892650] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x1c0 <4> [604.892651] __mutex_lock+0x9a/0x9c0 <4> [604.892652] rcu_barrier+0x23/0x190 <4> [604.892680] i915_gem_object_unbind+0x29d/0x3f0 [i915] <4> [604.892707] i915_gem_object_pin_to_display_plane+0x141/0x270 [i915] <4> [604.892737] intel_pin_and_fence_fb_obj+0xec/0x1f0 [i915] <4> [604.892767] intel_plane_pin_fb+0x3f/0xd0 [i915] <4> [604.892797] intel_prepare_plane_fb+0x13b/0x5c0 [i915] <4> [604.892798] drm_atomic_helper_prepare_planes+0x85/0x110 <4> [604.892827] intel_atomic_commit+0xda/0x390 [i915] <4> [604.892828] drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x57/0xa0 <4> [604.892830] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x1c4/0x720 <4> [604.892830] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb0/0xf0 <4> [604.892831] drm_ioctl+0x2e1/0x390 <4> [604.892833] ksys_ioctl+0x7b/0x90 <4> [604.892835] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x11/0x20 <4> [604.892835] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x220 <4> [604.892836] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe <4> [604.892837] Changes since v1: - Use (*values)[n++] in perf_read_one(). Changes since v2: - Centrally allocate values. References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/8042 Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200502171413.9133-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
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Bumps idna from 3.4 to 3.7.
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1d365e1Release v3.7c1b3154Merge pull request #172 from kjd/optimize-contextj0394ec7Merge branch 'master' into optimize-contextjcd58a23Merge pull request #152 from elliotwutingfeng/dev5beb28bMore efficient resolution of joiner contexts1b12148Update ossf/scorecard-action to v2.3.1d516b87Update Github actions/checkout to v4c095c75Merge branch 'master' into dev60a0a4cFix typo in GitHub Actions workflow key5918a0eMerge branch 'master' into devDependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting
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